Federal Court of Australia

Thompson v Lane (No 3) [2026] FCA 766

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The interlocutory application lodged by Ms Emma Thompson on 3 June 2026 be dismissed with costs.

2. Pursuant to s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), no further material be accepted for filing without leave by any party to QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 until further order of the Court.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER J:

1 On 3 June 2026, the applicant, Ms Thompson, sent an email to the Queensland Registry of the Federal Court (Registry), requesting that the Registry file an interlocutory application (the interlocutory application) and accompanying affidavit sworn on 26 May 2026 in QUD 447 of 2023. I note that proceedings QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 have been joined and are being run together.

2 On 3 March 2026 I listed proceedings QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 for case management hearing at 9.15am on 17 June 2026 to seek the parties’ views in respect of next steps in the proceedings, noting the hearing listed for 16 July 2026.

3 The interlocutory application and accompanying affidavit were lodged by the Registry on Ms Thompson’s behalf and at her request, and accepted for filing by the Registry on the morning of 17 June 2026.

4 In the interlocutory application Ms Thompson sought both interim and final relief.

5 The interim relief which Ms Thompson sought was as follows:

(1) That the substantive proceeding QUD447 of 2023, and the associated proceedings QUD176 of 2024 and QUD490 of 2025, be delisted and stayed until the final determination of this set aside application.

(2) That a judge of the Federal Court that is independent of the primary judge decision maker determine this Application.

6 The final relief which Ms Thompson sought was as follows:

(3) The Interlocutory Decision of Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(4) Order 1 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(5) Order 2 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(6) Order 3 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(7) Order 4 in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 is set aside.

(8) An Order that the respondent is to cease to act, or purport to act, as the trustee of the Applicant’s estate or to undertake an administration pertaining thereto.

(9) An Order that the Federal Court determine the proven debts in the Applicant’s bankrupt estate as of the date of the Applicant’s bankruptcy.

(10) An Order that within 7 days of the decision the respondent is to;

(a) cause the transfer back into the Applicant’s name, of the Title of the real property at 3/40 Glen Road, Toowong in the State of Queensland; and

(b) transfer the $523,528 held in trust since 2 July 2023 into the Applicant’s nominated bank account; and

(c) provide in writing to the Applicant, pursuant to s.65-25 and 70‐56 of Schedule 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966:

(i) copies of all written communications, and File Notes of all oral communications, to and from, all creditors and all other persons, pertaining to the Applicant’s bankruptcy; and

(ii) evidence of all steps taken to administer the Applicant’s bankrupt estate as efficiently as possible by avoiding unnecessary and unreasonable expenses; and

(iii) a comprehensive settlement statement and account to the Applicant for the proceeds of sale of the property at 16 Aaron Avenue, Hawthorne in the State of Queensland and all steps taken prior to the sale to determine if there was a debt to be paid from the sale proceeds; and

(iv) evidence of the respondent’s determination of all amounts paid from funds held in trust; and

(v) evidence (receipts) of all payments made from the bankrupt’s estate.

(11) An Order that the Federal Court conduct a review of the trustee’s administration of the Applicant’s bankrupt estate.

(12) Further Orders that the Honourable Court deems fit.

(13) Costs of the proceeding.

7 Materially, in her supporting affidavit, Ms Thompson deposed, in summary:

The trustee has not accounted to her for the difference between the sale price of real property in Hawthorne, Queensland and the amount deposited into trust;

She became homeless due to the trustee’s conduct;

She made an annulment application in respect of her bankruptcy; and

The trustee improperly continued acting in respect of her estate notwithstanding her discharge from bankruptcy.

background TO THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS

8 On 24 October 2024, I delivered judgment in Thompson v Lane [2024] FCA 1234 (the 2024 decision). In that decision I made the following orders:

1. The interim order sought by the applicant in the originating application filed on 17 October 2023 be refused.

2. The interim application filed on 13 December 2023 be dismissed.

3. The further relief sought by the applicant pursuant to submissions filed on 6 February 2024 be refused.

4. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to these interlocutory proceedings on a party-party basis.

9 Ms Thompson sought an extension of time to appeal, and leave to appeal, the 2024 decision. Both applications were refused by the Court in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951, for reasons that included that there was no reasonable prospect of success in respect of her grounds of appeal.

10 On 10 September 2025, Ms Thompson filed interlocutory applications in QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 which sought that I recuse myself from all three proceedings on the basis of actual and/or apprehended bias, and that the 2024 decision be set aside. I delivered judgment (Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86) on 13 February 2026. I made the following orders:

1. The interlocutory applications lodged by Ms Thompson on 10 September 2025 in proceedings QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 (interlocutory applications) be dismissed.

2. Ms Thompson pay the costs of the respondent to the interlocutory applications of and incidental to the interlocutory applications, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

11 The proceedings QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 have been listed for final hearing on 16 July 2026. The following case management orders to take these matters to trial were made on 2 March 2026:

1. By 4.00pm on 20 March 2026 (Brisbane time), Ms Thompson file any further affidavit material in relation to all three proceedings.

2. By 4:00pm on 2 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Mr Lane file any further affidavit material in relation to all three proceedings.

3. By 4:00pm on 10 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Ms Thompson file single submissions in relation to all three proceedings (limited to 10 pages).

4. By 4:00pm on 21 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Mr Lane file single submissions in relation to all proceedings (limited to 10 pages).

5. By 4:00pm on 28 April 2026 (Brisbane time), Ms Thompson file single submissions in reply in relation to all proceedings (limited to 5 pages).

6. All matters be listed together for a one (1) day hearing at the earliest available date after 28 April 2026, to be administratively advised. Costs be reserved.

12 Ms Thompson has now lodged the interlocutory application dated 3 June 2026.

THIS MORNING’S HEARING

13 At the case management hearing this morning Ms Thompson appeared in person. The respondent, Mr Lane, was represented by Counsel.

14 I invited Ms Thompson to address the Court in respect of the interlocutory application. Ms Thompson submitted, in summary:

The 2024 decision must be set aside and cannot be relied on at the hearing of 16 July 2026;

Ms Thompson relied on the contents of the interlocutory application; and

The oral submissions of Counsel for Mr Lane made in Court this morning were incorrect.

15 Counsel for Mr Lane submitted, in summary:

The relief sought by Ms Thompson in the interlocutory application reflected the relief already sought in QUD 447 of 2023;

There have already been orders made pursuant to an application by Ms Thompson that I recuse myself for bias; and

All of the matters within the final relief of the interlocutory application can be dealt with at the hearing on 16 July 2026.

Consideration

16 After hearing the parties this morning, I considered it appropriate that the interlocutory application before me be dismissed forthwith without further hearing. My reasons for doing so were as follows.

17 Relevantly Ms Thompson claimed that, in the 2024 decision, I acted on an erroneous factual and legal basis, misunderstood the law and disregarded available evidence.

18 I am not prepared to make any of the orders sought by Ms Thompson in the interlocutory application seeking that the 2024 decision be set aside, namely referable to paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.  Ms Thompson sought leave to appeal the 2024 decision, but, as I noted earlier in these reasons, that leave was refused by another Judge of this Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. No basis of merit has been advanced for me to, in essence, go behind the decision of this Court in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951 and set aside the 2024 decision. I further note in any event that the interlocutory application reprises the same issues Ms Thompson sought to raise in her interlocutory application lodged on 10 September 2025, which I dismissed on 13 February 2026. The relief Ms Thompson has sought in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 has no prospects of success, or has already been litigated.

19 In paragraph 2 of the interlocutory application Ms Thompson sought an order that a Judge other than myself hear the interlocutory application. Although Ms Thompson has not specifically so pleaded, or explained the basis on which she has sought this relief, I understand that Ms Thompson has sought that I recuse myself from hearing the interlocutory application.

20 I note that I addressed Ms Thompson’s earlier application that I recuse myself in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86. To my knowledge that judgment remains undisturbed. In the circumstances no reasons have been advanced for me to revisit my decision in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2026] FCA 86.

21 Further, the final relief Ms Thompson sought in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the interlocutory application essentially replicates relief she has sought in other proceedings currently before the Court. Specifically:

Paragraph 8, whereby Ms Thompson seeks “An Order that the respondent is to cease to act, or purport to act, as the trustee of the Applicant’s estate or to undertake an administration pertaining thereto” replicates an order sought by Ms Thompson in her originating application in QUD 447 of 2023, which is going to trial on 16 July 2026. I further note that Ms Thompson sought an equivalent order in her interim application filed on 13 December 2023, which I have already refused in the 2024 decision.

Paragraph 9 of Ms Thompson’s interlocutory application seeks reopening of her bankruptcy and a “determination of proven debts” in her bankruptcy by the Federal Court. Ms Thompson’s debts in her bankruptcy have long been determined. Specifically, Ms Thompson has already filed proceedings in respect of the original sequestration orders against her estate and her bankruptcy, and that issue was determined by Justice Logan in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) (No 3) [2022] FCA 128. Ms Thompson’s appeal against the decision of Justice Logan was dismissed in Thompson v Lane (Trustee) [2023] FCAFC 32. There is no basis on which I can redetermine findings in those judgments. Further, to the extent that Ms Thompson seeks for any particular debts to be re-examined – including on the basis that she was never insolvent – such relief appears to be covered by her application in QUD 447 of 2023, which is listed for trial on 16 July 2026.

Paragraph 10, whereby Ms Thompson seeks orders including that property and monies be transferred back to her, is the subject of the proceedings in QUD 490 of 2025, which is listed for hearing on 16 July 2026.

22 Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the interlocutory application accordingly add nothing to the relief Ms Thompson has sought in her existing applications, which are due to be heard in July 2026.

23 Finally, in paragraph 11 of her interlocutory application Ms Thompson sought “An Order that the Federal Court conduct a review of the trustee’s administration of the Applicant’s bankrupt estate.” Although Ms Thompson referred generally to “multiple provisions in the Act [which] provide for a “review” of decisions including section 104”, it appears that Ms Thompson relied only on s 104(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) which provides that:

Subject to the power of the Court to extend the time, an application under this section to review a decision shall not be heard by the Court unless it was made within 21 days from the date on which the decision was made.

24 Section 104(3) refers to s 104(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, which in turn refers back to s 102(1), (3) or (4). Those sections concern admission or rejection of proofs of debt (s 102(1)), wrongful admission of a proof of debt (s 102(3)), and wrongful rejection of a proof of debt (s 102(4)).

25 In the present case it is unclear:

In respect of which decision (if any) Ms Thompson sought review in paragraph 11 of her interlocutory application; or

Whether Ms Thompson sought an extension of time for the conduct of any such review (although I note that Ms Thompson referred to s 33(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act which confers a discretion on the part of the Court to extend time). Although Ms Thompson referred to s 33(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, no application has been made by her to the Court to extend time for review of any decision of the Trustee, such as to enliven the Court’s powers under s 104 of the Bankruptcy Act.

26 In my view paragraph 11 of the interlocutory application is so vague as not to plead any relief which the Court is empowered to order.

Conclusion

27 Ms Thompson has sought to either relitigate issues already determined by the Court, or duplicate relief which is already the subject of proceedings in this Court which are due to go to trial next month. In respect of Ms Thompson’s application for review of the trustee’s “administration of the Applicant’s bankrupt estate”, the relief she has sought is unarticulated by reference to any particular decision or aspect of the trustee’s conduct, such that the powers of the Court are not enlivened (even if time had not expired).

28 In my view, the interlocutory application has no merit and should be dismissed with costs.

29 As I have noted in the course of these reasons, the three sets of proceedings filed by Ms Thompson have been listed for hearing on 16 July 2026. Case management orders were made on 2 March 2026 to take the three proceedings to trial, and I understand that there has been compliance with those orders by the parties.

30 In that light, I am concerned that further material may be filed with the intentional effect of disrupting the orderly progress of QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025 to trial on 16 July 2026. I am concerned that any such filings would cause the incurring of costs unnecessarily, and the unwarranted use of Court time. In this context I note comments of Steward J in In the matter of an application by Rakesh Lal for leave to issue or file [2025] HCASJ 8 at [11].

31 Noting that the three matters are proceeding to trial in only a calendar month, I consider that, in the interests of justice pursuant to r 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and as well as efficiency under s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), it is appropriate for me to order that no further material be accepted for filing without leave in any of QUD 447 of 2023, QUD 176 of 2024 and QUD 490 of 2025, by any party to those proceedings, until further order of the Court.

Associate:

Dated:    17 June 2026