Federal Court of Australia

Groom v National Registrar Federal Court of Australia [2026] FCA 720

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application is allowed.

2.    Subject to these orders, the documents with lodgement identification number 1571969 (Documents) be accepted for filing.

3.    The order in paragraph 2 does not preclude a party from seeking orders that the proceeding commenced by the filing of the Documents be stayed, struck out or summarily dismissed for any reason.

4.     At or before the time of service of the sealed Documents, the applicant is to serve upon the State of South Australia a copy of these orders and the reasons for judgment published today.

5.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

1    On 20 November 2025 the applicant, Mr Stephen Groom, attempted to commence a proceeding in this Court by lodging in the South Australia Registry a proposed originating application, a proposed statement of claim and an affidavit (together the Documents). The Documents were accompanied by a letter of the same date by which Mr Groom sought to have the proposed proceeding heard and determined urgently. On the Court’s record, the Documents and the accompanying letter were given the lodgement identification number 1571969.

2    A Registrar refused to accept the Documents for filing in the exercise of a power conferred by r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). It provides:

2.26     Refusal to accept document for filing—abuse of process or frivolous or vexatious documents

A Registrar may refuse to accept a document (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious:

(a)    on the face of the document; or

(b)    by reference to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document.

3    In the proposed proceeding, Mr Groom sought relief against the State of South Australia, including an award of damages in the amount of $25 million. The Registrar refused to accept the Documents for filing for the following written reasons:

The Documents seek the issue of administrative law writs against the State of South Australia in relation to decisions or conduct of the Magistrates Court of South Australia, as well as other bodies in the South Australian legal system over the course of the last fourteen years. Whilst it is not immediately clear on the face of the material, the substance of your dispute seems to stem from an intervention order issued by the Magistrates Court in 2011. In addition to the administrative law writes, the Documents seek compensation in the sum of $25 million.

I note that the Form 66 - Judicial Review Application is a form used to seek relief under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). The Documents do not identify the legislative basis upon which the writs have been sought but I have proceeded on the basis they have been sought under the ADJR Act. That act applies to administrative decisions that are made ‘by a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth’: see s 3, ADJR Act. Neither of the Magistrates Court of South Australia or the State of South Australia is a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, a decision of the Magistrates Court in the issuing of an intervention order, and of any superior court reviewing that decision, are judicial decisions and plainly not susceptible to ADJR Act review.

4    The Registrar went on to say that the proceeding sought to be commenced by Mr Groom was doomed to fail and hence constituted an abuse of process. The Registrar further concluded that the compensation sought by Mr Groom was “arbitrary, without substance and fanciful, and otherwise made without reference to any jurisdictional basis for such relief”, such that the Documents were frivolous and vexatious.

5    This is Mr Groom’s application for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision. The Registrar submitted to the outcome (save as to costs) and did not participate in the hearing.

6    For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review will be allowed.

THE DOCUMENTS

7    The proposed originating application names the State of South Australia as the respondent. As the Registrar identified, it is in Form 66 (being the form prescribed under r 31.01(1) of the Rules for the commencement for an application for review of a decision under s 11(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act)) and is structured in five parts.

8    Part 1 is an introduction. It is to the effect that Mr Groom:

(1)    sought “judicial review and damages” in relation to an intervention order “purportedly issued on 19 October 2011 by the Adelaide Magistrates Court” (emphasis in original) in a specified action;

(2)    contended that the intervention order was void ab initio because there was no originating complaint, such that no “matter” existed and the Magistrates Court therefore lacked jurisdiction;

(3)    alleged that he was unlawfully detained and subjected to “ongoing enforcement for a total of 5,144 days [ongoing]” (emphasis in original);

(4)    alleged that he has suffered severe personal, financial and reputational harm; and

(5)    relied upon Chapter III of the Constitution, the principles stated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 280 CLR 137 and “[c]ommon law principles of jurisdiction and procedural fairness”.

9    Part 2 of the proposed originating application contains a chronology of events commencing with the issue of the intervention order on 19 October 2011 “without complainant”, and including the enforcement of the intervention order in 2012-2013 resulting in Mr Groom’s detention. The chronology refers to proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia, the nature of which is unclear. There is a reference in the chronology to a “vexatious litigant trial” and various references to missing evidence, wrongdoing on the part of the police and an allegation that the “CSO” (understood to be the Crown Solicitor’s Office) conceded that there was no original complaint supporting the intervention order.

10    Part 3 of the proposed originating application is titled “Grounds for Relief”. It contains five grounds. The first is an allegation that the Magistrates Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the intervention order because no complaint had been sworn or filed, there was no “matter” as required by Chapter III of the Constitution and the judicial power of the Magistrates Court had not been invoked. As a consequence, the intervention order is said to be void ab initio. The second and third grounds are to the effect that Mr Groom’s detention was an act of unlawful detention by the Executive branch of the government in violation of the principles discussed in Kable and NZYQ. The fourth ground alleges procedural unfairness and misfeasance. It includes allegations that police, prosecutors and the Crown Solicitor’s Office knew that no original complaint existed, ignored subpoenas and that “[e]vidence went missing from the court file for years”. The conduct is said to constitute an abuse of process, misfeasance in public office, procedural unfairness and a breach of natural justice. The fifth ground alleges that there has been continuous enforcement of the intervention order including detention on remand on two occasions totalling five weeks, overnight detention in cells, home detention and “[r]estrictions and legal proceedings based on a void order”. By that ground Mr Groom alleges that he has suffered “personal, financial and reputational harm” and that he seeks “damages of not less than $25,000,000”.

11    The relief sought is detailed in Part 4 of the proposed originating application. It includes a declaration that the intervention order was void ab initio, “[o]rders of certiorari and prohibition, as required”, damages under the common law “and constitutional principles”.

12    Part 5 of the proposed originating application is titled “Summary of Legal Authority”. It includes references to Ch III of the Constitution, Kable, NZYQ and various common law principles.

13    The proposed statement of claim repeats the allegations made in the proposed originating application. More specifically, it contains the following pleas:

3.    The Applicant contends that the conduct of State officers constitutes serious abuses of process, breaches of statutory duty, malicious prosecution, and misfeasance in public office.

…

7.     Multiple applications across different courts, including the Supreme Court of SA and High Court, failed to resolve the invalidity despite contested evidence.

…

11.     The Applicant requests orders in the nature of certiorari and prohibition to set aside all orders, warrants, detentions, home detentions, convictions, or enforcement actions arising from the invalid order.

…

14.     On 5 May 2025, the CSO failed to contest a Supreme Court application regarding the missing complaint. (CIV 25-3840)

14    Under the heading “Legal Grounds” there is a reference to “[m]alicious prosecution”, “[a]buse of process”, “[m]isfeasance in public office”, “[b]reach of statutory duty” and “[b]reach of international human rights”.

15    Also among the Documents is Mr Groom’s affidavit of 20 November 2025. In that affidavit, Mr Groom refers to his application “for judicial review and constitutional relief, including orders of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, declarations, and damages, arising from” the intervention order. He refers to the intervention order being replaced with a restraining order under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). Among other things, he alleges that the intervention order affected his rights in family law proceedings. Mr Groom also refers to proceedings commenced by the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia to have him declared a vexatious litigant. The outcome of that proceeding is not stated. He alleges that in the course of that proceeding it was established that there had been no originating complaint in the proceedings in the Magistrates Court. Mr Groom further states that he commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court “seeking to have the jurisdiction of the purported intervention order determined” and to have the order revoked. He states that the application was not contested but does not state the outcome of that proceeding.

16    By the cover letter lodged with the Documents, Mr Groom agitated for an urgent hearing. The letter otherwise adds little substance to the description of the substantive proceeding Mr Groom sought to commence.

GROUNDS FOR THIS APPLICATION

17    Mr Groom’s primary contention is that the Registrar was not authorised to reject the Documents for filing because the decision to reject them involved the purported exercise of judicial power. That contention is rejected. It is well established that the power exercised by the Registrar under r 2.26 of the Rules is administrative in character: Satchithanantham v National Australia Bank Ltd [2010] FCAFC 47; 268 ALR 222 at [47]-[49]; Ferdinands v Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80 at [29]. It is unnecessary to expound upon those principles here. Contrary to Mr Groom’s submissions, they apply irrespective of whether his proposed proceeding gives rise to issues concerning the jurisdiction of any court, or any issue arising under the Constitution. It is sufficient to restate that, in accordance with the authorities, r 2.26 of the Rules does not offend Ch III of the Constitution for so long as there exists a right to seek review of the Registrar’s decision in this Court: Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 at 95. That disposes of all of the grounds for review specified on the face of the originating application in this proceeding alleging that the Registrar did not have the power to reject documents for the commencement of a proceeding raising questions relating to jurisdiction and the Constitution.

18    Mr Groom otherwise relied upon three affidavits in support of his application for review. The first affidavit adds nothing to illuminate or expand upon the grounds of review. The second complains that the originating application in this matter was not put before a duty judge for urgent consideration and resolution. The third confirms that the decision complained of in this action is the decision of the Registrar of 28 November 2025 to refuse to accept the Documents for filing. Mr Groom filed that affidavit to avoid confusion about the identity of the decision he sought to challenge in this proceeding. It resolves confusion as to whether he later filed amended documents that formed the subject of further decisions under r 2.26. Given the outcome of this proceeding, it is unnecessary to consider any such further remonstrations or decisions.

Oral submissions

19    In oral submissions, Mr Groom confirmed that he had sought to challenge the Registrar’s decision on the basis that the Registrar had misinterpreted the nature of the proceeding he had sought to commence by lodging the Documents. The essence of that submission was that the Registrar had proceeded on an incorrect assumption that the proceeding was intended to comprise (and only comprise) an application for judicial review of a decision of the Magistrates Court of South Australia brought (or purportedly brought) under the ADJR Act.

20    I consider it appropriate to permit Mr Groom to rely upon that argument in support of a ground of review of the Registrar’s decision, notwithstanding that the ground is not clearly articulated in his originating application in this proceeding. That is principally because I consider that to decline that leave would only result in the lodgement of further documents to the same or similar effect, potentially followed by a further refusal and then a further application for judicial review. The ground argued by him is that the Registrar erred in concluding that the proposed proceeding was doomed to fail because it was wholly one that this Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain.

21    In further written submissions, Mr Groom contended that the Registrar had erred by describing his claim for damages in the amount of $25 million as fanciful. I consider it to be in the interests of justice to permit Mr Groom to rely upon that contention as a further ground of review. Again, that is because if the argument is not substantively resolved in this proceeding it is reasonable to assume that there may be further judicial review proceedings following the lodgement of further documents giving rise to the same issue.

22    Having granted that leave, the originating application in this proceeding will be taken to include those grounds, and I now turn to consider their substantive merits.

Jurisdiction arguably invoked by the proposed proceeding

23    The Registrar was correct to conclude that Mr Groom had utilised Form 66 and that the ADJR Act conferred no right of review in relation to the intervention order. To that I would add that this Court’s jurisdiction under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to issue a writ of mandamus or prohibition (and by implication certiorari) is confined to actions in which such relief is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, to the extent that the proceeding proposed to be commenced by Mr Groom had the character of an application for judicial review under either the ADJR Act or s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act, it is correctly characterised as doomed to fail and hence an abuse of process.

24    I nonetheless accept Mr Groom’s submission that the Registrar was incorrect to characterise the proposed proceeding as solely comprising an application for judicial review. As he correctly submitted, the nature of the proposed proceeding was to be discerned not only by reference to the Form he had utilised, but from the substantive content of the Documents, considered as a whole. Errors as to form may be rectified in a proceeding in which the Court has jurisdiction.

25    Fairly construed, the Documents disclose an intention to rely on several causes of action, including misfeasance in public office and breach of statutory duty. It is apparent that those causes of action are alleged in support of the claim for damages. True it is that the proposed respondent in the action is the State of South Australia and the conduct complained of is that of officers and agents of the Crown in right of the State. However, that status does not preclude this Court from adjudicating a controversy involving that respondent, provided that it otherwise has the authority to do so.

26    I have accepted the submission that the Registrar erred in concluding that the only source of jurisdiction sought to be invoked by Mr Groom was a claim for relief under the ADJR Act. To the extent that Mr Groom sought writs of prohibition or mandamus (or relief in the nature of certiorari), that part of the claims for relief would be liable to be struck out as an abuse of process. However, it does not necessarily follow that the Documents must be rejected. Whether they should be rejected may depend on an analysis of the nature of the controversy that remains after the removal of all claims for writs on judicial review against persons not being officers of the Commonwealth (whether or not relating to criminal proceedings).

27    This Court’s original jurisdiction extends to any matter “arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation”: Judiciary Act, s 39B(1A)(b). Unlike the jurisdiction conferred by s 39B(1), that jurisdiction is not expressly excluded by virtue of the respondent being the Crown in right of a State or Territory, nor does it appear to be expressly excluded by reason of the impugned act being a purported exercise of a law of a State, nor by reason of the act being that of an inferior court of a State. I express no concluded view on those questions.

28    On their face, the proposed originating application and the proposed statement of claim each invoke Ch III of the Constitution (and authorities explaining its effect) in support of the claims for relief. The claimed relief includes a claim for damages founded upon (among other things) an allegation of unlawful detention. Again, I draw no substantive conclusion as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate such a controversy. It is sufficient to say that it is not obviously the case that the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim for damages founded in (at least) unlawful imprisonment in so far as the claim is one giving rise to an issue arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. I consider that is a substantive question that ought be considered in open Court and with the benefit of submissions.

29    There are other matters relevant to the grant of relief.

30    The first is that the Documents disclose that Mr Groom has been involved in legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia and possibly the High Court relating to the lawfulness of his detention. In addition, he has referred to an application to have him declared a vexatious litigant in the Supreme Court, without disclosing the outcome of that action. A proceeding may constitute an abuse of process if it is an attempt to litigate matters that have already been determined, or if it otherwise offends the finality principle: see generally McDonald v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 297; McDonald v Colbran [2019] FCA 1937.

31    It may be anticipated that if the Documents were accepted for filing the respondent may argue that the proceeding constitutes an abuse of process or should otherwise be struck out, for reasons relating to competency or for other reasons. However, in my view, those too are matters that are appropriately ventilated in proceedings in open Court and in a manner that facilitates the provision of all relevant information to the Judge to whom the matter is allocated. On the limited information before me it is not appropriate to express a view as to whether the proposed proceeding offends the finality principle or as to whether it is otherwise vexatious.

32    It remains to be considered whether the Documents should be rejected for filing on the discrete basis that they contain a claim for damages in the amount of $25 million. The Registrar characterised that claim as frivolous and vexatious including because it was made without any jurisdictional basis. In my view, a claim for damages suffered as a consequence of unlawful detention may have a proper jurisdictional basis at general law, including where the alleged unlawfulness of the detention depends upon the outcome of a collateral challenge to the Constitutional validity of the exercise of a power.

33    I share the view that the quantum of damages appears to be arbitrary and is relevant in determining whether the proposed proceeding is vexatious or otherwise an abuse. However, in a case where the Court otherwise has jurisdiction, that may more appropriately be addressed upon an application for particulars specifying the factual grounds for the quantum claimed. It would be open to the respondent to submit that the claimed quantum of damages supports a conclusion that the proceeding is an abuse of process. For present purposes it is sufficient to find that the Registrar erred in concluding that a claim for damages per se was a sufficient basis to reject the Documents for filing.

34    For the above reasons I conclude that the Registrar’s failure to consider all of the causes of action alleged in the Documents is a sufficient basis to set the decision aside, and I will not make a direction that the Documents be rejected for filing on another basis. That should not be equated with a finding that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, nor a finding that the Court in fact has jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. Those matters are to be determined by the Judge to whom the matter is allocated, upon hearing from the parties.

Associate:

Dated:    11 June 2026