Federal Court of Australia

Sandilands v Chief of Defence Force [2026] FCA 715

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) it is directed that the Registry shall not accept for filing the documents lodged by the Applicant on 28 May 2026, being the interlocutory application, submissions and the annexure to the submissions.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WHEATLEY J:

INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

1    On 28 May 2026, Mr Sandilands who is the Applicant and self- represented, sought to file an interlocutory application in these proceedings. That interlocutory application sought the following:

(1)    A declaration that the Commonwealth (through the Department of Defence and/or Defence Counsel Services) has breached its obligation to provide legal assistance to the Applicant in relation to his dealings with the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force (IGADF).

(2)    An order compelling the Respondent(s) to immediately provide independent legal assistance through Defence Counsel Services for the purpose of reviewing, preparing, and making submissions in the Applicant’s current IGADF matter(s).

(3)    An order that the costs of this interlocutory application be reserved.

(4)    Such further or other orders as the Court deems fit.

2    Rule 2.27(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) provides that a document will not be accepted for filing if the Court has given a direction that it is not to be accepted. For the following reasons, I direct the Registry not to accept this interlocutory application and associated documents for filing.

Relevant procedural history

3    On 1 April 2025, Mr Sandilands commenced these proceedings by filing an application for an extension of time to seek an order for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). Attached to the application for an extension of time was a (draft) of an originating application for judicial review applying under the ADJR Act to review a decision of the IGADF.

4    Initially Mr Sandilands had also sought relief against the Chief of the Australian Defence Force. However, the Chief of Defence Australian Defence Force was removed as a party on 26 February 2026.

5    The proceeding was case managed by a Registrar of the Court, which included, amongst other matters, allowing Mr Sandilands to file and serve an amended application for an extension of time together with an amended originating application for judicial review under the ADJR Act. The Respondent was also ordered to file and serve a bundle of relevant documents. The proceeding was listed for hearing on 4 September 2025.

6    An issue was raised by Mr Sandilands regarding certain documents, which caused the proceeding to be again listed for case management. Additional orders were made, including requiring a supplementary bundle of material by the Respondent.

7    On 26 August 2025, the hearing listed on 4 September 2025 was vacated and Mr Sandilands was granted a pro bono referral certificate. Additional timetabling orders were made which included permitting Mr Sandilands to file and serve any further amended application and submissions, after pro bono counsel had been appointed. Those timetabling orders were extended on 21 October 2025 and the matter was again listed for hearing on 8 April 2026.

8    It became apparent and both parties agreed that the matter may benefit from a mediation. A mediation proceeded before another Registrar of the Court.

9    On 25 March 2026, that Registrar made the following orders:

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    The application proceeded to mediation on 24 March 2026.

B.    The parties reached agreement at mediation.

THE COURT ORDERS BY CONSENT THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    There be no order as to costs.

(the 25 March Orders)

10    A Deed of Settlement was entered by the parties, as a result of the mediation. The 25 March Orders have been entered and were made by consent. This proceeding has been dismissed.

what occurred after THE 25 MARCH ORDERS

11    On 5 May 2026, Mr Sandilands lodged two interlocutory applications and submissions. Supplementary submissions in support of these two interlocutory applications were also lodged on 7 May 2026 by Mr Sandilands. The submissions lodged on 5 May 2026 sought the following:

(1)    That the Defence/ADF immediately remove all technical restrictions preventing effective communication between the Applicant and Defence Counsel Services, and that full and unrestricted legal assistance (including access to Major Dan Coombes and/or Senior Counsel) be provided within 7 days.

(2)    That the IGADF’s further inquiry process (including any review of the Applicant’s submissions and the 14 additional documents) be stayed until the Applicant has had a reasonable opportunity to instruct and receive input from Defence Counsel Services.

(3)    That within 7 days the Respondent file and serve an affidavit from an appropriately authorised officer identifying exactly where within LTCOL Gandy’s Defence email account the 4–10 August 2021 email chain was recovered from (inbox, sent items, or deleted folder).

(5)    That the Applicant be re-interviewed by an Assistant Inspector-General under formal caution, with his legal representative present, once proper legal assistance has been facilitated.

(6)    That the following personnel be formally re-interviewed on oath or affirmation regarding the recovered documents: LTCOL Gandy, CAPT Crosbie, LT Clyde-Smith, and SGT Edwards.

(7)    That specific questions be put to the above personnel, including:

•    LTCOL Gandy: Why the 4–10 August 2021 email chain was not referred to or released to the Assistant IGADF during Inquiry 41-23.

•    LTCOL Gandy and CAPT Crosbie: Did CAPT Crosbie brief the Applicant as claimed in PM008 dated 6 December 2022? (Noting that FOI material, the Applicant’s evidence, and the IGADF’s own findings confirm that no such briefing took place.)

•    Further, that both officers be required to provide a formal explanation as to why they supplied false information in an official Defence document (PM008) and why they provided false testimony to the Assistant IGADF while under caution, declaring their statements to be ‘true and correct’.

(8)    Liberty to apply on short notice.

(9)    That the Respondent pay the Applicant’s incidental costs (attached) thrown away by reason of these post-settlement breaches (noting that the Applicant is self-represented and has suffered further significant mental health harm).

(10)    Such further or other orders as the Court considers appropriate.

12    On 7 May 2026 a Registrar of the Court reviewed the documents submitted by Mr Sandilands and determined that these should not be accepted for filing. This was on the basis that the documents were not substantially complete: r 2.27(a) of the Rules. The Registrar also observed that Mr Sandilands may be seeking to re-open the proceeding or commence a new proceeding on the basis of an alleged failure by the Respondent to comply with the Deed of Settlement.

13    Later on 7 May 2026, Mr Sandilands sought to file another interlocutory application together with submissions and five other separate documents which were emails, letters and other correspondence.

14    This 7 May interlocutory application sought the following orders:

(1)    That the Respondent and the Department of Defence immediately remove all technical restrictions (including any “firewall” or email blocking measures) preventing effective communication between the Applicant and Defence Counsel Services (DCS).

(2)    That the Respondent and the Department of Defence provide the Applicant with the full and unrestricted legal assistance formally approved by COL Richard Cawte, Director of Defence Counsel Services, on or about 31 March 2026 (including access to Major Dan Coombes or other approved legal officers / Senior Counsel) within 7 days of the making of these orders. (The Respondent’s claim that it “cannot contact” the Applicant is rejected. The technical barriers are within the control of the Respondent/Defence and must be resolved immediately.)

(3)    That the IGADF’s further inquiry/review process (including any consideration of the Applicant’s supplementary submissions and the 14 additional documents) be stayed until the Applicant has received the approved legal assistance and has had a reasonable opportunity to obtain specialist input from Defence Counsel Services.

(4)    That within 7 days the Respondent file and serve an affidavit from an appropriately authorised officer identifying exactly where within LTCOL Gandy’s Defence email account the 4–10 August 2021 email chain was recovered from (inbox, sent items, or deleted folder).

(5)    That the Applicant be re-interviewed by an Assistant Inspector-General under formal caution, with his legal representative present, once proper legal assistance has been facilitated.

(6)    That the following personnel be formally re-interviewed on oath or affirmation regarding the recovered documents: LTCOL Gandy, CAPT Crosbie, LT Clyde-Smith, and SGT Edwards.

(7)    That specific questions be put to the above personnel, including those set out in the Applicant’s submissions filed in support of this application.

(8)    Liberty to apply on short notice.

(9)    Such further or other orders as the Court considers appropriate.

(Emphasis in original)

15    On 27 May 2026, another Registrar of the Court reviewed the further documents submitted for filing on 7 May 2026. The Registrar considered those documents and determined that they should not be accepted for filing on the basis of r 2.26 of the Rules. That rule provides:

2.26    Refusal to accept document for filing—abuse of process or frivolous or vexatious documents

A Registrar may refuse to accept a document (including a document that would, if accepted, become an originating application) if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious:

(a)    on the face of the document; or

(b)    by reference to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document.

16    The Registrar observed:

    From my perusal of the Documents, you have not identify [sic] any basis upon which the Federal Court could grant the various categories of relief sought.

    From my pursual of the Documents, you have not identified any Commonwealth statue which would grant the Federal Court jurisdiction.

    From my pursual of the Documents, I am of the view the relief you seek is not sufficiently clear to enable the Court to understand and deal with your application, and to enable any respondent to properly respond.

17    The Registrar was satisfied that the Documents were frivolous or vexatious and had no prospects of success and were doomed to fail. As such, it would constitute an abuse of process of the Court if they were accepted for filing: Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 (Ferdinands v Cridland) at [27] to [30] (White J). The Registrar refused the Documents for filing and encouraged Mr Sandilands to seek legal advice.

18    The day after this correspondence from the Registrar, and again without any legal assistance, on 28 May 2026, Mr Sandilands lodged the current interlocutory application and submissions. These documents were also accompanied by a letter, an annexure to the submissions and the Deed of Settlement.

Relevant principles

19    Rule 2.27 of the Rules provides as follows:

2.27    When documents will not be accepted in a Registry

A document will not be accepted for filing if:

(a)    it is not substantially complete; or

(b)    it does not substantially comply with these Rules; or

(c)    it is not properly signed; or

(d)    a Registrar has refused to accept the document; or

(e)    the Court has given a direction that the document not be accepted; or

(f)    the Court has given a direction that the document not be accepted without the Court’s leave, and leave has not been obtained.

Note:    If a document is lodged with the Court in accordance with paragraph 2.21(1)(b), (c) or (d) and the Registry does not accept it, a Registrar will notify the sender of the document accordingly.

20    Without limiting the ambit of r 2.27(e) of the Rules, the Court will give a direction that a document is not to be accepted for filing in circumstances including when the document is or raises an abuse of process, is frivolous or vexatious. Neither of these component parts (or any composite phrase) are defined in the Rules: Ferdinands v Registrar Burns [2024] FCAFC 105 (Ferdinands v Burns) at [21] (Cheeseman, Goodman and McEvoy JJ)

21    In the context of a summary judgment application, McKerracher J in Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808 provided the following observations (which I agree with) in relation to the terms “frivolous” and “vexatious” (at [35]-[38]):

[35]    The expressions ‘scandalous’, ‘vexatious’ and ‘frivolous’ can be used either separately, or in conjunction, or interchangeably, with the expression ‘abuse of process of the court’ …

[36]    A matter is ‘frivolous and vexatious’ where the ‘cause of action is one which on the face of it is clearly one which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide, and contend that he had a grievance which he was entitled to bring before the court’ …

[37]    In relation to the term ‘frivolous’:

(a)    a matter that is ‘frivolous’ may be described as one that is ‘without substance or groundless or fanciful’ …;

(b)    a proceeding will be ‘frivolous’ where, despite whatever attempts are made to discern a cause of action in the case, it is still not arguable …; and

(c)    ‘frivolous’ may also describe a situation where a party is trifling with the Court or wasting the Court’s time …

[38]    In relation to the term ‘vexatious’:

(a)    a ‘vexatious’ proceeding is one without foundation, which cannot succeed, or is brought for an ulterior and collateral purpose. ‘Vexatious’ might also describe proceedings that are seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging …;

(b)    proceedings may also be described as ‘vexatious’ where they impose on a respondent party an unnecessary injustice in the form of a burden other than, and additional to, the burden necessarily imposed on a party to litigation instituted on reasonable grounds for the purpose of obtaining relief within the scope of the available remedy …;

(c)    a proceeding is to be regarded as ‘vexatious’ where:

(i)    it is instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom the proceeding is brought; or

(ii)    it is brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which it gives rise; or

(iii)    irrespective of the motive of the litigant, the proceeding is so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless …; and

(d)    ‘vexatiousness’ is a quality of the proceeding rather than a litigant’s intention, so that the question is not whether the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously but whether the legal proceedings are in fact vexatious …

(Citations omitted)

22    A proceeding will be frivolous or vexatious if, amongst other things, it is based on a cause of action which is without substance or groundless: Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80 (Charlesworth, Burley and Cheeseman JJ) at [8]; Ferdinands v Cridland at [30]; Ferdinands v Burns at [22].

23    As to what amounts to an abuse of process, Wheelahan J explained (which I agree with), in Luck v Principal Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Court of Australia (Permanent Stay) [2024] FCA 1256 at [36]:

…As to what amounts to an abuse of process, the categories are not closed. In Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; 276 CLR 216 at [69], Edelman J explained that there are at least three established categories of abuse of process: (i) the use of the court’s processes for an illegitimate purpose; (ii) the use of the court’s processes in a manner that is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; and (iii) the use of the court’s processes in a manner that impairs the integrity of the court. The three categories undoubtedly overlap, because each invites consideration of whether there is some real question in issue. Within the first category are processes involving a collateral attack on earlier decisions. Within the second category are processes that raise issues that are frivolous or vexatious, or which fail to disclose a cause of action. Issues that are frivolous or vexatious include those that are manifestly groundless or hopeless: see General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129 (Barwick CJ). See also Ferdinands v Registrar Burns [2024] FCAFC 105 at [22] (Cheeseman, Goodman and McEvoy JJ). Within the second and third categories is process that is prolix such as to amount to oppression or which impairs the processes of the Court. And the power under r 2.26 must be interpreted and applied in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose referred to in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act.

(Emphasis added.)

24    The 25 March Order dismissed the proceeding by consent. This proceeding is at an end.

The 28 May documents should not be accepted for filing

25    These proceedings have been finalised, by way of final orders dismissing the proceeding. The matter the subject of QUD204/2025 has been decided and the Court file for this proceeding has relevantly been closed.

26    The 28 May documents filed by Mr Sandilands do not seek to vary or set aside the 25 March Order, after it has been entered: r 39.05 of the Rules. In any event, the discretionary power under r 39.05 is limited to exceptional circumstances and must be exercised with caution, mindful of the overarching principle of the finality of litigation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 318 at [6] (Gordon J, then of this Court); AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77 at [104] (Raper J with whom Wigney and Lee JJ agreed). It is not apparent that any of sub-clauses of r 39.05 have any application in the circumstances advanced in the 28 May documents.

27    Further, it is not apparent that the 28 May documents are seeking to “re-open” Mr Sandilands’ case. This is sufficient to direct the Registry not to accept the 28 May document for filing.

28    On the face of the 28 May documents, Mr Sandilands seeks to raise matters regarding the Deed of Settlement. That is not a matter which should be raised in these proceedings.

29    Having said that, and having reviewed and considered the Deed of Settlement, that Deed does not provide Mr Sandilands with a “right” to legal assistance in relation to his dealings with the IGADF. In broad terms what it does provide Mr Sandilands with is an opportunity to make a further submission (with reference to particular documents) and for the IGADF to consider that submission and provide a response.

30    It is apparent from Mr Sandilands’ submissions that he is of the view that this submission to the IGADF “triggers and reactivates” his claimed “right” to independent legal assistance. Whether or not that is correct is unnecessary to decide. This is because the relief claimed by the most recent interlocutory application is based on an alleged breach of the Deed of Settlement. As the Deed of Settlement does not oblige the Respondent to provide Mr Sandilands with independent legal assistance, his claimed breach is unfounded and manifestly groundless or hopeless. It fails to disclose any cause of action or any basis for the interlocutory application, based on the Deed of Settlement.

31    The relief claimed by Mr Sandilands in the 28 May documents has no prospects of success, it is groundless and without substance, in these proceedings. The finality of litigation principle is applicable in this case. The proceeding has been dismissed and is at an end. The 25 March Orders conclude this proceeding. As such, pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Rules, I direct the Registry not to accept the interlocutory application and any of accompanying documents for filing.

Associate:    

Dated:    9 June 2026