Federal Court of Australia

Reece v Professional Services Review Committee No 1578 [2026] FCA 714

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s application for Order 4(a) of the Orders made on 19 March 2026 to be set aside or varied is refused.

2.    The applicant’s application for Order 4(b) of the Orders made on 19 March 2026 to be set aside or varied is allowed and Order 4(b) is set aside.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

1    The applicant is a medical practitioner in general practice with a particular focus on addiction medicine.

2    The applicant seeks judicial review of findings made by Professional Services Review Committee No 1578 (the Committee) that he engaged in inappropriate practice within the meaning of s 82(1)(a) of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) (the HI Act).

3    The proceeding is actively defended by the Director, Professional Services Review (the Director).

4    Section 106F of the HI Act provides, relevantly:

106F    Protection of Committee members, representatives and witnesses at hearings

(1)    A Committee member has, in the performance of his or her duties, the same protection and immunity as a Justice of the High Court.

…

5    In the interlocutory application presently before the Court, the applicant seeks an order for discovery requiring the Director to serve a list of relevant documents in her control in accordance with r 20.17 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules). The order sought would require the Director to describe the documents for which the Committee members claim an entitlement to immunity from production.

6    The Director opposes the application, submitting that the Committee members’ immunity extends to immunity from any order compelling identification of documents that would disclose any aspect of their decision-making process.

7    I will commence by giving an overview of the relevant statutory provisions and the Committee’s findings that are the subject of the application for review.

The statutory provisions and the Committee’s findings

8    The Professional Services Review Scheme is established under Part VAA of the HI Act. Under s 79A, the object of the Scheme is protection of the integrity of the Commonwealth medical benefits program so as to protect patients and the community from the risks associated with inappropriate practice, and protection of the Commonwealth from having to meet the cost of services provided as a result of inappropriate practice.

9    In National Home Doctor Service Pty Ltd v Director of Professional Services Review (2020) 276 FCR 338, Griffiths J observed that the Scheme has four tiers of decision-making, each providing for decisions to be made by different administrative decision-makers. The tiers may be summarised as follows:

(a)    Tier 1 – a request by the Chief Executive Medicare to the Director to review the provision of services: Div 3, ss 86-87;

(b)    Tier 2 – a decision by the Director as to whether or not to undertake the review, the undertaking of any review; and then whether to take no further action, enter into an agreement, or make a referral to a Committee: Div 3A, ss 88-94;

(c)    Tier 3 – referral by the Director to a Committee to investigate whether the person engaged in inappropriate practice; and investigation and reporting by the Committee: Divs 3A and 4, ss 93 and 95-106N;

(d)    Tier 4 – the imposition of any sanctions by the Determining Authority if the Committee has made a finding of inappropriate practice: Divs 5 and 5A, ss 106Q-106XB.

10    In the present case, the Director set up and referred the applicant to the Committee on 6 January 2023 pursuant to s 93(1) of the HI Act. Under that provision, the Committee’s function was to investigate whether the applicant engaged in “inappropriate practice” in providing the services specified in the referral.

11    The Committee conducted hearings which concluded on 11 August 2023. After providing a draft report on 1 March 2024 pursuant to s 106KD(1), the Committee gave its final report to the applicant on 10 December 2024 setting out its “findings” pursuant to s 106L.

12    In its final report, the Committee found that Dr Reece had, “engaged in inappropriate practice in connection with providing the Referred Services”.

13    On 28 February 2025, the applicant lodged for filing an application for an extension of time to seek an order for review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). The extension was granted on 3 April 2025.

The application for discovery

14    On 5 February 2026, the applicant made an application pursuant to r 20.15(1) of the Rules for an order that the Director provide non-standard discovery of particular categories of documents. On 12 March 2026, I heard and substantially determined the application but reserved questions of whether the Director should be required to give discovery of (a) documents claimed to be immune from production under s 106F(1) of the HI Act; and (b) documents of a clerical or administrative nature. The parties subsequently provided written submissions upon these issues.

15    The Orders made on 19 March 2026 are, relevantly, as follows:

3.    Pursuant to rule 20.15(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), by 4.30 pm (AEST) on 17 April 2026, the second respondent provide discovery of the categories of documents contained in Schedule A to this order, such discovery to be made in the manner required by rule 20.17.

4.    The second respondent is not required to discover, subject to any further orders of the Court:

a.    a document or a portion of a document that is protected from production by s 106F of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth);

b.    a document or a portion of a document that relates solely to providing a service that is clerical or administrative in nature.

16    Schedule A is in the following terms:

1.    all documents evidencing the time spent by Margaret Parker and Angela Moran on the draft report and the final report, such as internal emails or timesheets;

2.    all documents directly relevant to establishing:

a.    the nature and extent of the services received by the Director from PSR employees (including permanent, part-time or seconded), in the course of the Director’s review under Division 3A of Part VAA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) (Act) during the period 20 December 2021 to 6 January 2023.

3.    all documents dated between 6 January 2023 and 10 December 2024:

a.    relevant to establishing the nature and extent of the work performed by Margaret Parker, Angela Moran, Andrew Shelley, Jaqueline Healy, Erin East, Georgia O’Keefe, Lachlan Jones, Shelley Skinner, Jordan Sacco, Anastasia Anderson and Ellin Kim in: preparing the draft report of the Committee No. 1578 up to 17 January 2024; and preparing the final report of the Committee No. 1578 up to 17 September 2024.

b.    relevant to establishing which employees (including permanent, part-time or seconded) of the PSR had access to the GovTEAMS or SharePoint platforms used by the Committee No. 1578.

17    The applicant seeks discovery of the documents in Schedule A to assist his case concerning the following grounds of his Amended Originating Application, noting that the sixth ground was added pursuant to leave granted on 19 March 2026:

3.    The First Respondent failed to perform its statutory obligation under s.106KD(1) to prepare a draft report that was the product of the Committee Members’ independent and impartial consideration of the issues, the evidence and the submissions before the Committee, and thereby made a jurisdictional error.

4.    The First Respondent failed to take into account the submissions made to the First Respondent by the applicant on or about 27 August 2024 as required by s.106L(1), before issuing its final report on or about 10 December 2024, and thereby made a jurisdictional error.

5.    The First Respondent failed to perform its statutory obligation under s.106L(1) to prepare a final report that was the product of the Committee Members’ independent and impartial consideration of the issues, the evidence and the submissions made to them, and thereby made a jurisdictional error.

6.    There is a reasonable apprehension of bias in the decisions of the Committee by reason of the involvement of the staff of the Professional Services Review agency in the deliberations of the Committee, in the finding of inappropriate practice made by the Committee and in the preparation of the draft report and final report of the Committee.

18    These grounds have apparently arisen from the affidavit of Margaret Parker, an employee of the Professional Services Review Agency (PSRA), filed on behalf of the Director on 2 December 2025. I understand the PSRA to be the statutory agency of which the Director is the Head under s 106ZM of the HI Act. Ms Parker’s affidavit discloses, inter alia:

(a)    The draft report was initially written by PSRA staff members and produced to the Committee members for their comments on 17 January 2024.

(b)    The final report was drafted by PSRA staff members and produced to the Committee members for their comments on 17 September 2024.

(c)    The Committee members could make changes to the documents.

(d)    The Committee and the PSRA staff discussed the findings to be made by email.

(e)    Ms Parker reviewed Dr Reece’s submissions in response to the draft report, summarised them in the final report, provided a complete draft of the final report to the Committee and advised the Committee that they were not required to read Dr Reece’s submissions and attachments in full.

19    In substance, the applicant’s argument appears to be that in light of the extensive involvement of PSRA staff in the Committee’s findings of inappropriate practice, (a) it should be inferred that the Committee failed to independently consider the material and submissions; and (b) such involvement gives rise to an apprehension of bias.

Discovery, inspection and production of documents under Part 20 of the Rules

20    Part 20 of the Rules deals with discovery, inspection and production of documents. Where one party seeks access to documents in the control of another party, the process under Part 20 involves the following stages:

(a)    An application is made for an order that the other party give discovery (r 20.13(1)).

(b)    An order may be made requiring a party to give standard discovery (r 20.14) or non-standard discovery (r 20.15(1)).

(c)    A party gives discovery by serving a list of documents verified by affidavit (rr 20.16 and 20.17).

(d)    A party may serve a notice to produce for the inspection of any document in the list (r 20.31(1)).

(e)    The party receiving a notice to produce must serve a notice that, inter alia, makes any claim of privilege (r 20.31(2)).

(f)    The party who gave the notice to produce may apply to the Court for an order for production for inspection of any document in the other party’s list of documents (r 20.32(1)).

21    The Rules distinguish between “discovery” and “production for inspection” of documents. In relation to discovery, r 20.16 of the Rules provides, relevantly:

20.16    Giving discovery

(1)    A party gives discovery by serving on all parties to the proceeding a list of documents, in accordance with rule 20.17.

…

22    Rule 20.17 of the Rules provides:

20.17    List of documents

(1)    A list of documents must be in accordance with Form 38.

(2)    The list must describe:

(a)    each category of documents in the party’s control sufficiently to identify the category but not necessarily the particular document; and

(b)    each document that has been, but is no longer in the party’s control, a statement of when the document was last in the party’s control and what became of it; and

(c)    each document in the party’s control for which privilege from production is claimed and the grounds of the privilege.

(3)    A party may apply to the Court, before or after the list of documents has been served, for an order:

(a)    about the use of categories in the list; or

(b)    that a more detailed list of documents be provided; or

(c)    that each document in a category be separately described.

(4)    The list of documents must be verified by an affidavit sworn in accordance with rule 20.22.

Note:    Control is defined in the Dictionary.

(Underlining added.)

23    The definition of the expression “control” in the Dictionary in Schedule 1 of the Rules is, “if referring to a document, means possession, custody or power”.

The submissions

24    The applicant seeks an order setting aside Order 4 of the Orders of 19 March 2026 or varying the order to replace the word “discover” with the words “produce for inspection”. The varied order would read:

The second respondent is not required to discover produce for inspection, subject to any further orders of the Court:

a.    a document or a portion of a document that is protected from production by s 106F of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth);

b.    a document or a portion of a document that relates solely to providing a service that is clerical or administrative in nature.

25    The applicant submits that under the varied Order, the Director would be required to particularise in his Form 38 list of documents all relevant documents in his control in the categories in Schedule A of the Orders in accordance with r 20.17(2)(c). The applicant accepts, consistently with r 20.02 of the Rules, that the Director would not be required to produce “privileged” documents for inspection, but submits that the list of documents would afford the applicant an opportunity to challenge the Director’s claims for “privilege” from production. The applicant submits that this approach would accord with the usual approach to discovery contemplated by r 20.17(2)(c), where a party lists each document over which “privilege” is claimed and the grounds of the claim.

26    The Director submits that the “immunity” enjoyed by Committee members under s 106F(1) of the HI Act extends, not only to immunity from any order compelling production of documents that would disclose any aspect of the decision-making process, but also against identification of such documents through any discovery process.

Consideration

27    The parties tended to use the expression “privilege from production” which appears in r 20.17(2)(c) interchangeably with “immunity” from production under s 106F(1) of the HI Act. The Director at one point made a brief submission that “immunity” in s 106F(1) was different to “privilege” in r 20.17(2)(c), but the submission was not developed. Whether “privilege” in r 20.17(2)(c) also refers to immunity is not ultimately determinative of the present application.

28    However, in Middendorp Electric Co Pty Ltd v Law Institute of Victoria [1994] 2 VR 313, Nathan J at 317 provided a helpful explanation of a conceptual distinction between legal professional privilege and public interest immunity:

Legal professional privilege is essentially the right a party to a legal relationship has to claim exemption from a legal requirement to produce evidence about communications within that relationship. It is a privilege inuring to a legal person which can be waived or surrendered. It is not directly akin to public interest immunity, which exempts from production documents or communications regardless of any legal relationship between parties, because it exists to protect the interests of the public and cannot be waived or surrendered…

29    In Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166 at [38], Gleeson CJ described the rationale for judicial immunity from civil liability as, “for the protection of judicial independence in the public interest”. His Honour added at [39]:

This does not mean that judges are unaccountable. Judges are required, subject to closely confined exceptions, to work in public, and to give reasons for their decisions. Their decisions routinely are subject to appellate review, which also is conducted openly.

30    In Queensland v Stradford (a pseudonym) (2025) 99 ALJR 396, Gageler CJ and Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ, referring to the public interest rationale described by Gleeson CJ, observed at [75] that, “[t]his justification for judicial immunity by reference to the protection of judicial independence has been long and widely recognised”.

31    The applicant has not suggested that any aspect of the immunity conferred on the Committee members by s 106F(1) of the HI Act has been waived by the Director’s action in filing and serving Ms Parker’s affidavit, nor that such immunity is capable of being waived. A Committee set up under s 93 of the HI Act is accountable in the sense that it is required to provide a fair hearing, provide reasons for its findings, and its conduct and findings are amenable to judicial review.

32    In Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (2000) 74 ALJR 698 (Herijanto No 1), Gaudron J considered an application to set aside interrogatories delivered to individual members of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the RRT). The interrogatories were designed to establish, first, that the RRT members had failed to read certain documents stored within the RRT’s database (known as “Part B” documents) they were required to consider under s 424(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth); and, second, that the plaintiffs had been misled by representations that the members had considered the Part B documents. The defendants applied to set aside the interrogatories on the basis that s 435(1) of the Migration Act and s 60(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) conferred on a member of the RRT, “the same protection and immunity as a Justice of the High Court”.

33    In Herijanto No 1, the defendants submitted that the protection and immunity of a Justice of the High Court means that the Justice cannot be compelled to disclose what material was read in making a decision – much less, when and where it was read and in what form. The plaintiffs argued that the interrogatories did not require disclosure of what was actually read by the members, but merely disclosure of the RRT’s record. They also argued that s 435(1) merely conferred protection from civil suit, not from compulsory disclosure.

34    Justice Gaudron rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that s 435(1) of the Migration Act did not extend to providing immunity from compulsory disclosure, holding at [12] that the entire general protection and immunity of a Justice of the High Court was conferred on a member of the RRT. As to the basis and extent of immunity from compulsory disclosure, Gaudron J held:

[13]    It has been settled law since Knowles’ Trial that judges cannot be compelled to answer as to the manner in which they have exercised their judicial powers. In Hennessy v BHP Co Ltd, the immunity was said to be such that judges cannot be compelled “to testify as to matters in which they have been judicially engaged”. However, it was also pointed out in that case that “their evidence has been received upon matters which did not involve the exercise of their judicial discretions and powers”.

[14]    In MacKeigan v Hickman, the Supreme Court of Canada held that judges could not be compelled to disclose what affidavit evidence had been received when that did not clearly appear from the record. However, Wilson J, in dissent on this point, would have held that they might be asked “what as a factual matter comprised the final record for purposes of their decision”.

[15]    In MacKeigan, the immunity of judges from compulsory disclosure was rested on the principle of judicial independence. In Sirros v Moore, a case concerned with immunity from civil suit, Lord Denning MR suggested that the reason underlying that immunity was to ensure that judges “may be free in thought and independent in judgment”. That, in my view, is also the true basis of the immunity from compulsory disclosure. And on that basis, I see no reason why a judge might not be compelled to disclose the record upon which he or she has acted. However, that is subject to the qualification that disclosure of the record cannot be compelled if it would also reveal some aspect of the decision-making process, as may well have been the case in MacKeigan.

[16]    There is no difficulty in saying that, in an appropriate case, judges may be compelled to disclose the record on which they have acted. In the context of the judicial process, “the record” bears a clear meaning. The same is not necessarily true in the context of administrative decisions. Thus, it is preferable to identify what is within the immunity, rather than that which is outside it. And in my view, the immunity is immunity from disclosing any aspect of the decision-making process. That is what is required to ensure freedom of thought and independence of judgment. And that approach is entirely consistent with what was said in Hennessy.

(Underlining added.)

35    Accordingly, Gaudron J’s consideration of whether the interrogatories should be set aside focussed on whether they sought, “disclosure of any aspect of the decision-making process”. The interrogatories that were disallowed included Interrogatory 5 which required “identification of each document” relating to consideration of the plaintiffs’ applications “that the member read” during a particular period.

36    Subsequently, in Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (No 2) (2000) 74 ALJR 703 (Herijanto No 2), Gaudron J considered the plaintiffs’ application for discovery of the RRT’s computer records to ascertain whether the individual members accessed the Part B documents. Her Honour rejected the application, holding:

[9]    So far as the plaintiffs seek discovery to ascertain whether the individual members concerned with their review applications gained access to the Pt B documents stored in computer databases, they seek to achieve indirectly what they cannot achieve directly by means of interrogatories. The protection afforded to individual members of the tribunal by s 435(1) of the Act would be illusory if, although they could not be compelled to disclose their decision-making processes, those processes could be revealed by analysis of computer records.

[10]    In my view, the protection and privilege conferred by s 435(1) of the Act extends not merely to disclosure by the individual member concerned, but the revelation, by whatever means, of any aspect of his or her decision-making process…

37    In Saint v Holmes (No 1) [2005] FCA 1057 (Saint), French J (then a member of this Court) considered an application for discovery in the course of an application for judicial review of decisions of the Director and a Committee under the HI Act. The grounds included an allegation that the Committee acted at the direction or behest of a staff member who had prepared a draft report. His Honour noted that O 15 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) provided that a court, “shall not make an order… for the filing or service of any list of documents or affidavit or other document or for the production of any document unless satisfied that the order is necessary at the time when the order is made”. Accordingly, like in the present Rules, there was a distinction between an order for service of a list of documents and an order for production of documents.

38    The applicant sought discovery of documents from the Commission “relating to the conduct” of the Committee and, “relating to the draft report and the final report”, on the basis that the documents were relevant to the allegation that the Committee had acted at the behest of the staff member. Justice French noted that the documents sought were so widely described as to include the working papers of the Committee and its secretaries. His Honour held at [54]-[55] that in light of the immunity conferred under s 106F(1):

[54]     … The working papers of the committee would not be discoverable. Nor, in my opinion, could drafts prepared by staff of the Commission assisting the committee…

[55]     … That discovery will not extend to drafts of the committee’s report prepared for its assistance by officers of the Commission.

39    It is apparent that French J used the words “discoverable” and “discovery” at [54] and [55] to refer to an order for the filing and service of a list of documents. His Honour was prepared to order that the Committee members, “give discovery by list of… [a]ll documentary or other material which was made available to [the Committee] by way of evidence or submission in relation to its determination”. His Honour also made a similar order concerning, “[a]ny submission made to the committee by any person… provided that this does not extend to any draft determinations and legal advice made available to the committee to assist it in making its decision”. It is notable that the orders were limited to requiring description of what evidence and submissions was placed before the Committee, but did not require any description of the documents the Committee had actually read or considered.

40    It may be noted that the applicant’s application for discovery is not against the Committee members, but against the Director, who may be assumed to have some or all of the Committee’s documents within her control. However, if the Committee members cannot be ordered to make discovery of documents for which immunity is asserted, then such an order could not be made against the Director because the order would purport to derogate from the immunity held by the Committee members: cf. Herijanto No 2 at [9]-[10].

41    Section 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides, relevantly, that the Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as the Court thinks appropriate. However, another statute may expressly or impliedly limit the power of the Court to make orders: see Thomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150 at 161. The Court does not have power to make orders inconsistent with the protection and immunity conferred upon Committee members under s 106F(1) of the HI Act.

42    The judgments in Herijanto No 1, Herijanto No 2 and Saint demonstrate that Committee members who have the benefit of protection and immunity under s 106F(1) of the HI Act cannot be compelled to identify or produce documents if doing so would reveal any aspect of the decision-making process. Committee members may be ordered to discover “the record”, but the order cannot extend to requiring revelation of any aspect of the decision-making process, including assistance provided to the Committee, such as draft reports and legal advice. There is a distinction between identification of the record, which may be ordered, and revelation of which documents the Committee members have read, which may not be ordered. Since Committee members read documents in the course of making their findings, identification or production of the documents they have read would reveal an aspect of the decision-making process.

43    Ms Parker’s affidavit produces a number of emails to and from the Committee members that reveal aspects of the decision-making process and are therefore immune from production. An example is an email from Ms Parker sent to the Committee members on 17 January 2024 indicating a draft report had been uploaded to a database for their review and inviting them to make changes or edits. There are also emails between the Committee members and PSRA staff dated 2 and 6 February 2024 where the Committee members discuss their impressions of the draft report and the applicant’s submissions.

44    As it happens, Ms Parker’s production of some documents that are subject to the s 106F(1) immunity facilitates testing of the applicant’s proposition that a list of documents in accordance with r 20.17 of the Rules could describe the documents that are immune from production without revealing any aspect of the Committee’s decision-making process. Rule 20.17(2)(c) requires a description of, “each document in the party’s control for which privilege from production is claimed and the grounds of the privilege”. The ground of immunity from production would be that the immunity under s 106F(1) of the HI Act encompasses immunity from production of any document that would reveal any aspect of the decision-making process.

45    The first email referred to above might be described in a list of documents as, “An email from Ms Parker to the Committee members dated 17 January 2024”. Such a description, taken with the articulated ground of immunity, would reveal that an email was sent by Ms Parker to the Committee members; that it was sent after the hearings had been concluded; and that it concerns an aspect of the Committee’s decision-making process. The obvious inference would be that the Committee members read the email they received as part of their decision-making process. Accordingly, even such a seemingly anodyne description of the email would reveal an aspect of the decision-making process.

46    The second group of emails could be described as, “Emails between the Committee members and PSRA staff dated 2 and 6 February 2024”. This would reveal that as part of their decision-making process, the Committee members had exchanged and read the emails. It would thereby reveal an aspect of their decision-making process.

47    Any order requiring the Director to serve a list of documents in accordance r 20.17 of the Rules would require (by r 20.17(2)(c)) a description of at least some documents that would reveal aspects of the Committee’s decision-making process. An order of that kind would purport to derogate from the immunity of the Committee members and could not be made.

48    Order 4(a) of the Orders of 19 March 2026 qualifies the order for discovery under Order 3 by providing that the Director is not required to discover a document or portion of a document protected from production by s 106F(1) of the HI Act. Order 4(a) is necessary and appropriate and should not be varied or set aside. The applicant’s argument to the contrary must be rejected.

49    Although the applicant understandably expresses disquiet about the ability of the Director and Committee members to assert immunity from discovery and production of documents without having to even identify those documents, that is a product of the policy choice made by the legislature under s 106F(1) of the HI Act. That policy is to protect the freedom of thought and independence of judgment of the Committee members by granting them protection and immunity from any order that would reveal any aspect of their decision-making process. It is evident that such a policy is considered necessary in the context of the Professional Services Review Scheme’s object of protecting the integrity of the Commonwealth medical benefits program in the public interest.

50    The applicant also seeks an order that would vary Order 4(b) to remove the exemption from discovery of documents or portions of documents that relate solely to providing a service that is clerical or administrative in nature.

51    The applicant asserts that such documents are relevant to his apprehended bias ground. That ground invokes Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board (1972) 128 CLR 509 (cited in Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135 at [37]), where Barwick CJ considered at 517 and 520 that it may be contrary to natural justice for an accuser to be present during the deliberations of a tribunal since the accuser’s presence might inhibit and affect those deliberations. The applicant relies upon the closeness of the PSRA staff and the Committee members in the decision-making process, including through their communications about the draft and the final reports.

52    The expression “clerical and administrative services” comes from s 106ZPL(2) and (3) of the HI Act. Those provisions envisage that the Director will provide staff to provide clerical and administrative services to the Committee. It can be inferred that some clerical and administrative services will be connected with the Committee’s decision-making process, while others will not. It can also be inferred that some such services will be relevant to the applicant’s grounds of review while others will not be relevant.

53    If Order 4(b) were set aside, the Director and the Committee would still have the protection of Order 4(a) (“a document or a portion of a document that is protected from production by s 106F”) as well as the requirement of relevance to the grounds of the substantive application. I am unable to see that the interests of justice favour retaining Order 4(b).

54    I will order that Order 4(b) of the Orders made on 19 March 2026 be set aside.

Associate:    

Dated:    10 June 2026