Federal Court of Australia

Safarimaznabi v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2026] FCA 712

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to r 16.21(1)(c), (d), and (e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), paragraphs 20 to 23, 26, 28 to 31, 33 to 38, 44 to 45, 59 to 63, 66 to 70, 76 to 78, 81 to 82, 84 to 87, 90 to 98, 101 to 105 and 113 of the Consolidated Statement of Claim filed on 16 November 2025 be struck out.

2.    The applicant has leave to replead the claims made in the Consolidated Statement of Claim, with the exception of the claims made in paragraphs 59 and 61, within 28 days of the date of these orders.

3.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the first and third respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 17 December 2025 and of the second, fourth, and fifth respondents’ interlocutory application filed on 17 March 2026, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SARAH C DERRINGTON J:

INTRODUCTION

1    Before me are two interlocutory applications by which the first and third respondents (Commonwealth Respondents) and the second and fourth to sixth respondents (Oakmoore Respondents) respectively seek orders striking out certain paragraphs of a consolidated statement of claim filed by the applicant, Mr Safarimaznabi, on 16 November 2025 (CSOC).

2    By the first application, filed on 17 December 2025, the Commonwealth Respondents seek an order pursuant to r 16.21(1)(c)-(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that paragraphs 59 to 61, 69, 76, 81 to 82, 85, 91, 94, 97, 101 and 104 of the CSOC be struck out. By the second application, filed on 17 March 2026, the Oakmoore Respondents also seek an order pursuant to r 16.21(1)(c)-(e) of the Rules that paragraphs 20 to 23, 26, 28 to 31, 33 to 38, 44 to 45, 60, 62 to 63, 66 to 70, 76 to 78, 81 to 82, 84 to 87, 90 to 98, 101 to 105 and 113 of the CSOC be struck out (together, the Strike Out Applications).

3    The Commonwealth Respondents relied on the CSOC, their defence filed on 17 December 2025, the consolidated further and better particulars filed by Mr Safarimaznabi on 21 December 2025, the reply to the Commonwealth Respondents’ defence filed by Mr Safarimaznabi on 23 January 2026, two affidavits of Zita Maree Rowling filed on 8 May 2025 and 17 December 2025 (Second Rowling Affidavit), and 13 pages of submissions filed on 31 March 2026.

4    The Oakmoore Respondents relied on their defence filed on 17 December 2025, an affidavit of Katie Rebecca Richardson filed on 17 March 2026 (Richardson Affidavit), and 13 pages of submissions filed on 31 March 2026.

5    In response to the Strike Out Applications, Mr Safarimaznabi relied on his 72 pages of written submissions filed on 8 April 2026, an affidavit dated 11 April 2026, and a bundle of documents described as “Materials to be relied on at hearing”. Mr Safarimaznabi also made oral submissions.

6    For the reasons that follow, the Strike Out Applications should be allowed, and the paragraphs specified in these applications struck out.

BACKGROUND

7    In broad terms, Mr Safarimaznabi contends that the Oakmoore Respondents subjected him to retaliatory actions as a consequence of “blowing the whistle” on alleged tax irregularities he identified in the course of his employment with Oakmoore. On this basis, Mr Safarimaznabi alleges that the Oakmoore Respondents breached ss 14ZZY and 14ZZZAA(a)-(c), (e)-(f) and (h)-(i) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA). Mr Safarimaznabi alleges further that the Commonwealth Respondents are liable for breaches of the same provisions and were negligent at common law, on the basis that they failed to provide him with adequate protection from the alleged retaliatory actions he faced from the Oakmoore Respondents. Mr Safarimaznabi also alleges that the Oakmoore Respondents breached various sections of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

8    By an originating application filed on 19 March 2025, Mr Safarimaznabi commenced this proceeding originally as against the first (the Commissioner of Taxation (CoT)) and the second respondents (Oakmoore Pty Ltd trading as EGR) only. Mr Safarimaznabi has at all times represented himself in this proceeding, as is his right. He told the Court that he is studying law at university. As has been said on many occasions, it is not the function of the Court to give judicial advice to, or conduct the case on behalf of, a self-represented litigant: Bhagwanani v Martin [1999] SASC 406; 204 LSJS 449 (Bleby J); Clark v New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 914 (Johnson J). A clear statement of what the Court can, and cannot, do when a litigant is self-represented is now found in the Litigants in Person Practice Note (GPN-LIP), particularly in Section 4. I have nevertheless been mindful of the Court’s duty to ensure a fair hearing and that Mr Safarimaznabi not be disadvantaged from the fact that he has exercised a right to be self-represented: see Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138; 280 FCR 479 at [51]–[57] (Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ); SZRUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; 216 FCR 445 at [37] (Robertson J; Allsop CJ and Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) agreeing); Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [311]–[316] (Beazley JA; Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing).

9    On 17 April 2025, the representatives of the CoT sent Mr Safarimaznabi a first request for further and better particulars of the statement of claim filed on 19 March 2025.

10    On 20 April 2025, in response, Mr Safarimaznabi filed two documents:

(1)    Further and Better Particulars in response to the CoT’s request dated 17 April 2025 (First Particulars).

(2)    Further and Better Particulars in response to Oakmoore (Second Particulars). Mr Safarimaznabi asserts in this document that the particulars sought by Oakmoore had already been supplied in the following documents filed in proceedings before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) against the fourth to sixth respondents (FCFCOA Proceedings) (which are contained in the Second Particulars): chronology and summary of the events document dated 3 March 2025; applicant’s points of claim document dated 12 January 2025; amended statement of claim dated 18 February 2025; statement of claim dated 17 February 2025; applicant’s response dated 9 March 2025; and a notice to admit facts dated 7 March 2025. I note that, at the date of filing of the Second Particulars, the FCFCOA Proceedings had not yet been joined to the proceedings in this Court.

11    Mr Safarimaznabi subsequently filed an amended statement of claim on 6 May 2025, seeking to expand his claim against the CoT.

12    On 8 May 2025, the CoT filed an interlocutory application seeking summary judgment or, alternatively, strike out of the entire amended statement of claim. On 22 May 2025, Mr Safarimaznabi filed an interlocutory application by which he sought to join the Commonwealth of Australia as a respondent to the proceedings. These applications were heard together on 21 July 2025.

13    On 17 October 2025, I dismissed the first respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 8 May 2025 and ordered that the Commonwealth be joined as a respondent to the proceeding: Safarimaznabi v Commissioner of Taxation [2025] FCA 1266. The Commonwealth was subsequently joined as the third respondent.

14    On 12 November 2025, I ordered the FCFCOA Proceedings be transferred to this Court and consolidated with this proceeding, and that Mr Safarimaznabi file a statement of claim which dealt with the consolidated proceeding. In apparent anticipation of the joinder of the fourth to sixth respondents, Mr Safarimaznabi had already sent to the representatives for the Commonwealth and Oakmoore Respondents a draft consolidated statement of claim (Draft CSOC) on 11 November 2025.

15    On 14 November 2025, the representatives of the Oakmoore Respondents sent correspondence to Mr Safarimaznabi in response to the Draft CSOC (Richardson Affidavit at [4(a)]). This correspondence provided Mr Safarimaznabi with detailed information about the appropriate form and content of pleadings, particularly where alleging accessorial liability, and identified various alleged deficiencies with the Draft CSOC. The representatives also provided to Mr Safarimaznabi copies of two judgments which outline the requirements for pleading accessorial liability.

16    On the same date, Mr Safarimaznabi stated that he understood the issues identified and would revise the Draft CSOC to “ensure full compliance with the Rules” (Richardson Affidavit at [4(b)]).

17    Mr Safarimaznabi filed the CSOC on 16 November 2025.

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES

18    A party may apply to the Court for an order that part of a pleading be struck out under r 16.21(1) of the Rules where, relevantly, the pleading:

16.21    Application to strike out pleadings

…

(c)    is evasive or ambiguous; or

(d)     is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding; or

(e)     fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action …

19    The principles applicable to strike out applications are well established:

(a)    a pleading will be evasive or ambiguous if it is unintelligible or confusing, including where it is vague as to the material factual allegations underpinning the claim: Faruqi v Latham [2018] FCA 1328 at [94] per Wigney J.

(b)    a pleading is likely to cause embarrassment if it is generally vague, internally inconsistent or if it asserts conclusions of liability or wrongdoing from facts which have not been adequately stated, such that the responding party does not have sufficient certainty as to the case to be met against them: Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664 per Murphy, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ; Faruqi at [94] per Wigney J.

(c)    a pleading will fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action if it is not apparent that the facts pleaded, even if proved, would establish the cause of action alleged: Wride v Schulze [2004] FCAFC 216 at [25] per Spender, Tamberlin and Bennett JJ.

20    The Court’s focus on such an application is on the adequacy and sufficiency of the pleadings alone. The Court is not concerned with consideration of facts or evidence outside the pleadings. A statement of claim must plead all the material facts for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action against an alleged wrongdoer. If it does not, the pleading may be struck out, notwithstanding there may be evidence that shows a person may have a reasonable cause of action or reasonable prospects of success: Farah Custodians Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCA 1185 at [93] per Wigney J, citing Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712-713; Webb v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 1215 at [6] per Abraham J.

Correspondence prior to strike out applicationS

21    On 17 November 2025, the representatives of the Commonwealth Respondents sent correspondence to Mr Safarimaznabi in response to the Draft CSOC (Second Rowling Affidavit at [5]). This correspondence referred Mr Safarimaznabi to the request for further and better particulars sent on 17 April 2025 in respect of the first statement of claim and identified a series of deficiencies in the Draft CSOC. Notably, in this correspondence, the representatives “suggest that [Mr Safarimaznabi] ensure[s] that all of the relevant further and better particulars included in [his] response are incorporated into the Draft Statement of Claim” (emphasis added). As it happened, Mr Safarimaznabi had already lodged the CSOC (which had been substantially amended from the Draft CSOC) for filing before receiving this letter.

22    On 25 November 2025, the representatives of the Oakmoore Respondents sent Mr Safarimaznabi a request for further and better particulars of the CSOC (Richardson Affidavit at [6(a)]). This request provided details of what comprises the “usual particulars” of a communication and requested particulars of various paragraphs of the CSOC. Where the “usual particulars” were not being requested, the correspondence set out detailed questions for Mr Safarimaznabi to address with respect to each impugned paragraph.

23    In response, Mr Safarimaznabi referred to the First and Second Particulars filed in respect of the first statement of claim and stated that “[t]hose particulars remain relied upon in full” (Richardson Affidavit at [6(b)].

24    On 5 December 2025, the representatives of the Commonwealth Respondents sent Mr Safarimaznabi a request for further and better particulars in respect of the CSOC (Second Rowling Affidavit at [7]). This request set out a series of specific questions for Mr Safarimaznabi to answer with respect to each impugned paragraph to enable him to properly particularise his claims.

25    On the same date, in response to this request, Mr Safarimaznabi directed the representatives to the First Particulars and to an “affidavit previously served on” the representatives, and stated that the documents “collectively address the particulars requested”, and the Second Particulars which, as Mr Safarimaznabi points out in his correspondence, comprises “approximately 175 pages” (Second Rowling Affidavit at [8]). As Colvin J said in Azad v Avant Insurance Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 853 at [7]:

The true burden of these procedures is to set out a clear and concise statement of the party’s case. Detail is no substitute for clarity.

26    On 8 December 2025, Mr Safarimaznabi wrote to the representatives of the Commonwealth and Oakmoore Respondents listing the “governing provisions” for certain matters which he alleged fell “exclusively within the Respondents’ knowledge”, and asserted that, consequently, it was not his responsibility to provide particulars of these matters (Richardson Affidavit at [7]; Second Rowling Affidavit at [9]).

27    On 22 December 2025, Mr Safarimaznabi served on the representatives for the Commonwealth and Oakmoore Respondents a 52-page document titled “Consolidated Particulars” filed on 21 December 2025 (Consolidated Particulars). In that document at paragraph 3, Mr Safarimaznabi referred to an observation I made in Safarimaznabi at [24] that the CoT had been “provided with ample assistance by Mr Safarimaznabi to understand the basis of his case” to support a contention that he had not failed to particularise his pleaded case. That observation was made in the context of an application for summary judgment – a context different from the respondents’ present concerns and was also made in relation to a different version of the statement of claim and prior to the joinder of the Commonwealth and the fourth to sixth respondents.

28    On 23 January 2026, the representatives of the Oakmoore Respondents sent correspondence to Mr Safarimaznabi which asserted continuing inadequacies in his particulars and foreshadowed the filing of a strike out application were those inadequacies not rectified (Richardson Affidavit at [11(a)]). To assist him with appropriately addressing the request for further and better particulars, the representatives provided Mr Safarimaznabi with a table that set out each request for particulars and included a blank column for him to provide his response (FBP Table).

29    On 2 February 2026, Mr Safarimaznabi responded to this correspondence and stated that he did not accept the position that the particulars he had provided to date were inadequate (Richardson Affidavit at [12]). He directed the representatives to pleadings and “extensive particulars” provided at “multiple stages”, specifically the amended statement of claim filed on 6 May 2025, the First and Second Particulars filed on 20 April 2025, “additional particulars” provided to Oakmoore filed in the FCFCOA Proceedings, the CSOC, and the Consolidated Particulars. He did not provide a completed FBP Table.

30    On 9 February 2026, Mr Safarimaznabi provided submissions in support of orders for case management, Annexure B of which contained the FBP Table detailing Mr Safarimaznabi’s responses to each request (Richardson Affidavit at [13]). These responses were made only by reference to paragraph ranges of the Consolidated Particulars.

31    Although I observed in Safarimaznabi (at [7]) that Mr Safarimaznabi had done an “admirable job” on that occasion in conveying to the Court the substance of his opposition to the application for summary judgment and his reasons for the joinder application, that should not have been taken as a signal that he had conducted the proceeding as if he were a qualified legal practitioner. Although Mr Safarimaznabi has attempted to comply with the Rules, he does not appreciate the requirements of the pleading rules, which are designed to ensure fairness as between all parties to the proceeding. This is particularly so where, as in this case, very serious allegations are made against the respondents: Azad at [3]–[8] per Colvin J.

32    Mr Safarimaznabi is correct that r 16.41 of the Rules permits a party to provide particulars within a document that is separate from the pleading itself, but that liberty does not envisage providing the opposing party, or the Court, with voluminous documentation within which the particulars are said to be found within various paragraph ranges. This is particularly so when much of the material asserted to be “particulars” of an allegation is in the nature of evidence and/or submission.

33    By way of example, the Oakmoore Respondents complain about the failure to plead the material facts regarding the allegations made in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the CSOC, which plead:

20.    In the course of performing his duties as Management Accountant from November 2023, the Applicant identified a series of accounting and tax-related irregularities within the Second Respondent’s operations.

21.     The irregularities identified by the Applicant included:

(a)    inaccurate calculations of Cost of Goods Sold (COGS); and

(b)    indirect labour costs being capitalised or offset against inventory in a manner inconsistent with applicable accounting standards; and

(c)    potential underreporting or misclassification of payroll and indirect labour expenses for taxation purposes.

34    The Oakmoore Respondents requested the following particulars:

(1)    In respect of paragraph 20:

(a)    the date(s) on which the Applicant says he identified each irregularity;

(b)    each ‘accounting and tax-related irregularity’ identified;

(c)    the accounting standard(s) or provision(s) of taxation law alleged to be contravened for each irregularity;

(d)    the facts, matters and circumstances relied upon to allege each ‘accounting and tax-related irregularity’, including the specific transactions or accounting periods involved.

(2)    In respect of paragraph 21:

(a)    the date(s) on which the Applicant says he identified each irregularity;

(b)    the accounting periods or transactions said to involve inaccurate COGS calculations;

(c)    the accounting standards alleged to have been breached and the manner of breach;

(d)    the facts relied upon to allege that indirect labour costs were capitalised or offset against inventory inconsistently with those standards;

(e)    the facts relied upon to allege potential underreporting or misclassification of payroll and indirect labour expenses, including the relevant taxation provisions said to have been contravened.

35    In his responses contained in the FBP Table, Mr Safarimaznabi refers the respondents to paragraphs 42 to 58 of the Consolidated Particulars, albeit that paragraphs 51 to 58 are said to be particulars of paragraph 25 of the CSOC. Those paragraphs are in the form of a narrative and include submissions as to the possible consequences of alleged conduct. For example, paragraph 46 of the Consolidated Particulars says:

The Applicant alleges that the matters pleaded at paragraph above were of a kind that could constitute breaches of tax laws and/or result in misleading financial statements, by reason that the identified irregularities may directly affect cost attribution, expense recognition, inventory-related values, and reported profitability outcomes.

36    Nowhere in these paragraphs does Mr Safarimaznabi provide the particulars requested by the Oakmoore Respondents. No dates on which these irregularities were identified are particularised. Mr Safarimaznabi does no more than state that the accounting matters of concern included “inaccurate calculations within a COGS report” and “improper cost allocation within a COGS report”, and the possibility of “labour absorption outcomes affecting the COGS result” and/or “offsetting indirect labour costs with capitalized labour”. No accounting standards or provisions of taxation law are specified. No details of transactions or accounting periods are listed. The information in these paragraphs plainly does not address the requested particulars.

37    Similarly, and by way of example only, the Commonwealth Respondents asked for three particulars in relation to the allegation in paragraph 61 of the CSOC, which pleads:

Despite ongoing notifications of detriment, the Commissioner allowed Oakmoore Pty Ltd to address its taxation issues without addressing the Applicant’s treatment as a whistleblower.

38    The particulars sought by the Commonwealth Respondents were:

1.    How did the second respondent address its taxation issues?

2.    When did the second respondent address its taxation issues?

3.    How did the first respondent “allow” the second respondent to address its taxation issues?

39    Mr Safarimaznabi referred to paragraphs 94 to 103 of the Consolidated Particulars as containing particulars of paragraph 61, none of which address any of those three questions. Those paragraphs are directed towards Oakmoore’s alleged detrimental treatment of Mr Safarimaznabi.

40    I do not propose to set out each and every request for particulars in relation to the 51 paragraphs about which the respondents have complained, nor the relevant portions of the 52 pages of Consolidated Particulars filed by Mr Safarimaznabi in purported response to those requests. None of Mr Safarimaznabi’s responses to the complaints made by the Commonwealth Respondents or the Oakmoore Respondents in respect of the impugned paragraphs are satisfactory responses to those parties’ requests for particulars. In the absence of appropriate responses to the requests made, which may include assertions that some of the requests are not proper requests for particulars, or that particulars cannot be provided until after disclosure, the respondents are at a significant disadvantage in knowing what the case is that they are required to defend.

41    It is clear from the correspondence between the parties as set out above that the respondents have attempted to provide Mr Safarimaznabi with significant assistance to allow him to properly particularise his case prior to their filing of the Strike Out Applications. In oral submissions, Mr Safarimaznabi asserted that the respondents were only “upset” because “their work template were not used by me to fill up the particulars or the elements that they want me to fit in to the way they want to be fit in”. He pointed to the adversarial system as the reason for why he would not accept their advice.

42    Although some degree of tolerance is usually afforded to self-represented litigants in the interests of justice, the Rules continue to apply: Kimber v The Owners Strata Plan No. 48216 [2017] FCAFC 226; 258 FCR 575 at [69] (Logan, Kerr and Farrell JJ). As was explained to him at the hearing of the Strike Out Applications, it is not appropriate for Mr Safarimaznabi to continue to file vast amounts of material and expect the respondents to cross-refer to various documents to understand the bounds of his claims.

43    In the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to strike out the paragraphs identified in the respondents’ interlocutory applications.

Leave to Replead

44    The Commonwealth Respondents submit that there is no utility in granting leave to replead, in part because there have been multiple opportunities already given to Mr Safarimaznabi to replead. They point in particular to the fact that the CSOC is the third iteration of the pleading and, that despite the express requests to provide clarity to the matters of ambiguity raised by the Commonwealth Respondents, none has been forthcoming. They also submit that Mr Safarimaznabi has effectively conceded, in paragraphs 4 and 81 of the Consolidated Particulars, that he cannot plead the necessary material facts to support his positive disclosure claim against the Commonwealth Respondents.

45    As to the latter submission, Mr Safarimaznabi pleads in paragraph 59:

The Applicant alleges that one or more officers of the ATO, by act or omission, were knowingly concerned in the Second Respondent’s contraventions, within the meaning of s 14ZZZ of the TAA.

46    This allegation must be read as intending to rely on the accessorial liability provision in s 14ZZZ(2)(c)(iii), which provides:

(2)    A court may make an order under section 14ZZZA in relation to a person (the first person) if:

(a)     the first person is or was an officer (within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001) or employee of a body corporate; and

(b)     paragraphs (1)(a), (b) and (c) of this section apply to the body corporate because of detrimental conduct engaged in by the body corporate; and

 (c)     the first person:

(i)     aided, abetted, counselled or procured the detrimental conduct; or

(ii)     induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the detrimental conduct; or

(iii)     was in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the detrimental conduct; or

 (iv)     conspired with others to effect the detrimental conduct.

(Emphasis added.)

47    As the Commonwealth Respondents submit, correctly in my view, there are two difficulties with this plea. First, if Mr Safarimaznabi is intending to rely on s 14ZZZ(2)(c)(iii), the plea fails at the first hurdle because neither the CoT, nor the Commonwealth (or its officers) are officers or employees of the body corporate that has alleged to have engaged in the wrongdoing, being Oakmoore. Secondly, as is well-settled (Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke [2007] FCAFC 87; 164 IR 299 at [26] per Tamberlin, Gyles and Gilmour JJ; Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (in liq) (2008) 252 ALR 41 at [13] per Finkelstein J), to establish that a person is ‘knowingly concerned’ for the purposes of a provision such as s 14ZZZ(2)(c)(iii), it is necessary to establish actual knowledge of the essential facts of the contravention and that the person knowingly concerned engaged in some act or conduct that ‘implicates or involves him or her’ in the alleged contraventions so that there is a ‘practical connection’ between the person knowingly concerned and the contravention. None of those matters are pleaded against the Commonwealth Respondents.

48    In any event, paragraph 59 purports to plead knowledge and, contrary to r 16.43(1) of the Rules, fails to plead the particulars of the facts on which Mr Safarimaznabi relies.

49    In response, Mr Safarimaznabi submits that, by reason of r 16.03(2) of the Rules, he is not required to particularise the identity of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) officers because he contends he does not bear the burden of proving facts that “fall exclusively within the Respondents’ knowledge”, and because they bear the evidentiary onus by reason of, relevantly, s 14ZZZ(2B) of the TAA.

50    The latter section provides, relevantly:

(2B)    In proceedings where a person seeks an order under section 14ZZZA in relation to another person:

(a)    the person seeking the order bears the onus of adducing or pointing to evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility of the matters in:

(i)     if subsection (1) of this section applies—paragraph (1)(a); or

(ii)     if subsection (2) of this section applies—paragraph (1)(a), mentioned in paragraph (2)(b); or

(iii)     if subsection (2A) of this section applies—paragraphs (2A)(a) and (d); and

(b)     if that onus is discharged—the other person bears the onus of proving that the claim is not made out.

51    Again, as the Commonwealth Respondents submit, this section does not have the effect of reversing the onus as contended by Mr Safarimaznabi. He retains the onus of adducing sufficient evidence that “suggests a reasonable possibility of the matters alleged”, which must include the identity of the ATO officers, their alleged knowledge or the material facts from which such knowledge might be inferred, and their conduct. This is for two reasons. First, to the extent that Mr Safarimaznabi claims pursuant to a novel duty of care, such a claim is outside the scope of s 14ZZZA of the TAA. Secondly, even if he could establish a prima facie basis for a claim pursuant to s 14ZZZA, the onus will not shift until he has first established both the detrimental conduct and who has acted detrimentally.

52    For this reason, Mr Safarimaznabi is not permitted to replead the claim made in paragraph 59 of the CSOC.

53    Paragraph 61 is in a slightly different category. By it, Mr Safarimaznabi alleges that the CoT “allowed” Oakmoore to “address its taxation”, without particularising what that means. It is not at all clear what relevance that plea has to Mr Safarimaznabi’s claims in any event. It appears to be background information which he claims provides context for Oakmoore’s conduct.

54    For this reason, Mr Safarimaznabi is not permitted to replead the claim made in paragraph 59 of the CSOC.

55    Apart from paragraphs 59 and 61, Mr Safarimaznabi should have one last chance to produce a pleading, particularised in proper form, guided by the helpful correspondence he has already received from the respondents.

Disposition

56    For these reasons, the Strike Out Applications are allowed, and the following paragraphs should be struck out: paragraphs 20 to 23, 26, 28 to 31, 33 to 38, 44 to 45, 59 to 63, 66 to 70, 76 to 78, 81 to 82, 84 to 87, 90 to 98, 101 to 105 and 113.

57    Mr Safarimaznabi has leave to replead all but the claims made in paragraphs 59 and 61 of the CSOC within 28 days of the date of this order.

58    In the circumstances of this case, where the Strike Out Applications could have been avoided had Mr Safarimaznabi responded more appropriately to the respondents’ correspondence, it is appropriate to order that he pay the respondents’ costs of the Strike Out Applications.

Associate:

Dated:    8 June 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES