Federal Court of Australia

Chang v Chang, in the matter of Chang [2026] FCA 707

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s interim application dated 20 March 2026, is dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCELWAINE J:

1    On 22 January 2026, Registrar Ellis made the following orders upon a creditor’s petition presented by Victor Chang for the sequestration of the estate of his sibling Holly Chang:

1.    The applicant have leave to amend the petition in the terms of the Amended Petition which is Exhibit VC-1 to the affidavit of Shengli Chang (also known as Victor Chang) lodged for filing on 14 January 2026, and to substitute 6 November 2025 as the date of commission of the act of bankruptcy, and the requirement for re-verification and reservice be dispensed with.

2.    The estate of HOLLY CHANG (also known as HONG CHANG) be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

3.    The applicant creditor provide a copy of this order to the Official Receiver within 2 business days of today.

2    The order records the date of the act of bankruptcy as 6 November 2025.

3    The creditor’s petition was presented on 20 November 2025. It relies on the failure to comply on or before 6 November 2025 with a bankruptcy notice served on 3 June 2025. The bankruptcy notice claimed a total debt of $31,137.07 based on costs orders made in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 12 November 2024.

4    It is fair to observe that Victor and Holly have been engaged in tortuous litigation in the Supreme Court of Victoria and in this Court for many years. A selected history is set out in Chang v Chang [2025] FCA 1259 at [3] – [16], Hill J (Chang No 1); Chang v Chang (No 2) [2025] FCA 1441 at [3] – [10], Hill J (Chang No 2); Chang v Chang (No 3) [2025] FCA 1507, Longbottom J; Chang v Chang [2025] VSC 715, Hannon J and Chang v Chang (No 2) [2025] VSC 770, Hannon J. Without exception, Holly has failed in all of her applications for leave, applications for a stay, de novo review applications, appeals and applications for leave to appeal to this Court and in the Supreme Court of Victoria related to the costs orders and the bankruptcy notice.

5    Undeterred, Holly in the present matter prosecutes an interim application filed on 20 March 2026 for the following orders:

(1)    Pursuant to rule 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the orders made by Registrar Ellis on 22 January 2026 in proceeding VID1527/2025, including the sequestration order made under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), be set aside or varied.

(2)    Alternatively, the operation of the sequestration order be stayed pending the determination of this application.

(3)    Pursuant to rule 1.32 and/or rule 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the time within which the Applicant may apply for review of the decision of Registrar Ellis made on 22 January 2026 be extended to the date of this application.

(4)    Such further or other orders as the Court considers appropriate.

6    Victor opposes the interim application. On 10 February 2026, the Official Trustee advised Holly that the administration of her estate had been transferred to Mr Joseph Loebenstein (Trustee). The Trustee does not seek to be heard on the interim application. Throughout the course of the various applications in this Court, Holly and Victor have acted as self-represented litigants in almost all matters.

7    As is well understood, when a Registrar of the Court makes a sequestration order there is a right that a bankrupt has to seek de novo review pursuant to s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). As provided therein, the application must be made within the time prescribed by the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), or within any further time as allowed in accordance with the Rules. This procedure was explained in detail in Bechara v Bates [2021] FCAFC 34; (2021) 286 FCR 166, Allsop CJ, Markovic and Colvin JJ.

8    The time limited by the Rules is 21 days after the power is exercised: r 3.11 of the Rules and r 2.02(3) of the Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth). Thus, the interim application for order (3) should have been filed by no later than 12 February 2026. The interim application is 36 days out of time. Time may be extended pursuant to r 1.39 of the Rules before or after time has expired. It is of no present relevance that the interim application references the incorrect extension power.

9    The power to extend time is conferred to avoid injustice. Generally an applicant for an extension must provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, address the issue of potential prejudice if time is extended and disclose an arguable basis for relief: Da Vesi Construction Group Pty Ltd v De Andrade [2019] FCA 553, Robertson J; Owen-Pearse v Lander Land Company Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 2077 at [17], Banks-Smith J.

10    Holly relies on her affidavits made on 20 March, 8 May and 22 May 2026. Victor relies on his affidavits made on 7 April, 15 May, 29 May and two dated 31 May 2026. The latter two comprise the affidavit of search of the National Personal Insolvency Index and the outstanding debt, each of which is only relevant if Holly succeeds in the extension of time application. Holly and Victor have each filed multiple written submissions.

11    For the following reasons the application to extend time is refused with the consequence that the interim application must be dismissed. A de novo review of the creditor’s petition therefore does not arise. Nor does the stay application. I should add that the first order Holly seeks, purportedly pursuant to r 1.32 of the Rules, cannot be relied on as a back-door method of review of the orders made by Registrar Ellis. Section 35A(6) of the FCA Act is the source of the Court’s power to review the exercise of delegated power by a Registrar and then to make such orders as the Court thinks fit “with respect to the matter with respect to which the power was exercised”. The general power at r 1.32 of the Rules to make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice cannot be construed as to operate concurrently or contrary to this specific provision in the FCA Act. Edmonds J construed r 1.34 similarly in McAlister v State of New South Wales [2014] FCA 702; (2014) 223 FCR 1 at [28], where his Honour accepted a submission from counsel to like effect.

12    There is no satisfactory explanation of the reasons for the delay in the filing of the interim application. Holly appeared before Registrar Ellis on 22 January 2026 to oppose the making of a sequestration order. She relied on multiple grounds of opposition as set out in a notice dated 16 December 2025. Her grounds sought to traverse many arguments that she had failed on in various applications to the Supreme Court of Victoria and before Hill J and Longbottom J in this Court. Registrar Ellis gave comprehensive ex tempore reasons for rejecting each ground of opposition.

13    On 2 February 2026, Holly signed and lodged her Statement of Affairs with the Official Receiver. From that document the following should be noted. Holly gave as the reason for insolvency “prolonged and complex litigation in the Supreme Court of Victoria and related proceedings” concerning family trust properties. She further stated that she was retired, reliant on government benefits and the accumulated litigation costs and her limited income resulted in her inability to pay her debts as they fell due. She commenced to experience financial difficulties in May 2025. She listed total unsecured debts of $1,547,329. She did not disclose any significant assets.

14    In her first affidavit in support of the interim application she gave as the first reason for the delay as “the complexity of multiple overlapping proceedings and the legal effect of my bankruptcy”. By 10 February 2026 she was informed that her estate had vested in the Trustee and that she was not entitled to continue her multiple proceedings by operation of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). She asserted that as of 17 March 2026, the Trustee had not yet made an election under s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act to continue her various proceedings. Her second affidavit does not address the question of delay. In her third affidavit she states that she “reasonably believed” that by reason of the sequestration order she could no longer personally continue any of her proceedings (which I infer includes a de novo review of the Registrar’s orders), that she remained “in substantial legal and procedural uncertainty” following the sequestration order and that her delay “was not the result of deliberate delay” but arose from the sequestration order itself, her uncertainty concerning the position of the Trustee and her uncertainty relating to the continuation of her various proceedings.

15    None of this comes remotely near to a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The s 60 Bankruptcy Act point has nothing to do with Holly’s right to seek de novo review of the sequestration order. The effect of s 60(2) is to stay an action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes a bankrupt until the trustee makes an election in writing. It has no application to a proceeding commenced after a sequestration order is made: Watson v National Australia Bank [2017] FCA 128 at [41], Greenwood J. The right conferred by s 35A of the FCA Act only arises after a Registrar has made a sequestration order. In any event, Holly filed a de novo review application from orders made by Registrar Wilson on 6 November 2025 whereby her application to set aside the bankruptcy notice was dismissed. Justice Hill dismissed that application in Chang No 2. Holly was aware from at least the time of that application of the right to seek de novo review and the time limit applicable.

16    Victor in his affidavit of 7 April 2026, attaches significant post sequestration correspondence of Holly. His written submissions of 8 April 2026 attach a chronology which accurately summarises that evidence and other evidence from the affidavits of Holly. I find according to it. It is divided into two parts. Part B summarises events after 22 January 2026. There is reference by Holly in multiple emails to her extant proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria and in this Court but, tellingly, made no reference at all to any proposed application for de novo review of the sequestration order.

17    Moreover and more to the point, Holly has failed to give any evidence about why the asserted complexity of her multiple overlapping proceedings caused her to delay the filing of the interim application within the 21-day period. Nor does she provide any explanation as to why the “legal effect” of her bankruptcy caused delay. Her assertion that she was informed that the control of her estate had vested in her Trustee, and thereby she apparently believed that it was not open to her to file the interim application because of s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, is bereft of any detail. Holly has a very long history of self-representation in multiple complex legal proceedings (where it is apparent that she was aware of procedural requirements for applications, including time limits) and on the paucity of her evidence I simply do not accept that she laboured under any misapprehension as to her ability to proceed with the interim application without the involvement of or election by her Trustee.

18    Holly has not satisfactorily addressed the prejudice issue. She asserts in her first affidavit that the delay is “relatively short in the context of the multiple overlapping proceedings in the intervening bankruptcy administration”. The delay is not short. The delay of 36 days in the context of the multiple applications made by Holly for review of the entirety of the process of the bankruptcy proceedings is quite significant when one recalls that the act of bankruptcy relied on occurred on 6 November 2025. There is an obvious public interest in bankruptcy matters being dealt with expeditiously: Totev v Sfar [2008] FCAFC 35; (2008) 167 FCR 193 at [17], Emmett J.

19    Nor has she addressed the fact that the costs orders on which the bankruptcy notice is founded were made in November 2024 and since then Holly has engaged in much litigation in failed attempts to avoid payment. On her own admissions in her Statement of Affairs she has been insolvent since May 2025, but nonetheless continued in her litigious attempts to avoid satisfying the relatively modest costs liability. Holly seeks to put aside as irrelevant the fact that Victor has been deprived of the benefit of the costs order. It is not. In all of her proceedings she has caused Victor to spend time to answer her meritless contentions. She has not addressed how her delay impacts on the administration of her estate or the costs that have been incurred by her Trustee. She has not addressed the broader issue of the impact of delay on her unsecured creditors, apart from Victor. She has not explained why there is no prejudice to the administration of her estate and to the administration of justice more generally by reason of her delay.

20    Next there is the issue of merit (or in this case lack of merit) in her proposed review grounds which must be understood as grounds to oppose the creditor’s petition. The grounds are numbered [6] to [17]. Grounds [6], [7] and [10] in various ways contend that the bankruptcy notice was not founded on a final debt because the costs orders were subject to continuing appeal and related proceedings, are dependent on unresolved property and breach of fiduciary duty disputes and are otherwise disputed and therefore not final. These contentions or their effect were addressed and held to be meritless in Chang No 2 when Hill J dismissed the review application from the decision of a Registrar not to set aside the bankruptcy notice. Further, Hannon J in Chang v Chang [2025] VSC 715 at [57] – [60] found that there was “no real prospect” of establishing that the costs orders were affected by error and for that reason, amongst others, dismissed an application to extend time for leave to appeal the costs orders.

21    Ground [8] is an unspecified reference to “related proceedings” which remain on foot. Even adopting a most generous interpretation of what is intended to be referred to, such proceedings are subject to s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Holly requested the Trustee to elect to continue the proceedings in March 2026. He declined for the reasons given in his correspondence to her 25 March 2026 and gave formal notice to that effect to the Registry of the Supreme Court that day. Accordingly, by s 60(3) these proceedings are taken to be abandoned.

22    Ground [9] is an unparticularised reference to the existence of caveats and competing proprietary claims which demonstrates that ownership and interests in unspecified properties remains “genuinely contested”. Even if that is accepted as so, it says nothing about the enforceability of the costs orders.

23    Ground [11] asserts that there is a serious issue to be determined as to whether “the bankruptcy process was invoked prematurely”. That contention is of no merit. The costs orders were made and were not set aside upon any of Holly’s applications to the Supreme Court of Victoria.

24    Ground [12] is a contention about delay in the filing the interim application and is not a relevant reason to oppose the creditor’s petition. Similarly, ground [13] is concerned with the Trustee’s election contention (addressed above) and has nothing to do with whether a sequestration order should be made upon de novo review. Grounds [14], [15], [16] and [17] agitate matters concerning delay in the filing of the interim application and make generalised assertions that Victor will not suffer prejudice. Likewise, these matters are not relevant to the making of a sequestration order.

25    There being no merit in any of the proposed grounds to oppose the making of a sequestration order on de novo review, it would be futile in any event to extend time for the filing of the interim application.

26    For these reasons, I refuse the application to extend time and it follows that the interim application must be dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    5 June 2026