Federal Court of Australia

Greaves v Ice Skating Australia Limited [2026] FCA 683

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 27 March 2026 is dismissed.

2.    The proceeding is listed for a case management hearing at 10.00am on 12 June 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NESKOVCIN J:

1    The applicant alleges that he made three disclosures in June 2025 to the respondent, Ice Skating Australia Limited (ISA), that qualified for protection under Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (whistleblower provisions). By his amended statement of claim (ASOC), the applicant claims that his confidential information contained in the disclosures was wrongfully disclosed to a third party, contrary to the whistleblower confidentiality protections in s 1317AAE of the Corporations Act, and that he has suffered detriment because of the disclosures. The applicant seeks, by way of relief, compensation, exemplary damages and a written apology.

2    By interlocutory application filed on 27 March 2026, ISA sought orders pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and/or r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for summary judgment. ISA submitted that the applicant cannot establish that:

(a)    he was an “eligible whistleblower” within the meaning of s 1317AAA of the Corporations Act;

(b)    he made an “eligible disclosure” within the meaning of s 1317AA(2), including that any disclosure concerned “misconduct, or an improper state of affairs”, “in relation to” ISA; or

(c)    the two disclosures alleged to have been subsequently disclosed, contrary to the whistleblower confidentiality protections, were made to an “eligible recipient” within the meaning of s 1317AAC.

3    ISA submitted that each of those matters is a “jurisdictional fact” and the applicant’s inability to establish those facts is fatal to his claims. As a result, it was submitted, the applicant’s claim has no reasonable prospects of success and should be summarily dismissed.

4    ISA relied on the following affidavits in support of the application:

(a)    an affidavit of Ms Suzanne Craig, solicitor for ISA, by which Ms Craig gave her opinion, based on instructions from ISA, information and belief, that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of establishing the matters set out at [2(a)]–[2(c)] above;

(b)    an affidavit of Mr Peter Marcovich, president and chairperson of ISA, which sought to explain ISA’s governance and “corporate” structure, its integrity framework, as well as the applicant’s relationship with ISA, including the assistance and services he claims to have provided to ISA in his ASOC and how these interacted with his disclosures; and

(c)    an affidavit of Ms Diane Di Gemma, a volunteer and director of ISA, which annexed a screenshot of ISA’s National Integrity website, said to be relevant to the “eligible recipient” issue referred to above at [2(c)].

5    The applicant, who is a litigant in person, relied on three affidavits which he affirmed on 26 March 2026, 29 March 2026 and 14 April 2026. In effect, the applicant sought to adduce, to the extent available, evidence in support of the claims made in his ASOC, which broadly fell into three categories. First, evidence of his eligibility as a whistleblower, including the services he provided to ISA at particular ice skating events. Secondly, evidence regarding the nature and content of the disclosures made and how he says they relate to ISA. Thirdly, evidence as to the recipients of his disclosure and their authority as “eligible recipients” under the whistleblower provisions. The applicant also relied on a written outline of submissions and made submissions at the hearing of the application.

6    For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the applicant’s claim, which raises several questions of fact and law to be determined, has no reasonable prospects of success. The application should be dismissed.

7    References in these reasons to sections are references to sections of the Corporations Act, unless stated otherwise.

Background

8    ISA, which is a company limited by guarantee, is the national governing body for figure skating and ice skating in Australia. It is a membership-based organisation whose members consist of one recognised controlling body in each Australian state and territory. Each ISA member appoints a representative to attend and vote at ISA’s general meetings.

9    Ice Skating Victoria Incorporated (ISV) is a member of ISA. It is an incorporated association under state legislation. ISV’s members include individuals who are paid-up members and associated clubs.

10    Melbourne Figure Skating Club Incorporated (MFSC) is a member of ISV and an incorporated association under state legislation.

11    ISA has established a national regulatory framework for ice-skating through its Constitution, By-Laws and Policies, and exercises the delegated “Sporting Power” conferred by the International Skating Union.

12    While ISA members, such as ISV, are separate legal entities and participate in the governance of ISA, clause 8 of ISA’s Constitution provides that ISA’s members, and its members’ members, are subject to, and submit unreservedly to, the jurisdiction, procedures, penalties and appeal mechanisms of ISA under ISA’s Policies and Constitution. The definition of “Policies” includes By-Laws made by the ISA Board: see cl 22 of the Constitution.

13    Clause 2 of ISA’s Constitution states the objects of ISA, which include to:

(a)    conduct, control and manage all levels of Ice Skating in Australia in collaboration with ISA Members and other stakeholders;

(b)    prevent and address threats to the integrity of Ice Skating in Australia, supporting a national approach to these issues;

(c)    control, manage and conduct Ice Skating events, competitions and championships;

(d)    conduct Ice Skating activities in a manner that secures and enhances the safety of participants, officials, spectators and the public; and

(e)    consider the public interest in its operations.

14    Presumably in furtherance of these stated objects, ISA has adopted and administers a National Integrity Framework to address matters affecting the integrity, safety and reputation of ice skating at a national level. This includes an Integrity Committee, Integrity Managers and appointed officers responsible for administering complaints and integrity-related processes.

15    The National Integrity Framework also includes the ISA National Integrity Framework – Member Protection Policy (MP Policy), which establishes nationally consistent standards of behaviour and mechanisms for addressing integrity-related conduct, including abuse, bullying, harassment, discrimination, sexual misconduct and victimisation. The MP Policy applies to ISA, its member organisations (including state and territory associations, such as ISV), and relevant persons participating in ice skating activities, which naturally includes ice skating events.

16    Mr Marcovich’s evidence was that, in practice, under ISA's integrity procedures, responsibility for handling integrity matters is allocated by subject matter, such that matters concerning ISA's internal affairs, national programs, officers or ISA-sanctioned activities are addressed at the ISA level, while matters concerning the internal governance, conduct or operations of member state organisations or their affiliated clubs are ordinarily addressed by the relevant member state in the first instance.

17    The National Integrity Framework also includes a Whistleblower Policy.

18    Clause 6 of the Whistleblower Policy relevantly provides:

Who is an eligible whistleblower under this Policy?

6.    This policy only applies to disclosures made by individuals who are, or have been:

a)    officers, employees, contractors, members or their volunteers of ISA;

b)    an individual who supplies services or goods to ISA (whether paid or unpaid);

…

f)    (when making a protected disclosure, each of these is a whistleblower).

19    As a result of the above, ISA’s policies and procedures apply to its state-based organisations, such as ISV and MFSC, however, the whistleblower provisions in the Corporations Act do not apply to ISV or MFSC: see s 5F of the Corporations Act and s 144 of the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Vic).

Relevant legal principles

20    Section 31A of the FCA Act relevantly provides as follows:

31A Summary judgment

…

(2)    The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a)    the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b)    the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

(3)    For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:

(a)    hopeless; or

(b)    bound to fail;

for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.

21    Rule 26.01 of the Rules provides:

26.01 Summary judgment

(1)    A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:

(a)    the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or

(b)    the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or

(c)    no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or

(d)    the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court;

    …

22    The principles in relation to summary judgment applications are well established. In Bishnoi v Star Track Express Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 808 at [8], I summarised the relevant principles as follows:

(a)    A proceeding may be summarily dismissed where the Court is satisfied that the party bringing the proceeding has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding: Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; [2010] HCA 28 at [22]–[23] (French CJ and Gummow J).

(b)    Section 31A of the FCA Act has lowered the threshold for summary judgment and it is no longer necessary for the case to be shown to be “hopeless” or “bound to fail”. However, the power to dismiss a proceeding summarily is not to be exercised lightly: Spencer at [22]–[24] (French CJ and Gummow J), [52]–[60] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Danthanarayana v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCAFC 114 at [4] (Jagot, Bromberg and Murphy JJ); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641 at [50] (Reeves J); Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808 at [27]–[29] (McKerracher J).

(c)    The determination of a summary dismissal application does not require a mini-trial based upon incomplete evidence to decide whether the proceedings are likely to succeed or fail at trial. Instead, it requires a critical examination of the available materials to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial: Cassimatis at [46].

(d)    A practical judgment as to the case at hand is required, by reference to the stage it has reached: Spencer at [25]; Cassimatis at [46].

(e)    Cases involving complex issues of law and fact or mixed issues of law and fact are unlikely to be appropriate for resolution by summary judgment: Spencer at [26], citing Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [No 3] [2003] 2 AC 1 at [95] (Lord Hope).

23    The following principles summarised by Gilmour J in Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955 at [6], which were endorsed by the Full Court in Mogislevsky v Leroy (Trustee of the bankrupt estate of Mogislevsky) [2017] FCAFC 52 at [64] (McKerracher, Farrell and Markovic JJ), are particularly relevant to the present application:

(e)    if there is a real issue of fact or law to be decided, and the rights of the parties depend upon it, it is obviously appropriate that the matter goes to trial. It cannot be said that where there is a real factual dispute and that factual dispute must be resolved to determine whether the claim succeeds that there is ‘no reasonable prospect of success’;

[(f)]    it ought not be used to shut out proceedings where, on a proposition of law, there may be room for doubt. On questions of law, an inquiry as to their merit should not be for the purpose of resolving them and also not simply to determine whether the argument is hopeless, but in order to decide if it is sufficiently strong to warrant a trial;

…

(i)    in determining if there are real issues of fact in issue so as to preclude summary judgment the courts must draw all reasonable inferences in favour of the non-moving party.

24    Furthermore, in Adnunat Pty Ltd v ITW Construction Systems Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 499 at [37], Sundberg J stated that the authorities endorsed the following principles (citations omitted):

•    In applying s 31A, the court does not conduct fact finding but must assess the strength of the allegations made by reference to the pleadings, affidavits and any other evidence adduced, in order to determine whether the claim is sufficiently strong to warrant a trial. Ultimately, the court must consider whether there are any real, as opposed to fanciful, issues of fact or law that require proper determination at a trial.

•    In assessing whether there are reasonable prospects of success, the court should draw all reasonable inferences (but only reasonable inferences) in favour of the non-moving party. Moreover, where the evidence on a summary judgment application is of an ambivalent character, there will be a real issue of fact and therefore reasonable prospects of success for the purposes of s 31A.

•    The moving party bears the onus of persuading the court that its opponent has no reasonable prospects of success. However, where the moving party establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment, the opposing party must be able to point to “specific factual or evidentiary disputes that make a trial necessary”.

the applicant’s claims

25    ISA submits that, even if the facts pleaded by the applicant are accepted, the applicant’s cause of action is not capable of succeeding as a matter of law. This requires an examination of the applicant’s claims and pleaded facts, which were set out in an ASOC.

26    The applicant claims that he was a whistleblower within the meaning of ss 1317AAA(c) and/or (e). In support of that position, he relies on the pleaded fact that he:

(a)    was a board member of ISV from May 2024 to March 2025;

(b)    assisted with the organisation of the Australian Figure Skating Championships held in December 2024, which was “sanctioned” by ISA;

(c)    was a member of the local organising committee of the Crystal Challenge "Champ Series" figure skating competition in 2025, which was published on ISA’s website;

(d)    provided unpaid assistance on governance reporting matters in connection with ISA up to November 2025.

27    The applicant states that, on 6 March 2025, he resigned as a director of ISV and, on 26 March 2025, he became Treasurer of MFSC.

28    The applicant further states that, in April and May 2025, in his role as Treasurer of MFSC, he:

(a)    reviewed information relating to the operation of figure skating competitions organised by MFSC;

(b)    noted entries by competitors who did not hold current membership at the time of entry; and

(c)    raised those records with the relevant MFSC committee members on 20 April 2025 and 22 May 2025.

29    The applicant claims that he made three “eligible disclosures”.

30    First, on 1 June 2025, the applicant sent an email to ISA’s integrity unit, to the email addresses complaints@isa.org.au and integrity@isa.org.au, with the subject line “Whistleblower complaint MFSC”. The email relevantly stated:

Dear Integrity chairs and managers,

…

In the recent few weeks I have become increasingly concerned that our club is not following due process to make our competitions fair and safe environments for skaters. Therefore, I am reporting this under the ISA whistleblower policy.

In order to support you in the preliminary decision about whether to proceed with my whistleblower allegation, I am providing you with a folder of all the materials that will support my case. Inside this folder is a video which allow[s] me to explain. I have taken the non-standard step of informing my committee peers in advance that I am deciding to whistleblow. This video is one which I shared to them in our WhatsApp group channel as an expiring video that they were permitted to view once.

Folder containing Chris Greaves evidence

I believe that the contents of the video will summarise as far as possible the nature of the complaint: that of creating unnecessary risk to skaters, and providing an unfair playing field for entry to club competitions. As far as I know, creating a safe and fair community are some of the core tenets of Ice Skating Australia.

Evidence to support

Here is a helpful spreadsheet that links directly to some supporting evidence (emails and messages). As it stands, I have reached what I feel is the end of the road in receiving accurate and transparent information from our committee, hence I am taking this approach.

I am entirely unfamiliar with how whistleblowing works, but I fully support you passing any details to the ISA Board for consideration, as this directly seems to be in contravention of the organization's policies and could be a risk to wellbeing.

Needless to say, this creates a very challenging working environment for the committee and I'm concerned they will begin to sideline me as a result. I have already been targeted by an abusive message (separate complaint). Any support you may be able to provide on this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely

31    Second, on 9 June 2025, the applicant sent an email to Ms Patricia Moritz, to her private email address, with the subject line “Potential corruption and improper governance at MFSC”. The email relevantly stated:

Dear Tricia,

I hope you're well. I am writing to bring to your attention three serious matters which are taking place within Melbourne Figure Skating Club (MFSC), and which I will outline, below. I believe that in the year of ISA's push for improved governance, it is pertinent to bring this to your attention.

Breach of Rules by member

…

Competition Rules Breach

I have also brought to the committee's attention the serious problem that skaters who entered Autumn Challenge 2025 did not hold the relevant state or club membership, despite ISA rules stating that all competition entrants must be a member of an ISA Member. This ensures that competitors are appropriately covered by ISA insurance in the event of an accident, and reduces liability for MFSC (and presumably ISV).

I raised this with MFSC prior to the competition to ensure that this was being checked. However, the competition convenors chose to ignore my request, resulting in many skaters entering without the necessary state or club accreditation. This is not only a problem from a member wellbeing point of view (as we should not be allowing uninsured members to be stepping onto the ice), but it also creates huge unfairness for those people who have properly registered and paid. Announcements make it clear that appropriate membership should be valid, otherwise skaters will be withdrawn. Many skaters missed out on Autumn Challenge due to popularity, despite many members entering without proper membership - a huge unfairness.

Direct and public humiliation

...

All of the necessary evidence for my findings can be found in a folder Folder containing Chris Greaves evidence. There is also a spreadsheet which outlines the timeline of me raising complaints against the committee. Here is a helpful spreadsheet

Bringing such issues to light raises an important discussion topic to the board members at ISV around what it means to have good governance within the member clubs.

I would encourage ISV to take decisive steps, potentially placing MFSC into special measures until such time that they (we the committee) can demonstrate that we have the necessary steps in place to ensure members are being looked after, money is not being improperly used, and skaters' wellbeing needs are met.

I would be happy to talk more about this if you need to discuss.

For your reference, I did not receive a response from ISV Secretary for over 1 week with your details, so in the meantime, I have reported my issues to the ISA Integrity Chairs and Managers.

32    Third, on 15 June 2025, the applicant sent a further email to Ms Moritz, with the subject line “Fwd: Whistleblower complaint MFSC”, which forwarded correspondence received from ISA’s integrity unit on 13 June 2025. The third email relevantly stated:

…

I'm forwarding you a copy of the response that I have received from ISA [Integrity].

They have informed me that I need to first raise this with ISV. I realise that this is not member protection situation, but as an ISV Board member, would you be able to clarify the steps you can recommend for me to report this.

In essence, I was whistleblowing MFSC's failure to implement competition procedures that provided adequately insured skaters, posed a liability issue to the club (and I assume ISV) and also created unfairness to skaters who had paid, while others had not.

Current status

…

Please feel free to read what ISA have replied below. I bring your attention to the last paragraph.

Best wishes and again thank you for taking the time to look into this

33    The applicant claims that Ms Moritz provided information contained in the June disclosures to a third party and that Ms Moritz’ communications identified the applicant as the source of the information. As a result, the applicant claims that his confidential information contained in the disclosures was wrongfully disclosed to a third party, contrary to the whistleblower confidentiality protections in s 1317AAE, and that he has suffered detriment as a result of the subsequent communication of the protected disclosures.

Disposition

34    As already mentioned, ISA’s application for summary judgment was conducted on the basis that the question whether the applicant’s claim has no reasonable prospects of success turned on whether the applicant would be able to establish that:

(a)    he was an “eligible whistleblower” within the meaning of s 1317AAA of the Corporations Act;

(b)    he made an “eligible disclosure” within the meaning of s 1317AA(2); and

(c)    the two disclosures, alleged to have been subsequently disclosed, were made to an “eligible recipient” within the meaning of s 1317AAC.

35    Each of those matters is addressed, in turn, below.

“Eligible whistleblower”

36    As already mentioned, the applicant claims that he was a whistleblower within the meaning of ss 1317AAA(c) or (e), which provide as follows:

An individual is an eligible whistleblower in relation to a regulated entity if the individual is, or has been, any of the following:

…

(c)     an individual who supplies services or goods to the regulated entity (whether paid or unpaid);

…

(e)     an individual who is an associate of the regulated entity.

37    The term “associate” has the meaning given by ss 10 to 17 of the Corporations Act, however, s 11 is the section that would be applicable in this case. Relevantly, the applicant would be an “associate” of ISA if he was a director or secretary of ISA, or a “related body corporate” of ISA, or a director or secretary of such a “related body corporate”. Neither ISV nor MFSC are a related body corporate of ISA: s 50. I am therefore satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of establishing that he was an “eligible whistleblower” within the meaning of s 1317AAA(e).

38    Turning to s 1317AAA(c), ISA submitted that the high point of the applicant’s case is paragraphs 26(a) and/or (b) above. Counsel for ISA submitted that, to fall within s 1317AAA(c), the applicant had to have provided services “to” ISA, whereas the services the applicant relied on were provided to ISV or MFSC. Secondly, the services had to have been provided to ISA before the “eligible disclosure” (which occurred in June 2025) and, on that basis, paragraph 26(d) obviously was excluded. Paragraph 25(c) may also have been excluded because the event to which it related, the Crystal Challenge “Champ Series” event, was conducted on 7, 8 and 10 August 2025 (ie, after the June disclosures). To the extent the applicant’s assistance in relation to this event only took place at the event itself, or only after the June disclosures, this paragraph would also be excluded. Finally, ISA also submitted that the services that the applicant claims to have provided cannot be divorced from the alleged disclosures, which I understood to mean from a temporal point of view. To the extent the submission concerned a connection other than a temporal one, I deal with this below at paragraphs 71 and 72.

39    As a result, I will focus on the high point of the applicant’s case in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the ASOC, which are set out in paragraphs 26(a) and (b) above respectively, and whether the applicant’s services were provided “to” ISA and, if so, when. For completeness, I will deal with paragraph 2(c) of the ASOC as well, which is set out in paragraph 26(c) above.

The basis on which the applicant says he was an ‘eligible whistleblower’

40    As set out at paragraph 26(a) above, the applicant stated that he was a Board member of ISV from May 2024 to March 2025. ISA submitted that, even if accepted, this would constitute services to ISV, not ISA.

41    As to paragraph 26(b), the applicant says that he assisted with the organisation of the Australian Figure Skating Championships held in December 2024, which was “sanctioned” by ISA. As its name suggests, the Australian Figure Skating Championships is a national competition. It is held annually in different locations in Australia. For example, it appeared in the “Ice Skating Australia Event Calendar 2025”, along with other competitions (including some state-based events, such as the WA State Championships, expressed to be for WAISA members only) and other national events, such as the ISA AGM. Each domestic competition included a notation of the state-based organisation to whom ISA delegated responsibility to host and administer the event.

42    ISA By-Law 605 states that the organisation of Australian Championship Events shall be under the general control of the ISA Board, who may delegate the organisation of the event to an ISA Member or club, or to a specifically designated Committee.

43    In 2024, the Australian Figure Skating Championships was held in Melbourne. ISV organised the event, with the assistance of volunteers, such as the applicant. Similarly to paragraph 26(a) above, ISA submitted that the applicant provided services to ISV, not ISA.

44    In relation to paragraph 26(c), the applicant says that he was a member of the local organising committee of the Crystal Challenge "Champ Series" figure skating competition in 2025. Similarly to the Australian Figure Skating Championship, the Crystal Challenge was an event which appeared in ISA’s 2025 event calendar and the applicant stated it was also published on ISA’s website.

45    ISA’s Champ Series Event Policy states that Champ Series events are applied for by States, and if acceptable, approved by ISA. It further states that their status makes them “not just a State consideration, but a National consideration”. The applicant stated that eligibility for the competition required skaters to be a “current financial member” of an “ISA member”, referring to ISA By-Law 311 – 323.

46    The applicant became the Treasurer of MFSC in March 2025. The applicant stated that, in or about August 2025, in his role as an elected committee member of MFSC, he was a member of the organising committee for the Crystal Challenge Champ Series event and, in that role, he was involved in administrative tasks relating to the event, including matters concerning entrant payments and the application of eligibility requirements. Based on the applicant’s affidavit, it would seem that the relevant services were provided after the June disclosures.

Determination

47    The whistleblower provisions confer various protections concerning the making of certain disclosures by “eligible whistleblower[s]”, such as protection from victimisation or reprisal: that is, from actual or threatened subjection to detriment on account of what is or is perceived to have been disclosed: Reiche v Neometals Ltd [2026] FCAFC 53 (Reiche (No 3)) at [1] (Snaden, Raper and Neskovcin JJ).

48    Counsel for ISA submitted that there has been limited judicial consideration of the whistleblower provisions in Pt 9.4AAA. See also Reiche v Neometals Ltd (No 2) (2025) 338 IR 312; [2025] FCA 125 (Reiche (No 2)) at [54] (Feutrill J).

49    Counsel for ISA referred the Court to two decisions, namely, Mount v Dover Castle Metals Pty Ltd (2025) 339 IR 1; [2025] FCA 101 (Katzmann J) and Reiche (No 2) (Feutrill J).

50    In Reiche (No 2), Feutrill J observed, at [58] and [66], that the object or purpose of Pt 9.4AAA is to encourage employees, officers and subcontractors engaged by companies to report suspected breaches of the corporations law to either regulators or internally within the entity. The policy of the whistleblower provisions “reflects the dual aims of facilitating the early detection and prosecution of corporate misconduct, and promoting improved business practices and standards”: Quinlan v ERM Power Ltd (No 1) [2021] 7 QR 377 at [18] (Bowskill J).

51    It is consistent with that object and purpose that the whistleblower provisions afford protections to persons who are an “eligible whistleblower” before making the protected disclosures. As a result, this would exclude the services referred to in paragraph 26(c) and (d) above.

52    As to paragraphs 26(a) and (b) above, ISA disputed that the volunteer services of the applicant were provided to ISA and submitted that the services were provided to ISV or MFSC. ISA appeared to accept, at a minimum, that the applicant was a volunteer of ISV, being a member of ISA. While it may be open to ISA to submit that as a board member of ISV, the applicant provided services to ISV and not ISA, the matter is not as clear with respect to the volunteer services provided in assisting with the organisation of the Australian Figure Skating Championships.

53    ISA is a national sporting body which sits above a structure of underlying state organisations, affiliated clubs and paid-up members. The proper characterisation of services provided by volunteers in respect of national competitions and events, for which the ISA board retains control, but whose services are organised by the state-based member organisations, raises mixed questions of fact and law whose determination, in my assessment, should await trial. That is to say, it is conceivable that such services are provided “to” ISA. Indeed, ISA’s Whistleblower Policy contemplates that “eligible whistleblowers” would include individuals who are or have been “officers, employees, contractors, members or their volunteers of ISA” (see above at paragraph 18).

54    Finally, in relation to ISA’s submission that the applicant’s services cannot be divorced from the alleged disclosures, at least from a temporal point of view, this is undermined by the chapeau to s 1317AAA, which contemplates that an “eligible whistleblower” includes a person who “is, or has been” in one of the designated relationships with the company.

55    For those reasons, I am not satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of establishing that he provided services to ISA before the June disclosures. The proper characterisation of the relationship between the applicant and ISA raises mixed questions of fact and law, that should await trial. As the Chief Justice said in Plaintiff M83A/2019 v Morrison (No 2) [2020] FCA 1198 (Mortimer CJ) at [48]:

Despite the acknowledged broadening of the approach for summary dismissal brought about by s 31A, in Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118 at [25]-[26], French CJ and Gummow J also recognised a proceeding should not be summarily dismissed simply because the allegations in a proceeding challenge existing law, or involve questions of fact which would be difficult to prove. Indeed, Spencer itself involved allegations of this character, both as to law and fact. This is one reason it is important for Courts to be cautious in exercising summary dismissal powers. The law advances and develops [through] claims thought at the time to be novel, and which are sometimes made in circumstances of considerable controversy

“Eligible disclosure”

56    Subsections 1317AA(2), (4) and (5) provide:

(2)    A disclosure of information by an individual (the discloser) qualifies for protection under this Part if:

(a)     the discloser is an eligible whistleblower in relation to a regulated entity; and

(b)     the disclosure is made to an eligible recipient in relation to the regulated entity; and

(c)     subsection (4) or (5) applies to the disclosure.

…

Disclosable matters

(4)     This subsection applies to a disclosure of information if the discloser has reasonable grounds to suspect that the information concerns misconduct, or an improper state of affairs or circumstances, in relation to:

(a)     the regulated entity; or

(b)     if the regulated entity is a body corporate—a related body corporate of the regulated entity.

(5)     Without limiting subsection (4), this subsection applies to a disclosure of information if the discloser has reasonable grounds to suspect that the information indicates that any of the following:

(a)     the regulated entity, or an officer or employee of the regulated entity;

(b)     if the regulated entity is a body corporate—a related body corporate of the regulated entity, or an officer or employee of a related body corporate of the regulated entity;

has engaged in conduct that:

(c)     constitutes an offence against, or a contravention of, a provision of any of the following:

(i) this Act;

(ii) the ASIC Act;

(iii) the Banking Act 1959;

(iiia) the Financial Accountability Regime Act 2023;

(iv) the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001;

(v) the Insurance Act 1973;

(vi) the Life Insurance Act 1995;

(vii) the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009;

(viii) the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993;

(ix) an instrument made under an Act referred to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (viii); or

(d)     constitutes an offence against any other law of the Commonwealth that is punishable by imprisonment for a period of 12 months or more; or

(e)     represents a danger to the public or the financial system; or

(f)     is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph.

57    In relation to the meaning of “an improper state of affairs or circumstances” referred to in s 1317AA(4), which was the focus of ISA’s submissions, ISA relied on the observations of Katzmann J in Dover Castle, at [129]:

… “Improper state of affairs or circumstances” is not a defined term. I therefore infer that Parliament intended these words to have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meanings of “improper” include “not in accordance with truth, fact, reason or rule; abnormal, irregular; incorrect, inaccurate, erroneous, wrong”: Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs [2009] HCA 7; 83 ALJR 494; 252 ALR 619; 71 ATR 23 at [29] (French CJ). For this reason, DCM (and I infer all respondents) accepted that the word “has a broad construct”. The concession was appropriate. It is consistent with the intention of the legislation as explained in the Revised EM:

2.34    The broad categories of disclosable conduct are also intended to include conduct that may not be in contravention of particular laws. For example misconduct, or an improper state of affairs or circumstances in relation to a regulated entity, may not involve unlawful conduct but may indicate a systemic issue that would assist the relevant regulator in performing its functions.

2.35    Information that indicates a danger to the public or a danger to the financial system is also a disclosable matter. This is intended to cover a broad range of conduct that poses significant risk to public safety or the stability of, or confidence in, the financial system, whether or not it is in breach of any law.

58    Similarly, in Reiche (No 2), Feutrill J stated, at [91], that there are:

textual indications that [the] intended subject of disclosable matters under s 1317AA(4) and s 1317AA(5) is information that is of relevance to the regulatory functions (compliance, enforcement and (or) discipline) of ASIC, APRA or another Commonwealth authority in relation to the regulated entity.

59    ISA submitted that, consistently with their Honour’s observations, “an improper state of affairs or circumstances” means conduct in relation to a regulated entity which raises integrity issues, a systemic issue or would have a significant impact on the regulated entity, and that would assist the relevant regulator in performing its functions.

The basis on which the applicant says he made an ‘eligible disclosure’

60    Paragraph 11 of the ASOC, which Counsel for ISA did not take issue with, asserts that the June disclosures contained references to the following matters:

(a)    competitors participating in events without meeting ISA’s published entry and eligibility requirements;

(b)    the possible absence of insurance cover for some competitors under ISA’s insurance arrangements;

(c)    possible:

(i)    safety concerns for individual skaters;

(ii)    liability for ISA;

(iii)    liability for MFSC; and

(d)    governance and compliance practices within MFSC and ISV.

61    The applicant referred, by way of example, to By-Law 311, which provides, in relation to “Eligibility”, that skaters must be “a current financial member of an ISA Member”.

62    ISA submitted that the alleged eligible disclosures related to “MFSC”, not ISA, as the email subject headings suggested. ISA also highlighted references to MFSC and ISV in the body of the disclosures.

Determination

63    In Reiche (No 2), at [94], Feutrill J, though not considering it necessary to determine the necessary nexus between the information disclosed and the regulated entity to meet the description “in relation to … the regulated entity”, observed they are words of wide import. There, disclosed information pertained to a subsidiary of the regulated entity. However, the case was not put on the basis it was “in relation to” the subsidiary in its capacity as a related body corporate of the regulated entity; rather, it was accepted the disclosure “related to” the parent company because it was about the subsidiary.

64    ISA By-Laws originate at ISA but are implemented at a club level. Thus, a complaint about a club event may also be a complaint about ISA, where it concerns ISA By-Laws and exposes a failure in the implementation or enforcement of ISA By-Laws.

65    ISA is the administrator of the National Registration Levy insurance scheme applicable to its members and their members. The scheme is funded by a levy on financial members of state and territory figure skating associations. Furthermore, ISA’s Insurance Policy notes ISV and MFSC as insured parties covered by the policy. I infer that members of state and territory-based associations are required to pay a levy, which is forwarded to ISA, to fund the National Registration Levy insurance scheme and this scheme ensures that ISA, ISA-members and their members hold insurance.

66    The announcement for the MFSC 2025 Autumn Challenge, referred to in the 9 June 2025 disclosure, stated that “All members of State Associations are covered under the ISA National Insurance Policy while participating in the event. This policy includes “Sport Accident cover”. Entry requirements included that members were full financial members, “[i]nclusive of ISA Insurance Registration either directly or via their state association”.

67    As already mentioned, one of the matters raised in the 1 June 2025 disclosure was a concern about unnecessary risks to skaters and contraventions of ISA’s policies. The attachments to the 1 June 2025 disclosure were not before the Court. However, in light of the ASOC, and ISA’s response to the 1 June 2025 disclosure which referred to “concerns on … following due process against its policies … relating to the membership status of competitors”, I infer that the 1 June 2025 disclosure raised a concern about the possible absence of insurance cover for competitors and potential liability issues for ISA and others, whether directly or indirectly.

68    I refer to paragraph 12 above, where I described pertinent aspects of ISA’s Constitution, which related to ISA’s national integrity role and the functional connection between ISA and club-level conduct. The applicant demonstrated the attribution or flow-through effect of the subject matter of his 9 June 2025 disclosure for ISA in the disclosure itself, stating:

I have also brought to the committee's attention the serious problem that skaters who entered Autumn Challenge 2025 did not hold the relevant state or club membership, despite ISA rules stating that all competition entrants must be a member of an ISA Member. This ensures that competitors are appropriately covered by ISA insurance in the event of an accident, and reduces liability for MFSC (and presumably ISV).

69    Having regard to the observations in Dandaven at [6] and Adnunat at [37], for the purpose of the application, I am satisfied that to the extent that the June disclosures concerned absence of insurance or a potential breach of ISA’s policies, they were matters “in relation to” ISA. To the extent that the reason for the potential absence of insurance, in breach of ISA’s policies, was an issue that had not been detected or had been overlooked, advertently or otherwise, it was potentially raising a systemic issue. If such an issue should have been, but had not been, detected at the ISA level, it may also have raised governance issues. The disclosures focused on competitions hosted by MFSC and/or ISV, which are, according to ISA’s constitution, “under the control of the ISA board” and, as counsel for ISA accepted, conducted under the auspices of ISA. Of course, insurance is also important for other matters, such as ISA’s child protection policies.

70    It is not necessary for me to reach a definitive conclusion on the meaning of “information concern[ing] misconduct, or improper state of affairs or circumstances, in relation to … the regulated entity” or the limits of the nature of the information that might be captured by that expression in s 1317AA(4). For a national sporting body like ISA, which would be expected to have systems in place to ensure the safe participation of its members in national sporting events, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that ASIC would be interested in an issue concerning lack of oversight or conduct that might compromise insurance for a national sporting body which is meant to hold insurance for its state-based organisations and their members, or that such an issue represents a danger to the public.

71    In presenting its application for summary judgment, ISA largely compartmentalised the requirements for the applicant to establish that he was an “eligible whistleblower” who made an “eligible disclosure” to an “eligible recipient”. However, ISA also submitted that the underlying subject matter of the disclosures was not, in any way, tethered to the services that the applicant alleges he provided to ISA, which entitles him to whistleblower protection. ISA relied on the applicant’s statement, in the 9 June disclosure, that the “eligible disclosures” concerned information that he became aware of while performing his functions as Treasurer of MFSC.

72    ISA’s latter submissions were made without reference to any authorities, presumably because limited judicial consideration has been given to the whistleblower provisions. While ISA’s submissions may be attractive at a high level, there is a tension with the object and purpose of the whistleblower provisions, being for persons in possession of information to report suspected breaches and promote improved business practices, without fear of reprisals.

73    In the present context, it is not necessary for me to decide whether an “eligible whistleblower” who makes an “eligible disclosure” is entitled to protection if the disclosures are not tethered to the services provided. This is an issue properly left for trial. In my assessment, the statutory language “information … in relation to the regulated entity” may encompass the present facts.

“Eligible recipient”

74    Section 1317AAC(1) relevantly provides:

(1)    Each of the following is an eligible recipient in relation to a regulated entity that is a body corporate:

(a)    an officer or senior manager of the body corporate or a related body corporate;

...

(d)     a person authorised by the body corporate to receive disclosures that may qualify for protection under this Part.

75    The 1 June 2025 disclosure was made to ISA’s Integrity Co-Managers and ISA accepts that each was authorised by ISA to receive disclosures that may qualify for protection.

76    The 9 and 15 June 2025 disclosures were sent to Ms Moritz at her personal email address. It was not in dispute that Ms Moritz was not an officer or senior manager of ISA.

The basis on which the applicant says Ms Moritz was an ‘eligible recipient’

77    In order for Ms Moritz to be an “eligible recipient” she had to fall within s 1317AAC(d) and, in particular, she had to have been a person “authorised” by ISA to receive disclosures that may qualify for protection under Pt 9.4AAA.

78    For many years, Ms Moritz was the Member Protection Information Officer (MPIO) for ISA. Ms Moritz resigned from her role as MPIO on 25 July 2024. As a result, ISA submitted, Ms Moritz was not authorised by ISA to receive disclosures that might qualify for protection from 25 July 2024.

79    The applicant stated that he sent the 9 and 15 June 2025 emails to Ms Moritz because Ms Moritz was listed as “ISA Member Protection Officer” in the ISA National Integrity Framework published on ISA’s website in June 2025.

80    The relevant document was entitled (emphasis in original):

ICE SKATING AUSTRALIA

NATIONAL INTEGRITY FRAMEWORK

Safeguarding Children and Young People Policy

81    The title to the document appeared beneath the logo for Sport Integrity Australia and the cover page stated that the policy had a commencement date of 1 January 2024 and was to be reviewed by Sport Integrity Australia in July 2025.

82    Clause 1 of the policy stated (emphasis in original):

Ice Skating has a zero-tolerance policy to harm, abuse and/or neglect of a Child/Young Person in any form.

… Ice Skating Australia (ISA) is committed to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of Children/Young People in Ice Skating …

If you have reason to believe that a Child/Young Person is at immediate risk of harm, you must follow the procedures set out in Annexure A: Responding to Risk of Abuse and Harm to Children and Young People …

83    Annexure A contained, among other things, the following contact details:

Child Safe Contact at Ice Skating Australia:

Name: Tricia Moritz

Position: ISA Member Protection Officer

Email and/or Phone: integrity@isa.org.au or ….

84    ISA has several email addresses for persons who are authorised to receive disclosures that may have qualified for protection, which are generic emails such as “complaints@isa.org.au”, “integrity@isa.org.au” and “mpio@isa.org.au”. The email addresses are not specific to a particular individual. Had the applicant sent the email to the nominated contact address, the present issue would not have arisen because, although Ms Moritz had resigned as the MPIO, ISA accepted that the above contact email address was an appropriate email address.

85    The applicant said that upon seeing the reference to Ms Moritz, in the National Integrity Framework, he did a google search which confirmed Ms Moritz’s role. The applicant explained, however, that he also understood that Ms Moritz also held a role within ISV and it would appear that he knew or had Ms Moritz’s personal email address, and he sent the 9 and 15 June 2025 disclosures to her personal email address instead.

Determination

86    ISA did not dispute that the ISA National Integrity Framework was published on ISA’s website in June 2025 and that it referred to Ms Moritz as the MPIO. ISA submitted, however, that the applicant’s reliance on the policy was “misplaced” because it was a document prepared by Sports Integrity Australia and did not form part of ISA’s whistleblower policy framework and could not alter Ms Moritz’s legal status at the time of the disclosures.

87    ISA accepted that a person who is “authorised”, for the purpose of s 1317AAC(1)(d), to receive disclosures that may qualify for protection includes a person with apparent or ostensible authority. Even if, as ISA submitted, the policy was prepared by Sports Integrity Australia, it appeared on ISA’s website, it referred to ISA throughout the policy and it included ISA specific contact details. I infer ISA either provided Ms Moritz’s name to Sports Integrity Australia for inclusion in the policy, inserted her name itself, or otherwise stood behind the accuracy of the information included in the policy, which bore ISA’s name and was published on its website. The metes of “authorised” in the context of the whistleblower provisions have not been determined. Whether this amounts to authorisation within s 1317AAC, including on an apparent or ostensible basis, raises a question that is not suitable for summary determination.

88    In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of establishing that Ms Moritz was an “eligible recipient” at the time of the alleged “eligible disclosure”. Once again, it is unfortunate that the applicant did not send the relevant disclosures to the email address nominated by ISA.

89    The underlying premise of the remainder of ISA’s submissions was that the applicant could not establish that he was an “eligible whistleblower” who made an “eligible disclosure” to an “eligible recipient”. As a result, it is unnecessary to deal with the balance of ISA submissions.

conclusion

90    As mentioned above, the power to grant summary judgment should be exercised with caution. The present dispute raises a number of legal and factual matters and, as noted in the section regarding the applicable principles, that combination usually gives rise to complexities that require a full hearing. I am not satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that he was an “eligible whistleblower” who made an “eligible disclosure” to an “eligible recipient”, such that the applicant’s claims ought not proceed to trial. Furthermore, as the whistleblower provisions have not been the subject of extensive judicial determination, and given there are some unresolved legal issues that may have significance for other cases, I would decline to determine such a claim summarily.

Associate:

Dated:    3 June 2026