Federal Court of Australia

Brookhouse v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2026] FCA 667

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the proceeding is summarily dismissed.

2.    The applicant is to pay the respondent the costs of this application, to be agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

1    The applicant brings proceedings against the respondent alleging violations of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) (and its predecessor legislation), the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act), the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Copyright Act) and the National Vocational Education and Training Regulator Act 2011 (Cth) (NVETR Act). The applicant’s further amended statement of claim (FASOC) filed on 13 November 2025 also alleges the respondent has not acted in accordance with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) (PGPA Act), the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (Public Service Act), the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (Cth) (ABC Act) and the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) (Archives Act). Although, it appears the applicant does not seek relief in relation to those alleged breaches.

2    The respondent seeks summary dismissal of these proceedings pursuant to ss 19 and 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 26.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) on the basis the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding, no reasonable cause of action is disclosed or the proceeding is an abuse of the Court’s process. The applicant opposes the application.

3    The applicant filed a statement of claim on 20 July 2025, an amended statement of claim on 25 July 2025, further and better particulars on 20 October 2025, pursuant to orders dated 29 September 2025, and a FASOC on 13 November 2025, pursuant to orders dated 30 October 2025. Prior to bringing this application, the respondent corresponded with the applicant identifying various issues with the pleadings, including in respect to his standing to bring some claims, the issue of a limitation period in respect to the FW Act, and the failure to particularise claims to enable them to be properly understood. This included correspondence since the current form of the pleadings were filed.

4    For the reasons below, the applicant’s proceedings are summarily dismissed.

Relevant Principles

5    The relevant principles applicable to the determination of an application for summary dismissal are well established and are unnecessary to repeat in detail.

6    In respect to summary dismissal, I summarised the relevant principles in Quail v Gibson [2021] FCA 1115 (Quail) at [6]-[11] as follows:

[6]    Section 31A of the FCA Act relevantly provides:

(1)    The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a)    the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b)    the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

(2)    The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:

(a)    the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and

(b)    the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.

(3)    For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:

(a)    hopeless; or

(b)    bound to fail;

for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.

(4)    This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.

(5)    This section does not apply to criminal proceedings.

[7]    The power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly: Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer) at [60] and see [24], although it does not require that the proceedings to be seen as “frivolous”, “untenable” or “groundless”: Spencer at [24], [53]-[60]. The critical question is whether the moving party has persuaded the court that the opposing party has no reasonable prospect of success: Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126; (2011) 203 FCR 293 at [17].

[8]    The meaning of reasonable prospect of success in this provision was considered in Spencer with the plurality, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ observing at [59]-[60]:

[59]    In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like “clearly”, “manifestly” or “obviously”) as “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty”. But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word “reasonable”, in the phrase “no reasonable prospect”, be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty” claim.

[60]    Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success…

[9]    The inquiry required under s 31A is “not an enquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail”: Spencer at [52].

[10]    The assessment of whether a proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success necessitates the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the Court: Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401 at [28].

[11]    Rule 26.01 provides for circumstances in which a party can make an application to the Court for summary judgment which relevantly includes where the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding: r 26.01(a); where proceedings are vexatious or an abuse of process: r 26.01(b); and where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed: r 26.01(c).

Submissions

7    The respondent submitted they provided the applicant with two separate opportunities to amend the flaws in his originating application alongside detailed guidance on how to improve his application (including how he should better particularise his claims). It was submitted that the applicant’s pleadings fail to articulate the statutory gateways by which the Court’s jurisdiction is engaged for many of the heads of relief (which are broad and declaratory in nature) nor how the elements of any compensatory or penalty claim are satisfied. The respondent read the affidavit of Ms Lucy Shanahan affirmed 27 November 2025 addressing inter alia, their correspondence with Mr Brookhouse.

8    To establish Mr Brookhouse has no reasonable prospects of success, the respondent made the following submissions. First, the public-sector governance statutes invoked by the applicant (i.e. the PGPA Act, ABC Act, Archives Act and Public Service Act) do not confer actionable private rights enabling declaratory or compensatory relief by an individual employee.

9    Second, the applicant has no standing to bring alleged breaches of the Privacy Act directly to the Court. The applicant would need to bring a claim to the Office of Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) before the Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened to enforce an OAIC determination, but no OAIC determination is pleaded. Further, the respondent submitted the pleadings use vague phrases which do not translate into actionable Privacy Act contraventions.

10    Third, the applicant’s copyright/moral rights claims are not particularised as to the specific acts of infringement within the limitation period and do not identify the statutory relief sought beyond generalised declarations. Specifically, Mr Brookhouse did not engage with the express contract terms of his employment contract where clause 14 vests intellectual property into the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and includes a broad consent clause. As such, the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success on this basis.

11    Fourth, the respondent submitted the FW Act and employment scheme claims are incoherent, ambiguous and embarrassing so they cannot respond to them. Many of the applicant’s claims are not pleaded as material facts and there is no way to determine whether they fall outside the six-year limitation period. The applicant’s claims that rely on superseded legislation are also not maintainable.

12    The respondent further submitted that the proceeding is an abuse of process because the pleading aggregates wide-ranging and unparticularised grievances across two decades that is not capable of being answered in a fair or efficient way. Further, the applicant seeks to deploy the Court’s processes to ventilate matters relating to many statutes and persists with untenable causes of action despite targeted procedural guidance.

13    The applicant submitted the appropriate course of action is for the respondent to file a defence for the following reasons. First, summary dismissal is an exceptional remedy and should be exercised with caution given pleadings have not yet closed and the proceedings raised mixed questions of fact and law. Second, the respondent’s application proceeds on an all-or-nothing basis and it does not seek to strike out discrete claims, narrow issues or ask for further particulars. Third, it is not possible to resolve questions of jurisdiction, standing, limitation periods, sufficiency, proper construction and enforcement pathways of various statutes in a single interlocutory application. The applicant submitted the respondent’s approach asks the Court to prematurely adjudicate contested matters. In oral submissions, the applicant relied on his written submissions. In answer to questions, Mr Brookhouse maintained that the matter should be able to proceed in the ordinary manner (i.e. the respondent should file a defence, and the matter proceed thereafter). He submitted he was willing to make “targeted adjustments” to the pleadings and would comply with any direction from the Court.

Consideration

14    I am mindful of the difficulties faced by a litigant-in-person in this Court when attempting to file appropriate documents and make submissions. I have taken that into account when considering the manner in which the applicant made his submissions and the respondent’s application: see AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68; (2016) 241 FCR 30 at [37]-[42]; SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 at [37].

15    That said, there are fundamental flaws with the proceedings (as amended) commenced by the applicant. The applicant does not have standing to bring some claims or this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim contended or the claims stand no reasonable prospect of success.

16    I accept the respondent’s submission that, in relation to the pleadings in the FASOC about the public-sector governance statutes (the PGPA Act, ABC Act, Archives Act and Public Service Act), the applicant relies on them as though each confers actionable private rights enabling declaratory or compensatory relief by an individual employee, when they do not.

17    In relation to the PGPA Act, the applicant relies on ss 15-19 but those provisions impose duties on accountable authorities and Commonwealth officials as part of an internal framework. As the respondent submitted, there is no express private right for individuals to sue for breach of these duties. If any, the provisions are upheld through public accountability mechanisms, not private claims by employees.

18    In relation to the ABC Act, the applicant relies on s 33 which relates to appointments and engagements. However, s 6(4) of the ABC Act provides that the functions provision of the managing director of the ABC does not impose a duty enforceable by court proceedings. Section 33 does not confer a justiciable individual right to sue.

19    In relation to the Archives Act, it contains provisions relating to specific access, with review mechanisms (including Administrative Appeals Tribunal review) for defined administrative decisions. There is no general cause of action for alleged systemic record-keeping contraventions. Nothing in the FASOC identifies any decision that can be judicially reviewed, nor the statutory gateway for relief in this Court.

20    In relation to the Public Service Act, it does not apply to the ABC or its employees. In any event, it does not create private rights for individual employees to sue in this Court for the kinds of matters alleged.

21    In relation to the Privacy Act, the respondent is correct that the applicant has no standing to bring alleged breaches of the Privacy Act directly to the Court. The applicant would need to bring a claim to the OAIC before the Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened to enforce an OAIC determination, but no OAIC determination is pleaded. Further, as the respondent submitted, the pleadings use vague phrases which do not translate into actionable Privacy Act contraventions.

22    As explained in Saffari v Latitude Financial Services Australia Holdings Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 573 at [39]-[40] and DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 3) [2019] FCA 1488 at [152]-[154], the mechanism for redress for an interference with the privacy of an individual in breach of the Privacy Act is by way of a complaint under s 36 to the Information Commissioner in accordance with part V. If the complaint is upheld, the Privacy Act confers power on the Commissioner to make various declarations including that the complainant is entitled to a specified amount of compensation, which may be enforced under s 55A where the court is satisfied that the respondent has engaged in an interference with the complainant’s privacy. The Privacy Act does not have a provision that allows a breach of an Australian Privacy Principle to be directly actionable in this Court. There is no pleading that a determination has been made by the Information Commissioner and there is no application for enforcement pursuant to s 55A. Indeed, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that he has made no complaint to the Commissioner. The applicant has no prospect of success on this claim.

23    In relation to the NVETR Act, the applicant in cl 4.4 of the FASOC concedes that only the regulator can bring proceedings, and that he has no standing to bring a claim under that Act. Despite that, in his FASOC, the applicant nonetheless seeks a declaration the respondent had contravened the NVETR Act. His explanation for relying on the NVETR Act in those circumstances was that he cited causes of actions in other legislation in the FASOC to support “the other explanation of conduct under the FW Act”. That provides no proper explanation for seeking a declaration for contravening the NVETR Act, when the applicant accepted he has no standing to do so. Rather, it is illustrative of the applicant’s approach to the FASOC, and the issues that flow. For example, the applicant lists legislation in the FASOC and requests the Court, through its “supervisory role”, to “identify the most appropriate statutory and equitable remedies”.

24    In relation to each of the above claims, there are no reasonable prospects of success.

25    Although the applicant has standing in the remaining claims, the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success on the pleadings.

26    In relation to the copyright claims, as the respondent submitted, the claims remain unparticularised as to specific acts and they do not identify the statutory relief sought beyond generalised declarations. The applicant does not properly engage with the terms of his contract which govern intellectual property and moral rights. In so far as the applicant acknowledged the contract, it is alleged the contract is ineffective, referring to ss 195AW, 195AWA and 195AWB of the Copyright Act, “including because it was obtained through duress, coercion and/ false or misleading representations”. However, there is no basis pleaded for those assertions. Rather, the highest the pleading rises to is generalised conclusory allegations with no particularised basis. In so far as the applicant claimed that the intellectual property terms of the contract, which are said to be ineffective, is part of the respondent’s “coercive and misleading conduct” under the FW Act, the generalised nature of the claim is addressed further below. Further, if this is about credit for his work, there is no particularisation of what works he should be credited for, how he was miscredited or not credited and what the credit should have been. There is nothing but generalised allegations in the FASOC. There is no basis pleaded for any of the assertions, which also appear to cover over 20 years.

27    In relation to the FW Act, the applicant alleges a continuous course of contraventions, including contraventions of ss 340-343 (adverse action and coercion), 345 (false or misleading representation of employment relationship), 357 (misrepresenting employment as independent contracting arrangement) and its predecessors, between 2004 and 2022. The applicant pleads the conduct “traverses successive industrial and statutory regimes” including legislation no longer in force. I accept the respondent’s submission that given the nature of the claims, s 544 of the FW Act is engaged, which imposes a six-year limitation period. That is, a person can only apply for an order in relation to a contravention if the application is made within six years after the day of the contravention. The assertions in relation to these claims are at the most general level and cover over 20 years of employment. For example, the FASOC alleges “ongoing misclassification, coercion, concealment and misrepresentation comprised a deliberate and continuous course of conduct within the meaning of s 557 of the FW Act and amounted to serious and systematic contraventions as defined in s 557A, extending across the entire period” of his employment: and see [28] below. However, no contraventions are pleaded in any sufficient detail. As the respondent submitted, the FASOC does not address the “who, what, when, where” of the alleged false or misleading representations, the workplace rights allegedly exercised and the adverse action or coercion said to have occurred. The limitation period was brought to the applicant’s attention by the respondent in correspondence dated 27 October 2025. At the same time, further particulars (beyond the further and better particulars filed on 20 October 2025) were sought in relation to the matters referred to above. None were provided. Despite the respondent’s guidance, the FASOC was filed with neither issue being addressed. When asked during the hearing as to how he said the FASOC sets out a reasonably arguably claim under the FW Act, the applicant did not explain his claim, but rather said he relied on his written submissions, which as explained below does not address the claims.

28    Further, as a general observation in respect to the claims, the FASOC consists of high level general conclusory assertions. For example, the FASOC refers to, amongst other things, “covert reference instruments”, “hidden reference instruments” and “covert administrative decisions” and asserts that the employment scheme “maintained concealed or hidden reference instruments, assigned unauthorised occupational aliases, and generated inconsistent payroll and personnel data”. The applicant also asserted that many covert instruments and internal systems describe the respondent as the “ABC” rather than the Australian Broadcasting Corporation which disguised the legal nature of documents such that it was opaque. General assertions of this nature, with no further identifying details or information of their contents are the basis of his claims. The claims are incoherent, ambiguous and embarrassing. The applicant has failed to plead any material facts. He has failed to articulate with any particularity any of the claims. On being prompted during oral submissions, the applicant also failed to articulate any particularised basis for his claim. I accept the respondent’s submission that the statement of claim “aggregates wide-ranging, unparticularised grievances across two decades into a case that is not capable of being answered in a fair or efficient way”. The pleadings do not satisfy the general tenets of pleadings. That is, the respondent is not informed of the case they have to meet. They are not pleadings to which a defence could be filed.

29    As explained earlier, the applicant submitted that it is not possible to resolve questions of jurisdiction, standing, limitation periods, sufficiency, proper construction and enforcement pathways, at this early stage. However, where a point of law has to be decided and the judge is satisfied this can be done, thereby avoiding the necessity and expense of a trial, they are entitled to determine the point on such an application: see Williams & Humbert v W & H Trade Marks [1986] AC 368. Most of the flaws are fundamental matters such as jurisdiction and standing, which in the circumstances, can be determined at this stage. These are not contestable matters.

30    The respondent submitted failure after ample opportunity to plead a reasonable cause of action may suggest that none exists and therefore the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success: White Industries Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; (2007) 160 FCR 298 at [47]; Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] FCA 53 at [18].

31    I note the applicant’s submission that the respondent did not seek to strike out discrete claims or narrow the issues or ask for better particulars. Although the first part might be correct, the second is not. The detailed communication to the applicant from the respondent did that. It was in that context the respondent brought this application.

32    The applicant has had repeated opportunities to address the pleading issues. In addition to the initial originating application and statement of claim, the applicant has, as a result of orders of the Court, filed further and better particulars and a FASOC. The order for that FASOC was made at a case management hearing in circumstances where the further and better particulars were at a level of generality that they were of no assistance. That was explained to the applicant, and that in filing a FASOC he needed to consider amongst other things, whether he has standing to bring some claims and whether any claims are time barred. These issues were in a context where the respondent has in correspondence identified issues with the further and better particulars he had filed. In doing so the respondent provided the applicant with an explanation of what needs to be further particularised and specified the claims for which the applicant lacked standing, referring to the relevant provisions in the various pieces of legislation. The correspondence also sets out material that is required for pleadings in this Court. The degree of detail was to assist the applicant. There has also been requests for further particulars by the respondent. It was in those circumstances the applicant filed the FASOC in its current form. It appears that the applicant did not consider any of the issues raised by the respondent. Further, in written and oral submissions on this application, the applicant did not provide any further details or particulars of his claims. Indeed, as referred to above, when asked to explain what his claims under the FW Act are, he did not explain his claim, but rather said he relied on his written submission. However, his written submissions makes it plain he did not propose to “seek to litigate the merits of the proceeding” which he considered inappropriate on the application. The applicant accordingly did not address any of the respondent’s submissions as to the issues with any of the claims. The applicant’s submissions did not address the basis of his claims. He chose not to explain his claims in the face of the respondent’s criticisms. That was an approach he maintained in oral submissions. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that no further opportunity should be given to the applicant to further amend the statement of claim.

33    I am conscious of the nature of an application for summary judgment, and that the discretion should be exercised with caution. However, in my view, the respondent has established that there is no reasonable prospect of success on the matters as pleaded in the FASOC. Accordingly, the respondent has succeeded in its application for summary dismissal, and the proceedings are dismissed.

Costs

34    The respondent submitted that costs are governed by s 570 of the FW Act rather than this Court’s general power to award costs under s 43 of the FCA Act. Section 570 of the FW Act implicitly presumes that parties to such proceedings will bear their own costs unless the Court is satisfied: the party instituted the proceedings vexatiously or without reasonable cause; the party’s unreasonable act or omission caused the other party to incur the costs; or the party unreasonably refused to participate in a matter before the Fair Work Commission and the matter arose from the same facts as the proceedings. Once s 570 is enlivened, the matter falls within the discretion conferred by part 40 of the FCR. Specifically, r 40.04 provides for costs on an interlocutory application or hearing and provides that if no order for costs is made in an interlocutory application or hearing, costs will either follow the event or will be costs in the cause of the successful part of the proceeding.

35    The respondent submitted that the applicant’s refusal to meaningfully amend his statement of claim, in the face of the respondent’s identification of its defects, and his continued pursuit of those issues was unreasonable and caused the respondent to incur costs unnecessarily. The respondent submitted if the Court is satisfied of the requirements of s 570, the applicant should pay the respondent’s costs of the interlocutory application on a party and party basis, consistent with the default position established by r 40.04.

36    The applicant opposed an order for costs.

37    The premise of the submission is primarily based on the applicant’s unreasonable act causing the respondent to incur the costs of this application. The application only relates to the costs of the summary dismissal application. I accept that the submission must be considered in the context of the litigant representing himself. However, as explained above, the applicant continued to press claims regardless of being on notice about fundamental issues with the claims. He did not provide any appropriate detail of those claims after issues had been raised. There appears to have been no meaningful engagement by the applicant with the issues raised in relation to the earlier further and better particulars, or his FASOC.

38    I am persuaded that the respondent has established that the costs of the application should be paid by the applicant.

Conclusion

39    The respondent has established its application and the proceedings are to be summarily dismissed. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be agreed or assessed.

Associate:

Dated:    2 June 2026