Federal Court of Australia

First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) [2026] FCA 633

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The time in Order 3 of the Orders dated 5 March 2026, in so far as it applies to the first to third respondents be extended until 5 June 2026.

2.    If the first to third respondents, or any one or more of them, fail to file and serve a defence to the statement of claim by 5 June 2026, the applicant has leave to file an application for default judgment.

3.    The first to third respondents pay the applicant’s costs of their interlocutory application filed on 11 May 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GOODMAN J:

1    These reasons for judgment address an application by the first to third respondents for an extension of time in which to file their defences. The background to the application is set out in First Class Securities Limited v Global Future Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 632 (FSC v GFH (No 2)) at [2], and for ease of reference is repeated below:

(1)    the proceeding was commenced on 29 December 2025;

(2)    on 5 January 2026, Shariff J made a freezing order with respect to the assets of the first to third respondents. That order, which remains in place, includes an exception for reasonable legal expenses;

(3)    on 5 March 2026, orders were made for the applicant to file and serve its statement of claim by 20 March 2026 and for the first to third respondents to file and serve their defences by 22 April 2026;

(4)    the applicant’s statement of claim was filed on 20 March 2026, but the first to third respondents’ defences were not filed by 22 April 2026. Instead, they brought an application for an extension of time to file those defences. On 23 April 2026, an order was made extending the time to 6 May 2026; and

(5)    the extended timetable was also not met. Instead, on 11 May 2026, the first to third respondents filed an interlocutory application seeking an extension of time until 15 June 2026 to file their defences.

2    The application was heard on 20 May 2026.

3    The application falls to be determined in circumstances where the first to third respondents rely only upon the affidavit evidence of their solicitor. The applicant relies upon the affidavits of its solicitor affirmed on 14, 19 and 20 May 2026.

4    The other foreshadowed evidence from the first to third respondents – affidavits of the third respondent and Dr Kenneth Norman (see FSC v GFH (No 2) at [2(5)] and [3]) – was not relied upon after I acceded to an application by counsel for the applicant that he be permitted to cross-examine those deponents. I did so, conscious that the discretion to allow cross-examination on an interlocutory application is to be exercised sparingly, but having formed the view that it was appropriate in this case in circumstances where: (1) the proposed areas of cross-examination were distinct from the issues to be determined on the pleadings, with the result that the cross-examiner was unlikely to obtain an unfair advantage from the cross-examination; and (2) the only objection to the proposed cross-examination was as to the timing of the notice given, and in my view adequate notice had been provided.

5    I then adjourned the hearing to allow counsel for the first to third respondents to make arrangements for the third respondent and Dr Norman to be available for cross-examination. Upon resumption, counsel for the first to third respondents indicated that the third respondent had a medical appointment and Dr Norman was in “back to back” meetings. I then offered the indulgence of allowing the third respondent and Dr Norman to make themselves available at 9:45 am on 21 May 2026. After a further brief adjournment, counsel for the first to third respondents indicated that she would not rely upon the affidavits of third respondent and Dr Norman.

6    The relevant evidence of the first to third respondents’ solicitor is that he does not hold funds in trust.

7    There is no explanation for the failure of the first to third respondents to file their defences by 22 April 2026 and then by 6 May 2026. The absence of any explanation weighs heavily against an exercise of the discretion favourable to the first to third respondents, particularly in view of the obligations upon those respondents to conduct the proceeding consistent with the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions, namely as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible – as required by s 37N(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

8    Other factors informing the exercise of the discretion are:

(1)    the time that has passed since 20 March 2026 when the statement of claim was filed;

(2)    the first to third respondents’ non-compliance with previous orders for the filing of defences, and the absence of an explanation for such non-compliance;

(3)    the absence of evidence as to any inability of the first to third respondents to pay for the preparation of their defences;

(4)    the absence of direct prejudice to the applicant in the sense that the extension sought will not endanger any interlocutory or final hearing dates; and the applicant has the benefit of the freezing orders. Nevertheless I accept that the extension would further delay the resolution of the proceeding and that there is prejudice in that general sense;

(5)    the fact that the first to third respondents’ solicitor and counsel have represented them for some time. Their solicitor first appeared on 9 January 2026 and their counsel first appeared on 4 February 2026. It may reasonably be assumed that they have some familiarity with the issues raised in the statement of claim (which, as noted above, was filed on 20 March 2026); and

(6)    the allegations in the statement of claim are serious allegations (see FCS v GFH (No 2) at [1]). However, it does not follow that any defences require the involvement of senior counsel. There is no suggestion that the first to third respondents’ solicitor and counsel are unable properly to prepare defences.

9    Taking all of the above matters into account, I am prepared to provide the first to third respondents with the indulgence of a further short extension of time. I will order that the time for the filing of their defences be extended to 5 June 2026. I will also order that, should the defences not be filed by that date, the applicant has leave to apply for default judgment. In circumstances where the application is the consequence of unexplained delays on the part of the first to third respondents and they have been granted the indulgence of a further extension of time, they should pay the applicant’s costs of the application. I will make orders accordingly.

Associate:

Dated:    21 May 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES