Federal Court of Australia

Ogbonna v Young [2026] FCA 610

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for review be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BANKS-SMITH J:

1    Mr Celestine Ogbonna seeks judicial review of a decision of a Registrar of this Court to refuse to accept for filing three documents:

(1)    an originating application;

(2)    a statement of claim with attached Bundle of documents; and

(3)    an affidavit in support.

2    The documents were lodged on 14 October 2025. On 24 October 2025 Mr Ogbonna was informed by Letter from the National Duty Registrar that he had decided to refuse to accept the documents for filing.

3    I have taken the application for review to be made pursuant to r 31.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and s 11(1) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). Mr Ogbonna also referred to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) but made no submissions in that regard.

4    Mr Ogbonna filed an affidavit and submissions in support of his application for review and did not seek a hearing. The registry communicated with Mr Ogbonna on a number of occasions to inform him that I proposed to determine the application on the papers, and he agreed to this course.

Documents sought to be filed and relevant statutory provisions

Proposed originating application

5    By the proposed originating application Mr Ogbonna sought to commence proceedings against the ‘Government of Western Australia’ (I take this to mean the State of Western Australia) and a named police Officer. He sought an extension of time under the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) to commence an action for defamation, and damages for defamation under the Defamation Act 2005 (WA). Any question as to whether this Court would have jurisdiction for such action is not addressed by this application.

Proposed statement of claim

6    Mr Ogbonna’s proposed statement of claim sets out (amongst other things) the basis upon which he seeks to pursue the defamation proceedings. He seeks to pursue the State and the Officer for defamation and damages based on the production of certain police reports to the Family Court of Western Australia on 17 February 2025.

7    Although it is not entirely clear, it appears the police reports that are the source of Mr Ogbonna’s complaint are within the Bundle attached to the statement of claim.

8    The Bundle includes three categories of documents.

9    The first category are documents that appear to be screenshots or photos taken of a computer screen of four police incident reports, a ‘person summary’ and an extract of a restraining order. Versions of these documents are also attached to the statement of claim by way of the third category of documents (see below). It is unclear from the purported statement of claim how these documents have been viewed or copied by Mr Ogbonna. The documents copied bear a watermark ‘draft’ and a note in the footer that they were compiled by the Officer on 17 February 2025.

10    The second is a letter to Mr Ogbonna from the Family Court dated 31 July 2025 referring to a Court order made by a judge of the Family Court on 31 July 2025, and said to attach an exhibit entitled ‘ICL 4’. Nothing marked ‘ICL 4’ is attached to the letter in the Bundle. It is possible that it is the document described at category three below. Nothing turns on whether the attachment was that document, or whether Mr Ogbonna obtained it separately.

11    The third category document is headed ‘Western Australia Police Force Interagency Information/Interagency Access Information Request’. The Information Request states that the information has been requested under legislation, being s 67ZBE of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). It is dated 17 February 2025 and attaches what appear on their face to be extracted records from police data that are separately described as History for Court, List of Charges, Incident Reports, Restraining Orders and Person Summary. Not all documents referred to in the Information Request are included in the Bundle. To the extent the documents replicate those in category one, they appear to be relevantly the same, but do not bear the ‘draft’ watermark and instead bear a ‘confidential’ watermark.

12    In the proposed statement of claim, the only publication said to have been made by the Officer of which Mr Ogbonna complains is the provision of the ‘fabricated documents’ to the Family Court in response to the Information Request under s 67ZBE ([8], [10], [13], [21], [23] and [26] of proposed statement of claim).

13    Separately, Mr Ogbonna pleads that on 13 October 2025 there was publication of the ‘fabricated documents’ to third parties including the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, to members of Parliament and to Attorneys General, and was published to recipients throughout Australia. However, it is not pleaded that the proposed respondents undertook such publication. Rather, based on an email chain that is also included in the Bundle, such publication was made by an email of that date which purportedly attached the Information Request documents, and which was emailed to some 225 third party addressees by Mr Joseph Ogbonna ‘on behalf of the extended Ogbonna family’. That conduct was self-evidently not publication by the respondents. On the face of the documents it appears that Joseph Ogbonna is Mr Ogbonna’s brother.

14    More generally, Mr Ogbonna asserts that the police reports published to the Family Court were fabricated. He asserts that the Officer’s conduct in lodging ‘fabricated documents’ with the Family Court was done ‘maliciously, corruptly and in deliberate disregard of lawful authority’ and was not conduct undertaken honestly or in good faith in the performance of police duties.

15    There are neither pleaded facts nor any evidence in the affidavit filed with the proposed originating application or statement of claim that informs these bare and scandalous allegations made by Mr Ogbonna.

16    Rather, having regard to the documents on their face, they indicate that the Officer provided the police records in compliance with an order made by the Family Court under s 67ZBE of the Family Law Act.

17    The proposed statement of claim also contains numerous unsubstantiated allegations by the respondents of falsification of documents, attempts to pervert the course of justice, fabrication of evidence and other conduct said to constitute criminal offences. Mr Ogbonna claims the Officer is liable for torts and that the Treasurer of the State should pay damages. The proposed statement of claim includes a section that alleges republication of material said to be defamatory by publication of a judgment by the Family Court and by an affidavit provided by Mr Ogbonna in Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia proceedings and appeals. In these paragraphs it is entirely unclear who has purportedly republished material.

Proposed affidavit

18    The affidavit addresses what Mr Ogbonna describes as the reason for delay in commencing the defamation proceedings. The affidavit refers to publication being in October 2022 and 2023. However, that is not what is pleaded in the proposed statement of claim. What is pleaded is publication in February 2025.

19    However, for completeness I note that Mr Ogbonna states he first became aware of the ‘publication’ on 6 June 2025. In support of this, he attaches a copy of a ‘Subpoena Office information sheet’ signed by him on 6 June 2025.

20    The attachment appears to be a standard information sheet that the Family Court gives to a person who is inspecting documents that have been provided to the Family Court. It states in effect that Mr Ogbonna is a party to proceedings in the Family Court; that material has been produced to the Court by people or organisations in response to a subpoena issued by the Court that required the material to be produced; and that Mr Ogbonna has been given permission to inspect the subpoenaed material. The information sheet sets out the obligations of a person who inspects such documents, including that they are only to be used for the purpose of the particular court case. The form was signed by Mr Ogbonna on 6 June 2025. I assume Mr Ogbonna’s position is that he inspected the documents produced in compliance with the Family Court order once he signed this form. Nothing in the proposed affidavit goes to or advances the merits of the underlying claim in the proposed originating application and the proposed statement of claim. I note that Mr Ogbonna also claimed in an affidavit in support of this review application that he does not require an extension of time in any event, as a matter of law.

Applicable framework for Registrar’s decision

21    Under r 2.26 a Registrar may refuse to accept a document if the Registrar is satisfied that the document is an abuse of the process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious.

22    In assessing whether a document answers these criteria, the Registrar may have regard to the face of the document. The Registrar may also refer to any documents already filed or submitted for filing with the document.

23    In Bizuneh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 42; (2003) 128 FCR 353, the Full Court described the former analogous rule (O 46 r 7A), observing that (at [15]):

The purpose of r 7A is to assist the Registrar to maintain efficient operation of a registry and, thereby, the Court. Even without a rule in the terms of r 7A it may be thought that it would be implied that a Registrar would have the power, or be under a duty, to protect

court procedures from abuse by refusing to accept a document for lodgment or filing which, on its face, would be an abuse of court process or frivolous or vexatious.

24    In Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2021] FCA 592 at [29]-[30], White J addressed in detail the composite phrase ‘an abuse of process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious’, concluding:

[29]    In Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808, McKerracher J discussed the meaning of the terms “vexatious” and “frivolous” appearing in r 26.01(1) of the FCR. His Honour said:

[35]    The expressions ‘scandalous’, ‘vexatious’ and ‘frivolous’ can be used either separately, or in conjunction, or interchangeably, with the expression ‘abuse of process of the court’ …

[36]    A matter is ‘frivolous and vexatious’ where the ‘cause of action is one which on the face of it is clearly one which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide, and contend that he had a grievance which he was entitled to bring before the court’ …

[37]    In relation to the term ‘frivolous’:

(a)    a matter that is ‘frivolous’ may be described as one that is ‘without substance or groundless or fanciful’ …;

(b)    a proceeding will be ‘frivolous’ where, despite whatever attempts are made to discern a cause of action in the case, it is still not arguable …; and

(c)    ‘frivolous’ may also describe a situation where a party is trifling with the Court or wasting the Court’s time …

[38]    In relation to the term ‘vexatious’:

(a)    a ‘vexatious’ proceeding is one without foundation, which cannot succeed, or is brought for an ulterior and collateral purpose. ‘Vexatious’ might also describe proceedings that are seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging …;

(b)    proceedings may also be described as ‘vexatious’ where they impose on a respondent party an unnecessary injustice in the form of a burden other than, and additional to, the burden necessarily imposed on a party to litigation instituted on reasonable grounds for the purpose of obtaining relief within the scope of the available remedy …;

(c)    a proceeding is to be regarded as ‘vexatious’ where:

(i)     it is instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom the proceeding is brought; or

(ii)    it is brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which it gives rise; or

(iii)    irrespective of the motive of the litigant, the proceeding is so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless …; and

(d)    ‘vexatiousness’ is a quality of the proceeding rather than a litigant’s intention, so that the question is not whether the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously but whether the legal proceedings are in fact vexatious …

(Citations omitted)

[30]    As is apparent, a proceeding will be frivolous and vexatious if, amongst other things, it is based on a cause of action which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide or if it is without substance, groundless, or fanciful …

25    The Full Court in Ferdinands v Registrar Cridland [2022] FCAFC 80 at [8] referred to White J’s review in Ferdinands of the meaning of the components with approval. There have been many other cases where the Court has similarly approved such descriptions of the terms.

26    A decision by a Registrar to refuse to accept a document for filing under r 2.26 is an administrative decision. The Full Court in Nyoni v Murphy [2018] FCAFC 75; (2018) 261 FCR 164 at [38] described the Registrar’s function as follows (at [38]):

… a Registrar acting under r 2.26 does not have power to adjudicate under the substantive law whether an application that a party seeks to bring is an abuse of process (or is frivolous or vexatious). The Registrar has no judicial power to determine substantively whether a claim must be dismissed because it is an abuse of process (or is frivolous or vexatious). Rather, r 2.26 is the means by which an administrative requirement is expressed that all documents filed in the Registry must not in their form and content (irrespective of any substantive assessment of their merit) be an abuse of the process of the Court or frivolous or vexatious …

27    Because a refusal decision is administrative in character it is subject to review pursuant to s 5(1) of the ADJR Act: Nyoni at [32]-[37].

The Registrar’s decision

28    The Registrar informed Mr Ogbonna in the Letter of the meaning of the terms ‘abuse of process’, ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious’ by refence to established authority, relevantly referring to the extracts from Ferdinands included above.

29    The Registrar then set out his decision. The Registrar stated that having carefully considered the content of the documents ‘as lodged’, he had determined that they should not be accepted for filing. The Registrar stated that he was of the view that the documents on their face are an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious and inevitably destined to fail if they were to be accepted for filing.

Consideration

30    Mr Ogbonna filed submissions in which he relied upon s 5(1)(f) and (h), and s 5(2)(g) and (j) of the ADJR Act. By inference he also relied upon s 5(1)(e).

31    Those provisions are relevantly as follows:

5    Applications for review of decisions

(1)    A person who is aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies that is made after the commencement of this Act may apply to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court for an order of review in respect of the decision on any one or more of the following grounds:

…

(e)    that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made;

(f)    that the decision involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision;

…

(h)    that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision;

…

(2)    The reference in paragraph (1)(e) to an improper exercise of a power shall be construed as including a reference to:

…

(g)    an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power;

…

(j)    any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power.

32    Mr Ogbonna submitted that his defamation claim constitutes a reasonable cause of action. As explained below, this submission does not accommodate the defence of absolute privilege. An entitlement on the part of the respondents to rely on that defence is apparent on the face of the documents because Mr Ogbonna’s documents disclose that the documents were provided to the Family Court in compliance with a court order. Furthermore, the statement of claim includes numerous scandalous and unsubstantiated allegations as to alleged corruption and criminal activity, and irrelevant commentary as to reporting of complaints to other bodies, which it appears have been included for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of having the Court adjudicate on a defamation claim. Such matters are vexatious and impugn the proposed statement of claim as a whole.

33    Mr Ogbonna submitted that there was no evidence or other material before the decision maker capable of supporting the decision. It is to be remembered that a Registrar reaches a view as to their satisfaction for the purpose of an administrative decision under r 2.26 on the face of the documents before them.

34    Mr Ogbonna made generalised submissions that the Registrar’s decision-making constituted an abuse of power and that the decision was ‘affected by jurisdictional error including unreasonableness’. Such submissions did not descend into any detail and there was nothing on the face of the documents or the Letter that would reveal such allegations have any substance.

35    Mr Ogbonna submitted that the Registrar acted for an improper purpose and in bad faith. It appears that Mr Ogbonna simply disagrees with the decision of the Registrar and infers a malevolent intention without any foundation.

36    Mr Ogbonna submitted that the Registrar misunderstood the applicable test. I do not agree. The Registrar referred to relevant authority and clearly understood that he was to have regard only to the face of the documents in reaching a state of satisfaction that the documents constitute an abuse of process or are vexatious or frivolous.

37    Mr Ogbonna submitted that the Registrar’s conclusion went beyond a permissible administrative assessment and constituted a determination of a judicial character. He submitted that the Registrar did not possess judicial power to determine whether a claim constitutes an abuse of process or lacks substantive merit. Mr Ogbonna in this context is referring (correctly) to the principle as summarised in Nyoni and referred to above at [26]. However, Mr Ogbonna has not persuaded me that the Registrar in making his decision has transgressed this divide.

38    The Registrar was aware of what was meant by the phrase ‘an abuse of process of the Court or is frivolous or vexatious’, including that a proceeding will be frivolous and vexatious if, amongst other things, it is based on a cause of action which no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide or if it is without substance, groundless, or fanciful. The Registrar cited authorities to this effect in the Letter. There is no reason to infer that the Registrar did not apply meanings of this kind to those terms when considering whether Mr Ogbonna’s proposed documents were frivolous or vexatious on their face.

39    The Registrar did not purport to make any substantive judgment about the underlying merits of a claim for relief. Perhaps (it was not clear) Mr Ogbonna suggests that use of the words ‘inevitably destined to fail’ might be taken to suggest that some judgment about the underlying merits of the case was made. But any such suggestion would reflect a superficial interpretation of those words within the Letter, made without proper regard to the context in which the words were used in the Letter and the other descriptors used by the Registrar. The Registrar expressly referred to the extract from Ferdinands which addressed the type of cause of action that might be frivolous and vexatious, observing (as already noted) that it includes one which ‘no reasonable person could properly treat as bona fide or if it is without substance, groundless, or fanciful’.

40    The Registrar undertook the task of considering, on the face of the documents, their nature. It is apparent from his decision that this was the administrative task undertaken. In a clear case such as this, no substantive judgment about the underlying merits of a cause of action was required in order for a decision-maker to be satisfied for the purpose of an administrative decision that Mr Ogbonna’s claims were without substance, groundless, or fanciful. In undertaking the assessment of the proposed claims, the Registrar sought to ensure compliance with procedural requirements, by refusing to accept for filing documents which on their face were frivolous or vexatious or would be an abuse of the Court’s process.

41    Mr Ogbonna also submitted that the Registrar refused to accept filing of the documents for reasons that constituted unlawful racial discrimination. Such submission is entirely without foundation and is itself scandalous and vexatious. Similarly, Mr Ogbonna’s allegation that the decision by the Registrar was ‘corrupt’ is scandalous and vexatious.

42    Mr Ogbonna has not established any error of law or that there was an absence of material to justify the making of the decision. No improper exercise of power is established. No exercise of power so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have exercised it is established. None of the grounds set out in the provisions of s 5 of the ADJR Act relied upon by Mr Ogbonna are established.

43    Finally, Mr Ogbonna submitted that the documents lodged were substantially in accordance with approved forms. This is not to the point. The Registrar’s decision was not based on procedural non-compliance, but on the content of the documents lodged.

44    Having considered Mr Ogbonna’s submissions, no reviewable error has been shown in relation to the state of satisfaction of the Registrar in deciding to refuse the lodged documents for filing. In particular I note the following matters.

45    The statement of claim includes scandalous and fanciful allegations, particularly allegations of criminal conduct and corruption, and commentary as to circulation of complaints, which can be taken to have been included in order to embarrass the respondents and are vexatious. The fact that the statement of claim annexes the email from Joseph Ogbonna that disseminated Mr Ogbonna’s complaints and the police reports produced to the Family Court to some 225 parties (parties who have no apparent relevant involvement in the proposed proceeding) is a further basis for drawing this inference.

46    Unquestionably on the face of the documents they were an abuse of process and it was appropriate that they be rejected (noting the proposed originating application and affidavit are inextricably linked to the proposed statement of claim and were not filed independently of it).

47    However, I further note that it is clear on the face of the documents that a defamation claim against a police officer that purports to rely on publication by compliance with a Family Court order is without substance, having regard to the well-recognised absolute privilege that pertains to the provision of evidence in judicial proceedings.

48    The police records were produced by the Officer to the Family Court in the context of judicial proceedings involving Mr Ogbonna. So much is properly inferred from the reference in the Information Request to s 67ZBE of the Family Law Act that forms part of the Bundle. Mr Ogbonna also refers to this provision in the body of his proposed statement of claim. The provision empowers the Court to order in identified proceedings an information sharing agency to produce to the Court any documents, and give the Court any information in the agency’s possession or control relating to matters mentioned in the section.

49    Prima facie, the fact that the Officer produced the documents in compliance with a Family Court order under s 67ZBE of the Family Law Act for the purpose of judicial proceedings accords the respondents a defence of absolute privilege in any defamation proceeding that relies on such publication.

50    Relevantly, s 27 of the Defamation Act 2005 (WA) provides:

27    Defence of absolute privilege

(1)    It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that it was published on an occasion of absolute privilege.

(2)    Without limiting subsection (1), matter is published on an occasion of absolute privilege if —

…

(b)    the matter is published in the course of the proceedings of an Australian court or Australian tribunal, including (but not limited to) —

(i)    the publication of matter in any document filed or lodged with, or otherwise submitted to, the court or tribunal (including any originating process);

(ii)    the publication of matter while giving evidence before the court or tribunal; and

(iii)    the publication of matter in any judgment, order or other determination of the court or tribunal;

51    This provision reflects the common law position, as enunciated in Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 at 211-212 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, citations omitted):

It is well settled that absolute privilege attaches to all statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, whether made by parties, witnesses, legal representatives, members of the jury or by the judge. It extends to oral statements and to statements in originating process, in pleadings or in other documents produced in evidence or filed in the proceedings.

It is said that it extends to any document published on an ‘occasion properly incidental [to judicial proceedings], and necessary for [them]’.

52    There is nothing on the face of the documents lodged for filing by Mr Ogbonna that suggests that such absolute privilege would not apply or would not be available to the proposed respondents. Rather, it is plain in those circumstances, having regard to the matters Mr Ogbonna sets out and on the face of the documents, that the prospect of Mr Ogbonna establishing defamation by such production to the Family Court is fanciful.

Other

53    For present purposes I have put to the side the relief sought in the proposed originating application for an extension of time based on any limitation period, as the real issue for consideration was the nature of the underlying proposed defamation claim and other matters set out in the proposed statement of claim. As the proposed proceeding was properly regarded as vexatious, there was no point in considering any extension for limitation purposes. And furthermore, as I noted above, by his affidavit filed in support of this application Mr Ogbonna contended that he no longer required an extension of time in any event.

Outcome

54    The application for review must be dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    15 May 2026