Federal Court of Australia

Lye v Commonwealth of Australia (as represented by the Bureau of Meteorology) [2026] FCA 594

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 17 April 2026 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

introduction

1    The respondent (the “Bureau”) is an emanation of the Commonwealth and the former employer of the applicant, Mr Lye. By a proceeding commenced in February 2026, Mr Lye charges the Bureau with various statutory contraventions related to his employment and its termination. By an interlocutory application dated 17 April 2026, he moves for interlocutory injunctive relief, seeking, amongst other things, that he be reinstated to his former position. It is to that application that the following reasons pertain.

2    Mr Lye’s interlocutory application is supported by affidavits that he affirmed on 6 February and 23 April 2026. The Bureau opposes the interlocutory application and, to that end, relies upon affidavits affirmed as follows, namely:

(1)    by Ms Clare Strange, solicitor, on 30 March 2026;

(2)    by Ms Bridie Andriske, General Manager, Organisational Resilience and General Counsel, on 30 April 2026;

(3)    by Ms Ella Harrison, General Manager, Flood Warning Infrastructure Network – Business Solutions Group, on 30 April 2026;

(4)    by Mr Tim Abrahams, General Manager, Organisational Development, on 1 May 2026; and

(5)    by Ms Astrid Heward, Group Executive – Enterprise Services, on 4 May 2026.

3    For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that Mr Lye has established a prima facie case for the relief for which he moves; and his delay in pursuing it inclines strongly against the court’s awarding it. Mr Lye’s interlocutory application of 17 April 2026 should and will be dismissed.

background

4    Mr Lye commenced his employment with the Bureau in January 2023 as a Senior Service Management Specialist in its Digital Data Services Branch. His employment appears to have been marked by escalating friction as between him and certain of his colleagues. Over its course, Mr Lye had occasion to avail himself of a number of complaints processes, both internal and external to the Bureau, and of varying degrees of formality. They included:

(1)    a claim that he made with the Commonwealth’s workers’ compensation authority (“Comcare”), lodged in March 2024 and accepted in October of that year, in relation to the aggravation of his pre-existing generalised anxiety disorder arising from his employment at the Bureau;

(2)    concerns that he raised in respect of the Bureau’s administration of his workers’ compensation claim and the rehabilitative and return-to-work steps that followed its approval;

(3)    complaints that he made about how the Bureau treated him as a person who had been diagnosed with physical and mental disabilities, including about its failures to implement the adjustments that he requested be made to accommodate those disabilities;

(4)    a disclosure that he made to Ms Heward in March 2025, by which he alleged that certain of the Bureau’s conduct in relation to his employment and disabilities amounted to disclosable conduct as defined by s 29 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth);

(5)    a report that he made (or threatened to make) to the Australian Federal Police in or around May 2025 alleging that a Bureau staff member had made false statements to Comcare; and

(6)    an application in the Fair Work Commission (the “FWC”), lodged in June 2025, seeking orders to require that several Bureau staff members stop bullying him.

5    The making of those complaints, or some of them, coincided with a disciplinary process that the Bureau commenced against Mr Lye. On 16 June 2025, Ms Heward effected his suspension—initially without pay—on the grounds that he was suspected of breaching the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (the “Code”). Ms Harrison was appointed to investigate the alleged breaches of the Code and to consider any consequences that might flow therefrom. On 20 October 2025, following the conclusion of that process, she notified Mr Lye of his dismissal. Mr Lye’s employment with the Bureau came to an end on 22 October 2025.

6    By his originating application dated 6 February 2026, Mr Lye moves for final relief in respect of (relevantly for present purposes) alleged contraventions by the Bureau of what are known as the General Protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“FW Act”). Mr Lye maintains that the Bureau effected his suspension and dismissal for reasons that the FW Act proscribes. Specifically, he contends that that conduct was variously animated by reason of his possession or exercise of certain “workplace rights” or, otherwise, was engaged in with intent to coerce him as to their exercise. The statutory injunctions against which he maintains that that conduct infringed are found in ss 340 and 343 of the FW Act.

7    The workplace rights upon which Mr Lye relies are as follows, namely:

(1)    that he was able to and did make complaints or enquiries in relation to his employment (including in respect of some or all of the complaints articulated at [4] above);

(2)    his right to participate in proceedings (including proceedings in the FWC) under workplace laws; and

(3)    rights that he contends that he possessed in relation to workplace health, safety, injury management, rehabilitation and the affording of “reasonable adjustments” to his work environment.

8    The interim reinstatement for which Mr Lye now moves is, he contended, required to preserve the status quo, to protect him from further irreparable harm and to ensure that his ability to prosecute his substantive proceeding is not undermined. He seeks ancillary orders as to the measures that the Bureau might take to accommodate his disabilities and rehabilitation, as to the payment of his salary and entitlements, and as to his access to workplace systems, email accounts and documents required for his role and the conduct of the proceeding. Even if the court is not minded to reinstate him to his position, he contended that equivalent orders with respect to his salary, access to documents and systems and access to the workplace and its personnel ought to be made.

Legal principles

9    The principles that govern the granting of interlocutory injunctive relief of the kind for which Mr Lye moves are uncontroversial. Mr Lye must demonstrate that he has a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 (“O’Neill”), 81-84 [65]-[72] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed). His prima facie case must have a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. The degree of likelihood that must be shown depends upon the nature of the rights asserted and the practical consequences that are likely to flow from the order sought: O’Neill, 82 [65]; Quinn v Overland (2010) 199 IR 40, 50 [45]-[46] (Bromberg J); and Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal and Allied Services Union of Australia v Dee Vee [2012] FCA 988, [17]-[18] (Tracey J).

10    When considering the grant of an interlocutory injunction, the issues of whether an applicant has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience and the interests of justice favour the grant of an injunction are related inquiries. The question of whether there is a serious question or a prima facie case should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238, 261 [67] (Dowsett, Foster and Yates JJ), citing, with approval, Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 81 IPR 339, 342 [15] (Sundberg J).

11    In Bullock v FFTSA (1985) 5 FCR 464, Woodward J (with whom Smithers and Sweeney JJ relevantly agreed) stated (at 472):

…[A]n apparently strong claim may lead a court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even. A more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises "a serious question to be tried") may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it.

12    Additionally, an applicant for interlocutory injunctive relief must, in showing that the balance of convenience favours that outcome, point to inconvenience for which an award of damages at trial would not be a sufficient remedy: Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148, 153 (Mason ACJ); Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Blue Star Pacific (2009) 184 IR 333, 339 (Greenwood J). That is not a third criterion upon which the granting of interlocutory relief hangs; rather, it forms part of the court’s assessment as to where the balance of convenience lies: Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Jugovic [2021] FCA 607, [283] (Beach J).

13    Assessing the existence (and strength) of a prima facie case here will require consideration of the substantive (final) relief for which Mr Lye moves. It is convenient, then, that attention might turn to the statutory provisions upon which that relief is sought.

14    Section 340(1) of the FW Act provides (and, at relevant times, provided) as follows:

340 Protection

(1)     A person must not take adverse action against another person:

(a)     because the other person:

(i)     has a workplace right; or

(ii)     has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or

(iii)     proposes or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or

(b)     to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.

Note: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).

15    Adverse action is defined by s 342 of the FW Act. It is not presently in doubt that Mr Lye’s suspension and dismissal each qualify as adverse action. Insofar as either might be seen to have been animated, or partly animated, by his possession or exercise of a workplace right or workplace rights, it will have been effected in contravention of s 340(1) of the FW Act.

16    Section 341 of the FW Act identifies when a person might be thought to possess a “workplace right”. Relevantly, it provides as follows:

341 Meaning of workplace right

Meaning of workplace right

(1)     A person has a workplace right if the person:

(a)    is entitled to the benefit of, or has a role or responsibility under, a workplace law, workplace instrument or order made by an industrial body; or

(b)     is able to initiate, or participate in, a process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument; or

(c)     is able to make a complaint or inquiry:

(i)     to a person or body having the capacity under a workplace law to seek compliance with that law or a workplace instrument; or

(ii)     if the person is an employee—in relation to his or her employment.

(2)    Each of the following is a process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument:

(a)    a conference conducted or hearing held by the FWC;

…

(k)    any other process or proceedings under a workplace law or workplace instrument.

…

17    Section 343(1) of the FW Act is concerned with coercion in the context of “workplace rights”. It provides (and provided) as follows, namely:

343 Coercion

(1)     A person must not organise or take, or threaten to organise or take, any action against another person with intent to coerce the other person, or a third person, to:

(a)     exercise or not exercise, or propose to exercise or not exercise, a workplace right; or

(b)     exercise, or propose to exercise, a workplace right in a particular way.

Note:     This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4-1).

18    In most General Protections matters, ss 360 and 361 of the FW Act assume some significance. They relevantly provide (and provided) as follows, namely:

360 Multiple reasons for action

For the purposes of this Part, a person takes action for a particular reason if the reasons for the action include that reason.

361 Reason for action to be presumed unless proved otherwise

(1)     If:

(a)     in an application in relation to a contravention of this Part, it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a particular intent; and

(b)     taking that action for that reason or with that intent would constitute a contravention of this Part;

it is presumed that the action was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise.

(2)    Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to orders for an interim injunction.

19    At trial, Mr Lye will have the benefit of the statutory presumption for which s 361(1) of the FW Act provides. It will (or very likely will), at that juncture, fall to the Bureau to establish that it did not take adverse or coercive action against him because, or for reasons that included that, he possessed or exercised a workplace right or workplace rights, or otherwise in aid of any intention that he should do so in a particular way or ways.

20    At the hearing of the present application, Mr Lye sought to avail himself of that presumption to establish the existence of his prima facie case. Although the issue has not always been free from doubt, it appears now to be accepted that a court considering an application for interlocutory injunctive relief cannot proceed in a way that takes account of the presumption for which s 361(1) provides: Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union (AMWU) v O-I Operations (Australia) Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1272, [48]-[52] (Snaden J); Weber v Thomas Foods International (Stawell) Pty Ltd (Interim Reinstatement) [2024] FCA 1506, [55] (Wheelahan J); Williams v Natural Solar Pty Ltd (Urgent Reinstatement Application) [2025] FCA 527, [41] (Needham J). Insofar as there remains non-binding authority adhering to the view expressed in the context of predecessor legislation in Police Federation v Nixon (2008) 168 FCR 340 (Ryan J), I respectfully consider that it is wrong and should not be followed. To take account of the statutory presumption in an application for interlocutory injunctive relief is to proceed as though it applies in that context. It doesn’t. Section 361(2) is very clear about that.

21    For reasons that will become apparent, it is convenient to set out two further provisions that, at relevant times, governed the circumstances in which Mr Lye was entitled to file his originating motion in this court. Sections 365 and 370 relevantly provide (and at the material time provided) as follows, namely:

365 Application for the FWC to deal with a dismissal dispute

If:

(a)    a person has been dismissed; and

(b)    the person, or an industrial association that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the person, alleges that the person was dismissed in contravention of this Part;

the person, or the industrial association, may apply to the FWC for the FWC to deal with the dispute.

…

370 Taking a dismissal dispute to court

A person who is entitled to apply under section 365 for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute unless:

(a)    both of the following apply:

(i)    the FWC has issued a certificate under paragraph 368(3)(a) in relation to the dispute;

(ii)    the general protections court application is made within 14 days after the day the certificate is issued, or within such period as the court allows on an application made during or after those 14 days; or

(b)    the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction.

…

PRIMA FACIE CASE

22    There can be no serious doubt that, by suspending him and later terminating his employment, the Bureau subjected Mr Lye to adverse action. At issue presently is whether there is a prima facie basis for supposing that it did so for a reason or reasons that might suffice to engage either or both of ss 340(1) or 343(1) of the FW Act.

23    As is typical in applications of this nature, Mr Lye led no direct evidence that any of the action to which he was subjected was visited upon him for a reason or with an intention that the FW Act proscribes. Instead, he contended that the court ought to infer that the relevant limbs of ss 340(1) and 343(1) are satisfied—or that there is a strong prima facie case that they might be—from the basic chronology set out above at [4]-[5]. In those respects, he was at pains to emphasise that his suspension was first effected only one or two days after service upon the Bureau of his application to the FWC for orders that his colleagues stop bullying him. The timing, he said, was not coincidental.

24    There is, perhaps, another basis upon which Mr Lye submitted that the court might draw an inference as to the Bureau’s intent or state of mind. He pointed to various of the circumstances that attended his suspension and dismissal that, he maintained, might give the court cause reasonably to infer that the reasons for which the Bureau said that it effected those outcomes were not its real reasons, or were not its only reasons.

25    Before exploring that contention, something might be said about the Bureau’s evidence. The Bureau’s affidavit material was directed to the mechanics and causes of Mr Lye’s suspension and dismissal. Its evidence—necessarily untested at this juncture—was that Mr Lye’s suspension and subsequent dismissal were actuated not by any complaints that he had made but by reason of the unnecessarily personal, aggressive and persistent way in which they were pursued.

26    Each of the relevant decision makers—Ms Heward and Ms Harrison—identified why it was that they made the decisions that they made in respect of Mr Lye’s employment. Ms Heward confirmed that her reasons were those set out in letters advising Mr Lye of his initial suspension and the subsequent decisions that she made to continue it. It is convenient to extract aspects of the first such letter, dated 16 June 2025 (emphases original):

3.    Grounds for deciding to suspend you

3.1    I believe that you may have breached the follow [sic] elements of the Code:

(a)    Section 13(3) of the [Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (“PS Act”)]:

An APS employee, when acting in connection with APS employment, must treat everyone with respect and courtesy, and without harassment.

I believe that you may have been disrespectful, discourteous and harassing towards Bureau employees dealing with your claim for workers' compensation and rehabilitation by:

(i)    alleging, without foundation, that many of these employees have acted criminally or illegally, have acted for an improper purpose or have victimised you;

(ii)    repeatedly escalating concerns and grievances without foundation (internal to the Agency and externally) about these Bureau employees' behaviours and capabilities.

[and Ms Heward here identified the relevant Bureau employees and examples of the communications with them upon which she relied]

…

(b)    Section 13(4) of the PS Act.

An APS employee, when acting in connection with APS employment, must comply with all applicable Australian laws.

Under s 28 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) (WHS Act):

“While at work, a worker must:

…

(b)    take reasonable care that his or her acts or omissions do not adversely affect the health and safety of other persons;”

A safe workplace is one where all employees of the Bureau may attend work, without having their competency, integrity and character unfairly diminished by other employees. Such disrespectful, discourteous and harassing behaviour towards employees may cause them stress. When stress is prolonged or severe, it poses a risk of harm.

Accordingly, it may be the case that you have not taken reasonable care that your acts do not adversely affect the health and safety of other persons, as required by s 28 of the WHS Act.

(c)    Section 13(11) of the PS Act.

An APS employee must at all times behave in a way that upholds:

(a)    the APS Values and APS Employment Principles; ...

I believe that your conduct mentioned above is also behaviour that may not uphold the APS Employment Principles in relation to the following:

(i)    "The APS is a career-based public service that makes fair employment decisions with a fair system of review": see s 10A(1)(a) of the PS Act.

Being disrespectful, discourteous and harassing towards employees making decisions in relation to your employment adversely impacts their ability to make fair decisions about your employment on the merits of the matter, due to likelihood of being further harassed if you simply disagree with their decision.

In this respect, I acknowledge that you may have review or appeal rights in relation to actions taken in relation to your employment, and that it is appropriate for you to reasonably raise concerns or questions about decisions that affect you.

(ii)    “The APS is a career-based public service that provides ... safe and rewarding workplaces”: see s 10A(1)(e) of the PS Act.

A safe workplace is one where all employees of the Bureau may attend work, without having their competency, integrity and character unfairly diminished by other employees. Such disrespectful, discourteous and harassing behaviour towards employees may cause them stress. When stress is prolonged or severe, it poses a risk of harm.

Relevant to each of these matters, I believe that you may not have insight into:

(i)    the appropriateness of your conduct in the workplace; and

(ii)    the impact of [sic] your conduct has on others.

As a result, I am concerned that your behaviour will not stop, even if you are counselled in relation to your conduct.

…

27    The letter then addressed Ms Heward’s view about whether the suspension was in the interests of the Bureau. She concluded that it was, taking account of the seriousness of the conduct, the impact of it on Mr Lye’s colleagues, and that it was ongoing. In that respect Ms Heward was concerned that Mr Lye had not cultivated any understanding or insight into his behaviour. She considered that “anyone dealing with [Mr Lye], and who is responsible for making a decision that affects [him] and with which [he disagrees], is at risk of being the target of [his] conduct”.

28    Ms Harrison similarly deposed that the reasons for her deciding to terminate Mr Lye’s employment were those given in her correspondence to him. There, she set out her finding that he had breached the Code; and her preliminary (and ultimately final) view on the sanction appropriately applied in respect of that breach.

29    Whilst Ms Harrison acknowledged that there were rights afforded to Mr Lye to make complaints or inquiries in relation to his employment, she took issue with the manner in which Mr Lye had agitated the various complaints that he made. He had, in her view, done so in a way that was discourteous to and disrespectful and harassing of his colleagues. By engaging in the conduct that he had, Ms Harrison found that Mr Lye had contravened the prohibition in the Code on engaging in “unreasonable complainant conduct”.

30    That conclusion rested upon a number of anterior findings. The behaviour and decisions of colleagues about which Mr Lye had had cause to complain were reasonable and engaged in with pure intent. Moreover, Mr Lye had engaged in the complaint conduct that he had engaged in—which included the escalation of complaints outside of the channels established for that purpose—with “the intent of bringing about changes in those decisions, not by reference to the merits of [his] claims (when properly considered), but by the making of serious, repeated and frequent complaints”.

31    In reaching both the breach finding and her decision as to sanction, Ms Harrison took note of the multiple occasions upon which the impact of Mr Lye’s behaviour had been raised with him by his colleagues. She also had regard to the outcome of a Comcare inspection conducted on Mr Lye’s request, which suggested that it was Mr Lye’s—rather than the Bureau’s—conduct that appeared to breach applicable safety laws and, potentially, to present a psychosocial hazard for his colleagues.

32    By their evidence, Ms Heward and Ms Harrison each denied that their respective reasons for taking the action that they took included any of the reasons enumerated at [6]-[7] above. Similarly, Ms Heward denied that she decided to continue Mr Lye’s suspension with any coercive intention of the kind proscribed by s 343 of the FW Act. Both maintained that they took the actions that they took against Mr Lye because of the way in which he had transacted with his colleagues; that is to say, because of what they considered was the gratuitous incivility by which his interactions had routinely been coloured.

33    Mr Lye submitted that there is reason to doubt those assertions. He suggested that they might, to some degree or another, have been reconstructed to support the decisions that had in fact already been made; decisions that, he posited, were at least partly actuated by his possession and exercise of workplace rights.

34    The circumstances that Mr Lye sought to emphasise in that regard are as follows. First, he considered that Ms Heward’s affidavit evidence—which, amongst other things, attested to the impact that she witnessed of Mr Lye’s aggression toward various Bureau staff—is inconsistent with representations in correspondence that she sent to him claiming that she had “not been personally involved in any of the matters that give rise to the grounds for the suspension”. Second, he pointed to deficiencies in the documentary evidence that supported Ms Heward and Ms Harrison’s respective reasons. He suggested that, had his conduct wrought the effects alleged, there would be documented complaints from colleagues and/or Bureau risk assessments about the impact that his behaviour had had upon them. The absence of either, he maintained, suggests that neither was genuinely at issue. Finally, he highlighted several ways in which the suspension and dismissal processes had, in his view, departed from standards of procedural fairness. He maintained that each of those matters suggests (or, in combination, suggest) a predetermined conclusion actuated (or potentially actuated) by proscribed reasons unaligned with what the Bureau’s witnesses were careful to record and to which they no less carefully attested.

35    The resolution of whether any (and, if so, how much) of the evidence of Ms Heward and Ms Harrison should be accepted—and, if accepted, whether it will suffice to displace the presumption for which s 361(1) of the FW Act provides—must await trial. For present (interlocutory) purposes, it suffices to note that that evidence stands uncontradicted, is internally coherent and is founded upon an evidential foundation that is at least partly documented. Without foreclosing upon the possibility that Mr Lye’s contentions might succeed at trial (where the statutory presumption will apply), it nonetheless remains that the matters that Mr Lye was minded to emphasise about that evidence are not sufficient now to establish a prima facie case. If the evidence remains as it presently is, the court could not properly infer the matters of causation or intent that Mr Lye must invite it to draw. I do not consider that Mr Lye can establish, as he must if his present application is to succeed, the existence of a prima facie case.

36    Although the conclusion just stated is dispositive, there is, perhaps, one other potential obstacle that Mr Lye faces in establishing the prima facie case that he must establish in order to ground an entitlement to interlocutory injunctive relief. As it was the subject of submission at the hearing, I will address it.

37    The Bureau maintained that Mr Lye is precluded from bringing the claims that he now brings by the combined operation of ss 725, 728 and 732 of the FW Act. Cumulatively, those provisions relevantly bar a person “who has been dismissed” from bringing an application under the General Protections provisions of the FW Act in addition to an application or complaint under another law, provided that each of them is “in relation to” dismissal and has not been withdrawn or failed for want of jurisdiction. Mr Lye is, on the Bureau’s contention, at least potentially barred from pursuing the current proceeding by virtue of a previous complaint that he made to the Australian Human Rights Commission (the “AHRC”) under the provisions of (perhaps amongst others) the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

38    It is convenient to set out briefly the nature of that complaint. It was made to the AHRC on 9 September 2025, several weeks prior to Mr Lye’s dismissal from his employment. It related to such matters as the Bureau’s failure to afford him “reasonable adjustments” to his work environment, reprisal action that Mr Lye contended was taken against him because of his complaints and public interest disclosure(s), and his suspension, which Mr Lye alleged was imposed on account of his disabilities or the manners in which they manifested. It has not been withdrawn or dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

39    The Bureau sought to rely on Bilal v Ampol Limited [2025] FCA 1189 (Shariff J) (“Bilal”) to suggest that complaints “in relation to” dismissal might include complaints relating to matters leading up to an employee’s dismissal.

40    In that proceeding, the applicant had pursued parallel claims against his former employer in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia and in this court. The former was a claim under the provisions of pt 3-1 of the FW Act; and the latter under the whistleblower protections in pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). His Honour struck out so much of the applicant’s whistleblower claims as related to his dismissal; however, he was granted leave to replead in respect of an aspect of his claim that, arguably, did not relate to his dismissal. By it, the applicant alleged that the former employer (with others) had “orchestrat[ed] and implement[ed] a pretextual and constructive dismissal process to remove [him] from his employment with Ampol”. His Honour said as follows in this regard (at [79]-[80]:

79    It may be accepted that the words “in relation to” have been held to be of very wide import and their meaning depends on the context: see eg Tooheys Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) [1961] HCA 35; 105 CLR 602 at 613–614 (Dixon CJ), 616–619 (Kitto J; Menzies J agreeing at 623), 620–621 (Taylor J), 624–625 (Windeyer J); Joye v Beach Petroleum NL [1996] FCA 502; 67 FCR 275 at 285 (Beaumont and Lehane JJ); Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia [2001] FCA 1549; 114 FCR 472 at [68] (Hill J); Australian Communications Network Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission [2005] FCAFC 221; 224 ALR 344 (Heerey, Merkel and Siopis JJ); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Narain [2008] FCAFC 120; 169 FCR 211 at [66]–[80] (Jacobson and Gordon JJ). However, to conclude that the words are of broad import does not lead to the conclusion that any connection with a person’s dismissal will suffice to enliven the statutory bar. In O’Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16; 169 CLR 356 at 367, Dawson J stated that:

The words “In relation to”, read out of context, are wide enough to cover every conceivable connexion. But those words should not be read out of context, which in this case is provided by the … Act … What is required is a relevant relationship, having regard to the scope of the Act. Where jurisdiction is dependent upon a relation with some matter or thing, something more than a coincidental or mere connexion — something in the nature of a relevant relationship — is necessary …

80    In the present case, the relevant aspect of Mr Bilal’s claim seeks to establish a cause of action relating to the Respondents allegedly “orchestrating and implementing a pretextual and constructive dismissal process to remove [him] from his employment with Ampol”. Although that may be viewed as seeking to complain about a matter that was in relation to his dismissal, in that it seeks to impugn the steps leading up to his allegedly contrived dismissal, it does not necessarily follow that all such steps were in relation to the dismissal. The difficulty with resolving the question at this point in time is that the assertions made in this regard in the SOC are not adequately pleaded to a point where I can readily determine the issue. I consider it to be a more appropriate exercise of my discretion that the SOC should be struck out and Mr Bilal be given an opportunity to replead with precision the matters about which he complains. In doing so, Mr Bilal will need to be conscious that he runs the risk that his repleaded claim may fall foul of the statutory bar if his application and complaints relate to his dismissal.

41    Echoing the approach that his Honour was minded to prefer in Bilal, the Bureau submitted that the spectre of jurisdictional objection compounds the challenges that Mr Lye faces in establishing the prima facie case that he must establish in order to attract interlocutory injunctive relief.

42    Even if, contrary to what I have concluded, the evidence was such as to reflect the existence of a prima facie case for relief, the existence of Mr Lye’s AHRC complaint would weigh neutrally upon its strength, and not only because his case is not yet fully articulated. Mr Lye’s complaint to the AHRC was primarily framed in terms of disability discrimination, a cause of action that he does not advance here. It predated his dismissal entirely and he did not amend it once he was dismissed. It may be accepted—and indeed, Mr Lye conceded—that the factual substrata of the two applications overlap. However, whether that circumstance is sufficient to enliven the prohibition that s 725 of the FW Act establishes is a complex question of law that ought not materially to weigh upon the existence or strength of a prima facie case.

43    For obvious reasons, that interesting detour does not affect my central conclusion. I do not consider that Mr Lye has established the prima facie case that he needs to establish in order to attract the interlocutory injunctive relief for which he moves.

Balance of convenience

44    As to balance of convenience, although I consider that it favours Mr Lye, I am unpersuaded that it inclines strongly one way or the other.

45    Mr Lye deposed to the inconvenience that would attend his failure on the present application. It was said to inhere in the worsening of his medical condition, and the stifling of his rehabilitation and return to work plan, each of which, he said, would result from his continuing exclusion from the workforce. He relied upon a brief letter from his General Practitioner, which, he said, should be understood to reinforce those contentions. Those circumstances, he contended, would also operate to compromise his ability effectively to participate in the substantive proceeding.

46    The Bureau relied upon a number of circumstances that might be taken to suggest that Mr Lye is not, in fact, fit to return to work; and that, if he were to do so, he might not participate productively in any rehabilitation processes. Those circumstances, howsoever fairly raised they might be, do not accumulate to a level at which I might seriously doubt that the aggravation of Mr Lye’s generalised anxiety disorder could be perpetuated by his present unemployment; or that it will or might be more difficult for him to rehabilitate and return to the workforce absent injunctive relief now.

47    Against that, there are instances of inconvenience that a grant of interlocutory injunctive relief would undoubtedly visit upon the Bureau and its staff. More than six months have passed since Mr Lye’s employment ended. It ended in circumstances marked by disharmony sufficient to cast at least some doubt upon the proposition that it could congenially be resumed. Further, the position in which Mr Lye was employed has been filled. Those are properly considerations that inform the court’s assessment of where the balance of convenience lies.

48    Indeed, the period that has elapsed since Mr Lye was dismissed is, I consider, a very strong consideration inclining against the interlocutory injunctive relief for which he now moves. Mr Lye was dismissed from his employment on 22 October 2025. The case for interim reinstatement would not appear to be materially stronger or more urgent now than what it might have been six months ago. The appropriate time to apply for it was then; but Mr Lye, perhaps labouring under incorrect assessments of what the FW Act (and, in particular, s 370) permitted, preferred to chart alternative courses. That choice has had consequences, not the least of which being that the Bureau has, as it was entitled to, made alternative arrangements, with which the court, after such an extensive delay, should not lightly interfere.

49    Even looking beyond the course of events as they transpired between October 2025 and February 2026 (when the present matter was commenced), it remains the case that Mr Lye has proceeded with insufficient urgency in seeking what he now seeks. In early February 2026, when the matter commenced, Mr Lye did not seek reinstatement. Many weeks passed before he did so.

50    Had the balance of convenience so strongly inclined in favour of interlocutory injunctive relief, I would have expected that Mr Lye would seek it far more urgently than he did. The position as it presently stands is that Mr Lye seeks not so much to preserve the status quo; but to disrupt circumstances that are now of long standing. In the absence of a strong prima facie case for relief, I would not indulge that course.

disposition

51    Given my conclusions about the absence of a prima facie case and the pall that delay has cast upon the balance of convenience, I am not satisfied that the court’s discretion to grant interlocutory injunctive relief should, in this case, be exercised. Mr Lye’s interlocutory application dated 17 April 2026 should and will be dismissed.

52    Before concluding, I should address the claim that Mr Lye advanced in support of alternative relief. It was suggested that, were the court to decline, as I have, to make an order requiring the Bureau to reinstate Mr Lye to his former employment, it should nonetheless make orders requiring the Bureau to pay him his salary, reinstate his access to his former email account and other of the Bureau’s systems and documents, and afford him reasonable access to his former workplace and workplace personnel. Relief in those forms would largely (although, perhaps, not entirely) correspond to relief in the form of reinstatement; but even assuming that there are material differences, I would nonetheless decline it for the same reasons.

53    The awarding of costs in proceedings of the present kind is exceptional: FW Act, s 570(1). No order in that regard was sought and none shall be made.

Associate:

Dated:    14 May 2026