Federal Court of Australia

Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Discovery) [2026] FCA 591

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 16 January 2026 (Interlocutory Application) be dismissed.

2.    The costs of and incidental to the Interlocutory Application be reserved.

3.    By no later than 4.00 pm on 20 May 2026, the parties confer and provide the Court with proposed consent orders regarding:

(a)    discovery by the respondent of an unredacted version of the Excel schedule containing details of the applicant’s alleged injuries;

(b)    an appropriate extension to Order 4 of the orders of Shariff J dated 27 November 2025 (being the time for the applicant to file his evidence in reply); and

(c)    the date by which the parties must file any documents they intend to tender at the trial, which must be no later than 1 July 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SHARIFF J:

1.    INTRODUCTION

1    The applicant (Mr Bilal) has brought yet another interlocutory application. I have made earlier interlocutory determinations both in these proceedings and in separate but related proceedings that Mr Bilal has commenced against both the present respondent (Ampol) and another entity, EML NSW Limited (EML): see Bilal v Ampol Limited [2025] FCA 1189; Bilal v EML NSW Limited [2025] FCA 1190; Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (Interlocutory) [2025] FCA 1473.

2    The background to Mr Bilal’s various claims made against Ampol and EML are set out in my earlier judgments and it is unnecessary to repeat them. As I understand it, Mr Bilal has also commenced other proceedings that are presently before this Court and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. I do not know the details of these other proceedings, but there have already been several published judgments relating to them: Bilal v Lagos [2026] FCA 35 (Perram J); Bilal v Australian Information Commissioner [2026] FCA 376 (Stewart J); Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 1724 (Manousaridis J); Bilal v Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2G 374 (Manousaridis J).

3    The present proceedings raise a narrow point for determination. They arise in the context of Mr Bilal having made a claim for workers’ compensation against Ampol, which was apparently being managed by EML. The focus of Mr Bilal’s case is a letter dated 11 November 2024 which appears to have been sent by EML on behalf of Ampol and has the effect of informing Mr Bilal that his weekly compensation payments would be suspended (Suspension Letter). Mr Bilal contends that Ampol knowingly or recklessly made false or misleading representations in the Suspension Letter about his workplace rights in contravention of s 345 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act). In a Statement of Claim filed on 5 September 2025 (SOC), Mr Bilal pleads that:

(a)    the suspension of his weekly payments on the basis of an alleged failure to attend a medical examination was a false or misleading representation made knowingly or recklessly: SOC at [5];

(b)    the representation that his weekly payments were being suspended was false or misleading, and made knowingly or recklessly, because he was not actually receiving weekly payments at that time: SOC at [6]; and

(c)    the representation that his weekly payments were being suspended on the basis of an independent medical examination said to have been “made in accordance with the Workers Compensation Guidelines” was false or misleading and made knowingly or recklessly: SOC at [7].

4    Mr Bilal’s claims are listed for hearing as to the question of liability on 22 and 23 July 2026.

5    By an application filed on 16 January 2026, Mr Bilal seeks the following orders:

(a)    declarations that Ampol failed to comply with orders for discovery made by the Court on 27 November 2025 (Discovery Orders), and specifically Orders 5, 6 and 7;

(b)    Ampol give fresh discovery in compliance with the Discovery Orders, and that this discovery be verified by an affidavit prepared in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules);

(c)    Ampol be precluded from relying at trial on any document not discovered by it in accordance with the proposed new discovery order; and

(d)    Ampol be precluded from relying, for any purpose in this proceeding, on any contention pleaded in its Defence filed on 19 September 2025 that EML was its insurer “including (without limitation) any contention of subrogation or any contention that depends upon or is derived from that alleged status”.

6    In support of his application, Mr Bilal relies upon an affidavit affirmed by him on 16 January 2026. He also relies on his earlier affidavits filed on 29 September 2025 and 12 October 2025. Ampol relies on the affidavit of Ms Emily Jane Baxter filed on 21 April 2026, and the affidavit of Mr Benjamin Phillip Sebeih also filed on 21 April 2026. These affidavits variously also attached Discovery Affidavits (as referred to below). None of this evidence was challenged.

7    For the reasons that follow, Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application should be dismissed.

2.    CONSIDERATION

2.1    Facts relevant to the Discovery Orders

8    On 24 October 2025, Ampol consented to giving discovery to Mr Bilal in answer to the categories of documents set out in annexure AB-7 of Mr Bilal’s affidavit filed on 12 October 2025.

9    Having regard to that consent position, I made the Discovery Orders on 27 November 2025.

10    Ampol subsequently conducted searches for material captured by the discovery categories by searching for documents relating to Mr Bilal’s workers’ compensation claim and for other documents across its entire Microsoft 365 environment (including email accounts, shared drives and other document repositories) created between 2 November 2023 and 17 December 2025. Mr Bilal contends that these searches were inadequate in several respects. I will return to the extent and significance of these searches to Mr Bilal’s present application.

11    On 17 December 2025, Ampol’s solicitors wrote to the solicitor for EML asking whether EML held documents within the discovery categories and whether it would provide copies of those documents to Ampol so they could be discovered. EML’s solicitors responded by indicating that EML was not willing to release any documents to Ampol. Mr Bilal contends that this step taken by Ampol was not an adequate step to ensure that it had produced documents within its control.

12    On 23 December 2025, Ampol filed and served a list of documents (and a verifying affidavit), and produced 83 documents to Mr Bilal in native format with metadata preserved, except where redactions to privileged information necessitated conversion to PDF (the First Discovery List). The First Discovery List was supported by a verifying affidavit of Mr Sebeih (Ampol’s in-house lawyer with carriage of these proceedings) that was affirmed on 23 December 2025 (the First Discovery Affidavit). The First Discovery List and Affidavit comprise annexure BS-1 to the affidavit of Mr Sebeih dated 21 April 2026. As I return to below, Mr Bilal contends that the First Discovery List did not comply with the Rules.

13    On 24 December 2025, Mr Bilal sent Ampol a letter raising various requests, complaints and concerns about Ampol’s discovery.

14    On 7 January 2026, Ampol’s solicitors responded to Mr Bilal addressing multiple issues, confirming that Ampol would comply with its ongoing discovery obligation under r 20.20 of the Rules, and indicating that further instructions were being sought. Amongst other things, Ampol’s solicitor indicated that a new discovery list would be prepared to address some of the complaints that Mr Bilal had raised. Further correspondence was sent on 14 and 15 January 2026 confirming that instructions were continuing to be sought.

15    On or about 15 January 2026, Mr Sebeih became aware that additional documents which fell within the scope of the Discovery Orders were potentially stored in a separate database called “SolvInjury”. Upon realising that additional discovery documents were potentially in Ampol’s control, Ampol conducted further searches for those materials.

16    Mr Bilal filed the interlocutory application on 16 January 2026.

17    On 23 January 2026, Ampol's solicitors provided a comprehensive response to the balance of Mr Bilal's email of 24 December 2025, including an updated discovery list identifying each discovery category, the number of documents within each category, the reasons for redactions, and the categories into which privileged documents fell (the Second Discovery List). That response and the Second Discovery List comprise annexure EB-13 to the affidavit of Emily Jane Baxter filed on 21 April 2026. Ampol also informed Mr Bilal that further searches for documents were being conducted on the SolvInjury database.

18    On 30 January 2026, Ampol filed its evidence in chief in the proceeding.

19    On 12 February 2026, Ampol served a further list of documents and produced an additional 166 documents, all of which had been located on the SolvInjury database (the Supplementary Discovery List). The Supplementary Discovery List and accompanying verifying affidavit comprise annexure BS-2 to the affidavit of Mr Sebeih dated 21 April 2026. The documents were produced to Mr Bilal in native format with metadata preserved, except where redactions to privileged information necessitated conversion to PDF.

2.2    Alleged non-compliance with the Discovery Orders and application for fresh discovery

20    Mr Bilal contends that Ampol failed to comply with:

(a)    Order 5 of the Discovery Orders which required Ampol to give discovery of all documents which fell within one or more of 13 specified categories of documents;

(b)    Order 6 of the Discovery Orders which required Ampol to give discovery in native format with metadata preserved; and

(c)    Order 7 of the Discovery Orders which required Ampol to give discovery of any documents recording or evidencing the appointment of EML as insurer in respect of the workers’ compensation policy, and the “Proposal” and “Schedule of Employer Particulars” (as those terms are defined in cl 1 of schedule 3 to the Workers Compensation Regulation 2016 (NSW)).

21    During the course of oral submissions, Mr Bilal made a number of submissions in support of the orders that he sought. It is convenient to summarise those submissions before turning to consider them.

22    First, Mr Bilal contended that the Court had ordered non-standard discovery (ie discovery by categories) consistent with r 20.15 of the Rules and that in his application for discovery, he had specifically wished to avoid standard discovery so that it was not left to Ampol to determine the relevance of documents to produce (ie so that rr 20.14(1)(a), 20.14(1)(b) and 20.14(2) would not apply). Mr Bilal submitted that non-standard discovery was more extensive and required Ampol to discover exhaustively the documents that respond to the relevant categories, rather than merely conducting reasonable searches.

23    Second, and relatedly, Mr Bilal contended that he had specifically requested that the discovery be given in an electronic format with all metadata, and that Ampol had not only consented to this but that the Court had ordered discovery to be given in such a format. Mr Bilal submitted that the effect of such an order was that Ampol was obliged to give discovery in accordance with Part 3 of the Court’s Practice Note, “Technology and the Court Practice Note (GPN-TECH)” (the Technology Practice Note). Mr Bilal submitted that Part 3 of the Technology Practice Note required Ampol to have attended to a number of steps, which he claims Ampol failed to do. Amongst other things, Mr Bilal submitted that Ampol had:

(a)    failed to comply with the Court’s Standard Document Management Protocol (SDMP) as specified in the Technology Practice Note;

(b)    failed to identify the methodology used by it in searching for, collating and producing documents in answer to the categories;

(c)    “flattened” documents when that was not permitted or was not their native format; and

(d)    failed to identify the custodians of documents or which custodians were considered.

24    Third, by reference to Mr Sebeih’s First Discovery Affidavit and Mr Sebeih’s affidavit filed for the purpose of the interlocutory application, Mr Bilal submitted that Ampol had not conducted adequate searches or ones that were necessary to be undertaken for an organisation of its standing to have complied with the more extensive discovery required by r 20.15 of the Rules. In this regard, amongst other things, Mr Bilal submitted that:

(a)    Mr Sebeih was not a proper “officer” to have deposed a verifying affidavit for the purpose of discovery under the Rules;

(b)    Mr Sebeih had not conducted any of the searches himself and his evidence was based on hearsay (including because he was not employed by Ampol at the time relating to the subject matter of Mr Bilal’s claims);

(c)    Mr Sebeih had (a couple of days before discovery was required to be completed) merely asked the “Cyber Security team” at Ampol to conduct searches:

(i)    of Mr Bilal’s workers’ compensation claim; and

(ii)    across all of Ampol’s Microsoft 365 environments, including email accounts, shared drives and other document repositories, for documents created between 2 November 2023 and 17 December 2025 which contained certain key words, which Mr Bilal claimed were inadequate and otherwise erroneous in one respect as they contained an incorrect file number;

(d)    Mr Sebeih had otherwise done no more than spoken to another employee, Ms Yvette Mansfield (National Injury and Workers Compensation Manager at Ampol), and asked her if Ampol was in possession of any document that fell within scope of Order 7 of the Discovery Orders;

(e)    Mr Sebeih was apparently satisfied on the basis of hearsay evidence that Ms Mansfield had said there were no documents in Ampol’s possession or control in answer to Order 7, except one document (being an email from Mr Stephen Wray to Ms Mansfield dated 15 September 2025) which was produced to Mr Bilal on 23 December 2025;

(f)    using one category of discovery as an example, Mr Sebeih had not disclosed whether searches were conducted for drafts of documents, such as the drafts of the Suspension Letter, and had provided no audit trail of documents;

(g)    Mr Sebeih had not disclosed whether a “legal hold” was put on documents so as to ensure that their integrity had been maintained and that they were not deleted or otherwise altered;

(h)    Mr Sebeih had not disclosed whether searches were conducted in recycle bins or deleted items folders, or whether any other steps were taken to recover deleted documents;

(i)    Mr Sebeih did not disclose the methodology used to search for or retrieve documents and said nothing about the custodians of documents or how they were searched for; and

(j)    neither Mr Sebeih nor any officer of Ampol had sought to obtain documents from EML.

25    Fourth, Mr Bilal submitted that the documents had been produced to him in a form whereby he could not reconcile them with the categories of discovery and that they were inconsistent with their itemisation. Mr Bilal contended that the discovery list produced by Ampol did not comply with Form 38 as required by r 20.17(1) which, in turn, required Ampol to identify the category of each document and the number of documents in each category.

26    Fifth, Mr Bilal submitted that Ampol had redacted some documents on the ground of “privacy” or confidentiality privilege, where no such privilege exists.

27    Sixth, Mr Bilal submitted that Ampol’s claims in relation to legal professional privilege were unspecified and inadequate, especially where they appeared to be internal communications between Ampol employees.

28    Seventh, Mr Bilal submitted that the Supplementary Discovery List and the supplementary discovery produced by Ampol did not address the many issues he had raised and, in any event, said that the list was unsigned and therefore, Ampol had not complied with its obligations such that Ampol remained in default of the Court’s orders.

29    Mr Bilal submitted these were just some of his many complaints, but they all pointed in the direction that Ampol had not complied with the Discovery Orders. He contended that this raised a matter of public importance such that the Court should declare this to be the case and make the other orders that he had sought. In support of these contentions, Mr Bilal relied upon r 5.22 and 5.23 of the Rules, which empower the Court to make any order as it sees fit when a party is in default of the Court’s orders. Mr Bilal submitted that the orders he sought in response to Ampol’s alleged non-compliance with the Discovery Orders were a “lightweight sanction”: T16.4-.10.

30    I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contentions for the following reasons.

31    First, it is necessary to commence by repeating what is specified in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). As there stated, the “overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes…according to law…and…as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”. Section 37M(2)(e) provides that the overarching purpose includes the objective of “…the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute”. Additionally, s 37M(3) and (4) provide as follows:

(3)     The civil practice and procedure provisions must be interpreted and applied, and any power conferred or duty imposed by them (including the power to make Rules of Court) must be exercised or carried out, in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose.

(4)     The civil practice and procedure provisions are the following, so far as they apply in relation to civil proceedings:

(a)     the Rules of Court made under this Act;

(b)     any other provision made by or under this Act or any other Act with respect to the practice and procedure of the Court.

(Original emphasis.)

32    Mr Bilal’s contentions disregard these fundamental objectives.

33    It is necessary to apply a healthy dose of reality to what is in issue in these proceedings. As noted above, by his pleaded case, Mr Bilal contends that Ampol intentionally or recklessly made misrepresentations about his workplace rights in the Suspension Letter in contravention of s 345 of the FW Act. On any view, that is a necessarily confined case and not one that calls for a discovery exercise that is disproportionate to the confined issues in contest. That is more so the case given the default position in relation to costs as specified in s 570 of the FW Act.

34    Second, it is to be accepted, as Mr Bilal contends, that the Court ordered non-standard discovery and that it should be given in an electronic format. However, it does not follow that this required compliance with Part 3 of the Technology Practice Note. Mr Bilal’s contentions proceed on a misunderstanding as to what was ordered by the Court and what the Court’s Practice Notes require. Order 6 of the Discovery Orders provided that:

The documents discovered in accordance with order 5 are to be electronically discovered in native format with metadata preserved.

35    There is nothing within the terms of that Order that required application of Part 3 of the Technology Practice Note. Mr Bilal’s contentions assumed that Part 3 of the Technology Practice Note applied to every case before the Court. That is not correct. Aside from anything else, Part 3 of the Technology Practice Note proceeds on the basis that before the Court makes an order for electronic discovery, it is expected that the parties will have conferred about the appropriate protocols to be used for the exchange and management of documents in electronic form: see Technology Practice Note at paragraph 3.3. That had not occurred in the present case. There was no agreement between the parties as to the means or methodology for the provision of electronic discovery. In any event, the Technology Practice Note contemplates the type of efficient methods for electronic discovery that may be considered appropriate in large commercial cases where many thousands of documents are to be exchanged. It is inapposite to a case of the present type.

36    Order 6 of the Discovery Orders required nothing more than that the documents be discovered electronically in native format with metadata presented. That was an order I considered to be consistent with the spirit of the Court’s Practice Note “Central Practice Note: National Court Framework and Case Management (GPN-1)” (General Practice Note), specifically as set out at paragraphs 10.3 to 10.4.

37    Nothing in the Court’s various Practice Notes limits or qualifies the Court’s general powers. That itself is made plain in paragraph 10.13 of the Court’s General Practice Note which states that “[h]ow a discovery dispute is resolved by the docket judge will be a matter for him or her”.

38    In the present case, Mr Bilal raises a dispute by asserting that Ampol has not complied with its obligations to provide electronic discovery by failing to comply with its obligations under the Court’s SDMP as specified in the Technology Practice Note, by failing to identify the custodians of documents or which custodians were considered, and by failing to identify the methodology used by it in searching for, collating and producing documents in answer to the categories. Each of these contentions assume the application of the Technology Practice Note, which I reject. To the extent that Mr Bilal’s contentions rely upon some other source of obligation, it was not identified. I reject his contentions in this respect.

39    In so far as Mr Bilal contended that Ampol was not permitted to “flatten” documents, what appears to have occurred is that Ampol wished to exercise privilege over some portions of documents and, as a result, those documents were not able to be produced in their native format. In respect of those documents, Ampol “flattened” them, which I understand to be a process of producing a PDF version of a document, and applied redactions. Whilst Order 6 of the Discovery Orders required documents to be discovered in their electronic format, I do not consider that the production of flattened documents in order to make a claim for privilege gave rise to any material non-compliance, given that nothing in the Discovery Orders abrogated the privileges that Ampol wished to claim. I deal later in these reasons with the question of redactions.

40    Third, I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contentions that the Court’s orders called for a particular form of search or searches to be conducted. Rules 20.16 and 20.17(1) of the Rules requires a party to give discovery by serving on parties a “list of documents” in accordance with “Form 38”. Rule 20.17(4) provides that the list of documents must be verified by an affidavit sworn in accordance with r 20.22. The Rules themselves do not mandate that the discovering party is to disclose in detail the search or searches that were conducted, though they do require disclosure where a search was not made, and otherwise require disclosure of documents that are no longer in the party’s control, etc.: see rr 20.16(2) and 20.17(2).

41    Nor does Form 38 mandate any particular form of disclosure as to the searches that were conducted, or dictate how a party is to go about the task of conducting those searches. The template for the verifying affidavit in Form 38 contains the following text:

Pursuant to the order for discovery made on [date], the [role of party eg Respondent] makes this list of documents and affidavit.

Affidavit

On [date], I [name address and occupation] [*either]say on oath [*or]affirm:

1.    [*Either]I am the [role of party eg Respondent] [*or]I am the [position of officer eg director] of the [role of party eg Respondent] and I am authorised to make this affidavit on the [role of party eg Respondent]’s behalf.

2.    I have made reasonable enquiries as to the existence and location of the documents specified in the order.

3.    To the best of my [*]knowledge [*or]knowledge, information and belief, there are no documents specified in the order that are or have been in [*if deponent is the party]my control [*or]the control of [the party/person ordered to make the list of documents], other than the documents specified in this list of documents.

4.    The documents set out in part 1 are in [*if deponent is the party]my control [*or]the control of [the party/person ordered to make the list of documents] and I do not claim privilege from production for any of these documents.

5.    The documents set out in part 2 are in [*if deponent is the party]my control [*or]the control of [the party/person ordered to make the list of documents] but I claim privilege from production of each of these documents on the grounds set out in part 2.

6.    The documents set out in part 3 have been but are no longer in [*if deponent is the party]my control [*or]the control of [the party/person ordered to make the list of documents]. Details of when each document was last in [*if deponent is the party]my control [*or]the control of [the party/person ordered to make the list of documents] and what became of it are set out in part 3.

(Emphasis added.)

42    As is evident from the above, Form 38 itself does not govern the extent of the searches to be conducted.

43    The effect of Mr Bilal’s contentions is that the searches conducted by Ampol were inadequate and failed to address a number of matters. As Mr Bilal alleges that Ampol has failed to comply with an order of the Court, he bears the onus of establishing that serious allegation. I am not satisfied that he has discharged that onus.

44    Mr Sebeih has affirmed three affidavits in the proceedings in support of Ampol’s discovery. The first affidavit is dated 23 December 2025 in support of the First Discovery List. That affidavit is in the same form as Form 38. Mr Sebeih deposed that, “I have made reasonable enquiries as to the existence and location of the documents specified in the order.”

45    The next affidavit that Mr Sebeih affirmed is dated 12 February 2026 in support of the Supplementary Discovery List. In that affidavit, Mr Sebeih explained that since 23 December 2025, he had become aware of the SolvInjury database and the existence of further documents there that fell within the relevant categories for discovery. He then deposed as follows:

6.    I understand and verily believe that documents are uploaded manually by authorised users. In most instances, the source documents originate from Ampol's email account services, typically Microsoft Outlook. Relevant correspondence, medical certificates, claim forms, insurer communications, and related material are saved from Outlook and then uploaded to the Solvlnjury Management platform by authorised personnel. The platform does not permit open access or automatic external uploads.

7.    Prior to 23 December 2025, the Respondent took steps to comply with the Discovery Orders through the use of an automated eDiscovery and compliance tool known as Microsoft Purview. Microsoft Purview is a Microsoft compliance and governance platform that enables organisations to conduct electronic searches across Microsoft 365 environments, including email accounts, shared drives, and other document repositories.

8.    As explained in my December 2025 affidavit, I understood and verily believed that the material captured by the relevant Microsoft Purview searches would largely comprise duplicates of the material stored on the Solvlnjury Management platform. This belief was based on the fact that documents uploaded to Solvlnjury are typically sourced from Ampol's Microsoft Outlook email system, which was itself subject to the Microsoft Purview searches.

9.    In or around 15 January 2026, following authorisation to access the platform, I accessed the Respondent's Solv Injury Management platform account. That access was provided for the purpose of reviewing documents stored within the system in connection with the Respondent's discovery obligations in these proceedings. I then became aware that there were additional documents on Solvlnjury which fall within scope of the Discovery Orders, which were not identified as part of the Microsoft Purview searches.

10.    The documents in the list of documents below are stored on Solvlnjury. The Applicant will already have access to some of these documents, as they were produced to him on 23 December 2023 by the Respondent's solicitors, Kingston Reid.

11.    To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, there are no documents specified in the Discovery Orders that are or have been in the control of the Respondent, other than the documents specified in the list of documents in this affidavit and the list of documents in my affidavit affirmed 23 December 2025.

46    This evidence was not the subject of any challenge. As Mr Sebeih explained, Ampol’s systems were, and are, such that documents relating to Mr Bilal and his workers’ compensation claim were saved on Microsoft Outlook and they had been the subject of searches, and then further searches were subsequently conducted of the SolvInjury database.

47    In his third affidavit affirmed on 21 April 2026, Mr Sebeih provided further elaboration of the searches that had been conducted, as follows:

7.     As to paragraph 7 of the February Affidavit, on 17 December 2025, I asked Ampol’s Cyber Security team to conduct electronic searches for documents using Microsoft Purview. I asked the team to conduct searches:

(a)     of the entire file relating to Mr Bilal’s workers’ compensation claim 6220420 lodged on 2 November 2023; and

(b)     across all of Ampol’s Microsoft 365 environments, including email accounts, shared drives and other document repositories, for documents created between 2 November 2023 and 17 December 2025 which contained any of the following key words: “Ali”, “Bilal”, “EML”, “proposal”, “suspend”, “suspension”, “IME”, “IMC”, “Malik”, “Virk”, “Medicins”, “Medicins Legale”, “psychiatrist”, “examination”, “medical”, “11 November 2024”, “consultation”, “case manager”, “authority”, “claim”, “workers compensation”, “injury”, “personal injury commission”, “PIC”, “690”, “22946”, “2913”, “Franco”, “Mick”, “Bartier Perry”, “solicitor”, “legal”, “lawyer”, “liability”, “pay” and “payment”; and

(c)     the documents identified using the keyword searches outlined in subparagraph (b) were then refined to documents created by users with specific email domains, including “@ampol.com.au”, “@eml.com.au”, “@bartier.com.au”, “@procaregroup.com.au”, “@aon.com”, “@aumail.docusign.net”, and “@caltex.com.au”.

8.    I reviewed the final search results, and asked Kingston Reid to do the same. The documents which fell within scope of the Discovery Orders, based on the reviews of the material undertaken by both me and Kingston Reid, were outlined in the list of documents filed 23 December 2025.

9.     On or around 17 December 2025, I spoke to Ms Yvette Mansfield (National Injury and Workers Compensation Manager at Ampol) and asked her if Ampol was in possession of any document that fell within scope of Order 7 of the Discovery Orders. I was informed by Ms Mansfield that such documents were not in Ampol’s possession or control, except one document (being an email form Mr Stephen Wray to Ms Yvette Mansfield dated 15 September 2025) which was produced to Mr Bilal on 23 December 2025.

10.     As to paragraph 9 of the February Affidavit, on or around 15 January 2026, I became aware, through conversations with Ms Yvette Mansfield (National Injury and Workers Compensation Manager at Ampol), that additional documents relating to Mr Bilal’s workers compensation claim may be duplicated on a separate database called SolvInjury.

11.     As outlined in paragraph 9 of the February Affidavit, I then sought access to the SolvInjury platform, and became aware that additional documents on SolvInjury fell within scope of the Discovery Orders, which were not captured as part of the Microsoft Purview searches outlined above in paragraph 7.

12.     All documents in SolvInjury which fell within scope of the Discovery Orders were outlined in the list of documents filed 12 February 2026.

13.     Having reviewed the documents on SolvInjury and the searches results using Microsoft Purview, I believe that there are no further searches that Ampol can conduct for documents that fall within scope of the Discovery Orders. I acknowledge that Ampol has ongoing discovery obligations pursuant to rule 20.20 of the Federal Court Rules.

(Original emphasis.)

48    Contrary to Mr Bilal’s assertions, I am not satisfied that it has been established that the searches conducted by Ampol were inadequate or not in compliance with Ampol’s obligations to discover documents falling within the respective categories. On the unchallenged evidence before me, documents relating to Mr Bilal, his workers’ compensation claim and its management were stored electronically either on one or more of the Microsoft platforms or the SolvInjury database. Those platforms have been searched using keywords that would naturally produce documents relating to the subject matter of the categories for discovery. For example, the search terms, including “Ali”, “Bilal”, “EML”, “suspend” and “suspension”, were of such broad generality and scope that I am satisfied that they identified documents falling within the categories, including any draft letters.

49    I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contention that Mr Sebeih was required to conduct the searches himself or required to provide more details as to the “Cyber Security team” or the methodologies that had been applied. It has not been established that the searches that were conducted were inadequate. Nor do I accept that the hearsay evidence as to Mr Sebeih’s discussions with Ms Mansfield was not probative in establishing that sufficient steps had been taken to identify any other sources of documents relating to Mr Bilal. That evidence was admitted without objection.

50    I also do not accept that it is of any moment that there is no evidence that Ampol had placed a “legal hold” on documents, by which Mr Bilal meant that Ampol had taken no steps to guard against the alteration or destruction of documents. There is no evidence to suggest that this has occurred or that Ampol has not complied with its obligations in the face of being a respondent to proceedings before the Court.

51    As for Mr Bilal’s contentions that there is no evidence that Ampol had searched the “recycle bin” or for deleted items, I cannot be certain whether this has occurred on the state of the evidence but it will be a matter for Ampol to ensure that this has occurred if it has not done so already. On the present state of the evidence, I am not satisfied that Mr Bilal has established that these searches have not been undertaken.

52    Further, contrary to Mr Bilal’s contentions, I am satisfied that Ampol has taken adequate steps to obtain documents from EML. Ampol’s solicitor requested documents from EML’s solicitor to no avail. Mr Bilal contended that it was necessary for an officer from Ampol to make such a request to an officer of EML and rely upon any contractual arrangement between them. I do not accept that contention. The letter from Ampol’s solicitor to EML’s solicitor indicates that Ampol has, through an authorised agent, made an appropriate request.

53    Fourth, it is also of no moment whether Mr Sebeih is or is not an “officer” of Ampol. Rule 20.22 of the Rules provides as follows:

20.22     Deponent for affidavit for discovery

(1)     An affidavit verifying a party’s list of documents or an affidavit to be filed by a party under an order under rule 20.21 must be made by one of the following:

(a)     the party;

(b)     if the party is a person under a legal incapacity—the party’s litigation representative;

(c)     if the party is a corporation or organisation—an officer of the corporation or organisation;

(d)     if the party is a body or persons lawfully suing or being sued in the name of the body or in the name of any officer or other person—a member or officer of the body;

(e)     if the party is the Crown or an officer of the Crown suing or being sued in the party’s official capacity—an officer of the Crown.

(2)     However, if the party is a person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), (c), (d) or (e), the party to whom discovery is made may apply to the Court for an order specifying:

(a)     by name or otherwise—the person to make the affidavit; or

(b)     by reference to an officer or office—the persons from whom the party may choose the person to make the affidavit.

(3)     A person making an affidavit under paragraph (1)(c), (d) or (e) must know the facts to make the affidavit.

54    Mr Sebeih’s affidavits identify that he is the “Corporate Counsel – Employment & Industrial” of Ampol. He deposes that he was “authorised to make” the various affidavits on Ampol’s behalf. Assuming (without deciding) that Mr Sebeih was not an “officer” of Ampol for the purpose of r 20.22(1)(d) of the Rules, it would be open to the Court to make an order under r 20.22(2) that Mr Sebeih make the respective affidavits. He was, and is, a lawyer by skill and qualification, and had the authority of Ampol in respect of the relevant subject matter of the proceedings. There is nothing to suggest that he was not so authorised or anything to impugn his integrity in discharging his duties. Thus, to the extent that there was non-compliance by Ampol with r 20.22(1)(d) of the Rules on the basis that Mr Sebeih is not an “officer” of Ampol, it is a matter of no material substance and does not (in the exercise of my discretion) warrant the grant of declaratory relief that Mr Bilal seeks. The grant of declaratory relief in this respect would be inutile in circumstances where I am otherwise satisfied that Ampol has complied with its discovery obligations.

55    Fifth, Mr Bilal’s complaints that the First Discovery List was produced to him in a form whereby he could not reconcile the discovered documents with the categories of discovery and otherwise did not comply with Form 38, as required by r 20.17(1), have since been addressed by way of the production of the Second Discovery List and the Supplementary Discovery List. It would be an arid exercise in futility to grant declaratory relief in respect of these mattes which are inconsequential in light of the further lists that have been provided. To the extent that Mr Bilal contends that these further lists have not been signed, this should be addressed by Ampol if it has not already done so. Matters of this type are quintessentially ones that should be remedied by constructive correspondence between the parties in the discharge of their obligations, as opposed to judicial determination.

56    Sixth, Mr Bilal’s contentions about Ampol’s redaction of documents have some force, but only to a limited extent. It has been observed that there are two conflicting lines of authority in this Court on the question of when it is permissible to redact documents produced on discovery: see Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 10) [2016] FCA 970 at [57] (Yates J) citing Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission (No 2) [2009] FCA 12; 253 ALR 354 at [25] (Besanko J); CSL Ltd v Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 671; 87 IPR 134 at [14] (Jessup J); Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudentia Investments Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 863 at [92]–[99] (Logan J) and the cases there cited. More recently, in Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union (No 3) [2020] FCA 316, Wheelahan J considered the relevant authorities at [12]-[19] and stated, “[m]y own disposition is that redactions of whole integrated documents should not ordinarily occur except by consent or by court order. In my view, if a document is relevant, and is therefore discoverable, then generally the whole of the document should be produced”.

57    The better view appears to be that redaction is (a) permissible where privilege is claimed, (b) may be permissible where standard discovery has been ordered, and (c) may not be permissible where non-standard discovery by category has been ordered.

58    In the present case, I was not taken to any of the documents that were said to have been redacted. I was informed that one document was a large Excel schedule that contained Mr Bilal’s name and alleged injuries in one row, but each of the other rows disclosed the details of other former or current employees of Ampol. Ampol expressed concern about the disclosure of personal and health information relating to third parties unaffected by the present litigation. Mr Bilal contended that he would not misuse such information and he understood he was the subject of the Harman undertaking: see Harman v Secretary of State for Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280. In respect of this issue, I agree with Mr Bilal that the unredacted form of the document should be produced to Mr Bilal. If the document is to be tendered in the proceedings, I will consider making appropriate orders at that time as to the non-publication and suppression of relevant information contained in that document. However, given the sensitivity of the information contained in the document, I do not fault Ampol for taking the course it has taken, and Mr Bilal is on notice about the need to ensure that this document and the information contained therein is kept secure and is not used for any other purpose. There is no need for me to make any declaration to this effect, but I will ask the parties to prepare short minutes of order to give effect to the production of that document so that it is correctly described.

59    The second document to which the parties referred (without providing me a copy) was said to be an email about Mr Bilal in respect of which a portion was redacted. Ampol submitted that the relevant portion was one over which it claimed legal professional privilege as disclosed in its various Discovery Lists. Mr Bilal did not dispute that this was a claim that had been made by Ampol. In the circumstances, I consider that redaction of material on the basis of a claim for legal professional privilege was warranted.

60    I was not taken to or informed about any other document in respect of which redaction was an issue. Given what I have said above, I would expect the parties to resolve any further issues as to redacted documents as between themselves. The Court should not now be troubled again by these disputes.

61    Seventh, I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contention that Ampol’s claims in relation to legal professional privilege were unspecified and inadequate. The Discovery Lists prepared by Ampol identify the relevant communications, the persons who were involved in those communications and the ground upon which privilege is claimed. Mr Bilal’s complaint that some of these documents include communications between internal employees who are not lawyers misunderstands the grounds upon which privilege is being claimed by Ampol, including that the relevant communication was prepared for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice or contains the content of legal advice. I reject Mr Bilal’s contentions in this respect.

62    Eighth, I do not accept Mr Bilal’s contention that Ampol has failed to comply with Order 7 of the Discovery Orders, which required the separate production of documents outside the categories referred to in Order 5. As noted above, Mr Sebeih’s evidence has disclosed the steps taken to comply with that order.

63    I do not accept any of the other matters which Mr Bilal raised as demonstrating Ampol’s non-compliance with the Discovery Orders.

64    It follows from the foregoing that I am not satisfied that any declarations should be made in the form sought by Mr Bilal.

3.    DISPOSITION

65    Mr Bilal’s interlocutory application should be dismissed. I will reserve the question of costs of and incidental to that application.

66    I will direct the parties to confer and provide a consent short minute of order as to the production of the document referred to in paragraph [58] above.

Associate:

Dated:    13 May 2026