Federal Court of Australia

Gounder v Mansfield as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Gounder (No 2) [2026] FCA 582

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for an extension of time for leave to appeal filed 22 July 2025 is dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LONGBOTTOM J:

INTRODUCTION

1    The Applicant seeks an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made on 28 May 2025: Mansfield (Trustee) v Gounder, in the matter of Gounder [2025] FedCFamC2G 780 (primary judgment).

2    The primary judgment declared the Applicant’s interest in a property in Warner, in the State of Queensland, vested in the Respondent (Trustee) as trustee of her bankrupt estate on 11 October 2018, and made consequential orders requiring the Applicant to deliver up vacant possession of the property, authorising the Trustee to sell the property and providing for the distribution of the proceeds of sale.

3    The Applicant requires an extension of time to appeal from the primary judgment. That is because she did not seek to institute an appeal until 22 July 2025, which is outside the 28-day period prescribed by r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The Applicant explains that she was unable to file the appeal within time because she was caring for a family member who had been critically injured and was struggling physically and emotionally as a result. On the day of the hearing, the Applicant separately asserted that she did attempt to file a notice of appeal within the time required under the Rules, but it was not accepted for filing by the Court.

4    The Trustee opposes the application. He argues that an extension of time should not be granted because the substantial application is without merit. The Trustee submits that the complaints the Applicant makes about the primary judgment – which essentially concern the Trustee, her personal circumstances, and a proposal to pay certain underlying debts – have no relationship to the decision itself. The Trustee further contends that the Applicant has failed to provide an adequate explanation for her delay.

5    The application for an extension of time will be refused. For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the proposed appeal has no reasonable prospects of success and, as such, that it is not in the interests of justice to exercise the discretion to permit the Applicant to file an appeal out of time.

background

6    On 11 October 2018, a Registrar of the Federal Circuit Court sequestered the Applicant’s estate pursuant to s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Since then, considerable litigation has ensued: Superior Alignments Pty Ltd v Gounder [2019] FCCA 1607; Gounder v Superior Alignments Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 2093; Gounder (Bankrupt) v Superior Alignments Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 691; Gounder (Bankrupt) v Superior Alignments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 741; and Gounder v Mansfield as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Gounder [2025] FCA 856. The following overview draws from those decisions and the primary judgment the subject of this application.

7    The underlying liability, the subject of the sequestration order, comprised unpaid invoices for repair work undertaken by Superior Alignments Pty Ltd in July and August 2017. In January 2018, Superior Alignments obtained default judgment in respect of those invoices and in April 2018, Superior Alignments obtained an order for costs in respect of an unsuccessful application by the Applicant to have the default judgment set aside.

8    There followed the filing of a creditor’s petition, the sequestration order and the appointment of the Trustee. The Applicant applied for a review of the sequestration order and, when that did not result in the sequestration order being set aside, sought an extension of time within which to appeal the review. On 6 December 2019, the application for an extension of time was refused. The Applicant subsequently applied to the Federal Circuit Court for an order that her bankruptcy be annulled pursuant to s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act. That application was dismissed on 2 August 2024, and on 12 August 2024, the Applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application.

9    In the intervening period, on 31 October 2022, the Applicant was sent a notice to vacate the property. Despite some early indications that she would comply with the notice, the Applicant has not done so and continues to live at the property. On 9 October 2024, the Trustee applied for declarations and orders, the effect of which were to require the Applicant to vacate the property to enable it to be sold, and for the proceeds of sale to be distributed to the creditors of her bankrupt estate. The evidence filed in support of the application indicated that, as of April 2025, the known creditors were owed in excess of $366,000 and the Trustee’s costs and expenses were estimated to be $282,102.

10    It is the judgment resulting from that application that the Applicant now seeks an extension of time within which to appeal.

11    The Applicant opposed the application by the Trustee on grounds the primary judge described as “unrelated to the issues before the Court for its consideration”: primary judgment at [5]. I pause to note that while the part of the primary judgment in which that statement is made refers to the “applicant” (the Trustee below), it can sensibly be understood to be directed to the Applicant because it referred to a defence to the application that had been made by the Trustee.

12    The material the Applicant filed in opposition to the application consisted of complaints about the Trustee’s fees, emphasised her personal circumstances and mental health, asserted that her bankruptcy was made on incorrect grounds and identified several proposals to deal with the creditors of her bankrupt estate: primary judgment at [6]-[9]. The primary judge was not satisfied that material “disclosed any foundation for the dismissal of any part of” the application or “demonstrated any factual or legal basis which might constitute a defence” to the claim by the Trustee for relief: primary judgment at [9]. Being otherwise satisfied that the orders sought by the Trustee were in all respects appropriate, the primary judge proceeded to grant the relief sought: primary judgment at [10].

proposed appeal

13    The Applicant has provided a draft notice of appeal identifying the following grounds of appeal:

1.    Trustees fees to be revoked from the time the full amount of the invoice in the bankruptcy to Superior Alignment[s] Pty Ltd was paid.

2.    I am a victim of domestic violence and hence suffer from severe anxiety and PTSD and I’ve put in a distressed financial situation soon after my husband’s death which is causing a lot of stress and at times, sadness, pain, mental stress, repeated vomiting and uncontrolled anxiety which has my body shaking or jolting. Hence I shouldn’t be put in any financial stress and be allowed to rebuild my life and live happily with my children.

3.    We need happiness and peaceful and this instance or situation is causing a lot of pain and stress and sadness as it is continuation of a similar kind of abuse that I have been through with [my] late [husband].

14    The draft grounds of appeal make no reference to the primary judgment. The Applicant has filed written submissions in support of the application, but again, they do not make any mention of the primary judgment. The written submissions advance contentions with respect to: the Trustee (including an alleged failure to put a payment proposal to creditors and intimidation of the Applicant); the treatment of the bankruptcy debts (including an assertion that the underlying debt was paid in full or is a small amount and should be put aside); and the prolonged period of the bankruptcy (including a contention that it automatically discharges after three years). The Applicant also makes reference to her family background, her belief that her personal situation has been used against her in this proceeding, and a proposed counter-claim against the Trustee.

15    During the course of the hearing, I asked the Applicant to identify why she said the primary judgment was wrong. The submissions she advanced in response are encapsulated by the following:

As I said, everything that I’ve said has been ignored, and everything said by the trustees have been taken care of, so I just feel it’s a biased decision. That’s all. I would like to have reasoning, and maybe we go back and look at cases where someone is suffering, their personal circumstances are difficult, why we put them – if they are put in place in this situation, that all your rules state that, “Okay. We won’t make their lives more difficult. We will resolve this as soon as possible, or we will do something to get them out. If not, if it is too difficult, if it is affecting them financially, if they” – like, it was a really, like, end of road situation for us, then something should have happened.

Like, even allowing us to live there, incurring costs, paying, like – how does the bankruptcy rule then work? She will be the sole earner. The children are still in school. They have suffered so much. They should be allowed to live freely. Okay. They have assets. Let’s – the block of land that got sold now at a very cheaper rate, it had some value then. The amount of debt that was there, that could have been sold immediately. That could have been used as an equity. There were so many things. Like, everything in this bankruptcy has stated the trustees – what they are trying to achieve. Nothing of mine has been looked. So I argue that everything that has been stated by the trustees and taken into consideration in making the decision that, “Okay. We take over the house,” that shouldn’t have happened. Will you – in normal life, will you – if someone is suffering, there’s incidents of domestic violence happening, will you push them out of their house?

16    It appears, therefore, that the two discernible complaints the Applicant makes about the primary judgment are that she “has been ignored” and an assertion that the decision is “biased”. The other matters the Applicant raised in oral argument reiterate what is set out in the draft notice of appeal and written submissions with respect to the Trustee and her personal circumstances.

disposition

17    The Court has power under r 36.05 of the Rules to extend the time within which to file an appeal. The principles relevant to its application were helpfully summarised by the Full Court in BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33] (Yates, Wheelahan and O’Bryan JJ). The guiding consideration is justice between the parties. In determining whether to exercise the discretion to grant an extension of time within which to institute an appeal, the Court is to have regard both to the adequacy of the explanation for the delay and the merits of the substantive application for an appeal. That said, the Court is to “assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way” rather than going into too much detail: BQQ15 at [33(e)], citing Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [7]-[9] (Brennan CJ and McHugh J).

18    The Applicant in this case is a litigant-in-person. The Court has a duty to ensure that its processes are fair and that requires that a litigant does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising their recognised right to be self-represented: Zaghloul v Woodside Energy Limited (No 9) [2019] FCA 1718 at [17] (Colvin J). It is common for the Courts to take a lenient view of the rules and the law in aid of such persons, provided that the leniency does not go so far as to confer an advantage on them: Kumar v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 79 at [20] (Collier ACJ, Goodman and Meagher JJ) and the authorities there cited. To “do otherwise, or to regard a litigant in person as enjoying a privileged status, would be quite unfair to the represented opponent”: Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, Court of Appeal, NSW, 16 June 1986) at 27 (Samuels JA), as cited with approval in Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36; (2018) 265 CLR 236 at [47] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ).

19    I am conscious of the duties owed by the Court to the Applicant. Nonetheless, having regard to the principles outlined above, I am not satisfied that this is a case that warrants the exercise of the discretion to extend the time within which to institute an appeal against the primary judgment. That is for the following reasons.

The explanation for the delay is not adequate

20    In explaining her delay in instituting an appeal, the Applicant relies on two matters. First, her role as primary carer for her mother while she was hospitalised between 15 April and 3 June 2025. Second, a document tendered on the day of the hearing, which the Applicant characterises as an appeal against the primary judgment. The Applicant asserted in oral submissions that “the court staff have not taken” the document, which is why the appeal was not filed within time.

21    Dealing firstly with the document, it is not a notice of appeal but a Federal Circuit Court “Affidavit – General Federal Law and Migration proceedings” completed by the Applicant, but not signed. Therein, the Applicant details why her mother’s hospitalisation meant that she could not make any “further submissions” in the six weeks from 14 April to 3 June 2025 and why an appointment with her mother’s orthopaedic surgeon on 28 May 2025 meant she “couldn’t attend the hearing”. I infer that “the hearing” is a reference to the day on which the primary judgment was delivered by the Federal Circuit Court because that occurred on 28 May 2025. I pause to note that the Applicant did appear and make oral submissions at the hearing itself (on 8 April 2025) and later filed written material (on 10 April 2025): primary judgment at [5]-[6]. In any event, there is no evidence before me that court staff did not accept the document for filing. As such, I am not persuaded that the document or the assertion that it was not accepted for filing provides an explanation for the delay in instituting an appeal from the primary judgment.

22    Turning then to her mother’s hospitalisation, as the Trustee submits, while the Applicant’s role as primary carer provides some explanation for why she did not institute the proceeding before 3 June 2025, it does not explain the subsequent period of delay until 22 July 2025. The Applicant also states that she was going through mental and physical struggles during that time. Her material includes a medical certificate dated 4 June 2025, which refers to the Applicant having had an exacerbation of anxiety “due to ongoing financial pressures placed on her by claims that she feels are unfounded” and the need to avoid further “pressure to limit [the] effect on her mental health”. There is also a referral letter to a psychologist dated 22 July 2025. The Applicant did not specifically rely upon the medical certificate or referral letter in support of the explanation for a delay.

23    I accept that the practicalities associated with caring for her mother go some way to explaining why the Applicant did not seek to file an appeal before 3 June 2025. I also accept that the Applicant’s mental health has been adversely affected by her circumstances and that those adverse effects are ongoing. I am, however, not satisfied that those matters provide an adequate explanation for why the Applicant was unable to institute the appeal at any time between 4 and 25 June 2025. The evidence does not support the inference that the Applicant’s adverse mental health precluded her from instituting the appeal within time as she sought to do some weeks later. But, even if I were satisfied of the adequacy of the explanation for a delay, I would not be prepared to exercise the discretion to grant the Applicant an extension of time within which to appeal the primary judgment. That is because the proposed appeal is without reasonable prospects of success and, as such, it is not in the interests of justice to permit it to be filed out of time.

The proposed appeal has no reasonable prospects of success

24    The judgment did three things. First, it declared the effect of the sequestration order made on 11 October 2018. Relevantly, that on the making of that order, the Applicant’s interest in the property vested in the Trustee and became divisible amongst the creditors of her bankrupt estate: Bankruptcy Act, s 58 and s 116. Second, it made orders giving effect to the statutory obligations imposed on the Applicant by reason of her bankruptcy, relevantly, to deliver up vacant possession of the property and do all things necessary to enable it to be sold: Bankruptcy Act, ss 30, 77(1)(e) and 77(1)(g). Third, it made orders giving effect to the statutory powers of the Trustee as trustee of the bankrupt estate to sell the property including, if the Applicant does not comply with the orders, to do all things necessary to effect the sale and distribute the proceeds as provided for by the orders: Bankruptcy Act, ss 134(1)(a), 134(1)(k), 134(1)(o) and 134(3).

25    The matters raised by the Applicant before the primary judge, as reagitated before me, were not relevant to granting that relief. Rather, they are, at least in part, directed to the making of the sequestration order on 11 October 2018 in that they concern the exercise of the power under s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act to make such an order against the estate of a debtor. The Applicant had, and availed herself of, the opportunity to seek a review of that order, but was ultimately unsuccessful both in the application for a review and the application for an extension of time within which to institute an appeal. The only other avenue available to the Applicant to challenge the effect of the sequestration order was to seek to annul the bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act. Again, the Applicant availed herself of this opportunity, but was unsuccessful.

26    Upon sequestration of the bankrupt estate, the Federal Circuit Court was empowered to make orders to give effect to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act pertaining to its administration by the Trustee: Tyler v Thomas [2006] FCAFC 6; (2006) 150 FCR 357 at [13] (Branson J), citing Re Bilen; Ex parte Sistrom [1985] FCA 141 at [8] (Neaves J); see also, Tyler at [78] (Bennett J) and [208] (Graham J).

27    In so doing, the primary judge was not required to go behind the sequestration order as the Applicant was, in effect, urging him to do. Nor did her complaints about the Trustee, or her personally distressing circumstances, though understandable, provide a basis for the primary judge to decline to make the orders sought. In any event, as outlined above, the primary judge did consider those matters, but was not satisfied that they “disclosed any foundation for the dismissal of any part of” the application or provided “a factual or legal basis which might constitute a defence” to the relief sought by the Trustee: primary judgment at [7]-[9]. As such, I am persuaded that the Applicant has no real prospects of success in appealing the primary judgment on the basis of the matters set out in her written submissions and as amplified during the hearing: BQQ15 at [33(e)].

28    The Applicant also submits that she feels that the primary judgment is “a biased decision”. That bare assertion, unsupported by a legally relevant explanation or evidence, is “devoid of merit” and bound to fail: Jackamarra at [7]; see also, Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 279 CLR 148 at [37]-[38] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J); and Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135 at [20] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

29    It follows that I do not consider it to be in the interests of justice to grant the Applicant an extension of time within which to institute an appeal against the primary judgment: cf, Rules, r 36.05.

costs

30    The Trustee seeks an order for his costs. The Court has a general discretion to award costs: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43; see also, Bankruptcy Act, s 32. The discretion is “very wide” but must be exercised judicially: Principal Strategic Options Pty Ltd, in the matter of Coshott v Coshott [2001] FCA 664 at [17]- [18] (Branson J). The general rule in bankruptcy proceedings (as in other proceedings before the Court) is that costs follow the event: Re Skase; Ex parte Donnelly (1992) 37 FCR 509 at 522 (Drummond J); see also, Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [35] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), [66]-[67] (McHugh J with whom Brennan J agreed at [3]) and [134] (Kirby J). In my view, there are no circumstances which justify the departure from the general rule in this case.

conclusion

31    For all of the above reasons, the application for an extension of time within which to appeal the primary judgment will be dismissed and the Applicant will pay the Trustee’s costs of the application.

Associate:

Dated:    13 May 2026