Federal Court of Australia

EFT24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 581

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The first respondent’s name be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.    The appeal be dismissed.

3.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal fixed in the sum of $5,000.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FEUTRILL J:

1    This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) by which the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was dismissed: EFT24 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1172. The AAT decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The second respondent is the Administrative Review Tribunal. The AAT was abolished and replaced with ART in October 2024. If the appeal were successful and the decision of the AAT set aside the matter would be remitted to the ART.

2    The appellant is a citizen of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He originally entered Australia in 2013 on a prospective marriage visa and was later granted a partner visa. In 2017 he was convicted of a serious drug offence and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. In 2020 his visa was cancelled. He unsuccessfully sought to have the cancellation revoked. Then, in 2024, he applied for a protection visa. In February 2024 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellant a protection visa under s 65 and s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the appellant sought review of that decision by the AAT.

3    The appellant claimed protection under the refugee and complementary protection criteria set out in s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. He claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution (refugee criteria) by reason of membership of a particular social group if removed from Australia to Nigeria and (or) that there were substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of removal there is a real risk that he will suffer significant harm (complementary protection criteria) on three grounds.

(1)    As a person who was part of a Nigerian drug operation who assisted prosecutors in Australia he feared the family of his co-accused and his business associates in Nigeria would kill him (retaliation claim).

(2)    As a Nigerian returning after conviction of a drug offence outside Nigeria he feared exposure to ‘double jeopardy’ and torture, punishment, inhumane treatment and suffering and possible death at the hands of Nigerian authorities (double jeopardy claim).

(3)    As a member of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) he fears that he will be arrested, detained, questioned, tortured or killed by Nigerian police (IPOB claim).

4    The AAT considered the evidence relating to each of those claims and made findings. Before explaining its evaluation of the evidence and findings, the AAT set out observations it made about the credibility of the appellant, two witnesses who gave evidence in support of the appellant’s claim, and certain documents that the appellant had provided in support of his claim. As part of those observations the AAT found that the appellant had breached the conditions of a Malaysian visa. The AAT observed that non-compliance with the migration laws of another jurisdiction affected the appellant’s credibility: T [94]-[99]. Against those general observations about credibility, the AAT then addressed the evidence that was relevant to each of the appellant’s claims.

5    The AAT was not persuaded by the totality of the evidence that the appellant ‘faces a real chance of targeting for serious harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future in Nigeria because of his testimony’ in the criminal trial against his co-offender. The AAT concluded that there was no real chance that the appellant will suffer ‘serious harm’ from ‘[the co-offender], or his family, or from drug lords or syndicates, or anyone else for reason of providing incriminating evidence in the trial of [the co-offender] if he returns to Nigeria now or in the reasonably foreseeable future’: T [102]-[108].

6    The AAT did not accept, based on the evidence, that the appellant had a real chance of serious harm because he is a Nigerian convicted of an overseas drug offence. Amongst other things, the AAT was of the view that the law that exposed the appellant to double jeopardy was a law of general application and would not be applied in a discriminatory way against the appellant. The AAT also found that the chance of any prosecution was remote: T [109]-[119].

7    The AAT accepted that the appellant was a member of IPOB, but he was an ordinary rank and file financial member and not active. The AAT found that he would not be considered by the Nigerian authorities as an activist and the appellant would not participate in political demonstrations that may bring him to the attention of those authorities. The AAT found that he returned to Nigeria in late 2014 for a period of time after he had become a member of IPOB and was able to move freely and faced no harm or threats. Ultimately, the AAT rejected the claim that the appellant is a person who is or would be perceived to be an active member of IPOB or in a leadership role of that organisation such that he would face a real chance of serious harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returned to Nigeria: T [120]-[130].

8    Based on the findings concerning the appellant’s claims, the AAT was not satisfied that he met the refugee criteria: T [137]. Based on the same findings and for essentially the same reasons the AAT was also not satisfied that he met the complementary protection criteria: T [138]-[141].

9    In the Circuit Court the appellant contended that the decision of the AAT should be set aside for jurisdictional error on four grounds. The primary judge rejected each of the grounds. The appellant’s notice of appeal repeats the four grounds. As the existence or non-existence of jurisdictional error is a question of law and the appellant is a litigant-in-person, I take the grounds of appeal to be contentions that the primary judge erred in law for failing to accept that the AAT made each of the jurisdictional errors pleaded in the appellant’s originating application in the Circuit Court.

10    Before the hearing of the appeal the appellant made an interlocutory application which, amongst other things, sought to recast the grounds of appeal as errors of the primary judge. After hearing the appellant’s interlocutory application and oral submissions, the following issues, derived from the grounds of judicial review in the Circuit Court, emerged for determination on the appeal.

(1)    Was the AAT in error for placing undue emphasis on non-compliance with the Malaysia visa?

(2)    Was the AAT in error for failing to engage with the retaliation claim?

(3)    Was the AAT in error in the manner in which it decided the double jeopardy claim?

(4)    Was the process of reasoning the AAT used with respect to the retaliation and double jeopardy claims illogical or irrational and legally unreasonable?

(5)    Was the AAT in error for failing to engage with his claim that he would be denied state protection?

(6)    Were any errors of the AAT material so as to amount to jurisdictional error?

Preliminary matters

11    The appellant was represented in his proceeding in the AAT, but represented himself in the application before the primary judge and in the appeal.

12    The primary judge’s reasons record that the appellant had not requested the assistance of an interpreter in the proceeding before the Circuit Court and that ‘he had more than sufficient English language skills to participate in a meaningful way in the hearing’: PJ [22]. Notwithstanding that observation of the primary judge, the appellant was assisted in the appeal by an interpreter. During the oral hearing in the appeal, although the appellant conducted parts of the hearing in English, in my assessment, he was not able to participate properly in the appeal without an interpreter particularly when dealing with legal concepts and questions. During the oral hearing it also became evident that the documents the appellant had filed in the appeal suggested that he had a better understanding and ability to work in written English than he demonstrated at the hearing and that the appellant had been assisted in drafting Court documents by another person or other persons.

13    The documents the appellant filed before the hearing included a notice of appeal, a proposed amended notice of appeal and written submissions addressing the grounds of appeal in the proposed amended notice. While none of those documents identified with any degree of particularity a ground for judicial review of the decision of the AAT and, hence, a ground for error on the part of the primary judge for failing to conclude that the AAT had made such an error, their contents suggested that the appellant had an understanding of the legal concepts of judicial review and appeal and that he would be in a position to address those concepts orally at the appeal. However, when questioned about these documents it became apparent that the appellant had very little knowledge of these matters. It also became apparent that the appellant did not have with him all documents relevant to the appeal, or if he did, that these were not sufficiently organised for him to identify any documents to which the Court, the Minister or he made reference. Moreover, he showed a lack of knowledge of the contents of the written documents he had filed in the appeal.

14    As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court provided the appellant with folders of the documents filed in the appeal and identified the documents to which the Court made reference or about which the Court asked the appellant questions during the hearing. The Court confirmed the appellant had or was provided with paper and pen for taking notes during the hearing. The concepts of judicial review of administrative decisions and appeal were explained to the appellant. The appellant was then asked to explain the substance of his complaints about the reasons for decision and process of decision-making of the AAT. As already mentioned, the six issues identified earlier then emerged from the written documents and the appellant’s oral submissions and the Minister confirmed he was not prejudiced by dealing with those matters as the real issues in the appeal.

15    The Court expresses its gratitude to the interpreter for her assistance in the appeal. The Court also acknowledges the Minister’s discharge of his obligation under s 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) by adopting a co-operative approach to allow the appeal to be conducted consistently with the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions described in s 37M of that Act.

Was the treatment of non-compliance with the Malaysian visa erroneous?

16    It is not easy to fit the appellant’s complaint about the manner in which the AAT addressed his admitted non-compliance with his Malaysian visa into a recognised category of jurisdictional error. In oral submissions the appellant accepted a characterisation of the alleged error as the AAT’s placement of undue or too much weight or emphasis on that non-compliance as a means of discrediting the appellant’s claims. Therefore, it is best characterised as a contention that using the appellant’s admitted breach of Malaysian migration law to discredit the appellant’s claims to any significant or material extent was illogical or irrational or unreasonable.

Principles applicable to the legal reasonableness of findings of credit

17    It is well-established that, in general, Parliament is taken to have intended that powers conferred on administrative decision-makers are to be exercised reasonably: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), [88] (Gageler J).

18    In the grant or refusal of a protection visa under s 65 the Minister must be satisfied (or in the case of refusal, not satisfied) relevantly that the applicant meets the refugee or the complementary protection criteria. That state of satisfaction is a jurisdictional fact upon which the Minister’s power to grant or refuse the visa rests: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12 at [37] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). The formation of a state of satisfaction (or non-satisfaction) through an illogical or irrational process of jurisdictional fact-finding may result in jurisdictional error if the state of satisfaction has not been formed in accordance with the Act and, therefore, an essential precondition to the authorised exercise of power under s 65 has not been met: EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681; 272 FCR 409 at [55]-[61] (Derrington J).

19    Relevantly, a subjective jurisdictional fact (state of mind of the decision-maker) does not exist if it is founded upon findings or inferences of fact which were not supported by some probative material or could not be supported on logical grounds: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; 197 CLR 611 at [145], [147] (Gummow J); Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 at [34]-[37], [52] (McHugh and Gummow JJ); SGLB at [38] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [40] (Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J), [102]-[105], [121]-[131] (Crennan and Bell JJ). However, not every lack of rationality or lapse of logic results in an error in subjective jurisdictional fact-finding. Further, describing reasoning as irrational, unreasonable or illogical must be more than a mere emphatic way of expressing disagreement with it: Eshetu at [40] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J). It must mean more than that on the material before the decision-maker, the court would (or would not) have reached the required state of satisfaction: S20/2002 at [9] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J).

20    In respect of credibility findings of an administrative decision-maker the following observations of the Full Court in ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109 at [47], [83]-[84] (Griffiths, Perry and Bromwich JJ) are apposite.

(1)    ‘Extreme’ illogicality or irrationality must be shown ‘measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one upon which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions and against a framework of the inquiry being as to whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal’.

(2)    The issue of whether a credibility finding involves jurisdictional error is case specific and should not be analysed by reference to fixed categories or formulae. Nonetheless, adverse credibility findings might involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as a failure to afford procedural fairness, reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis and (or) legal unreasonableness.

(3)    The reasons of the decision-maker must be analysed in detail to determine whether or not there has been jurisdictional error. That analysis may require that close attention be given to the relevant parts of the reasons for decision, transcript to which reference is made and (or) other evidence upon which the findings of credit were made.

21    Nonetheless, ‘[r]easonableness is not exhausted by rationality’: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [59] (Gageler J). A decision may be unreasonable if the exercise of the statutory power properly construed, having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of that power has been abused by the decision-maker. The manner in which abuse of statutory power manifests itself is not limited to specific errors or labels such as ‘manifestly unreasonable’ or ‘irrational’ or ‘bizarre’ so that no reasonable person could have arrived at it. The question is whether the result is so unreasonable that it could not have been reached if proper reasoning had been applied in the exercise of the statutory power in the particular circumstances. That exercise is fact-dependent and reasons, where provided, form the focal point for that assessment: SZVFW at [78]-[84] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). As Allsop CJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 (at [12]-[13]) ‘the task is to evaluate the quality of the decision, by reference to the statutory source of the power and thus, from its scope, purpose and objects to assess whether it is lawful.… Reasons may fail to disclose an evident and intelligible justification or may not be sufficient to outweigh the inference that the decision is so unjust as to be (in the context of the statutory source of the power) beyond a lawful exercise of the power’.

How, if at all, was breach of Malaysian migration law used to discredit the appellant’s claims?

22    The AAT found that the appellant had breached Malaysian migration law because he operated a business in Malaysia contrary to a prohibition on his student visa in Malaysia. The AAT rejected a submission that the appellant had made to the effect that fact was not relevant to the assessment of his protection claims. The AAT said that the appellant’s past conduct was relevant to an assessment of his character and his credibility as a witness ‘in relation to seeking a particular migration outcome’ and to ignore it would undermine the integrity of the protection visa regime. The AAT said that as a consequence it had ‘borne in mind the [appellant’s] conceded non-compliance with his migration obligations in Malaysia, not in any determinative way, but as a part of all the evidence before [the AAT], which includes his compliance with the Australian prospective marriage visa which was granted to him.’ The AAT also observed that included his co-operation with prosecutors in giving evidence against his co-accused in the criminal proceedings: T [97]. On a fair reading of the reasons, the AAT was not expressing a view that non-compliance with Malaysian migration law was of any particular weight, merely that it was a relevant fact that negatively affected the appellant’s credit. At the same time, the AAT acknowledged there were other facts that positively affected his credit.

23    The AAT found that a screenshot of a WhatsApp message containing a threat was not reliable evidence. The AAT considered that the provenance of the message was not reliable and the witness who produced the message (the appellant’s brother) was not a reliable witness. The AAT also considered the contents of the message vague and not connected to the appellant’s evidence in the criminal trial: T [96], [102].

24    The AAT rejected the appellant’s claim that he had received a photograph of a person who claimed to have been assaulted. It was rejected because the photograph was not produced, the appellant’s evidence about it was lacking in detail and presented as rehearsed and not credible: T [104]. Otherwise, various other claims were rejected or not accepted for reasons unrelated to the appellant’s evidence and ultimately the retaliation claim was not accepted on the totality of the evidence: T [102], [103], [105]-[108].

25    The AAT did not accept the evidence of the appellant’s brother to the effect that he had received a telephone call from a police officer inquiring about the appellant. That evidence was not accepted on the basis of unreliability of the appellant’s brother as a witness and inherently incredible aspects of his evidence: T [123]. The AAT also made adverse findings about the credit of another witness (the secretary of IPOB) because her evidence was vague and generalised. As a consequence, although the AAT accepted that the appellant was an ordinary and financial member of IPOB, the AAT was not persuaded that the appellant was an ‘IPOB activist’: T [95], [124], [128]. The AAT also observed that the appellant’s explanation for the reason that he was not harmed when he returned to Nigeria in 2014 (no one knew he was supporting IPOB) as inconsistent with his claim that he had been an active supporter and contributor to IPOB and that the authorities in Nigeria would have an adverse interest in him for that reason: T [127].

26    None of the reasons the AAT gave for not accepting the double jeopardy claim were connected with the appellant’s evidence as a witness or the evidence of any other witness: T [109]-[119]. Otherwise, various other claims were rejected or not accepted for reasons unrelated to the appellant’s evidence. Ultimately, the retaliation claim was not accepted on the totality of the evidence: T [102], [103], [105]-[108]. The IPOB claim was also not accepted on the totality of the evidence: T [122]-[126], [128]-[130].

27    It follows that the adverse finding of credit the AAT made about the appellant relating to his breach of Malaysian migration law was not expressly referred to as a reason for rejecting or not accepting any claim the appellant had made. At most, it might have had an influence on non-acceptance of the appellant’s evidence about the photograph, but that evidence was expressly rejected for other reasons.

Conclusion

28    For the foregoing reasons, the adverse finding of credit that the AAT made against the appellant resulting from his breach of Malaysian migration law was not used in any significant or material way to discredit the evidence the appellant gave to the AAT. Further, to the extent that it may have had an influence on the AAT not accepting or rejecting parts of the evidence the appellant gave, the appellant has not demonstrated that limited use of adverse findings of credit was illogical, irrational or unreasonable in the relevant sense.

Was there a failure to engage with the retaliation claim?

29    In the appellant’s written submissions he submits that the retaliation claim was central to his protection claim and, while the reasons of the AAT recorded his claim, in the reasoning of the AAT there was not proper engagement with the appellant’s claim and evidence because the AAT focussed on the appellant’s delay raising the claim, the absence of direct threats to the appellant and collateral credibility matters. The appellant was not able to augment these submissions orally in any way that was relevant to judicial review.

30    The AAT was required to consider all ‘claims’ that the appellant made and the essential components or integers of those claims: Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; 233 FCR 136 at [42] (Allsop J, Spender and Merkel JJ agreeing). In that context, a failure to respond to ‘a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’ can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. That is, a failure to perform the ‘review’ in accordance with the Act and the AAT Act: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389 at [24]-[32] (Gummow and Callinan JJ), [95] (Hayne J); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 at [13] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), [105] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). Further, the AAT was not limited to its determination of the ‘case’ articulated by the applicant if the evidence and the material which it accepts, or does not reject raises a ‘case’ that is not articulated but clearly emerges on that evidence and material: NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1 at [55], [58], [60], [68] (Black CJ, French and Selway JJ).

31    There is a distinction between ‘considering’ an applicant’s claim in the sense of reading, identifying, understanding and evaluating the claim and its essential components or integers and ‘considering’ in the sense of evaluating the claim and its essential components or integers in the course of making a decision. It is for the AAT, acting reasonably and rationally and having demonstrably identified and understood the applicant’s claims, to evaluate the evidence and the significance of the claims. In the context of judicial review, the Court does not enquire into the degree or quality of the AAT’s evaluation: Jabari v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 98; 298 FCR 431 at [51]-[55] (Katzmann, Jackson and McEvoy JJ); ECE21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 52; 297 FCR 422 at [7]-[9] (Mortimer, Colvin and O’Sullivan JJ).

32    The AAT identified the appellant’s retaliation claim and the evidence upon which the appellant relied: T [11]-[78]. The AAT addressed aspects of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence: T [94]-[99]. The AAT made findings of fact on the evidence and reached conclusions based on those findings relevant to whether the AAT was satisfied that the appellant met the refugee or complementary protection criteria: T [101]-[119]. I do not detect in any of these parts of the reasons of the AAT any failure to read, identify, understand and evaluate the appellant’s claims and evidence in support of those claims. In substance, the appellant’s complaint relates to the ‘quality’ of that consideration and, in particular, the conclusions the AAT reached regarding the appellant’s claims and evidence. No error has been demonstrated for failing to ‘consider’ the appellant’s claims.

Was the evaluation of the double jeopardy claim erroneous?

33    The appellant was not really able to articulate what he contends was erroneous about the manner in which AAT dealt with the double jeopardy claim. The issue was raised in connection with his complaint about the AAT failing to consider the retaliation claim. In that context, it is to be understood as an allegation of a failure to consider the double jeopardy claim.

34    The AAT accepted that the appellant would be exposed to prosecution under Decree 33 of 1990 and s 22 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act (Nigeria) and imprisonment for up to five years upon return to Nigeria on the basis of the appellant’s conviction for drug-related offences in Western Australia. However, the AAT considered those provisions of the NDLEA Act to be laws of general application and there was no evidence that those provisions would be applied against the appellant in a discriminatory manner. The AAT also found, based on the evidence, that there was only a remote chance and not a real chance that the appellant would be prosecuted under the NDLEA Act if removed to Nigeria. For these reasons, the AAT was not satisfied of the appellant’s claims as to the refugee or complementary protection criteria: T [109]-[119], [138]-[141].

35    The AAT has not failed to read, identify, understand or evaluate the double jeopardy claim. Otherwise, there is nothing obviously incorrect in terms of its approach to the legal or factual issues associated with that claim. Thus, the appellant has not demonstrated a ground for setting aside the decision of the AAT based on its rejection of the double jeopardy claim.

Was the process of reasoning illogical and (or) irrational and legally unreasonable?

36    In the appellant’s written submissions he submits that the AAT accepted parts of the factual setting, including the appellant’s co-operation against the co-offender, but rejected the claim in a manner that ‘lacked a rational bridge to the statutory inquiry’. In particular, the appellant contends that the absence of an express threat was treated as more important that the ‘nature of a retaliation claim based on organised actors’. The appellant was not able to augment the written submissions in any meaningful way in his oral submissions. Nonetheless, the contention appears to extend to illogicality and (or) irrationality and legal unreasonableness in connection with each of the other complaints the appellant made about the AAT’s decision.

37    The applicable principles concerning illogical, irrational and (or) legally unreasonable decision-making are set out earlier in these reasons. Having regard to those principles the appellant has not demonstrated that the AAT made an error of logic, rationality or reasoning in the manner in which it dealt with the retaliation claim. The finding that the AAT made of the absence of any direct threat made to the appellant was logically and rationally connected to its ultimate conclusion that there was not a real chance of harm to the appellant. The AAT accepted that the co-offender may have animosity towards the appellant. However, in substance, it was not satisfied on the evidence that the co-offender or that person’s family or supporters in Nigeria had the intention and capacity to cause harm to the appellant. The absence of a direct threat was logically and rationally relevant to the question of intention to harm. To the extent that the appellant’s contention extends to the other complaints, for the reasons already given, the appellant has not demonstrated any error in the manner in which the AAT dealt with his claims.

38    The appellant has not demonstrated that the decision of the AAT was illogical, irrational or legally unreasonable in any way.

Was there a failure to engage with the claim of denial of state protection?

39    The appellant contends that part of his claim was that he would not receive protection from Nigerian authorities. He asserts that the AAT failed to deal with that part of his claim and, thereby, the AAT failed to perform its evaluative function according to law. Again, this complaint was not augmented by the appellant’s oral submissions.

40    The appellant’s contention and assertion are not accepted. The AAT addressed the appellant’s claims relating to the absence of state protection. The AAT rejected that part of the claim that was based on the evidence of the appellant’s brother relating to police inquiring about the appellant. It also rejected a claim to the effect that he would not receive a fair trial in Nigeria because of corruption in the judiciary. Otherwise, the AAT considered that it was not necessary to address the factual basis for that part of the appellant’s claims because the AAT had not found that the appellant faced a real chance of harm: T [134]-[135].

Were any errors material?

41    As the appellant has not demonstrated that the AAT made any of the asserted errors the issue of materiality does not need to be addressed.

Disposition

42    The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the AAT made any of the asserted jurisdictional errors. Accordingly, the appellant has also failed to demonstrate that the primary judge made any error of law.

43    The appeal should be dismissed. The Minister has sought an order that the appellant pay his costs fixed in the sum of $5,000. It is appropriate that costs follow the event and that the costs be fixed in a lump-sum in accordance with the Central Practice Note: National Court Framework and Case Management (CPN-1) and the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) and the observations in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 403. The sum the Minister claims is a reasonable amount in which to fix the costs.

Associate:

Dated:    12 May 2026