Federal Court of Australia

Allen (Trustee) v Huangfu, in the matter of the bankrupt estate of Zhang [2026] FCA 533

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The respondent’s interlocutory application dated 28 November 2025 be dismissed.

2.    The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

3.    The matter be listed for further case management hearing on a date to be fixed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROFE J:

1.    Introduction

1    On 13 June 2025, the respondent filed an interlocutory application seeking that this proceeding be transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the FCFCoA) pursuant to s 32AB of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act) and rr 27.01 and 27.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

2    The interlocutory application was referred to a Registrar for determination and was subsequently refused on 11 November 2025.

3    The respondent now applies for review of that decision pursuant to r 3.11(1) of the Rules and s 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act (the review application). It is well settled that a review under s 35A(5) of the Federal Court Act is conducted by way of a hearing de novo. The Court is therefore required to determine the application afresh on the evidence that was before the Registrar as well as any further evidence which has been filed since, without the need to identify error in the Registrar’s decision.

2.    Background

4    The applicant, Paul Allen, has instituted this proceeding in his capacity as trustee of the bankrupt estate of James Tenghui Zhang. The respondent is Weina Huangfu, the non-bankrupt and estranged spouse of Mr Zhang.

5    On or around 9 August 2016, Ms Huangfu and Mr Zhang were registered as joint proprietors of the land located at 11 Monomeath Avenue, Canterbury in the State of Victoria, more particularly described as Volume 4586 Folio 051 (the Property).

6    On 15 September 2023, Mr Zhang transferred his interest in the Property to Ms Huangfu, after which, she became the sole proprietor of the Property. Ms Huangfu denies allegations by Mr Allen that she gave no consideration for the alleged transfer.

7    In 2025, the Property was sold to a third party for $14,280,000. At the time of the contract of sale, Ms Huangfu claims that she held at least a 50% interest in the Property and was entitled to at least 50% of the sale proceeds of the Property.

8    On 9 April 2025, Mr Allen was appointed as the trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to the acceptance of a debtor’s petition and on that date, the divisible property of Mr Zhang vested in Mr Allen pursuant to s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act. However, the Property did not vest in Mr Allen as, at the time, Ms Zhang was its registered owner.

9    In commencing these proceedings on 12 May 2025 (the Bankruptcy Proceeding), Mr Allen claims that the transfer of the Property to Ms Huangfu is void on the premise that it was an undervalued transaction aimed at defeating creditors. To that end, Mr Allen sought inter alia, the following final relief:

(a)    a declaration pursuant to s 120(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that the alleged transfer of the Property is void as against Ms Huangfu; or,

(b)    in the alternative, a declaration pursuant to s 121(1) of the Bankruptcy Act that the impugned transfer is void as against Ms Huangfu.

10    Mr Allen has since indicated that he no longer presses for a declaration under s 121(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of any intent to defeat creditors, and hence, his case remains solely hinged on s 120(1) regarding the impugned undervalued consideration in exchange for the transfer.

11    The net sale proceeds from the sale of the Property were $14,106,662. Substantial amounts were applied in satisfaction of secured debts, including payments to the Australian Taxation Office ($2,228,489.47) and the National Australia Bank ($7,637,566.88). The balance of the proceeds, being $3,234,547.60 (the unencumbered value identified), is subject to freezing orders made by Bennett J on 15 and 16 May 2025 upon the application of Mr Allen. Those orders prevent the company controlled by Ms Huangfu—the entity that received the sale proceeds—from dealing with its assets up to that amount.

12    Ms Huangfu has since resided in rented accommodation with her and Mr Zhang’s three children. During the marriage, the Property was used as security for loans said to relate to Mr Zhang’s business affairs.

13    Ms Huangfu resists the substantive claims in this proceeding, denying the alleged transfer or receipt of any relevant interest. In the alternative, she contends that if any transfer is found to be void, the doctrine of exoneration applies in respect of the secured debts, on the basis that the loans were incurred by Mr Zhang alone in connection with his business affairs. Accordingly, Ms Huangfu asserts that she is entitled to a charge over Mr Zhang’s share of the net sale proceeds.

14    Ms Huangfu, Mr Allen and Mr Zhang are also parties to litigation in the FCFCoA, following proceedings instituted by Ms Huangfu on 29 August 2025, pursuant to ss 78 and 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). This proceeding has been allocated the FCFCoA file number MLC 11149 of 2025 (the Family Court Proceeding). Ms Huangfu has named Mr Zhang and Mr Allen as the first and second respondents, respectively, to that matter, and seeks final relief in the following form:

1.    It is declared pursuant to s 78 of the Family Law Act that the net proceeds of sale from the property situate at 11 Monomeath Avenue, Canterbury in the State of Victoria are the sole property of the Applicant Wife.

2.    In the alternative to Order 1, that there be an alteration of property interests between the parties pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act to give effect to a just and equitable division of the parties’ legal and equitable interests in the Applicant’s favour.

3.    The Applicant Wife be otherwise excused from particularising the Final Orders sought, including any orders for a superannuation split, until such time as there has been full and frank financial disclosure.

4.    Such further or other Orders as this Honourable Court deems appropriate.

15    On 29 March 2026, Judicial Registrar McGee made orders in the Family Court Proceedings adjourning all extant applications in the matter to 3 June 2026, with a further notation which states:

A.    The matter is adjourned at the request of the Applicant and Second Respondent where they await judgment in the parallel bankruptcy proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia.

3.    Procedural matters

16    This matter was listed before me on 11 March 2026 for case management and for the hearing of the review application.

17    While, on Mr Allen’s view of the matter, the pleadings had closed, senior counsel for Ms Huangfu noted that Mr Allen had not filed any reply in the proceeding. This was particularly so given that Ms Huangfu raised, for the first time in her defence, the doctrine of exoneration, and there was no pleading from Mr Allen addressing that issue.

18    Further, by orders made by consent on 28 November 2025, Ms Huangfu was required to file and serve any further affidavit evidence she intended to rely upon by 6 February 2026. No evidence was filed in accordance with that order. On 12 February 2026, Mr Allen’s representatives contacted my chambers seeking to have the matter listed on an urgent basis, prior to 11 March 2026 (being the next return date), to address that non-compliance. I declined to list the matter any earlier than 11 March 2026, particularly where the orders referred to “any evidence”, leaving it to the discretion of the party as to whether such evidence would be filed.

19    Notwithstanding this, after hearing from the parties, it became apparent that steps should be taken to progress the Bankruptcy Proceeding, regardless of whether the matter is ultimately transferred to the FCFCoA. Ms Huangfu was therefore granted leave until 30 April 2026 to file any evidence upon which she intends to rely.

20    Finally, counsel for both parties referred to discussions, conducted on a without prejudice basis, that had previously occurred in the Family Court Proceeding, and indicated an openness and willingness to engage in a similar process in the Bankruptcy Proceeding, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the matter ultimately proceeds. To facilitate this, I made a further order for the parties to attend mediation before a Registrar of this Court in May 2026. In the event that the Bankruptcy Proceeding was to be transferred, the orders made on 11 March 2026 would continue to apply to the parties. The Bankruptcy Proceeding is presently listed for mediation before Judicial Registrar Gronow on 14 May 2026.

4.    Relevant principles and provisions

21    The task before the Court is to determine whether the particular circumstances of this proceeding warrant the matter being transferred to the FCFCoA. This question is to be determined by reference to s 32AB of the Federal Court Act which, relevantly, provides:

32AB     Discretionary transfer of civil proceedings to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(1)    If a proceeding is pending in the Court, the Court may, by order, transfer the proceeding from the Court to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

[…]

(6)    In deciding whether to transfer a proceeding to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia under subsection (1), the Court must have regard to:

(a)    any Rules of Court made for the purposes of subsection (4); and

(b)    whether proceedings in respect of an associated matter are pending in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia; and

(c)    whether the resources of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia are sufficient to hear and determine the proceeding; and

(d)    the interests of the administration of justice.

22    In conjunction with the above provision, notification and consultation pursuant to r 27.01 of the Rules must occur between the courts for the approval of any such transfer.

23    It is readily apparent that the Court’s exercise of power under these provisions is discretionary in nature. The onus falls on Ms Huangfu to satisfy the Court of the factors contemplated in subs-s 32AB(6) such that it is appropriate and in the interests of justice to exercise its discretion.

24    The relevant authorities elucidate that a transfer may be ordered where the circumstances of a case justify that course. The question of transfer is necessarily fact-specific and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. An example frequently cited where transfer was refused is Macks v Edge (2006) 156 FCR 302. While that case bears certain factual similarities to the present proceeding, it ultimately serves only as an illustration of the discretionary nature of the inquiry rather than as determinative authority.

25    It is correct that only the FCFCoA has jurisdiction to determine applications brought under ss 78 and 79 of the Family Law Act, which concern declarations of interests in property and the alteration of property interests. Accordingly, it would not be permissible for the Family Court Proceeding to be transferred to this Court.

26    The jurisdiction of the FCFCoA to hear both bankruptcy matters and matters arising under the Family Law Act was conferred following the enactment of the Bankruptcy and Family Law Amendment Act 2005 (Cth). In the Second Reading Speech, in respect of the Bankruptcy and Family Law Legislation Amendment Bill 2005 (Cth) in the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General provided the following explanation as to the purpose of the amendment, which was to:

[…] enable concurrent bankruptcy and family law proceedings to be brought together in a court exercising family law jurisdiction, to ensure that all issues are dealt with at the same time.

(Australia, House of Representatives, Debates (2005) No 5, 17 February 2005, p 31)

27    In the Family Court Proceeding, the FCFCoA has jurisdiction to make an order under s 79(1)(d)(ii) of the Family Law Act requiring a trustee in bankruptcy to make, for the benefit of either or both of the parties to the marriage or a child of the marriage, such settlement or transfer of property as the court determines. Specifically, if the FCFCoA was to find that Mr Allen was entitled to a portion of the funds that are the subject of the Freezing Order as a result of the s 120 of the Bankruptcy Act (which Ms Zhang denies), then it is open to the FCFCoA to make an order in the Family Court Proceeding that some or all of the funds be transferred to Ms Huangfu under s 79(1)(d)(ii) of the Family Law Act.

28    Any property that is ordered to be transferred from Mr Allen to Ms Huangfu in accordance with s 79(1)(d)(ii) of the Family Law Act will not be available to creditors pursuant to s 116(2)(q) of the Bankruptcy Act.

29    Accordingly, the task before me is to determine whether, having regard to the matters identified in s 32AB of the Federal Court Act and the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to exercise this Court’s discretion to transfer the Bankruptcy Proceeding to the FCFCoA.

5.    Submissions

30    It is useful to set out the parties’ respective positions in relation to each of the matters which they contend bear upon the Court’s exercise of its discretion in this application.

31    Ms Huangfu asserts the following reasons in support of her application for transfer:

(1)    consistency in outcomes by avoiding the overlap of evidence;

(2)    efficiency and economy of hearing both proceedings together; and

(3)    lack of prejudice to Mr Allen from any transfer.

5.1    Consistency in outcomes

32    The parties are at odds as to whether transferring the Bankruptcy Proceeding to the FCFCoA would promote consistency between that proceeding and the Family Court Proceeding. Ms Huangfu submits that the determination of her defence based on the equity of exoneration would require this Court to identify the respective assets and liabilities of herself and Mr Zhang, and to consider whether she received any benefit from debts discharged from the proceeds of the sale of the Property. She submits that inquiries of that kind substantially overlap with the matters that will arise in the Family Court Proceeding, where the FCFCoA must identify the parties’ legal and equitable interests in property and consider their respective financial circumstances pursuant to ss 78 and 79 of the Family Law Act: see Sebastian v Sebastian (No 5) [2013] FamCA 191 at [144] (per Young J), citing Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108.

33    The doctrine upon which Ms Huangfu relies is well established. As the Full Court observed in Parsons v McBain (2001) 109 FCR 120 at [18] (per Black CJ, Kiefel and Finkelstein JJ), the authorities concerning the equity of exoneration “go back three centuries”. Their Honours explained at [20]–[21] that the doctrine arises where a person charges property to secure the debt of another and, as between them, the property of the principal debtor is to be regarded as primarily liable for that debt. In such circumstances, the surety is entitled to an indemnity against the estate of the principal debtor. Their Honours further observed at [25] that the existence of some “tangible benefit” to the surety will not ordinarily defeat the equity.

34    Mr Allen, however, relies upon the approach adopted by Besanko J in Macks v Edge, where his Honour declined to transfer proceedings involving claims by a bankruptcy trustee notwithstanding the existence of related family law proceedings. His Honour observed at [41] that the trustee’s claim under the Bankruptcy Act was logically anterior, and that any claim by the spouse in the family law jurisdiction would arise only if the trustee were successful. While Ms Huangfu sought to distinguish Macks v Edge on the basis that no defence of equity of exoneration arose in that case, Mr Allen submits that the same sequential logic applies here and that findings made in the Bankruptcy Proceeding would ultimately bind the parties.

5.2    Efficiency and economy of judicial determination

35    In Horne (Trustee), in the matter of Tebb (Bankrupt) v Tebb [2013] FCA 585, Bromberg J dealt with an interlocutory application to transfer bankruptcy proceedings from this Court to the (then) Family Court of Australia. The substantive proceeding before his Honour concerned a trustee in bankruptcy seeking orders in relation to the property of the bankrupt, under the Bankruptcy Act. Similar to this matter, the named respondent was the bankrupt’s spouse. There, his Honour observed at [16] that “issues of efficiency, economy and comity raised by [the respondent spouse were] persuasive factors which support[ed] the grant of her application”. Ultimately, his Honour allowed for the transfer, distinguishing the circumstances in that matter from those in Macks v Edge.

36    In the present proceedings, Ms Huangfu submits that a transfer may similarly promote efficiency and reduce duplication of effort and costs. She notes that the parties would otherwise bear the costs of two separate proceedings, with the losing party generally ordered to pay the other party’s costs. Ms Huangfu further observes that, in the context of trustee litigation, costs are ultimately recovered from the bankrupt estate unless the Court orders otherwise. On that basis, she submits that any additional costs arising from parallel proceedings would be borne by the creditors, rather than the parties themselves, and that the interests of creditors should not automatically outweigh the potential interests of the wife: see Beaman v Bond (2013) 212 FCR 350 at [33] (per McKerracher J). She also notes that cost considerations were relevant factors in favour of transfer in Combis v Jensen (No 2) (2009) 181 FCR 178 at [62] (per Collier J), another matter in which the Court considered an application to transfer bankruptcy proceedings in circumstances where related proceedings were on foot in the Family Court.

37    Mr Allen submits, however, that transfer may not result in meaningful cost savings or procedural efficiencies. He contends that even if the matter were transferred, it would remain a matter for the FCFCoA to decide whether the Bankruptcy Proceeding and the Family Court Proceeding would be heard concurrently. He further submits that concurrent proceedings could increase complexity as a court would be required to determine the adjustment claim against Mr Allen (and necessarily engage with the related claim against Mr Zhang) without knowing whether the claim has merit until after a full contested hearing. Mr Zhang would also be required to participate in evidence and issues largely irrelevant to him. Further, any partial success by Mr Allen would require the trial to proceed on multiple alternative bases, with the merits and quantum of any adjustment potentially varying depending on the outcome of the Bankruptcy Proceeding.

5.3    Prejudice to the trustee in bankruptcy?

38    The parties advance differing views as to whether a transfer would prejudice Mr Allen. Ms Huangfu submits that any prejudice can be managed and that the potential efficiencies arising from a transfer would outweigh any inconvenience or cost exposure.

39    Mr Allen submits that a transfer would give rise to practical difficulties, including the potential for delay, additional costs, and uncertainty. He notes that he is subject to an undertaking as to damages, and that any delay arising from transfer or the prospect of concurrent hearings may heighten that exposure. He also submits that, if required to participate in the Family Court Proceeding, he may incur costs which could prove irrecoverable, particularly if the Bankruptcy Proceeding does not succeed and the claims in the family law proceedings are thereby rendered moot. In that event, any costs orders made in the Family Court would not necessarily compensate him as trustee for his remuneration or the expenses of defending the proceedings.

40    Mr Allen further submits that he would be required to engage with claims made against the bankrupt, the scope and implications of which remain uncertain, potentially increasing the complexity and burden of the litigation. He notes that he participates in these proceedings in the performance of his statutory functions, and that the risks he faces in that capacity differ from those borne by the other parties.

41    Mr Allen also highlights that he remains unfunded in the present proceeding and would likewise be unfunded in the Family Court Proceeding if the review application is allowed, both in respect of his own remuneration as well as any legal costs he may incur. While senior counsel for Ms Huangfu raised, during oral submissions, that it is the creditors that ultimately bear the cost of litigation in connection with litigation concerning the bankrupt estate as a trustee is able to recover their expenses out of a bankrupt estate, counsel for Mr Allen submitted that there is no money and his client bears the costs. Further, to the extent that counsel and his instructing solicitors represent Mr Allen and run the case on a contingent basis, they bear the cost.

5.4    Stage of each of the proceedings

42    Another factor relevant to the exercise of the discretion is the relative procedural stages of the proceedings.

43    In the present case, the Bankruptcy Proceeding is relatively advanced. While no trial date has yet been fixed, the dispute is limited in scope, principally concerning s 120 of the Bankruptcy Act and the doctrine of exoneration. Prior to the hearing of the review application, it appeared that the matter was ready for final hearing, with pleadings and evidence having closed. However, during the hearing it became apparent that further pleadings and evidence may be required to more fully articulate the parties’ respective positions. In addition, according to Ms Huangfu, further discovery is necessary before she can finalise her evidence.

44    The Family Court Proceeding, however, remains at an early stage. Pursuant to orders made on 27 March 2026, it is currently adjourned to 3 June 2026 at the request of Mr Allen and Ms Huangfu, pending the outcome of the review application. Earlier procedural orders made on 9 February 2026, including orders permitting service on Mr Zhang and the filing of a notice of address for service, likewise indicate that the matter remains at a preliminary stage.

5.5    Any other relevant factors?

45    Moreover, there is discord between the parties as to the kinds of factors that the Court may take into account in assessing the present application.

46    Mr Allen drew the Court’s attention to the following factors set out by McKerracher J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Residence Riverside Pty Ltd (As Trustee for the D&J Discretionary Trust and as Trustee for the D&J Investment Trust) (2013) 95 ATR 86 at [17] when considering an application for transfer of proceedings:

•    the stage of the proceedings in the respective courts;

•    the commonality or diversity of the parties;

•    the nature of the proceedings;

•    the commonality or diversity of the issues;

•    the risk of conflicting findings of fact or conflicting orders;

•    a cost benefit analysis;

•    the potential unnecessary drain on judicial and other public and private resources; and

•    whether there is any particular judicial expertise residing in one court or the other.

47    However, Ms Huangfu contended that this authority had no application as his Honour was concerned with the Court’s cross-vesting, a subject not in contention in these proceedings.

6.    Consideration

48    Having regard to the submissions and the procedural context of each matter, it is apparent that the factors for and against transfer are finely balanced. While Ms Huangfu emphasises potential efficiencies and cost savings, Mr Allen submits that concurrent or transferred proceedings may increase complexity, require engagement with issues that may ultimately be unnecessary, and expose him to costs that may not be recoverable. Both parties also accept that no orders can be made in the Family Court Proceeding against Mr Allen until the outcome of the Bankruptcy Proceeding is determined.

49    On one hand, transfer may promote procedural efficiency, reduce duplication and allow both bankruptcy and family law issues to be determined by a single court, as contemplated by the Bill. Ms Huangfu submits that such efficiencies include potential savings in costs and the avoidance of parallel proceedings. In support of that submission, reliance is placed on evidence from Gary Yan of Coote Family Lawyers, the firm on record for Ms Huangfu, who estimated that a two-day hearing in the FCFCoA would cost approximately $150,000, in contrast to the estimate of a three-day hearing of the Bankruptcy Proceeding in this Court costing approximately $188,500. However, I consider Mr Yan’s evidence of little value as the estimates lack proper evidentiary foundation. Upon my inquiry on these figures at the hearing, senior counsel for Ms Huangfu indicated that the costs in either jurisdiction could likely be closer to $100,000. The variation between the figures contained in the evidence and those later suggested in oral submissions makes it difficult to place significant weight on the asserted cost differential. On the other hand, while Mr Allen claims that concurrent litigation may not in fact reduce costs, he has not provided any figures to support this assertion.

50    The Court does recognise that there are real risks of potential delay and cost exposure, particularly given the uncertainty surrounding the Family Court Proceeding being in its early stages. However, it is undesirable for parallel litigation to be conducted in separate courts that contain facts and issues that may overlap or otherwise intersect: Beaman v Bond at [31] (per McKerracher J). In the face of potential delays, steps can be taken in the Family Court Proceeding to expedite its progression in order to enable its concurrent running with the Bankruptcy Proceeding. This is not an issue that is without answer and can be managed with an interventionist case management approach by a court.

51    The Court does attribute significant weight to the fact that Mr Allen is a party to these proceedings solely in the performance of his statutory functions. While Mr Allen accepts the risks associated with commencing and conducting the Bankruptcy Proceeding, it would not be appropriate to impose the additional risks and costs associated with the Family Court Proceeding unless and until there is clearer evidence that the claims are not nugatory. To the extent that Mr Allen, and his legal representatives, are bearing their costs, this is indeed an onerous burden and one that weighs against any order for a transfer of the Bankruptcy Proceeding.

52    The next factor to weigh is the relative stages of the two proceedings. In Combis v Jensen, Collier J reasoned that the following factors weighed in favour of the transfer of bankruptcy proceedings to the FCFCoA at [60]–[64]:

(a)    while this Court can hear only the bankruptcy aspects, the FCFCoA can determine both the bankruptcy and family law issues;

(b)    there was potential for each party to save over $100,000 in costs if the matter were transferred;

(c)    there was no evidence that either jurisdiction would result in an earlier hearing;

(d)    the legislative amendments demonstrate an intention to enable the FCFCoA to hear concurrent bankruptcy and family law proceedings and

(e)    the family law proceeding was at a more advanced stage than the bankruptcy matter, unlike the circumstances in Macks v Edge.

53    By contrast, Besanko J acknowledged in Macks v Edge at [42] that the wide powers of the Family Court was a powerful reason in favour of the transfer, however, ultimately the infancy of the family law proceedings as compared to the bankruptcy proceedings weighed against the making of the transfer order. Moreover, in Horne, while Bromberg J allowed the transfer of the bankruptcy proceeding to the Family Court, his Honour declined at [22] to make orders requiring the two matters to be heard concurrently, leaving such questions to the discretion of that Court. Mr Allen correctly observes that a transfer does not necessarily guarantee that the proceedings would be heard together. While I respectfully agree with the approach taken by Bromberg J in Horne, it would remain open to the parties, if a transfer were to occur, to draw the relationship between the two matters to the attention of the FCFCoA registry and invite that Court to consider whether the matters should be listed or otherwise managed together. Viewed in that way, the issue is not without a practical solution

54    In the present circumstances before this Court, I consider that the most practical and neutral consideration is the capacity of the relevant registry to list the matter for hearing. The Court therefore has regard to the practical question of listing capacity. At the time of the hearing the review application, I did not have capacity to hear and determine the Bankruptcy Proceeding before the end of this year and was not otherwise able to accommodate a final hearing until sometime next year. However, since then, changes to my docket have occurred. As a result, the Court is now able to accommodate the hearing of the Bankruptcy Proceeding in September of this year.

55    Moreover, internal enquiries were made at a high level as to the likely timing of any hearing were a transfer to occur. Those enquiries indicated that it was unlikely that any such hearing would take place before early 2027. Further, there is no guarantee that the Bankruptcy Proceeding would be heard concurrently with the Family Court Proceeding if transferred. An additional relevant consideration is that timetabling would need to occur in both proceedings in order to prepare them for a substantive hearing, which is likely to compound existing concerns regarding delay.

56    The availability of a substantive hearing in this Court within that timeframe removes a significant practical consideration that might otherwise have favoured transfer. The Bankruptcy Proceeding will therefore be listed for final hearing in September 2026, on a date to be fixed, subject to the parties being ready to proceed and the matter not having settled at mediation. I consider that this course best serves the efficient administration of justice, having regard to the parties’ positions, the stage of each proceeding, the lack of persuasive evidence on costs savings and the additional costs that will be incurred by Mr Allen in the event of transfer, and the need to progress the matter without undue delay.

7.     Disposition

57    For the reasons set out above, the review application is dismissed.

58    The Bankruptcy Proceeding will remain in this Court. The matter will be listed for a further case management hearing on a date to be fixed, for the purpose of timetabling the proceeding and making any necessary directions in advance of a substantive hearing in September 2026.

59    There is no sufficient basis to depart from the usual position as to costs. Ms Huangfu is to pay Mr Allen’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Associate:

Dated:    30 April 2026