Federal Court of Australia

Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited (No 2) [2026] FCA 524

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The respondents’ application made by email on 20 June 2025 to vary the orders made by the Court in this matter on 22 May 2025 is granted.

2.    Order 2 of the orders made on 22 May 2025 be amended, to read:

The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application in the amount of $9,364.10, via electronic funds transfer into the following bank account:

3.    Liberty to apply.

4.    By 4:00pm AEST on 6 May 2026, the respondents file and serve written submissions of no more than 3 pages with respect to the costs of the oral hearing application and the variation of orders application.

5.    By 4:00pm AEST on 13 May 2026, the applicant file and serve written submissions of no more than 3 pages in reply.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MEAGHER J

introduction

1    This matter concerns two applications made after I heard and decided the applicant Ms Galinovic’s interlocutory application on 22 May 2025 in my capacity as the duty judge: Galinovic v Singtel Optus Pty Limited [2025] FCA 611.

2    The first application is an application made by email on 20 June 2025 to vary orders (variation of orders application) by the respondents to the substantive interlocutory application, Singtel Optus Pty Ltd and Optus Bill Services Pty Ltd (the respondents).

3    The second application is made by Ms Galinovic and sought an oral hearing (oral hearing application) of the variation of orders application.

4    The orders made on 22 May 2025 were:

1.    The applicant’s interlocutory application be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the costs of the application.

5    The orders sought in the variation of orders application were:

1.    Order 2 of the orders made by the Honourable Justice Meagher on 22 May 2025 be amended, to read:

The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application in the amount of $9,364.10, via electronic funds transfer into the following bank account:

2.    Liberty to apply.

3.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of this application, fixed at $950, via electronic funds transfer into the following bank account:

(Original emphasis.)

6    Ms Galinovic’s application for an oral hearing filed on 21 June 2025 sought the following orders:

1.    That the Respondents’ application for variation of orders be dismissed.

2.    That the matter be set down for a hearing before Justice Meagher rather than being determined “in Chambers” without a hearing.

3.    Costs of and incidental to this application.

background

7    On 24 June 2025, the Court made an order that Mr Henderson’s email be taken to be the variation of orders application. Mr Henderson’s email attached an affidavit of Mr Simon Theodore, a solicitor employed by Gadens, the solicitors for the respondents, sworn on 20 June 2025 and attaching relevant correspondence between the parties in relation to the satisfaction of the costs order.

8    The correspondence spanned from 3 June 2025 to 20 June 2025. The respondents’ position was that they required that the costs order be satisfied by electronic funds transfer. Ms Galinovic challenged the basis for that, on 13 June 2025 requesting “specific policy documentation that explicitly limits satisfaction methods to bank transfers only” and stated that “[a]bsent such documentation, standard commercial practices permit various legally recognised methods of obligation satisfaction”.

9    Ms Galinovic’s position in her letter of 16 June 2025 was that she would “tender satisfaction … through a legally valid instrument in accordance with Australian commercial law”.

10    On 19 June 2025, Mr Theodore wrote to Ms Galinovic as follows:

1.    We refer to the recent correspondence between the parties and your notice of intention to tender satisfaction dated 16 June 2025 (Your Letter).

2.    On 22 May 2025, orders were made by the Honourable Justice Meagher that your interlocutory application has been dismissed and you are required to pay Optus’ costs of the application (Costs Order).

3.    Costs are to be paid by way of agreement, court order or otherwise be taxed.

4.    The terms of Optus’ order to settle the Costs Order, as set out in our letter of 3 June 2025, are as follows:

(a)    Amount: $8,292.44 (inc GST);

(b)    Payment date: 20 June 2025; and

(c)    Payment method: EFT to Gadens Trust Account,

(Offer).

5.    All terms of the Offer must be accepted for an agreement to be reached between the parties.

6.    If you do not make payment of $8,292.44 by 20 June 2025 by EFT to Gadens Trust Account, we will be seeking orders from the Court.

We reserve all of Optus’ rights.

(Original Emphasis.)

11    On 19 June 2025 the following exchanges occurred:

    Ms Galinovic emailed Mr Theodore to confirm that she had tendered payment by express post.

    Ms McGuire, a Senior Associate at Gadens, emailed Ms Galinovic and requested that she “confirm by 8am tomorrow that payment will be made via electronic funds transfer to the Gadens Trust Account”. Ms McGuire also informed Ms Galinovic again that Gadens had instructions to seek orders from the Court should there be a failure to comply.

    Ms Galinovic wrote to Mr Theodore and stated that “full and final satisfaction of the costs order was tendered on 18 June 2025” by way of Australia Post. Ms Galinovic included the Australia Post tracking number and expected delivery date. She also noted that she had provided the amount of $9,000 which exceeded the required amount. Her letter also detailed as follows:

I note that your current position contradicts the email from Max Petro dated 16 June 2025, which explicitly stated: “We don’t have a written policy mandating that EFT to Gadens is the only method payable – this is just our usual practice.”

This tender complies with all requirements under Australian law for the discharge of a court-ordered obligation, particularly in light of Mr. Petro’s confirmation that multiple payment methods are acceptable.

12    By way of email on 20 June 2025, Ms McGuire informed Ms Galinovic of Singtel Optus’ position as follows:

Dear Christina,

We refer to your letter of 19 June 2025. As set out in our letter of the same date, in order for an agreement to be reached, all elements of the offer must be accepted. You have failed to do so.

Optus formally withdraws its offer to settle the costs order dated 22 May 2025.

Optus confirms that it will send your tender back to you via express post once received.

13    On 20 June 2025, Ms Galinovic wrote to Ms McGuire and expressed her concern that Singtel Optus had declined to accept her tender of payment “without first examining it”. Ms Galinovic stated that the “decision to refuse a payment of $9,000.00 appears to contradict both standard commercial practice and Max Petro’s email of 16 June 2025, confirming no policy exists mandating payment by EFT only”. Further, Ms Galinovic asserted that established legal principles existed affirming that “when a creditor refuses a proper tender of payment without reasonable examination, such refusal may constitute acceptance of the tender as satisfaction of the debt”.

consiDeration

Oral Hearing Application

14    Ms Galinovic’s application for an oral hearing with respect to the variation of orders application will be considered first.

Material relied upon

15    Ms Galinovic relied upon the following material in relation to the oral hearing application:

    Ms Galinovic’s correspondence dated 21 June 2025 (Ms Galinovic’s correspondence or correspondence);

    written submissions dated 14 July 2025;

    an affidavit of Ms Galinovic dated 14 July 2025; and

    written reply submissions dated 28 July 2025.

16    The respondents relied upon the following material in relation to the oral hearing application:

    written submissions dated 22 July 2025; and

    an affidavit of Mr Theodore dated 22 July 2025.

17    Broadly, Ms Galinovic submitted that the dispute involved “significant constitutional, federal legislative, and equitable issues requiring oral examination for procedural fairness”. Much of Ms Galinovic’s submissions with respect to the need for an oral hearing reiterated her objections to the variation of orders application, discussed below.

18    Ms Galinovic relied upon Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; 17 VR 100 at [140] for the proposition that as a litigant in person, she was at a “grave disadvantage in legal proceedings of all kinds” such that she was entitled to “due assistance” from the Court. Ms Galinovic expressed “legitimate concern” about the costs of the proceedings and contended that she suffered “real prejudice” flowing from the respondents’ conduct. In her affidavit dated 14 July 2025, she considered that “an oral hearing is essential to ensure procedural fairness given the complexity of the legal issues involved and my status as a self-represented litigant”.

19    Ms Galinovic also invoked s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which provides for the “just resolution of disputes” in a manner which is “according to law” and “as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”.

20    Ms Galinovic submitted that she would only concede to have the variation of orders application heard on the papers “if the Court consider[ed] the legal position sufficiently clear that costs orders cannot be retrospectively varied to impose payment method restrictions not contained in the original order”.

21    The respondents opposed Ms Galinovic’s oral hearing application and contended, instead, that the application should be determined on the papers in accordance with s 20A of the Act and r 36.41(ea) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

22    The respondents relied upon s 37M(3) of the Act, such that the civil procedure and practice of the Court must be carried out in accordance with the overarching principles in s 37M(1). This proposition was supported in the respondents’ submissions by the Court’s Central Practice Note: National Court Framework and Case Management (CPN-1) which, they submitted, provides for the minimisation of interlocutory hearings wherever practicable, as per [8.5](j). Consequently, the respondents contended that the variation of orders application was “straightforward” and “no credibility or factual disputes exist[ed] between the parties and the legal arguments in relation to the matter [could] be dealt with adequately by written submissions”. The respondents also relied upon Ms Galinovic’s correspondence of 15 and 16 July 2025 which, in their submissions, confirmed Ms Galinovic’s intention to rely “comprehensively” on her written submissions.

23    Notwithstanding the force of the respondents’ submissions, as I heard the oral hearing application and the variation of orders applications concurrently, I determined, consistent with s 37M of the Act, to grant Ms Galinovic’s oral hearing application.

24    The oral hearing application is granted.

Variation of Orders Application

25    I now turn to the variation of orders application.

Material relied upon

26    With respect to the variation of orders application, the respondents relied upon the following materials:

    written submissions dated 26 June 2025;

    an affidavit of Mr Theodore dated 20 June 2025 (Mr Theodore’s first affidavit);

    an affidavit of Mr Theodore dated 26 June 2025 (Mr Theodore’s second affidavit); and

    written submissions in reply dated 16 July 2025.

27    Ms Galinovic relied upon the following materials:

    Ms Galinovic’s correspondence;

    an affidavit of Ms Galinovic dated 21 June 2025 (Ms Galinovic’s first affidavit);

    written submissions dated 7 July 2025; and

    an affidavit of Ms Galinovic dated 7 July 2025 (Ms Galinovic’s second affidavit).

Evidentiary Issues

28    Ms Galinovic took issue with several aspects of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit. She submitted that the respondents’ affidavit contained “systematic Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) violations” and pointed to ss 59, 76, 79 and 135.

29    Mr Theodore’s first affidavit at [8] stated:

As part of her evidence in the Interlocutory Application, Ms Galinovic exhibited attempts to make payment of Optus’ invoices by handwriting the following on the Optus invoices and sending them back to Optus via Australia Post: “Conditionally accepted for value and surrender for value without dishonour to you upon proof of claim the amount is not already settled and closed” followed by Ms Galinovic’s Tax File Number and a number for a ‘Galinovic Trust’ (purported Bills of Exchange). A copy of these purported Bill of Exchange are at “ST-1”.

(Original emphasis.)

30    Ms Galinovic in her first affidavit deposes that this characterisation by Mr Theodore’s of her tender “directly contradicts my explicit written assurance” of good faith and that “no bill of exchange will be presented”.

31    At [12](b) of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit, he states that in the email sent on 10 June 2025 by Mr Petro, Mr Petro confirmed that “the only acceptable payment method is bank transfer (electronic funds transfer)” for the purposes of the payment of the costs sum pursuant to the costs order.

32    Ms Galinovic contends that this statement was “directly contradicted by Max Petro’s email date 16 June 2025 … admitting no such policy exists”.

33    At [25] of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit, he states that:

I am informed by Mr Petro and believe it to be true, that Optus is concerned that Ms Galinovic shall attempt to make a purported payment of the costs order in a manner that will not result in actual funds, in Australian dollars, being transmitted into a bank account nominated by Optus.

34    Ms Galinovic in her first affidavit contends, without elaborating further, that this statement contains “multiple forms of inadmissible evidence”, including hearsay, presumptions about future conduct without a “factual foundation”, opinion evidence and speculative evidence.

35    At [26] of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit, he states his belief in the reasonableness and proportionality of the lump sum costs amount, as calculated by Gadens and contained in their invoice annexed to that affidavit. He also states his belief in the likelihood of the full recovery of the lump sum costs amount, should it be assessed on either a standard or party and party basis.

36    Ms Galinovic asserted that these statements were “improper opinion evidence on legal costs assessment without establishing expertise”.

37    Ms Galinovic also took issue with [14], [20], [21], [22] and [23] of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit, which introduce relevant correspondence which is contained in various annexures to the affidavit. In Ms Galinovic’s submissions, these paragraphs “selectively quote our correspondence without providing the full context of our exchanges”. Ms Galinovic contended that this “appears designed to present a misleading impression of our correspondence to the Court”.

38    Ms Galinovic also contested [27] of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit, which states:

The purpose of the request to seek a variation to Her Honour’s order now is to obviate the anticipated need for further time and expense, including court resources, being expended unnecessarily in circumstances where Ms Galinovic purports to make payment of the costs order in a matter that does not involve Optus receiving funds in Australian dollars.

39    Ms Galinovic stated that this statement “directly contradicts my clear written statement in the Notice of Intention to Tender Satisfaction, on 16 June 2025” in which Ms Galinovic stated that she would “proceed to tender satisfaction” of the obligation under the costs order by way of a “legally valid instrument”.

40    Ms Galinovic also invoked rr 3.1, 4.1.2, 5.1.1 and 22.2 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 and stated that “the conduct of the Respondents’ legal representatives in this matter raises serious concerns regarding compliance” with these rules.

41    Ms Galinovic has not persuaded me that any of the impugned paragraphs of Mr Theodore’s first affidavit can be considered “systematic Evidence Act violations” in reliance upon ss 59, 76 – 79 and 135. Mr Theodore’s first affidavit is an entirely orthodox affidavit in a matter of this kind. The mere contradiction of Ms Galinovic’s evidence does not render Mr Theodore’s own evidence a “violation” of the Evidence Act. Ms Galinovic cannot sustain an objection that correspondence is quoted “selectively” when all the relevant correspondence is annexed to Mr Theodore’s first affidavit.

42    Consequently, Ms Galinovic’s objections to Mr Theodore’s first affidavit have no merit and are not upheld.

Costs orders

43    The respondents brought the variation of orders application under s 43 of the Act, which relevantly provides:

43 Costs

(1)    The Court or a Judge has jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Court (including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction) other than proceedings in respect of which this or any other Act provides that costs must not be awarded. This is subject to:

(a)    subsection (1A); and

(aa) section 46PSA of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986; and

(b)    section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009; and

(c)    section 18 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013.

…

(2)    Except as provided by any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court or Judge.

(3)    Without limiting the discretion of the Court or a Judge in relation to costs, the Court or Judge may do any of the following:

(a)    make an award of costs at any stage in a proceeding, whether before, during or after any hearing or trial;

(b)    make different awards of costs in relation to different parts of the proceeding;

(c)    order the parties to bear costs in specified proportions;

(d)    award a party costs in a specified sum;

(e)    award costs in favour of or against a party whether or not the party is successful in the proceeding;

(f)    order a party’s lawyer to bear costs personally;

(g)    order that costs awarded against a party are to be assessed on an indemnity basis or otherwise;

(h)    do any of the following in proceedings in relation to discovery:

(i)    order the party requesting discovery to pay in advance for some or all of the estimated costs of discovery;

(ii)    order the party requesting discovery to give security for the payment of the cost of discovery;

(iii)    make an order specifying the maximum cost that may be recovered for giving discovery or taking inspection.

Note: For further provision about the award of costs, see subsections 37N(4) and (5) and paragraphs 37P(6)(d) and (e).

44    The discretion conferred by s 43 of the Act must be exercised judicially: Summers v Repatriation Commission (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 64 at [13] – [14] (Kenny, Murphy and Beach JJ).

45    The respondents pointed specifically to s 43(3)(d) of the Act, which allows the Court to “award a party costs in a specified sum”, and r 40.02 of the Rules which provides as follows:

40.02 Other order for costs

A party or a person who is entitled to costs may apply to the Court for an order that costs:

(a)    awarded in their favour be paid other than as between party and party; or

(b)    be awarded in a lump sum, instead of, or in addition to, any taxed costs; or

(c)    be determined otherwise than by taxation.

Note 1: The Court may order that costs be paid on an indemnity basis.

Note 2: The Court may order that the costs be determined by reference to a cost assessment scheme operating under the law of a State or Territory.

46    With respect to r 40.02 of the Rules, the respondents referred to Vantage Holdings Pty Ltd v Huang (No 2) [2015] FCA 185; 232 FCR 556 at [9], where Collier J stated as follows:

First, I do not accept that it is standard practice that costs are assessed and ordered at the end of a hearing. Indeed r 40.02 recognises that a party who is already entitled to costs may apply to the court for an order that an existing costs order be varied (cf von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 120, and see commentary in Dal Pont GE, Law of Costs (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) at 15.14). There is no reason for me to find that this rule does not apply to costs of an interlocutory proceeding.

47    It is accepted that r 40.02 of the Rules applies to the costs of interlocutory proceedings.

48    The respondents, relying on Byrnes v Brisconnections Management Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 1432 at [51], submitted that this was a fairly simple proceeding, notwithstanding being contested, and it was thus appropriate for the Court to fix costs.

49    Further, the respondents contended that the Court should adopt the following approach:

    the costs sum should be “fixed broadly having regard to the information of the charges rendered Optus’ solicitors before the Court” as per Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 57 FCR 119 at 124 – 125;

    the fixed costs sum should be “proportionate to the nature, including the complexity, of the case” as per Canvas Graphics Pty Ltd v Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 23; and

    the Court’s consideration need not be as detailed as that required for taxation or formal costs assessments, as per Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [2000] FCA 628; 57 FCR 119 at [35].

50    Accordingly, the respondents submitted that they sought “a lump sum for costs of $9,364.10, comprising $9,127.60 on … solicitor fees and $236.50 in disbursements” which was “less than the amount that could be claimed in an assessment carried out under Part 40 and Schedule 3 of the Rules”.

51    The respondents pointed to the obligations under s 37M(3) of the Act to further support their position, namely that the Court ought to exercise the discretion under s 43 of the Act “in the way that best facilitates the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”. They submitted that making an order that Ms Galinovic pay the costs by electronic funds transfer (EFT) would prevent an “ongoing and counter-productive dispute”, be time- and cost-efficient, and, in the interests of justice, provide “some finality”. Otherwise, the respondents contended that there was “a significant risk of further litigation resulting in further expenses”.

52    The respondents also submitted that the “unilateral delivery of a Promissory Note is not a ‘payment’ of the costs order” which requires actual payment, not a mere promise to pay.

53    In contrast, Ms Galinovic submitted in her correspondence that the respondents’ application should be dismissed, and that the matter should be determined by way of hearing, on the following grounds:

1.    The Applicant has already tendered payment in full satisfaction of the costs order on 18 June 2025 via Australia Post Express Post (Tracking Number: 02 01017 59836 50060 40999), sending $9,000.00 AUD, which exceeds the $8.292.44 amount requested by the Respondents.

2.    The Respondents granted the Applicant an extension until 4PM on 20 June 2025 to make payment, but then pre-emptively rejected the Applicant’s payment without examination at 10:27 AM that same day, a full 5 hours and 33 minutes before the agreed deadline, as evidenced by the email from Associate, Hannah McGuire dated 20 June 2025.

3.    The Respondents filed their application to retroactively vary the terms of the order on 20 June 2025, before the expiration of the very deadline they had agreed to, despite knowing payment had already been tendered.

4.    The Respondents’ Senior Corporate Counsel, Max Petro, explicitly confirmed by email on 16 June 2025 that “We don’t have a written policy mandating that EFT to Gadens is the only method payable – this is just our usual practice in such matters.”

5.    The original order dated 22 May 2025 did not specify any particular method of payment.

6.    The conduct of the Respondents’ legal representatives raises concerns regarding compliance with the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012, particularly their paramount duty to the court and the administration of justice (Rule 3.1), duty of honesty and courtesy in legal practice (Rule 4.1.2), and obligation not to diminish public confidence in the administration of justice (Rule 5.1.1).

7.    Procedural fairness requires that the Applicant be given an opportunity to be heard on this matter at a formal hearing.

54    In her written submissions, Ms Galinovic relies upon s 39(8) of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), s 9 of the Currency Act 1965 (Cth) and s 195(1) of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) to establish that promissory notes are Australian currency. She submits that the Commonwealth has power to establish promissory notes as currency pursuant to s 51(xvi) of the Commonwealth Constitution.

55    In Ms Galinovic’s first affidavit, which largely constitutes submissions, she contends that:

    she tendered payment “in good faith in an amount that exceeds what was requested by the Respondents and well within the agreed timeframe”;

    the respondents are attempting to “unilaterally alter the agreed terms after the fact, [which conduct] is both procedurally unfair and contrary to the principles of justice”; and

    the respondents’ conduct, especially in having “breached their own deadline”, demonstrates “both bad faith and a systematic attempt to frustrate my compliance with the Court’s order”.

56    Ms Galinovic made various misguided submissions with respect to her alleged payment pursuant to the costs order, mostly on the basis of contractual principles. Ms Galinovic appeared to characterise her obligation to pay the respondents as a contractual one. In this regard Ms Galinovic referred to an Allonge, exhibited to her second affidavit, which set out as follows:

In accordance with established legal principles, if you wish to disclaim the payment tendered, you must return the payment within 72 hours after delivery and receipt. Failure to do so will be deemed as acceptance of the payment for full and final satisfaction of the outstanding liabilities owed.

57    She submitted that by accepting the delivery of her payment on 24 June 2025 and retaining the payment beyond the 72-hour deadline as specified, the respondents had “contractually agreed” to the terms outlined in the Allonge. Ms Galinovic asserted that the respondents had failed to “dishonour within [the] customary time” as per s 47 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) such that they had waived their right to.

58    Ms Galinovic further sought to rely upon the principles of equity and estoppel. She contended that the respondents’ actions, in retaining the promissory note whilst claiming rejection, violated “fundamental equitable principles”. In her submission, the relevant principle was “money refused is money accepted” where payment has been tendered by one party and the other party retains the instrument. Ms Galinovic also claimed that the respondents had unjustly enriched themselves.

59    In addition to these submissions, Ms Galinovic asserted that the respondents had engaged in a “pattern of unconscionable conduct” by failing to uphold their corporate values, by admitting that their communication was a unilateral notice of termination and by issuing that notice on the same day that they received Ms Galinovic’s formal complaint, and by allegedly seeking to vary the payment terms prior to the expiration of the deadline.

60    Ms Galinovic submitted that her promissory note remains her property and that the respondents’ retention of it without justification violates s 24 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).

61    Ms Galinovic’s reference to principles of contract is misguided. Her obligation to pay the costs arises as a result of an order made by the Court. The making of arrangements as to the method for paying those costs and the tender to be advanced in that regard is not contractual in nature.

62    Further, Ms Galinovic’s purported promissory note falls far short of the requirements for legal tender. The respondents rely upon Woods v Australian Taxation Office [2016] QDC 198; 103 ATR 758; at [17], where Judge Kent considered that a purported promissory note which is merely an “engagement to pay, not on demand, but at a fixed future time”, where time is “limited to one minute [at a] unilaterally chosen (and apparently inconvenient) location” was not a valid promissory note. This was because it could not be understood to be an “unconditional promise[ ] in writing to pay on demand nor [was it] to pay at a determinable future time”. The same conclusion follows in respect of the promissory note in this case.

63    Ms Galinovic’s submissions regarding the respondents’ retention of the promissory note must also be rejected. She has advanced no credible basis for her assertions that failure to return the promissory note within a particular timeframe stipulated by her amounts to an acceptance of her terms, nor that it violates some principles of estoppel or equity.

64    Finally and importantly, neither the respondents nor their solicitors have engaged in a pattern of unconscionable conduct; rather, they have sought to provide clear communication to Ms Galinovic with respect to her obligation to comply with the costs order and provided an orthodox method of doing so. Any criticisms of the respondents or their solicitors must be rejected.

conclusion

65    The oral hearing application is granted. The variation of orders application is granted.

66    The respondents indicated that they wished to be heard on the questions of costs if the variation of orders application was granted. I have made orders which accordingly permit the parties to file written submissions on costs.

Associate:

Dated:    29 April 2026