Federal Court of Australia

JVZ25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 358

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interlocutory application dated 16 March 2026 be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Delivered ex tempore, revised from the transcript

BROMWICH J:

1    The applicant has today filed an application for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of Division 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

2    Last Friday, 13 March 2026, the primary judge refused the grant of an injunction to restrain the applicant’s removal from Australia tomorrow, 18 March 2026, pending the hearing of his judicial review application from a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal almost nine years ago.

3    The application for leave to appeal alleges errors of law and jurisdictional error on the part of the primary judge in refusing to grant the injunctive relief that was sought. Independently of the application for leave to appeal, the applicant has also today filed an interlocutory application seeking an injunction to prevent his removal pending the hearing of his application for leave to appeal. I am hearing this matter in my capacity as the duty judge for this week.

4    What is before me today is the applicant’s interlocutory application for an injunction. In a sense, the same issue that was before the primary judge is before this Court because ultimately the error that must be established in the primary judge’s refusal to grant an injunction gives rise to the same questions as occurred before the primary judge.

5    Before the primary judge, the Minister conceded, for the purposes of that hearing only, that the balance of convenience in relation to injunctive relief only favoured the applicant. I will give that concession its broadest application for present purposes as addressing a range of issues that the applicant also canvassed before me today, namely his health condition, the need for treatment and the harms that he fears were he to be returned to his home country. All of those matters before me, as they were before the primary judge, will be assumed to operate in his favour such that the balance of convenience aspect of granting injunctive relief is treated as being established in his favour.

6    However, the stumbling block in getting injunctive relief before the primary judge turned on the underlying application for judicial review before his Honour. The amended originating application before his Honour contained an assertion that the Tribunal erred in using illogical reasoning to make findings about the credibility of the applicant which are particularised in five subparagraphs numbered (a) through to (e). The primary judge described that proposed ground of review as misconceived and having no merit. His Honour said that the ground of review misunderstood how the Tribunal reasoned in relation to the credibility finding it made and seeks impermissible merits review for reasons as described in [42]-[46] of his Honour’s reasons.

7    Before me, the applicant continued to agitate matters going to the balance of convenience question which, as I have already indicated, is a matter that was conceded by the Minister before the primary judge and before me. The applicant did not adequately address the serious question to be tried aspect which, if the primary judge got wrong, would in turn impugn the decision to refuse him an injunction. That is the only matter he can bring to this Court in its appellate jurisdiction. However, the closest the applicant came to that issue was to say that there was an error in refusing him an injunction, and nothing beyond that.

8    I have reviewed the primary judge’s reasons from [39]-[47] on whether there was a serious question to be tried. As I indicated to the applicant during the course of the hearing this afternoon, I was unable to discern any error on the part of the primary judge. The applicant did not attempt to demonstrate any such error. I note in that regard that he is a litigant in person, but I also note that he sought for this application to be heard today, doubtless because he faces removal tomorrow.

9    In those circumstances, I am unable to form a view that there is a serious question to be tried in relation to any error on the part of the primary judge in refusing to grant an injunction. The same reasoning applies to the extent that the application for an injunction is treated as being an application directly to this Court, whether in original or appellate jurisdiction. I note in this regard that this Court would not be likely to have original jurisdiction.

10    Contrary to there being any error on the part of the primary judge in refusing the injunction, I consider that his Honour’s reasoning as to the lack of merit in the underlying judicial review application sought to be brought is sound. In those circumstances, there is no proper basis for the grant of an injunction, which is the sole matter I am deciding today, despite necessarily giving some consideration to the prospects of success in the appeal from the refusal of an injunction by the primary judge that the applicant seeks to bring.

11    It follows that the interlocutory application dated 16 March 2026 that is directly before me today must be dismissed.

12    There is no reason that I can see why costs should not follow the event. Accordingly, the applicant must be ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding before me today.

Associate:

Dated:    26 March 2026