Federal Court of Australia

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v CCZ26 [2026] FCA 320

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The parties are to provide draft orders reflecting the reasons for judgment (either agreed or marked-up to identify disagreement) via email to the Associate of Needham J by 5:00pm on 30 March 2026.

2.    Until orders are made on the interlocutory application,

(a)    Order 5 of the orders dated 13 February 2026 is to continue.

(b)    Order 6 of the orders dated 13 February 2026, as amended by the orders of 20 February 2026, is to continue.

3.    The first, second, third and fourth respondents to be identified, respectively, as CCZ26, CDA26, CDB26, and CDC26 in all court documents including the transcript, until further order or final determination of these proceedings.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    If the draft orders referred to in order 1 are agreed between the parties, her Honour may be prepared to make those orders in chambers.

B.    If agreement cannot be reached or her Honour is not satisfied that the orders are appropriate, the matter is to be relisted for further argument.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NEEDHAM J:

1    These proceedings came before me on 20 February 2026 for the hearing of an interlocutory application (IA) filed by the respondents for suppression orders. Although the respondents are the applicants under the IA, where I refer to the parties by their role in the proceedings, I will do so by reference to their roles in the substantive proceedings.

What are the substantive proceedings about?

2    The substantive proceedings are brought by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation against the first respondent (a company director), the second respondent (his wife), and the third and fourth respondents (each being a company which holds property in which the first respondent is alleged to have an equitable interest). The Commissioner seeks judgment in a sum of money in the millions of dollars against the first respondent, declarations that the second respondent holds a property subject to a transfer from the first respondent which it is alleged is void as an alienation of property to defeat creditors, and declarations that the third and fourth respondents hold properties subject to equitable interests in favour of the first respondent.

3    The Commissioner originally sought interlocutory relief in the form of freezing orders against the respondents which were made by Perram J on 18 September 2025, extended by Kennett J on 23 September 2025 and 30 September 2025, varied by Kennett J on 8 October 2025 (to reflect a slightly different sum from the original freezing order), and further extended by Kennett J on 21 October 2025 and 4 December 2025. The matter was then allocated to my docket.

The application for suppression orders

4    The IA arose out of a third-party application for access to documents on 27 January 2026. The third-party applicant was a media organisation which was notified of the hearing of the IA and was entitled to appear (see s 37AH(2)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act)) but chose not to do so.

5    On receiving the indication from the respondents that they intended to seek suppression orders over some of the material in the file, I made orders in chambers on 30 January 2026 directing that the respondents file the IA and supporting material and listed the matter on 13 February 2026 for case management hearing. During that case management hearing, I made various orders including that the IA be listed on 20 February 2026. On that date, Ms Bishop SC with Mr Parrish of counsel appeared for the respondents, and Mr Raffell of counsel appeared for the Commissioner. I had, on 13 February 2026, made interim orders suppressing the file until the provision of these reasons and orders. I had hoped to give judgment shortly after the hearing but other pressures on my calendar meant that that was not possible; this has had the unfortunate result that the file itself has been suppressed in full for a longer period of time than I had anticipated.

6    In short compass, the respondents seek an order under s 37AF of the FCA Act prohibiting the disclosure of documents filed in these proceedings. The respondents seek an order that the Court’s file be marked as suppressed, and that no access be granted to any person, or, alternatively, that some or all of a list of documents (including the Originating Process, the material before the Court on the application for the freezing order, and all transcripts, judgments, and orders in these proceedings) be not disclosed to persons outside the proceedings. They seek that the respondents be identified by pseudonyms in all court documents in the proceedings. They no longer press for suppression of the fact that documents have been filed.

7    As a further alternative, the respondents provided a schedule as to nominated information for a s 37AF order (see the Schedule of Proposed Redactions in the Alternative to Primary Relief in tab 3 of the Court Book). The Schedule includes (not an exhaustive list):

(a)    BSB and account numbers of the respondents’ bank accounts;

(b)    Some allegations as to misconduct by the first respondent;

(c)    The name of the company operated by the first respondent;

(d)    The amount of tax allegedly owed;

(e)    Addresses of properties;

(f)    Email addresses;

(g)    Income tax returns;

(h)    Bank statements and loan applications;

(i)    Notices of assessment;

(j)    Reasons for decision in relation to the first respondent;

(k)    Parts of the Commissioner’s submissions; and

(l)    Parts or all of affidavits filed by the respondents.

8    The factual background to the matter is that the Commissioner issued assessments to the first respondent, which related to “tax-related liabilities for income tax, administrative penalties and associated interest charges”. The freezing order granted by Perram J was ex parte and restricted the first respondent from dealing with his Australian assets equal to an amount that is equal to the claimed judgment debt; the second to fourth respondents were restrained from dealing with the properties named in the Originating Application. No wrongdoing was (as far as I am aware) alleged against the second to fourth respondents; they are respondents because they hold property to which the Commissioner alleges he may have recourse in these proceedings.

9    The first respondent was required, by the orders of Perram J, to set out his net asset position on affidavit.

10    The first respondent has lodged an objection to the assessments. The objection has not yet been determined, and no case officer has yet been allocated.

11    As Wheatley J said in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Peever [2025] FCA 460 at [62]:

The principles of open justice, as a primary consideration, must be taken into account when determining whether or not to make orders for suppression or non-publication order. Open justice enables the public to understand how the justice system works and facilitates public scrutiny. Where the Court has exercised an invasive power, by way of the freezing orders, there is an obvious public interest in disclosing the material relied upon: Lee at [84]-[86] and see more generally, Country Care at [30]; Ogawa at [26]; Rinehart at [32]; Llewellyn at [25]-[29]; Rush at [186]-[189] and [195]-[197]. It is not the role of the Court to supervise the media report to ensure they report in a fair and accurate way, that is the responsibility of the media themselves: Tasmanian Cricket at [6]; Rush at [193]-[194]; Rinehart at [33] and [54].

(references not included)

12    The principles pursuant to which an order under s 37AF can be made were not in dispute, and I do not intend to set them out here, except to say that there are tensions between s 17 of the FCA Act (providing that the Court exercise its jurisdiction in open court) and s 37AF of the FCA Act (making an order for suppression but only if the order is necessary (relevantly) to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – s 37AG(1)(a)). The Full Court has set out the way in which the open justice principle should be applied and both parties were in agreement that the approach is correct – see Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 22; 296 FCR 272 at [83] to [91]). It was agreed – correctly – that if I form the view that an order is necessary under s 37AF, then it is not a matter for discretion; I must make an order (Lee at [88]).

13    An order should only be made “where necessity compels departure from the open justice principle” (see Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; 275 FCR 377 at [8]).

14    As the High Court said in Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651 at [30], ““necessary” is a strong word”, and one which does not “[deal] with trivialities”. The administration of justice is “a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest”.

The respondents’ submissions

15    The respondents put their case on a number of different bases. Principal among them was the fact that the first respondent will not have the chance, in these proceedings, to explain the process by which the assessments came about; they were, the evidence shows, “default assessments” under s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) arising out of “unexplained deposits”. The respondents submitted that the “unexplained deposits” were identified by way of “bank analysis methodology” in a “covert audit” which, it was submitted, while a legitimate form of assessment, necessarily involves an amount of guesswork (see Gashi v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 30; (2013) 209 FCR 301 at [55]). The Commissioner did not push back on that description.

16    Default assessments arise when the Commissioner is not satisfied with the return lodged, and can instead make a judgment about the “amount of income upon which … income tax ought to be levied” (Gashi at [56]). As explained by Derrington J in Commissioner of Taxation v Ross [2021] FCA 766; 174 ALD 77 at [40], s 166 “requires, unequivocally, an evidence-based calculation of a person’s taxable income, tax payable thereon, and tax offset refunds”. Section 167, on the other hand, “authorises the Commissioner to form a judgment as to the amount on which tax ought to be levied …” (emphasis in original). A s 167 assessment occurs when the Commissioner is unable to make an accurate assessment. An assessment is still conclusive evidence of a debt, whether it is an “evidence-based calculation” or a “judgment” of the amount of income tax owed.

17    Part IVC of the Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA) provides a framework whereby the taxpayer may challenge an assessment. The objection process is private, and there are secrecy provisions binding the Commissioner. The Commissioner must decide to allow the objection, in whole or in part, or to disallow it: s 14ZY(1) TAA. A dissatisfied taxpayer may bring an application for review to the Tribunal, or an appeal to the Federal Court against the decision: s 14ZZ(1) TAA. Applications for review in the Tribunal are also private if the party making the application requests this: s 14ZZE TAA.

18    These proceedings are recovery proceedings, relying on the assessments issued to the first respondent. The validity or accuracy of the assessment cannot be challenged in these proceedings; if a notice of assessment is produced, it is conclusive evidence that the assessment is correct; see cl 350-10 Schedule 1 TAA. The respondents say that a number of propositions flow from this:

(a)    Allegations of serious misconduct in the freezing order application, affidavits, and submissions have been made against the first respondent.

(b)    The first respondent has been required to provide his financial information in response to the freezing order.

(c)    He will only be able to challenge the allegations about his taxation affairs (which are serious) in relation to the Notice of Objection, which will be the subject of a separate proceeding and, if successful, will obviate the need for these proceedings.

19    The respondents submitted that two matters may flow from publication of the material filed in these proceedings; one is that the business may be harmed by way of contracts being terminated after publicity of the allegations, and the other is that the first respondent’s reputation may be harmed.

20    The respondents relied on the decision of A v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 1307 (Perram J) (A v COT) and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Wu [2024] FCA 250 (DCT v Wu) (Thawley J). While there was some discussion during argument of the different ways in which A v COT had been interpreted by the Court (including by Bromwich J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lee [2022] FCA 1307 at [35], and by Kennett J in Commissioner of Taxation v [Respondent] [2023] FCA 1176 at [24]-[25]), the respondents relied on the approach of Thawley J in DCT v Wu at [42]. Thawley J said at [42]-[44]:

In the circumstances just described, the administration of justice is prejudiced if the necessary consequence of reading or deploying evidence on an ex parte application for a freezing order is complete disclosure of all the material regardless of the consequences. People would rightly think that the law is inadequate if it were unable to respond by protecting from disclosure material likely to result in harm to third parties (who might not be aware of the proceedings) or to respondents to a proceeding in which the respondents so harmed could not adduce evidence in defence of the position taken against them. Section 37AF is one means of response. Section 37AF and s 37AE, read together, recognise that the administration of justice might be prejudiced if the open justice principle is pursued without regard to context or consequences.

Some of the allegations made against the respondents in the material deployed on the ex parte application are serious and disclosure of them is reasonably likely to result in commercial harm. The result, in the absence of limited orders under s 37AF, would be unfairness to the respondents of a kind which prejudices the administration of justice. The prejudice to the administration of justice lies in the procedural and substantive unfairness to the respondents (and the same applies a fortiori to third parties) in not having had the opportunity to seek to prevent the material from being deployed in open court and in not having the opportunity in the proceedings to answer the material which is likely to cause them harm. In the absence of an order under s 37AF, in respect of limited material, the principle of open justice will have been pursued inflexibly without regard to the context or circumstances of the particular case.

The prejudice to the administration of justice is amplified where the harmful material does not materially assist an understanding of what has occurred in the proceeding, or the Court’s reasons for making orders, or does not otherwise materially assist the achievement of the objectives underlying the open justice principle.

21    “[T]he circumstances just described” in DCT v Wu at [42] were very similar to those in the instant case. The Commissioner sought judgment for debts on the basis of an assessment which had not been subject to the objection process, and a freezing order was sought, during which application allegations were made about the dishonest conduct and evasion of the respondents in that case. The respondents were not able to answer those allegations, nor would they be able to have “a meaningful opportunity in the proceedings to respond” to them because the amounts of the assessments were not capable of challenge. As explanations of the relevant transactions giving rise to the assessments are irrelevant, they would be inadmissible: s 56(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (see DCT v Wu at [41]).

22    In Lee, the Full Court (Thawley, Stewart and Abraham JJ) discussed the relevance of reputational harm, and financial or commercial damage, to an application under s 37AF. The Full Court held that because of the test of “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”, the statutory language requires that “it is necessary to identify the contended prejudice to the proper administration of justice that would result if the order is not made” (at [90]). The Full Court went on to say (at [90]-[91]):

The fact that a person will suffer reputational or commercial harm from publication of evidence relied upon in open court does not have the necessary consequence that the proper administration of justice is or will be prejudiced. Such harm can be an inevitable part of open justice.

That is not to deny that there might be circumstances where likely reputational or commercial harm from the publication of particular information might be such that an order is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”.

23    At [93]-[96] of Lee, the Full Court set out instances of how the contended harm must be linked with s 37AG(1)(a) and listed some categories where commercial harm was often found; for example, the protection of trade secrets and commercial confidentiality (see Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 at [85]).

24    The respondents argue that this Court should follow A v COT and make a suppression order for the reasons set out above from DCT v Wu (although I note that in that case, the suppression orders were limited partly because of prior publication of the subject matter of the proceedings – at [16], [22], [62]). In DCT v Wu, Thawley J pointed to the “unfairness of a procedural and substantive nature” arising out of the inability of the respondents to respond to ex parte freezing orders, and the inability to answer the material in a “fair or meaningful way” because of the statutory regime surrounding assessments (at [59]).

25    Here, the respondents relied on evidence to the effect that the first respondent was the sole director and shareholder of a company which employs around 90 staff. The company is a party to six commercial contracts, of significant value, which can be terminated at will and without cause. The first respondent’s solicitor gave evidence that he was concerned that should the material in the freezing orders proceeding become public, the reputational damage he may suffer may result in one or more of the contracts being terminated. For this reason, the respondents say that an extensive suppression order is necessary. The contracts each contain confidentiality provisions.

26    The respondents submit that as an alternative remedy, the documents or parts thereof set out in the Schedule are not necessary to the proper conduct of the proceedings and should be suppressed. The Commissioner opposes the relief sought in the IA but neither consents to nor opposes the material in the Schedule being subject to orders.

27    In relation to access to documents where a matter has been allocated to a judge, Part 4 of the Access to Documents and Transcripts Practice Note (GPN-ACCS) provides:

Access by media

4.15 Requests from the media are flagged for coordination by the National Operations Registry ("NOR") in conjunction with the Director Public Information and assisted by Court and Tribunal staff from within each Registry.

4.16 An initial assessment is then made to determine whether the proceeding to which the Request relates has been allocated to a judge.

Allocated matters

4.17 Where the relevant proceeding has been allocated to a judge, the NOR will, in consultation with chambers, promptly consult with the parties to determine whether the originating application and supporting material (or other documents which have been filed to commence the proceeding) have been served on the respondent or respondents. 

4.18 Once the relevant documents which initiated the proceeding have been served on the respondent or respondents, the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to file an application seeking a suppression or non-publication order, and no party has filed such an application, then, in the ordinary course of events, a Registrar will grant leave for the inspection of the documents pursuant to the Request. 

4.19 If any party files an application seeking a suppression or non-publication order prior to leave being granted pursuant to r 2.32(4), the NOR will, in consultation with chambers, list the matter for a directions hearing to hear the application. Nothing in this practice note is intended to remove any entitlement of any interested person to be heard on that application. Unless the Court makes an order at that directions hearing preventing a non-party inspecting unrestricted documents, the documents may be inspected pursuant to the Request. 

4.20 If leave is granted to inspect an unrestricted document, then, in the ordinary course of events and subject to any order of the Court, a Registrar will grant leave for the inspection of that document pursuant to subsequent Requests.

28    In this case, the respondents would have been considered (in accordance with cl 4.18) to have had a reasonable opportunity to seek a suppression or non-publication order; that has been the case since at least 19 September 2025 when the freezing orders were served, or 24 September 2025 at the latest, when the matter was returnable before Kennett J. Case management hearings have been held on 4 December 2025, and 13 February 2026, and the matter has been visible on the public list and the Court’s website. When the matter was docketed to me and I received the third-party access request, it appeared to me that the respondents should be given the opportunity to consider whether an application should be made, despite the “deeming” effect of cl 4.18 of the Practice Note, because of the compulsory aspect of the freezing order affidavits and the material contained in the Commissioner’s evidence.

The Commissioner’s submissions

29    The Commissioner’s primary position was that there is insufficient evidence to establish a blanket suppression order (as in orders 4 and 7(a) of the IA), an order restricting publication of the fact of the mere nature of the proceedings and the fact such claims have been brought, or the identity of the respondents.

30    The Commissioner’s first argument was that the relevant information has been in the public domain for five months. This submission was on the basis that the freezing order was heard in open court before Perram J and has returned to Court on a number of occasions.

31    In relation to the “public domain” argument, I have read the transcript of the hearing before Perram J on 18 September 2025 attached to Ms Chan’s affidavit of 19 February 2026 on this application, and although of course the application and affidavits in support were formally read, the most that could have been extracted from an observer present in the Court on that day was that freezing orders were made in this matter, and in four other apparently unrelated matters heard at the same time, and no specific reference was made to the facts of this matter at all. However, the Commissioner is correct that the “open justice” principle has now been deployed after the matter has had a case management hearing and in particular where both parties were represented (see Part 2 of the Practice Note for more information on the Court’s approach to the open justice principle and the limitations which are applied to access requests, in the interests of justice).

32    Further, the Commissioner says that the freezing orders have been in the public domain since they were annexed as registered dealings on the certificates of title of the properties held by the second, third, and fourth respondents. Were a member of the public to wish to view those orders, they could do so by:

(a)    searching the relevant properties; and

(b)    requesting a copy of the relevant dealing,

which would result in that member of the public being able to see the names of the respondents and the terms of the relevant freezing order. This has been the position since after the hearing on 18 September 2025.

33    The Commissioner relied on the above to submit that:

the names of the parties in these proceedings, the fact and terms of the Freezing Orders and the general nature of the proceedings have been matters that have been within the public domain for about 5 months. No action was taken by [the first respondent] to prevent this disclosure for at least 4.5 months.

34    In relation to this argument, Ms Bishop SC took me through the process which a member of the public would need to follow in order to get access to the orders by way of NSW Land Registry Services. If a title search were done on the properties themselves, the fact of an order would be revealed, but on the title it indicates “consult legal”. The respondents submitted that “on-disclosure” could be dealt with by a limited order (which has been made on an interim basis) requiring NSW Land Registry Services not to on-disclose the terms of the orders.

35    Secondly, the Commissioner submitted that the confidentiality provisions in the contracts with the first respondent’s company were not a reason to make the suppression orders. It was submitted that, at most, it may justify a limited suppression order to prevent any likely commercial harm to the relevant third parties, if those contracts are part of the evidence served in these proceedings.

36    Thirdly, the Commissioner submitted that there was no sufficient evidence to ground a submission that there was a reasonable risk of the contracts being terminated. Mr Raffell pointed to the evidence by the first respondent’s solicitor in the affidavit of 11 February 2026 that the contracts “could” be terminated, which was heightened to an expression that cancellation was “likely” in his affidavit of 17 February 2026. It was submitted that this view was of limited weight, particularly in light of the provisions of the contracts that they can be terminated by the contractors “entirely at will”. Even if I were to find that that outcome were likely, it was submitted that commercial harm from the publication of documents in court does not necessarily lead to a finding that the ground in s 37AG(1)(a) is satisfied.

37    The Commissioner, fourthly, submitted that mere reputational harm to the first respondent was not a sufficient basis for an order to be made – see Lee at [90], [91]. Further, he said that nothing in the respondents’ arguments provides a proper basis for a pseudonym order.

The respondents in reply

38    In oral submissions in relation to these three grounds, the respondents concentrated rather more on the DCT v Wu argument that the first respondent never had, and will not have, an opportunity to dispute the allegations in the freezing order proceedings, nor have his side of the story told in the hearing of this matter. However, they submitted that reputational distress along with commercial harm, “not just to the respondents, but also third parties” (presumably a reference to the other parties to the contracts, and/or the employees of the company) was reasonably likely. They distinguished cases such as Commissioner of Taxation v [Respondent] as a civil penalty case which was argued on the basis of whether the respondent had to file a defence in pursuance of his right to silence.

39    Ms Bishop SC also distinguished Peever, which was a case which did not arise out of a covert audit but instead was a GST fraud case with potential criminal proceedings as well. In that case, Wheatley J said (at [52]) that A v COT does not stand for the broad propositions that untested allegations by the Commissioner which may cause “reputational damage, inconvenience, and embarrassment … should be suppressed”. Instead, Ms Bishop cited the principles in DCT v Wu that the first respondent did not, and will not be able to, respond to the allegations in open court, and that, combined with the possibility of commercial harm to his company, his employees, and contractors, is the link which ties non-disclosure and the necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice.

Consideration of whether a departure from open justice is necessary

40    The test is of whether the publication of the allegations in the various court documents is “reasonably likely” to result in commercial harm (see DCT v Wu at [43]) and unfairness to the respondents such that the administration of justice requires its suppression. I am not convinced that the test is met in the current case such that the entirety of the proceedings need be suppressed. I am not persuaded that a blanket suppression order, whether of the file itself or of the documents on it and their contents, is warranted in these circumstances. The link between the granting of the freezing orders and a reasonable likelihood of the kind of harm which was contemplated by the first respondent’s submissions has not been made out to such an extent that I would order a blanket suppression of the file and its contents. The contracts are already terminable at will, and there is no evidence (because it would not be possible to obtain it) that any customers or contractors would terminate their financial dealings with the first respondent’s company if they knew of the allegations.

41    There is both a public interest in the public having an understanding of how the Commissioner fulfils its duties under its legislation, as well as an interest in those duties not causing harm to the persons who are affected by the allegations in the proceedings before this Court. The allegations against the first respondent are serious. Publication of the entirety of the material where the first respondent is unable to deal with the allegations in these proceedings would be a case where “the open justice principle is pursued without regard to context or consequences” (see Lee; Thawley J in DCT v Wu at [42]). In DCT v Wu, Thawley J noted that freezing orders had been made and that “various aspects of the dispute between the Commissioner and the respondents have already been published or are otherwise in the public domain” (at [62]). While in a technical sense the freezing orders in this case are in the public domain – because the matter has been listed and argued in open court prior to the IA being filed – they had not been reported on, and the material which was not suppressed by Thawley J was category (1) (at [61]), “an account of various facts, coupled with documents and reasoning explaining the Commissioner’s view that the respondents behaved dishonestly”. However, Thawley J did not make orders for disclosure of that material beyond that which was necessary for an understanding of the proceedings and the reasons for the freezing orders.

42    The public interest in disclosure of matters before the courts is such that I am prepared to provide suppression only of those matters which create a “material risk of harm” (see DCT v Wu at [64]), and in a way which will protect, not the first respondent’s personal reputation or his likely distress, but instead those of the persons who may be financially impacted by any commercial detriment which may arise from the publication of all of the details of the freezing orders and the underlying allegations, and of the second to fourth respondents, who are not accused of any wrongdoing. The public interest is served by knowing that the Commissioner can seek to further his legitimate interests by the making of freezing orders, and the kind of allegations which underpin them. That should not, however, mean that it serves the public interest for all details of those orders to be in the public eye.

Proposed orders

43    I am of the view that the risk of economic harm to a significant business which employs many people does, in the interests of justice, require some degree of anonymity and suppression, particularly where the fact of the freezing orders is not currently in the visible public domain, and the first respondent’s ability to counter the information provided to the Court by the Commissioner is necessarily very limited. I am of the view that this is best achieved by:

(a)    suppression orders of the identity of the four respondents and the company;

(b)    a pseudonym order for the four respondents (to be referred to, respectively, as CCZ26, CDA26, CDB26, and CDC26) and the company (to be referred to as “the Company”), to be made until further order or the determination of these proceedings; and

(c)    an order redacting the material set out in the Schedule (in each case, where there are alternatives, the narrower redaction rather than the whole of each item. So, for example, in paragraph 51.1 of Mr Morelande’s affidavit of 17 September 2025, a table is sought to be redacted; rather, what should be redacted is all references to BSB, account, and credit card numbers).

44    I will maintain the suppression of the matter until the parties bring in consent orders reflecting these reasons (either agreed or marked-up to identify disagreement) which should be delivered to my chambers by email on or before the date 7 days after the delivery of these reasons, at which time I may make the orders in chambers or, if unavoidable, relist the matter for further argument.

Associate:

Dated:    23 March 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES