Federal Court of Australia

Wang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 310

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.    The name of the second respondent be amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.

3.    The appeal be dismissed.

4.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

5.    Pursuant to r 39.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), these orders be entered forthwith.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SARAH C DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

1    Mr Wang appeals from orders made by a Judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCA) on 19 March 2025 dismissing an application for judicial review of a Decision made by the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 14 March 2023. In its Decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision made by a delegate of the First Respondent (the Minister) not to grant Mr Wang a subclass 820 temporary partner visa.

2    It is observed at the outset that this was the second Tribunal constituted for the purpose of reviewing the delegate’s decision. The First Tribunal had conducted a hearing on 14 September 2021. The Tribunal was reconstituted on 26 August 2022 following the retirement of the Member who constituted the First Tribunal. The Tribunal reviewed the full audio and transcript of the hearing conducted on 14 September 2021.

3    On 19 October 2018, Mr Wang applied for a partner visa on the basis of his relationship with an Australian permanent resident sponsor. Eleven weeks later, on 4 January 2019, his sponsor advised the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that she withdrew her sponsorship. Consequently, Mr Wang became ineligible for a partner visa unless (relevantly) he could establish that he “ha[d] suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner” (Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) Sch 2, cl 820.221(3)(b)(i)).

4    The Regulations prescribe evidential matters that need to be adduced before a person is capable of being found to have experienced family violence (Regulations Div 1.5). In the circumstances of this case (that is, where Mr Wang did not seek to rely on a judicially-determined claim of family violence), at the time, such evidence comprised (among other things) two items of evidence set out in IMMI 12/116 (Regulations reg 1.24(b)). Mr Wang did not adduce any evidence before the Delegate that satisfied the provisions of IMMI 12/116.

5    Before the Tribunal, Mr Wang sought to advance a claim that he had suffered family violence by the sponsor but was similarly unable to adduce evidence of the nature required by IMMI 12/116.

6    Mr Wang was self-represented at all stages of the proceedings but has been assisted by an interpreter.

7    At the outset of the appeal, Mr Wang raised an objection to the “competency of the Appeal Book”. Despite standard timetabling directions having been made by a Registrar, which, inter alia, provided that if the appellant was self-represented, the Minister would prepare the Appeal Book, Mr Wang alleged that he had been denied procedural fairness in not being given an opportunity to comment on a draft index. He purported to have lodged a “Notice of Objection” on 31 October 2025, but the Notice had not been accepted for filing by the Registry. On ascertaining from Mr Wang which additional documents he sought to have included in the Appeal Book, I dismissed the Notice of Objection but granted him leave to read and rely on the additional documents. Those documents were Mr Wang’s submissions before the primary judge filed on 24 February 2025, his original application to the FCFCA filed on 17 February 2023, and his affidavits filed on 17 April 2023, 1 April 2025 and 9 May 2025.

8    Mr Wang filed two Notices of Appeal in this Court. The first was dated 1 April 2025 (NOA) and the second, described as “Supplementary”, was dated 9 May 2025 (Supplementary NOA). Together, they contain 37 grounds of appeal. The Minister contended that the later Notice replaced the earlier one; Mr Wang contended the later was “supplementary”. There is, in any event, considerable overlap between the two documents and the continued reliance on any ground in the former which has not been reproduced in the latter could not be said to have taken the Minister by surprise nor to have caused any prejudice. For these reasons, I have considered the grounds set out in both the NOA and Supplementary NOA.

9    For the reasons that follow, none of the grounds of appeal raises appellable error by the primary judge (PJ) and the appeal must fail.

Grounds of Appeal

10    Mr Wang’s overarching submission was that neither the Tribunal nor the primary judge had jurisdiction to deal with the decision of the Delegate to refuse him a partner visa or alternatively, if the primary judge did have jurisdiction, he erred by failing to identify jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

11    The closest Mr Wang’s grounds of appeal come to raising error on the part of the primary judge are grounds 16 of the NOA and grounds 16, 17, 18, and 21 of the Supplementary NOA. For that reason, I deal with them first. They are in the following terms:

16.    The primary court Judge erred in failing to find that the decision of Tribunal is affected jurisdictional error. That is because the Tribunal wrongly took an irrelevant consideration for the Applications of “Request to issue summons.”

…

17.    The primary court judge erred in finding the Appellant’s “Request to Issue Summons” is addressed to New Zealand.

18.    The primary court judge erred in finding in failed to find that the Second Respondent applied incorrect law when consider the Appellant’s application of “Request to Issue Summons”.

…

21.    The primary court Judge erred in failed to find that the Second Respondent had wrongly exercised discretions.

(Errors in the original.)

12    At the relevant time, IMMI 12/116 specified that a minimum of two different types of the following evidence of domestic violence were required, in addition to a statutory declaration by an alleged victim under reg 1.25 of the Regulations:

•    Medical report, hospital report, discharge summary or statutory declaration made by either a person who is registered as a medical practitioner and is performing the duties of a medical practitioner, or registered as a nurse within the meaning of section 3 of the Health Insurance Act 1973 and is performing the duties of a registered nurse;

•    Either a report, record of assault, witness statement or statutory declaration that is made by a police officer of a State or Territory, or a police officer of the Australian Federal Police;

•    A witness statement that is made by someone other than the alleged victim to a police officer during the course of a police investigation;

•    Report or statutory declaration made by an officer of a child welfare authority, or a child protection authority of a State or Territory;

•    Letter or assessment report made by a women’s refuge, or a family/domestic violence crisis centre on the organisation’s letterhead;

•    Statutory declaration made by a member of the Australian Association of Social Workers, or a person who is eligible to be a member of that Association, who has provided counselling or assistance to the alleged victim while performing the duties of a social worker;

•    Statutory declaration made by a registered psychologist in a State or Territory who has treated the alleged victim while performing the duties of a psychologist;

•    Statutory declaration made by a family consultant appointed under the Family Law Act 1975 or a family relationship counsellor who works at a Family Relationship Centre listed on the Australian Government Family Relationships website;

•    Statutory declaration or a letter on the school’s letterhead made by a school counsellor or school principal in their professional capacity.

13    At the hearing before the First Tribunal, Mr Wang was told what information he needed to provide to make a valid claim of non-judicially determined family violence. He was told (Decision at [36]):

So you must provide a statutory declaration from yourself and you must provide two types of evidence that are listed in schedule 1. The types of evidence must be in the form described in the schedule and it must contain the details as specified in the schedule.

14    Prior to the hearing before the First Tribunal, Mr Wang had requested the Tribunal issue three summonses. One, dated 2 September 2021, was directed to “Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service” for the following reasons:

Police report (Number: QP1802418124) is the best important evidence for my case. Because, on 25 Dec 2018, two Police Officer went to house and did the Domestic Violence Inspection.

(Errors in original.)

15    A second summons was also directed to “Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service”, dated 3 September 2021. It gave the following reasons:

I request:

1. Queensland Police Service provide police report QP1802418124 to AAT before 14 September 2021.

2. Schedule Mareeba police station police officer CON STABLE WAYNE HAPI (4032852) to attend the hearing which at 3:00 pm; 14 September 2021 by telephone.

Because, the Police Report and Police Officer are best evidence for my case.

•    On 25 Dec 2018, police officer went to house talked with me about 40 minutes and did the DV inspection.

•    Police officer called my ex-wife to confirm the reasons after my ex-wife had kicked me out of the house.

•    Police officer told me that I was suffering violence and referred me to call DV service line 1800 811 811 and Men's line 1800 600 636.

(Errors in original.)

16    A third, dated 15 September 2021 (although provided by email to the Tribunal on 4 September 2021), was directed to “The Proper Officer (DVConnect)” for the following reasons:

1. I had called The DV service line 1800 811 811 and 1800 600 636 many times and these lines are belonging to DVConnect.

2. I tried to get the phone call records by Right to Information. however, I failed.

3. I informed DVConnect that I will request a summon to DVConnect. DVConnect agreed and provided me the details to receive the summon.

Addition Information:

On 25 Dec 2018, Police officer had confirmed that my ex-wife kicked me out of the house. Then police told me that kicked out of the house is violence and provided two DV service number (1800 811 811 and1800 600 636) to me to call.

I called DV service line 1800 811 811 after I had gone out of the police station. A DV service officer talked with me and referred me to call 1800 474 753.

Also, I called 1800 600 636 many times, I believe that DVConnec have all the records.

(Errors in original.)

17    Before this Court, Mr Wang complained that the Tribunal had not dealt with his summonses because the boxes on the final page of the Request to Issue Summons form had not been filled in. There is no substance to that complaint. It is clear that the Tribunal dealt with each of the three summonses (Decision at [8]). The Decision records (at [10]) that, during the Hearing on 14 September 2021, Mr Wang was told the Tribunal would not issue the summonses as currently requested, asked him to make reasonable efforts to obtain the information himself, and to explain how the information and related documents sought were directly relevant to meeting the criteria prescribe by IMMI 12/116.

18    The reconstituted Tribunal had before it a statutory declaration dated 1 December 2022, signed by Mr Wang. It also had Queensland Police Report QP1802418124 in relation to the visit by officers to his home on 25 December 2018, which included a Domestic Family Violence Report, albeit with his sponsor named as the aggrieved (Decision at [12]). The Tribunal observed (Decision at [13]), that Mr Wang had obtained and provided the police report prepared by Constable Hapi but that correspondence accompanying the report, which was also provided to the Tribunal by Mr Wang, indicated that Mr Hapi was no longer with the Queensland Police and now resided in New Zealand. As the Tribunal observed, pursuant to s 363(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) as it was at the time, it had no power to summons a person who is not in Australia to appear as a witness.

19    The Tribunal noted that Mr Wang had sought access to any recordings or reports of his contact with DVConnect by a Freedom of Information request made on 27 November 2022, which he subsequently withdrew on 28 November 2022 (Decision at [20]). Nevertheless, Mr Wang put before the Tribunal correspondence from DVConnect dated 18 May 2020.

20    As the Tribunal observed (Decision at [14]) “the applicant would appear to have subsequently been able to procure all the documents he sought to summons”, although not the attendance of Mr Hapi. His attendance was sought apparently to confirm that the police were called to Mr Wang’s house where a report of domestic violence was made. That attendance was unnecessary. Verbal testimony of a police officer would not, in any event, satisfy the requirements of IMMI 12/116.

21    The police report, although partially redacted, records that Mr Wang provided a version of events that was consistent with that of the sponsor. It clearly did not satisfy the requirements of IMMI 12/116 because it did not identify Mr Wang as the victim. That was the finding of the Tribunal (Decision at [59]). Had the Commissioner of Queensland Police been required by summons to produce QP1802418124, that would not have improved Mr Wang’s position, contrary to his submission in this Court that the report would “have been very different”.

22    The correspondence from DVConnect was on the service’s official letterhead but, similarly, could not satisfy the requirements of IMMI 12/116. That is because it recorded that Mr Wang “identified himself as the aggrieved” and his wife as the perpetrator but did not provide a professional opinion that the claims made by Mr Wang were consistent with his having been subject to family violence, as required by IMMI 12/116. A summons could not have changed the content of the letter already supplied.

23    Further, Mr Wang seemed to be labouring under the misapprehension that, because of s 134A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) (Evidence Act), the Tribunal could not consider the police report or the correspondence from DVConnect unless they had been provided pursuant to a summons. That is not the effect of s 134A. It is a permissive provision enabling a person to make application to the principal officer of a government agency or public authority to produce a document in a civil proceeding.

24    Mr Wang also laboured under the impression that the Tribunal was obliged to seek an independent expert opinion if it was not satisfied that he had suffered family violence. Whilst the Tribunal has the power to seek such an opinion, it is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Tribunal if, and only if, there is a valid claim of family violence before it. In circumstances where the police report clearly identified Mr Wang’s sponsor as the aggrieved, it cannot be said that the discretion has miscarried.

25    The primary judge was correct to find (PJ at [26]) that no error was made by the Tribunal in refusing to issue the summons nor in refusing to obtain a report from an independent expert (PJ at [31]).

26    Mr Wang’s remaining grounds of appeal arise primarily because of his misunderstanding of court procedures and processes, and of concepts of natural justice and procedural fairness. They can, therefore, be dealt with briefly.

27    Ground 1 of the Supplementary NOA (ground 1 of the NOA):

The primary court or the Respondents did not serve/delivery the court sealed and signed orders to the Appellant.

28    Mr Wang was present before the primary judge when the orders were pronounced on 19 March 2025. Pursuant to r 24.01 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (FCFCA Rules), orders take effect “on the day the judgment is given or the order is made”. Nothing in the FCFCA Rules requires service of an order in such circumstances. Mr Wang was fully aware of the orders made; he lodged an appeal against the orders on 30 March 2025. This ground is without foundation.

29    Ground 2 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court judge did not direct to enter the orders made on 19 March 2025.

30    Rule 24.07 of the FCFCA Rules requires orders to be entered unless they are merely procedural. The orders were entered on 19 March 2025, as is recorded on the sealed copy of the orders. No specific direction of the judge is required. Mr Wang had asked the primary judge to make an order in accordance with r 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules). It is not clear how such an order would have made any difference but, in any event, those Rules did not apply to the proceeding, which was before the primary judge in a different court. This ground is misconceived.

31    Ground 3 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge made a direction to amend a document other than the order made on 19 March 2025.

32    The transcript of the proceedings before the primary judge does not disclose any such direction.

33    Ground 4 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge breached the rules of natural justice.

34    Mr Wang submitted first, that he was denied procedural fairness because the primary judge did not take into account his written submissions filed on 24 February 2025. The transcript records the primary judge saying, “where it is relevant, I will take it into account, but where it is irrelevant, I will ignore it.”

35    Secondly, Mr Wang contended that the primary judge only considered the grounds in his amended application filed on 14 April 2023 and failed to determine those in the amended application filed on 15 February 2025. The transcript reveals that the primary judge had regard to “the application filed on 14 April 2023, and amended on 14 February 2025 and further amended on 15 February 2025” (PJ at [51]).

36    The third alleged breach of procedural fairness relied upon by Mr Wang is the primary judge’s failure to have the interpreter sworn in. Mr Wang asked, in English, that the interpreter be sworn in in the following terms: “Now, it’s just that the court usually swearing the interpreter either verbally or through affirmation. That is the process that I understand.” He denied the proposition put to him by the primary judge that he was concerned that the interpreter may not interpret what he said properly. The primary judge explained that “The court will swear in an interpreter when it is that a person is giving evidence to the court.” The primary judge explained to Mr Wang that he was not a witness, but was making submissions. As was the case before this Court (where the interpreter had been sworn), before the primary judge, Mr Wang continually interrupted the interpreter when he was dissatisfied with the translation. Mr Wang submitted that an interpreter who was sworn in was less likely to make mistakes. Given the purpose of an oath is to ensure honesty rather than accuracy, I reject that submission.

37    The primary judge did not deny Mr Wang natural justice or procedural fairness.

38    Ground 5 of the Supplementary NOA (grounds 4 and 5 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge erred in fact in making a decision for the Appellant’s application filed to the primary court on 14 April 2023. Because, the application filed on 14 April 2023 was replaced by the Appellant’s amended application filed to the primary court on 15 February 2025.

39    The primary judge considered the grounds in the amended application as is made patent by an examination of the grounds of the amended application dated 15 February 2025 and PJ at [37]-[48]. The complaint is baseless.

40    Ground 6 of the Supplementary NOA (ground 6 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge erred in law in rejected the Appellant to call witness and tender exhibits to the judge in the hearing dated 19 March 2025.

41    The matter for the primary judge was an application for judicial review. It is entirely orthodox that new evidence not be introduced on such an application: Joseph v Spencer [2025] NSWCA 80 at [44]:    

[I]n general the evidence relevant to a judicial review case does not extend beyond the material that was before the decision-maker. As Gordon J explained in MZXLD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1912 (citations omitted):

[10]     The resistance to the admission of fresh evidence in judicial review proceedings is well established by the authorities. The function of judicial review is a process by which legal error might be corrected, leaving the primary decision maker as wholly responsible for determining questions of fact or the merits of any application. The danger in acceding to a request to admit further evidence on review is that the court will necessarily need to revisit findings of fact.

(Emphasis added.)

42    The primary judge did not err in refusing to admit further evidence.

43    Ground 7 of the Supplementary NOA (ground 7 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge erred in law in failed to give opportunities to the respondents to call witnesses and tender exhibits and give opportunities to the Appellant to test the Respondent’s exhibits (cross-examination) in the hearing dated 19 March 2025.

44    The Minister did not seek to call any witnesses or to tender any additional documents before the primary judge. This ground is wholly misconceived.

45    Ground 8 of the Supplementary NOA (ground 14 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge erred in law in admitted the evidence which had provided to the Second Respondent on 14 September 2021 are evidence for the judicial review.

46    The evidence before the Tribunal on the date of the Hearing, being 14 September 2021, was properly before the primary judge on an application for judicial review. The complaint is unfounded.

47    Ground 9 of the Supplementary NOA (grounds 8 and 10 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge erred in law in failing to find facts based on evidence.

48    Mr Wang raises four matters in support of this ground.

49    First, that in refusing to issue the summons directed to Constable Hapi, there “is no evidence that the Appellant requested AAT to issue a summon address to New Zealand”. To the contrary, correspondence from Sergeant Mitchell at the Mareeba Police Station addressed to Mr Wang, which was before the Tribunal, stated that the summons would “need to [be] served upon Mr Hapi in New Zealand, via the New Zealand Police” (Decision at [13]).

50    Secondly, Mr Wang alleged that there was no evidence that police issued a temporary domestic violence order against him, contrary to the primary judge’s acceptance of the Tribunal’s finding (PJ at [22]). Again, the evidence before the Tribunal was of a Protection Order requiring Mr Wang, inter alia, to be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved (his sponsor) dated 12 August 2019. Further, an affidavit sworn by the sponsor that was provided to the Tribunal deposed to an earlier temporary Protection Order having been made against Mr Wang on 29 July 2019.

51    Thirdly, Mr Wang again raises his complaint that the DVConnect documents were not provided to the Tribunal pursuant to s 134A of the Evidence Act, a matter I have already dealt with above.

52    Fourthly, Mr Wang complains that the primary judge erred by finding that Mr Wang had called only two witnesses at the Hearing before the Tribunal on 14 September 2019. This complaint is misconceived. The primary judge said (PJ at [5]), “the Applicant called two other witnesses to give evidence to the Tribunal” (emphasis added).

53    Ground 9 cannot be sustained.

54    Ground 10 of the Supplementary NOA (ground 3 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge erred in law in failing to rely on evidence to determine whether the interpreter provided correct interpreting service in the hearing dated 19 March 2025.

55    This ground must be premised on a contention that there would be a never-ending circle of witnesses to testify as to the accuracy of each interpreter’s interpretation; which is just that, interpretation not translation. There was, in any event, no suggestion by the appellant that there had in fact been any errors of interpretation, let alone material error. The ground is baseless.

56    Ground 11 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in fact in find the Appellant called two witnesses for his case in the hearing dated 14 September 2021. Because, the Appellant called three witnesses and provided evidence for his case in the hearing dated 14 September 2021.

57    As I have already explained above in relation to Ground 9, the primary judge made no such error.

58    Ground 12 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in law in failing exercise a discretion to stay the primary court proceeding, because the Appellant showed to the primary court judge that he have sustained work-related injuries in Australia and need to stay in Australia to resolve the work-related issues.

59    A refusal to stay proceedings is an interlocutory decision from which leave to appeal is required (Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)). This ground is, therefore, incompetent.

60    In any event, it has no prospects of success. In his affidavit dated 18 February 2025, filed in his application for judicial review, Mr Wang deposed that he was still waiting for the Industrial Court of Queensland “to make its final decision” and referred to an affidavit he had filed on 14 February 2025 (referred to in the outline of submissions in this Court). That affidavit referred to the hearing having taken place on 5 April 2023. Mr Wang did not provide any evidence as to the status of those proceedings, or indeed as to whether he needed to remain in Australia pending the decision. The primary judge exercised his discretion to refuse to stay the proceedings. No error of the kind referred to in House v R [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 can be discerned.

61    Ground 13 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in law in failing interfere with the exercise a discretion by the First Respondent, because the Appellant showed to the primary court judge that the first Respondent relied on incorrect facts to make decision.

62    As the primary judge, correctly with respect, identified (PJ at [42]), the delegate of the first respondent is a “primary decision-maker” whose decision is not reviewable by the FCFCA: Migration Act ss 476(2)(a) and 476(4). Consequently, this ground must fail.

63    Ground 14 of the Supplementary NOA (ground 11 of the NOA):

The primary court Judge failed to determine whether the Second Respondent relied on incorrect information/documents to make the decision.

64    Mr Wang contends that the Tribunal did not have before it the correct Department file; that is, it did not have his file. The basis of this contention is the cover sheet to the Tribunal’s Decision Record which, relevantly, is as follows:

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:                Migration & Refugee Division

APPLICANT:                Mr Yuehai Wang

CASE NUMBER:            1906257

DIBP REFERENCE(S):        BCC2018/4586799

MEMBER:                Deputy President Justin Owen

DATE:                    14 March 2023

PLACE OF DECISION:        Sydney

DECISION:    The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.

65    Mr Wang’s contention arises from the “DIBP REFERENCE(S)”, which identifies files emanating from the “Department of Immigration and Border Protection”. It is common ground between the parties that the Department of Immigration and Border Protection was integrated into the Department of Home Affairs on 20 December 2017. There is no dispute that all documents exchanged between the Department of Home Affairs and Mr Wang relevant to this matter were identified with the number BCC2018/4586799, as set out on the cover sheet to the Tribunal’s Decision Record.

66    Mr Wang submits however, that the Tribunal’s reference to the file of the precursor to the Department of Home Affairs means that he cannot be sure that the correct file was before the Tribunal. This ground is also misconceived. Machinery of Government changes, whereby functions, resources, and people are moved from one entity to another, often with name changes to the entities. This is a normal part of Commonwealth Government operations, particularly after election. Absent any specific legislation, s 19B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides, in effect, that where the name or title of a Department of State is changed, a substituted reference order can be made substituting the newly named Department for the former Department.

67    The primary judge did not err in dismissing such a contention (PJ at [44]).

68    Ground 15 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in law in failing interfere with the exercise a discretion by the Second Respondent, because the Appellant clearly showed to the primary court judge that the Second Respondent relied on incorrect facts to make the decision.

69    No particulars of this ground were provided by Mr Wang, nor did he address it in his written or oral submissions. The ground is too vague to be entertained.

70    Ground 19 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in fact in finding the police issued temporary domestic violence order nature against the Appellant.

71    This ground repeats matters relied on under Ground 9 and is without foundation.

72    Ground 20 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in law in failing to admit the Appellant’s “Notice to Admit” served to the Respondents on 26 February 2025, because the Respondents did not serve a valid “Notice Disputing a Fact or Document” to the Appellant.

73    The Notices were apparently not tendered before the primary judge, who had expressed the view that the documents attached to the Notice to Admit were not relevant. To the extent that some of the documents were not before the Tribunal, the primary judge had made clear that he would not permit the introduction of further evidence. Mr Wang sought to tender them in this Court over the objections of the Minister. I allowed the tender but have been unable to discern how either Notice assists Mr Wang. He certainly did not establish that the Notice Disputing a Fact or Document was not served on him. Nor did he identify how any of the admissions or non-admissions would have assisted him before the Tribunal or the primary judge.

74    No appellable error on the part of the primary judge can be discerned.

75    Ground 21 of the Supplementary NOA:

The primary court Judge erred in failing to find that the Second Respondent had wrongly exercised discretions.

76    In his written submissions, Mr Wang reagitates his complaint about the Tribunal’s refusal to issue the summonses and failing to appoint an independent expert. These complaints have already been dismissed above. This ground adds nothing of substance.

77    Grounds 2, 9, 13 and 15 of the NOA do not appear to correlate with any ground in the Supplementary NOA but are so vague that they fail to identify any error, let alone appellable error.

Disposition

78    For these reasons, Mr Wang has failed to establish any error on the part of the primary judge. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    20 March 2026