Federal Court of Australia

GGPG Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2026] FCA 297

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 43(3)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the costs payable by Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd, David Alexander John Whiteman and Marc Andrew Clancy (together the costs respondents) to GGPG Pty Ltd (Receiver & Manager Appointed) (In Liquidation) and Park Ridge 180 Pty Ltd (Receiver & Manager Appointed) (the costs applicants) pursuant to order 10 of the orders made on 9 February 2026 are fixed in the lump- sum of $1,587,994 (exclusive of GST) (lump-sum).

2.    The costs respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the lump-sum.

3.    There be no order as to the costs of and incidental to the lump sum costs hearing on 16 March 2026.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

MCELWAINE J:

1    I outlined the tortuous procedural history of this matter and the related matter QUD 93 of 2022 in my reasons published on 18 December 2025: GGPG Pty Ltd (Receiver and Manager Appointed) v Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 1620. For the reasons there explained, I set aside orders that this matter be heard and determined concurrently with QUD 93 of 2022 and set this matter for trial to commence on 9 February 2026. The trial did not proceed. The respondents capitulated. The parties reached a compromise and provided a memorandum of consent orders that I then made on 9 February 2026. The applicant succeeded in its claims. The cross-claim of the respondents was dismissed. The respondents and cross-claimant were ordered to pay the applicant and the cross-respondents’ costs of the proceeding to be agreed or determined utilising the lump-sum costs procedure. The orders set today for the hearing of the lump-sum costs claim. Subsequently, and again by consent, I made procedural orders for the determination of the lump-sum costs claim, including for the filing of affidavits and written submissions. For convenience I simply refer to the applicant as including the cross-respondents and to the respondents as including the cross-claimants.

2    The applicant relies on two affidavits made by their solicitor, Marc Maskell dated 23 February and 13 March 2026. They also rely on their written submissions of 10 March 2026 and their supplementary submissions of 13 March 2026. The respondents rely on an affidavit made by their solicitor, Benjamin Cohen made 12 March 2026 as well as an affidavit from a costs consultant, Sharon Drew made on 12 March 2026.

3    There is a vast chasm that divides the parties. On the applicant’s revised claim, the following amounts are sought:

(1)    Professional fees, billed and unbilled- $1,171,533.30;

(2)    counsel’s fees – $483,096.18; and

(3)    disbursements – $51,994.05.

4    In total, $1,706,623.53. These claims do not include GST because the receiver and manager is entitled to claim input tax credits in respect of all invoiced fees. The professional fees claim has been discounted by 40% from the total solicitor/client costs incurred since 2022 of $2,824,072.81. The claims are explained in detail by Mr Maskell in his first affidavit. Relevantly, he is a partner in the firm of solicitors who have acted for the applicant since the commencement of the proceeding and has personally undertaken a significant component of the solicitors’ legal work. He is an experienced practitioner of over 25 years standing in commercial litigation matters. His affidavit is relatively brief, straight to the point and provides an appropriate level of detail for a lump-sum costs determination.

5    The respondents contend that at most the lump-sum amounts should not be more than:

(1)    professional fees – $665,530;

(2)    counsel’s fees – $282,896; and

(3)    disbursements – $41,292.19.

6    That totals $989,718.19, before Ms Drew applies a further 10% global discount to arrive at $890,746.37.

7    Ms Drew is an acknowledged costs consultant with appropriate experience in estimating and providing expert opinion evidence about legal costs. Her affidavit attaches her report of 12 March 2026 comprising nine pages of analysis. She commences with the contention that the professional fees claimed “appear to be disproportionate to both the nature and complexity of” this proceeding and the related matter – QUD 93 of 2022. She provides no analysis to support that conclusion. Self-evidently, she did not have any involvement in the litigation. From that premise, she opines that:

In my experience, I would expect the costs calculated on a party and party basis for proceedings involving a 4-day trial to be in the range of $500,000 to $650,000; I would expect the costs calculated on a party and party basis for proceedings involving a 10-day trial to be approximately $1,000,000. These estimates include fees for both senior and junior counsel, allowing 1 day’s preparation for each day of trial, as well as an experienced solicitor instructing for each day of trial, plus costs associated with preparation of affidavit evidence and expert reports, mediation and general conduct of the proceedings.

8    Ms Drew does not disclose the basis for her experience claim. She does not reveal how she determined these estimates. I do not accept her implicit assumption of the complexity of this proceeding as founding these estimates. She has not referenced the fact that this and the related proceeding has resulted in 13 interlocutory decisions in matter QUD 93 of 2022 and one in this proceeding. Each proceeding was case managed concurrently, due to the expected overlap in the evidence and the issues, until I severed that relationship following a protracted interlocutory dispute in December 2025.

9    Further, I do not accept the evidence based on her expectation of party and party costs for either a four or a 10 day trial. She does not provide evidence by way of any useful comparison for those estimates; in that regard the basis for her conclusions is not disclosed and, in any event, there is no attempt to grapple with the prolonged pre-trial history of this proceeding and QUD 93 of 2022, a fact that is manifestly clear from the 45 pre-trial orders made by Derrington J and the 21 made by me in the related proceeding. I do not therefore make findings based on that aspect her evidence

10    Ms Drew further contends, in a speculative manner in her report, that the claims for solicitors’ professional fees “may relate” to one or more entities and that her review of the “material” indicates that costs have been included for work that relates to other entities and is not therefore within the scope of the costs orders. Mr Maskell in his supplementary affidavit conceded that five invoices from counsel should not have been included and has apologised for that error. Otherwise, he does not accept the overlap contention of Ms Drew. Apart from this concession, I am not satisfied that Ms Drew has been able to make herself sufficiently informed about this matter, and its relationship with matter QUD 93 of 2022, to provide useful expert opinion evidence on this question.

11    The next matter addressed by Ms Drew is that there is no order for costs in favour of the applicant in proceeding QUD 93 of 2022 and that there are inconsistencies in the evidence of Mr Maskell in his allocation of percentage apportionments to exclude work undertaken specifically related to that proceeding. I do not accept this criticism. From [35] of his first affidavit, Mr Maskell provides a detailed breakdown of the solicitor/client professional fee claims with broad percentage apportionments to exclude work undertaken for the receiver and manager across “general categories of work” as distinct from work specifically undertaken in the conduct of this proceeding. Necessarily, his estimates are broadly based, which is consistent with the lump-sum costs assessment procedure which is designed to reduce the minutiae of protracted disputation that is often a characteristic of the traditional process for taxing a bill of costs. In contrast, the analysis of Ms Drew harks back to the procedure for taxing costs with a firm eye upon the well-known but now antiquated work: L.L Oliver’s Law of Costs (Melbourne Law Book Co., 1960). We have moved on, at least in this Court. As correctly submitted for the applicant, the lump-sum assessment procedure must not morph into a taxation of costs by another means.

12    Further, the report of Ms Drew fails to give sufficient attention to the overlap with proceeding QUD 93 of 2022 and fails to confront Mr Maskell’s evidence that the firm practice management system provides for a division of solicitor’s time spent on this proceeding as distinct from QUD 93 of 2022 (affidavit [8] – [9] certain costs as ordered in the Supreme Court of Queensland have been excised) (affidavit [13] – [18]) which evidence supports his statement, which I accept, that the applicant “is not seeking double recovery for the same work between” those matters: affidavit [9].

13    The next criticism of Ms Drew concerns the 40% discount applied to the solicitor/client costs of the applicant. Ms Drew simply says that “in my experience” the 40% discount “is likely to be appropriate after costs that do not fall within the scope of the costs order have been excluded from the calculations” and on that basis the discount is not appropriate in this case. I do not accept her evidence. The 40% discount applied by Mr Maskell in his evidence is “very conservative” and is applied to the actual solicitor/client costs. His evidence is further that “there are no special or unusual costs arrangements underpinning the costs claimed” by the applicant and that “none of the amounts claimed fall outside the amounts permissible to be claimed”. That is supported by the detailed statement at [37] of his affidavit where he particularises the hourly rates of all the lawyers involved between 2022 and 2026. What is notable about his hourly rate, as a partner, is that it closely aligns with the maximum hourly rate for attendances by a solicitor at clause 1 of schedule 3 to the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

14    Ms Drew’s approach is correctly described in the applicant’s submissions as: “in substance, a taxation-style reconstruction of the claim by a series of overlapping and compounding percentage deductions, followed by a further global reduction” instead of the adoption of a broad evaluative assessment to determine an amount that is fair and reasonable on a party/party basis.

15    Ms Drew next opines that work was inadequately delegated, and that a “significant amount of time spent” was that of senior solicitors at partner level. The answer to that criticism is plainly revealed in the first affidavit of Mr Maskell. The receiver was for a considerable period of time unfunded, and therefore there was no option of engaging counsel. Work which would ordinarily be the subject of a brief to counsel was undertaken by solicitors. Moreover, this was complex time-consuming litigation. I do not accept the submissions of Mr Psaltis made today that the issue was relatively uncomplicated. That is borne out by the procedural history to which I have briefly referred. The delegation criticism of Ms Drew does not take account of these matters.

16    As to counsel’s fees, Ms Drew contends that the cost summary does not adequately identify the work performed by various counsel, nor their hourly rates. She makes further observations about the maximum amounts charged by senior counsel as being at “the upper end of the rate for senior counsel in the National Guide to Counsel Fees”. The problem with that evidence is that it does not reflect a detailed analysis of the work undertaken, with what degree of complexity and the Guide is in my view hopelessly outdated, as reflecting the position in July 2013. The Guide no longer serves its purpose, save for historic assessments. Mr Psaltis in answer to that proposition draws my attention to two decisions of this Court. The first is the decision of Gleeson J in Hislop v Paltar Petroleum Ltd [2017] FCA 1632 particularly at [49]. The first thing that needs to be said about that decision is that her Honour was concerned with an assessment of lump-sum costs in 2017. The second thing that needs to be said is that the passage relied upon at [49], that is:

While I accepted Mr Johnson’s evidence that the rates in the Guide are significantly lower than the rates regularly charged by pre-eminent commercial senior counsel in Sydney in matters of this nature, Mr Johnson did not go so far as to suggest that competent counsel could not have been retained at rates falling within the ranges in the Guide. To the extent that it was suggested on Mr Hislop’s behalf, I did not accept that the relationship between the rates in the Guide and rates charged by pre-eminent counsel is relevant to the quantification of a lump sum costs order that is fair and reasonable.

must be read with what her Honour said at [50], that:

I was prepared to accept that it is fair and reasonable to allow an amount for counsels’ charges in excess of the ranges set in the Guide having regard to the special features of the litigation and the evidence of the rates charged by counsel for the defendants, but I did not accept that the allowance should be significantly in excess of those ranges.

17    I do not follow, with respect, her Honour's approach and apply it to this case. Her Honour was concerned with an assessment of counsels' fees at a time relatively proximate to the publication of the Guide. I am not in that position. The Guide is now approximately 13 years out of date. I can take judicial notice of the fact that counsel's fees are at market rates considerably higher than those referred to in the Guide for the period of the assessment now in question, that is, commencing in 2022.

18    The second authority that Mr Psaltis relies upon is the more recent decision of Feutrill J in the matter of Frigger v Professional Services of Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2025] FCA 1639. Mr Psaltis particularly relies on his Honour's observation at [23], where in part his Honour said at the end of that paragraph that the hours of rates charged by counsel in that case are:

...indicative of fair and reasonable hourly and daily rates for superior court work in Western Australia at the relevant time and accord with the National Guide to Counsel Fees.

19    However, the difficulty with reasoning from that case to the present circumstances is to be found at [8] of his Honour's reasons, where it is clear that the counsel in that case agreed to be retained:

...on the basis of the scale of costs relevant to the work undertaken under Sch 3 of the Rules and the National Guide to Counsel Fees issued on 28 June 2013.

20    On that simple basis, the reasoning is distinguishable. In my view, the rates of charge of senior and junior counsel in this matter properly reflect the market rates as they were at the time, and it is appropriate, therefore, that they form the basis of a lump-sum costs determination.

21    Now, there are other criticisms that Ms Drew makes of the disbursement claims, particularly the fee of a town planner by the name of Mr Ovenden who was engaged to provide a town planning report. Mr Psaltis accepted that report was served. Subsequently, a forensic decision was made not to call Mr Ovenden. That is not a basis, in my opinion, to disallow the disbursement for his fees, because, as is often the case, forensic decisions are made in the course of litigation whereby some evidence no longer becomes necessary or is of utility. I am satisfied that it was appropriate to engage the town planner, given the scope of the issues in the case as framed.

22    For these reasons, I do not accept the evidence of Ms Drew where it conflicts with the evidence of Mr Maskell. Further, I do not consider her evidence to be persuasive in the evaluative assessment task that is required.

23    Then there is the affidavit of Benjamin Cohen of 12 March 2026. I ruled during the submissions that I would not receive the affidavit. I now explain in more detail why. The body of the affidavit extends to 52 paragraphs over 17 pages. The annexure extends to over 200 pages. At [6], Mr Cohen states that he provides his affidavit as “following additional background” to the matters relevant to the lump-sum costs application. The affidavit makes detailed reference to affidavits filed by the receiver and manager in QUD 93 of 2022, expresses opinions as to “non-recoverable counsel and solicitor’s fees” based on his experience, addresses certain costs orders made in the Supreme Court of Queensland, interrogates the tax invoices of the counsel engaged for the applicant, examines the history of the transfer of proceeding QUD 93 of 2022 from the Supreme Court of Queensland (including what occurred prior to the making of the transfer order), undertakes a detailed analysis of the tax invoices of the applicant’s solicitor, contends that there are certain errors and omissions in the lump-sum assessment of Mr Maskell and then, over a number of pages, undertakes what on its face is a reconciliation of the costs claimed that one would ordinarily expect to see in a detailed list of objections filed in response to a bill of costs for taxation.

24    As explained in the submissions of Mr Psaltis for the respondents, primary reliance is placed on those matters to demonstrate that a portion of the professional fees calculated by Mr Maskell relate to work undertaken in proceeding QUD 93 of 2022, which is not recoverable pursuant to the costs order in this proceeding. For that purpose considerable background detail is provided to the time when Derrington J ordered that the proceedings be heard and determined together, with the evidence in one being the evidence in the other. That order was made on 30 November 2023. Before it was, the applicant engaged in numerous procedural steps in the Supreme Court of Queensland and after the transfer order of 28 September 2022, which Mr Cohen details at [25]-[30]. This is intended to found a submission that the applicant has inadequately explained or inadequately accounted for these fees which do not fall within the lump-sum assessment order.

25    The applicant submits that the affidavit should not be received into evidence. It notes, correctly, that it may only be received by leave in that the order of 16 February 2026 required the respondents to file and serve any affidavit in response to the costs application, not exceeding eight pages in length (omitting formal parts and exhibits) by 9 March 2026.

26    The applicant is correct in that submission. The respondents agreed and consented to an order for the determination of costs on a lump-sum basis. The affidavit of Mr Cohen bespeaks complexity and inefficiency. It is in form and substance an attempt to by-pass the efficiency of the lump-sum assessment process by converting it into a protracted taxation objection by interrogating the costs claim on an invoice-by-invoice basis.

27    The respondents chose to engage Ms Drew as their expert to provide the costs response. If she was inadequately briefed, that is no reason to permit Mr Cohen to provide additional background material.

28    More fundamentally, the attempt radically departs from the purpose and object of the lump-sum costs procedure. The starting point is clause 17 of the Central Practice Note: the determination of the quantum of costs for a successful party “should not be delayed”. To this end, the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) emphasises that the process “should be as inexpensive and efficient as possible” (cl 3.1), should “avoid, where possible, the making of costs orders that lead to potentially expensive and lengthy taxation of costs” (cl 3.3) and respectively:

4.11     The Costs Summary must be clear, concise and direct and not resemble a bill of costs in taxable form, nor should it contain submissions on the law. The intention of the lump-sum costs procedure is to streamline and expedite the determination or resolution of the quantum of costs question and not to replicate the taxation process.

4.13     Any Costs Response must be clear, concise and direct and briefly summarise the categories of any disputes arising in respect of the Costs Summary. The summary should not resemble formal costs objections (as prepared for a taxation of costs) nor contain submissions on the law. The Costs Response should make clear which of the costs issues arising from the Costs Summary are in dispute and which are not, and should not exceed 4 pages in length (omitting formal parts) or, in large or complex cases, no more than 8 pages.

29    Mr Cohen’s affidavit, with respect to him, is the antithesis of these requirements.

30    As long ago as 2006, when dealing with an application under the former rules for a gross sum costs order, Conti J explained in Anastasia Ualesi and Peti J Ualesi t/as Australian Empire Imports v Expeditors International Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 26, the correct approach to the making of such orders at [14]:

My attention was drawn by counsel for the respondent to Order 62 Rule 4(2)(c), and to the observations of von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1995) 57 FCR 119 concerning the evident purpose of the Court’s power to make costs orders of the kind here presently sought by the respondent, that being to avoid an ongoing counter productive dispute, in the interests of achieving finality, subject always to the need to ensure that unreasonable amounts of costs are not pursued and awarded. I have not approached the task of assessment akin to that of a detailed ‘taxation’, which cannot sensibly be the judicial task set by the Court Rules, but rather from the perspective of an overview of the nature and extent of the relating broad issues which fell upon me for resolution, being misconceived issues nevertheless of some complexity, raised unsuccessfully by the applicants for resolution at the final hearing of the proceedings.

31    In Chen v Monash University (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 93, Barker, Downes and Markovic JJ, approved of what Conti J had said in a lump-sum determination under the present rules, adding at [13] that the purpose of the procedure “is to save the parties the time, trouble, delay, expense and aggravation in having a taxation proceed in a matter”. And at [16] observed that in seeking to avoid an ongoing counter-productive dispute as to costs that there must be balanced “the interests of achieving finality and subject always to the need to ensure that unreasonable amounts of costs are not pursued and awarded”.

32    The procedure aligns with the overarching purpose at ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), particularly the requirement of all parties to achieve the objective of the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court, the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner and the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

33    Conformably with those objectives and the purpose of the lump-sum costs procedure, the process of ascertaining and then determining an appropriate amount is one of estimation, not precise arithmetic: Nine Films and Television Pty Ltd v Ninox Television Ltd [2006] FCA 1046 at [8], Tamberlin J.

34    Mr Psaltis pressed the application despite these matters. He relies primarily on two matters. One is the Full Court decision in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 146; (2017) 253 FCR 403 at [18] where Allsop CJ, Besanko and Middleton JJ emphasised that:

[I]n making a lump sum award of costs, the Court in undertaking the task of assessing costs is not precluded from undertaking a close inquiry of costs relating to a particular issue or category of costs, should the Court consider it appropriate to do so: see e.g. Hudson v Sigalla (No 2) [2017] FCA 339 at [30] (Sigalla). The Court is able to adopt its own procedures in inquiring into costs, is able to be flexible in how it conducts that inquiry, including by the obtaining of suitable assistance whether by referee’s report or other reporting, and is able to acquire the level of detail needed to make a determination that is fair, logical and reasonable.

35    That passage begs the question in this case: why should a step be taken, such as the appointment of a registrar as a referee, when the parties agreed to a consent order that did not provide for a more detailed assessment beyond the mechanism set out in the Costs Practice Note? And why should the respondents be able to insist on that process, or some form of detailed interrogation by reference to Mr Cohen’s affidavit, when they have engaged an expert who has provided a report?

36    Relatedly, where does this evidence go? Mr Psaltis submits that Mr Cohen has identified in aggregate approximately $127,000 in professional fees as referable to proceeding QUD 93 of 2022. Mr Basson for the applicants draws attention to the first affidavit of Mr Maskell at [33] where there is set out a division of the professional fees as between the two proceedings. For proceeding QUD 93 of 2022, the GST exclusive amount is $314,956.50, which is then discounted by 40% to derive the claimed amount of $188,973.90. Further, at [35] various estimates are provided for work undertaken across several categories, including work performed in proceeding QUD 93 of 2022, where the estimate is between 10 and 15%. Thus, as I put to Mr Psaltis during submissions, if I were to accept the thrust of the point that is made, and adopting a broadbrush approach results in the further reduction of the total fees of 10% would achieve a reduction in professional fees of approximately $170,000, which is more than the discrepancy identified by Mr Cohen. It is unnecessary to rely on Mr Cohen’s evidence to approach the matter in that way. Submissions can be made based on the Court’s knowledge of the procedural history, when viewed through the lens of the 10 to 15% apportionment of Mr Maskell.

37    Another reason not to descend into the minutiae of the detail in Mr Cohen’s affidavit is that there is no claim for the general, care, skill and consideration uplift that may be allowed as a discretionary percentage pursuant to item 11 of Schedule 3 of the Rules, nor any claim for the additional professional fees inevitably incurred since 23 February 2026, in dealing with the costs determination and where the quantum was materially increased by the late filing of two affidavits by the respondents.

38    For these reasons, a grant of leave to rely on the affidavit of Mr Cohen will inevitably take this assessment on a pathway that is contrary to the purpose and objectives of the lump-sum procedure and the overarching purpose at this stage of this long-running litigation.

39    What then is an appropriate determination? Dealing first with professional fees, I am satisfied that the rates charged are within an acceptable range on a party and party basis, based on the evidence of Mr Maskell. I do not doubt his evidence that the work performed was reasonably necessary to conduct the proceeding and I find according to his evidence on that issue. It follows that I am satisfied that on a solicitor and client basis total professional fees are approximately $1.9 million (GST exclusive). That figure is conservative in that it does not take into account solicitor’s fees since 23 February 2026, nor does it reflect work undertaken in what, has turned out to be, a more protracted lump-sum assessment process than was anticipated.

40    I accept that a broad discount of 40% on the solicitor and client professional fees is appropriate to deduce an amount for party and party professional fees. Hence, I allow with rounding to $1,170,000. To that I apply a further discount of 10% to reflect unidentified work performed on proceeding QUD 93 of 2022 prior to the order made by Derrington J on 30 November 2023.Thereafter, no further discount is appropriate because the applicant’s solicitors were then required to be intimately concerned with the progress of this proceeding in conjunction with QUD 93 of 2022 where there was significant factual overlap. Thus, I allow $1,053,000, rounding down. This discount, on a broad-brush approach, accounts for the minutiae of the objections pressed by Mr Psaltis in his submissions put this afternoon. They include, but are not limited to, unidentified work undertaken for proceeding QUD93/2022, the Court of Appeal taxation orders, and the use of partners and special counsel to undertake work that might have been more cheaply undertaken by briefing junior counsel.

41    As to counsel’s fees, I accept as appropriate the adjustments in the supplementary affidavit of Mr Maskell. I allow the amounts as claimed, which totals $483,000 rounded down. I do not consider it appropriate to apply any further overall reduction in the order of 10% to counsel’s fees nor any of the other deductions proposed by Ms Drew, because I am satisfied that this was a complex matter and that, viewed overall, the total claim for counsel’s fees is proportionate. After all, each proceeding was bedevilled by much interlocutory skirmishing and case management. My view also reflects the fact that considerable work, which would ordinarily be undertaken by counsel, was for a time performed in-house by the applicant’s solicitors.

42    I accept the disbursements of $51,994. As explained, I do not accept the deduction proposed by Ms Drew for the fees of the town planner.

43    Thus, the amounts that I determine are:

(1)    Professional fees – $1,053,000;

(2)    Counsel’s fees-$483,000

(3)    Disbursements- $51,994.

44    That totals $1,587,994 (GST exclusive).

45    I order that pursuant to s 43(3)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the costs payable by Golden Eagle Property Group Pty Ltd, David Alexander John Whiteman and Marc Andrew Clancy (together the costs respondents) to GGPG Pty Ltd (Receiver & Manager Appointed) (In Liquidation) and Park Ridge 180 Pty Ltd (Receiver & Manager Appointed) (the costs applicants) pursuant to order 10 of the orders made on 9 February 2026 are fixed in the lump-sum of $1,587,994 (exclusive of GST) (lump-sum).

46    I further order that the costs respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the lump-sum and that there be no order as to the costs of and incidental to the lump-sum costs hearing on 16 March 2026.

Associate:

Dated:    19 March 2026

Schedule