Federal Court of Australia

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 295

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.    The appeal be dismissed.

3.    The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the lump sum of $5,000.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROFE J:

1.    Introduction

1    The appellant seeks to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) made on 1 February 2024 in Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 58 (Primary Judgment or PJ).

2    By that decision, the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal), in which the Tribunal had confirmed its earlier decision to dismiss an application for review pursuant to s 362B(1A)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3    For the reasons that follow, I consider that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

2.    Background

4    The primary judge sets out the factual background to the proceedings from PJ [6]–[31], which I adopt here.

5    The following facts provide context to the appeal. The appellant is a national of India. On 17 May 2016, he applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (Subclass 820) Visa based on his relationship with his Australian citizen spouse (the Sponsor).

6    On 9 January 2018, the Department of Home Affairs was notified that the Sponsor wished to withdraw her sponsorship for the Visa.

7    On 21 June 2018, a delegate of the Minister invited the appellant to comment on information that his spousal relationship had ceased. The appellant responded by letter dated 11 July 2018, outlining his relationship status and providing supporting material.

8    On 15 August 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused the Visa application, finding that the appellant was no longer the spouse of a person who satisfied cl 820.211(2)(a)(i) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), as required by cl 820.221(1)(a), and that he did not otherwise meet the criteria for the grant of the Visa.

9    On 1 September 2018, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision.

10    On 3 December 2018, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant pursuant to s 359A of the Migration Act, inviting him to comment on information suggesting that his relationship with the sponsor had ceased.

11    On 17 December 2018, the appellant responded by letter dated 16 December 2018, claiming he was the victim of domestic abuse and attaching two medical certificates supplied by Dr Mahrouf Muhammed of Plaza Medical Centre. The first of the two certificates, dated 20 June 2018, disclosed that the appellant was “receiving medical treatment for stress and anxiety” for the period from 20 to 24 June 2018 and would therefore be “unfit to continue his usual occupation”. The second certificate, dated 18 September 2018, stated that the appellant was “receiving medical treatment for stress due to current personal marital affairs” for the period from 11 to 16 September 2018 and, again, would therefore be “unfit to continue his usual occupation”.

12    On 11 February 2019, the Tribunal invited the appellant to attend a hearing listed for 7 March 2019 at its Melbourne registry. On 5 March 2019, the appellant informed the Tribunal that he was “currently suffering from severe stress and depression”, he could not attend or give evidence due to his situation and that he was “[…] not mentally ready to attend the AAT hearing […]”. He further provided a medical certificate from Dr Muhammed which stated the following:

Medical Certificate

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

Mr Karanveer Singh 6/8/1993

Feels very stressed & feels depressed due to his Father in Law not allowing him to contact his wife. His Father in Law has told him that his daughter has divorced him, but he has not got any documents related to that. When he contacted Victorian registry of birth, marriage and death registry to find out it is true he was told that there is no record of it. When he requested a copy of divorce certificate from his Father in Law he has told him that he had put all documents in rubbish.

Due to this scenario Mr Karanveer Singh is going through a lot of mental stress and anxiety and is not able to present himself on any sort of forum.

This Certificate was completed on 4/3/2019

[…]

(the March Certificate).

13    The Tribunal requested that he provide, by 6 March 2019, a suitable timeframe for rescheduling. The appellant did not do so, and, on 6 March 2019, the Tribunal declined to postpone the hearing. On 7 March 2019, the appellant failed to attend the scheduled hearing. The Tribunal dismissed the application under s 362B(1)(a)(b) of the Migration Act (the Dismissal Decision). The appellant was notified of that decision, with reasons, on 8 March 2019.

14    On 20 March 2019, the appellant sought reinstatement of the application on the basis of mental health concerns and requested a delay of six to eight months. Supporting medical documents were provided to the Tribunal by the appellant on 28 March 2019.

15    On 29 March 2019, the Tribunal confirmed the dismissal of the application (the Confirmation Decision).

2.1    The Dismissal Decision

16    In its Dismissal Decision, the Tribunal recorded that:

(a)    on 11 February 2019, the appellant was invited to attend a hearing on 7 March 2019. The invitation stated that if he failed to attend, the Tribunal may dismiss the application for review without further consideration of the application or the information before it;

(b)    on 5 March 2019, the appellant requested an adjournment of the hearing; and

(c)    later that day, the Tribunal spoke to the appellant by telephone and requested that he provide, by the following day, a suitable alternative hearing date and further information in support of the postponement request. The appellant did not provide any further information.

17    The Tribunal considered the March Certificate provided in support of the adjournment request but found it insufficient to justify postponing the hearing. It noted that the certificate did not clearly state the period during which the appellant was unable to attend a hearing and may have referred only to the date it was issued, being 4 March 2019. It also observed that the appellant’s condition was described only in general terms, including that he “feels very stressed [and] […] feels depressed” and was “going through a lot of mental stress and anxiety”, making it unclear whether any accommodation could have been made.

18    The Dismissal Decision further recorded that on 6 March 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant confirming that it had received the adjournment request but had decided not to postpone the hearing.

19    The Tribunal noted that the appellant did not attend the hearing at the scheduled time and place. The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant had been properly invited to attend the hearing in accordance with s 379A(5) of the Migration Act, that the invitation had not been returned to sender, and that no satisfactory explanation had been provided for his non-appearance. In those circumstances, the Tribunal dismissed the application for review without further consideration of the application or the information before it.

2.2    The Confirmation Decision

20    Moreover, in the Confirmation Decision, the Tribunal recorded the following:

(a)    on 7 March 2019, it dismissed the application for review under s 362B(1A)(b) of the Migration Act due to the appellant’s failure to attend the scheduled hearing, and notified the appellant of the decision and provided with written reasons in accordance with s 362C(5);

(b)    by email dated 20 March 2019, the appellant sought to reinstate the matter;

(c)    on 21 March 2019, the Tribunal requested further evidence in support of that request; and

(d)    it subsequently had regard to the material provided on 28 March 2019, together with the medical certificates previously submitted.

21    The Tribunal was not satisfied that reinstatement was warranted. It found that the evidence did not support the appellant’s claim that his mental health had caused him to “lose focus on important tasks”, resulting in his non-attendance at the hearing.

22    In particular, the Tribunal observed that there was no detailed medical or psychological evidence demonstrating that a postponement of six to eight months was required. The tax invoices provided did not disclose the reasons for the appellant’s attendance on his medical practitioner or psychologist, and the medical certificates contained only limited detail. The Tribunal also expressed concern regarding a medical certificate dated 11 September 2018, which referred to stress arising from “current personal marital affairs” (emphasis added), notwithstanding evidence that the relationship had ended months earlier, causing it to question the accuracy of the history provided. More specifically, it stated that “[t]his cause[d] the Tribunal to query whether the [appellant] was completely truthful when his [sic] giving his explanation to the medical practitioner”.

23    The Tribunal further noted that aspects of the appellant’s evidence suggested that he remained capable of attending to important matters. In particular, following the Tribunal’s request of 21 March 2019, the appellant attended medical appointments on 22 and 26 March 2019 and arranged for supporting material to be provided by the deadline of 28 March 2019.

24    In those circumstances, the Tribunal confirmed the Dismissal Decision.

2.3    The Primary Judgment

25    Before the primary judge, the appellant advanced two particularised grounds of review, through which he maintained that the Tribunal denied him procedural fairness and that the Confirmation Decision was affected by unreasonableness.

26    The primary judge was satisfied that the Tribunal invited the appellant to appear before it pursuant to s 360 of the Migration Act, and that the hearing invitation complied with the requirements of s 360A: PJ [43]. Her Honour considered the invitation made clear that, in the absence of an adjournment, the hearing would proceed, and that a failure to attend may result in the application being dismissed without further consideration: PJ [44]. In those circumstances, her Honour found that the Tribunal’s power under s 362B(1A)(b) was enlivened, and it validly exercised that power: PJ [45]. The Tribunal also complied with its obligations under ss 362B and 362C in providing written reasons for its decision: PJ [46].

27    The primary judge further found that the Tribunal’s confirmation decision was reasonable and open in the circumstances, including its conclusion that the appellant’s mental health did not prevent him from attending the hearing: PJ [54]. To the extent that the appellant contended that the Tribunal failed to put him on notice of its concerns regarding his medical evidence, her Honour held that this contention could not succeed: PJ [55]. Her Honour was satisfied that the Tribunal had communicated its concerns in its reasons for the Dismissal Decision, which were provided to the appellant prior to the Confirmation Decision. As such, her Honour held that the Tribunal was entitled to dismiss the application under s 362B(1A)(b) without further consideration of the material before it.

3.    Grounds of appeal

28    By an amended notice of appeal dated 17 February 2026, the appellant sought to challenge the Primary Judgment on the following two grounds of appeal:

1.    The primary judge erred in finding that the decision made on 29 March 2019 (Confirmation Decision) by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) to confirm the decision to dismiss the Review Application made by the Appellant on 7 March 2019 (Dismissal Decision) was not affected by jurisdictional error (TJ [48] – [57]):

(a)    The Confirmation Decision was not open nor reasonable and was affected by illogicality in the following circumstances:

(i)    The Appellant provided the Tribunal with the medical evidence requested;

(ii)    The medical evidence provided by the Appellant confirmed he suffered from an ongoing mental health condition that was being treated with medication;

(iii)    the Tribunal unreasonably construed the meaning of “current personal marital affairs”; and

(ix)     the Tribunal unreasonably found that the Appellant’s compliance with deadlines for providing this material set by the Tribunal undermined the legitimacy of his claim to be affected by his ongoing mental health condition; and

(b)    the Tribunal took an irrelevant matter into account in making the Confirmation Decision, namely whether the Appellant “was completely truthful when giving his explanation to the medical practitioner”.

2.    The primary judge erred in finding that Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations in making the Confirmation Decision where the Tribunal made an adverse finding about the Appellant’s credit, namely whether the Appellant “was completely truthful when giving his explanation to the medical practitioner” without seeking comment from the Appellant or providing him a chance to respond.

29    The appellant abandoned ground 2 at the outset of the hearing on 17 March 2026. Accordingly, only ground 1 and its constituent limbs are being pressed.

3.1    Ground 1(a)

30    By the first limb of ground 1, the appellant alleges that the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal’s Confirmation Decision was not unreasonable and therefore not affected by jurisdictional error. At PJ [52], her Honour held that the decision was open to the Tribunal and a reasoned one in the circumstances, citing Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [16] (per Kiefel CJ).

31    Section 362B of the Migration Act confers a discretion on the Tribunal to dismiss an application for non-appearance and, upon application, to reinstate it if it considers it “appropriate” to do so. In exercising that discretion, the Tribunal must act rationally and reasonably, and not arbitrarily or disproportionately: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [65], [72]–[74] (per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). The question is whether the decision was one that a rational decision-maker could make: Li at [28] (per French CJ).

32    In Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 459, Colvin J (with whom Kenny and Bromberg JJ agreed) elucidated at [30] that “[…] the use of the word “appropriate” requires the Tribunal to make an assessment of all of the matters that are advanced to support reinstatement”. Relevantly, his Honour also held at [28] that “[e]ven so, it is for the applicant to advance the application for reinstatement and any material relied upon”.

33    The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s assessment of the medical evidence and its findings as to the appellant’s mental health and marital circumstances were illogical and unreasonable. In support of his reinstatement application, the appellant provided:

(a)    four tax invoices dated 10 December 2018, 7 February 2019, 22 March 2019 and 26 March 2019 for appointments with Dr Muhammed;

(b)    two non-repeat prescriptions for Cymbalta EC Capsule 30mg and Zopiclone Tablet 7.5mg; and

(c)    a tax invoice dated 26 March 2019 for an appointment with Ms Chantal Santacaterina, a psychologist.

34    Notably, no explanation was provided for the indication of the prescribed mediation, nor was any clinical or psychological report produced.

35    The Tribunal found that the evidence “did not support this claim”, reasoning that some documents (such as the tax invoices) did not specify the reasons for attendance. The Tribunal nonetheless accepted earlier medical certificates and had regard to them in its decision. The appellant submits that the Tribunal’s conclusion was illogical and unreasonable as, in his view, the evidence clearly related to the treatment for stress and depression and was not unparticularised assertions of “unfitness”.

36    The Tribunal further held that a medical certificate dated 11 September 2018, noting treatment for stress due to “current personal marital affairs”, was inconsistent because the spousal relationship between the appellant and the sponsor had “broken down many months before this date”. The appellant submits that this finding was irrational. In the appellant’s view, the evidence before the Tribunal, including prior correspondence and financial matters, demonstrated ongoing discussions regarding the marriage, meaning the marital relationship remained a current source of stress. Therefore, the appellant contends that the Tribunal acted unreasonably by narrowly construing the meaning of “current” and failing to properly consider the material provided prior to 11 September 2018.

37    Moreover, the appellant takes issue with the adverse inferences drawn by the Tribunal from the appellant complying with deadlines for filing evidence. The appellant submits this was inherently illogical, as compliance with procedural requirements cannot undermine the validity of medical evidence.

38    The Minister submits that no error is disclosed. The Tribunal considered all material before it, identified deficiencies and inconsistencies in the evidence, and reached a conclusion that was open to it. The evidence was general in nature and did not substantiate the appellant’s claim that his mental health prevented his attendance. The Tribunal also afforded procedural fairness by inviting further corroborating evidence. In assessing the corroborating material, the Tribunal identified several shortcomings. It observed that there was no detailed medical or psychological evidence to substantiate the appellant’s mental health claims or to justify a lengthy adjournment. Much of the material comprised tax invoices, which did not disclose the purpose of the consultations with Dr Muhammed or Ms Santacaterina. The medical certificates provided only limited detail. Of particular concern was the certificate dated 11 September 2018, which referred to stress arising from “current personal marital affairs”, notwithstanding other evidence before the Tribunal that the relationship had ended in January 2018. This discrepancy led the Tribunal to question the reliability of the appellant’s account to his medical practitioner. Despite these deficiencies, the Tribunal afforded the appellant an opportunity to reschedule the hearing by inviting him to nominate suitable dates. The appellant did not do so and provided no satisfactory explanation for that failure.

39    Further, it was open to the Tribunal to consider the appellant’s ability to comply with procedural requirements in assessing whether reinstatement was appropriate. Its task was not to determine the existence of a medical condition, but whether reinstatement was justified in all the circumstances.

40    Whilst reasonable minds may differ, the Tribunal’s reasoning does not rise to the level of illogicality or irrationality required to establish jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 at [52], [54]–[56] (per Wigney J).

41    Accordingly, no error is established under this limb.

3.2    Ground 1(b)

42    In the Confirmation Decision, and as noted at [22] above, the Tribunal made the comment that, due to their finding that the marital issues reported by the appellant to his doctor were not “current” that “[t]his causes the Tribunal to query whether the [appellant] was completely truthful when his giving his explanation to the medical practitioner”. The appellant submits that this comment:

(a)    reveals irrationality as it relates to an irrelevant consideration in respect of reinstatement, namely his credit; and

(b)    amounts to a failure to provide an opportunity to respond or comment and therefore constitutes procedural unfairness.

43    The appellant contends that the primary judge failed to identify jurisdictional error arising from the Tribunal’s alleged consideration of an irrelevant matter. It is said that, by placing undue emphasis on the word “current”, the Tribunal implied that the appellant may not have been truthful in reporting his circumstances to his medical practitioner, thereby introducing an impermissible credit issue.

44    The appellant submits that, in the context of a reinstatement application under s 362B(1C), the relevant inquiry was the existence of stress rather than its cause. By focusing on the status of the spousal relationship, the Tribunal is said to have exceeded the permissible scope of its task. Reliance is placed on Singh, where it was observed that determining what is “appropriate” requires a balanced assessment of all relevant considerations so as to reach an outcome that is fit and proper. Relevantly, Colvin J observed the following at [29]:

When s 362B(1C) says that on an application for reinstatement the Tribunal must, if it considers it appropriate to do so reinstate the application, it imposes a statutory responsibility on the Tribunal to form an opinion or make an assessment as to whether reinstatement is “appropriate” having regard to all of the circumstances advanced to support reinstatement. In such a context, the word “appropriate” connotes two aspects: fitness and propriety. That is, in order to be “appropriate”, something must be both suited to the particular circumstances as well as sensible, right and proper. In Mitchell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 333 at 346, it was said by Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ that:

The phrase “considers … appropriate” indicates the striking of a balance between relevant considerations so as to provide the outcome which is fit and proper.

45    The Minister submits that the impugned statement does not constitute a finding as to credit but rather reflects the Tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence as a whole, including material indicating that the relationship had ceased in January 2018. The Tribunal was not required to accept the appellant’s claims uncritically: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 (per Beaumont J).

46    On the evidence, the Tribunal undertook a reasoned assessment of the appellant’s explanation for non-attendance and did not take into account any irrelevant consideration. Its conclusions were within the bounds of decisional freedom and open to a reasonable decision-maker. The primary judge did not err in finding that no jurisdictional error was established, and accordingly the second limb of ground 1 also fails.

4.    Costs

47    The Minister seeks an order that, in the event the appeal is dismissed, costs be fixed in the amount of $5,000 and payable by the appellant.

48    The Court has a broad discretion as to costs, including the power to fix an amount where appropriate: BAX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 181 at [29]–[30] (per Griffiths J). The amount sought is below that recoverable under a Short Form Bill for an appeal of this kind (as set out at item 15 in Schedule 3 to the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)) and is reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity of the proceeding: Bitek Pty Ltd v iConnect Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 506 at [18] (per Kenny J).

49    There is no reason to depart from the usual position that costs follow the event. I am satisfied the amount sought is appropriate and will order that costs be fixed in the sum of $5,000.

5.    Disposition

50    After considering the materials and submissions before the Court, I consider that no error is disclosed in the Primary Judgement. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    18 March 2026