Federal Court of Australia

TVGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 282

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceeding be dismissed.

2.    The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

1    The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.

2    The Amended Originating Application relies on five grounds. I have concluded that none of the grounds are established and that the application should be dismissed.

3    I will summarise the complex history of the applicant’s visa cancellations and refusals and the Tribunal’s decision before turning to consider the grounds of review.

Background

4    The applicant is a national of Iran. He arrived in Australia in 2003 at the age of 17 as the holder of a Child visa. I understand the applicant’s subsequent visa status to be as follows.

5    Between 2009 and 2022, the applicant was convicted of a number of criminal offences. His Child visa was cancelled in January 2021 under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). On 5 December 2023, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) decided to revoke the cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Act.

6    In June 2024, the Minister decided to cancel the Child visa, apparently under either s 501(1) or s 501BA of the Act.

7    In September 2024, the applicant made his application for a Protection visa. That application was initially unsuccessful. However, in November 2024, the AAT set aside the decision under review and found that the applicant met the requirements of s 36(2)(a) of the Act and remitted the application for further consideration. That is, the AAT was satisfied that Australia has protection obligations because the applicant is a refugee.

8    In January 2025, a delegate of the Minister determined that the applicant met s 36A(1)(a) and 36(1C) of the Act. It was expressly determined that the applicant was not a danger to Australian security.

9    In February 2025, the applicant was given a Notice of Intention to Consider Refusal of his Visa under s 501(1) of the Act. In April 2025, the Minister’s delegate decided to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

10    On 30 June 2025, the Tribunal decided to affirm the refusal decision. That is the decision under review.

11    It should be explained that the effect of s 197C(3) of the Act is that s 198 does not require or authorise an officer to remove an unlawful non-citizen to a country if a “protection finding” was made for the non-citizen with respect to the country. Even if the applicant’s application for a Protection visa is ultimately unsuccessful, he cannot be removed to Iran except at his request: see ASF17 v Commonwealth of Australia (2024) 418 ALR 382; [2024] HCA 19 at [36]. However, in the wake of NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 280 CLR 137, a category of Bridging Visa, known as Bridging Visa R (BVR) had been introduced to facilitate non-citizens’ release from immigration detention where their removal from Australia is not practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future. The applicant holds a BVR and will be subject to its conditions while he remains in Australia. Accordingly, the benefit for the applicant in obtaining a Protection visa would be that he would not be subject to the BVR.

The Tribunal’s reasons

12    The Tribunal noted that it was required to comply with Direction No. 110: Visa refusal and Cancellation under s. 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s. 501CA (Direction 110). The Tribunal found, and it is uncontroversial in the proceeding, that the applicant does not pass the character test as he had a substantial criminal record within s 501(7)(c) of the Act.

13    The Tribunal then proceeded to consider the exercise of its discretion by reference to the considerations specified under Direction 110.

14    The Tribunal observed that the applicant conceded that his offending was “very serious”. He submitted that his last offending had occurred nine years previously and that he had shown remorse and a genuine commitment to change.

15    The applicant relied on the strength, nature and duration of his ties in Australia, including the presence of his immediate family, who were supportive of him. The applicant stated that he had spent the majority of his life in Australia. He referred to his close relationship with his niece, who is a child.

16    The applicant referred to the unfairness and hardships of the BVR regime and submitted that the issue was whether he could remain in Australia permanently or only with the uncertainty of a BVR which would preclude him from forming family and other ties and thereby impose hardship.

17    The applicant referred to his ongoing need for medical treatment and support networks in Australia and the absence of such networks in any other country. He claimed he had properly engaged in mental health treatment and had done so voluntarily.

18    The Tribunal reached the following conclusions:

128.    The Tribunal has found that the Applicant’s offending had been very serious. It spanned over a lengthy period exceeding ten years and may be said to have been escalating in seriousness. The Applicant had committed violent offences against the vulnerable members of the community including the elderly and children. Importantly, while the Tribunal accepts that the risk of reoffending is now low, having regard to the Applicant’s present circumstances and in particular the degree of rehabilitation, protective factors and his personal circumstances, the Tribunal has decided that this is the case where the harm that may be caused by reoffending is such that any risk of reoffending is unacceptable. The Tribunal gives very strong weight to the protection of the community as a factor in favour of exercising the discretion to refuse the visa grant.

129.    The Applicant has committed family violence offending and that also weighs against visa grant. The Tribunal considers that the expectations of the community weigh very strongly against the visa grant.

130.    The Tribunal accepts that the best interests of a child weigh in favour of the visa grant but has decided to give this factor limited weight in circumstances where the Applicant does not have, and has never had a parental relationship in relation with the child. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant has strong ties to Australia and that the extent, nature and duration of his ties weighs heavily in favour of visa grant. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant’s family members may be adversely affected if the Applicant remains on the BVR and that also weighs in favour of the visa grant. The Tribunal accepts that the legal consequences may cause considerable hardship to the Applicant and others if he is not granted the substantive visa, particularly due to the restrictive BVR conditions and the uncertainty about the future, the limitations on his contact with family members, on employment and religious activities. These factors weigh heavily in favour of visa grant.

131.    The Tribunal finds that considerations such as business interests are neutral.

132.    In the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal has decided to give greatest weight to the primary considerations of the protection of the community and the expectation of the community. The Tribunal acknowledges the wording of Paragraph 7(2) of Direction 110 that the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. The Tribunal has formed the view that there could be serious harm to the community if the Applicant were to engage in similar offending in the future and any possibility of such harm, no matter how low, is unacceptable. The Tribunal has formed the view that the expectations of the community do not support the visa grant.

133.    Having regard to all the circumstances, the Tribunal has decided that the discretion to refuse to grant the visa should be exercised.

Consideration

Ground 1

19    The applicant’s first ground asserts that:

1.    The decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error because it constructively failed to address the case that was put to it, misunderstood parts of it, and or there was no evidence for some of its findings because (Tribunal, [22]-[26] including heading):

a.    there was no offending in 2022;

…

c.    the Tribunal confused the Applicant’s submissions as to particular drug use and serious offences and behaviour;

d.    these errors had consequential effects on the facts and how the Tribunal considered the matter, including the time frames involved; and

e.    these error(s) were material.

20    The applicant submits that the Tribunal was required to deal with the case that was put to it and not another case, citing Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389; [2003] HCA 26 at [24]-[25], [27], [32]-[33] and [95]. He submits that the Tribunal’s reasons disclose that it misunderstood relevant facts or material or misunderstood the case being made, referring to Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582; [2022] HCA 17 at [27].

21    The ground asserts that the Tribunal’s findings demonstrate a misunderstanding of the facts or the case that was put to the Tribunal in two respects. First, it is contended that the Tribunal found that the applicant had committed criminal offences in 2022 whereas his last offence had in fact been committed in 2016.

22    The Tribunal’s reasons commenced by considering paragraph 8.1 of Direction 110 which requires decision-makers to give consideration to (a) the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date; and (b) the risk to the Australian community, should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.

23    The Tribunal stated that it had regard to the circumstances of the applicant’s offending as set out in the sentencing remarks, police fact sheets and other materials. The Tribunal continued:

2022 offending

22.    The Tribunal has considered the sentencing remarks of Judge Yehia made on 25 May 2022 in relation to the robbery while armed. Her Honour described the circumstances of the offending, as set out in the statement of agreed facts, as follows. The Applicant’s co-accused had been consuming drugs and were discussing how to get money to buy more drugs. They decided to commit a break and enter at what was thought to be a drug dealer’s house. They switched off the electricity at the house where the victim lived with her mother and daughters. The victim was woken up and saw three intruders in her house, one holding a firearm. One of the intruders with the firearm directed her to lie on the floor and demanded money. Two of the victim’s daughters were also present. The intruder pointed the firearm at the victim’s mother and demanded money, then struck her in the face with the butt of the firearm, causing a wound to the forehead and eyebrow and then struck her body. The intruder later pointed the firearm at the head of the child asking for money and the phone. The intruders later left the house with some money, phones and credit card. The victim later found a balaclava in her house and a DNA profile was obtained matching that of the Applicant.

…

2015-16 offending

27.    The Tribunal has had regard to the sentencing remarks of Judge English made in December 2018 in relation to the armed robbery offending. His Honour sets out the agreed facts as follows. In October 2016 the victim, who was 77 years old at the time, was at home on her own and saw the offender in her lounge room carrying a knife with an approximately 30 cm blade. The victim tried to get out of the house but the way was blocked by the offender. As the victim fell down, the offender grabbed her and pulled her towards him and placed the knife against the victim’s throat and demanded her car keys before walking to the garage. The victim ran away and called for help while the offender drove her car out of the garage. DNA swabs were taken from the victim and the car surfaces.

…

24    It is common ground that the offending for which Judge Yehia was sentencing the applicant occurred on 17 October 2016. The applicant submits that the heading “2022 offending” indicates that the Tribunal misunderstood the material as indicating that the applicant’s offending occurred in 2022. The applicant also submits that the Tribunal’s error is illustrated by the fact that under the heading “2015-16 offending”, the Tribunal referred to offences that had occurred in 2015 or 2016.

25    It may be accepted that the use of the heading “2022 offending” tends to suggest that the applicant’s offending for which he was sentenced on 25 May 2022 occurred in 2022. That is particularly so when regard is had to the material under the next heading “2015-16 offending” which deals with offending that actually occurred in 2015 or 2016.

26    However, when the reasons are considered as a whole, it becomes apparent that the Tribunal was aware that the offences for which the applicant was sentenced on 25 May 2022 had in fact been committed much earlier. The Tribunal had earlier noted (at [17]) that the applicant stated, “his last offending occurred nine years ago”. Accordingly, the Tribunal was aware that the offending for which the applicant was convicted on 25 May 2022 had in fact taken place in 2016. That indicates that the Tribunal used the heading “2022 offending” to refer to offending for which the applicant had been convicted and sentenced in 2022, not that he had committed the offences in 2022.

27    This view is reinforced by the Tribunal’s detailed consideration of Judge Yehia’s sentencing remarks of 25 May 2022. Early in those remarks, the judge made it clear that the offending occurred on 17 October 2016. It is most unlikely that the Tribunal member could have mistakenly thought that the offending occurred in 2022.

28    It can be accepted that my understanding of the Tribunal’s reasons means there was an inconsistency in the way the Tribunal used the headings “2022 offending” and “2015-16 offending”. Nevertheless, in view of the Tribunal’s express recognition of the submission that the applicant’s last offending was nine years earlier, I am unable to conclude that the appropriate inference is that the Tribunal mistakenly thought that he had committed offences in 2022. The applicant’s argument must be rejected.

29    The second aspect of the applicant’s first ground is the assertion that the Tribunal confused the applicant’s submissions as to particular drug use and serious offences and behaviour.

30    This assertion arises from [52] of the Tribunal’s reasons:

The Applicant included the submission he made in support of his protection visa application in which he outlined the reasons he cannot return to Iran. In his declaration sworn on 8 November 2023 the Applicant refers to his anxiety and trauma and abuse he had suffered in Iran. The Applicant states that he started using drugs in his 20s and becoming ‘hooked’ on ICE after 2013 and starting heroin in 2016. The Applicant states that drug use was his way to cope and he states that his addiction to heroin led him to commit the serious offences and alter his behaviour. (The Tribunal is mindful that the Applicant had been convicted of some offences prior to 2016 when he claims he started using Ice so that the Tribunal is not satisfied the offending can be attributable to Ice addiction.) The Applicant states that he is ashamed of his behaviour and is sorry to his victims. He states that he should not have taken drugs. (In his communication of 10 July 2023 the Applicant also refers to his regret and remorse and the rehabilitative course he has engaged in).

31    The applicant asserts that in the sentence, “The Tribunal is mindful that the applicant had been convicted of some offences prior to 2016 when he claims he started using Ice so that the Tribunal is not satisfied the offending can be attributable to [that] Ice addiction”, the Tribunal’s reference to “ice” should instead have been “heroin”.

32    In my opinion, any confusion by the Tribunal in its understanding of whether the applicant was addicted to ice or heroin first is immaterial. The applicant’s submission was apparently to the effect that his serious offending could be explained by his use of heroin which started in 2016 and that he was no longer using heroin and was therefore not at risk of re-offending. The point the Tribunal was making was that the applicant had been convicted of some offences prior to 2016 so that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the offending was attributable to the addiction that had commenced in 2016. Whether it was heroin or to ice to which the applicant became addicted in 2016 made no difference to the point the Tribunal was making.

33    The Tribunal went on to consider in detail the applicant’s claim that his last drug use was in 2019 and that he had participated in programs and sought treatment for drug addiction since that time. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had engaged in counselling and rehabilitation programs and that the risk of offending had been greatly reduced. The Tribunal found that the risk of re-offending was low, although it was likely to increase if he were to resume drug use. However, the Tribunal also considered that if the applicant were to re-offend, the harm that would be caused was so serious that any risk that it may be repeated was unacceptable and weighed strongly in favour of exercising the discretion to refuse to grant the visa. This analysis did not depend on whether it was heroin or ice that the applicant had become addicted to in 2016.

34    In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321, the High Court held at [7] that an error will only be jurisdictional if the error was material to the decision that was made, in the sense that there was, “a realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if the error had not occurred”. There was no realistic possibility that the Tribunal’s decision could have been different if the Tribunal had not made a mistake about whether it was heroin or ice to which the applicant had become addicted in 2016.

35    The applicant’s first ground must be rejected.

Ground 2

36    The applicant’s second ground asserts:

2.    In terms of family violence, the Tribunal erred in law in (Tribunal, [71]-[74]):

a.    construing the Ministerial Direction 110 (‘Direction’) as requiring a finding of serious offending; or

b.    failed to give adequate reasons as to why the assault and contravention were serious offending; and

c.    these errors were material.

37    The applicant had been convicted of offences involving family violence. In his Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, the applicant accepted that on 1 May 2016, he had committed acts of family violence against his then girlfriend’s brother and that the, “offending should be regarded as very violent and serious”. He also breached his Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) conditions by returning to his then girlfriend’s home. The applicant received a suspended sentence of seven months imprisonment which was subsequently called up as a result of further offending.

38    Paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110 provides:

(1)    The Government has serious concerns about conferring on non-citizens who engage in family violence the privilege of entering or remaining in Australia. The Government’s concerns in this regard are proportionate to the seriousness of the family violence engaged in by the non-citizen…

39    The Tribunal found that the applicant had committed family violence offences and that this consideration weighed heavily against granting the visa. The Tribunal stated, “This is, and is considered to be, serious offending”.

40    The applicant submits the Tribunal’s finding involves a misconstruction of paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110. The applicant contends that the Tribunal member said, in effect, “whatever I think, it’s considered to be serious offending, whether or not it is”. The applicant also submits that, having regard to the offence that was charged and the penalty that was imposed, the Tribunal must have misconstrued paragraph 8.2 as meaning that any domestic violence is serious offending.

41    The Tribunal’s impugned finding should be construed as having two aspects. The first was that the Tribunal considered that the offending is serious offending. That is hardly surprising in light of the applicant’s admission that at least part of the family violence offending, “should be regarded as very violent and serious”.

42    The second aspect of the finding was that the offending is considered to be serious offending under paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110. Paragraph 8.2 is a little confusing but seems to indicate that (a) the government has serious concerns about conferring on non-citizens who engage in family violence the privilege of entering or remaining in Australia; and (b) the extent of its concerns about that matter rises with the seriousness of the family violence. Paragraph 8.2 seems to require the Tribunal to make its own assessment of the seriousness of the family violence in order to make an assessment of the extent of the government’s concerns.

43    Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the Tribunal made its own assessment that the applicant’s particular family violence offending was serious and also assessed that the government would regard the applicant’s particular family violence offending as serious. The Tribunal’s assessment did not involve any misconstruction of paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110.

44    The Tribunal has at [36] of its reasons described the applicant’s offending against his own father. The offending was described as, “destroy / damage property, common assault and stalk / intimidate”. The applicant, inter alia, accused his father of ruining his business, punched his father’s loungeroom window causing it to smash, pushed his father around the upper chest area and said, “I want to kill you”. The applicant was in contravention of an AVO. Having described the offending, the Tribunal characterised it as “serious”.

45    In Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations v Homewood [2006] FCA 779, French J (as his Honour was then) observed at [40] that the, “Tribunal will have discharged its duty under s 43 if its reasons disclose its findings of fact, the evidence on which they were based and the logical process by which it moved from those findings to the result in the case”. In my opinion, the Tribunal’s description of the circumstances was adequate to explain why the Tribunal regarded the offending as serious. There was no inadequacy of the Tribunal’s reasons.

46    Ground 2 must be rejected.

Ground 4

47    The applicant no longer relies on his third ground. Ground 4 asserts:

4.    In terms of construction of the Direction the Tribunal erred in law and committed a jurisdictional error in (Tribunal, [132]):

a.    construing the Direction as providing that any possibility of harm was unacceptable; or

b.    this error was material; or

c.    failed to undertake the weighing exercise required by it and this was material.

48    The applicant relies on CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138, where the Full Court held at [44]:

The Tribunal must be taken at its word. What it did, on the face of its reasons, is ascribe weight to the various considerations having considered each in isolation and then express a conclusion without demonstrating that it actually weighed the various considerations against each other and undertook a proper evaluation of whether there was indeed “another reason” why the cancellation should be revoked. That amounts to a failure to undertake the statutory task.

49    In this case, the Tribunal stated at [132]:

The Tribunal has formed the view that there could be serious harm to the community if the Applicant were to engage in similar offending in the future and any possibility of such harm, no matter how low, is unacceptable.

50    The applicant submits that:

When one looks at those reasons, the tribunal has misconstrued the direction and not, I suppose, in my submission, ascribing a particular weight to it, but it is clear that the tribunal has said, “Well, the possibility of harm, no matter how low, is unacceptable”.

And in my submission, that is a misconception of the direction. And as CRNL says, well, you’re ultimately required to ascribe weight to these things and then consider them in the mix. And when one looks at those paragraphs that I’ve referenced, it is clear that the Tribunal has misconstrued the direction and then that has led to an error in terms of the weighing task.

51    The Tribunal’s statement at [132] was a summary of its assessment of the considerations under paragraph 8.1 of Direction 110. The Tribunal after conducting an extensive analysis of the relevant facts had concluded at [70]:

Having regard to all the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the risk of reoffending is low in the Applicant’s present circumstances, although it is likely to increase if he were to resume the drug use. However, the Tribunal has also formed the view that there may be significant harm to the community if the Applicant were to reoffend. In the Tribunal’s view, the harm that would be caused if the Applicant were to reoffend is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated is unacceptable. The Tribunal finds that this consideration weighs very strongly in favour of exercising discretion to refuse to grant the visa.

52    The nature of the error or errors alleged by the applicant is not entirely clear from his submissions. However, no misconstruction of paragraph 8.1 is apparent. The Tribunal did not regard itself as bound to conclude that, “the possibility of harm, no matter how low, is unacceptable”. What the Tribunal concluded, after evaluating the nature and extent of the offending, was that the extent of the harm that would be caused if the applicant were to reoffend in a similar way was so serious that even the low risk that it may be repeated was unacceptable. Further, it is apparent that the Tribunal’s conclusion in that regard involved a weighing of the factors it considered relevant against each other. There is no error apparent from the Tribunal’s assessment of the unacceptability of the risk of reoffending and its treatment of that matter.

53    Ground 4 must be rejected.

Ground 5

54    The applicant’s Ground 5 asserts:

5.    The decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal:

a.    failed to correctly apply Ministerial Direction 110, and so failed to comply with s 499(2A) of the Act; and/or

b.    ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial and clearly articulated argument; or

c.    failed to undertake the weighing exercise required by it; and

these were material.

Particulars of a. and b.

a.    The Tribunal was required by s 499(2A) of the Act to comply with Ministerial Direction 110, given by the Minister on 7 June 2024.

b.    Clause 8.1.2(2)(b) of Ministerial Direction 110 required the Tribunal, in considering the risk that the applicant may pose to the Australian community, to take into account “information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen re-offending.”

55    Ground 5 as argued is concerned with [122] of the Tribunal’s reasons:

The Applicant states that the delegate found that he is not a danger to the Australian community and it was determined that he met the requirements of s. 36(1C). The Applicant submits that this finding should be given considerable weight as it reflects a careful assessment by the delegate that he does not represent an ongoing risk to public safety. It is not entirely clear to the present Tribunal why this particular finding of the delegate should be given significant weight while the finding of the delegate that discretion should be exercised to refuse to grant the visa (which is the decision that is the subject of the present review) or the finding of another delegate in September 2023 should be given no weight. Further, as noted above, the Tribunal is of the view that the assessment that the Applicant meets s. 36(1C) is of limited (if any) application here where the Tribunal is tasked with considering a very different issue.

56    The applicant had submitted to the Tribunal that the delegate’s finding that the applicant was not a danger to the Australian community should be given significant weight. In his oral submissions in the application before this Court, the applicant explained that the substance of Ground 5 was that the delegate’s finding that the applicant is not a danger to the Australian community should have been taken into account. The applicant submitted that the finding was not taken into account because the Tribunal found that it was, “of limited (if any) application”, and the Tribunal did not go on to weigh the delegate’s finding in the balance.

57    However, it is plain that at [122] the Tribunal did take into account, or consider, the submission that the delegate’s finding that the applicant was not a danger to the Australian community should be given significant weight in the sense that the Tribunal applied an active intellectual process to the submission: cf Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352 at [45]-[46]. The Tribunal was not required to accept the submission.

58    Ground 5 must be rejected.

Ground 6

59    The applicant’s Ground 6 asserts that:

6.    The Tribunal failed to consider a mandatory consideration(s) or undertake the weighing exercise that was required, these errors were material, and jurisdictional errors.

60    The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider that the applicant was receiving treatment for serious medical or mental health conditions, including that he was on a buprenorphine program, in respect of paragraph 9.2 of the Direction.

61    The Tribunal noted at [110] of its reasons that:

Paragraph 9.2 of the Direction directs a decision-maker to take into account the extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account:

a)    the non-citizen’s age and health;

b)    whether there are any substantial language or cultural barriers; and

c)    any social, medical and/or economic support available to that non-citizen in that country.

(Italics in original.)

62    The Tribunal found at [111]:

The Applicant claims he cannot return to Iran for a number of reasons outlined in his various submissions. As the Applicant is the subject of a protection finding, he may not (and will not) be removed to his home country. That is, irrespective of the present decision, there is no prospect of the Applicant being removed to his home country unless he consents to such removal. The issues relating to the possibility of the Applicant being removed to another country are addressed elsewhere.

63    The respondent had submitted in respect of paragraph 9.2 of Direction 110 that:

As noted above, the applicant is the subject of a protection finding under s 197(3) and there is nothing to suggest that the circumstances in s 197C(3)(c) of the Act apply to the applicant. Consequently, the impediments that the applicant may face if he were returned to Iran will not eventuate as a result of the Tribunal’s decision.

64    The applicant submitted, apparently in response, “We concur with the Respondent’s acknowledgment regarding the extent of impediments the Applicant would face if removed to the Islamic Republic of Iran”. In any event, the Minister’s submission does not appear to have been disputed.

65    The applicant went on to submit that it was neither logical nor reasonable to require someone with significant and ongoing medical conditions, who had been deemed by a delegate not to pose a risk to the safety of the Australian community, to remain on a temporary visa that offered no stability, long-term prospects or certainty. It is this submission that the applicant seems to contend should have been taken into account in respect of paragraph 9.2 of Direction 110. However, the submission appeared to relate to the unfairness of leaving him on a BVR in Australia instead of granting him a Protection visa. The submission did not have any obvious or apparent relevance to paragraph 9.2.

66    Further, the applicant’s submission was taken into account by the Tribunal. Under the heading “Legal consequence of the decision” the Tribunal stated:

107.     The Applicant submits that as a BVR holder, there are substantial restrictions on his daily life and these impair his ability to maintain meaningful family and community connections and create ongoing uncertainty and instability for him and his immediate family. Generally, the Tribunal accepts that the need to comply with visa conditions – some of which are restrictive and particularly so in the Applicant’s circumstances – and the uncertainty about the future, including the prospect of future detention and removal, are matters that may cause significant hardship to the Applicant and his family. The Tribunal also accepts the evidence of Dr O’Rourke that ongoing stay on a BVR may exacerbate the Applicant’s mental health condition.

108.     The Tribunal also accepts that if the Applicant’s visa is refused, he will not have the possibility of seeking other Australian visas in the future.

109.     The Tribunal finds that this consideration weighs in favour of the visa grant and gives it considerable weight.

67    The Tribunal found that, “there is no prospect of the Applicant being removed to his home country unless he consents to such removal”. That assessment was not challenged before the Minister. In those circumstances, any question of impediments the applicant may face if removed from Australia to Iran did not arise.

68    Further, the Tribunal’s finding has not been demonstrated to be wrong in the present application. The Tribunal recognised that the uncertainty for the applicant included the possibility that he may be removed to a country other than Iran and took that possibility into account.

69    Ground 6 must be rejected.

Conclusion

70    The applicant has not established any of his grounds of review.

71    The application must be dismissed with costs.

Associate:    

Dated:    19 March 2026