Federal Court of Australia

Ripple Markets APAC Pte Ltd v EzyRemit Worldwide Pty Ltd (No 2) [2026] FCA 233

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The respondents’ interlocutory application dated 29 January 2026 be dismissed.

2.    Order 3 of the orders made on 8 December 2025 be vacated.

3.    The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings as a lump sum, fixed in the amount of $88,751.00.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore; revised from transcript)

STEWART J:

1    Late last year, the applicant applied ex parte to enforce a foreign arbitral award. On 8 December 2025, I made orders on an ex parte basis enforcing the award pursuant to s 8(3) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth): see Ripple Markets APAC Pte Ltd v EzyRemit Worldwide Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 1551.

2    I ordered that judgment be entered in favour of the applicant against the respondents, jointly and severally, in sums amounting to approximately $1.3 million, and that the matter be returnable on 2 February 2026 and that judgment be stayed until the return day. I also ordered that if the respondents filed an application to set aside the judgment within 28 days of being given notice of the orders, the stay would continue until the final determination of that interlocutory application.

3    The respondents were given notice of the orders of 8 December by at least 10 December 2025.

4    On 29 January 2026, the respondents filed an interlocutory application for orders setting aside the judgment. The short affidavit by the respondent’s solicitor, Luke Kenneth Owens, in support of that application relevantly explained as follows:

6    Due to the volume of the materials to be reviewed in connection with the arbitration, it is not possible, as at the date of swearing this affidavit, to reach any concluded view as to the prospects of establishing grounds to set aside the Orders.

7    Based on an initial review of the materials, I consider that there may be grounds for the setting aside of the Orders under section 8(7)(b) or section 8(7A) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth).

8    In particular, I am exploring whether there is evidence that the Applicant had in fact received the amount claimed not to have been received, and whether the Respondents were afforded procedural fairness during the period in which they were unrepresented in the Arbitration.

9    It will be necessary to conduct further investigations and obtain supporting materials in order to establish a proper basis for these grounds.

10    I respectfully seek the orders sought in the Respondents’ interlocutory application in order to complete my review and investigation of the Arbitration, and to file any further evidence in support of this application.

5    The orders referred to in paragraph 10 of the affidavit were orders that the respondent have until 23 February 2026 to file further affidavits in support of their interlocutory application and consequential orders.

6    When the matter was called on 2 February 2026, counsel for the respondents elaborated on what it was envisaged was necessary to be done in order to advise on whether there was some reasonable basis to set aside the judgment. That included going through three folders of documents that had been provided, as well as potentially seeking further information from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and Flash Partners Pty Ltd. Following debate about programming, at the conclusion of the hearing on 2 February 2026 I ordered that the respondents file and serve any further evidence and an outline of submissions in support of their interlocutory application by 20 February 2026. I also made further programming orders and listed the interlocutory application for hearing on 2 April 2026.

7    As it happened, the respondents subsequently sought an extension to the date by which they had to file and serve further evidence and submissions. On 19 February 2026, I extended that deadline to 27 February 2026. The respondents did not meet that deadline, upon which the applicant sought to have the matter listed. Hence the listing today.

8    Mr Owens appears for the respondents. He has explained that a review of the documents produced under subpoena does not reveal any reasonable basis to set aside the judgment of 8 December 2025. On that basis, the respondents accept that their interlocutory application should be dismissed, and that the stay of the judgment will come to an end. They also accept that they should be liable for the costs of the interlocutory application.

9    The applicant seeks orders for the costs of the application for enforcement as well as the respondent’s interlocutory application to set aside the judgment to be assessed and determined on a lump sum basis. More specifically, they seek orders that their costs up until 28 January 2026 be assessed on a party and party basis, but that the costs thereafter be assessed on an indemnity basis. That is to say, they seek indemnity costs for the respondent’s interlocutory application.

10    The basis on which indemnity costs are sought is that the interlocutory application unreasonably put the applicant to the expenditure of costs, the proceeding was unduly prolonged beyond the return day by groundless contentions and/or that, properly advised, the respondents should have known that they had no chance of success: Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Limited (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 116 at [5] per Jagot, Yates and Murphy JJ. The applicant submits that there was never a proper basis for the interlocutory application, as has been demonstrated by its ultimate abandonment. The applicant also submits that the investigations for which the respondents sought time after 2 February 2026, if required at all, should have taken place in the period between 10 December 2025 and 2 February 2026. The applicant says that such investigations should in any event not have been required because the question of payments which was sought to be investigated was fully dealt with in the arbitration, and that that was the respondents’ opportunity to deal with that question.

11    Ultimately, I am not satisfied that costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis. The principal reason for that is that the applicant took advantage, as it was entitled to do, of applying for judgment on an ex parte basis. The consequence of that was that the onus was then on the respondents to apply to set aside that judgment. It was reasonable for them to instruct lawyers in Australia to advise on whether there was a proper basis to do so. They were entitled to receive such advice, including having a reasonable opportunity for the advice to be formulated and given.

12    I am troubled by the period from 10 December 2025 and 2 February 2026 in which the respondents seem to have done precious little to seek that advice. However, in circumstances where that period covers the Christmas shutdown, including the dies non period from 24 December to 14 January (see r 1.61(5) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR)), I do not consider it would be fair and just to visit on the respondents’ indemnity costs for, in effect, not having utilised that period more productively.

13    Insofar as “groundless allegations” are concerned, Mr Owens’s affidavit is measured and fair. It did not overstate matters or make unfounded allegations. The effect of the affidavit was to say: “I’ve recently been instructed. I need to investigate further in order to advise whether there’s a proper basis to apply to set aside the judgment, and I need time to do that.” That was a reasonable position for the respondents to take. I do not consider that that position is such as to justify the grant of an order for indemnity costs.

14    I must then turn to the quantification of the costs.

15    No issue has been taken with reducing the actual costs of the applicant by 30% to reach a party and party amount, save for the respondents’ submission that there has been no determination whether those costs were “fairly and reasonably incurred” (see FCR r 40.01 and sch 1 (definition of “costs as between party and party”)).

16    In my assessment, the proposed discount takes account of the possibility of costs not being fairly and reasonably incurred. The figures at stake are not substantial. I am satisfied that 30% is a reasonable rule of thumb in the present case.

17    I will, therefore, apply a discount of 30% to the applicant’s costs up to 28 January 2026, as the applicant has done in the supporting affidavit of David Gordon Anthony, its solicitor. I will then also apply that discount figure to the applicant’s solicitors’ fees for the period thereafter, which is to say for the interlocutory application. I will utilise only the dollar amounts and ignore the cents.

18    I am also satisfied that the disbursement amount, which is mostly counsels’ fees, should be awarded in full.

19    I will, therefore, make orders as follows:

(1)    That the respondents’ interlocutory application dated 29 January 2026 be dismissed.

(2)    That order 3 of 8 December 2025 be vacated.

(3)    That the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding on a lump sum basis, fixed [in an amount to be calculated].

Associate:

Dated:    10 March 2026