Federal Court of Australia

Sturmey v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FCA 214

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application is dismissed.

2.    The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

1    The applicant, Mr Sturmey, seeks review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 21 October 2025, wherein it affirmed a decision made on 25 June 2025 by a delegate of the Minister to cancel his visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act): Sturmey and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 2227 (T).

2    Mr Sturmey has a long and extensive criminal history, including a conviction for manslaughter in 2005 as a result of which he was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. More recently, he has convictions for domestic violence offences. It was his criminal conduct which led to his visa’s cancellation.

3    Following the delegate’s decision that his visa be cancelled, he sought review from the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s decision, being some 207 paragraphs long, thoroughly reviewed the material before it, and carefully addressed the matters in Direction 110, Visa Refusal and Cancellation Under s 501 and Revocation of a Mandatory Cancellation of a Visa Under s 501CA (Direction 110), which came into force on 21 June 2024. It affirmed the delegate’s decision.

4    When the matter was called on, Mr Sturmey initially appeared on his own behalf. However, he then requested that he be represented by Mr Anthony Gray, who was said to be from a charity that supported him. Mr Gray claimed to have received some form of legal education and, in the absence of any opposition from the Minister, he was given leave. It is relevant that Mr Gray also appeared in the Tribunal with or for Mr Sturmey, and provided an affidavit on which reliance was placed.

5    Mr Sturmey’s Originating Application identifies 15 grounds of review, none of which were abandoned by Mr Gray at the hearing. The latter did, however, assert that he would address the Court in a way that combined those grounds into five broader propositions. Nevertheless, as the points were advanced, they generally constituted repetition of some of the grounds articulated in the application, save for one ground which was wholly new. That said, there was no attempt to amend the Originating Application. If there were any valid ground of review raised on behalf of the applicant, an order allowing an amendment to advance that ground should be granted. However, as the following discussion reveals, there is no need to take that step.

Background

6    Mr Sturmey is a citizen of New Zealand.

7    He arrived in Australia in January 1980, then aged 15, and has lived here ever since.

8    Since 1 September 1994, he has lived here on an Absorbed Person Visa.

9    His first conviction was in 1984 and, since that time, he has been convicted of numerous other offences, a number of which involve assaults on females, including his then domestic partners. That resulted in domestic violence orders being taken out against him, though that did not prevent him breaching those orders and continuing to engage in acts of domestic violence of the most egregious kind.

10    In the period to 2005 he was convicted of an array of offences including some involving acts of violence.

11    Then in 2005, he was convicted of manslaughter, consequent upon severely bashing a person whom he asserted was his friend, and was sentenced to a period of 8 years imprisonment.

12    Following his release in about 2010, he was involved in further contraventions of the law, including unlicenced driving and drink driving.

13    In 2017, the police were called to premises where he was living with his daughter, Crystal, and her three children. Consequent upon the police’s attendance, a domestic violence order was taken out against him in favour of Crystal and her children.

14    In 2019, he was convicted of a public nuisance offence after being refused service of alcohol in a public bar.

15    In July 2024, he had a further domestic violence order issued against him. That arose out of an incident involving his either current or former partner, during which acts of violence were perpetrated against that person.

16    As mentioned, the delegate cancelled Mr Sturmey’s visa on 25 June 2025 under s 501(2) of the Act. He sought merits review before the Tribunal, though, on 21 October 2025, it affirmed the decision.

The Tribunal’s decision

17    The Tribunal’s decision carefully assays the evidence that was before it, particularly that in relation to Mr Sturmey’s offending and, in that context, specific attention was given to the incident resulting in him being convicted of manslaughter, as well as to the incidents involving domestic violence.

18    Pursuant to s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal was required to comply with Direction 110, which provides that the “primary considerations” for a decision under (relevantly) s 501(2) of the Act are (a) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, (b) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence, (c) the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia, (d) the best interests of minor children in Australia, and (e) the expectations of the Australian community.

19    The core of the Tribunal’s reasoning concerned the first consideration, which involved an assessment of the degree of risk that the applicant would engage in further criminal (and, in this case, violent) conduct. Mr Sturmey had relied upon a report from a forensic psychologist, Dr Laurel Morris, dated 11 September 2025. In that report, Dr Morris perceived that the risk of Mr Sturmey being involved in further violence would diminish over time given his older age and his reduced use of alcohol. On the other hand, she asserted that a risk remained due to his poor problem solving ability arising from a lack of self-confidence, poor self-esteem, and deeply held beliefs that normalise physical violence. The psychologist opined that the overall risk was low for future offending, especially if Mr Sturmey continued treatment under his psychology referral.

20    The Tribunal had difficulty accepting those findings, because many of the factors on which Dr Morris relied when determining that Mr Sturmey posed a low risk of violence, had not been established: T [94]. For example, Dr Morris observed that Mr Sturmey had returned to a relationship with his erstwhile partner, which was not the case. She also opined that he had made substantial changes to his drinking patterns, although the evidence before the Tribunal showed that he remained unwilling to accept that he had a problem with alcohol.

21    Accordingly, in order to assess the relevant degree of risk accurately, the Tribunal set out the relevant facts and considered the evidence of Mr Sturmey’s relationships, his work history, his community contributions, and the absence of any health issues.

22    Consistent with Direction 110, the Tribunal observed that violent crimes and acts of family violence are regarded as being “very serious” by both the Australian Government and the Australian community. It determined that the applicant’s acts of family violence – comprising his conduct dating back to the late 1990’s and his behaviour following his release from incarceration – warranted the description as “very serious”: T [111]. It reached the same conclusion in respect of the conduct underlying the manslaughter conviction: T [112].

23    The Tribunal also paid particular attention to the acts of family violence against Mr Sturmey’s daughter, Crystal, in 2017, and the incident involving his then intimate partner, Rebecca, in 2024. In relation to each incident, it preferred the contemporaneous police reports over the later evidence of Crystal and Rebecca, each of whom sought to minimise the significance of the events.

24    The Tribunal further considered that Mr Sturmey had been sentenced to significant periods of imprisonment over many years, including the 8 year sentence for manslaughter, and noted his history of violence toward women, which spanned over 20 years, albeit becoming less frequent and less severe over time.

25    Overall, after considering all the evidence, including Dr Morris’ report, the Tribunal concluded that there was a moderate risk that the applicant might cause injury to another person: T [133]. This finding weighed very heavily against the restoration of his visa: T [134].

26    In relation to the second primary consideration under Direction 110, being the applicant’s engagement in family violence, the Tribunal considered the evidence and determined that this factor weighed very strongly in favour of cancellation: T [135] – [139].

27    The Tribunal then turned to the remaining primary and other considerations under Direction 110, although it is unnecessary to refer to them at this stage.

28    Having assessed the evidence and the factors required by Direction 110, the Tribunal concluded that the original decision should be affirmed.

Grounds of review

29    The applicant adopted a scattergun approach to the appeal. Fifteen grounds are raised though, as the Minister submits, many are directed to attempts to engage in merits review. Notices of Appeal in the form advanced in this case should be discouraged. They evidence a lack of any serious attempt to formulate proper grounds of administrative review and demonstrate an uninformed understanding of the nature of the review process. Though Mr Gray sought to rehabilitate the application by some bundling of the grounds, ultimately, the majority of his submissions merely sought merits review of the Tribunal’s decision.

Ground One

30    This ground asserts a “misapplication of Direction 110 as to weighing and attention to detail of all competing considerations”.

31    In support of this ground it was submitted that the Tribunal failed to conduct the required structured weighing exercise required by Direction 110. That criticism is, however, unfounded. On the face of the Tribunal’s decision it considered, and where appropriate weighed, all the relevant matters required by Direction 110. Ultimately, it concluded that the consideration relating to the protection and expectations of the Australian community outweighed the considerations which favoured the applicant.

32    To the extent that it weighed any relevant matter, it did so consistently with the guidance given in Direction 110, and there was no rational submission to suggest otherwise. No specific submission was made to advance this ground in any substantial way.

33    The applicant contends in his written submissions that the Tribunal, “elevated speculative risk beyond what the evidence could legally support”. It is not immediately apparent that this submission has any connection with the grounds of review advanced in the Originating Application and, moreover, it is difficult to understand. It might be taken as a criticism of the Tribunal’s evaluation of the risk (in terms of chance) that Mr Sturmey might reoffend. However, the Tribunal specifically turned its mind to that issue and evaluated the evidence of his past conduct and his current circumstances in reaching a conclusion that the risk was “moderate”: T [130] – [134]. Its consideration of the numerous factors that logically related to that question self-evidently resulted in a conclusion that Mr Sturmey represented a material risk of causing substantial harm to others. He had continuing problems with alcohol that were untreated, as well as a psychological vulnerability which caused him to resort to violence when provoked.

34    The manner in which the Tribunal assessed the risk that Mr Sturmey might reoffend was entirely orthodox. The matters which it considered relevant to that issue were set out in its reasons, and it assessed them within the parameters of the reasonable conjecture permissible in that evaluative exercise. In CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 293 FCR 634 at 656 [74], it was observed that:

In assessing the likelihood of a future event, the key facts will include the regularity with which the event has occurred in the past, the conditions under which the event occurred in the past and the likelihood that those conditions have since changed or other events have intervened to interrupt the cycle of regularity.

35    This reflects the observations in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 28 – 29 [38] – [39]:

The notion of “risk” involves possibility in the future… The task [in assessing risk] is the consideration of future possibilities which “proceeds by drawing inferences from known facts” … and is based on “reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts”… To these considerations should be added as legitimate bases for the assessment process: common sense, a reasonable appreciation of human experience, and personal knowledge or specialised knowledge of the Minister or his or her Department…

36    Further, in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v ERY19 (2021) 285 FCR 540 at 562 [86], it was observed that:

… an assessment of risk of harm involves consideration of possibilities and permits a degree of permissible speculation on the part of the Minister…

37    So, of course, the process of assessing the “risk” of a future event occurring involves a degree of prognostication and conjecture and that is what is necessarily required by Direction 110.

38    Here, the Tribunal’s approach to assessing the risk was entirely orthodox and conducted in accordance with established principles. It follows that Ground One is bereft of any merit.

Ground Two

39    Despite the length and thoroughness of the Tribunal’s decision, the second ground of review is that it failed to consider certain evidence.

40    In his very careful and thoughtful submissions, Mr McGlade of Counsel for the Minister, set out the relevant principles together with numerous authorities identifying the limited grounds on which the Court might reach the conclusion that an administrative decisionmaker failed to consider relevant evidence. They cannot be improved upon, and I set them out verbatim as follows:

13.    Relevant principles: A judicial review applicant who asserts that a matter was not considered bears the onus of establishing that on the balance of probabilities [BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29, 45 [38]]. A finding that a matter has not been considered “will not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence” [Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352, 364 [48]]. In assessing whether such an inference ought to be drawn, a Court should “constantly [bear] in mind” its limited role in evaluating the legality – and not merits – of the decision under review [Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582, 599 – 600 [26]; refer also to King v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 142 ALD 305, 313 [18]].

14.     In discharging the abovementioned onus, it is noted that, as the evidence before the Tribunal is not required to be set out by the Tribunal in its statement of reasons [Kamal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 387 [9]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362, 377 [47]], a mere non-reference to evidence by a Tribunal does not supply a basis for inferring that such evidence was not considered [Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EEI17 (2018) 261 FCR 461, 474 [49]]. Relatedly, the absence of a finding on any particular matter generally only entitles a Court to infer that the Tribunal did not consider such a matter to be material to its decision (“material” in the sense of such a matter not being considered by the Tribunal to be a matter of material or significant weight in the context of its ultimate decision [Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, 390 [215]; ETA067 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 92 ALJR 1003, 1007 [24]; TNVP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 726 [37]]) unless such an inference cannot be sensibly explained [Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67, 75 [33] – [34]].

15.    Further, not considering evidence does not automatically vitiate a Tribunal’s decision. Whether jurisdictional error follows turns on “the importance of the material to the exercise of the Tribunal’s function and thus the seriousness of any error” [Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99, 130 [111]] and generally only arises where the relevant evidence is of pivotal or fundamental importance [DEL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 73 AAR 258 [53] – [63]; CRG16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 374 [52]].

41    At paragraph 10 of the applicant’s written submissions it is stated that:

The ART failed to lawfully consider the Applicant’s rehabilitation evidence, 45 years of residence, cultural and community integration and contributions (despite transgression, clearly the result of substance abuse, cognitive disability, and treatable illness as to pre-disposition), evidence of psychological help to mollify and reduce, if not eliminate risk, the effects likewise of the passage of time, stable family support, and contra-indications.

That is a mere assertion and is unhelpful. No particulars were provided and it pays no attention to that which is contained in the Tribunal’s reasons.

42    As the Minister correctly submits, the second ground of appeal, even taken together with paragraph 10 of the submissions, is liable to be dismissed due to the absence of any explanation as to why the Court might infer that any such evidence was not considered.

43    In fact, on the contrary, the Tribunal’s decision indicates that it considered all of the relevant evidence. It specifically states, in terms, that regard was had to all the evidence before it and that evidence was specifically identified: see T [20] – [24]. Additionally, as is outlined below, it is clear from the Tribunal’s lengthy discussion of the facts and circumstances, as well as its analysis, that it took into account the matters of which complaint is now made.

Rehabilitation evidence

44    In relation to the rehabilitation evidence, the complaint may be that the Tribunal did not give sufficient weight to the evidence of Dr Morris, concerning the nature and extent of the applicant’s rehabilitation. However, that is unrealistic given the Tribunal referred specifically to Dr Morris’ written opinion, extracted parts of it, and discussed it. It also noted that, in assessing the risk to the community, it had to have regard to the factors identified in Direction 110, including the risk of reoffending and evidence of rehabilitation: T [128]. In compliance with that obligation, it specifically addressed all the evidence of rehabilitation and concluded that very little had been achieved: T [138(c)].

45    There is no merit in the applicant’s suggestion that that the Tribunal did not consider this topic. The real concern is that the Tribunal did not find in the manner that Mr Sturmey wanted, and that does not found a ground of review.

Duration of residence and passage of time

46    It is further alleged that the Tribunal did not consider Mr Sturmey’s 45 years of residence in Australia. That too can be rejected. The Tribunal specifically identified, in several places, its awareness of the length of time that the applicant had been in Australia and gave weight to it: see T [1], [30], [140], [201(a)] and [204(a)]. That topic was also raised in the applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions and reply submissions which the Tribunal also considered.

47    The same can be said for the assertion that the Tribunal failed to consider the effects of the passage of time. It may be that this particular complaint referred to evidence given by Dr Morris to the effect that she perceived Mr Sturmey’s present risk profile to be lower than it was in the past. However, that was specifically considered and addressed by the Tribunal: see T [92] – [94], [130] – [134].

Prior convictions

48    It should also be observed that the Tribunal did not merely rely upon Mr Sturmey’s conviction for manslaughter as underpinning its findings in relation to the primary considerations in Direction 110. On the contrary, it relied upon the 40 or so years of continuous offending, including that following his release from prison. It also especially relied on his later acts of family violence, one of which occurred in 2024. This point was raised by Mr Gray in his oral address though he did not add to that which appeared in the submissions.

49    It follows that no valid complaint can be made in relation to the Tribunal’s consideration of Mr Sturmey’s history of offending and, in particular, his conviction for manslaughter in 2005.

Cultural and community contributions

50    In relation to the allegation that the Tribunal did not consider Mr Sturmey’s contributions to culture and the community. That which might be the subject of the applicant’s complaint is far from clear. The Tribunal specifically addressed matters relating to Mr Sturmey’s community contribution and his ties to Australia: see T [103] – [105], [140] – [143]. This issue was not pressed at the hearing.

Psychological assistance

51    Equally, the complaint that the Tribunal did not address the evidence of psychological help to mollify and reduce risk is without substance. The Tribunal referenced the evidence before it in this regard, noting that Mr Sturmey had previously undertaken some psychological sessions but, at the time of the Tribunal’s decision, he had not arranged to meet regularly with a psychologist: T [132], [138(c)]. It also ultimately formed the view that Mr Sturmey had made very little effort to address his psychological issues. That finding was not challenged.

Family support and contra-indications

52    Finally, an allegation is made that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence relating to stable family support and contra-indications. It is impossible to discern to what that complaint relates.

53    For all of the above reasons, there is no merit in Ground Two.

Ground Three

54    This ground seems to complain of the existence of some legal unreasonableness in the evaluative conclusion regarding risk and, particularly, the alleged failure to give due consideration to and apply the evidence of Dr Morris.

55    As the Minister has identified, an array of allegations of legal unreasonableness are spread throughout the applicant’s submissions. In particular, the submissions refer to “Ground 4 – Legal Unreasonableness”, though no such ground appears in the Originating Application. In any event, paragraphs 16 to 22 of the written submissions appear under that heading, and these might be taken as the relevant challenge.

Relevant principles in relation to alleged unreasonableness in administrative fact finding

56    To the extent to which it is decipherable, this ground complains about legal unreasonableness in the evaluative conclusion regarding risk of reoffending. In particular, the allegation is directed towards factual findings made by the Tribunal. The scope of the Court’s ability to address perceived unreasonableness in those circumstances was discussed in Vo v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 269 FCR 566, 575 – 577 [42] – [44] (Vo):

42    Legal unreasonableness may be used as a compendious term to describe the various circumstances in which there may be jurisdictional error. However, ground 3 seeks to invoke the narrower conception of a decision that lacks the character of reasonableness necessary to meet the implied standard applicable to the exercise of statutory decision-making power. Breach of that standard is not established by demonstrating factual error in relation to a particular aspect of the material considered by the Tribunal. A factual finding made without any basis or which was inherently illogical will not found a claim of jurisdictional error unless it had a consequence for the overall outcome. Rather, it must be an error of a kind that infects the decision in a foundational sense such that the whole exercise of authority can be said to lack the requisite standard of reasonableness. As stated in Tsvetnenko at [83]-[85]:

Unreasonableness as a ground of review is concerned with whether an implied statutory standard as to the character of the decision to be made in the exercise of power has been satisfied. Unreasonableness may be demonstrated by showing that the result is unreasonable or by showing that the reasons do not provide an intelligible justification for the result (see the review of the authorities in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Haq [2019] FCAFC 7 at [72]-[95] (Colvin J)).

However, unreasonableness is not demonstrated merely by an error in reasoning, even an error that may be characterised as grave. Where the claim of unreasonableness is based on alleged unreasonable reasoning it must be demonstrated that the reasons fail to provide an intelligible justification for the result.

The distinction is important because review for legal unreasonableness concerns the overall character of an administrative decision. Erroneous or illogical reasoning at a particular point in the decision-making process may or may not lead to the conclusion that the decision as a whole fails to conform to the implied statutory standard of reasonableness.

43    Where a complaint is made that there has been jurisdictional error by the Tribunal by reason of a breach of the implied standard of reasonableness in decision-making and the complaint is concerned with factual findings then the following matters pertain:

(1)    the test for unreasonableness is stringent and extremely confined: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [11], [52], [135];

(2)    where reasons have been provided then the reasons are the focal point for assessing whether the decision was unreasonable: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [46]-[47];

(3)    unreasonableness will not be demonstrated on the basis of a complaint about the weight given to particular evidence or material because determination of the weight to be given to evidence or material is a matter entrusted to the Tribunal: Tran v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 297 at [4]-[5];

(4)    it is for the Tribunal to reach conclusions about credibility and unreasonableness is not shown by complaints about credibility findings alone, but may be demonstrated where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact is used as a basis for rejecting the entirety of the claimant’s evidence (a conclusion to be reached with a high degree of caution): CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496 at [40]-[45] and DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175 at [30];

(5)    generally speaking, the Tribunal has the authority to reach conclusions about the inferences that might be drawn from particular evidence or material;

(6)    the Tribunal is not required to refer to every piece of evidence placed before it: ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46 at [13];

(7)    in many instances, by reason of the nature of the Tribunal’s statutory obligation to give reasons, it may be inferred that a failure to refer to a particular matter reflects the Tribunal’s view that it was not material to its decision: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [5], [69] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16 at [34] (although the positon [sic] may be different where there is a failure to consider a factual issue that is an essential integer of a claim or that would be dispositive: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593 at [47] and ETA067 at [14]);

(8)    mere strong disagreement with factual reasoning does not establish jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [40];

(9)    a decision (not just a part of a decision) which lacks an evident and intelligible justification is unreasonable: SZVFW at [10], [82];

(10)    a decision that no reasonable person could have arrived at is one circumstance in which the decision may be unreasonable, but there may be others - the category is not limited to such instances: SZVFW at [10], [59], [82], [89], [133]; and

(11)    there must be an error that is so grave both as to its nature and the significance of its subject matter that it results in a decision that has been reasoned in a manner that it is not authorised: Hossain at [25], [30]-[31].

44    As Allsop CJ said (Wigney J agreeing) in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1 at [12].

Crucial to remember, however, is that the task for the Court is not to assess what it thinks is reasonable and thereby conclude (as if in an appeal concerning breach of duty of care) that any other view displays error; rather, the task is to evaluate the quality of the decision, by reference to the statutory source of the power and thus, from its scope, purpose and objects to assess whether it is lawful. The undertaking of that task may see the decision characterised as legally unreasonable whether because of specific identifiable jurisdictional error, or the conclusion or outcome reached, or the reasoning process utilised.

57    It follows that the test for legal unreasonableness in the context of the current circumstances is stringent and extremely confined. Moreover, the mere making of a finding of “unreasonableness” is not enough to establish a jurisdictional error. Rather, the error must be “so grave both as to its nature and the significance of its subject matter that it results in a decision that has been reasoned in a manner that it is not authorised”: Vo 577 [43(11)].

58    To the above can be added that it was identified in Masi-Haini v Minister for Home Affairs (2023) 298 FCR 277 at 291 – 292 [49] – [52], that an unreasonable factual finding cannot result in jurisdictional error if the results of the case remained open on all the materials.

59    It must also be kept in mind that the Tribunal is not required to give an explanation for every finding of fact that it makes: Healey v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 295 FCR 210, 222 [36]: and there is no requirement that there be an evident and intelligible justification for each finding as opposed to the result of the case: Tsvetnenko v United States of America (2019) 269 FCR 225, 243 [83]; Vo 576 [43(9)].

Consideration

60    Perhaps the best way of considering this issue is by addressing the complaints raised in the applicant’s written outline.

61    The applicant says that the Tribunal’s assessment of risk was divorced from the current circumstances, and lacked an explanation as to how the risk conclusions were derived. It makes this submission on four bases, each of which lacks merit. That is because, in general terms, the Tribunal’s analysis involved a consideration of all the circumstances considered to be relevant to the applicant’s risk profile, and the conclusions drawn reflect a thorough analysis of the evidence: see T [130] – [134].

62    First, the applicant complains that the evidence of Dr Morris was not given due consideration. How that submission can be made is difficult to understand given Dr Morris’ evidence was discussed at length in the reasons: see T [20], [23(e)], [92] – [94], [106], [131] – [133]. Put simply, the Tribunal chose not to accept Dr Morris’ evidence for the reasons it gave, and it is entitled to rely upon its own conclusions as to the likelihood of the applicant reoffending.

63    In reality, the complaint sought to be made is merely that Mr Sturmey does not like the Tribunal’s conclusion as to the risk that he poses. The substance of his submission is that he wishes the Court to enter into a merits assessment of the material before the Tribunal and reach a different conclusion. That is something that it may not do: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 35 – 36. Whilst it is true that the Tribunal did not accept Dr Morris’ assessment of the risk posed by the applicant, it was not obliged to do so. Indeed, its statutory obligation was to form its own opinion as to that matter. In rejecting Dr Morris’ opinion, it identified the difficulties in her assessment, noting that many of the factors on which she relied to ground her opinion were not established by the evidence, or were overstated. It was also apparent that Dr Morris was unaware of the full extent of Mr Sturmey’s acts of violence and the Tribunal was also allowed to rely upon this in rejecting her views.

64    Rather than adopting some erroneous assessment of the evidence, the Tribunal appropriately addressed its veracity.

65    Secondly, the applicant complains that too much weight was given to the imperfect state of the family structure and to the prior relationship between him and Ms Nancy Capewell, the latter being the mother of most of his children. Here, the complaint seems to be that it did not accept that Mr Sturmey and Ms Capewell continued in some form of a de facto relationship, because it was not satisfied that he had resumed a close and stable relationship with her. The underlying nature of any complaint as to this assessment is difficult to understand. The Tribunal simply concluded that it had not been satisfied that any close relationship existed and it was entitled to reach that finding on the material before it. Again, this is nothing more than an attempt to engage the Court in merits review.

66    Thirdly, a substantial aspect of the applicant’s complaints arises from the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with two incidents of domestic violence. The first occurred in 2019, and the second in 2024. The complaints made are similar in that the applicant asserts the existence of some error by the Tribunal accepting information from police reports about those incidents, rather than from the victims who were associated with the applicant.

67    The 2019 incident is addressed at T [69] – [79], [115] and [117]. In essence, the police were called to a commotion at the premises where the applicant was then staying with his daughter, Crystal. As the police approached the house they heard a loud argument occurring in the front room of the address, including loud slapping sounds. When they entered, they observed a woman (later identified as Crystal) on the floor and Mr Sturmey standing near her. Mr Sturmey subsequently struggled with the police who then arrested him. A consequence of this incident was that domestic violence orders were made in favour of Crystal.

68    From that evidence the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had assaulted Crystal and that she was a family member. It was also satisfied that he assaulted her by slapping her hard enough to make her fall to the floor before the police arrived. That was confirmed, in part, by Crystal’s statement to the police officer that, prior to their arrival, the applicant’s behaviour towards her was aggressive and she had asked him to leave the house.

69    Before the Tribunal, Crystal gave evidence which differed significantly from the information recorded by the police. The two sources of information were considered by the Tribunal at T [72] – [73]:

72.    The content of the police report was read out in open court without demur when the applicant was charged with obstructing police. On that basis I am satisfied that what was recorded was an accurate account of what the police observed. To the extent that Crystal claims that there was no violence towards her that evening, or if there was it was not from her father, I do not accept that evidence. The police took out a domestic violence order to protect Crystal from her father following the incident. I am satisfied that there was physical violence directed towards Crystal that night and that it was her father who was responsible. To the extent that Crystal gave evidence that that was not the case I do not accept that evidence.

73.    The applicant gave no account of the evening, electing, as is his right, to take the privilege against self-incrimination.

70    The second incident of family violence occurred in 2024, and it involved offending towards the applicant’s former partner who went by the name of “Rebecca”. It is considered at T
[81] – [88] and [116] – [117]. Again, the Tribunal preferred the contemporaneous evidence derived from the police notes over the evidence given by Rebecca at the hearing. In an interview with the police, Rebecca stated while she was sleeping the applicant grabbed her by the pants and dragged her along the floor, before smashing her head into the floor, causing a large cut to the back of her head. She advised that that was the third time something like that had occurred but, due to her fear of the applicant’s controlling behaviour, she did not seek assistance from the police. The applicant admitted dragging Rebecca out of the room where she had been, but said that she threw herself backwards causing her head to hit the floor. An additional police report recorded information provided by Rebecca’s mother which supported the version in the police reports. Again, as a result of this incident, domestic violence orders were made against the applicant in favour of Rebecca.

71    The applicant sought to contradict the foregoing evidence with an affidavit by Mr Gray, in which he deposed to discussions he had had with Rebecca that suggested a contrary version of events. Ultimately, the Tribunal preferred the police reports.

72    The applicant’s complaints that the Tribunal preferred the police reports over the evidence of Crystal and Rebecca are misguided. It is not bound to act as a judicial fact finder. Rather, its obligation is to act as an administrative fact finder. It is entitled to act on the evidence before it, and is entitled to prefer one form of evidence over the other. In the present case, it was entitled to act on the hearsay evidence in the police reports: BTJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1636 [24]: and there is nothing unreasonable in it doing so. It was also entitled to prefer the ostensibly independent evidence of police officers to the evidence of witnesses who have a personal interest in the matter. All of that was within the fact finding task required of the Tribunal, and nothing was identified in the manner in which it approached that task to suggest that any error occurred. In essence, it acted entirely appropriately in evaluating the differing evidence before it.

73    Fourthly, a suggestion was made that the Tribunal needed to be satisfied on the criminal standard of proof in relation to these allegations. That is wholly without merit: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361 – 362; Nafady v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 181 ALD 208, 217 [23]; Maliau v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 12 [91].

74    Otherwise, the applicant’s complaints advanced under this ground are directed to the merits of the Tribunal’s factual findings. These are not matters to which the Court can have regard.

Ground Four

75    The ground is articulated as follows:

Error of law in treating disputed allegations as proven factual findings.

76    By itself, this fails to express any valid ground of review and it establishes no basis for alleging jurisdictional error. To the extent to which it may be picked up in the submissions, it is dealt with above.

Ground Five

77    This ground asserts a misunderstanding and misapplication of the “family violence” consideration, though it is difficult to know what is intended by the allegation. To the extent to which it is intelligible, it has been dealt with above. Otherwise, in the absence of explanation, no valid ground of appeal is raised.

Ground Six

78    By this ground it is said that there was a failure to properly consider and relatively weigh what was in the best interests of a large number of minor children who were associated with the applicant.

79    Direction 110 sets out what must be done in relation to the consideration of the best interests of minor children. Here, the Tribunal took great care to identify the affected minor children and to evaluate their particular circumstances. Ultimately, it concluded that, given the role of the applicant in the lives of the various children, the consideration weighed heavily against cancelling the applicant’s visa. There was nothing to indicate that this finding, which might be viewed as being overly generous to the applicant, was in any way in error. None of the submissions advanced by the applicant in the course of the application disclosed any relevant fault. Indeed, it was not truly pressed at the hearing.

Ground Seven

80    By this ground the applicant asserts that the Tribunal failed to give due consideration and proper weight to the applicant’s 45 years of residence and cultural integration. However, this ground is also misguided. The Tribunal undoubtedly took into account the number of years which the applicant resided in Australia (see supra [46]). It also took into account the difficulties that he would encounter on a return to New Zealand. In other words, it appropriately addressed his personal circumstances in relation to the consequences of an adverse decision.

81    Further, the weight which the Tribunal gives to such a matter is entirely in the discretion of the Tribunal.

Ground Eight

82    This ground seeks to reassert the relevance or value of the evidence of Dr Morris as to the risk posed by the applicant. It is, with respect, fatuous to think that the Tribunal did not properly address Dr Morris’ evidence. Indeed, her evidence about the reduction in the applicant’s drinking as a factor ameliorating the risk of reoffending is extracted in the Tribunal’s reasons: T [93]. It was, undoubtedly, appropriately considered (see supra [19] – [20]). Again, the applicant’s complaint in this respect rises no higher than an impermissible complaint going to the merits of the decision.

Ground Nine

83    By this ground the applicant claims that the Tribunal failed to recognise the applicant’s relationship and support needs, the removal of which might expose him unreasonably to harm.

84    Again, this ground lacks any merit. The Tribunal’s reasons expressly referenced Dr Morris’ evidence that the applicant’s removal to a location where he had no relationship and supports, exposed him to a risk of “psychological decompensation”: T [106], [196]. Further, the weight it gave to this evidence in considering the issue of the extent of impediments to him if removed, is a matter entirely for it and is not justiciable on an application of the present nature.

Ground Ten

85    This ground complains about too much weight being given to the complaint of Rebecca and the conflicting and untested police records.

86    It has been dealt with above (see supra [70] – [72]) and needs no further observation.

Ground Eleven

87    This ground seeks to reagitate the issue of the domestic violence incident involving the applicant’s daughter, Crystal. It too has been dealt with above (see supra [67] – [69], [72]) and requires no further consideration.

Ground Twelve

88    This ground complains that the Tribunal failed to consider and weigh the fact that the applicant had not previously been warned that his behaviour might give rise to the cancellation of his visa. However, the Tribunal specifically referenced the absence of any warning having previously been given to the applicant, and it considered whether such warning should occur now. Nevertheless, it concluded that the case before it was not one where it could be confident that a warning would be sufficient to eliminate the danger that the applicant posed to the Australian community. In this manner, it is clear that the Tribunal took the matter into account as being relevant to its determination. Moreover, as the Tribunal’s decision made abundantly clear, the giving of a warning was unlikely to bring about any alteration in the applicant’s conduct. It said at T [201(f)]:

In this case, a warning is unlikely to suffice. The applicant has been punished for violent crimes involving alcohol in the past. His lengthy time in prison gave a clear indication to him that he needed to deal with his issues with alcohol and violence. In the fifteen years that followed the applicant showed that despite having been punished he did not learn the lesson he needed to learn. He continued on occasion to engage in excessive alcohol consumption and engage in violence towards family members. This is not a case where the Tribunal can be confident that a warning will suffice to eliminate the danger that the applicant poses to the Australian community. The applicant has been dealt with on numerous occasions for his anti-social behaviour and it has not been sufficient to eliminate the conduct. I do not accept the submission that a warning is an adequate substitute for a visa cancellation.

89    Again, the complaint made is without merit.

Ground Thirteen

90    By this ground the applicant complains that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that he was disabled by cognitive and social defect, and that somehow the rules should apply differently to him.

91    It is undoubted that the Tribunal was acutely aware that the applicant had cognitive difficulties, however, there is nothing in the Act or Direction 110 which made that a relevant consideration in the administrative law sense. Certainly, there was nothing which suggested that it weighed in favour of cancelling the revocation decision.

Ground Fourteen

92    The applicant also complains that the Tribunal ought to have given him a warning against further transgressions and that his residency visa be allowed to stand.

93    Ultimately this is nothing more than an impermissible complaint about the merits of the decision and is without foundation given the discussion in relation to Ground Twelve (see supra [88] – [89]).

Ground Fifteen

94    This ground reads:

Failure to observe due process and properly assess the Respondents failure observed in both the domestic and international context, and otherwise to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

95    This ground is incomprehensible and fails to disclose any discernible jurisdictional error.

A new ground of review

96    The new ground advanced by Mr Gray on behalf of Mr Sturmey concerned the circumstances surrounding the domestic violence incident with Crystal. As explained by Mr Gray, the Tribunal was possessed of certain police reports concerning the family violence incident relating to Rebecca, though they were significantly redacted. The Tribunal ordered the Queensland Police to produce unredacted versions of their reports. In response, the police produced the reports with less redaction than the initial version, which revealed the incident with Crystal. As a result of this revelation, Mr Gray contacted Crystal and asked whether she would testify on behalf of her father. She agreed to do so and attended before the Tribunal where she was questioned by it and cross-examined. As mentioned, the Tribunal did not accept her evidence. The ground of review sought to be raised from this fact was an alleged denial of procedural fairness, though how that might be so, was unclear.

97    As first it was suggested that the Tribunal should have adjourned the hearing when the further material about Crystal came to light. An insurmountable difficulty with this is that none was asked for. A second problem is that, in response to the new evidence, Mr Sturmey or Mr Gray, sought to arrange for Crystal to attend at the hearing to give evidence in response, and that was permitted. Moreover, she attended and gave the evidence that they hoped that she would.

98    In this way, the Tribunal responded appropriately to the new evidence of further domestic violence and Mr Sturmey was given the opportunity to adduce his own evidence to rebut it.

99    Mr Gray suggested that, given the time constraints, he was unable to respond to the later revealed police report. There is nothing in that submission. In the first instance, he did respond by securing the attendance of Crystal at the Tribunal to give evidence. That evidence was considered and evaluated. Second, there is no evidence as to what benefit would be achieved if given more time. Mr Gray said that he would have been able to formulate additional questions to ask of Crystal. That is rather vague and not helpful. It is known that Crystal gave evidence which was contrary to that in the police reports, and she was disbelieved. It was not shown why she would have been more credible if she had additional questions posed to her by Mr Gray.

100    In the result, there is no merit in the allegation that Mr Sturmey was denied natural justice, and no amendment should be allowed to raise it now.

Conclusion

101    It follows from the foregoing that the application has been wholly misconceived. None of the grounds of review come remotely close to identifying any jurisdictional error.

102    In the circumstances the application for review must be dismissed.

103    The applicant must pay the Minister’s costs of the application.

Associate:    

Dated:    10 March 2026