Federal Court of Australia

Vinall v Bank of Western Australia Limited trading as Bankwest (No 2) [2026] FCA 172

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Orders 5 and 6 of the orders made by Registrar White on 19 February 2026 be discharged.

2.    Order 1 of the orders made by Cheeseman J on 24 February 2026 be discharged.

3.    The reasons for judgment given in Vinall v Bank of Western Australia Limited trading as Bankwest [2026] FCA 143, having been provided to the parties and their legal advisers on 24 February 2026, be published on the Court’s website.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHEESEMAN J:

1    These reasons address the final stage of a matter that came before me on an urgent basis in my capacity as the Commercial and Corporations Duty Judge. Familiarity with the reasons given in Vinall v Bank of Western Australia Limited trading as Bankwest [2026] FCA 143 (Vinall v Bankwest) is assumed. These reasons explain my decision to make orders on 26 February 2026 following an interlocutory listing at which the applicant failed to attend.

2    The relevant procedural history for present purposes is as follows.

3    On 22 January 2026, Registry accepted for filing an interlocutory application which had been lodged by Mr Vinall. By that application Mr Vinall sought, amongst other things, orders for the pseudonym of “James King” to be given to him for the purpose of this proceeding under ss 37AF and 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and for what he described as “targeted suppression”. Upon that interlocutory application being accepted for filing an administrative interim suppression was applied to the Court file.

4    The proceeding was listed on Mr Vinall’s instigation before Burley J sitting as the General Duty Judge on 4 February 2026. Mr Vinall appeared in person and was assisted by his wife, Mrs Fiona Vinall, taking the role of a McKenzie friend. That application was heard in open court. At the hearing, Mr Vinall asked for his name to be anonymised and for personal information relating to his medical condition be kept confidential. Burley J invited Mr Vinall to make an application under s 37AF of the FCA Act for suppression orders over personal information relating to Mr Vinall’s health. Burley J noted that there was no evidence before him as to the medical condition and his Honour did not make any orders at the hearing of 4 February 2026.

5    The proceeding was then docketed to Owens J. The proceeding was next listed before Registrar White for case management on 19 February 2026 at which time a further urgent duty application was foreshadowed. Registrar White made interim orders for the identity of Mr Vinall to not be published or otherwise disclosed other than to court staff, any legal advisers retained by Mr Vinall, as well as the Respondents and their lawyers. Registrar White also ordered that the documents filed to date not be published or otherwise disclosed until further order of the Court.

6    The next urgent duty application came before me on Friday afternoon, 20 February 2026. Mr Vinall appeared via a Microsoft Teams link and was against assisted by Mrs Vinall acting as a McKenzie friend. That application was heard in open court. I made orders dismissing Mr Vinall’s application for injunctive relief after 5.00pm on 20 February 2026 and a transcript was taken of the argument. Mr Vinall requested written reasons. He indicated that he was in the process of engaging counsel and a solicitor. I delivered written reasons on Tuesday, 24 February 2026.

7    When I pronounced orders on 20 February 2026, I informed Mr Vinall that upon delivery of my reasons I would make provision for him to bring forward his application for a pseudonym and/or a suppression order. I indicated that – at that time – I was not persuaded that it was appropriate to make a pseudonym order.

8    On 24 February 2026, I made orders which provided that any application to suppress any part of Vinall v Bankwest or to anonymise the applicant’s name in this proceeding be notified by email to my Associate by 2.00pm on 25 February 2026. Further, that if so notified, the application would be heard on 26 February 2026 at the end of case management hearings listed before me on that day.

9    By 2.00pm on 25 February 2026, Mr Vinall had not notified that he intended to press his application for either a pseudonym or a suppression order.

10    At 2.59pm, my Chambers sent an email to Mr Vinall noting that no notification of an application to suppress any part of the reasons for judgment or to anonymise his name had been notified as required by Order 2 of the Orders made on 24 February 2026.

11    At 4.17pm, Mr Vinall replied “I believe an application was made to suppress, if this is not the case does the court seek another application? If so may I ask for a slight extension to provide this to you by 5pm Thursday 26th February?”

12    At 4.31pm, my Chambers replied informing Mr Vinall that if he wished to press his application to suppress any part of the reasons for judgment or anonymise his name, he may do so at a hearing listed not before 11.00am on 26 February 2026. A Microsoft Teams link was provided to facilitate Mr Vinall to attend the hearing remotely if he chose to do so.

13    At 9.40am on 26 February 2026, Mr Vinall emailed the Registry asking for confirmation whether interim suppression or non‑publication protections that were previously in place had been lifted. Mr Vinall noted his intention to file an urgent non‑publication application and, if necessary, a fresh application for pseudonym and suppression orders and requested a period of seven days to obtain legal representation to prepare the necessary materials.

14    Shortly afterwards, at 9.49am, Mr Vinall emailed my Chambers directly stating that he intended “to pursue an application for non-publication and anonymisation orders under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act.” Mr Vinall further noted that he was unwell and unable to prepare affidavit material addressing the “medical and safety matters” he relied upon. Mr Vinall confirmed that he has engaged a solicitor and sought for the matter to be stood over until Monday. At the commencement of the hearing at 11.00am, and after calling the matter outside Court, the Court Officer confirmed that there was no appearance from Mr Vinall. The Microsoft Teams link providing for remote access was available to join throughout the hearing. At no time did Mr Vinall or Mrs Vinall (who as I have mentioned previously sought and obtained leave to assist Mr Vinall as a McKenzie friend) join the Microsoft Teams link for the hearing. The matter proceeded with Mr Tao of counsel appearing for Bankwest. Mr Tao appeared as a courtesy to the Court and informed the Court that Bankwest took a neutral position on any application for suppression and or/use of a pseudonym.

15    I am satisfied that Mr Vinall has had the opportunity to press his application which he first foreshadowed almost a month ago. The materials that he has placed before the Court, albeit informally, are in the main bare assertions and bereft of independent evidence that would substantiate those assertions.

16    The principles applicable to applications for suppression or non-publication orders (including for the use of a pseudonym) are well established: see Ogawa v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCAFC 160; 294 FCR 221 at [23]-[35] (Rares, Perry and Hespe JJ). The party moving the Court to make such orders has the onus of satisfying the Court that such an order is necessary. Necessary means precisely that – it does not equate to convenient, reasonable or sensible: see Misrachi v The Public Guardian [2019] NSWCA 67 at [11] (Bell P and Emmett AJA). The concept of being “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice” in s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act is a high bar. Why that is so is readily apparent because the making of such orders is a departure from the principle of open justice.

17    The matters to which reference has been made in the proceeding before me and the emails received in the past day in support of suppression or non-publication orders reduce to the following:

(1)    the assertion of medical and psychological vulnerability by Mr Vinall;

(2)    Mr Vinall’s desire to conceal the information concerning this proceeding from other potential financiers to which he may apply for finance;

(3)    Mr Vinall’s desire to conceal the information concerning this proceeding from the parties in other proceedings said to be pending before this Court and in other courts involving Mr Vinall or his family members; and

(4)    a generalised reference to “existing safety protections” and a related criminal matter which was first introduced in an email sent to the Registry today and which is wholly unparticularised.

18    Mr Vinall brings a blanket application to in effect suppress the whole Court file and anonymise his identity. He has not sought to identify with particularity any part of the reasons for judgment that he seeks to be the subject of a suppression and non-publication order.

19    Mr Vinall has not established that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. Indeed, the second and third reasons advanced by Mr Vinall tend to demonstrate that the orders if made may have the contrary effect. In Vinall v Bankwest, one of the factors that weighed heavily against the grant of the injunctive relief was that Mr Vinall’s objective in seeking the injunctions appeared to be to circumvent one of the intended objectives of the credit reporting scheme under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to the potential detriment of third-party financiers: [45]. Similar considerations of public policy would weigh against the making of the suppression and non-publication orders now sought.

20    Accordingly, I decline to make an order for a pseudonym or to suppress the reasons for judgment. I will make orders discharging the interim orders made by Registrar White and for the reasons in Vinall v Bankwest to be published on the Court’s website.

Associate:

Dated:    26 February 2026