Federal Court of Australia

Steele v Australian Financial Complaints Authority [2026] FCA 170

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed as incompetent.

2.    The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings, to be agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCDONALD J:

Introduction

1    On 15 July 2025, Michael Steele commenced the present proceedings by filing a notice of appeal against a judgment delivered by a judge of this Court (primary judge) on 20 June 2025: Steele v Host-Plus Pty Limited as trustee for the Hostplus Superannuation Fund [2025] FCA 668.

2    In that judgment, the primary judge dismissed an appeal by Mr Steele pursuant to s 1057(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) against a determination made by the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) on 27 November 2024.

3    The decision of AFCA that was the subject of the appeal which the primary judge dismissed was a decision to affirm a determination made by Host-Plus Pty Ltd (Host-Plus), as the trustee of the HostPlus Superannuation Fund. Host-Plus had determined to pay 100% of the death benefit of Mr Steele’s mother, Jennifer Cole, to her spouse, Stephen Cole. Host-Plus was the first respondent to the appeal which was dismissed by the primary judge, but has not been made a respondent to the present proceedings. AFCA was the second respondent in the proceedings before the primary judge, and is the sole respondent named by Mr Steele on the present appeal.

4    On 27 August 2025, AFCA filed a notice of objection to the competency of the present appeal. In the proceedings before the primary judge, AFCA had filed a submitting notice. The application to dismiss the appeal, which was upheld by the primary judge, was made and prosecuted by Host-Plus. In circumstances where AFCA is the only named respondent to the present appeal, it has acted appropriately in applying to have the appeal dismissed and making submissions in support of that application: cf Lynn v Australian Financial Complaints Authority [2025] FCA 175 (Lynn) at [10]-[13].

5    For the reasons given below, AFCA’s objection to the competency of the appeal must be upheld. The grounds on which Mr Steele seeks to rely, to the extent that they can be understood, do not identify any alleged error in the decision or reasoning of the primary judge. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Relevant factual background

6    As mentioned above, Mr Steele is the son of Ms Cole. After Ms Cole’s death, Host-Plus made a determination to pay 100% of the death benefit payable to her spouse, Mr Cole. Mr Steele and his sister, Amie Cicciarello, were dissatisfied with the decision of Host-Plus, and made a complaint to AFCA.

7    The decision of AFCA is described in the reasons of the primary judge at [24]-[28]. Though AFCA acknowledged that Mr Steele and Ms Cicciarello appeared to be facing financial hardship, it found that neither of them was financially dependent on Ms Cole at the time of her death. AFCA found that it was not the death of Ms Cole that caused financial hardship to Mr Steele and Ms Cicciarello. Rather, their apparent financial hardship related to legal proceedings which involved her husband, the father of Mr Steele and Ms Cicciarello, in connection with events which only occurred after Ms Cole’s death. AFCA further found that there was no evidence to support a conclusion that, had Ms Cole been able to foresee the legal proceedings involving her former husband, she would have contributed to his legal fees.

8    AFCA noted that Ms Cole had made her will on 10 May 2005 and, on 31 May 2005, had nominated Mr Cole as her preferred beneficiary, and he was then recorded as such on annual statements sent to Ms Cole every year thereafter. AFCA found that the decision of Host-Plus to pay 100% of Ms Cole’s death benefit to her preferred beneficiary, Mr Cole, was consistent with her wishes and was, in all the circumstances, fair and reasonable.

9    The primary judge found (at [34]-[35]) that the grounds of appeal did not raise any question of law that might arguably impugn the decision of AFCA and that, instead, they impermissibly sought to challenge the merits of AFCA’s decision. The primary judge then considered whether the notice of appeal raised matters that could be recast as raising seriously arguable questions of law. After a detailed consideration of two possible questions of law that he considered could potentially arise on the appeal (at [43]-[55]), the primary judge concluded (at [56]) that none of the allegations made by Mr Steele could give rise to a seriously arguable question of law. For that reason, his Honour determined that Mr Steele’s appeal should be dismissed.

Relevant legal principles relating to the competency of an appeal

10    Rule 36.72 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), so far as it is presently relevant, provides:

(1)    A respondent who objects to the competency of an appeal must, within 14 days after being served with a notice of appeal, file a notice of objection to competency:

(a)    in accordance with Form 125; and

(b)    that, briefly but specifically, states the grounds of the objection.

(2)    The appellant carries the burden of establishing the competency of an appeal.

(3)    A respondent may apply to the Court for the question of competency to be heard and determined before the hearing of the appeal.

…

(5)    If the Court decides that an appeal is not competent, the appeal is dismissed.

11    In accordance with r 36.72, AFCA applied for the question of the competency of the appeal to be heard and determined before the hearing of the appeal. As r 36.72(5) makes clear, the determination of an application under r 36.72 does not involve the exercise of a discretion: if the appeal is held not to be competent, the Court must dismiss the appeal: see, eg, Huang v University of New South Wales [2014] FCA 1337 at [52].

12    An appeal may be incompetent where it is “incomprehensible or entirely unrelated to the issues dealt with in the judgment” from which the appeal is brought: Zegarac v Dellios [2007] FCAFC 58 at [7]. The task of the Court in determining whether an appeal is competent has been said to be “one of determining whether the notice of appeal, as a matter of substance, specifies appellable errors”: Singh v Owners Strata Plan No 11723 (No 3) (2012) 207 FCR 390; [2012] FCA 1121 at 396-7 [31].

The notice of appeal and the submissions advanced by Mr Steele

13    Mr Steele’s notice of appeal contains two “grounds of appeal”, expressed as follows:

1.    Based on new evidence submitted by the applicant in MS 18, I wish for the court to find that [Mr Cole] most likely suppressed, concealed or destroyed letters addressed to us children containing our mothers’ final wishes’.

It is highly suspected that letters addressing our mothers’ true wishes should have been handed to us in an envelope at our mother’s funeral but were not. That it was out of character for our mother to depart without leaving a single word. That it is out of character in nature for any mother to depart without leaving a single word to her own children considering how much time they had to prepare for their own pending deaths.

I the applicant am pursuant to CRIMES ACT 1900 – SECT 317 Tampering etc with evidence

2.    That AFCA as a registered Australian business falsely and deceivingly advertises key phrases within its ‘AFCA approach to a superannuation death benefit’ which they have failed to honour, and which is a violation of consumer advertising laws.

Their words played a pivotal role in encouraging me to challenge this matter and which has cost me 2 years of my life doing that and am therefore pursuant to COMPETITION AND CONSUMER ACT 2010 – SECT 56BN Misleading or deceptive conduct—offence

(Emphasis in original.)

14    In the notice of appeal, Mr Steele seeks the following orders:

1.    That it is found by way of examining further evidence that I have submitted under MS 18, that the spouse most likely did indeed supress, conceal or destroy evidence required for this judicial proceeding, and,

2.    That $99,999,99c of our mother’s death benefit money be transferred into a family trust account to minimise tax, and to aid re-establishing our father who has clearly been wiped out by corrupted legal industries and as seen by all in ‘MS 13’.

The spouse and his children would otherwise also receive our mothers house worth between $700k and $800k, including their own mothers house and everything else our mother owned. We are asking for just 1 eighth of that amount. Steve the spouse is greedily trying to hog everything to himself without a single crumb to the members own children to support our father who is dependent on us, and therefore we in tum on our mother.

(Emphasis in original.)

15    The notice of appeal then goes on to identify the following as “grounds relied on”:

1.    I have produced previously unadmitted evidence titled ‘MS 18’ that proves beyond any reasonable doubt that our mother was a letter writer and has applied effort in the past towards her children. Evidence of our mother evolving from letter writing to texting can be seen in the last message that I received from her around a month before she died and as seen in the bottom photo also in ‘MS 18’.

2.    AFCA’s inability to provide an example of a more befitting set of circumstances of a ‘members family circumstances changing around the date of death’ in comparison to the members own family circumstances changing.

(Emphasis in original.)

16    I shall consider the notice of appeal on the basis that Mr Steele advances, as potential grounds of appeal, all of what appears in the paragraphs under the headings “grounds of appeal” and “grounds relied on”. I have also taken into account Mr Steele’s description of the orders sought in seeking to understand the issues he seeks to raise on the appeal.

17    The references to “MS 18” are references to an annexure to an affidavit of Mr Steele dated 3 July 2025. At my request, a copy of this annexure was produced at the hearing and was admitted into evidence, for the purpose of enabling the grounds of appeal which refer to “MS 18” to be more fully understood. Given that “MS 18” is described as “previously unadmitted evidence”, and contains evidence that was not before AFCA or the primary judge, it is not apparent that this document could have any bearing on an appeal from the decision of the primary judge, which was in turn considering an application to strike out a notice of appeal and to dismiss an appeal limited to a question of law.

18    The reference to annexure “MS 13”, which appears in the second of the orders sought in the notice of appeal, is to a document that was annexed to an affidavit of Mr Steele dated 28 March 2025, in the proceedings before the primary judge. It is entitled “Evidence that my father has been cleaned out by corrupted legal Industries”, and comprises a large amount of material, written or compiled by Mr Steele himself, which was not before AFCA when it made its decision. Its connection with the decision of AFCA, or any question of law arising in respect of that decision, is not apparent.

19    Mr Steele has described himself as an “apprentice slave lawyer” and “the perceived sacrificial lamb on a big imaginary boat”. It is apparent that he is deeply frustrated with the legal process, including his inability to obtain legal representation, and that he feels genuinely aggrieved by many things that have happened which he perceives to have been unjust – including, but by no means limited to, the decisions of Host-Plus and AFCA.

20    In order to assist Mr Steele to understand AFCA’s objection to the competency of his appeal, the concept of an appeal on a question of law, and the limits of an appeal to the Full Court from the decision of the primary judge, arrangements were made for a registrar of the Court to conduct an explanatory conference with Mr Steele. That conference was held on 13 November 2025. A further case management hearing (with a different registrar) was held on 23 February 2026.

21    On 4 November 2025, in accordance with an order I had made, AFCA filed written submissions, limited to 10 pages, in support of its notice of objection to competency. On 19 November 2025, I made an order requiring Mr Steele to file any written submissions in response, limited to 10 pages. On 21 November 2025, I made a further order extending the time for the filing of Mr Steele’s written submissions to 18 February 2026.

22    On 17 February 2026, Mr Steele provided to the New South Wales Registry of the Court a written submission (albeit in the form of an affidavit). That submission ran to some 79 numbered pages, and so did not comply with the order permitting him to file a written submission of up to 10 pages. On 24 February 2026, following the case management hearing before a registrar, Mr Steele provided further written submissions. The further written submissions comprised an additional 10-page submission directed to arguing that the appeal was competent, as well as attaching the previous 79-page submission. These submissions (including the original 79-page document) have been accepted for filing, and I have had regard to them.

23    The written submissions advanced by Mr Steele adopt a vitriolic and at times sardonic tone. They address multiple grievances that are, at best, distantly related to the decision of the primary judge. Insofar as Mr Steele’s submissions are addressed to the decision of AFCA, they are a mixture of assertions of corruption and incompetence and expressions of disbelief. They do not identify any error made by the primary judge in the judgment from which Mr Steele has appealed. Otherwise, his submissions comprise claims for damages totalling around $2.8m from AFCA, the New South Wales Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, the New South Wales Director of Public Prosecutions, and the fraud squad of the New South Wales police force; allegations of corruption and fraud by, and criticisms of, various institutions and individuals; complaints about the conduct of lawyers in connection with criminal proceedings involving Mr Steele’s father; reproachful commentary on the procedural course of the proceedings before the primary judge and the conduct of Host-Plus and AFCA in connection with the proceedings; and a contention that Mr Steele has been placed on a blacklist to prevent him from obtaining legal representation.

24    At the hearing, Mr Steele largely relied on his written submissions, but also advanced some oral submissions directed to some of the same issues. Mr Steele’s submissions generally are not directed to the questions of whether his notice of appeal identifies an error in the reasons of the primary judge, whether leave to appeal is required, or whether he has brought his appeal against all of the necessary respondents.

The appeal is not competent

Appeal grounds not directed to identifying error in the decision of the primary judge

25    As the primary judge explained, an appeal to this Court under s 1057 of the Corporations Act is an appeal on a question of law. To succeed on an appeal from the decision of the primary judge, it would therefore be necessary for Mr Steele to demonstrate that the primary judge had erred in concluding that Mr Steele’s appeal against the decision of AFCA did not raise an arguable ground based on a question of law. Given the nature of the decision made by the primary judge, that means that Mr Steele would need to identify a question of law by reference to which the decision of AFCA is said to be affected by error, and which the primary judge ought to have found was raised by him on the appeal and was arguable.

26    Although this requirement was explained to him, Mr Steele has not (whether in the notice of appeal or in his arguments before this Court) identified any arguable error on the part of the primary judge.

27    It is apparent that the grounds of appeal do not attempt to identify any error in the decision or reasoning of the primary judge. The grounds referring to “MS 18” appear to refer to new evidence which Mr Steele wishes to advance before the Court. Those grounds appear to be directed to the merits of the decision made by AFCA. They do not identify any question of law which is said to have arisen on the appeal that was brought by Mr Steele and which was dismissed by the primary judge.

28    In essence, Mr Steele appears to ask this Court to consider the conduct of various persons and bodies, including Mr Cole and AFCA, and to make orders to remedy a host of complaints that do not relate to the primary judge’s decision. The orders sought in the notice of appeal are not orders of a kind that the Court could make on the appeal. Insofar as they relate to the decision of AFCA, they are clearly directed to asking the Court to make a decision on the merits, based on evidence that was not before AFCA when it made its decision and was not before the primary judge. This strongly supports the conclusion that the appeal is not, in substance, directed to identifying error in the decision of the primary judge. The attempt to use the appeal as a vehicle to agitate these (as well as other) issues was also reflected in Mr Steele’s written and oral submissions, which were unfocussed and raised many complaints about the conduct of persons (most of whom are not parties to these proceedings) over several years.

29    Finally, insofar as Mr Steele’s grounds of appeal allege that AFCA has acted in contravention of s 56BN of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) in some way, it is not apparent that that is an allegation that could be relevant on an appeal against the decision of the primary judge, and its relevance was not explained. Section 56BN creates a criminal offence. That is not a matter that could be addressed on an appeal from the decision of the primary judge.

30    These defects are not matters of form that could be addressed by granting Mr Steele leave to file an amended notice of appeal. With the possible exception of the matters addressed in the following paragraphs, the issues that Mr Steele seeks to agitate on the appeal are not directed to establishing any relevant arguable error on the part of the primary judge, having regard to the nature of the application his Honour was called upon to decide.

31    In his written and oral submissions and, Mr Steele also advanced complaints that he had been denied legal assistance; that AFCA had not actively participated in the appeal proceedings before the primary judge (where it filed a submitting appearance); and that Host-Plus had actively participated in those proceedings. Insofar as these contentions might be interpreted as implicitly alleging errors on the part of the primary judge, they are so plainly unarguable that leave to amend Mr Steele’s notice of appeal to allege them, if sought, should not be granted.

32    Two further submissions advanced by Mr Steele in his written submissions should be addressed. First, Mr Steele complains that AFCA “failed to report systemic issues and serious contraventions” to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, as required by s 1052E of the Corporations Act. Mr Steele complains that he raised this issue before the primary judge and that the primary judge failed to address it properly. However, even if this allegation were correct, a failure of AFCA to report a systemic issue or serious contravention of a law would not raise a question of law relevant to an appeal against the decision which was the subject of the appeal proceedings before the primary judge.

33    Secondly, Mr Steele states:

The primary judge failed to weigh up expenses associated with Supreme court matters, or being wiped out by corrupted legal industries in comparison to the spouse and his children’s spending sprees on toys and other comfort things. The Primary Judge also failed to factor into consideration the systemic issues caused by the predatory loan which would be reaching boiling point as you read and will obviously become further grounds for litigation. You people drive me mad..

34    Although these statements are framed as failures on the part of the primary judge, they are complaints about the primary judge not having regard to certain alleged facts that could only be relevant to the merits of the decision of AFCA. Insofar as these can be regarded as allegations of error on the part of the primary judge, it is not arguable that his Honour was required, when deciding whether to dismiss an appeal on a question of law, to “weigh up” considerations as though he were standing in the shoes of AFCA and exercising the power to make a decision afresh. For that reason, if Mr Steele were to seek leave to amend the notice of appeal to include this allegation, leave should not be granted.

Leave to appeal and failure to name all proper respondents

35    AFCA also raises two additional reasons why Mr Steele’s present appeal is said not to be competent. The first of these is that Mr Steele’s appeal only lies with leave.

36    Section 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) identifies the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Section 24(1)(a) states that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine “appeals from judgments of the Court constituted by a single Judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court”. Although the proceedings that were dismissed by the primary judge were styled as an “appeal”, as a statutory appeal from an administrative decision on a question of law, what was involved was an exercise of this Court’s original jurisdiction: see, eg, Rana v Repatriation Commission (2011) 126 ALD 1; [2011] FCAFC 124 at 3 [3], 6-7 [20]; Lynn at [15].

37    Section 24(1A) of the FCA Act provides:

(1A)    An appeal shall not be brought from a judgment referred to in subsection (1) that is an interlocutory judgment unless the Court or a Judge gives leave to appeal.

38    Section 24(1D) provides that a decision granting summary judgment under s 31A of the FCA Act is taken to be an interlocutory judgment for the purpose of s 24(1A).

39    The decision of the primary judge was in substance a decision to summarily dismiss Mr Steele’s appeal against the decision of AFCA. There is Full Court authority which supports the conclusion that, in these circumstances, an appeal would only lie against the primary judge’s decision with leave: see, eg, Dimitrovski v Boland [2023] FCAFC 86 at [21]-[25]. Despite this defect having been pointed out by AFCA in its submissions, Mr Steele has not applied for leave to appeal.

40    It follows that AFCA is correct to submit that the appeal is not competent for this reason. Had this been the only basis on which Mr Steele’s appeal was not competent, it might well have been appropriate to have allowed him an opportunity to file an application for leave to appeal (and for the necessary extension of time to seek leave to appeal) and to have ordered that the notice of appeal be treated as a draft notice of appeal subject to the grant of leave.

41    The final basis on which AFCA submits the appeal is not competent is that Host-Plus has not been named as a respondent to the appeal.

42    Rule 36.31(1) of the Federal Court Rules provides that each party to the proceedings in the court appealed from who may be affected by the relief sought on appeal, or who might be interested in maintaining the judgment under appeal, must be joined as an appellant or respondent to the appeal. Host-Plus was the active respondent before the primary judge and the decision of the primary judge was made on an application by Host-Plus that the appeal before the primary judge be dismissed. Host-Plus had an interest in maintaining the judgment under appeal. Further, Mr Steele’s notice of appeal seeks an order that Ms Cole’s death benefit be distributed in a particular way. If that order were made, Host-Plus would be the party that would be required to comply with it. For each of these reasons, Host-Plus should have been named as a respondent. However, as AFCA appropriately acknowledged, had this been the only defect in Mr Steele’s appeal, it could appropriately have been addressed by the making of an order that Host-Plus be joined as a respondent.

Conclusion

43    For the reasons explained above, I conclude that the present appeal is not competent. Accordingly, it must be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. Mr Steele will be required to pay AFCA’s costs of the proceedings.

Associate:

Dated:    26 February 2026