Federal Court of Australia

Vinall v Bank of Western Australia Limited trading as Bankwest [2026] FCA 143

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application for interim injunctive relief filed 22 January 2026 be dismissed.

2.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Cheeseman J reasons for judgment published on 24 February 2026 are not to be provided to any person other than the applicant and his spouse and the respondents and their legal representatives until further order.

2.    Any application to supress any part of these reasons for judgment or anonymising the applicant’s name in these reasons for judgment be:

(a)    notified by email to the Associate to Cheeseman J by 2.00pm on 25 February 2026; and

(b)    if so notified, heard on 26 February 2026 at the end of case management hearings before Cheeseman J, details of which will be published on the daily court list.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHEESEMAN J:

1    These reasons concern an urgent duty application that came before me in my capacity as Commercial and Corporations Duty Judge. I heard the urgent aspect of the application on the afternoon of Friday, 20 February 2026. These are my reasons for dismissing the application.

2    The applicant is Mr Charles Vinall. Mr Vinall is a litigant in person. He brings this proceeding against the Bank of Western Australia Limited trading as Bankwest. In April 2022, Bankwest extended to Mr Vinall what is described as a construction home loan for $1.5 million. I will refer to this loan as 8069 Loan. The second respondent is Equifax Australia Information Services and Solutions Pty Ltd, which is a credit reporting body, with whom Bankwest has shared information in relation to Mr Vinall and the 8069 Loan.

3    Bankwest appeared in person at short notice in response to the urgent duty application. Bankwest was represented by Mr Tao of Counsel, instructed by Gadens Lawyers.

4    Equifax did not appear on the duty application. Although attempts had been made to bring the proceeding to Equifax’s attention, I was not satisfied that Equifax was aware of the listing on Friday afternoon. Equifax has not filed a notice of acting – appointment of a lawyer in the substantive proceeding. In these circumstances, I proceeded to determine the application in so far as it related to Bankwest only.

5    The urgent aspect of the application was directed to obtaining two forms of relief both of which arise in the setting of Part IIIA of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) which together with the Privacy Regulation 2013 (Cth) and the Privacy (Credit Reporting) Code 2025 (Cth) relevantly regulates consumer credit reporting in Australia.

6    One of the objects of the Privacy Act is to facilitate an efficient credit reporting system while ensuring that the privacy of individuals is respected: s 2A(d). The present application relates to the reporting of a financial hardship arrangement and involves financial hardship information, as those terms are defined in s 6QA of the Privacy Act. Mr Vinall disputes that the information which appears on the credit report relating to him in relation to the 8069 Loan which is available from Equifax is properly within the meaning of financial hardship for the purposes of these two definitions.

7    The relief sought by Mr Vinall was distilled into proposed consent orders to which Bankwest did not consent.

8    The first form of relief sought was directed to obtaining an interim injunction restraining Bankwest from engaging in any hardship-related credit reporting to any credit reporting body in relation to Mr Vinall.

9    The second form of relief was directed to obtaining an interim mandatory injunction requiring Bankwest to take reasonable steps to request each credit reporting body to which it had provided hardship-related information pertaining to Mr Vinall to temporarily suppress or remove that information.

10    In respect of both injunctions, the applicant sought an initial period of 90 days subject to being extended by further order.

11    Mr Vinall contended that the relief sought was urgent because he says that the continued publication of financial hardship indicators is materially impairing his ability to obtain finance to complete settlement on the purchase of a block of residential land that he says is now scheduled for 2 March 2026, having been previously extended. The address of the land the subject of the purchase is 4 Newfoundland Way, Box Hill NSW 2765. The evidence to which I will come in relation to this contract for the purchase of the Box Hill property was curious.

12    This application is brought in the context of substantive proceedings in which Mr Vinall claims amongst other things: declaratory and injunctive relief under the Privacy Act; orders directed to suppressing the disputed credit information and granting the applicant a pseudonym in this proceeding; damages for misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to financial services under s 12GF of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (the ASIC Act); and compensation including aggravated damages.

13    As I have mentioned, Mr Vinall is a litigant in person. He applied for leave for his wife, Mrs Fiona Vinall, to assist him as a McKenzie friend on the basis that he was undergoing continued treatment for a serious medical condition and that he felt unwell. Notwithstanding that there was no medical evidence before the Court in relation to Mr Vinall’s medical condition, I granted the application for the purpose of the duty application only. Mrs Vinall informed the Court during the course of the application that she has worked for a period in what she described as “credit history and banking” and has what she described as a “unique insight” in relation the statutory obligations owed by banks to comply with the Privacy Act, including in circumstances where an associated complaint has been referred to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA). The hearing was conducted in Court and by remote video link with Mr and Mrs Vinall appearing remotely. Mr Vinall was present on screen and was able to, and did, confer with Mrs Vinall as the hearing proceeded. It was difficult for Mrs Vinall to address the Court in this matter given her husband’s circumstances and the impact that the financial distress he is experiencing is having on their family. Mrs Vinall was frustrated and emotional at times but was tenacious in explaining the basis on which Mr Vinall posits his claim for relief against Bankwest.

14    Mr Vinall is the borrower under the 8069 Loan. Bankwest is a credit provider as defined by s 6G of the Privacy Act. Equifax is a credit reporting body as defined by s 6 and appears to conduct a credit reporting business as defined by s 6P. Relevantly, for the purpose of this application, Equifax maintains records which include credit information as defined in s 6N in relation to Mr Vinall’s credit history on the 8069 Loan.

15    The relief that Mr Vinall seeks, and the avowed purpose for which he seeks it is unusual. This is not an application for an injunction that will function to preserve the status quo pending determination of the substantive dispute between the parties despite Mr Vinall’s protestations to the effect that the relief is narrowly framed and directed “solely” to preserving the status quo. This is an application that seeks to restrain Bankwest from reporting financial hardship information under the Privacy Act prospectively for a period of at least 90 days and to cause Bankwest to use its best endeavours to cause Equifax to temporarily suppress or expunge the financial hardship information that it presently holds in relation to Mr Vinall and the 8069 Loan. Mr Vinall’s stated objective is to enhance his prospects of obtaining finance from another financier without the incoming financier being alerted to the existing financial hardship information held by Equifax in relation to Mr Vinall and the 8069 Loan. Mr Vinall says that he is precluded from securing finance on the competitive terms he desires to complete the purchase of the Box Hill property which he says is due to complete on 2 March 2026. Mr Vinall wants his credit history to be temporarily suppressed so that he may try to obtain offers of finance from a range of financiers at what he believes will be more competitive terms than those he apprehends may be available to him if his existing credit information maintained by Equifax in relation to the 8069 Loan is available to prospective financiers under the credit reporting regime established under the Privacy Act.

16    Mr Vinall justifies the relief that he seeks on the basis of his contention that the relevant information is incorrect, misleading and deceptive and that Bankwest is liable, amongst other things for breaches of the Privacy Act and the ASIC Act.

17    Based on the evidence before me, and accepting that the application was brought on relatively urgently, I am not satisfied that Mr Vinall has discharged his onus for the extraordinary relief that he seeks for the following reasons.

18    First, I am not satisfied that Mr Vinall has established that he has a prima facie case that is other than very weak. His contention is that the information supplied by Bankwest to Equifax was information that was supplied in breach of the Privacy Act and otherwise misleading and deceptive in breach of the ASIC Act. Mr Vinall seeks to advance a construction of the relevant statutory scheme focusing in particular on s 6QA(5) in a way that is devoid of textual and contextual support and if correct would be detrimental to achieving the object of the Privacy Act identified in s 2A(d).

19    The facts which emerged based on the limited evidence led on this application may be briefly stated. In early August 2023, Mr Vinall contacted Bankwest in relation to what was described as a serious medical condition the details of which are not in evidence. Relevantly, the medical condition was said to be impacting Mr Vinall’s ability to meet his commitments to Bankwest. At that stage Mr Vinall’s position was that he did not want financial assistance “yet”. Mr Vinall then lodged a financial hardship application on 5 August 2023 and Bankwest confirmed that the loan had been placed in the bank’s hardship area. There was further correspondence in August 2023 continuing into October 2023 which culminated in Mr Vinall lodging a complaint with AFCA on 18 October 2023. The AFCA complaint was determined on 14 February 2025 (AFCA Determination). In the intervening period Mr Vinall made no repayments.

20    The AFCA Determination was partially in favour of Mr Vinall. Mr Vinall chose to accept the AFCA Determination, which then became binding on Bankwest. Bankwest was informed by AFCA on 17 March 2025 that Mr Vinall had accepted its determination.

21    Relevantly, the AFCA Determination required Bankwest to provide Mr Vinall with a period of six months during which he could demonstrate his ability to service his existing loan commitments on or before the date on which they fell due. This was referred to as the serviceability arrangement. The AFCA Determination specifically required that during the serviceability arrangement Bankwest should report Repayment History Information (RHI) as defined in s 6V(1) of the Privacy Act by reference to whether Mr Vinall complied with the serviceability arrangement and report the arrangement as a financial hardship arrangement. The AFCA Determination included information in relation to credit reporting under the Privacy Act, including as to the appropriate codes to be used by Bankwest in relation to reporting financial hardship arrangements: see part 3.4 of the AFCA Determination. Bankwest confirmed by letter dated 19 March 2025 that the arrangement would commence on 17 April 2025 and conclude on 18 September 2025.

22    Subject to satisfactory completion of the serviceability arrangement, Bankwest was required to vary the contract by capitalising the arrears and to confirm in writing the new loan limit, and the minimum required monthly repayments to repay the loan by April 2052. This was referred to as the varied contract. In the event that a varied contract was entered into, Bankwest was required to “return to normal RHI reporting and report RHI against [Mr Vinall’s] compliance with the varied contract”.

23    The evidence demonstrates that Mr Vinall successfully completed the serviceability arrangement and on around 11 September 2025 entered into a varied contract with Bankwest, as a result of which approximately $170,000 in arrears was capitalised and became part of the principal repayable by the end of the term of the varied contract. The capitalisation took effect on 12 September 2025. Mr Vinall’s evidence is that he completed the serviceability arrangement by paying about $1,500 more than the minimum amount due under the contract for each of the six months. This is a matter to which Mr Vinall attaches some significance in his argument relating to the proper construction of the statutory regime and in particular s 6QA(5)(b) of the Privacy Act.

24    The evidence demonstrates that in the period of the serviceability assessment Bankwest reported Mr Vinall’s compliance with the serviceability arrangement as a financial hardship arrangement by using a green tick to show that payments were received on time and the letter “A” designated that the payment was due to a financial hardship arrangement. Bankwest’s reporting was in accordance with what AFCA had required for this period if Mr Vinall chose to accept the AFCA Determination, which he did.

25    The evidence further demonstrates that upon entry into the varied contract in September 2025, Bankwest reported Mr Vinall’s entry into a varied contract by using a green tick to show that payments were received on time and the letter “V” to designate entry into a “variation financial hardship arrangement”. Again, this was in accordance with the manner in which AFCA had required a varied contract if entered to be reported, and which was an integral part of the determination that Mr Vinall accepted.

26    Mr Vinall argues that the arrangements implemented by reason of his acceptance of the AFCA Determination did not constitute a “financial hardship arrangement” for credit reporting purposes which Mr Vinall submits is “governed exclusively” by s 6QA of the Privacy Act. Mr Vinall emphasises s 6QA(5)(b) in particular. He argues that because he made payments in excess of the minimum monthly payments otherwise due and payable under the original terms of the 8069 Loan during the period of the serviceability arrangement, the arrangement was not captured by the statutory definition of financial hardship arrangement. Accordingly, Mr Vinall submits that in reporting this information, Bankwest breached the Privacy Act and engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct under the ASIC Act.

27    For the purpose of this application, if I assume Mr Vinall is not estopped or otherwise precluded from complaining about an alleged breach of the Privacy Act to which he agreed for the purpose of obtaining a substantial benefit at the expense of Bankwest in the form of the capitalisation and deferral of his repayment obligations in relation to approximately $170,000, I regard the statutory construction of s 6QA of the Privacy Act as being barely arguable.

28    It is convenient to extract s 6QA of the Privacy Act in full:

6QA Meanings of financial hardship arrangement and financial hardship information

Financial hardship arrangement

(1)    If:

(a)    a credit provider provides consumer credit to an individual; and

(b)    the National Credit Code applies to the provision of the credit; and

(c)    the individual is or will be unable to meet the individual’s obligations in relation to the consumer credit; and

(d)    as a result of the inability, an arrangement covered by subsection (3) affecting the monthly payment obligations of the individual is made between the credit provider and the individual which is either:

(i)    a permanent variation to the terms of the consumer credit; or

(ii)    a temporary relief from or deferral of the individual’s obligations in relation to the consumer credit;

then the arrangement is a financial hardship arrangement.

Note:     Financial hardship arrangements affect repayment history information: see subsection 6V(1A).

(2)    For the purposes of this section, it does not matter whether the arrangement was initiated by the credit provider or the individual.

(3)    This subsection covers any kind of agreement, arrangement or understanding, whether formal or informal, whether express or implied and whether or not enforceable, or intended to be enforceable, by legal proceedings.

Examples: An arrangement might involve a credit provider agreeing to:

(a)     defer or reduce required monthly payments for a temporary period; or

(b)     accept interest‑only payments for a temporary period; or

(c)     extend the term of a loan to reduce monthly payments.

Financial hardship information

(4)    If subsection 6V(1A) (about financial hardship arrangements) applies in determining repayment history information about an individual, then the following information is financial hardship information about the individual:

(a)    for an arrangement referred to in subparagraph (1)(d)(i) (about permanent variations)—information, relating only to the first monthly payment affected by the arrangement, that indicates that the monthly payment is the first monthly payment affected by a financial hardship arrangement of that kind;

(b)     for an arrangement referred to in subparagraph (1)(d)(ii) (about temporary relief or deferral of obligations)—information, relating to each monthly payment affected by the arrangement, that indicates that the monthly payment was affected by a financial hardship arrangement of that kind.

Note:     Paragraph (b) may apply even if, under the arrangement, the individual is not required to make a payment for a month: see subsection 6V(1B).

(5)    Paragraph (4)(b) does not apply in relation to a monthly payment under a financial hardship arrangement if:

(a)    the individual met the obligation to make the monthly payment, as affected by the arrangement; and

(b)    the amount paid was equal to, or greater than, the amount the individual would have been obliged to pay apart from the arrangement.

29    Section 8A of the Privacy (Credit Reporting) Code is made for the purposes of, relevantly, s 6QA of the Privacy Act. I will not set it out in full. Of particular relevance is s 8A(8) which provides:

(8)     An individual will satisfy the conditions of paragraph 6QA(5)(b) of the Act if the individual pays their ordinary monthly payment in the month plus all amounts overdue from previous months, and that payment is made by the last day of the month.

Note:     Information about a temporary FHA is not financial hardship information where the conditions of subsection 6QA(5) of the Act are met, including that was equal to, or greater than, the amount the individual would have been obliged to pay apart from the arrangement.

30    On the plain terms of the definition of financial hardship arrangement in s 6QA(1) of the Privacy Act, the serviceability arrangement was captured (see s 6QA(1)(d)(ii), there being no dispute that the criteria in s 6QA(1)(a) to (c) are met), as was the varied contract (see s 6QA(1)(d)(i), there being no dispute that the criteria in s 6QA(1)(a) to (c) are met). Mr Vinall did not expressly suggest otherwise. The genesis of the two arrangements was the AFCA Determination which it will be recalled was initiated by Mr Vinall’s complaint amongst other things about Bankwest not providing “the reasonable hardship assistance he sought”. The breadth of ss 6QA(2) and (3) is more than adequate to cover the arrangements implemented as a result of Mr Vinall’s acceptance of the AFCA Determination, which then bound Bankwest.

31    Tracing through to the definition of financial hardship information in s 6QA(4) of the Privacy Act, the information that was provided by Bankwest in respect of the servicing arrangement and the varied contract is information of the type specified in ss 6QA(4)(a) and (b) respectively.

32    Mr Vinall’s argument seizes on the exception to s 6QA(4)(b) of the Privacy Act introduced by s 6QA(5). The exception is engaged if both the conditions in subsections (a) and (b) are met. Mr Vinall argues that because he exceeded the minimum monthly payment required under the 8069 Loan during the serviceability arrangement that meant that he met this requirement and therefore the exception was engaged. On the basis of the argument before me, and even allowing for the fact that this was an urgent application presented by Mrs Vinall who is not legally qualified, Mr Vinall’s submission as to the proper statutory construction lacks merit.

33    The first condition, in s 6QA(5)(a) of the Privacy Act, is that the borrower has met the obligation to make the monthly payment required under the new arrangement, in the present context, the servicing arrangement. It is common ground that Mr Vinall met this obligation. This requirement is however cumulative with the condition contained in s 6QA(5)(b) which requires that the amount paid must be “equal to, or greater than, the amount the individual would have been obliged to pay apart from the arrangement”. What is meant by s 6QA(5)(b) is elucidated by s 8A(8) of the Privacy (Credit Reporting) Code which is extracted above. An individual will satisfy the conditions of s 6QA(5)(b) if the individual pays their ordinary monthly payment plus all amounts overdue from previous months, and that payment is made by the last of the month.

34    Mr Vinall was in arrears to the tune of approximately $170,000 at around the time of the servicing arrangement. As a result of the servicing arrangement, he was given opportunity to demonstrate an ability to service the minimum repayments on the 8069 Loan going forward. He says he paid about $1,500 per month over and above the minimum monthly repayment required under the servicing arrangement. He was not required to clear the arrears which – but for the AFCA complaint process – were then otherwise due and payable. On the evidence before me there does not appear to be factual support for Mr Vinall’s contention that the information provided by Bankwest was within the exception created by s 6QA(5) even if Mr Vinall’s preferred construction is available as a matter of construction.

35    Notwithstanding that the requirement to demonstrate a prima facie case is not an exacting standard, Mr Vinall has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of sufficient strength to justify the court's intervention having regard to factors that weigh against granting the relief sought.

36    Second, I am not satisfied that Mr Vinall has demonstrated that if the relief is not granted he faces a risk of serious harm for which an award of damages is an inadequate remedy.

37    Mr Vinall has not put the whole of the contract for sale of the Box Hill property in evidence. He has annexed to his affidavit the first two pages of the contract. On the face of those pages, the contract appears to be a contract nominating Mr and Mrs Vinall as “purchaser”. The deposit was in the sum of $78,500. The balance due on settlement was $706,500. The contract date is 16 April 2025, which was about two months after the AFCA Determination, the day before the serviceability arrangement was due to commence and about four months before the conclusion of the serviceability arrangement. No date for completion is shown on the two pages of the contract that are adduced in evidence. Mr Vinall deposes that he signed and paid the deposit for the Box Hill land which he says had a delayed settlement date of 1 December 2025.

38    Mr Vinall says that he exchanged contracts for the purchase of the Box Hill property as part of restructuring his financial position and downsizing his family home. He gives the following account of his plans in that regard:

My plan involved the eventual lease or sale of my current home and the purchase of a smaller, more affordable home in Sydney for them which my wife would be able to afford on her own in future.

I planned to use the considerable equity in my current home to contribute to the construction of the new home such that the mortgage on the new home would be significantly lower.

I also planned to draw down on some of my equity to finish my current home to make it possible to lease out to tenants or to sell at market, specifically to complete the landscaping which had to be put on hold when I fell ill in 2023.

Accordingly, I signed a Contract of Sale and paid a deposit for the purchase of a block of land in Newfoundland Road Box Hill NSW which had a delayed settlement date of 1 December 2025.

I entered into discussions with builders for the construction of a small house on the plot of land that could be built quickly with reduced time frames.

In September 2025, I began making preparations to progress the landscaping on my home by seeking various quotes from suppliers and having further discussions with builders.

Aside from the construction of a new home and the completion of my existing one, I also intended to immediately draw down on my equity to pay off a high-interest rate credit card to improve my monthly cashflow and refinance two other loans.

…

Using the equity in my home to build a new home and lower my mortgage, complete the landscaping on my current home to increase it's value and support a lower Loan to Value ratio, to pay off a high interest rate credit card and loan, was intended to help me significantly reduce overall debt, substantially increase my monthly cashflow and help me secure my families future.

39    The only other documentary evidence of the terms of the contract for sale of the Box Hill property is an email from Ms Susan Clegg, conveyancer at Proctor and Associates to Mr and Mrs Vinall dated 19 February 2026. The email is said to attach a full copy of the exchanged contract and an email from the vendor’s solicitors advising terms of the extension to the completion date. As I have said a full copy of the contract was not adduced in evidence. The vendor’s solicitors letter email is in evidence. Based on those documents it appears that the vendor agreed to allow Mr and Mrs Vinall until 2 March 2026 to complete, that default interest at the rate of 8% per annum would be payable by the purchaser and the contract completion date was not varied. All adjustments are to be made on the basis that the contract completion date remained as 1 December 2025.

40    Mr Vinall relies on an email from Mr Jared Jacobs at Aussie.com.au dated 31 December 2025 as the best evidence of the impending risk of serious harm. Mr Jacobs appears to be a finance broker. This is the only evidence of Mr Vinall seeking finance, which he says was for the purpose of completing the purchase of the Box Hill property. Mr Jacobs notes that he has been able to get some responses from “our most competitive lenders currently”. He includes a list of some six lenders he has spoken to, namely ME Bank, Suncorp, HSBC, ANZ, ING and Westpac. He attributes these lenders as having “very sharp rates”. He then says:

With the exception of Westpac, the remaining lenders need to see a period of at least 12-months OFF the financial hardship agreement before they will accept your scenario

41    The passage of text that follows this has been masked by a black box. When challenged on this, Mrs Vinall searched for a copy of the email and agreed that she would send by email an unredacted copy of the email to the Court and Bankwest’s solicitors. She has not done so. I indicated that upon receipt that email would become Exhibit 4. At the date of providing these reasons the unredacted copy of the email has not been received. Mrs Vinall said in her address that the text which was redacted said “I will be in the process of negotiating interest rates with Westpac and I will provide you with information.”

42    When asked what steps Mr Vinall had taken to secure finance to complete the purchase of the Box Hill property, which on his evidence was due on 1 December 2025, Mr Vinall’s response was that upon obtaining a copy of his consumer credit report from Equifax on 6 November 2025 he realised that Bankwest had disclosed financial hardship information in respect of his home loan on his credit report. He says he realised at this point, amongst other things, that it was very unlikely that he would be able to complete the purchase of the Box Hill property. Mr Vinall then gives an account of his dealings with Bankwest and Equifax by which he has attempted to have the financial hardship information removed from his credit record without success.

43    Even if Mr Vinall’s contentions as to the respondents being the cause of any loss he may suffer if he does not complete the purchase of the Box Hill property (and not his own conduct) are accepted, Mr Vinall has not established that damages would be an inadequate remedy.

44    Third, in addition to not being satisfied that Mr Vinall has a demonstrated a prima facie case or that damages are an inadequate remedy, I am also satisfied that the balance of convenience weighs heavily against granting the relief sought for the following reasons.

45    Mr Vinall’s objective in bringing this application also raises public policy considerations in that he is seeking orders that would potentially circumvent one of the intended objectives of the statutory scheme to the detriment of third-party financiers. That weighs heavily against the grant of the injunctions.

46    The factual background and the procedural history demonstrate that Mr Vinall has not acted reasonably and without undue delay in bringing this matter to court. It is not necessary here to recite the procedural history in this Court which is known to Mr Vinall and to Bankwest. On the basis of Mr Vinall’s own evidence, he has been aware of this issue since early November 2025. He initiated a previous application which came before another judge of this Court sitting as duty judge on 4 February 2026 which did not result in any orders being made. There followed a period of conferral between Mr and Mrs Vinall and Bankwest’s solicitors which ultimately resulted in Bankwest making an open offer on 6 February 2026 to “explore whether a constructive resolution between the parties could be achieved within the bounds of what is possible having regard to the Bank’s existing legal, regulatory and operating environment”.

47    The proposal made by Bankwest was in effect to invite Mr Vinall and/or Mrs Vinall to submit a loan application to it in connection with financing the Box Hill property. While Bankwest could not guarantee the outcome of the application in circumstances where it is subject to responsible lending laws and other requirements, it undertook to receive and consider any such loan application in good faith on a priority basis, with the application to be handled sensitively and compassionately by experienced lending specialists, acknowledging that time is of the essence. Further, that while Bankwest was not in a position to remove the financial hardship indicator on the credit listing, being aware of the circumstances of the indicator being listed, it was prepared to consider a loan application in respect of the Box Hill property taking the broader circumstances into account. Bankwest confirmed in writing that its offer remained open for acceptance as at 19 February 2026. In order for Bankwest to be able to consider an application, Mr Vinall would have to provide up to date financial information.

48    Mrs Vinall made the following submission in response to Bankwest’s submission that Mr Vinall’s conduct was unreasonable by refusing to engage with this offer:

It’s not really an offer. It’s not capable of being accepted as an offer. It’s an invitation to treat. And I don’t think it’s reasonable for something that is so open-ended, so uncertain, you know, where there is no guarantee of an outcome, and where Charlie would have to actually provide detailed financial information to the respondent while there is a live litigation on foot, is very unfair.

And also to have to reduce him to be forced to go with one lender, as opposed to what I submit is more reasonable which is that the respondent agree to the temporary suppression of what we say is misleading, in effect, and inaccurate information, to open up the loss that Charlie would otherwise have which is open up his choice as to lenders to financial products that would open up to him, which the evidence, as you’ve seen, has been closed to him. So we don’t really feel that that offer was – our position is it is disingenuous, and carries risks in itself.

49    Mr Vinall’s pursuit of the extraordinary remedy of the injunctive relief that he seeks in this application, rather than engaging with the open offer made by Bankwest, is a factor that I take into consideration as weighing against the grant of the relief in the balance of convenience. Mr Vinall’s belief that he can obtain a more competitive interest rate is pure speculation given he is not prepared to disclose his financial position and given his broker’s query as to lenders acceptance of “[his] scenario”.

50    Bankwest submitted that there is a real question as to whether injunctive relief if granted would be of any utility. I accept that submission. There is a lacuna in the evidence about whether Equifax would be amenable to comply with a request from Bankwest and as to whether Equifax is the only credit reporting body that has recorded the relevant information in relation to Mr Vinall.

51    Another factor that I regard as weighing against the grant of the relief is that Mr Vinall has taken the substantial benefit granted to him under the AFCA Determination but now seeks to circumvent the terms on which he accepted that benefit as to reporting during the period of the servicing arrangement and in respect of the varied contract, both of which appear to be consistent with the statutory requirements under the Privacy Act.

52    Although Mr Vinall has offered the usual undertaking as to damages, there is a real question as to whether the undertaking is of any substance. The limited information that Mr Vinall has provided in relation to his financial circumstances suggests that he is experiencing ongoing financial difficulty including in relation to his exposure to high interest loans that he intended to be short term.

53    For all of these reasons, I dismissed Mr Vinall’s application for interlocutory relief. Mr Tao upon taking instructions did not press for an order for costs. Accordingly, I made no order for costs.

54    At the end of the argument, Mr Vinall indicated that he required reasons as he was in the process of engaging legal representatives. He sought to press his application for a pseudonym and suppression orders in relation to these reasons for judgment when available. I informed Mr Vinall that I would publish these reasons to the parties and their legal representatives in the first instance and entertain any such application if made. Bankwest indicated that it was likely to adopt a neutral position in relation to any such application. I will make additional orders addressed to the potential for an application of this type at the time of publishing these reasons.

Associate:

Dated:    24 February 2026