Federal Court of Australia

Australian Agrivision Pty Ltd v Wolstenholme (Vacate Trial) [2026] FCA 82

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The second respondent’s interlocutory application dated 6 February 2026 be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore; revised from the transcript)

STEWART J:

1    Today, Monday, is the first day of the final hearing. The second respondent, Mr Anderson, applies to vacate the hearing by an interlocutory application filed on Friday, 6 February 2026. That is to say, it was filed on the last business day before the first day of the hearing.

2    Mr Anderson has previously brought applications in an effort to put off the hearing of the matter.

3    On 14 April 2025, I dismissed Mr Anderson’s application to stay this proceeding pending the outcome of separate proceedings in which he is involved in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) (the Family Court). My reasons for doing so are published as Australian Agrivision Pty Ltd v Wolstenholme (Stay) [2025] FCA 364. Essentially, I was not satisfied that there was sufficient risk that this proceeding might adversely affect the Family Court proceeding.

4    On 18 July 2025, I listed the matter for trial on 9 and 10 February 2026, being today and tomorrow.

5    On 16 December 2025, I dismissed Mr Anderson’s application to file an amended defence and a crossclaim. My reasons for doing so are published as Australian Agrivision Pty Ltd v Wolstenholme (Leave to Amend) [2025] FCA 1612. I considered that introducing a crossclaim at that late stage, in particular against persons not already parties to the matter, would imperil the trial dates, and that there had been plenty of opportunity to file a crossclaim at some earlier time.

6    Mr Anderson relies on two affidavits to support his new application to vacate the trial dates. The first is dated 6 February 2026 and runs to 260 pages including annexures. The second is dated 8 February 2026 and runs to 99 pages including annexures.

7    I acknowledge at the outset that Mr Anderson is a litigant in person. Mr Anderson has a long history of experience in building administration, property and finance and a diploma in electrical engineering. However, he does not have legal qualifications. He is naturally disadvantaged in having to conduct this case for himself.

8    Mr Anderson’s essential underlying reason in support of vacating the hearing dates is that he is unprepared for trial. Aside from him not being a lawyer and not having been able to retain a lawyer, he says that arises from being overwhelmed by the concurrent proceedings in the Family Court and other matters that he has had to attend to.

9    It remains unexplained why or how it came to pass that Nicola Craven of Vintage Commercial Law came on record in this proceeding on 21 September 2025 and then, on 29 January 2026, Mr Anderson filed a notice of address for service thereby taking the case back so as to be conducted by himself personally. I understand from Mr Anderson that he has, in effect, terminated Ms Craven’s retainer in the proceeding. I do not know what Ms Craven was instructed to do in that period or why her retainer was terminated. I appreciate that Mr Anderson is disadvantaged by things that should perhaps have been done in that period and were not done, but I do not know the reasons why that occurred.

10    The short point is that this proceeding has been on foot since October 2024. As mentioned, in July 2025 I listed the matter for trial starting today. The last affidavit evidence in accordance with the pre-trial schedule was filed in July 2025. There has been plenty of time between then and now to prepare for the hearing and to do whatever might have been advisable by way of issuing subpoenas and the like to get further documents or information, if that was required.

11    I now turn to the particular issues raised by Mr Anderson. First, Mr Anderson says there are concurrent proceedings in the Family Court involving overlapping parties, properties and financial issues arising from the same transactions. That is essentially the point that I dealt with in the stay application. No new issues arise in relation to that. I do not see how progress in the present matter can prejudice the conduct of those proceedings. It is true, of course, that if the matter before me proceeds, and it results in a judgment against Mr Anderson, that will affect what happens and what is done in those proceedings, but that is no basis to put off what is before me. Those matters were previously explained by me in the stay application judgment.

12    Secondly, Mr Anderson raises that there are insolvency processes taking place in respect of the principal debtor, B&T Investment Group (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liquidation), for whose debt he and the first respondent, Ms Wolstenholme, are sued in this proceeding as guarantors. The liquidator of that company apparently intends to take recovery action against certain parties. Such action could have the effect of paying off part of the principal debt and, in that way, it would benefit both Mr Anderson and Ms Wolstenholme. All of that is speculative and it could take a long time. In any event, if the liquidator is successful in that way, Mr Anderson and Ms Wolstenholme will get that benefit as guarantors – any reduction of the debt of the principal debtor will in turn reduce any amount recoverable against them under any judgment against them in the present proceeding.

13    Thirdly, Mr Anderson says that the liquidator’s processes, including any public examination, may uncover evidence which may then be relevant in the proceeding before me. Of course, that possibility exists, but this Court has its own processes for obtaining relevant evidence in order to defend a claim. There is no basis to put this hearing off because of something that may or may not eventuate in some other speculative insolvency processes. Insofar as Mr Anderson relies on any risk of inconsistent findings between the processes envisaged by the liquidator and this proceeding, I fail to see that there is such a risk. Even if there were some risk, it may be better that this process precedes the insolvency processes rather than the other way round.

14    Fourthly, Mr Anderson has sought various documents from the principal lender pursuant to Australian Privacy Principles 12 and 13 (see Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), sch 1 ss 12-13). He says that his and Ms Wolstenholme’s positions could be prejudiced if those records are not received in time for them to be able to be used in this proceeding. Again, any relevant records could have been obtained by subpoena in this proceeding. I understand that Mr Anderson feels overwhelmed by the conduct of this proceeding, and possibly at having been let down by a solicitor not issuing such subpoenas in this proceeding (I make no judgment on that), but ultimately that is not a ground to put this proceeding off when there was plenty of opportunity to seek whatever documents might have been relevant under the processes available in this Court. There is also no indication of what defence in this proceeding those records may be relevant to.

15    Finally, Mr Anderson complains about the late filing and service of two affidavits by the applicant. Those affidavits were served only on Saturday, 7 February 2026.

16    The first affidavit deals with the sum of the principal debt outstanding, including the calculation of interest on that debt. It is a short affidavit. Mr Anderson points to some anomalies in the quantification of that sum, including apparently the inclusion of various legal fees and travelling costs. Those matters will all have to be explained in due course, but there is no reason to put this hearing off because of them. To the extent that Mr Anderson is prejudiced by that affidavit, it may be that the affidavit will not be admitted. Or, it may be admitted on the basis that the issues that it deals with be dealt with at a later time.

17    The second affidavit is even shorter. It is only seven pages. It deals with some corrections that are sought to be made in relation to a previous affidavit by the same deponent. Those relate, in particular, to the circumstances of arranging a meeting that took place between the principal of the vendor of the property, for which the loan that is the subject of the proceeding before me was sought, and the principal of the lender. To the extent they are relevant, those matters can all be dealt with in the trial. I do not see that they justify putting off this hearing which has been listed for so long. Even if the affidavit creates prejudice that cannot be dealt with by giving time within the course of the hearing to deal with it, then perhaps I will not allow it to be read because of its late filing. That is also a matter that can be dealt with in due course.

18     I therefore dismiss the application to vacate the hearing, which will consequently proceed. Mr Anderson should also pay the costs of the application, such as they are.

Associate:

Dated:    11 February 2026