Federal Court of Australia

Bilal v Lagos [2026] FCA 35

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The originating application dated 12 September 2025 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRAM J:

1    Rule 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (‘FCR’) permits a registrar of the Court to refuse to accept a document for filing if he or she is satisfied that the document constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes or is frivolous or vexatious. In determining this, a registrar is entitled to examine the face of the document but he or she is also entitled to examine any other documents which have been filed or which accompany the documents which the person in question seeks to file.

2    The present judicial review action involves several decisions by registrars of this Court to refuse various documents which Mr Bilal has lodged for filing together with other incidental allegations.

Mr Bilal’s eLodgments of 14 August 2025

3    On 14 August 2025, Mr Bilal lodged for filing an originating application dated 14 August 2025 and his own affidavit also dated 14 August 2025.

4    On 20 August 2025, a registrar refused to accept these documents for filing pursuant to FCR r‍ 2.26. The registrar gave written reasons for this in a letter dated 20 August 2025. She thought that no reasonable person could properly treat the two documents as bona fide.

5    The decision of the registrar under FCR r 2.26 is administrative in nature. Mr Bilal now seeks judicial review of that decision under the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘the ADJR Act’).

6    The originating application seeks relief under the provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and names 54 respondents, many of whom appear to be members of the Ampol group of companies. In his affidavit Mr Bilal explains that on 26 June 2025 he made a written request of the 6th respondent, Ampol Australia Petroleum Pty Ltd, for access to his employee records and that his request was also made to the 2nd to 52nd respondents. He made a similar request for his health information at about the same time under the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) together with a request for his personal information under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

7    Next, he says that no records were received in response. He then says that the 6th respondent’s ‘blockade caused me psychological harm, undermined my dignity, interfered with my ability to seek legal redress, and aggravated past injury related to the Employment’. The blockade is the 6th respondent’s blocking of Mr Bilal’s electronic communication channel with it. He then alleges that that the blockade was adverse action and was taken against him because he proposed to exercise or did exercise his workplace rights. It is unclear what the workplace right Mr Bilal has in mind is.

8    He also alleges two other forms of adverse action. First, a failure to disclose his records to him. Second, adverse action by portraying his requests as unreasonable or vexatious and by mischaracterising the 6th respondent’s own non-compliance and Mr Bilal’s entitlement to the requested records. It is unclear what Mr Bilal means and what workplace right he says this related to.

9    He makes additional allegations against the 54th respondent who seems to be the solicitor for the 6th respondent. She, along with many of the other respondents, are alleged to be involved in the blockade.

10    The case seems to be that because Mr Bilal sought access to his information, the respondents declined to respond to the requests because he had made them.

11    This case appears to be circular and makes very little sense. Lest I was missing something, I therefore convened a case management hearing on 28 November 2025. At this hearing, I asked Mr Bilal to explain in simple terms what his case was about. He declined to explain his case to me.

12    Mr Bilal’s case makes no sense. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the two documents are frivolous within the meaning of FCR r 2.26. It follows that even if the registrar made an error justifying judicial review relief, I would decline that relief since the registrar’s decision was the correct one.

Mr Bilal’s eLodgments of 24 August 2025

13    On 24 August 2025, Mr Bilal lodged for filing an originating application dated 24 August 2025 and a concise statement dated 24 August 2025. By a letter dated 25 August 2025, a registrar refused to accept these documents for filing pursuant to FCR r 2.26 on the basis that they were frivolous or vexatious.

14    The originating application seeks relief under the whistleblowing provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The underlying irritant is the same as in Mr Bilal’s first case, that is to say, the failure of the Ampol companies (and the law firm acting for them) to respond to Mr Bilal’s requests for information. A similar case was recently struck out by Shariff J in Bilal v Ampol Limited [2025] FCA 1189.

15    The documents of 24 August 2025 are frivolous and vexatious. I therefore apprehend no viable ground of judicial review under the ADJR Act for the registrar’s exercise of power under FCR r‍ 2.26.

Mr Bilal’s eLodgments of 27 August 2025

16    On 27 August 2025, Mr Bilal lodged for filing an originating application and a statement of claim both bearing that date. By a letter dated 4 September 2025, a registrar refused to accept the documents for filing pursuant to FCR r 2.26 on the basis that they would, if accepted for filing, constitute an abuse of process or be frivolous or vexatious.

17    These documents are yet another version of Mr Bilal’s whistleblowing claims of the kind he attempted to lodge on 24 August 2025 and of the kind dealt with by Shariff J above. I am satisfied that if the documents were accepted for filing, they would constitute an abuse of process. I am also satisfied that they are frivolous and vexatious. I therefore apprehend no viable ground of review under the ADJR Act for the registrar’s exercise of power under FCR r 2.26.

Mr Bilal’s email of 27 August 2025

18    Mr Bilal was dissatisfied with the decisions which refused to accept his documents for filing. On 27 August 2025, he sent an email to the email address for the New South Wales District Registry (‘NSW Registry’). He set out the rejections of his lodgements of 14 and 24 August 2025 and contended that the refusal decisions by the registrars had been boilerplate in nature. He sought to have the matter elevated to the highest levels within the Court including to the Chief Justice, the National Co-ordinating Judge of the Commercial and Corporations National Practice Area, the National Co-ordinating Judge of the Employment and Industrial Relations National Practice Area and the Chief Executive Officer and Principal Registrar of the Federal Court.

19    In his originating process for the present proceeding, Mr Bilal says that the Principal Registrar has failed to act on this email or even respond to it (and his follow up email of 2 September 2025). It may be assumed that the Principal Registrar has neither replied to Mr Bilal’s email nor escalated his complaints in the manner he sought. However, I do not accept that this gives rise to any entitlement on his part to obtain judicial review of the Principal Registrar’s decisions (assuming any such decision or non-decision was made). This is particularly so where I am satisfied that the three underlying decisions to refuse his documents for filing were lawful and regular.

Mr Bilal’s judicial review action of 8 September 2025

20    On 8 September 2025, Mr Bilal lodged for filing an originating application seeking judicial review of the decisions to refuse to accept for filing the documents he had lodged on 14‍ August 2025, 24 August 2025 and 27 August 2025. Each of the registrars who made those decisions was named as a respondent. Mr Bilal also named as the first respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia. At the same time, Mr Bilal lodged for filing an affidavit affirmed by him. This affidavit set out the detail of the three decisions he was seeking to challenge and his emails to the NSW Registry of 27 August 2025 and 2 September 2025.

21    Leaving aside the position of the Commonwealth, this application was a regular application for judicial review with a regular affidavit in support.

22    By a letter dated 9 September 2025, a registrar refused to accept both documents for filing. The reason given for this was that the originating application named the Commonwealth but did not seek any relief against it. The registrar considered that it would be an abuse of the processes of the Court if the documents were accepted for filing.

23    I am prepared to assume that this involved an error of law on the part of the registrar. The application regularly sought judicial review of the three refusal decisions and named as respondents each of the relevant decision makers. In a suit against three Federal Court registrars I agree that the joinder of the Commonwealth was probably unnecessary but I have some reservations as to whether that was sufficient to transform what was otherwise a regular suit into an abuse of process.

24    Making the assumption that the registrar erred in law in concluding that the documents, if filed, would constitute an abuse of process, I would not, however, grant any relief to Mr Bilal. This is because after this refusal he then lodged for filing the present originating application which did not name the Commonwealth as a party. This application and the accompanying affidavit were then accepted for filing. Having been accepted for filing it is that proceeding which is the subject of these reasons for judgment. Now to grant relief to Mr Bilal in relation to this predecessor judicial review action would achieve nothing since the present application is before the Court. In fact, in circumstances where this proceeding is on foot, to permit Mr Bilal to bring the same case a second time would itself be an abuse of process.

Conclusions

25    It will follow from the above that Mr Bilal’s claims for judicial review of the four decisions to refuse to accept documents for filing made on 20 August 2025, 25 August 2025, 4 September 2025 and 9 September 2025 should each be refused. For the reasons given, I would also refuse him relief in relation to his emails to the NSW Registry dated 27 August 2025 and 2 September 2025. Mr Bilal’s other claims for relief, cognate with these, should also be rejected. The originating application will be dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    2 February 2026

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES