Federal Court of Australia

Kanevsky (Administrator), in the matter of MA Services Property Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2026] FCA 17

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Glen Kanevsky and Jason Tracy be appointed as joint and several receivers without security over all the assets and undertaking of the property of the MA Services Property Group Trust (Trust Property), including but not limited to the land and improvements at:

(a)    Unit 41-47 Thomsons Rd, Keilor Park VIC 3042, being the land more particularly described as certificate of title volume 10900 and folio 904;

(b)    Unit 41-47 Thomsons Rd, Keilor Park VIC 3042, being the land more particularly described as certificate of title volume 10900 and folio 905;

(c)    Unit 78, 2 Thomsons Rd, Keilor Park VIC 3042, being the land more particularly described as certificate of title volume 12004 and folio 881;

(d)    Unit 8, 48 Thomsons Rd, Keilor Park VIC 3042, being the land more particularly described as certificate of title volume 12618 and folio 918; and

(e)    Unit 9, 48 Thomsons Rd, Keilor Park VIC 3042, being the land more particularly described as certificate of title volume 12618 and folio 919.

2.    Pursuant to s 90-15 of Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the first plaintiffs, as joint and several receivers of the Trust Property, have all the powers of a liquidator under s 477(2) of the Act with respect to the Trust Property including, but not limited to, the power to do all things necessary and convenient to enter into possession of, to take control of and to effect the sale of the Trust Property as if it were the property of a company in liquidation to which the first plaintiffs were appointed as joint and several liquidators.

3.    Leave be granted for any person affected by these orders, including any creditor of the second plaintiff or beneficiary of the MA Services Property Group Trust, to apply on seven business days’ notice to the receivers that the orders be varied or dismissed.

4.    Costs be reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

1    By an application filed on 20 January 2026, the plaintiffs sought, amongst other things, orders appointing the first plaintiffs as receivers of certain property. The application was referred to me in my capacity as duty judge and was brought on for hearing on an urgent basis in the afternoon of Friday, 23 January 2026. At the conclusion of that hearing, I made orders in open court materially consistent with what the plaintiffs had sought and I indicated that I would publish short reasons for preferring that course. These are those reasons, which for the ease of reference, I will express in the present tense.

2    The application is supported by an affidavit affirmed by Mr Glen Kanevsky on 16 January 2026 and an affidavit sworn by the plaintiffs’ solicitor, Ms Cassie Ann O’Bryan, on 22 January 2026. Additionally, the court was assisted by brief written submissions prepared by the plaintiffs’ senior counsel. All told, those materials spell out the backdrop against which the application is pressed, to which it is convenient that attention now turn.

3    The first plaintiffs have been appointed administrators of the second plaintiff, which to that point served as the trustee of the MA Services Property Group Trust (hereafter, the “Trust”). The property in respect of which the plaintiffs seek to have the first plaintiffs appointed as receivers is the property of the Trust. The application is made in circumstances in which the trust deed by which the Trust was and is established contains what is sometimes known as a “vacation of office” clause, by which (subject to certain conditions) the office of trustee is immediately vacated if, relevantly, the trustee (here the second plaintiff) enters into external administration.

4    It is unclear at this juncture whether any steps are afoot to appoint a new trustee to administer the Trust. The first plaintiffs are in contact with Mr Micky Ahuja, who is the sole director of the second plaintiff and the Trust’s appointor; but, to date, it is unclear what, if anything, might have been (or might be) done to that end. The application reflects some apprehension, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the second plaintiff now holds the assets of the Trust as bare trustee; a reality that has obvious ramifications for the administrators’ ability to steer the second plaintiff through or around its current financial predicament.

5    It appears that the second plaintiff has only ever operated exclusively in its capacity as trustee of the Trust. Under the terms of the relevant trust deed, it enjoyed—subject to limited exceptions not here said to be relevant—a right to be indemnified from the assets of the Trust for expenses that it incurred in connection with the Trust’s administration. By the application, the plaintiffs hope to realise the benefit of that indemnity.

6    The evidence discloses that:

(1)    the principal assets of the Trust are five properties located in Thomsons Rd, Keilor Park, Victoria; and

(2)    the second plaintiff has liabilities totalling $7,605,177.31, primarily comprising debts owed with respect to the five Thomsons Rd properties, together with an unsecured debt owed to a related entity (which is also under administration).

7    No question arises about the court’s power to grant relief in the forms in which it is sought. The application is brought under s 90-20 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) (sch 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) and under s 57 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“FCA Act”). No issue arises with respect to standing. Mr Ahuja has been made aware of the application and its listing, as have the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (in its capacity as mortgagee in respect of each of the Thomsons Rd properties).

8    Where a company’s office as trustee of a trust is vacated by reason of some insolvency process, it is generally appropriate that the officer appointed in consequence of that process (here, the first plaintiffs as administrators) should be appointed as receiver of the trust property under s 57(1) of the FCA Act: Micheletto (liquidator), in the matter of Rogers Property Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2024] FCA 1463, [30] (McEvoy J); Re Knight, Second ICO Pty Ltd (In Liq) (2020) 144 ACSR 329, 333 [24] (Anderson J); Re Cremin, Brimson Pty Ltd (2019) 136 ACSR 649, 656 [50] (Moshinsky J). That is so in order that the officer may deal with property of the trust so as to enforce the equitable lien thereover that endures to the erstwhile trustee’s benefit: see generally, Hosking, re Business Aptitude Pty Ltd (in liq) [2016] FCA 1438, [17]-[22] (Gleeson J).

9    This court has routinely made observations to that effect, and specifically in relation to companies under external administration: see, for example, Vouris, in the matter of Rapid Response Revival Research Limited (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2025] FCA 1088, [15] (Derrington J) (“Vouris”).

10    In Walker (Administrator), in the matter of Goldin Australia Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2024] FCA 1518, [21]-[22] (Shariff J), the court observed:

21    …In the present circumstances, I am satisfied that the Administrators and any relevant purchasers would have more confidence in their negotiation and ultimate sale of the assets or Companies or parts of them if the Administrators have unambiguous power in respect of those assets and that this could also possibly achieve a better return for the Trust’s assets, for the benefit of the Trust’s creditors and beneficiaries. This is particularly so where the relevant assets in the Trust are the only assets held by Goldin Australia (albeit subject to the Trust), and therefore it is appropriate that the Administrators be entitled to deal with those assets.

22    Further, and where Goldin Australia has a right of indemnity from those assets, but can be removed at any time as trustee, I am satisfied that it is appropriate that the Administrators be appointed as receivers of those assets in order to preserve that right of indemnity and to manage those assets going forward.

11    I make equivalent observations for present purposes. They properly inform the court’s exercise of the discretion that the plaintiffs have put in play.

12    The appointment of a receiver under s 57 of the FCA Act may or may not be made conditional upon the filing of a guarantee under rr 14.21 and 14.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). In matters such as this one, it is well-established that such an appointment ought not to be burdened by any such requirement: Vouris, [18] (Derrington J). That is the course that the plaintiffs here propose and it is appropriate.

13    The plaintiffs seek relief ancillary to their appointment as receivers of the Trust property. To a large extent, what is sought appears to be routine; but, dealing with the matter presently on an urgent “duty” basis, it is unnecessary that I should enter into those frays. That acknowledgement having been made (and with appropriate variation), the orders that the plaintiffs propose should and will be made.

Associate:

Dated:    27 January 2026