Federal Court of Australia

Greer v Bandjalang Aboriginal Corporation Prescribed Body Corporate RNTBC (No 3) [2025] FCA 1674

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Orders 1 and 2 of the orders made on 10 October 2025 by Longbottom J be set aside.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(DELIVERED EX TEMPORE AND REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

RANGIAH J:

1    The respondent (Bandjalang) applies on an urgent basis to set aside interlocutory injunctions granted by Longbottom J on 10 October 2025 in Greer v Bandjalang Aboriginal Corporation Prescribed Body Corporate RNTBC (No 2) [2025] FCA 1284.

2    The basis of the application is that there has been a significant change of circumstances such that the balance of convenience no longer favours the injunctive orders. The change of circumstances is that on 11 December 2025, a special administrator was appointed to Bandjalang pursuant to ss 487-1 and 490-1 of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (the CATSI Act).

3    The relevant orders made by Longbottom J were:

1.     The respondent is restrained from terminating the employment of the applicant:

(a)     if the applicant files an originating application within the time provided for in order 3 below, until further order or determination of the originating application; and

(b)     otherwise, until 24 October 2025.

2.     The respondent is restrained from commencing an investigation for misconduct against the applicant:

(a)     if the applicant files an originating application within the time provided for in order 3 below, until further order or determination of the originating application; and

(b)     otherwise, until 24 October 2025.

4    I propose to provide only a brief summary of the detailed reasons given by Longbottom J for granting the interlocutory injunctions.

5    The applicant, Ms Greer, is the Chief Executive Officer of Bandjalang. Ms Greer repeatedly complained to Bandjalang that she was being threatened and bullied by a small group of members, including at least two directors. In July 2025, Ms Greer made a complaint about her treatment to SafeWork NSW.

6    By an email of 6 August 2025, a member of Bandjalang purported to call a “member led general meeting”, at which a resolution was to be proposed to terminate Ms Greer’s employment for reasons including that she had made the complaint to SafeWork NSW and for alleged “serious misconduct, breach of contract, fraud, threats”.

7    On 10 August 2025, following the “member led general meeting”, a “formal notice of termination” signed by two directors was sent to Ms Greer.

8    There is dispute about the validity of the “member led general meeting” and the validity of any resolutions passed at that meeting.

9    On 23 October 2025, Ms Greer commenced proceedings alleging, inter alia, that Bandjalang had contravened and was threatening to contravene s 340 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) by purporting to terminate her employment and otherwise taking adverse action against her because she had made complaints about her treatment, including her complaint to SafeWork NSW. Ms Greer also sought urgent interlocutory injunctions restraining Bandjalang from taking such action.

10    Justice Longbottom was satisfied that Ms Greer had demonstrated a prima facie case of breach of s 340 of the FWA in respect of the SafeWork NSW complaint. Her Honour was not satisfied that a prima facie case had been demonstrated in respect of Ms Greer’s other alleged complaints. Her Honour concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the interlocutory injunctive relief.

11    Rule 39.05(c) and (d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) prescribe that the Court may vary or set aside an injunctive order or any interlocutory judgment or order.

12    The authorities make it clear that the power to set aside an interlocutory injunction may be exercised where there has been a material change in circumstances: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 178; Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46; Pivotel Satellite Pty Ltd v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 121 at [26]; CIP Group Pty Ltd v So (No 5) [2024] FCA 1373 at [14]; Greenbot Pty Ltd v Clean Energy Regulator [2025] FCA 369 at [60]-[62].

13    In this case, the appointment of the special administrator has brought about a substantial change in the governance of Bandjalang.

14    Part 11–2 of the CATSI Act deals with external administration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations. The following provisions are relevant:

    Section 487-1(1) - the Registrar may determine that a corporation is to be under special administration for a specified period.

    Section 490-1(1) - the Registrar may appoint a special administrator.

    Section 496-1 - the office of each director becomes vacant upon appointment of a special administrator.

    Section 496-10(1) - no person other than the special administrator can perform or exercise a function or power as an officer of the corporation.

    Section 499-1- the special administrator is responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation.

    Section 499-5 - the special administrator has control of the corporation’s business, property and affairs, and may, inter alia, engage or discharge employees.

15    An important consequence of the special administration is that the directors whose conduct forms the basis of Ms Greer’s allegations of contravention of s 340(1) of the FWA no longer have any power of control over Bandjalang’s affairs during the period of the administration. In particular, they have no power to terminate Ms Greer’s employment or carry out any investigations for any alleged misconduct. In other words, they cannot take any action during the special administration that could cause Bandjalang to contravene s 340 of the FWA.

16    The sole responsibility for the conduct of Bandjalang’s affairs, including the discharge of employees, reposes in the special administrator, Mr McQuoid.

17    Mr McQuoid deposes that his aim is to restore the corporation to financial and organisational health and, once that is achieved, to give back control to the members. He deposes that he needs to conduct and conclude a review of Ms Greer’s employment to determine whether Bandjalang can continue to afford her salary. His audit is expected to conclude in early January 2026. Mr McQuoid’s preliminary view is that Bandjalang cannot afford to continue to employ Ms Greer.

18    Mr McQuoid considers Bandjalang’s financial position is uncertain and that “it is likely that” its current liabilities “may” exceed its current assets. He also has significant concerns about the way the corporation has been managed over the last 12 months or so, including the lack of any basic financial oversight, failure to remit employee’s superannuation deductions and failure to pay workers’ compensation premiums.

19    Mr McQuoid has formed the view that Bandjalang can operate efficiently with only one full time employee. He considers that the employee should be a business manager who is paid less than half of the CEO’s salary. Mr McQuoid also deposes that since his appointment is only for six months, it is necessary to make decisions or changes quickly and effectively.

20    In an affidavit dated 16 December 2025, Mr McQuoid deposes that:

Given the matters above, I consider that there is an urgent need for the Injunctions to be discharged or set aside. If they are “lifted”, any action that I take in respect of the Applicant’s employment will be as a result of the investigations and/or audit that I carry out, and judgments I have made about how best to restore the company to financial health and good corporate governance. In making those decisions, I will not be having any regard to this dispute, any claims filed by the Applicant, or any complaints or enquiries she has made to BAC, or any other matter that does not arise from my statutory duties.

21    The fundamental factor underlying Longbottom J’s orders was the risk that some of the directors of Bandjalang would, in contravention of s 340 of the FWA, attempt to terminate Ms Greer’s employment or conduct an investigation for alleged misconduct because she had made a complaint to WorkSafe NSW.

22    In my opinion, that threat has dissipated with the appointment of the special administrator. The former directors no longer have any control over the affairs of Bandjalang during the period of administration. In particular, they have no power to terminate Ms Greer’s employment or carry out any investigation into her conduct for any reason. Those powers reside solely with the special administrator.

23    I accept, as Ms Greer submits, that it seems likely that the special administrator will terminate her employment and that he may conduct an investigation for any misconduct. However, I also accept that any such actions by the special administrator will be taken for what he perceives to be in the best interests of Bandjalang, and not because Ms Greer made any complaint to SafeWork NSW.

24    Ms Greer disputes the special administrator’s evidence about the financial state of the corporation and about her role in managing its financial affairs. She submits that there is no need for any redundancy of her employment or of her position. She points out that the audit has not yet been concluded. However, these submissions seem to me to be largely beside the point. The special administrator will make a decision to either make Ms Greer’s position redundant or retain her employment. If Ms Greer considers that there is no genuine basis for her redundancy, she may seek a remedy for unfair dismissal under s 390 of the FWA, including for reinstatement. It would not be appropriate for the present injunctions, which were granted because of the threat of contravention of s 340, to be maintained as a prophylactic against the possibility that Ms Greer’s employment may be terminated for an entirely different reason.

25    Ms Greer also submits that the administration will continue only until 16 May 2026 and that the directors may then return and the threat of termination in contravention of s 340 may recur. However, that is only one of a number of other possibilities. If that circumstance does eventuate, it is always open to Ms Greer to make another application for further interlocutory injunctions.

26    I am satisfied that the threat of the contravention of s 340 of the FWA which founded the injunctions ordered by Longbottom J has dissipated. The balance of convenience no longer supports the maintenance of the injunctions.

27    The respondent’s application to set aside the interlocutory injunctions will be granted.

Associate:    

Dated:    22 December 2025