Federal Court of Australia

BCI Media Group Pty Ltd v CoreLogic Australia Pty Ltd (Strikeout) [2025] FCA 1600

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interlocutory application filed 21 November 2025 be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NEEDHAM J:

The Strikeout AI

1    The respondents in these proceedings moved on an interlocutory application (Strikeout IA) seeking orders pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules) which was argued before me on 8 December 2025, ahead of a final hearing listed to commence on 8 April 2026 for 18 days. Another interlocutory application by the respondents, seeking leave to adduce experimental evidence pursuant to r 34.50(2)(b) of the FC Rules, was argued on 8 December 2025 but was resolved on 9 December 2025. While the respondents are the applicants in the Strikeout IA, I will refer to the parties by its or their respective role in the substantive proceedings.

2    There have been a number of decisions in this matter relating to pleadings and other interlocutory matters sub nom BCI Media Group Pty Ltd v CoreLogic Australia Pty Ltd. I have already given three decisions in this matter, sub-titled Review of Registrar’s Decision [2025] FCA 616, Application to Vacate Hearing [2025] FCA 733, and Amendment and Strikeout [2025] FCA 1030. These reasons assume familiarity with those decisions and use where appropriate the defined terms.

3    The current pleadings are:

(a)    Originating Application dated 31 March 2021

(b)    Further Amended Statement of Claim dated 12 September 2025 (FASOC)

(c)    Confidential Annexures A, B, C, and D to the FASOC;

(d)    Consolidated Particulars to FASOC dated 12 September 2025;

(e)    Amended Defence dated 14 October 2025; and

(f)    Amended Reply dated 21 October 2025.

4    The respondents seek to strike out paragraphs 43 and 82E of the FASOC. In relation to paragraph 43, it seeks, as an alternative, an order for further and better particulars pursuant to r 16.45 of the FC Rules.

Paragraph 43 of the FASOC

5    This paragraph has been included in substantially similar terms in the current and two previous iterations of the Statements of Claim, although matters formerly particularised in previous versions are now included in the body of the pleading. The applicant has provided particulars to paragraph 43 in the Consolidated Particulars, and the respondents have pleaded a bare denial to that paragraph.

6    The paragraph provides:

Use of Comparative Documents created from LeadManager information

43     It is to be inferred that RP Data used the information copied from LeadManager (as pleaded in paragraphs above 42 to 42B above) and the Comparative Documents (as pleaded in paragraph 42C above) to improve Cordell Connect by:

(a)     identifying gaps in the information on Cordell Connect; and

(b)     using information copied from LeadManager to fill those gaps.,

by reason of the emails sent between the following directors and employees of RP Data and Cordell in respect of identification and filling of gaps in Cordell Connect:

(c)     RP Data employees: [names of 29 employees].

(d)     Cordell employees: [names of two employees].

(e)     Directors of RP Data and Cordell: [names of two directors].

7    The particulars to paragraph 43 in the Consolidated Particulars provide:

(i)    The gaps that RP Data identified and filled using information copied from LeadManager and the Comparative Documents which are presently known to BCI Media Group are in respect of projects listed in the Applicant’s Consolidated Particulars dated 12 September 2025 (Applicant’s Confidential Particulars).

(ii)     The conduct is to be inferred from emails sent between the following directors and employees of RP Data and Cordell in respect of identification and filling of gaps in Cordell Connect:

(A)     RP Data employees: [names of 29 employees].

(B)     Cordell employees: [names of two employees].

(C)     Directors of RP Data and Cordell: [names of two directors].

(iii)     The gaps that RP Data identified and filled using information copied from LeadManager and the Comparative Documents which are presently known to BCI Media Group are in respect of projects listed at paragraph A1 of the Applicant’s Confidential Particulars dated 12 September 2023 (Applicant’s Confidential Particulars).

(iv)     The conduct is to be inferred from emails sent between the following directors and employees of RP Data and Cordell in respect of identification and filling of gaps in Cordell Connect:

(A)     RP Data employees: [names of 29 employees].

(B)     Cordell employees: [names of two employees].

(C)     Directors of RP Data and Cordell: [names of two directors].

(v)     The conduct pleaded in paragraph 43(a) (using information from LeadManager to identify gaps in Cordell Connect) is to be also inferred from the following documents discovered by the Respondents:

[particularised documents (A) to (V)]

(vi)     The conduct pleaded in paragraph 43(b) (using information from LeadManager to fill gaps in Cordell Connect) is to be also inferred from the following documents discovered by the Respondents:

[particularised documents (A) to (R)]

(names of persons removed for conciseness and privacy)

8    Paragraph A1 of the Applicant’s Confidential Particulars is as follows (anonymised to preserve confidentiality):

The gaps that RP Data identified and filled using information copied from LeadManager and the Comparative Documents which are presently known to BCI Media Group are in respect of the following projects:

(a)     XXXXXXX – [address] Reservoir;

[then follow 24 other building projects in lines (b)-(y) – this information is confidential]

9    Avid readers of BCI v CoreLogic decisions will recall that the question of whether the pleading commencing with paragraph 43 of the ASOC and the following paragraphs contained an unpleaded inferential case or not has been a hotly debated topic, which was apparently settled by inter alia the addition of the leading clause to paragraph 43 of the FASOC.

10    The respondents contend that the pleading in its current form requires the applicant to identify the specific gaps alleged and the specific information which was used to fill those gaps. The information is partly protected by a confidentiality order, but one of the examples used by the respondents in submissions was the first in a list of projects set out in the Applicant’s Confidential Particulars, the property development project in Reservoir noted above. The respondents in their submissions ask:

There is, for instance, nothing which indicates which data point or points was filled. Was it, for example, the name of the builder on the project? Or could it have been the contact details for the project architect? All of that remains a complete mystery.

11    The respondents also object to this paragraph in the pleading because the list of projects is said to be a “representative sample” of projects appearing in documents discovered by the respondents, and is therefore incomplete. They say that they only became aware of this by reason of the solicitor for the applicant, Mr Williams’ affidavit of 2 December 2025. They contend that that characterisation indicates that BCI is aware of more projects, but is unable or unwilling to provide details. The respondents complain that the applicant will not provide a full list of the projects in which they allege gaps have been filled with LeadManager information. In similar vein, they point to the particularisation that the list is “as presently known” to BCI as indicating that the applicant has not yet particularised its whole case, and so should be struck out. The respondents said:

Implicit in that is that BCI would, at some point, seek to supplement those particulars. That time was, presumably, after discovery and evidence. That time has now been reached. BCI must now lay all of its cards on the table. It has not done so.

12    Mr Martin KC, who appeared with Mr Hastie for the respondents, said that the evidence filed for the respondents did not engage with gaps generally because there was no evidence as to what the gaps were. The evidence of Ms Bolles, for example, is that nothing in the 25 reports particularised was changed by using information gained from LeadManager.

13    If paragraph 43 were struck out, the respondents say in their written submissions that any paragraphs which reference paragraph 43, such as “[55(b)(i)], [77B(c)(i)], [82(b)(i)], [82D(a)], [98(b)(iii)(A)], [98A(b)(i)], [99(b)(i)], [99C(b)(i)], [99D(a)(i)], [127D(b)(i)]” should also be struck out. The respondents did not develop this point further in their oral submissions.

14    The respondents, in support of their argument that a “representative sample” was not an appropriate way to particularise the applicant’s claim, relied on the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Cummins v Vella [2002] FCAFC 218 (Heerey, Mansfield, and Hely JJ) where the primary judge was found to be in error due to a consideration only of a small number of the total paintings said to be in breach of copyright (at [44]).

15    The applicant’s position is that the Strikeout IA is an abuse of process because on 7 July 2025, I ordered that any application in relation to the pleadings or particulars be filed by 18 July 2025. No such application was filed, although the respondents filed an Interlocutory Application seeking further and better particulars of paragraphs 43E(c), 43F(e) and 43G(d) to the FASOC on 26 September 2025. Those particulars were provided by the applicant on 1 October 2025, and the application was dismissed by way of consent orders on 16 October 2025. The FASOC had been filed on 12 September, pursuant to orders made on 27 August 2025 in Amendment and Strikeout, and on 1 October the respondents filed their Amended Defence. The respondents’ evidence is nearly (and relevantly) complete, and a number of their witnesses “filed evidence giving unqualified denials of paragraph 43 of the FASOC”.

16    In support of this last contention, the applicant tendered some of the lay evidence filed by the respondents, including affidavits by Ms Bolles of 12 September 2025, Mr Nikurawu of 17 October 2025, and Ms Jones of 12 September 2025. Ms Bolles, for example, included “Paragraph 43 of the amended statement of claim” as a chapeau to paragraphs 46-54 of her affidavit.

17    I pause here to note that the previous iteration of paragraph 43 (to which Ms Bolles was directing her evidence) in the ASOC read:

Use of Comparative Documents created from LeadManager information

43     RP Data used the information copied from LeadManager (as pleaded in paragraphs above 42 to 42B above) and the Comparative Documents (as pleaded in paragraph 42C above) to improve Cordell Connect by:

(a)     identifying gaps in the information on Cordell Connect; and

(b)     using information copied from LeadManager to fill those gaps.

Particulars

(i)     The gaps that RP Data identified and filled using information copied from LeadManager and the Comparative Documents which are presently known to BCI Media Group are in respect of projects listed at paragraph A1 of the Applicant’s Confidential Particulars dated 12 September 2023 (Applicant’s Confidential Particulars).

(ii)     The conduct is to be inferred from emails sent between the following directors and employees of RP Data and Cordell in respect of identification and filling of gaps in Cordell Connect:

(A)     RP Data employees: [names of 29 employees].

(B)     Cordell employees: [names of two employees].

(C)     Directors of RP Data and Cordell: [names of two directors].

18    As can be seen, the differences between paragraph 43 in the ASOC and paragraph 43 in the FASOC are that the inferential nature of the pleading has been moved from the particulars into the beginning of the pleading, as have the details of the emails from which the inferences are said to be drawn. When the respondents sought further and better particulars of the FASOC, they did not complain of the pleading or particulars in paragraph 43. The applicant pointed to the fact that no explanation of the failure to bring such an application has been provided.

19    Mr Williams noted in his 2 December 2025 affidavit that the particulars to paragraph 43 contain:

(a)    A representative sample of projects listed by reference to their project ID and project name (of which the Reservoir project was one);

(b)    Twenty-two emails discovered by the respondents which “set out instances of LeadManager being used to identify gaps in Cordell Connect”, and

(c)    Over 18 emails which “set out instances of information from LeadManager being used to fill gaps in Cordell Connect”.

(emphasis in original).

20    The applicant submitted that the respondents were predicating their application on a “mischaracterisation” of the pleading in paragraph 43. Mr Hennessy SC, who appeared with Mr McMeniman for the applicant, submitted that the pleading and particulars are sufficient to support the inference that, from the emails particularised and the material from the respondents’ discovery relied on in Confidential Exhibit MJW-32 to Mr Williams’ 2 December 2025 affidavit, the respondents were doing what it is alleged they have done. He submitted that the documents showed that queries had been raised about (in the example) the Reservoir project, and that the recipient of the request had looked in LeadManager, and, he says it can be inferred, used that material to update Cordell Connect. He says that “that is a demonstration only of the fact that the correspondence that has been particularised makes plain that there is a proper basis for the allegation”.

21    The applicant pointed to the evidence of the way in which the “Stellar” database was used by the respondents to update projects. As for the respondents’ complaint that the projects were put forward only as a representative sample, Mr Hennessy pointed to Confidential Exhibit MJW-32 and noted that the Stellar database generated “recall reports” if information in a particular project were to be revised. However, he submitted that the recall reports “don’t make apparent what actually is the nature of the revision”. It was submitted that in circumstances where the respondents’ own records do not record the information sought by the respondents by way of particulars, the applicant should be allowed to prove by inference by reference to the correspondence and the projects particularised that the purpose of the extraction of 159,578 projects from LeadManager between 1 January 2018 and 27 March 2020 (which is only one timeframe relied upon) was to identify and fill gaps in Cordell Connect. It would not be practical or possible to perform a matching exercise on every project. As noted in Amendment and Strikeout at [26], both parties are agreed that some regime should be formulated so that the Court is not required to make a determination on each and every one of the instances of information obtained from LeadManager.

22    The applicant relied on the decision of the High Court in Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd v Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd [2018] HCA 43; 265 CLR 1 at [4] and [5] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ, agreeing with Gageler J) to bolster its argument that it would not be appropriate to focus on individual acts when damages flow from the consequences of “the overall effect of [the] wrongful conduct”. It was submitted that the application ignored the fact that the pleading in paragraph 43 was inferential, and so would not (it is said) require direct evidence to prove matters such as identification and filling of gaps in the Cordell Connect database.

23    The applicant relied on JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Limited v Cummings [2016] FCAFC 20; 329 ALR 625 at [308], which used proof in relation to part of a body of work or information to prove the question in relation to the whole. JR Consulting involved numerous versions of the same software, and proof of copyright in a version of the software was established in relation to each of them. Mr Hennessy distinguished Cummins v Vella as dealing with a completely different subject matter – impasto paintings of flowers – and requiring individual consideration of each alleged copyright breach.

24    In reply, Mr Martin KC submitted that if the projects listed were to be regarded as being representative samples of alleged breaches, that should have been specifically pleaded. The applicant should have to plead what was actually done in relation to the information – “If they are going to run that case, they should know now what those gaps are”, and the respondents should not have to wait for trial to know. He drew a link to what Yates J directed the applicant to plead in BCI Media Group Pty Ltd v CoreLogic Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 664 when (at [97]) his Honour directed the applicant to provide particulars of the identities of the actual, or prospective, customers of BCI and RP Data who acted in the ways alleged.

25    The respondents replied to the timing point by noting that previously, the inferential part of the case was particularised, and now it is in the body of the pleading itself, and that the difference between pleadings and particulars needs to be recognised. A mere pleading of an inferential case does not facilitate proof of breach of copyright in other documents which are not particularised.

Paragraph 82E of the FASOC

26    Paragraph 82E of the FASOC reads as follows:

82E     Further, in the premises of paragraph 82C above, CoreLogic, Inc’s authorisation of the copyright infringements pleaded in paragraph 79 above have enlarged the profits of CoreLogic, Inc, in that CoreLogic, Inc financially benefitted from:

(a)     the increased revenue of RP Data and/or Cordell referred to in paragraph 82D above;

(b)     the reduced operational costs of RP Data referred to in paragraph 82D above,

as RP Data and Cordell’s ultimate parent company.

27    The particulars to that paragraph in the Consolidated Particulars provide:

(i)     BCI Media Group repeats the particulars to paragraph 82D above.

(ii)     BCI Media Group refers to and repeats the particulars at 4 above.

28    The pleading has been essentially in that form since 2023. The underlined portions reflect amendments in the FASOC to the paragraph as pleaded in the ASOC. The particulars refer to paragraph 82D, which pleads that the copyright infringements by RP Data (and, in the FASOC, Cordell) have saved the respondents costs and increased the capital value of the Cordell Connect product as an asset, by in part improvements in revenue. The particulars to paragraph 4 of the FASOC refer to 43,748 invoices for Cordell Connect services and cites some examples with “COR.” document reference numbers.

29    The respondents seek to strike out this paragraph. It is common ground that CoreLogic Inc is the US-based parent company of the other respondents. Mr Ross, the applicant’s accounting expert, was “asked to include in [his] Account of the Respondents’ profits any profits the Respondents made from the CoreLogic, Inc. Sale Transaction (‘Account of Capital Profit’)”. CoreLogic Inc was the subject of a takeover by Stone Point Capital in June 2021 and all its shares were sold for a total price of $6B USD. Mr Ross calculated the Account of Capital Profit on two bases; EBITDA multiples identified as being 10 to 14 times EBITDA, and another approach using comparative revenue.

30    The respondents say that the allegation in paragraph 82E is “unsustainable” because:

(a)    no facts are pleaded as to how the activities of RP Data (or, presumably, Cordell) increased the profits of CoreLogic Inc; and

(b)    Mr Ross’ evidence deals with the sale price of CoreLogic Inc and the increase in its capital value, but the pleading in paragraph 82E focuses on enlargement of profit.

31    It is submitted that it is “fundamentally flawed” to plead that a company makes a profit from the profit of its subsidiaries. If it owns all the shares in the subsidiaries, the benefit derived is a dividend. Mr Martin KC differentiated between Mr Ross’ report, which referred to capital profits, and what he identified as “trading profits” alleged in the FASOC. He said it “defies any logic that subsidiaries of a publicly listed company derive profits if there’s a takeover of the shares in the publicly listed company”. He pointed out that the shareholders, not the subsidiaries, would benefit from the profit on the sale.

32    The respondents objected in correspondence to the part of Mr Ross’ report that dealt with capital profits, claiming it did not relate to any pleaded issue.

33    In response, the applicant repeated the point that the orders of 7 July 2025 gave the respondents their chance to seek to strike out this paragraph, and they did not take it. Mr Ross’ report is dated 30 May 2025 and was provided to the respondents prior to 7 July 2025. Their expert has responded to it. Paragraph 82E was in the ASOC in essentially similar terms (except for the inclusion of Cordell in addition to RP Data).

34    Mr McMeniman, who took the argument for the applicant on the 82E point, referred again to Ancient Order of Foresters to demonstrate that an account of profits includes more than just “trading profits”, and includes identifying a benefit which flows from the kind of equity from breach of duty discussed by Gageler J in that case. He noted that 82E does not restrict itself to “trading” profits, and that CoreLogic Inc had, it was pleaded elsewhere, authorised the copyright infringement of its subsidiaries. That, it was submitted, was sufficient to settle liability for copyright infringement on CoreLogic Inc. In addition, it was submitted that the profits below “flowed up through the group”, and the value of the CoreLogic business included the previously pleaded allegations, that had not sought to be struck out, of lowered costs and higher revenue as a result of the activities complained of.

35    The question of whether CoreLogic Inc’s value has been increased by reason of the activities of its subsidiaries is, Mr McMeniman submitted, “ultimately a triable issue as to whether that is the way in which this court ought to quantify any … capital profit that has been obtained from CoreLogic by CoreLogic Inc from … the trading profit of its subsidiaries being enlarged”. He relied on Ancient Order of Foresters and the plurality’s focus on the scheme, as opposed to the individual acts, of breach of fiduciary duty. Rather than inquiring as to a causal connection between particular acts, attention should be focused on the various parties’ participation in “the strategy for despoiling the business” (at [8]).

36    It was submitted that the focus of Ancient Order of Foresters was trading profits versus future value, and resulted in the “despoilers” accounting for the total capital value of the business including unrealised profits (per Gageler J at [66]; see also Potton Ltd v Yorkclose Ltd [1990] FSC 11 per Millett LJ at 15, and Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (No 2) [1999] FCA 183; 88 FCR 568).

37    The applicant took the Court to more detail in Mr Ross’ report, found in part 5, and submitted that the increase in value in CoreLogic Inc was tied to the increase in revenue of the subsidiary companies. It was also submitted that Mr Ashby, the respondents’ valuer, had engaged with this evidence.

38    In reply, the respondents sought to refute the applicant’s submissions as to enlargement of profits because of increased revenue and reduced operational costs by noting that “capital value” appears in 82D but not in 82E of the FASOC. Further, paragraph 2.4.2 of Mr Ross’ report noted that Mr Ross was asked to look at “any profits the Respondents made from the CoreLogic, Inc. Sale Transaction”, an entirely different question, the respondents submitted, from the pleading in paragraph 82E.

Disposition

Principles

39    The Court may order that part of a pleading be struck out if, relevantly, the pleading is evasive or ambiguous, likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding, fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court: FC Rules, r 16.02(2).

40    In KTC v David [2022] FCAFC 60 (Wigney, Anastassiou and Jackson JJ) (at [125]) it was said by Wigney J (in a passage which was not controversial):

Normally the power to strike out should be exercised only in plain and obvious cases, where no reasonable amendment could cure the alleged defect or deficiency: Allstate at 236. The power is discretionary and should be employed sparingly and only in a clear case “lest one deprive a party of a case which in justice it ought to be able to bring”: Trade Practices Commission v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 164 at 175.

41    I refer to the authorities on case management and the impact of forensic decisions on interlocutory applications set out at paragraphs [30]-[31] of Application to Vacate Hearing, and on delay in making interlocutory applications and the importance of explanations of delay at [27] and [28] of Amendment and Strikeout.

Are the respondents foreclosed from bringing this application?

42    As a preliminary matter, I will have regard to the point which the applicant says is sufficient to deal with the Strikeout IA; that is, did the failure by the respondents to bring this application when directed to do so by the order of 7 July 2025 mean that they are, effectively, foreclosed from doing so?

43    Each party relied on s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That section requires me to have regard to the disposal of matters both according to law and as “quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible” (s 37M(1)), but also requires me to have regard to case management and fairness principles (s 37M(2)). In a large and complex matter, there will often be more – sometimes many more – pre-trial skirmishes than in a smaller, simpler matter, but at some point the focus of parties must be honed in on the hearing in order to meet the expectations of the Court as set out in s 37M(2). Managing the interests of justice as well as the interests of the parties and of the Court’s business is a balancing act. As Justice Edelman, then of this Court, said in Lowden v Elliott Harvey Securities Ltd (No 3) [2016] FCA 869 at [11]:

There is no doubt that considerations of speed, expense, and efficiency are extremely important in the resolution of disputes, but the resolution to which s 37M refers is a “just” disposition.

44    The hearing of this matter commences in April 2026, four months to the day from the hearing of this IA. A substantial hearing set for September 2025 was vacated. This is, as I have said, the fourth time I have had to consider the pleadings and the adequacy of them and of the particulars, either directly or as a reason to order vacation of the hearing dates. Justice Yates has considered the pleadings twice. While the parties tell me that they are, in parallel to this IA, preparing for the hearing, it seems to me that each side should be getting on with that preparation and not taking points which should have been taken, five months ago at the very latest.

45    I have reached the conclusion that the respondents should have brought this application in response to the 7 July 2025 orders; despite the fact that the FASOC was not filed until September 2025, this pleading and its particularised facts, which give rise to the respondents’ complaints, was in its current form before then. I note that the Statement of Claim filed in November 2023 from which the ASOC and the FASOC flowed (the original Statement of Claim having been struck out by Yates J) contained versions of paragraphs 43 and 82E which were materially the same as those in the corresponding paragraphs in the FASOC.

46    Paragraph 43 had been the focus of the applicant’s attention prior to 7 July 2025. The orders of 13 June 2025 granted the applicant leave to serve further and better particulars, confined to particulars of discovered material, including to paragraph 43. The respondents and the applicant corresponded later in June 2025 about the adequacy of particulars to paragraph 43. On 26 September 2025, the respondents sought further and better particulars of various paragraphs, not including paragraph 43. There is a dispute between the parties about whether the parties should have followed up on the complaints about paragraph 43, or whether the applicant could have considered that path abandoned, after no application was filed in response to the order of 7 July and no issue with paragraph 43 was included in the September 2025 IA. I think the latter is more likely.

47    While not all of the evidence had been filed as at 7 July 2025, there was certainly a basis for the respondents to make the points then that they make before me now. In particular, the respondents were able not only to plead to the matters set out in paragraphs 43 and 82E in the ASOC, but to file evidence which was given specifically in response to those paragraphs (including expert accounting evidence).

48    The respondents say that it was not until Mr Williams’ affidavit of 2 December 2025 that they understood that the Applicant’s Confidential Particulars were “a representative sample” of the projects in which gaps had been identified and filled. I do not think that that is a sufficient answer to the applicant’s complaint that this application should have been brought in July. That is because the inference is properly pleaded (yet was probably less so in July, given that the inference appeared only in the particulars). The strength of the respondents’ arguments do not in any event incline me to setting aside the issues with the timing of this application. I deal with this matter below.

Strength of the respondents’ arguments

49    I am not so convinced of the strength of the respondents’ arguments, nor of the fallibility of the two paragraphs, that I would have determined them in the respondents’ favour were I to have taken a different view about when this application should have been brought.

50    Paragraph 43 of the FASOC pleads foundational facts of the specific emails which it says were sent between the various employees and directors of RP Data and Cordell. It lists projects which it says were the subject of inclusion of information obtained from BCI’s databases. It pleads that from that, it can be inferred that “information copied from LeadManager” and “the Comparative Documents” were used to “improve Cordell Connect” by identifying gaps, and filling those gaps with information found in LeadManager. That is a broad allegation of generalised misuse (noting that the Comparative Documents are alleged to be documents comparing the BCI product unfavourably with the respondents’ product using information obtained by the alleged data scraping). It properly pleads an inference (see Yee v Wellington [2025] QSC 121 at [22], discussed at [32] of Review of Registrar’s Decision). The pleading is not confined to particular projects, but alleges that the respondents used BCI’s information to improve the respondents’ product, Cordell Connect. The paragraph asks the Court to find that the improvement of Cordell Connect, not the specific and particular gaps which were filled with LeadManager information, can be inferred from the emails and the various projects mentioned.

51    The particulars to the paragraph, while not necessarily helpfully drafted as they use the words “as presently known”, set out the specific emails upon which the inference as to improvement is said to be able to be drawn, and the 25 or so projects to which those emails relate. Those particulars are part of the evidentiary foundation from which BCI will ask the Court to infer that the attempts to “improve” Cordell Connect were being undertaken. That inference is not reliant on, say, the name of the builder or the contact details of the architect.

52    Accordingly, even were I inclined to determine the Strikeout IA on its merits, I would have found against the CoreLogic Parties in relation to paragraph 43 of the FASOC.

53    In relation to paragraph 82E, there is some disconnect, as pointed out by the respondents, between the pleading in the FASOC and what the expert was asked to do. It may be that the applicant is able, or may be unable, to convince me that the value of the CoreLogic Inc shares has a relationship to the revenue and operating costs of the other three respondents which should sound in a remedy of account of profits. However, the pleading that the profits of the subsidiary increased the value of the parent company – who is also claimed to have authorised the conduct and so is alleged to be liable for equitable damages – is a triable issue. I regard that aspect as being arguable and even if I had been inclined to determine the Strikeout AI on its merits, I would have allowed this part of the claim to remain.

Orders

54    The Strikeout IA will be dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    17 December 2025

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES