Federal Court of Australia

Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd v Manti (No 2) [2025] FCA 1231

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 6 October 2025 for an injunction order and other orders be, in the first instance, returnable instanter.

2. The application, in the first instance, be determined on an ex parte basis.

3. Upon the applicant giving the Court the usual undertaking as to damages, until 10 October 2025 (the Return Date), the first respondent and Ms Theresa Manti be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining them from disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the proceeds of the sale of the property situated at 9 Dale Street, Maribyrnong, Victoria, less any selling costs and agent’s fees. Subject to the next paragraph, this order has effect up to and including the Return Date.

4. On the Return Date at 9:30am there will be a further hearing in respect of this order and the application before Justice Neskovcin, as the Commercial and Corporations Duty Judge.

5. The parties and Ms Manti have leave to apply to the Court at any time to vary or discharge this order.

6. Service of the application, supporting affidavit, written submissions and this order is to be effected on the first respondent and Ms Manti by 4:00pm on 8 October 2025.

7. The application be returnable inter partes at 9:30am on the Return Date before Justice Neskovcin, as the Commercial and Corporations Duty Judge.

8. The costs of the application are reserved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NESKOVCIN J:

1 The applicant, Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd, filed an interlocutory application for an injunction or freezing orders to be made ex parte on an urgent basis against the first respondent, Mr Manti, and Ms Theresa Manti. The application came before me as the Victorian Commercial and Corporations Duty Judge on 7 October 2025.

2 At the hearing of the application, Sansoni Group relied on an affidavit of Mr Andrew Croxford, solicitor, affirmed on 6 October 2025, and an outline of written submissions.

3 On 7 October 2025, I made an interim injunction order to restrain Mr Manti and Ms Manti from dissipating the net proceeds from the sale of a property at 9 Dale Street, Maribyrnong, Victoria (the Property), and indicated I would provide reasons later. These are my reasons.

Background

4 Mr Manti is a former employee of Sansoni Group, whose employment was terminated on 11 October 2024. On 11 November 2024, Sansoni Group commenced this proceeding against Mr Manti on an urgent basis seeking search orders after it became aware that Mr Manti had:

(a) downloaded confidential information of Sansoni Group, including information concerning sales leads, clients, pricing proposals and strategy and marketing documents;

(b) used a program "TraceDestructor.exe" to carry out a system wipe of the laptop issued to Mr Manti by Sansoni Group;

(c) changed the host of the domain names for the websites "aaronsansoni.com" and "sansoni.com" such that he, and not Sansoni Group, controlled those domain names; and

(d) caused the business name "Aaron Sansoni" to be registered in the name of the third respondent, Everco, of which Mr Manti was, at the time the application was commenced in November 2024, the director and shareholder.

5 Ms Manti was made a party to this proceeding because she was named on the ASIC register as a director of Everco. However, after Mr Manti re­appointed himself as a director of Everco, Sansoni Group discontinued the proceeding against Ms Manti.

6 Search orders were made by Justice Hespe on 12 November 2024. Since that date, there have been approximately 12 hearings principally before Justice Moshinsky directed to Mr Manti's compliance with the Court's orders and steps allegedly taken by Mr Manti to interfere with Sansoni Group's business.

7 On 22 January 2025, Sansoni Group issued contempt of court proceedings against Mr Manti and Ms Manti with respect to:

(a) their failure to transfer to Sansoni Group domain names associated with Sansoni Group and to serve affidavits deposing to the steps taken by them to so transfer in accordance with orders dated 16 December 2024; and

(b) the non-compliance by Mr Manti with the search orders made on 12 November 2024 because of his failure to permit the independent solicitor carrying out the search order to inspect a mobile phone.

8 The contempt application was heard by Justice Moshinsky on 21 and 28 March 2025. As at the date of hearing of the application, judgment in the contempt application was reserved, however, on 3 October 2025 his Honour's chambers advised the parties that judgment was expected to be handed down in the week commencing 6 October 2025.

9 At the time the proceeding was commenced in November 2024, Mr Manti was the sole registered proprietor of the Property, which was and still is unencumbered.

10 On 13 January 2025, only two months after the proceeding was commenced, Mr Manti transferred the Property to Ms Manti, who, at the time of the application, was the registered proprietor of the Property.

11 On 19 September 2025, Mr Croxford became aware that Ms Manti had listed and sold the Property, but it was not until Mr Croxford undertook an online search on 3 October 2025 that he became aware that the Property had been sold on 6 August 2025. After a PEXA search was undertaken, Mr Croxford discovered that settlement of the Property was scheduled to occur on 8 October 2025.

12 By the application, Sansoni Group sought an order that Mr Manti and Ms Manti pay the net proceeds of sale of the Property into Court until the hearing and determination of the proceeding or, alternatively, that freezing orders be made against Mr Manti and Ms Manti.

Applicable Principles

13 The Court has general power to grant a Mareva injunction and to make freezing orders under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and Div 7.4 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

14 The applicable principles are well-established and were conveniently summarised by Feutrill J in UFC Enterprise Morley Pty Ltd v UFC Enterprise Northbridge Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1396 at [13]–[14], which I gratefully adopt and repeat insofar as they are relevant to this proceeding:

(a) The language of r 7.32 of the Rules reflects what has been considered to be a general power of the Court to grant a Mareva injunction under s 23 of the FCA Act: Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; 162 CLR 612 at 622-623 (Deane J).

(b) As a general proposition, a freezing order may be granted if the applicant demonstrates a prima facie or good arguable case for final relief and the circumstances are such that there is a danger of the respondent absconding, or a danger of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the applicant, if it gets judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (2010) 273 ALR 194; FCA 1014 at [8] (Kenny J) and the authorities there cited.

(c) The reference in r 7.32 to a “danger” that a judgment or prospective judgment will go wholly or partly unsatisfied is a reference to a risk of that outcome. The risk must be real or substantial as opposed to a remote or speculative or theoretical possibility. The applicant must prove facts from which the Court can infer the existence of a real or substantial risk on the balance of probabilities: Duro Felguera Australia Pty Ltd v Trans Global Projects Pty Ltd (in liq) (2018) 53 WAR 201; WASCA 174 at [42]–[43] (Buss P, Murphy and Mitchell JJA) and the authorities there cited.

(d) It is not necessary to establish that judgment will be unsatisfied unless a freezing order is made. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that a respondent has a positive intention to frustrate a judgment. However, there must be facts from which “a prudent, sensible commercial” person can “properly infer a danger of default if assets are removed from the jurisdiction”. That may include facts concerning a lack of available information about a respondent: Hua Wang Bank Berhad at [9]–[12] (Kenny J) and the authorities there cited. See, also, Severstal Export GmbH v Bhushan Steel Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 141; NSWCA 102 at [59]–[60] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Barrett JA agreeing); Trans Global Projects at [45].

(e) Ultimately, it is a question for evaluation by the Court as to whether the degree of the danger or risk is sufficient to justify an order in the terms made. In making that evaluative assessment, the Court will bear in mind that a freezing order is a drastic remedy which imposes a severe restriction on a respondent’s right to deal with its assets, and that the purpose of the order is not to provide security for a judgment which the applicant hopes to obtain and fears might not be satisfied: Trans Global Projects at [44] and the authorities there cited.

15 The principles applicable to the grant of interlocutory injunctions pending resolution of a dispute are also well established. Again, adopting Feutrill J’s summary in UFC Enterprise, the principles require there to be a serious question to be tried and that the balance of convenience favour the order for an interlocutory restraint pending determination of the substantive dispute. The Full Court set out the “correct approach” in Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; FCAFC 156 at [52]–[74]. The applicant must first show that they have a prima facie case in the sense of a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; HCA 46 at [65] (Gummow and Hayne JJ, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreeing). This is commonly referred to as a serious question to be tried. What will be sufficient will depend on “the nature of the rights [the applicant] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks”: Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622. Secondly, a party must also demonstrate that the balance of convenience and justice favour the grant of an injunction: Beecham Group at 623.

Reasons For Granting The Injunction

16 For the purpose of the application for an urgent ex parte interlocutory order, I was satisfied that Sansoni Group has a good arguable claim for relief against Mr Manti for breach of statutory and contractual duties owed by Mr Manti to Santoni Group as a former employee. As a result, Sansoni Group has a good arguable claim for damages or compensation against Mr Manti.

17 Sansoni Group submitted that the Court could be satisfied that there was a danger that assets will be dissipated in disregard of, or in an attempt to frustrate, the Court’s processes for the following reasons:

(a) the claims against Mr Manti involve allegations of serious and dishonest conduct;

(b) conduct of a similar kind to that which gave rise to the commencement of the proceeding has continued even after the commencement of the proceeding, namely, Mr Manti caused Everco to make a trademark application to IP Australia to trademark the names “sansoni” and “aaron sansoni”;

(c) the coincidence of the commencement of the proceeding and transfer of the Property by Mr Manti to Ms Manti, and the transfer by Mr Manti to Ms Manti of his shares in Everco, a short time thereafter; and

(d) the coincidence of the transfer of the Property by Mr Manti to Ms Manti and the subsequent sale of the Property.

18 In addition, Sansoni Group relied on Mr Manti’s non-compliance with orders of the Court, which founded the contempt application brought in March 2025, namely:

(a) Mr Manti’s failure to provide certain login details by 18 November 2024 in accordance with orders made on 15 November 2024;

(b) despite the Court making orders on 6 December 2024 restraining Mr Manti from communicating with Sansoni Group’s clients, Mr Manti sent emails to various clients and news agencies on 24 December 2024; and

(c) despite the Court making orders on 16 December 2024 restraining Mr Manti from registering any domain name or business name that includes the word “Sansoni”, on 2 September 2025 Mr Manti caused Everco to register the business names “sansoni” and “aaron sansoni”.

19 In Victoria University of Technology v Wilson [2003] VSC 299 at [33], Redlich J (as his Honour then was) stated:

A risk of dissipation cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the plaintiff has a prima facie cause of action. One may in some cases, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, infer the existence of a risk of dissipation partly or wholly from the fact that the plaintiff has a good, arguable case. Where the plaintiff’s prima facie case against a defendant involves proof of allegations of serious dishonesty, such an approach may be appropriate.

[Footnotes omitted]

20 I was satisfied, on the material before the Court, that the claims against Mr Manti are allegations of serious dishonesty and that Mr Manti has taken and is prepared to take steps to harm Sansoni Group’s commercial interests or disrupt its business. Furthermore, Mr Manti has shown a disregard for orders of this Court. In my assessment, those are matters that support the applicant’s assertion that there is a risk of dissipation of assets belonging to Mr Manti, or that are under his control, to frustrate the Court’s processes.

21 In regard to Ms Manti, who is a not a party to the proceeding, the applicant’s counsel frankly conceded that there is a lacuna in the evidence in relation to the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the Property to Ms Manti, the subsequent listing of the Property for sale and the status of the relationship between Mr Manti and Ms Manti. Mr Manti had previously asserted that the marital relationship had broken down and that Mr Manti and Ms Manti had entered into a “separation agreement”, although Sansoni Group were sceptical about that. As mentioned above, Ms Manti was joined to the contempt application, however, the nature and extent of Ms Manti’s involvement in the relevant matters and her alleged non-compliance with orders of the Court was not addressed in any detail.

22 In relation to the power to make a freezing order in respect of property of a non-party, in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380; HCA 18 at [57], Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ stated:

In our opinion such an order may, and we emphasise the word "may", be appropriate, assuming the existence of other relevant criteria and discretionary factors, in circumstances in which:

(i)     the third party holds, is using, or has exercised or is exercising a power of disposition over, or is otherwise in possession of, assets, including "claims and expectancies", of the judgment debtor or potential judgment debtor; or

(ii)    some process, ultimately enforceable by the courts, is or may be available to the judgment creditor as a consequence of a judgment against that actual or potential judgment debtor, pursuant to which, whether by appointment of a liquidator, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or otherwise, the third party may be obliged to disgorge property or otherwise contribute to the funds or property of the judgment debtor to help satisfy the judgment against the judgment debtor.

[Footnotes omitted]

23 The applicant submitted that paragraph (ii) of the above passage in Cardile was apposite to this case.

24 I was not satisfied that it was appropriate to make an order requiring Ms Manti to pay the proceeds of sale of the Property into Court given that the circumstances in which the Property came to be transferred to Ms Manti and in which the Property came to be listed for sale were unexplained.

25 I was, however, satisfied that it was appropriate to grant an interim injunction against Mr Manti and Ms Manti for a short period until the application could be heard inter partes. This would provide Mr Manti and Ms Manti with an opportunity to explain the circumstances in which the Property was transferred to Ms Manti and listed for sale, at which time the Court could consider whether to continue the existing orders, whether the proceeds of sale should be paid into Court and/or whether freezing orders should be made against Mr Manti and Ms Manti.

26 I was satisfied that the balance of convenience and interests of justice favoured the making of those orders to preserve the status quo in circumstances where there is a danger that assets belonging to Mr Manti, or under his control, might be dissipated in the absence of such an order.

27 For those reasons, an urgent interim injunction was granted upon the applicant giving the usual undertaking as to damages and on the basis that the application was set down for an inter partes hearing a short while later.

Associate:

Dated:    10 October 2025