Federal Court of Australia

Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd v Manti [2025] FCA 1229

ORDERS

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1. By failing to take, by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the domain name sansoni.com.au to the applicant, the first respondent (Mr Manti) breached paragraph 2(a) of the Court’s orders dated 16 December 2024 and is guilty of contempt.

2. By failing to file and serve, by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, a signed affidavit setting out the steps he had taken to give effect to paragraph 2 of the Court’s orders dated 16 December 2024, Mr Manti breached paragraph 3 of those orders and is guilty of contempt.

3. By failing to file and serve, by 4.00 pm on 27 December 2024, an affidavit setting out the steps taken to give effect to paragraph 3 of the Court’s orders dated 23 December 2024, the second respondent, Theresa Manti, breached paragraph 4 of those orders and is guilty of contempt.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

4. The respondents’ informal application dated 15 August 2025 (to re-open their case in relation to the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 22 January 2025) be dismissed.

5. Mr Manti pay a fine of $10,000 in respect of the breaches of paragraphs 2(a) and 3 of the 16 December 2024 orders.

6. The fine payable by Mr Manti pursuant to paragraph 5:

(a) be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund; and

(b) subject to paragraph 7, be payable within 60 days.

7. There be liberty to apply to seek an order for the payment of the fine by instalments over a period of time longer than 60 days.

8. Charge 3 in the statement of charge relating to Mr Manti be adjourned indefinitely.

9. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 22 January 2025 otherwise be dismissed.

10. In relation to the costs of the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 22 January 2025 (including the costs of the adjourned hearing on 28 February 2025 and the costs of the application to re-open):

(a) within 14 days, each party file and serve a short written submission on costs;

(b) within a further 14 days, each party file and serve a short responding submission; and

(c) the issue of costs be determined on the papers.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOSHINSKY J:

Introduction

1 The applicant, Aaron Sansoni Group International Pty Ltd (ASGI), seeks declarations that the first respondent, Mr Francesco (Frank) Manti (Mr Manti) and the second respondent, Ms Theresa (Anna) Manti (Ms Manti), have committed contempt of court.

2 Mr Manti was previously employed by ASGI in the role of Financial Controller or Chief Financial Officer.  His employment was terminated on 11 October 2024.

3 On 11 November 2024, ASGI filed an urgent application before the start of a proceeding seeking (among other things) a search order in respect of Mr Manti’s residential premises.

4 On 12 November 2024, a Judge of this Court (in her capacity as duty Judge) made orders as sought by ASGI (the Search Order).  Of particular relevance for present purposes are paragraphs 9(g), 20 and 21 of the Search Order, which provided:

9.    Having permitted members of the search party to enter the premises, you [i.e. Mr Manti] must:

…

(g)    permit the independent computer expert (if there is one) to search any electronic device or cloud storage facility and make a copy or digital copy of any electronic device or cloud storage facility and permit the independent computer expert (if any) or the independent lawyer to remove any electronic device from the premises as set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 below.

…

Computers and electronic devices

20.

(a)    The search party must include a computer expert who is independent of [ASGI] and of [ASGI’s] lawyers (“the independent computer expert”).

(b)    Any search of an electronic device or cloud storage facility must be carried out only by the independent computer expert.

(c)    The independent computer expert may make a copy or digital copy of the information stored on any electronic device or cloud storage facility [and] remove that copy or digital copy from the premises.

(d)    The independent computer expert may search the electronic device or cloud storage facility or the copy or digital copy of the computer hard drive at the premises and/or away from the premises for listed things and may copy the listed things electronically or in hard copy or both.

(e)    The independent computer expert must as soon as practicable and, in any event, prior to the hearing on the Return Date, deliver the copy or digital copy of the information stored on the electronic device or cloud storage facility and all electronic and hard copies of listed things to the independent lawyer, together with a report of what the independent computer expert has done including a list of such electronic and hard copies.

(f)    The independent lawyer must, at or prior to the hearing on the Return Date, deliver to the Court all things received from the independent computer expert and serve a copy of the latter’s report on the parties.

(g)    Notwithstanding the foregoing subparagraphs of paragraph 20 of this order, if the independent computer expert considers it necessary to remove an electronic device from the premises for safekeeping or for the purpose of copying its contents electronically and printing out information in documentary form, the independent computer expert may remove the electronic device from the premises for that purpose and cause that purpose to be achieved. Any mobile phone is to be returned to the Respondent within 24 hours of it being removed from the premises.

21.

(a)    This paragraph (21) applies if you are not a corporation and you wish to object to complying with paragraph 20 on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that you:

(i)    have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or

(ii)    are liable to a civil penalty.

(b)    You must:

(i)    disclose so much of the information required to be disclosed to which no objection is taken; and

(ii)    prepare an affidavit containing so much of the information required to be disclosed to which objection is taken, and deliver it to the Court in a sealed envelope; and

(iii)    file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection.

5 On 15 November 2024, pursuant to the Search Order, Mark Schofield of Nicholas O’Donohue & Co (the Independent Lawyer) and Paul Harrison of KordaMentha (the Independent Computer Expert) attended Mr Manti’s premises and conducted a search (the Search).  Mr Manti refused to permit five electronic devices to be searched or copied or removed.  Mr Manti adopted this course following discussion with the Independent Lawyer and on the basis that he (Mr Manti) was permitted by para 21 of the Search Order to withhold the devices.

6 Also on 15 November 2024, ASGI commenced this proceeding against Mr Manti.  (Ms Manti was not a respondent when the proceeding was commenced.)

7 On 19 November 2024, a hearing took place before a Judge of the Court (in her capacity as duty Judge).  The Court directed Mr Manti to produce the five electronic devices to the Independent Computer Expert, which Mr Manti did on 20 November 2024.

8 On 16 December 2024, the Court made further orders (the 16 December 2024 Orders) including:

2.    [Mr Manti] forthwith, and by no later than 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024:

a.    take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the domain name sansoni.com.au to [ASGI]; and

b.    take all reasonable steps within his power to cause the cancellation of the registration of the following business names (currently registered in the name of Everco Pty Ltd):

i.    “Aaron Sansoni”;

ii.    “Sansoni”; and

iii.    “Sansoni Services”.

3.    By 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, [Mr Manti] file and serve a signed affidavit setting out the steps he has taken to give effect to paragraph 2 above.

9 On 23 December 2024, Ms Manti was joined as the second respondent to the proceeding and a company called Everco Pty Ltd (Everco) was joined as the third respondent.  Ms Manti is the wife of Mr Manti, but they have entered a separation agreement or arrangement.  It appeared at that time that Ms Manti was a director of Everco, but it is now apparent that she was not (see further below).  On that date, the Court made orders (the 23 December 2024 Orders) including:

3.    Subject to further order, [Ms Manti] and [Everco] must forthwith, and by no later than 4.00 pm on 24 December 2024, take all necessary steps to cause:

a.    the transfer of the domain name sansoni.com.au to [ASGI]; and

b.    the cancellation of the registration of the following business names:

i.    “Aaron Sansoni”;

ii.    “Sansoni”; and

iii.    “Sansoni Services”.

4.    By 4.00 pm on 27 December 2024, [Ms Manti] and a Director of [Everco] file and serve an affidavit setting out the steps taken to give effect to paragraph 3 above.

10 By an interlocutory application dated 22 January 2025 (the contempt application), ASGI seeks orders declaring that each of Mr Manti and Ms Manti has committed contempt of court.  The grounds of the application are set out in two statements of charge:

(a) a statement of charge dated 22 January 2025 in respect of Mr Manti; and

(b) a statement of charge dated 22 January 2025 in respect of Ms Manti.

Although ASGI later filed an amended statement of charge in relation to Mr Manti, it indicated at the hearing that it did not press the amended statement of charge.

11 The statement of charge in respect of Mr Manti contains six charges.  However, during the course of the hearing ASGI said that it was content for charge 3 to be adjourned indefinitely and that it did not press ground 4.  The remaining charges can be summarised as follows (arranging the charges in chronological sequence based on the date of the orders):

(a) that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 9(g) of the Search Order by failing to permit the Independent Computer Expert to search five electronic devices and make a digital copy of those devices and by failing to permit the Independent Computer Expert or the Independent Lawyer to remove those devices from the premises (charge 5);

(b) that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 21(b) of the Search Order by failing to file and serve an affidavit as required by that paragraph (charge 6);

(c) that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 2(a) of the 16 December 2024 Orders by failing to take (by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024) all necessary steps to transfer the domain name sansoni.com.au (the Domain Name) to ASGI (charge 2); and

(d) that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders by failing to file and serve (by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024) a signed affidavit setting out the steps that he had taken to give effect to para 2 of those orders (charge 1).

12 The statement of charge in relation to Ms Manti contains two charges.  The charges can be summarised as follows:

(a) that Ms Manti failed to comply with para 3(a) of the 23 December 2024 Orders by failing to take (by 4.00 pm on 24 December 2024) all necessary steps to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI (charge 1); and

(b) that Ms Manti failed to comply with para 4 of the 23 December 2024 Orders by failing to file and serve (by 4.00 pm on 27 December 2024) an affidavit setting out the steps taken to give effect to para 3 of those orders (charge 2).

13 For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that:

(a) In relation to Mr Manti:

(i) charges 5 and 6 are not made out; and

(ii) charges 1 and 2 are made out.

(b) In relation to Ms Manti:

(i) charge 1 is not made out; and

(ii) charge 2 is made out.

14 I have reached the following conclusions in relation to penalties:

(a) In relation to Mr Manti: a fine of $10,000 should be imposed for the breaches of paras 2(a) and 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders.

(b) In relation to Ms Manti: no penalty should be imposed.

The hearing and the evidence

15 The contempt application was originally listed for hearing on 28 February 2025, but that hearing was adjourned in circumstances where Mr and Ms Manti served substantial new material a short time before the hearing.  The application was subsequently heard over two days, on 21 March 2025 and 28 March 2025.  ASGI was represented by senior and junior counsel.  Mr Manti and Ms Manti were not legally represented and appeared for themselves at the hearing.

16 The hearing was conducted on the basis that the evidence in the application relating to Mr Manti was evidence in the application relating to Ms Manti and vice versa.

17 ASGI relied on the following affidavit evidence:

(a) three affidavits of Andrew Croxford, the principal of Croxford Milardovic & Associates (also referred to as CMA Law), the solicitors for ASGI, dated 21 January 2025 (comprising 9 paragraphs), 21 January 2025 (comprising 14 paragraphs) and 19 February 2025; and

(b) an affidavit of Paul Harrison, a Director of KordaMentha who was engaged as the Independent Computer Expert in relation to the Search Order, dated 21 January 2025.

18 Both Mr Croxford and Mr Harrison were cross-examined by Mr Manti during the hearing.  There was no real challenge to their reliability as witnesses, and I accept their evidence.

19 Mr Manti relied on nine affidavits that he made dated 19 November 2024, 24 November 2024, 29 November 2024, 22 December 2024, 31 January 2025, 6 February 2025 (comprising 10 paragraphs), 6 February 2025 (comprising 6 paragraphs), 12 February 2025 and 25 February 2025.  Insofar as some of these affidavits were not sworn or affirmed on those dates, Mr Manti subsequently adopted them in the witness box (either during the hearing of the contempt application or at an earlier hearing). Mr Manti was cross-examined.  I discuss his evidence later in these reasons.

20 Ms Manti relied on five affidavits that she made on 23 December 2024, 11 February 2025, 12 February 2025, 25 February 2025 and 25 March 2025.  Insofar as some of these affidavits were not sworn or affirmed on those dates, Ms Manti subsequently adopted them in the witness box. Ms Manti was cross-examined.  I discuss her evidence later in these reasons.

21 Following the completion of the cross-examination of Ms Manti, I raised with ASGI whether Ms Manti should be removed as a respondent to the proceeding.  This was because ASGI’s case against Ms Manti was premised on her being, or having been, a director of Everco.  However, Ms Manti’s affidavit evidence was that she had never been a director of Everco, and ASGI did not challenge that evidence during cross-examination.  ASGI did not oppose removal of Ms Manti as a respondent to the proceeding, provided that this would not affect the contempt application against her (T167-168).  I then made an order removing Ms Manti as a respondent to the proceeding, noting that this did not affect the contempt application against her, which was yet to be determined.

22 In addition to the above affidavit evidence, ASGI relied on a number of documents that were admitted into evidence.  Further, during the hearing, the parties made reference to the transcripts of hearings that had taken place in the proceeding in November and December 2024.  Although they were not formally tendered, I consider that regard may be had to those transcripts for the purposes of the contempt application.

23 At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were given leave to file and serve written closing submissions, which they subsequently did.

24 Mr Manti’s submissions annexed a number of medical reports.  Mr Manti was given leave to file and serve, by 11 April 2025, an affidavit from a medical practitioner on matters relevant to the contempt application.  In the event that Mr Manti filed such further evidence, ASGI was given the opportunity to have the matter listed for further hearing in order to cross-examine the deponent of that affidavit.  Subsequently, Mr Manti filed further affidavits that he made dated 11 April 2025 and 5 May 2025.  Those affidavits do not comply with the order giving leave because the order referred to an affidavit from a medical practitioner.  Accordingly, I do not propose to have regard to those affidavits.

Application to re-open

25 On 7 April 2025, Ms Manti filed an affidavit dated 4 April 2025 that annexed some of the documents that had been annexed to her outline of submissions (which had not gone into evidence).  Some of the documents annexed to the affidavit appeared to relate to an issue as to whether there was a 60-day ‘lockout’ on transferring the Domain Name to another registrant (the 60-day lockout issue) (discussed later in these reasons).  In an email from my chambers to the parties dated 15 August 2025, it was pointed out to Mr and Ms Manti that, if they wanted to rely on that affidavit, they would need to make an application for leave to re-open their case.  By email dated 15 August 2025, Mr and Ms Manti indicated that they did wish to re-open their case to rely on that affidavit.  Initially, all parties indicated that they were content for the application to re-open to be put ‘on hold’ while a mediation took place (and requested that I defer delivering judgment until after the mediation had been completed).  However, at a case management hearing on 25 September 2025, ASGI indicated that it wanted the application to re-open to be dealt with, so that judgment could be handed down, notwithstanding that the mediation had not been concluded.

26 ASGI opposed the application to re-open, relying on an affidavit of Jenny Brown dated 24 September 2025 and written submissions dated 24 September 2025.  Mr and Ms Manti relied on an unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit of Mr Manti and an outline of submissions dated 1 October 2025 in support of the application to re-open.  As the parties’ submissions indicate, there is no issue between the parties as to the applicable principles relating to an application to re-open: see, eg, Reid v Brett [2005] VSC 18 at [41]; and Smith v New South Wales Bar Association [1992] HCA 36; 176 CLR 256 at 267.

27 By email from my chambers dated 3 October 2025, I indicated that the application to re-open was refused, and that reasons would be provided in my judgment on the contempt application.  My reasons for dismissing the application to re-open are as follows.

28 Insofar as Ms Manti’s affidavit dated 4 April 2025 annexes (as “AM-1”) a copy of information obtained from “DeepSeek”, that information is already in evidence as “FM-12” to the affidavit of Mr Manti dated 25 February 2025.  Therefore, the annexure does not add anything and is unnecessary.

29 Insofar as Ms Manti’s affidavit dated 4 April 2025 annexes (as “AM-2”) a copy of an email enclosing Ms Manti’s submissions, this adds nothing of substance.  The submissions are before the Court and have been considered.

30 While at first blush some of the documents annexed to Ms Manti’s 4 April 2025 affidavit (namely, “AM-3”, “AM-4” and “AM-5”) appeared to be relevant to the 60-day lockout issue, upon further analysis they do not provide any assistance to Mr and Ms Manti in relation to this issue.  As discussed below, one of Mr Manti’s contentions in relation to charge 2 was that the Domain Name was not transferable during the relevant period (between 16 December 2024 (when the relevant order was made) and 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024 (the date for compliance with the relevant order)) because the Domain Name was subject to a lockout on transfer for a period of 60 days following its registration (on 3 November 2024).  If this contention were correct, it would mean that there were no steps that could be taken by Mr Manti to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to ASGI, as required by the relevant order.  Arguably, this would mean that Mr Manti did not breach the order.  However, upon analysis, the documents annexed to Ms Manti’s 4 April 2025 affidavit do not support Mr Manti’s contention.

31 “AM-3” to Ms Manti’s affidavit dated 4 April 2025 is an extract from the rules of ICANN, which is a governing body for certain domain names.  However, it is apparent from other material in evidence that ICANN is not the governing body for .au domain names.  This is apparent from Mr Croxford’s affidavit dated 19 February 2025, para 16, which states that auDA is an Australian not-for-profit organisation responsible for administering the .au domain.  It may be inferred that ICANN is not the relevant governing body for .au domains.  I note that this is confirmed by the chat message dialogue between Mr Manti and Webcentral that is “FjM-6” to the unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit of Mr Manti dated 1 October 2025 in support of the application to re-open.  In response to a query from Mr Manti, Webcentral responded:

… the .au (including .com.au/.org.au etc) namespace is not subject to the same ICANN 60-day lock as the .au namespace is not governed by ICANN but instead, auDA (the .au Domain Administration).

32 In response to a further query from Mr Manti, Webcentral responded:

.au domains (including .com.au) are not governed by ICANN. They fall under auDA’s rules, which do not enforce an automatic 60-day lock for registrar transfers or registrant changes.

33 Further, the extract from ICANN’s rules annexed to Ms Manti’s affidavit is concerned with transfer from one registrar to another registrar, but the relevant order here required Mr Manti to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI (that is, to another registrant).  The relevant passage from the ICANN rules reads:

After 1 December 2016, registrars must impose a lock that will prevent any transfer to another registrar for sixty (60) days following a change to a registrant’s information. Registrars may (but are not required to) allow registrants to opt out of the 60-day lock prior to the change of registrant request.

(Emphasis added.)

34 “AM-4” to Ms Manti’s affidavit dated 4 April 2025 is an extract from the Crazy Domains website.  Ms Manti’s affidavit states that this is ASGI’s domain provider.  Even if that is correct, the rules applied by Crazy Domains are not relevant, because the Domain Name was not registered with Crazy Domains.  In any event, the passage extracted is concerned with a transfer of a domain name to another registrar (also referred to as “another provider”).  The second sentence is an exception to the first sentence, which is concerned with transfer to another registrar.

35 “AM-5” is an extract from Webcentral’s service terms (as updated 23 August 2022).  A full version of the document was annexed to Ms Manti’s submissions dated 18 March 2025 as Annexure “E”. The extract at “AM-5” is of clause 16 (“Transfer of Ownership”).  It appears that Mr Manti relies, in particular, on the last sentence of that clause, which reads:

You acknowledge that you will not be entitled to change registrars during the first sixty (60) days following the registration of your domain name.

36 However, by reference to the full document at Annexure “E”, it is apparent that this clause is applicable to .cn domain names rather than .au domain names.  The service terms comprise 52 pages.  Pages 1-23 contain general terms.  Pages 23-28 contain terms applicable to .au domain names.  Those pages do not include any provision to the effect set out above.  The clause relied on by Mr Manti appears at p 37 of the service terms.  That page forms part of a section of the document (running from pp 34-40) that relates to .cn domain names.  Further, the provision set out above is concerned with transfer of a domain name from one registrar to another, rather than from one registrant to another.

37 For these reasons, “AM-3”, “AM-4” and “AM-5” do not assist Mr and Ms Manti in relation to the 60-day lockout issue, and therefore there is no need to grant leave to re-open in relation to these documents.

38 The last document annexed to Ms Manti’s 4 April 2025 affidavit (as “AM-6”) is an email chain between the parties, ending with an email from Mr Manti sent on 3 April 2025.  This is relied on by Mr Manti to demonstrate his willingness to resolve the domain name issue.  However, there was a long period of time between the date of the relevant order (16 December 2024) and the dates of the hearing (21 and 28 March 2025) for Mr Manti to seek to demonstrate this.  Mr Manti filed a substantial affidavit dated 25 February 2025 in relation to these issues (which was part of the reason for the adjournment of the hearing on 28 February 2025).  Further, the email chain does not propose any concrete steps; it merely provides a generalised offer to assist.  I do not consider that the email chain adds anything of substance to Mr Manti’s contentions in relation to the contempt application.

39 For these reasons, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to grant leave to re-open to rely on Ms Manti’s 4 April 2025 affidavit.

40 If and to the extent that Mr and Ms Manti seek leave to re-open to rely on the contents of, and exhibits to, Mr Manti’s unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit dated 1 October 2025, I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to grant leave to re-open to rely on that material.  I put to one side the fact that the document has not been sworn or affirmed.  Insofar as the documents annexed to the affidavit relate to the relationship between Webcentral and Melbourne IT (“FjM-1” and “FjM-2”), they do not take the matter beyond the inferences that I would draw from the material that is in evidence.  The documents at “FjM-3” are already in evidence.  (Although the version of the 15 January 2025 letter at “FjM-3” is a complete version of the letter and the version in evidence is incomplete, the version in evidence comprises the substance of the letter.)  “FjM-4” is a complaint made by ASGI.  I do not consider it relevant.  “FjM-5” is a version of the Webcentral service terms (updated 23 August 2022).  For the reasons given above, the service terms do not assist Mr and Ms Manti in relation to the 60-day lockout issue.  “FjM-6” is a chat dialogue between Mr Manti and Webcentral that has already been referred to above.  This dialogue does not assist Mr and Ms Manti in relation to the 60-day lockout issue; to the contrary, it states that .au domains (including .com.au) fall under auDA’s rules, “which do not enforce an automatic 60-day lock for registrar transfers or registrant transfers”.

41 In paras 15-16 of the unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit dated 1 October 2025, and in the chat dialogue that is “FjM-6” to that affidavit, Mr Manti states (for the first time) that in about December 2024: (a) he attempted to update the registrant details to include ASGI’s, rather than his own, details but an error code (“API error”) was generated; and (b) he clicked on the “EPP”, which he says was necessary to effect a transfer to another registrar, but nothing happened despite several attempts.  There is no mention of this in Mr Manti’s affidavits filed in connection with the contempt application.  In particular, there is no mention of this in paras 12-16 of Mr Manti’s 22 December 2024 affidavit, paras 19-21 of Mr Manti’s 31 January 2025 affidavit, or paras 29-38 of Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, which are the key paragraphs in which he describes the steps he took in December 2024 in relation to the Domain Name.  If Mr Manti did in fact carry out those steps in December 2024, he could have given evidence to that effect before or during the hearing of the contempt application on 21 and 28 March 2025.  No satisfactory explanation has been provided as to why the evidence was not provided earlier.  In these circumstances, and notwithstanding that Mr Manti is self-represented, I do not consider it appropriate to grant leave to re-open to rely on that evidence.

Applicable principles

42 In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ACN 117 372 915 Pty Limited (in liq) (formerly Advanced Medical Institute Pty Limited) [2015] FCA 1441, I summarised the applicable principles in relation to contempt of court.  For ease of reference, I set out, in the following paragraphs, that summary of the applicable principles.

43 This Court’s power to punish for contempt of its power and authority is contained in s 31(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).  The power is the same as that of the High Court to punish for contempt of that Court.  The High Court’s power in this regard is the same as that of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England at the commencement of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): s 24 of that Act.

44 An application by a party who alleges a contempt of court is governed by Div 42.2 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.  If a party alleges that a contempt has been committed by a person in connection with a proceeding in this Court, an application for punishment for the alleged contempt is to be made by the party by interlocutory application in the proceeding: r 42.11(1).  An application alleging that a contempt has been committed must be accompanied by a statement of charge, specifying the contempt with sufficient particularity to allow the person charged to answer the charge, and the affidavits on which the person making the charge intends to rely to prove the charge: r 42.12.

45 A distinction is drawn between civil and criminal contempt.  An alleged breach of a court order generally falls to be considered under the principles applicable to civil contempt.  Deliberate conduct which is in breach of a court order will constitute wilful disobedience of the order, and therefore a civil contempt, unless the conduct is casual, accidental or unintentional: see Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; 161 CLR 98 at 113 per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ; Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 148 (Hurd v Zomojo) at [90]-[91] and [97]-[101] per Besanko and Gilmour JJ, at [164] per Beach J.  Whether the charge be for civil or criminal contempt, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway [1995] HCA 3; 183 CLR 525 at 534 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 21; 256 CLR 375 at [42] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ, at [59] per Nettle J.

46 In Advan Investments Pty Ltd v Dean Gleeson Motor Sales Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 201, Gillard J set out the elements necessary to establish a civil contempt involving a breach of an order of the court.  His Honour said (at [31]):

In order to prove a civil contempt of court involving a breach of an order of the court, the plaintiff has to prove the following:

(i)    that an order was made by the court;

(ii)    that the terms of the order are clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance;

(iii)    that the order was served on the alleged contemnor or excused in the circumstances, or service dispensed with pursuant to the Rules of Court;

(iv)    that the alleged contemnor has knowledge of the terms of the order;

(v)    that the alleged contemnor has breached the terms of the order.

General findings

47 Before addressing the specific charges, I make some findings that are relevant to the charges generally.

48 Mr Manti gave evidence during cross-examination that he is the current director of Everco and he has been the sole director of the company at all relevant times (T124).  He was not challenged on that evidence.  Ms Manti gave evidence to the effect that, despite some forms lodged with ASIC suggesting otherwise, she has never been a director of Everco (see Ms Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit at para 6; and her 25 March 2025 affidavit at paras 10, 17, 39).  This was not challenged during cross-examination.  On the basis of that evidence, I find that Mr Manti was the sole director of Everco at all relevant times and that Ms Manti was never a director of Everco.

49 It is apparent from the evidence generally that Ms Manti did not play an active role in any of the relevant events and that Mr Manti was the active party in all relevant events.  Further, Ms Manti gave evidence during cross-examination (which I accept) that Mr Manti drafted all of her affidavits and her submissions (although she did read them) (T159, T162).

50 It is apparent from the evidence generally that Mr Manti was experiencing mental health issues during November and December 2024.  For example, in his oral evidence, he made several references to late 2024 having been a “dark time” (T133, T137) and to his having been in a “dark place” (T140). I find that Mr Manti was experiencing mental health issues that may have affected his judgment during those months.

51 It emerged during the cross-examination of Mr Manti that he had submitted forms to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) nominating Ms Manti as a director of Everco without a proper basis for doing so (T126-128).  Further, it emerged during cross-examination that Mr Manti made statements to the Court in late 2024 that were incorrect and contrary to the evidence that he gave during the hearing of the contempt application (T135-137).  In light of these matters, I approach his evidence with caution, particularly where it is not corroborated by other evidence.

52 In circumstances where (as I have found above) Ms Manti did not play an active role in any of the relevant events, her personal knowledge of the relevant matters is quite limited.  I therefore give her evidence limited weight.

Charges in relation to Mr Manti

Charges 5 and 6 (Search Order)

53 It is convenient to deal with charges 5 and 6 together as they both relate to the Search Order.  It is also convenient to deal with them before charges 1 and 2, which relate to a later order.

54 Charges 5 and 6 are as follows:

Charge 5

5.    You did not comply with paragraph 9(g) of the Court’s orders made 12 November 2024 (Search Order) and you thereby committed contempt of the Federal Court of Australia.

Particulars:

i.    Paragraph 9(g) of the Search Order provided that you must permit the independent computer expert (if there is one) to search any electronic device or cloud storage facility and make a copy or digital copy of any electronic device or cloud storage facility and permit the independent computer expert (if any) or the independent lawyer to remove any electronic device from the premises as set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Search Order.

ii.    Service of the Search Order on [Mr Manti] was on 14 November 2024 and [Mr Manti] appeared before the Court at 8.30 am on the morning of 15 November 2024.

iii.    Pursuant to the Search [Order], Paul Harrison, Director of KordaMentha, was the independent computer expert.

iv.    On 15 November 2024, citing paragraphs 21(a)(i)-(ii) of the Search Order, you objected to the search and examination by the independent computer expert of the following electronic devices:

a.    Red Umidigi Mobile phone: telephone Identifier [details omitted]

b.    Black custom desktop computer - identifier: Samsung 860 Evo Solid State Drive with serial number [details omitted].

c.    White Western Digital Portable hard drive. Identifier: Serial number [details omitted].

d.    IPhone 14 Pro Max. (Theresa Manti Mobile Phone). Identifier: [details omitted].

e.    Black Acer laptop. Identifier serial number [details omitted]. “Electronic Devices”

[v.]    On 15 November 2024 you did not comply with the Search Order and permit the independent computer expert to search the Electronic Devices and make a copy or digital copy of any Electronic Devices or permit the independent computer expert or the independent lawyer to remove the Electronic Devices from the premises.

[vi.]    In the premises, [Mr Manti] is guilty of contempt of court.

Charge 6 (alternative to charge 5)

6.    You did not comply with paragraph 21(b)(iii) of the Court’s orders made 12 November 2024 (Search Order) and you thereby committed contempt of the Federal Court of Australia.

Particulars:

i.    Paragraph 21(b) of the Search Order provided that you must file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection to complying with paragraph 20 of the Search Order on the grounds that some or all of the information required to be disclosed may tend to prove that you: (i) have committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (ii) are liable to a civil penalty.

ii.    Service of the Search Order on [Mr Manti] was on 14 November 2024 and [Mr Manti] appeared before the Court at 8.30 am on the morning of 15 November 2024.

iii.    On 15 November 2024, citing paragraphs 21(a)(i)-(ii) of the Search Order, you objected to the search and examination by the independent computer expert of the following electronic devices:

a.    Red Umidigi Mobile phone: telephone Identifier [details omitted]

b.    Black custom desktop computer - identifier: Samsung 860 Evo Solid State Drive with serial number [details omitted].

c.    White Western Digital Portable hard drive. Identifier: [details omitted].

d.    IPhone 14 Pro Max. (Theresa Manti Mobile Phone). Identifier: [details omitted].

e.    Black Acer laptop. Identifier serial number [details omitted]. “Electronic Devices”

iv.    You did not comply with paragraph 21(b) of the Search Order and file and serve on each other party a separate affidavit setting out the basis of the objection to complying with the … search and examination by the independent computer expert of the Electronic Devices.

v.    In the premises, [Mr Manti] is guilty of contempt of court.

Further findings

55 I will first make some findings of fact that are relevant to charges 5 and 6.  I will then consider whether each of the charges is made out.

56 On 12 November 2024, the Search Order was made by a duty Judge, following an ex parte application by ASGI.

57 On 14 November 2024, there was an initial, unsuccessful attempt to execute the Search Order.  A copy of the Search Order was left at the premises of Mr and Ms Manti.

58 On 15 November 2024, at 8.30 am, a hearing took place before the duty Judge.  Both ASGI and Mr Manti appeared at this hearing.  Mr Manti appeared for himself (that is, without legal representation).  During this hearing, Mr Manti was formally served with the Search Order (transcript 15 November 2024, p 22).  During the hearing, it was arranged that the search pursuant to the Search Order would take place shortly after the hearing concluded.

59 On the same day, at 10.40 am, the Independent Lawyer and the Independent Computer Expert attended Mr and Ms Manti’s premises and carried out the Search (see Mr Harrison’s first report, which is annexed to his affidavit).

60 During the Search, Mr Manti objected to the copying (or removal for copying) of five electronic devices on the basis of para 21 of the Search Order.  The five devices are detailed in Mr Harrison’s first report and are:

(a) Red Umidigi Mobile Phone (Mr Manti’s mobile phone);

(b) Black Custom Computer (Mr Manti’s computer);

(c) White Western Digital Portable Hard Drive;

(d) iPhone 14 Pro Max (Ms Manti’s mobile phone); and

(e) Black Acer Laptop (Ms Manti’s laptop).

61 It is common ground that Mr Manti objected to the copying (or removal for copying) of these electronic devices by reference to para 21 of the Search Order.  There is, however, an issue between the parties as to whether Mr Manti was entitled to object to the copying (or removal for copying) of the devices on the basis of that paragraph.

62 Before discussing whether, as a matter of law, Mr Manti was entitled to object on that basis, I make some further factual findings.

63 Mr Manti’s evidence is that, during the Search, he expressed the view that para 21 of the Search Order entitled him to object to the copying (or removal for copying) of electronic devices on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination or the privilege against self-exposure to penalty, and that the Independent Lawyer expressed the same view as to the operation of para 21: see Mr Manti’s 24 November 2024 affidavit, paras 25-29; and Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, paras 42-45, 58.  The Independent Lawyer was not called to give evidence in the contempt application.  Therefore, I do not have any direct evidence from him as to what he did, or did not, say.  The evidence of Mr Harrison during cross-examination supports Mr Manti’s evidence on this issue.  Mr Harrison accepted in cross-examination that the Independent Lawyer’s view and Mr Manti’s view aligned, with para 21 taking precedence over anything else in the Search Order (T59).  Further, Mr Harrison gave evidence that, when Mr Manti objected to the examination of the White Western Digital Portable Hard Drive, the Independent Lawyer directed Mr Harrison to stop examining that device (T41-43).  This suggests that the Independent Lawyer considered that para 21 of the Search Order provided a proper basis on which to object to the examination of the device.  In light of the evidence of Mr Harrison, I accept Mr Manti’s evidence on this issue.  That is, I accept that, during the Search, Mr Manti expressed the view that para 21 of the Search Order entitled him to object to the copying (or removal for copying) of electronic devices and that the Independent Lawyer expressed the same view as to the operation of para 21.

64 On 19 November 2024, the matter returned to Court before a different Judge, also acting in the capacity of duty Judge.  Late the previous evening (18 November 2024), Mr Manti had sent an email to the Court and to ASGI’s solicitors attaching an unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit dated 19 November 2024 (comprising 49 pages).  It appears that this is the same as the affidavit of that date that is before the Court on the contempt application.  The unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit dealt with the objection based on para 21 of the Search Order in brief terms at paras 42-44.

65 During the hearing on 19 November 2024, reference was made (both by the duty Judge and senior counsel for ASGI) to the unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit of Mr Manti dated 19 November 2024.  Mr Manti was invited to, and did, adopt the affidavit in the witness box during that hearing (transcript 19 November 2024, p 10).  There was also reference to a second affidavit that Mr Manti had prepared, which he proposed to provide only to the Court.  However, Mr Manti only had an electronic copy of this affidavit and was unable to provide it to the Court during the hearing.  That affidavit is not before the Court on the contempt application.

66 During the hearing, the fact that Mr Manti had objected to the copying (or removal for copying) of the five electronic devices was discussed.  The duty Judge expressed the view, in summary, that images could be taken of the five electronic devices and that any objection on the basis of para 21 of the Search Order was to be raised at a later stage, when access to the material was sought (see transcript 19 November 2024, pp 14-18).  For example, the duty Judge said (at p 17):

Yes, look, Mr Manti, under [paras] 20 and 21 [of the Search Order] – I mean, that’s just an image. And I think [para] 21 would be at the point where people want to look at the material. And then, you’ve got an objection to the material being looked at. But the search order allows them to take an image, and then the image is stored, where no one is looking at it. And then when you come back to court, on the return date, there will be argument as to whether or not the images can be looked at.

67 On this basis, the duty Judge indicated to Mr Manti that he needed to make the five electronic devices available for copying.  In substance, the duty Judge directed Mr Manti to produce the five electronic devices.

68 On 20 November 2024, Mr Manti produced the five electronic devices to the Independent Computer Expert for copying: see the cross-examination of Mr Harrison at T59.

Charge 5

69 I will now consider whether Mr Manti is guilty of contempt of court as alleged in charge 5.

70 In my view, there is a lack of clarity in the formulation of paras 9(g), 20 and 21 of the Search Order, in that it is not clear whether para 21 entitles the addressee of the Search Order to withhold from production electronic devices that contain material that may tend to prove that the addressee has committed an offence or is liable to a civil penalty.

71 The privilege against self-incrimination is a substantive common law right: Reid v Howard [1995] HCA 40; 184 CLR 1 at 11-12; X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; 248 CLR 92 at [104].  This informs the construction of the relevant paragraphs of the Search Order.

72 Paragraph 9(g) is to be read together with, and therefore subject to, paras 20 and 21.  This is clear from the concluding words of para 9(g) (“as set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 below”).

73 There are at least two possible interpretations of paras 20 and 21:

(a) On one view, where objection is taken to complying with para 20 on the grounds set out in para 21(a), the addressee is not required to produce the electronic device, but is to deliver it to the Court in the sealed envelope referred to in para 21(b)(ii).

(b) On another view, in that situation, the device must still be produced for copying (or removal for copying) at the time of the search, and the affidavits described in para 21(b)(ii) and (iii) are to be prepared later, when access to the material is sought.

74 As set out above, the Independent Lawyer appears to have taken the former view, while the duty Judge took the latter view. I consider each of the above interpretations to be open.  Para 21 is expressed as an exception to para 20; it refers to a situation in which the addressee of the order “wish[es] to object to complying with paragraph 20”.  Para 21(b) sets out a procedure by which certain information (namely, information to which no objection is taken) is to be disclosed, while other information (namely, information to which objection is taken) is to be contained in an affidavit which is to be delivered to the Court in a sealed envelope.  The structure of para 21 as an exception to para 20 tends to suggest that the procedure outlined in para 21 is to be adopted at the time that compliance with para 20 would otherwise be required. However, I consider it unnecessary to determine the correct construction of the relevant paragraphs of the Search Order.  That is because, in any event, the terms of the Search Order are not clear (which is one of the requirements for a finding of contempt).  That is to say, it is not clear that Mr Manti was not entitled to withhold production of the five electronic devices during the Search.  For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the requirements for a finding of contempt have been established.

75 Accordingly, charge 5 is not made out.

Charge 6

76 Charge 6 is relied on by ASGI in the alternative.  The gist of this charge is that, if Mr Manti was entitled to withhold production of the electronic devices on the basis of para 21 of the Search Order, he was required to provide an affidavit as described in para 21(b)(iii) of that order, but failed to do so.

77 As set out above, late on the evening of 18 November 2024, Mr Manti did file and serve an affidavit dated 19 November 2024 that at least purported to comply with para 21(b).  ASGI’s contention is that the affidavit failed to comply with the requirements of para 21(b) because it did not relate Mr Manti’s objections to specific items of information stored on specific devices.  There is force in this criticism of the affidavit, but it should also be noted that Mr Manti prepared the affidavit himself, without the benefit of legal assistance.

78 Further, as set out above, at the hearing on 19 November 2024, the duty Judge took the view that the five electronic devices needed to be produced for imaging, and that any affidavits under para 21(b) were to be provided at a later stage, when access to the material was sought.  In accordance with the Judge’s direction, Mr Manti produced the five devices on 20 November 2024.

79 For the following reasons, I am not satisfied that Mr Manti is in contempt of court as alleged in charge 6.

80 Charge 6 depends on establishing that Mr Manti breached para 21(b)(iii) by not providing an affidavit setting out the basis for his objections.  However, there is a lack of clarity in the order as to when that affidavit was required to be provided.  This lack of clarity is a corollary of the lack of clarity discussed above in the context of charge 5.  On one view, the affidavit is required at the time of (or soon after) the search at which objection is taken.  On another view (that taken by the duty Judge at the hearing on 19 November 2024), the affidavit is not required until access to the material is sought (which, in this case, has not yet occurred).  As with charge 5, I do not consider it necessary to determine the correct construction because, in any event, the terms of the Search Order are not clear.  For these reasons, the requirements for a finding of contempt are not satisfied.

81 I also observe that it would be a surprising result, and quite unfair, to find Mr Manti in contempt for failing to provide an affidavit setting out the basis for his objections in circumstances where the duty Judge in substance told him he did not need to do so at that stage.

82 For these reasons, charge 6 is not made out.

Charges 1 and 2 (Domain Name)

83 Charges 1 and 2 in relation to Mr Manti are as follows:

Charge 1

1.    You failed to comply with paragraph 3 of the Court’s orders made 16 December 2024 (16 December Order), which required you to file and serve a signed affidavit setting out the steps you had taken to give effect to paragraph 2 of the 16 December Order and you thereby committed contempt of the Federal Court of Australia.

Particulars:

i.    Paragraph 3 of the 16 December Order required that [Mr Manti], by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, file and serve a signed affidavit setting out the steps he had taken to give effect to paragraph 2 of the 16 December Order.

ii.    Service of the 16 December Order on [Mr Manti] was on 16 December 2024 and the Court provided a sealed copy of the 16 December Order to [Mr Manti] on 16 December 2024.

iii.    By 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, [Mr Manti] had not filed or served any signed affidavit in accordance with paragraph 3 of the 16 December Order.

iv.    In the premises, [Mr Manti] is guilty of contempt of court.

Charge 2

2.    You failed to comply with paragraph 2 of the Court’s orders made 16 December 2024 (16 December Order), which required you to take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the domain name sansoni.com.au (Domain Name) to [ASGI] and you thereby committed contempt of the Federal Court of Australia.

Particulars:

i.    Paragraph 2 of the 16 December Order required that [Mr Manti], forthwith and by no later than 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to [ASGI].

ii.    Service of the 16 December Order on [Mr Manti] was on 16 December 2024 and the Court provided a sealed copy of the 16 December Order to [Mr Manti] on 16 December 2024.

iii.    At all material times [Mr Manti] was the company secretary of Everco Pty Ltd.

iv.    At all material times [Mr Manti] was the Registrant Contact and Tech Contact for the Domain Name.

v.    As at the date of this charge, the Domain Name has not been transferred to the Applicant.

vi.    In the circumstances where there has been no affidavit filed by [Mr Manti] in accordance with paragraph 3 of the 16 December Order and the Domain Name has not been transferred to the Applicant, [Mr Manti] has not complied with paragraph 2(a) of the 16 December Order.

vii.    In the premises, [Mr Manti] is guilty of contempt of court.

Further findings

84 I will now make some further findings of fact that are relevant to charges 1 and 2.

85 On 3 November 2024, Mr Manti purchased and registered the Domain Name on behalf of Everco (T101; Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, para 17 and “FM-15”).  The Domain Name had previously been owned by ASGI but was not registered at this time (Mr Manti’s affidavit of 31 January 2025, paras 3-8).  Mr Manti purchased the Domain Name online from Webcentral (Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, “FM-15”). Webcentral is a registrar or provider of domain name services.

86 On the day he purchased the Domain Name – 3 November 2024 – Mr Manti also cancelled the registration of the Domain Name: see Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, para 18 and “FM-14”.  The cancellation was not effective immediately, but rather was to take effect at the end of the billing term (3 November 2025): see Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, “FM-14”, “FM-17”.  The only explanation as to why Mr Manti cancelled the Domain Name is a statement by Mr Manti that there had been no reason to purchase it in the first place (Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, para 18).

87 The evidence includes a number of “search results” obtained from an online database named “WHOIS”.  This is a registration data directory service relating to domain names: see Mr Croxford’s affidavit of 19 February 2025, para 18.  One of these search results is dated 6 November 2024 (“AC-3” to Mr Croxford’s affidavit dated 21 January 2025 comprising 14 paragraphs).  This shows that, as at 6 November 2024, the Registrar of the Domain Name was Melbourne IT, the Registrant was Everco, and the Registrant Contact Name was Frank Manti.  It appears that Melbourne IT is a business name of a company called Netregistry Pty Ltd (see Mr Croxford’s 19 February 2025 affidavit, para 20). It is unclear why the Registrar is recorded as Melbourne IT when Mr Manti’s dealings were with Webcentral. I infer that Webcentral is another business conducted by Netregistry and that, for internal administrative reasons, Melbourne IT rather than Webcentral was recorded as the Registrar.  Nevertheless, it is clear that Mr Manti’s dealings in relation to the Domain Name were with Webcentral.

88 The search results from the WHOIS database dated 6 November 2024 include the following information regarding the status of the Domain Name:

clientDeleteProhibited

serverRenewProhibited

clientUpdateProhibited

Further, in relation to “Status Reason”, it is stated: “Not Currently Eligible For Renewal”.  The evidence does not explain what the statements regarding the status of the Domain Name mean.

89 On 16 December 2024, the relevant orders were made.

90 It does not appear that Mr Manti took any steps, in the period from 16 December to 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024, to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI.  For example, there is no evidence that he phoned, emailed or messaged Webcentral (or Melbourne IT) instructing or requesting them to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI. Nor is there any evidence that he approached them to ask how he could transfer the Domain Name to ASGI.  Mr Manti accepted in cross-examination that the evidence did not include a single chat dialogue in which he had asked Webcentral, Netregistry or Melbourne IT for assistance in transferring the Domain Name (T106).

91 Mr Manti did not file and serve (by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024) a signed affidavit setting out the steps that he had taken to give effect to para 2 of the 16 December 2024 Orders (as required by para 3 of those orders). There is no dispute between the parties about this.  Mr Manti accepts this in para 6 of his 25 February 2025 affidavit (which was corrected during cross-examination to refer to para 3 instead of para 2 of the 16 December 2024 Orders: T100).

92 On or before 22 December 2024, Mr Manti contacted Webcentral and requested information about how to cancel the Domain Name with immediate effect.  “FM-4” to Mr Manti’s 22 December 2024 affidavit is an undated chat message, apparently sent by Mr Manti, to that effect.  It is not clear when that message was sent.  However, it must have been sent on or before 22 December 2024, the date of the affidavit.  Mr Manti wrote to Webcentral: “I wish to cancel now so that it goes back to being made available”.  He asked how to do this.

93 On or about 23 December 2024, Mr Manti exchanged messages with Webcentral about the Domain Name: see Mr Manti’s 31 January 2025 affidavit, para 21 and “FM-3”.  The first message in time was from Webcentral and stated that the cancellation of the Domain Name remained scheduled to take effect at the end of the current billing period (3 November 2025).  Mr Manti responded that he had asked that the Domain Name be cancelled now (being on or about 23 December 2024) rather than on 3 November 2025.  Webcentral responded: “Your domain name sansoni.com.au is now canceled with immediate [e]ffect”.  On the basis of this document, and in the absence of any direct evidence to the contrary, I find that the date of effect of the cancellation was brought forward from 3 November 2025 to about 23 December 2024.

94 The evidence includes a letter dated 15 January 2025 that was sent to the Court in response to a subpoena that had been issued by ASGI to Netregistry Pty Ltd (“FM-14” to Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit).  The letter (sent by the General Counsel of World Host Group, on behalf of its group company, Netregistry Pty Ltd) includes:

As [an] urgent matter we searched our systems regarding the domain name <sansoni.com.au> with the following results:

Pursuant to Registry data the domain name was registered on Nov 3, 2024. The customer requested a cancellation on Nov 3, 2024. So the domain name was cancelled for the billing records and is no longer in his account; it will be deleted at the expiration date (2025-11-03).

This document provides support for the finding (which I have made above) that the Domain Name was cancelled by Mr Manti on 3 November 2024 (albeit, at that time, with only prospective effect).  The word “his” appears to be a reference to Mr Manti, but it could be a reference to Everco.  This document indicates that as at 15 January 2025 the Domain Name was no longer in the account of Mr Manti (or perhaps Everco).  However, there is no witness evidence as to what this means in practical terms.

95 The evidence includes a copy of a search of the Melbourne IT website as at 18 February 2025 (see “AC-16” to Mr Croxford’s 19 February 2025 affidavit).  In response to a search of the Domain Name, the website stated that it was “[t]aken – but can be transferred if you’re the owner”.  This suggests that, notwithstanding the cancellation, the Domain Name could still be transferred.  However, in the absence of any direct witness evidence about the transferability or otherwise of the Domain Name at this time, I give the document limited weight.

96 At the hearing of the contempt application, ASGI tendered search results from the WHOIS database dated 21 March 2025 for the Domain Name (Exhibit A9).  The document states that the Registrar Name is Melbourne IT, the Registrant Contact Name is Frank Manti, and the Registrant is Everco.  In relation to “Status”, the document states: “serverRenewProhibited”.  In relation to the “Status Reason”, the document states: “Not Currently Eligible for Renewal”.

97 I now deal with the 60-day lockout issue, namely whether there was a 60-day lockout on transferring the Domain Name to another registrant.  As noted above, one of Mr Manti’s contentions in relation to charge 2 was that the Domain Name was not transferable during the relevant period (between 16 December 2024 and 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024) because the Domain Name was subject to a lockout on transfer for a period of 60 days following its registration (on 3 November 2024).  If this contention were correct, it would mean that there were no steps that could have been taken by Mr Manti to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to ASGI, as required by the relevant order.  Arguably, this would mean that Mr Manti did not breach the order.

98 Mr Manti annexes (as “FM-12” to his 25 February 2025 affidavit) a document from “DeepSeek” (which I understand to be an online AI tool).  The document comprises two pages and sets out information about the transfer of domain names.  The document includes the following information as the fourth paragraph under “Step 1”:

4.    Ensure the Domain is Eligible

* The domain must be at least 60 days old and not within 60 days of a previous transfer or registration.

99 Apart from the obvious evidentiary difficulties with this material (in that it is not evidence from a human with personal knowledge of the subject matter), there is no way of knowing whether the generic information set out in the document is applicable to Webcentral (or Melbourne IT).  I therefore give this information no weight.

100 There is no other evidence to support the proposition that there was a 60-day lockout on transferring the Domain Name to another registrant.

101 In light of the above, I find that the transfer of the Domain Name to another registrant was not precluded by a 60-day lockout period.

102 Further, I am satisfied based on the evidence generally that the Domain Name was capable of transfer to another registrant during the period 16 December 2024 to 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024.  Apart from the 60-day lockout issue, no other basis was put forward to suggest that the Domain Name was incapable of transfer.  The evidence generally establishes that it could be transferred during the period 16 December 2024 to 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024.  Although the Domain Name had been cancelled, the cancellation had not yet come into effect.

103 I now address what steps needed to be taken to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI.  Unfortunately, the evidence on this is not as clear as one might have expected.

104 In his 19 February 2025 affidavit, Mr Croxford states at para 22 that the process by which a domain name can be transferred from Melbourne IT was the subject of his 23 December 2024 affidavit (“AC-17”) and email advice dated 24 December 2024 from ASGI’s IT provider and expert, Mr Habib Barakat of LIV IT (“AC-18”; also Exhibit A10).

105 In the affidavit of 23 December 2024, Mr Croxford states that the Melbourne IT website states that transfers of domain names are “actioned and take 48 hours”.  Annexure “AC-3” to that affidavit is an extract from the Melbourne IT website.  However, the pages extracted are concerned, in the main, with transfers from other registrars to Melbourne IT (as distinct from transfers from one registrant to another).  The sentence relied on by Mr Croxford (referring to 48 hours) appears to relate to changing the registrar of a domain name.  In any event, this material does not detail the steps that are required for transfer of a domain name to a different registrant.

106 In his email dated 24 December 2024, Mr Barakat wrote that, in order for the Domain Name to be transferred to ASGI, the following steps were required to be taken by the current Domain Name holder:

(a) the holder must provide LIV IT (on behalf of ASGI) with the Domain Name password and/or the Domain Name key; and

(b) the holder must update the Domain Name registrant email address to an email address of LIV IT (which was set out in the email).

107 There are two difficulties with this evidence.  First, there is no affidavit from Mr Barakat.  On an issue such as this, and notwithstanding that the contempt application is brought (in accordance with the Federal Court Rules) by way of interlocutory application, I would have expected evidence to have been led from a person with personal knowledge, so that they could be cross-examined about the issue.  Secondly, it is unclear whether Mr Barakat was aware of the cancellation of the Domain Name.  It is therefore unclear whether he took this into account in formulating his advice.  I therefore give this evidence limited weight.

108 In his affidavit dated 22 December 2024, Mr Manti deals with the steps necessary to transfer the Domain Name at paras 12-16.  He states that the domain registrar does not offer a straightforward feature to transfer domain ownership in a single step.  He states that: “Initial inquiries have indicated that, for a transfer to take place, the domain must first be placed in a cancelled state.”  I have difficulty accepting that it was necessary to cancel the registration of the Domain Name before it could be transferred.  First, this seems counterintuitive.  Secondly, Mr Manti does not provide any documentary support for these statements.  He does not annex, for example, any statement from Webcentral (or Melbourne IT) to that effect.

109 In his later affidavit of 25 February 2025, Mr Manti states at para 29 that, “[u]nable to find a way to transfer ownership onto someone else”, he conducted an online search and also asked his brother (who he describes as “retired IT”) for assistance.  Mr Manti states that these enquiries led him to believe that the “earlier cancellation approach appeared to be the logical solution” and that this “was also in keeping with the domain’s previous status”.  Mr Manti states that “[t]his would then allow [ASGI] to reclaim it”.  It appears that this evidence relates to enquiries made on 22 and 23 December 2024 or perhaps a few days earlier.  Mr Manti does not provide any detail of the online searches he conducted and he does not provide any detail as to what his brother told him.  Moreover, there is no affidavit from the brother. I therefore give this evidence limited weight.  Further, this evidence does not explain the steps needed to transfer the Domain Name to another registrant.

110 While there is no clear evidence as to the necessary steps, there were some steps that Mr Manti could have taken to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI.  For example:

(a) Mr Manti could have contacted Webcentral to instruct or request them to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI; or

(b) Mr Manti could have contacted Webcentral to request instructions as to how to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI, and Mr Manti could then have carried out those instructions.

111 Although there is a lack of clarity in the evidence as to the precise steps necessary to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI, the evidence is clear that Mr Manti took no steps to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI in the period 16 December 2024 to 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024.

Charge 2

112 I will deal with charge 2 before charge 1.

113 Charge 2 alleges that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 2(a) of the 16 December 2024 Orders by failing to take (by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024) all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to ASGI.

114 I am satisfied that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 2(a) of the 16 December 2024 Orders as alleged.  I have found that the Domain Name was transferable during the period 16 December 2024 to 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024.  I have found that Mr Manti could have taken, but did not take, the following steps to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI:

(a) Mr Manti could have contacted Webcentral to instruct or request them to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI; or

(b) Mr Manti could have contacted Webcentral to request instructions as to how to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI, and Mr Manti could then have carried out those instructions.

115 I am satisfied that the failure to take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name as required by para 2(a) was deliberate in the relevant sense.  In para 8 of Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit he states, and I accept, that during the relevant week his health deteriorated significantly, impairing his ability to undertake regular tasks.  However, this evidence is not specifically related to the (relatively simple) steps that I have referred to above.  Accordingly, I consider that Mr Manti’s conduct was deliberate.

116 Each of the other elements necessary to establish contempt is satisfied.

117 I am satisfied to the requisite standard that charge 2 is made out.

Charge 1

118 I will now deal with charge 1.  In summary, this charge alleges that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders by failing to file and serve (by 4.00 pm on 19 December 2024) a signed affidavit setting out the steps that he had taken to give effect to para 2 of those orders.

119 I have found, above, that Mr Manti did not file and serve an affidavit during that period.  Accordingly, I am satisfied that Mr Manti failed to comply with para 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders.

120 For the same reasons as set out above, I am satisfied that the failure to file and serve an affidavit as required by para 3 was deliberate in the relevant sense.

121 Each of the other elements necessary to establish contempt is satisfied.

122 I am satisfied to the requisite standard that charge 1 is made out.

Charges in relation to Ms Manti

123 There are only two charges in relation to Ms Manti.  They are as follows:

Charge One

1.    You failed to comply with paragraph 3(a) of the Court’s orders made 23 December 2024, which required you to take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the domain name sansoni.com.au (Domain Name) to [ASGI], and you thereby committed contempt of the Federal Court of Australia.

Particulars:

i.    On 23 December 2024, his Honour Justice Moshinsky made orders (23 December Order) which required, at paragraph 3(a), that [Ms Manti] forthwith, and by no later than 4.00 pm on 24 December 2024, take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to [ASGI].

ii.    Service of the 23 December Order on [Ms Manti] was on 23 December 2024.

iii.    By 4.00 pm on 24 December 2024, [Ms Manti] had failed to comply with the order and take all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to [ASGI].

iv.    In the premises, [Ms Manti] is guilty of contempt of court.

Charge Two

2.    You failed to comply with paragraph 4 of the Court’s orders made 23 December 2024, which required you to file and serve an affidavit setting out the steps taken to give effect to paragraph 3 of the Court’s orders made 23 December 2024, and thereby committed contempt of the Federal Court of Australia.

Particulars:

i.    On 23 December 2024, his Honour Justice Moshinsky made orders (23 December Order) which required, at paragraph 4, that [Ms Manti] by 4.00 pm on 27 December 2024, file and serve an affidavit setting out the steps taken to give effect to paragraph 3 of the 23 December Order.

ii.    Service of the 23 December Order on [Ms Manti] was on 23 December 2024.

iii.    The second respondent failed to comply with paragraph 4 of the 23 December Order.

iv.    In the premises, [Ms Manti] is guilty of contempt of court.

124 Some of the findings set out above (both in the general findings section and in the section with further findings relating to charges 1 and 2 against Mr Manti) are also relevant in this context.

Charge 1

125 Charge 1 alleges that Ms Manti failed to comply with para 3(a) of the 23 December 2024 Orders by failing to take (by 4.00 pm on 24 December 2024) all necessary steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to ASGI.

126 This order was predicated on Ms Manti being a director of Everco, and therefore in a position to take steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name.  However, as I have found, it is now apparent that Ms Manti was never a director of Everco.  In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there was anything that Ms Manti could have done to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to ASGI.  Putting this another way, she was not capable of complying with the order.

127 In light of the above, charge 1 is not made out.

Charge 2

128 Charge 2 alleges that Ms Manti failed to comply with para 4 of the 23 December 2024 Orders by failing to file and serve (by 4.00 pm on 27 December 2024) an affidavit setting out the steps taken to give effect to para 3 of those orders.

129 Although I have concluded that Ms Manti was not capable of complying with para 3 of the 23 December 2024 Orders, I consider that she was still obliged to file and serve an affidavit pursuant to para 4.  The affidavit could have stated (for example) that she had not taken any steps to cause the transfer of the Domain Name to ASGI because she was not a director of Everco and therefore could not take any steps to transfer the Domain Name.

130 Ms Manti did not file and serve such an affidavit by 4.00 pm on 27 December 2024.  In cross-examination, Ms Manti accepted that she did not file an affidavit as required by para 4 (because she misinterpreted the order) (T161; see also Ms Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit, para 38).

131 It is true that, at 11.25 pm on 23 December 2024, Mr Manti emailed to the Court and to ASGI’s solicitors an unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit of Ms Manti dated 23 December 2024.  That document was the subject of discussion at a hearing before me on 24 December 2024 (at which Ms Manti as well as Mr Manti appeared).  I put to one side the fact that, at that time, the affidavit was not sworn or affirmed.  The difficulty with the affidavit is that it refers to steps taken by Mr Manti to cancel the Domain Name; it does not describe any steps taken to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI.  Nor does it state that Ms Manti had not taken any steps to transfer the Domain Name because she was not a director of Everco and therefore was not able to take any steps. For these reasons, that affidavit does not comply with para 4 of the orders.

132 In light of the above, I am satisfied that Ms Manti failed to comply with para 4 of the 23 December 2024 Orders.

133 To constitute a contempt, a breach of a court order must be deliberate and not casual, accidental or unintentional: see [45] above.  There does not appear to be any real suggestion that Ms Manti’s failure to comply with the order was casual or accidental, but there may be a question whether it was unintentional.  As noted above, Ms Manti’s evidence during cross-examination was that she failed to comply with the order because she misinterpreted the order.  Further, in para 38 of her 25 February 2025 affidavit, Ms Manti states that she did not prepare an affidavit on 27 December “as it was mistakenly interpreted that it was no longer required”.  Accepting that the order was misinterpreted, I have some doubt as to whether it was Ms Manti (as distinct from Mr Manti) who misinterpreted the order.  I have found, above, that Ms Manti did not play an active role in any of the relevant events and that Mr Manti was the active party in all relevant events.  In light of this, it is likely that it was Mr Manti rather than Ms Manti who misinterpreted the order.  In any event, misinterpretation of the order is not to be equated with an unintentional failure to comply with the order.  This is apparent from the following passages from Hurd v Zomojo.  In that case, Besanko and Gilmour  JJ stated at [91]:

It is important to bear in mind that a direct intention to disobey an order is not a necessary element in a finding of wilful disobedience or a deliberate commission or omission in relation to an order. In other words, a contempt may be made out even where there is no intention to disobey an order or knowledge that acts or omissions were in breach of an order.

Further, their Honours stated at [100]:

As we have already said, there is no requirement that an alleged contemnor intended to breach the order. To take a somewhat extreme example, it is clear that a person may be guilty of civil contempt even though they were acting on legal advice …

134 These passages make clear that the references in the cases to the conduct not being intentional relate not to the person’s subjective understanding that they are or are not breaching the Court’s order, but rather to whether or not the conduct giving rise to the breach of the Court’s order was unintentional: see also Re.Group Pty Ltd v Kazal (No 4) [2017] FCA 1084 at [73] per Perram J.  In the circumstances of the present case, even though the order was misinterpreted, the conduct which constitutes the failure to comply (namely, the failure to file and serve the affidavit required by para 4 of the 23 December 2024 Orders) was deliberate and was not unintentional.

135 There does not appear to be any real issue about the other elements necessary to establish a contempt.  I find that those other elements have been proven.

136 I am satisfied to the requisite standard that charge 2 is made out.

Penalties

Applicable principles

137 The applicable principles relating to sentencing for contempt were recently stated by Abraham J in Tax Practitioners Board v Hacker (No 4) [2021] FCA 940 at [19]-[23].  It is sufficient for present purposes to set out the following passage of that judgment:

19    The rationale of sentencing for contempt is the protection of the effective administration of justice.

20    As the Full Court explained in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2017] FCAFC 111; (2017) 256 FCR 90 at [97] (Besanko, Wigney and Bromwich JJ) (Kazal):

The plurality in [Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375] observed at [41], endorsing the statement of principle by Hayne J in Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 at [12], that the ‘cardinal feature of the power to punish for contempt’ was as an exercise of judicial power to ‘protect the due administration of justice’. Viewed in that way, contempt proceedings are essentially protective in nature as to the judicial function and the role of the courts, even if they also serve to vindicate private interests and rights. Contempt proceedings are therefore to be viewed as essential in facilitating courts being able to function properly. That includes being, and being seen to be, effectual in adjudicating upon and resolving disputes, and in particular making orders that will ordinarily be obeyed. This means that individual contempt cases have an importance transcending the instant case by supporting and enhancing the integrity of judicial proceedings, both in respect of orders made, and more generally. That view of contempt proceedings can be seen to permeate longstanding sentencing authority in this area.

21    Considerations relevant to determining an appropriate penalty for contempt of court have been identified, in a non-exhaustive manner, to include: the contemnor’s personal circumstances; the nature and circumstances of the contempt; the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice; the contemnor’s culpability; the need to deter the contemnor and others from repeating contempt; the absence or presence of a prior conviction for contempt; the contemnor’s financial means; and whether the contemnor has exhibited general contrition and made a full and ample apology: Director of Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Cartledge (No 2) [2015] FCA 851 at [6]; Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 83; (2006) 149 FCR 494 at [25]; Kazal at [101]-[103]; Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155 at [129].

Mr Manti

138 I have found that charges 1 and 2 in relation to Mr Manti are made out.  I propose to fix a single fine in relation to both charges, recognising that they both relate to the transfer of the Domain Name.  The two charges are factually intertwined and, were they not considered together, there would be a risk of double punishment.  I note that a similar approach was taken by Perram J in Re.Group Pty Ltd v Kazal (No 7) [2019] FCA 387 at [5].

139 While it is necessary to have regard to all of the facts and circumstances, I note the following matters in particular.

140 First, the nature and circumstances of the contempt are serious in that there has been a failure to comply with a court order for the transfer of the Domain Name and an associated order involving verification of the transfer.  The orders were designed to preserve the status quo pending the hearing and determination of the proceeding.  As a result of the failure to comply, the Domain Name was not transferred to ASGI and the orders have not achieved their purpose.  That said, it does not appear that the Domain Name (as distinct from sansoni.com) was actively being used by ASGI at the time it was registered by Mr Manti.  Mr Manti describes the Domain Name as “dormant” in his 25 February 2025 affidavit (at para 13) and he was not challenged on that statement.  Thus, it does not appear (at least, on the basis of the present material) that the practical effects of the failure to transfer have been significant for the conduct of ASGI’s business.

141 Second, Mr Manti appears to have been suffering mental health issues in November and December 2024 and those issues are likely to have affected his judgment.  This is a mitigating factor for the purposes of determining the appropriate penalty.  As noted above, Mr Manti gives evidence that, during the week that the affidavit was due (pursuant to para 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders), his health deteriorated significantly, impairing his ability to undertake regular tasks: see para 8 of Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit.  There was no cross-examination on that paragraph and I accept that evidence.  Having regard to that evidence and the evidence generally, I am satisfied that Mr Manti was experiencing mental health issues during November and December 2024.

142 Third, insofar as Mr Manti (on or about 23 December 2024) sought to bring forward the cancellation of the Domain Name rather than transferring it to ASGI (as he had been ordered to do) it is unclear whether this was: (a) a good faith but misguided attempt to achieve the purpose of the order; or (b) a stubborn refusal to comply with the order, dressed up to look like an attempt to achieve the purpose of the order.  Given the difficulty in making a finding about this, I consider it appropriate to give Mr Manti the benefit of the doubt, and proceed on the basis that it was (a).

143 Fourth, a substantial penalty is required for the sake of deterrence – both specific and general.  It is important to ensure that court orders are complied with.  It is therefore necessary to make clear that the consequences of non-compliance are substantial.  Further, I consider that a substantial penalty is necessary to bring home to Mr Manti that he needs to comply with court orders.  Otherwise, there is a risk of non-compliance by him in the future.

144 Fifth, it appears that Mr Manti’s financial means are limited.  The background to this proceeding is the termination of Mr Manti’s employment with ASGI.  As at the time of the hearing of the contempt application, it appeared that he was not employed.  He indicated that he was representing himself due to financial constraints.  While I do not have detailed evidence about his financial situation, it appears that he is experiencing difficult financial circumstances.

145 Sixth, while Mr Manti has not expressed contrition, he has acknowledged that he should have acted differently in relation to the matters that are the subject of charge 1: see para 9 of Mr Manti’s 25 February 2025 affidavit. Further, as discussed above, I will proceed on the basis that the steps he took to bring forward the cancellation were a good faith (but misguided) attempt to achieve the purpose of the order.  I note also that on 22 December 2024, some days after the deadline in the relevant order, Mr Manti provided to the Court and ASGI an unsworn/unaffirmed affidavit in which he stated that the Domain Name was in a cancelled state and that he had sought to bring forward the effective date of the cancellation (see paras 12-16).  While I do not consider the affidavit to be compliant with the relevant order (because it did not set out steps taken to cause the transfer of the Domain Name), it can be seen as an attempt to remedy the failure to comply with the order regarding the affidavit.

146 Having regard to the factors discussed above, I do not consider imprisonment to be appropriate.  A fine is a sufficient penalty in the circumstances.

147 Having regard to these matters, and the circumstances generally, I consider it appropriate to order Mr Manti to pay a total fine of $10,000 in respect of the breaches of paras 2(a) and 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders.  I consider that that amount is necessary to achieve the objects of specific and general deterrence and that it takes into account the other facts and matters discussed above, including the mitigating circumstances.

148 I will provide for the fine to be payable within 60 days.  However, given Mr Manti’s financial circumstances, I will reserve liberty to apply to enable him to make an application for the payment of the fine by instalments over a period of time longer than 60 days.  If Mr Manti wishes to bring such an application, it should be filed as soon as possible, and it should be supported by detailed evidence about his financial situation.

149 I note for completeness that I considered whether to impose a daily or weekly fine that would continue until such time as Mr Manti takes all necessary steps to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI.  Such an approach might be thought to be desirable to create an incentive for Mr Manti to comply with the relevant order.  However, I concluded that such an approach was not appropriate for the following reasons.  The difficulty is that, on the basis of the evidence currently before the Court, it is not clear whether the Domain Name remains transferable in circumstances where it has been cancelled and the cancellation has come into effect.  Thus, it is not clear to me that the Domain Name has been transferable since about 23 December 2024.  If ASGI seeks a further order that Mr Manti take all necessary steps (or that he take certain specified steps) to transfer the Domain Name to ASGI, it is open to ASGI to bring an application for such an order, supported by material that makes clear that the Domain Name remains transferable and that sets out the necessary steps.  In my view, it would be appropriate for these matters to be dealt with in an affidavit from a deponent with personal knowledge about such matters.

Ms Manti

150 I have found that charge 2 in relation to Ms Manti is made out.  In circumstances where (as I have found) Ms Manti did not play an active role in any of the relevant events and Mr Manti was the active party in all relevant events, I do not consider Ms Manti to bear any culpability for the failure to comply with para 4 of the 23 December 2024 Orders.

151 Accordingly, I do not consider it appropriate to impose any penalty on her for breach of para 4 of those orders.

Conclusion

152 For the reasons set out above, I have concluded that charges 1 and 2 in relation to Mr Manti and charge 2 in relation to Ms Manti are made out.  It is appropriate to make declarations reflecting those conclusions.  I have concluded that a fine of $10,000 should be imposed on Mr Manti in respect of the breaches of paras 2(a) and 3 of the 16 December 2024 Orders, and that no penalty should be imposed on Ms Manti.  I will give the parties the opportunity to provide written submissions on costs.

Associate:

Dated:    9 October 2025