Federal Court of Australia

ZDTV v Administrative Review Tribunal [2025] FCA 1150

ORDERS

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.    Section 110X(4)(h) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) provides that the proscription contained in ss 110X(1) and 110X(3) against publishing a list or identifying account of any designated review proceedings does not apply to, or in relation to, the publication of accounts of proceedings where those accounts have been approved by the Court.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The proceedings be dismissed.

2.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act):

(a)    all current proceedings instituted by the applicant in the Court be stayed; and

(b)    the applicant be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue and obtaining leave.

3.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the FCA Act, the applicant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act and obtaining leave in accordance with s 37AT of the FCA Act.

4.    The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceedings, as agreed or taxed.

5.    The publication or dissemination of any list or account of any designated review proceedings identified in ZDTV v Administrative Review Tribunal [2025] FCA 1150 be approved.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SHARIFF J:

1.    INTRODUCTION

1    The applicant in these proceedings is a serial litigant. He has commenced many proceedings in this Court, and in other courts and tribunals. The present proceedings are the most recent manifestation of a longstanding effort on his part to challenge child and spousal maintenance orders made many years ago.

2    The short background is this. The applicant and his former wife were married in Poland. They were divorced in Australia in 2002. In September 2006, the Regional Court in Rawa Mazowiecka, Poland, made orders requiring the applicant to pay spousal maintenance (the 2006 Maintenance Orders). Following requests made by the relevant Polish authorities, the predecessor to the second respondent registered the 2006 Maintenance Orders on 10 January 2014. Since that time, the applicant has made numerous attempts to set aside or challenge the registration of the 2006 Maintenance Orders (to which I will return).

3    In these proceedings, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the first respondent, the Administrative Review Tribunal (the ART), dated 24 January 2025 (the 2025 ART Decision). The applicant has also filed ten notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) by which, amongst other things, he raises alleged constitutional issues and seeks a transfer of the proceedings to the High Court. In this respect, he submits that this Court has no jurisdiction to decide “…the question of law about the conflicting laws and the question of fact included with the Applicant's final 22 August 2025 submissions.”

4    In response to the proceedings, the ART filed a submitting notice and the second respondent, the Child Support Registrar, filed an interlocutory application seeking:

(a)    summary dismissal of the proceedings pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (the FCA Act) and rr 26.01(a) and (d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules); and

(b)    orders under s 37AO of the FCA Act on the basis that the applicant is a vexatious litigant.

5    In order to efficiently case manage the proceedings, I listed the applicant’s application for judicial review for final hearing at the same time as the second respondent’s interlocutory application.

6    For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the application for judicial review should be dismissed. As I have concluded that the application for judicial review should be dismissed, it is not necessary to determine the second respondent’s application for summary dismissal as the proceedings are to be dismissed in any event. However, I am satisfied that orders that the second respondent seeks under s 37AO of the FCA Act should be made. To explain why I have reached these conclusions, it is first necessary to examine the 2025 ART Decision before addressing why the applicant’s challenges to that Decision should be dismissed and why orders should be made under s 37AO of the FCA Act.

2.    THE 2025 ART DECISION

7    On 6 October 2024 and 17 October 2024, the applicant lodged applications with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT) for a review of certain decisions relating to the registration of the 2006 Maintenance Orders. Those decisions were made by the predecessor to the second respondent on 7 June 2012 and 10 January 2014. These decisions had been reviewed by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (the SSAT) on 6 February 2013 and 27 August 2014. Despite the fact that these decisions had already been reviewed by the SSAT, the applications made by the applicant in October 2024 sought an extension of time to seek to review these decisions again.

8    In essence, in his application to the AAT, the applicant submitted that there was:

(a)    new evidence he had received from the “Polish Social Institution” on 28 November 2024 that indicated that he had no debt to his former wife and that she had committed a crime by seeking the registration of an apparent debt of child maintenance; and

(b)    further new evidence from the Republic of Poland that it did not “intermediate” or request a new application of spousal maintenance in 2013 – 2014 such that the registration in Australia of the 2006 Maintenance Orders was fraudulent and a crime.

9    On 14 October 2024, all applications before the AAT were transferred to the ART.

10    On 16 January 2025, a Senior Member of the ART conducted a hearing in relation to the preliminary issue as to whether the ART had jurisdiction to review the relevant decisions. The applicant had the opportunity to make both oral and written submissions to the ART about this question of jurisdiction, and had the opportunity to respond to the second respondent’s submissions as to this point.

11    The applicant submitted to the ART that the decisions to register the 2006 Maintenance Orders were fraudulent and they should not have been registered by the second respondent. In oral submissions before the ART, the applicant acknowledged that the relevant decisions to register the 2006 Maintenance Orders had been reviewed by the SSAT and further acknowledged that the decision of the SSAT of 27 August 2014 had been the subject of an application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) (as it was then known) on 15 February 2015. Despite acknowledging these matters, the applicant submitted that the decisions made by the SSAT remained reviewable by the ART on the basis that a fraud had occurred.

12    Ultimately, the ART determined that it had no jurisdiction to conduct second reviews of the relevant decisions. In coming to this conclusion, the ART had regard to s 131D of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act), which provides:

131D    Who can apply

(1)     A person whose interests are affected by an ART social services decision may apply to the Tribunal for review (the second review) of the decision.

(2)     However, an application cannot be made for second review if the ART social services decision was made in accordance with subsection 103(2) (decision agreed by parties).

(3)     An ART social services decision is:

(a)     for an eligible social services decision that has been affirmed by the Tribunal—the decision as affirmed; or

(b)     for an eligible social services decision that has been varied by the Tribunal—the decision as varied; or

(c)     for an eligible social services decision that has been set aside and remade by the Tribunal—the decision as remade; or

(d)     for an eligible social services decision that has been set aside and remitted to the decision-maker by the Tribunal—the decision as set aside; or

(e)     for an eligible social services decision made under section 92 or subsection 95N(2) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988—the decision as made.

13    The ART also had regard to s 131C of the ART Act which sets out the meaning of “eligible social services decisions” which, relevantly, provides that in respect of decisions under the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (the Collection Act), “eligible social services decisions” are decisions relating to the refusal of an extension of time under s 92 of the Collection Act, the review of a care percentage decision, or a decision to make, or not make, a determination under subs 95N(2) of the Collection Act. The ART reasoned that that neither of the decisions made by the SSAT were “eligible social services decisions” which were capable of being the subject of a second review. As a result, the ART determined that the decisions challenged by the applicant were not reviewable.

14    Accordingly, the applications made by the applicant on 6 and 17 October 2024 were dismissed.

3.    THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW SHOULD BE DISMISSED

15    The applicant’s application for judicial review is far from a model of clarity. In many respects, it is incomprehensible and does not conform to the basic rules of pleading. The affidavits that the applicant has relied upon in support of his application are of a similar nature. Doing the best I can, I have discerned that the applicant appears to challenge the 2025 ART Decision on the following grounds:

(a)    denial of natural justice by the ART;

(b)    denial of the opportunity to adduce “fresh evidence”;

(c)    breach of Australian criminal law regulations;

(d)    breach of the “Best interest of the Child” principle; and

(e)    an abuse of process.

16    During the oral hearing before me, the applicant’s submissions were difficult to comprehend but the essence of them appeared to be that:

(a)    the 2006 Maintenance Orders had been registered by reason of fraud and the perpetuation of crimes and he had new evidence suggesting that to be the case;

(b)    the decisions of the SSAT had been made as a result of the relevant fraud and crimes and the ART should have heard his application;

(c)    there was diplomatic scandal as between the Republic of Poland and Australia and only the High Court of Australia had jurisdiction to determine these matters and, as a result, the proceedings should be transferred to that Court; and

(d)    this Court had no jurisdiction to determine his claims and it was inappropriate for it to do so when it had failed to uphold his previous complaints and proceedings.

17    I am not satisfied that any of the apparent grounds of review and submissions advanced by the applicant are established.

18    As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to observe that, to the extent that they were comprehensible, the applicant’s various challenges to the 2025 ART Decision proceeded on a misconceived basis. The relevant question that the ART was dealing with was whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the applications that the applicant had made to the ART. The question of whether the ART had jurisdiction was naturally an anterior question to the determination of the merits of the relevant applications. Having considered this question, the ART came to the conclusion that it did not have power to conduct a second review based upon an orthodox examination of ss 131C and 131D of the ART Act (as set out above). That question did not turn upon an assessment of the applicant’s various contentions as to whether the first decisions were procured by alleged fraud or whether there was now “fresh evidence” to challenge the original decisions of the decision-maker, but whether the applications made by the applicant fell within the meaning of an “ART social services decision” and an “eligible services decision”. The applicant did not identify with any precision any error that the ART had made in coming to the conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to determine his applications. Rather, as explained in the following paragraphs, the applicant merely repeated his complaints that the original decisions had been procured by alleged fraud and that there was now “fresh evidence” to challenge those original decisions.

19    First, the applicant’s contention that he was denied natural justice by the ART is baseless. The content of natural justice and procedural fairness will depend on the statutory framework within which the decision-maker exercises power and the facts and circumstances of the particular case: see Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550 at 615 (Brennan J); SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152 at [26] (Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). In the present case, the applicant was made aware that the ART wished to address the issue of jurisdiction as a preliminary matter. He then attended a hearing before the ART on 16 January 2025 which was held to address that preliminary question of jurisdiction. The applicant had the opportunity to make both written and oral submissions for the purpose of the determination of that question. He was also provided a copy of the second respondent’s written submissions prior to that hearing and had an opportunity to respond to them. I am not satisfied that the applicant has identified any relevant denial of natural justice or procedural fairness. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that that this ground of the applicant’s contentions is established.

20    Second, the applicant’s contention that he was not permitted to provide “fresh evidence” is misconceived. In his written and oral submissions, and in his evidence, the applicant claims that he had “fresh evidence” from Poland which he was unable to rely upon before the ART. The relevant “fresh evidence” appears to be that which is contained in the applicant’s affidavit dated 28 January 2025 including a translated letter from the President of the Court of Appeal in Lodz to the applicant dated 6 April 2023. The applicant contends that this letter is to the effect that “the President of the Court of Appeal in Lodz [gave an] explanation that the Regional Court in Lodz did not intermediate in 2013 – 2014 in submitting a new application for enforcement of maintenance to the Australian party made on 6 April 2023.” As I understood it, the applicant also relied upon other “fresh evidence” that he contended demonstrated that a debt as to child maintenance was claimed when it was not due or was not due in the amount in which it was claimed.

21    As noted above, the applicant’s contentions as to “fresh evidence” are misconceived in that they do not establish any error, let alone jurisdictional error on the part of the ART. The question as to whether the ART had jurisdiction to conduct a second review under ss 131C and 131D of the ART Act did not turn upon whether there was “fresh evidence” to challenge the original decisions which had been made years beforehand, but whether the applications made by the applicant fell within the meaning of an “ART social services decision” and an “eligible services decision”. I discern no error (let alone jurisdictional error) in the ART’s determination that it had no such jurisdiction, irrespective whether the applicant claimed there was “fresh evidence”.

22    Third, the applicant’s next contention that the ART’s decision did not conform with and was in breach of the principle as to the best interests of the child is also misconceived. The determination of the question whether the ART had jurisdiction did not turn upon (let alone require) consideration being given to any principle as to the best interests of the child.

23    Fourth, the balance of the applicant’s contentions as to the ART or other persons breaching criminal laws or engaging in an abuse of process do not rise beyond baseless assertions. These claims made serious but unsupported allegations that again misconceived the determination that was made by the ART that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a second review.

24    Fifth, in light of the foregoing there is no constitutional issue that arises in the present proceedings. As set out above, the issue that arises is whether the ART erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction to conduct a second review. The notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act that the applicant filed and sought to serve alleged (for example) that:

The interpretation of this situation by the High Court of Australia is need[ed] urgently to avoid to lodge an application for an order to make an application about the impersonation by Poland Government itself against Australia under art. 16 to the International Court of Justice finally.

25    As noted above, the applicant submitted that there was a diplomatic incident that could only be resolved by the High Court and not this Court.

26    Whether a proceeding “involves a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation is a question for the Court to determine”: Luck v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2017] FCA 540 at [31] (Kerr J) citing Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 428; 184 FCR 516 at [12]–[14] (Rares J); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473 at [20]–[21] (Perry J). Section 78B of the Judiciary Act is not engaged “unless the constitutional point is at least arguable and its determination is required”: Luck at [31] citing Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1151; 95 FCR 292 at [13] (French J). Such a point does not arise “merely because someone asserts that it does”: Luck at [31] citing Re Finlayson; Ex parte Finlayson (1997) 72 ALJR 73 at 74 (Toohey J)). And, it is not permissible to plead a constitutional point simply by making that point in a s 78B notice alone: see Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398 at [36] (Cheeseman J).

27    In the present case, there is no reasonably arguable constitutional issue that arises. The applicant’s assertion that there is a diplomatic incident does not give rise to any constitutional issue. Nor do any of his various grounds raised in the present application. For the reasons stated above, the applicant’s contentions are misconceived. There is no basis for any notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act to issue, let alone for the proceedings to be transferred to the High Court.

28    For these reasons, I am satisfied that the application for judicial review should be dismissed with costs. It is unnecessary to determine the second respondent’s application for summary dismissal as I have in any event determined to dismiss the applicant’s claims.

4.    VEXATIOUS LITIGANT ORDERS

4.1    The power to make vexatious litigant orders

29    Section 37AO of the FCA Act empowers the Court to make a “vexatious proceedings order” against a person. The section provides as follows:

37AO    Making vexatious proceedings orders

(1)     This section applies if the Court is satisfied:

 (a)    a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or

 (b)    a person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in an Australian court or tribunal.

 (2)     The Court may make any or all of the following orders:

 (a)    an order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the Court already instituted by the person;

 (b)    an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in the Court;

 (c)    any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.

Note:    Examples of an order under paragraph (c) are an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail, an order to give security for costs and an order for costs.

 (3)     The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of any of the following:

 (a)     the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;

 (b)     the Chief Executive Officer;

 (c)     a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding;

 (d)     a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

 (4)     The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

 (5)     An order made under paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is a final order.

 (6)     For the purposes of subsection (1), the Court may have regard to:

 (a)     proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal; and

 (b)     orders made by any Australian court or tribunal; and

 (c)     the person’s overall conduct in proceedings conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including the person’s compliance with orders made by that court or tribunal);

    including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section.

30    As evident above, s 37AO(4) provides that the Court must not make an order under s 37AO(2) without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard. In the present case, I am satisfied that the applicant has had an opportunity to be heard in relation to the making of these orders. Specifically, the second respondent filed an interlocutory application dated 24 June 2025 seeking such orders. The second respondent also filed affidavits from Mr M Fisher and Mr J Hutton setting out the long history of the various proceedings that the applicant has commenced and upon which the second respondent relied. The second respondent also filed detailed written submissions addressing (including by reference to the detailed evidence) why orders under s 37AO should be made. The applicant has had an opportunity to respond to all of these materials. He has elected not to do so. I also gave him the opportunity to make oral submissions at the hearing before me and an opportunity to file further written submissions.

31    The Court may make one or more of the types of orders specified in ss 37AO(2)(a), (b) and (c). Such orders include ones to the effect that the applicant:

(a)    be prohibited from continuing any current proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to continue them;

(b)    be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act; and

(c)    at the time of filing any application pursuant to s 37AR of the FCA Act, or any other application, must pay a sum that the Court considers appropriate.

32    The making of an order under s 37AO(2)(b) has the result that the person is precluded from instituting proceedings without the leave of the Court: see also 37AQ(1)(a) of the FCA Act.

33    Although the making of orders under s 37AO may be regarded as an extreme step, their purpose is “not to bar vexatious litigants from instituting proceedings entirely or to impose punishment but to place prospective litigation under the control of the Court to protect the Court’s processes against unwarranted usurpations of its limited resources”: AZO24 v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCAFC 77 at [133] (Raper J; Wigney and Lee JJ agreeing) citing Storry v Parkyn [2024] FCAFC 67 at [39] (Lee, Feutrill and Jackman JJ).

34    The Full Court’s decision in Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100; 304 FCR 318 (Lee, Feutrill and Jackman JJ) contains a helpful summary of the principles relevant to the making of an order under s 37AO. In short, there are certain “cumulative conditions” that need to be satisfied to enliven the power to make such an order, being that the litigant has: (a) frequently, (b) instituted or conducted, (c) vexatious proceedings, (d) in Australian courts or tribunals: Storry at [20]. Most critically, to be satisfied that orders should be made, it is necessary to be satisfied that the applicant has instituted or conducted frequent proceedings in Australian Courts or tribunals, and that they have been vexatious proceedings.

35    In the present case, there is no doubt that the applicant has commenced many proceedings before Australian courts and tribunals. The real issue is whether they have been frequent and whether they were vexatious proceedings. In order to address these issues, it is first necessary to summarise the various proceedings that the applicant has commenced. Due to their number, I have set out the summary of these proceedings not in strict chronological order but by reference to the sequence of the various complaints he has made and proceedings he instituted and, in doing so, I have attempted to maintain a chronological order within each such grouping. It is also necessary to observe that the applicant’s name was not suppressed in most of these proceedings and, in respect of others, he was given a pseudonym.

4.2    The 2013 SSAT Decision and subsequent application in the FCC

36    On 28 June 2012, the applicant sought the review of a decision of the second respondent (then the Child Support Agency or CSA) made on 30 January 2012 (the Exchange Rate Decision) by which the CSA entered liability against him using the 16 December 2004 exchange rate of Australian dollars to Polish zloty. The application for review of the Exchange Rate Decision was heard by the SSAT on 21 November 2012 and 6 February 2013.

37    On 6 February 2013, the SSAT set aside the Exchange Rate Decision and remitted it to the second respondent for reconsideration: Przybylowski and Przybylowska & Child Support Registrar SSAT 2012/SC001429 (2013 SSAT Decision).

38    On 20 March 2013, the applicant filed an appeal (subsequently amended) to the FCC. As a result of the applicant’s failure to attend Court for the hearing, the proceedings were dismissed pursuant to r 13.03C of the then Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) and the 2013 SSAT Decision was affirmed: Patrick & Patterson & Anor [2013] FCCA 785 at [10], [19] (Judge Scarlett). That decision was not appealed.

4.3    The 2014 SSAT Decision

39    On 27 August 2014, the SSAT made a decision which concerned an application for review made on 17 June 2014 by the applicant in respect of “the registration of a Polish court order for the payment of spousal maintenance by Mr Miroslav Przybylowski to Ms Elzbieta Przybylowska”—ie, the registration of the 2006 Maintenance Orders: Przybylowski and Przybylowska & Anor [2014] SSAT 2014/SC005301 (the 2014 SSAT Decision).

40    The decision under review was made by the Department of Human Services (Child Support) (DHS) on behalf of the second respondent on 10 January 2014.

41    The background to the decision was set out in the 2014 SSAT Decision as follows:

2.    On 10 January 2014 a decision was made by the Department of Human Services (Child Support) on behalf of the Child Support Registrar to register an order made on 28 September 2006 by the District Court in Rawa Mazowieka, Poland. The order provides for Mr Przybylowski to pay spousal maintenance of 200 zloty (PLN) a month. It was registered from 7 November 2013 with Mr Przybylowski liable to pay the sum of $73.20 a month.

3.     Mr Przybylowski objected to that decision and on 5 June 2014 a Child Support objections officer disallowed his objection. Mr Przybylowski applied for review of that decision to the [SSAT] on 17 June 2014.

42    As is apparent, the issue was whether or not the 2006 Maintenance Orders should be registered.

43    The SSAT was satisfied that the applicant was a resident of Australia, that his former wife was a resident of Poland, and that they had been married and were subsequently divorced by an order made by an Australian court in 2002. The SSAT made findings “that an order was made for spousal maintenance in the District Court in Rawa Mazowiecka, Poland, on 28 September 2006 which requires Mr Przybylowski to pay 200PLN a month from 1 July 2002”, and “that the Regional Court in Lodz applied for registration of the spousal maintenance order on 13 May 2009 as well as orders for child maintenance for Mr Przybylowski’s daughters”: 2014 SSAT Decision at [14]–[15].

44    The SSAT noted each of the applicant’s claims as to why the registration of the spousal maintenance order was not lawful, but did not accept them. The SSAT affirmed the decision under review: 2014 SSAT Decision at [29].

45    The applicant appealed from the 2014 SSAT Decision to the FCC, which dismissed the appeal on 15 May 2015: Pryor v Pearce [2015] FCCA 1240 (Judge Scarlett) (the 2015 FCC Decision). In an affidavit filed in the proceedings before the FCC, the applicant claimed that the decisions were “made by fraud, in that the Government lied in a letter of 4th July 2013” and “The court in (country omitted) had no jurisdiction to make an order for spousal maintenance”, and also that he had been the “subject of financial and procedural bullying”: 2015 FCC Decision at [14].

46    After reviewing the applicant’s evidence and submissions, the FCC dismissed the appeal as “incompetent”, describing it as “misconceived and entirely lacking in merit”: 2015 FCC Decision at [2], [13]. In a subsequent decision on the question of costs, Judge Scarlett made an order for costs against the applicant on 11 November 2015, noting that he had been “wholly unsuccessful” and “had relied on nine separate affidavits, which were objected to on the basis that they were irrelevant and largely incomprehensible”: Pryor v Pearce (No 2) [2015] FCCA 2965 at [9]–[10].

47    Some six years later, the applicant revived his complaints in relation to the 2014 SSAT Decision. On 6 January 2022, the applicant wrote to the (then) AAT indicating he was seeking to lodge an application in relation to the 2014 SSAT Decision. That letter was treated as an application: Preece and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2022] AATA 3098 at [3] (Preece 1).

48    On 21 June 2022, the AAT dismissed the application pursuant to s 42A(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act), finding that the AAT did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine that application: Preece 1 at [13].

49    The applicant appealed the AAT’s decision to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA). On 12 September 2022, Judge Street dismissed the applicant’s appeal: Dixon v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2022] FedCFamC2G 767. His Honour noted that the applicant had filed multiple affidavits, one of which “apparently seeks to re-agitate issues concerning the registration in Australia of the Country B spousal maintenance order that was the subject of the proceedings before Judge Scarlett dismissing the applicant’s application”: Dixon at [6]. Judge Street found that the applicant had not identified a proper question of law and it was not clear how the FCFCOA or this Court had “jurisdiction to entertain any question related to the matters identified by the applicant”: Dixon at [9]. His Honour also noted the applicant’s “allegation of fraud in the present case is unclear and embarrassing”: Dixon at [10]. After reviewing the applicant’s other grounds and materials, Street J concluded that “the current proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success and should accordingly be struck out”: Dixon at [28].

50    On 1 September 2022, whilst his appeal in the FCFCOA was pending (that is, prior to Judge Street’s decision in Dixon), the applicant lodged a further application with the AAT which purported to seek a review of “inaction” alleged against the second respondent to these proceedings. This application is addressed at [78] below.

51    On 14 September 2022, the applicant lodged a notice of appeal with this Court seeking to appeal from Judge Street’s decision in Dixon (NSD776/2022).

52    On 24 March 2023, Perry J dismissed the applicant’s appeal in respect of Dixon, concluding that it was incompetent: CMW22 v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2023] FCA 262 [37]–[39]. Significantly, her Honour highlighted the applicant’s extensive history of commencing proceedings and indicated that an order under s 37AO of the FCA Act may be warranted:

Finally, I observe that this matter is one of a very substantial number of proceedings brought by the appellant, all of which stem from the appellant’s dissatisfaction with the registration of the spousal maintenance order in Australia. Because the publication of the appellant’s name has been suppressed under s 110X(4)(h) of the Child Support Act, I am unable to refer specifically to those proceedings. Nonetheless, I note that the appellant’s claims in those cases have variously been described as hopeless, incomprehensible, having no reasonable prospects of success, and/or an abuse of process.

Against that background, it may be appropriate to consider the suitability of a vexatious proceedings order against the appellant pursuant to s 37AO of the FCA Act. Such an order would preclude the appellant from instituting proceedings in this Court without prior leave of the Court (s 37AQ(1)), and would facilitate in the making of further orders staying or dismissing all pending proceedings before the Court (s 37AO(2)).

However, as no issue pertaining to s 37AO of the FCA Act has been raised in this proceeding, I make no further comment on that issue.

(Emphasis added.)

4.4    AHRC complaints and subsequent judicial review applications

53    Various decisions reveal the applicant’s attempts to re-litigate his challenges to the 2006 Maintenance Orders but on human rights grounds. He has made several applications to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and made multiple judicial review applications concerning decisions made by a delegate or delegates of the President of the AHRC declining to inquire into his complaints pursuant to s 20(2)(ba) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (the AHRC Act).

4.4.1    First judicial review application against the AHRC

54    On 12 May 2017, a delegate of the President of the AHRC decided not to continue to inquire into four separate complaints made by the applicant under ss 20(2)(c)(ii), (iv) and (v) of the AHRC Act.

55    On 8 June 2017, the applicant sought judicial review of this decision in this Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act).

56    On 13 September 2017, the Commonwealth Attorney-General was granted leave to intervene in the proceedings under s 18 of the ADJR and was therefore deemed to be a party.

57    On 9 April 2018, Perry J made orders dismissing the applicant’s judicial review application and requiring him to pay the Attorney-General’s costs as agreed or assessed. Her Honour observed that the Applicant’s “points of claim” alleged “without any specificity a breach of natural justice, errors of law, and that the [AHRC’s] decision was induced or affected by fraud or was otherwise contrary to law”: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473 at [30] (Przybylowski 1 or P1). Her Honour then proceeded to summarily dismiss the proceedings, stating at [32]:

First, at a general level, the applicant’s pleadings consist at their highest of baseless, unparticularised claims of legal error of various kinds, and bare claims for judicial review. Where the applicant includes further detail allegedly of his claims, as explained above, that detail is incomprehensible. As such the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action and there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant successfully prosecuting the proceeding. Indeed, even if the test remained the more stringent test which preceded the enactment of s 31A of the FCA Act, I would find that the proceedings were hopeless.

(Emphasis added.)

58    Her Honour was also critical of the applicant’s bare assertions of fraud, describing this as an “abuse of process”: P1 [33]. Perry J described the proceedings as seeking to “collaterally” challenge the 2015 FCC Decision, noting that it had not been appealed: P1 [40]. Her Honour observed that there was otherwise nothing in the applicant’s affidavit to indicate any reasonable cause of action or prospects of success; rather, like the points of claim, the affidavits contained “unparticularised and baseless assertions and claims”: P1 [41]. Her Honour found that the applicant’s “claims of non-compliance with [certain] international obligations [were] unparticularised to the point where they are meaningless”: P1 [45]. Her Honour also found that the Applicant had made “no attempt to demonstrate how any such breach might impact on the [AHRC’s] decision on the judicial review application” and failed to identify “any specific breach by Australia of its international obligations”: P1 [45].

4.4.2    Second judicial review application against the AHRC

59    As identified by Flick J in Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2020] FCA 198 at [4] (Przybylowski 2 or P2), the applicant made further complaints to the AHRC on 1 and 7 December 2018. Those complaints included a complaint summarised by the President as follows:

You say that Poland has denied sending any maintenance request for any child support/spousal maintenance after your maintenance obligations ended on 21 June 2013 and the registration of the maintenance order is corruption.

(Przybylowski 2 at [4].)

60    On 13 June 2019, the AHRC decided not to inquire into those complaints: P2 [1].

61    On 24 June 2019, the applicant filed another application for judicial review: Przybylowski 2. Again, the Attorney-General intervened in the proceedings: P2 [2]. The applicant claimed, amongst other things, that the AHRC had breached the principles of natural justice or procedural fairness in that it had not obtained a decision of the International Court of Justice: P2 [8]. The applicant also filed a “Statement of Claim”, which, amongst other things, alleged fraud against the AHRC: P2 [8].

62    On 27 February 2020, Flick J gave judgment. His Honour summarily dismissed the proceedings with costs, for reasons of non-justiciability and “the absence of any reasonable prospect of success in establishing a breach of the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness”: P2 [16]. Further, his Honour remarked that the “allegation of fraud as made in the Statement of Claim” was “without substance”: P2 [21].

63    The applicant sought leave to appeal that decision (on 12 March 2020), which Perry J dismissed on 7 March 2023: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2023] FCA 177 (Przybylowski 3 or P3). Her Honour accepted that the proposed grounds of appeal were “without substance” and unparticularised: P3 [28]. Perry J further held that, “[i]n any event, the decision below [was] not attended by any doubt about its correctness, and substantial injustice would not therefore result if leave to appeal is refused”: P3 [29]. Her Honour observed that:

The crux of Mr Przybylowski’s claim in the Court below related to his dissatisfaction with the decision of the President not to take certain proceedings before the ICJ. For reasons explained by Kirby J in [Thorpe v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) (1997) 71 ALJR 767] (at 797) and relied upon by the primary judge, it is clear that the relief sought by Mr Przybylowski was not justiciable and his claim for relief was completely hopeless. This was a complete answer to his application for judicial review and the primary judge was therefore correct to summarily dismiss the judicial review application.

(Przybylowski 3 at [34].)

64    Perry J also stated that “to the extent that [the Applicant] seeks to collaterally challenge other decisions of this and other courts, that challenge would constitute an abuse of process”: P3 [36].

65    Importantly, Perry J made the following observations about the applicant’s claims:

Again, Mr Przybylowski failed to give any rational or comprehensible explanation for the order sought; nor is there any basis in the material before the Court for the making of a vexatious proceeding order against the respondent. To the contrary, in this and related proceedings, the Commission has only ever been a respondent to proceedings brought by Mr Przybylowski and has played no active part in the proceeding, filing submitting appearances save as to costs: see also Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2018] FCA 25; Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473 at [2] (Perry J); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398 at [2] (Cheeseman J); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1249. I also note that in these cases, as well as in the present case, it is the claims by Mr Przybylowski which have been described as hopeless, incomprehensible, having no reasonable prospects of success, and/or an abuse of process: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission (No 2) [2018] FCA 473 at [32] and [40] (Perry J); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398 at [45] (Cheeseman J); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1249 at [43] (Perry J); Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FedCFamC2G 1072 at [42] (Manousaridis J).

(Przybylowski 3 at [37].)

4.4.3    Third judicial review application against the AHRC

66    On 20 January 2021, the Applicant commenced a third set of judicial review proceedings in this Court: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398 (Cheeseman J) (Przybylowski 4 or P4). The Attorney-General again intervened in the matter and sought summary judgment: P4 [2].

67    On 11 November 2021, Cheeseman J made orders summarily dismissing the proceedings. Her Honour noted that these proceedings were “one of a number of judicial review applications Mr Przybylowski has pursued in this Court”: P4 [12]. The applicant had advanced three grounds of review (merely repeating ss 6(1)(a), (c) and (g) of the ADJR Act). After considering the Applicant’s “bare grounds of review”, Cheeseman J summarily dismissed the application and accepted that the application was an “abuse of process”:

In doing this Mr Przybylowski is seeking to have this Court consider and revisit matters which were the subject of the 2014 SSAT decision and 2015 FCC Judgment in order to pursue relief that is non-justiciable […]. Mr Przybylowski seeks to do so in circumstances where he is well beyond the time limit imposed on an appeal from the 2015 FCC Judgment. There is a public interest that inheres in preventing individuals from repeatedly litigating matters that have been the subject of determination by a Court. Mr Przybylowski’s attempt to mount a collateral challenge to the 2015 [sic] SSAT decision and the 2015 FCC Judgment in these proceedings is at best unorthodox but in the context of the whole of the broader procedural history I am satisfied that it amounts to an abuse of process. Accordingly, I am satisfied that an additional basis on which these proceedings ought to be summarily dismissed is in reliance on r 26.01(d) of the Rules.

(Przybylowski 4 at [45].)

68    Her Honour observed that these were “the third judicial review proceedings” in this Court: P4 [20]. Cheeseman J described the applicant’s complaints as follows:

In sum, Mr Przybylowski in his submissions requested that the Commission and/or the AAT dismiss the [2014 SSAT Decision]; that payments made by way of spousal maintenance be returned from Poland on account of his son; that he receive compensation in the amount of $25,000 (which he referred to as his court costs) and a review under Regulation 36 of the Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) by transfer from the AAT to an Australian court or otherwise to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

(Przybylowski 4 at [29].)

69    Dissatisfied with Cheeseman J’s decision, on 13 November 2021 the applicant sought leave to appeal: see Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1249 (Perry J) (Przybylowski 5).

70    On 21 October 2022, Perry J refused leave with costs, finding that:

…the applicant’s un-particularised grounds of appeal would have no prospects of success if leave to appeal were granted. Nor is there any apparent basis on which to doubt the correctness of the carefully reasoned judgment of the primary judge.

(Przybylowski 5 at [42].)

4.4.4    Fourth judicial review application against the AHRC

71    In the meantime, the applicant had commenced new and separate proceedings in the FCFCOA concerning an application under s 46PO of the AHRC Act in relation to an AHRC complaint made by the applicant on 14 December 2021.

72    Section 46PO of the AHRC Act confers jurisdiction on the FCFCOA and this Court to make orders of the kind identified in s 46PO(4) if the “court concerned is satisfied that there has been unlawful discrimination by any respondent”. The applicant contended that “his complaint was about [Services Australia] (SA), and the [AAT]; and his complaint was that SA and the AAT breached the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)”: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FedCFamC2G 1072 [16] (Judge Manousaridis) (P6). A delegate of the AHRC President had, again, decided not to inquire into the applicant’s complaint: P6 [22].

73    After reviewing the complaint, the extensive material filed by the applicant (much of which had been produced in his earlier, related proceedings), and the parties’ submissions, Judge Manousaridis concluded that the applicant had “no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting this proceeding” and dismissed it: P6 [42].

4.4.5    Fifth judicial review application against the AHRC

74    On 26 March 2025, the applicant filed an originating application for leave to proceed pursuant to s 46PO(3A)(a) in this Court.

75    This proceeding arose from the termination on 3 February 2025 of another complaint made by the applicant to the AHRC. The delegate had terminated the complaint on the basis of ss 46PF(1)(b) and 46PH(1)(c) of the AHRC Act.

76    The matter was heard by Stewart J on 25 July 2025 and disposed of that day: Przybylowski v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] FCA 862 (Stewart J) (Przybylowski 7 or P7). In dismissing the originating application for leave with costs, Stewart J made the following observations:

… A search of the Court’s records indicates there have been at least 11 such proceedings, including the present case. There are at least nine published judgments of both the Federal Court and the Federal Circuit and Family Court from a succession of judges in which various of the applicant’s proceedings have been dismissed, principally because of an absence of reasonable prospects of success. The substratum of facts relied on by the applicant for each of these proceedings is essentially the same as that in the current case – a challenge to the maintenance obligations that were owing to his ex-spouse in Poland, or their consequences, or how they have been administered by Services Australia or its predecessors. Although not necessary to recount here, each of those judgments describe the untutored approach of the applicant to litigation and the general absence of particulars capable of forming a reasonably arguable case for the relief that the applicant seeks.

It is abundantly clear that a disproportionate amount of judicial hearing time and court resourcing has been spent triaging the applicant’s ongoing efforts to contest those maintenance obligations and their effects. The applicant has on each occasion been without the benefit of legal representatives capable of providing an objective and informed perspective on the merits of the matters which he seeks to pursue.

(See Przybylowski 7 at [29]–[30])

77    His Honour noted that this repeated litigation raised an issue as to the appropriateness of the Court making a s 37AO order under the FCA Act, but his Honour stopped short of making that order given these proceedings that were listed before me and (then) remained on-foot: P7 [31].

4.5    Other extant proceedings in this Court

78    Of the proceedings commenced by the applicant, there appears to remain one other set of proceedings in this Court that have not yet been disposed of. These proceedings (NSD3/2023) concern the further application lodged by the applicant with the AAT on 1 September 2022 (as mentioned at [50] above).

79    On 6 December 2022, the AAT relevantly dismissed the applicant’s further application pursuant to s 42A(4) of the AAT Act, which empowered the AAT to dismiss an application to review a decision if satisfied that the decision was not reviewable: Preece and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2022] AATA 5230 (Preece 2). In dismissing the application, the AAT first identified that an application could “be made for first review of a decision listed in section 89 of the [Collection Act]” before noting that the information contained in the applicant’s application did not appear to disclose a reviewable decision: Preece 2 at [3]. The AAT then noted that, in light of this, it invited the applicant to provide evidence of a reviewable decision having been made: Preece 2 at [4]. The AAT observed that the applicant submitted further documents, and referred to a letter addressed to the AAT that was headed as follows:

“APPLICATION FOR REVIEW of the Child Support inaction regarding my money under robbery and extortion by the Child Support after the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction expired. NO RESPONSE TO My APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 37 OF THE CSRC ACT 1988.”

(Preece 2 at [5].)

80    The AAT also noted that the applicant provided a document which purported to be a judgment of a Polish court which in any event post-dated the applicant’s application: Preece 2 at [6]. Plainly this could not rationally disclose a reviewable decision as such a decision could only have been made before the application was filed.

81    The AAT concluded that the applicant had not identified a decision that was reviewable by the AAT and, as it did not have a reviewable decision before it, dismissed the application for review: Preece 2 at [8]–[9].

82    On 29 December 2022, the applicant lodged a notice of appeal with this Court seeking judicial review of the decision of the AAT in Preece 2, thereby commencing proceedings NSD3/2023. These proceedings were docketed to a Registrar of this Court for determination. On 30 March 2023, the Child Support Registrar filed an interlocutory application seeking summary dismissal of the proceedings. Orders were subsequently made programming the exchange of submissions and facilitating the disposition of the application on the papers. It appears, however, that a series of intervening circumstances overtook the determination of this application. Such circumstances relevantly include the applicant having lodged a formal complaint with the Court by which he alleged amongst other things that the Registrar lacked the power to determine his application. This complaint was not substantiated. The applicant also filed a series of notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act with twelve notices in total and seven such notices filed in July 2023 alone.

83    It is not necessary to look behind why this application has not progressed. It suffices to observe that, at its core, the applicant’s notice of appeal from the decision of the AAT appears to ultimately be concerned with his longstanding grievance with the second respondent’s registration of the 2006 Maintenance Orders. The question posed in the notice, and the grounds of review identified, appear to disclose no reasonable basis for seeking to review the AAT’s decision by which the tribunal determined that the applicant had not identified any decision that was capable of review. In view of this, I consider it appropriate that these proceedings be stayed pursuant to s 37AO(2)(a), subject to any leave granted by the Court.

4.6    Vexatious litigant orders should be made

84    As noted above, I am satisfied that there is overwhelming evidence that the applicant has commenced or initiated proceedings in several courts (the FCC, the FCFCOA, and this Court) and tribunals (the SSAT, the AAT, and the ART) in Australia.

85    I am further satisfied that an examination of the history of the various proceedings that the applicant has commenced discloses that that they have been a frequent occurrence. The meaning of the word “frequently” is relative and is contextualised by the procedural history of the proceedings under consideration. The word takes its ordinary meaning and is to be compared to the former O 21, r 1 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (repealed) which imposed a “higher threshold of the need to establish that vexatious proceedings had been conducted ‘habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds’”. In other words, the use of the term “frequently” under s 37AO(1)(a) “imports a lesser test” than its predecessor: HWY Rent Pty Ltd v HWY Rentals (in liq) (No 2) [2014] FCA 449 at [111] (Perry J). In HWY Rentals, Perry J reasoned that:

112     The term “frequently” is a relative term and “must be looked at in the context of the litigation being considered”: Attorney General (NSW) v Gargen [2010] NSWSC 1192 at [7] (Davies J); see also Attorney General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008 at [12]; Jones v Cusack (1992) 109 ALR 313 (Jones) at 315 (Toohey J), and Chan at [37]. Thus, the Court may find that a person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings “frequently” even though the number of proceedings may be quite small, such as where the proceedings are an attempt to re-litigate an issue determined against the person: Fuller v Toms [2013] FCA 1422 (Fuller) at [77] (Barker J).

113     Thus in Fuller, for example, the applicant against whom a vexatious proceedings order under s 37AO was made had commenced five separate proceedings over a period of approximately five years. Having regard to the circumstances and the conduct of those various proceedings, Barker J was satisfied that the applicant had “frequently” instituted and conducted proceedings of the type contemplated by s 37AO notwithstanding that “the number of proceedings may be considered small”. Similarly, in Jones, in determining whether the applicant had “frequently” instituted proceeding for the purposes of former O 63, r 6(1) of the High Court Rules, Toohey J held that the five proceedings initiated by the applicant during a six year period “readily answer[ed] that description”.

114     In short, there being no numerical threshold prescribed by Part VAAA itself, the question of whether an applicant has “frequently” instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings for the purposes of s 37AO must be answered in the circumstances of the particular case.

(Original emphasis omitted.)

86    Although s 37AO orders have been made against individuals who have commenced more proceedings than the applicant, the authorities make clear that numerical comparisons are not dispositive. Each of the applicant’s proceeding under consideration broadly concerns his attempts to reopen or revisit the 2006 Maintenance Orders. As several judges have observed, the applicant has sought to relitigate or reagitate these issues in successive proceedings.

87    I am also satisfied that the proceedings that the applicant has commenced have been vexatious proceedings: see, generally, Cull v Singh [2024] FCA 258 at [59]–[69] (Snaden J). This is so for several reasons.

88    First, the applicant has repeatedly made baseless or unmeritorious claims. It has been said that vexatiousness lies just as equally in the hopelessness of the causes that a person has routinely prosecuted. The summary of proceedings above demonstrates that the applicant has habitually advanced propositions that are either inadequately drawn or upon which he has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. Like in Ferdinands v Registrar Burns (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 157 (Cheeseman, Goodman and McEvoy JJ), the applicant’s various submissions, arguments and claims are “largely prolix, irrelevant and are directed to relief beyond the jurisdiction of the Court”: Ferdinands at [52].

89    A common theme in the various decisions is that the applicant misconceives the Court’s jurisdiction or its processes, and his claims lack a cogent legal foundation. Several decisions have found the applicant’s originating application to be incompetent or otherwise entirely lacking in merit or baseless. The applicant’s arguments are often difficult to follow and contain legal irrelevancies and misconceptions. As the Full Court stated in Storry, “trying to understand them and make them comprehensible causes considerable Court time to be consumed and directed to no useful end”. The Applicant has continually shown that he is unable to plead a case.

90    Second, the applicant repeatedly collaterally attacks adverse decisions. The applicant has displayed an unmistakable tendency to relitigate matters that have been decided adversely to him. Several judges have noted that the proceedings concern the same or similar fact pattern.

91    Third, the applicant has repeatedly made extravagant and scandalous claims. The summary of proceedings set out above discloses that the applicant has regularly made allegations of fraud, corruption, and deceit, but has made no attempt to substantiate these allegations. Several judges have criticised the Applicant for advancing baseless fraud allegations.

92    Fourth, there is no doubt in my mind that the various proceedings that the applicant has brought are an abuse of process. In one way or another, the applicant has sought to re-agitate and ventilate complaints about the 2006 Maintenance Orders, including decisions seeking to update those Orders (by way of indexed or revised amounts payable by him). He has well and truly had his day in various tribunals and courts seeking to challenge those Orders and has failed. Despite this, he continues to complain about them.

93    Fifth, I am satisfied that the applicant is likely to persist in making baseless claims which burden the Court. Unless a s 37AO order is made there is every indication that the applicant will persist in commencing unmeritorious proceedings. These various misconceived and baseless proceedings have resulted in expense, burden, inconvenience, and even disruption to the efficient management of the Court’s business, which must be controlled. Like the appellant in Ferdinands, the applicant “has had his day in court – he has in fact had numerous days in court, and more than ample opportunity to pursue any legitimate claims (and rights of appeal) that may have been available to him”: Ferdinands at [49].

94    I am satisfied that the applicant has well and truly exhausted the legitimate limits of pursuing his claims. By constantly making unmeritorious applications, which has merited dozens of hearings, the applicant has deprived other litigants of the Court’s time: no person is “entitled to another person’s day in Court to pursue quixotic and misconceived complaints”: Storry at [74] (Lee, Feutrill and Jackman JJ). Furthermore, it is significant that at least two Justices of this Court (Perry and Stewart JJ separately) have foreshadowed the appropriateness of making a s 37AO order.

95    Taking these reasons together, I am satisfied orders should be made.

96    As to the form and content of the orders, it important to observe that s 37AO of the FCA Act permits the Court to make “an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in the Court”. The words, “proceedings of a particular type” are defined in s 37AM(1) to include “proceedings in relation to a particular matter” and “proceedings against a particular person.” During the hearing before me, I raised with both the applicant and Counsel for the second respondent whether the facts were such that I should make a general order in relation to all future proceedings or limit these to proceedings of a particular type or subject matter. I invited supplementary submissions as to this point. The applicant submitted that he should not be precluded from bringing any new proceedings at all whereas the second respondent contended that a more general order was warranted in the circumstances.

97    I am satisfied that the more general order in the form advanced by the second respondent should be made. In Ferdinands, the Full Court considered it appropriate to make an order in “general terms” as opposed to one “limited to proceedings of a particular type” having regard to “the many different ways in which Mr Ferdinands has sought to frame the proceedings he [had] instituted over the years” and the inefficacy of a previous order of the Court “limited by reference to subject matter”: Ferdinands at [60]. Although no previous orders have been made against the applicant, the applicant has over the course of the many proceedings he has commenced framed his case in various ways (albeit with similar themes and similar respondents). As the history of the applicant’s litigation demonstrates, the applicant has made ever-so subtle attempts to seek to distinguish his past claims, even though they all relate to the same or similar subject matter. Moreover, given the applicant’s demonstrated inability to conform or abide by the basal strictures of pleading, and his propensity to make scandalous claims, it is appropriate that he prohibited from commencing any new proceedings without leave.

98    In my view, the mechanism which requires the applicant to seek leave to commence future proceedings is an appropriate filter and will not prevent any new claim of “substance” from being commenced by the applicant in relation to the same or different subject matter. This accords with the observation made by the Full Court in Luck v Secretary, Services Australia (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCAFC 103 at [49] (Rofe, Hespe and Kennett JJ). It is also consistent with several recent decisions of this Court orders in general terms: Ogbonna v CTI Logistics Limited (No 6) [2022] FCA 615 at [32] and Order 1 (Colvin J); Cull v Singh [2024] FCA 258 at [71] and Order 1 (Snaden J); Nasir v Reynolds (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCA 1194 at [90] and Order 1 (Lee J); Ezekiel-Hart v Council of the Law Society of ACT (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2025] FCA 551 at [78] and Order 1 (Needham J); McGinn v High Court of Australia (No 5) [2025] FCA 975 at [18] and Order 1 (Jackman J); Sammut v Lawrence [2025] FCA 1040 at [199] and Order 2 (Raper J). See also the proposed orders in AZO24 at [136].

99    For the foregoing reasons, I will make an order pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the FCA Act prohibiting the applicant from instituting proceedings in this Court without applying for and receiving leave in accordance with ss 37AR and 37AT of the FCA Act. Further, I will make an order under s 37AO(2)(b), staying all current proceedings instituted by the applicant in the Court, including the Applicant’s application for judicial review in proceedings NSD3/2023. As I have identified above, these proceedings seem to lack a proper purpose and appear to be yet another attempt to achieve the same ends.

Associate:

Dated:    18 September 2025