Federal Court of Australia

Liang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1047

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.    The appeal be dismissed.

3.    The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, except the costs of the hearing on 26 August 2025, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SARAH C DERRINGTON J:

INTRODUCTION

1    The first appellant, Ms Liang, is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who first arrived in Australia on 28 February 2013 as the holder of a Higher Education Sector (Subclass 573) visa. Ms Liang's husband (the second appellant) and daughter (the third appellant) arrived in Australia on 11 April 2013 as dependants on Ms Liang’s student visa.

2    Ms Liang represented herself in the hearing before this Court, assisted by a Mandarin interpreter despite it becoming clear that she needed very little assistance with the English language. That was no surprise given the length of time she has been in Australia and her educational and employment history in this country. Ms Liang completed a Master of Engineering Management in Australia on 11 December 2014. As will be explained, she has commenced, but not completed, a Master of Business Administration (MBA).

3    In her oral submissions, Ms Liang told the Court that she wishes to complete an MBA before returning to China. Ms Liang explained that there were certain policies in China which had the effect that her first Masters degree would now be considered stale, being more than 10 years old, and so she would be prejudiced in the employment market in China. She also explained that her daughter is now 18 and, having grown up in Australia, speaks very little Chinese and would find it very difficult to live in China.

4    Ms Liang’s application for a student visa the subject of these proceedings was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 8 November 2019. In her oral submissions, Ms Liang told the Court that this decision had a devastating effect on her and her family. On 25 November 2019, she applied to the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal for judicial review of the delegate’s decision. On 16 December 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision after a hearing conducted by telephone on 20 September 2021 with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter. Unfortunately, the transcript of that hearing was not in evidence before me, although the Appeal Book Index listed an audio-recording to which neither party referred.

5    Ms Liang sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA (Div 2)). On 27 November 2024, the primary judge dismissed that application. This is an appeal from that decision commenced by a Notice of Appeal filed on 23 December 2024 and amended on 11 February 2025.

6    Ms Liang has been self-represented at all levels of this matter. That is unfortunate. She is understandably aggrieved that she did not fully understand the judicial review process and has raised issues in this appeal that perhaps could have been explored more fully below. As was explained to her during the hearing in this Court, this appeal is not an opportunity to re-litigate the matters that were, or could have been, put before the Tribunal. The role of this Court is to discern whether there was any error on the part of the primary judge in dismissing the application for judicial review before him having regard to the way in which Ms Liang put her case.

7    For the reasons that follow, the appeal must be dismissed.

Background

8    Subsequent to her first visa, Ms Liang was granted further Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 573) visas on 11 September 2014 and 17 March 2015.

9    On 21 August 2015, Ms Liang was granted a Temporary Work (Skilled) (Class UC) (Subclass 457) visa, valid until 21 August 2019. She then on 19 August 2019 applied for yet another student visa for the purpose of studying an MBA at Kaplan Business School.

10    On 17 September 2019, the Department invited Ms Liang to comment on adverse information that did not support her student visa application including, inter alia, that:

(a)    she had been offshore for a total of only 67 days since arriving in Australia;

(b)    she completed a Master of Engineering Management in Australia, at the Queensland University of Technology, on 11 December 2014;

(c)    she commenced an MBA at James Cook University (JCU) on 12 March 2015 and ceased those studies on 21 October 2015 after having been granted the Temporary Work visa;

(d)    she applied for an Employer Nomination Scheme (Subclass 186) visa, being a permanent visa, which application was subsequently withdrawn on 23 July 2018; and

(e)    inconsistent information had been provided in her Temporary Work visa application and her student visa statement in relation to when she commenced working with her sponsoring employer.

11    Ms Liang responded to that invitation on 11 October 2019.

12    On 8 November 2019, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellants student visas on the basis that Ms Liang did not satisfy the requirements of cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). The appellants sought review of the delegate’s decision before the Tribunal.

13    Prior to the Tribunal hearing, Ms Liang provided additional evidence in support of her application, including information as to her enrolment in a registered course of study on 10 September 2021, namely an MBA at JCU. On 20 September 2021, the appellants appeared before the Tribunal, albeit by telephone, at an oral hearing with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter.

14    On 16 December 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

THE TRIBUNAL’s DECISION

15    The Tribunal’s decision turned on cl 500.212 of the Regulations, which required that an applicant for a student visa demonstrate that:

The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:

(a)     the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:

(i)     the applicant’s circumstances; and

(ii)     the applicant’s immigration history; and

(iii)     if the applicant is a minor—the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and

(iv)     any other relevant matter; and

(b)     the applicant intends to comply with any conditions subject to which the visa is granted, having regard to:

(i)     the applicant’s record of compliance with any condition of a visa previously held by the applicant (if any); and

(ii)     the applicant’s stated intention to comply with any conditions to which the visa may be subject; and

(c)     of any other relevant matter.

16    As the Tribunal noted, when considering whether an applicant meets this “genuine temporary entrant criterion”, a decision-maker must have regard to Ministerial Direction No. 69 ‘Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa and Student Guardian visa applications’, made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Direction). The Direction requires that regard be had to the following factors:

    the applicant’s circumstances in their home country, potential circumstances in Australia, and the value of the course to the applicant’s future;

    the applicant’s immigration history, including previous applications for an Australian visa or for visas to other countries, and previous travel to Australia or other countries;

    if the applicant is a minor, the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and

    any other relevant information provided by the applicant, or information otherwise available to the decision-maker, including information that may be either beneficial or unfavourable to the applicant.

17    The Tribunal considered each of those factors, with the exception of the third, which was not applicable to Ms Liang.

18    As to the value of the course to Ms Liang’s future, the Tribunal observed that she had previously completed Bachelor’s level education in China (Tribunal reasons at [17]), as well as the aforementioned Master’s degree in Australia, before several times enrolling in (but not completing) an MBA at different institutions (Tribunal reasons at [18], [22]). It was also noted that her enrolment to study an MBA at JCU in September 2021 was obtained just 10 days before the Tribunal hearing (Tribunal reasons at [22]).

19    The Tribunal accepted that if Ms Liang completed the MBA, it would improve her employment prospects and level of remuneration in China (Tribunal reasons at [24]), and that she was seeking a high-level qualification consistent with her existing level of education for the purpose of changing her career path (Tribunal reasons at [26]). However, the Tribunal did not accept Ms Liang’s explanation for not being enrolled in any course of study and found that the gap in undertaking any study between her application for the visa in August 2019 and her eventual enrolment in the MBA course in September 2021 was inconsistent with the policy of granting a student visa (Tribunal reasons at [28]-[29]). Further, the Tribunal did not accept Ms Liang’s explanation for undertaking the MBA in Australia rather than in China, particularly as she had ample opportunity to complete her studies in Australia over the several preceding years (Tribunal reasons at [27]-[28], [30]).

20    As to Ms Liang’s immigration history, the Tribunal noted that she had, by the time of its decision, lived in Australia for 8 years and 10 months, and intended to remain in Australia for a further 13 months to complete her studies (Tribunal reasons at [40]). The Tribunal also observed that Ms Liang had previously been refused a permanent visa, being an Employer Nomination Scheme (Subclass 186) visa, in November 2017 because the nomination of her sponsor was refused by the Department (Tribunal reasons at [42]). While the Tribunal did not make adverse findings on the basis of that visa refusal, and indeed found that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that Ms Liang had had any other prior immigration issues, the Tribunal did take the application for a permanent visa into account (together with the prolonged three-year gap in undertaking any studies) in finding that she was undertaking further studies for the purpose of maintaining her residency in Australia rather than to study here temporarily (Tribunal reasons at [42]-[44]).

21    As to Ms Liang’s potential circumstances in Australia, the Tribunal found that she has substantial ties in Australia, including that: her husband and daughter reside with her here; they own a property in Macgregor, Queensland; her daughter attended secondary schooling here; and she and her husband have a high level of income working in management roles in Australia. Based on those ties, the Tribunal concluded that Ms Liang had a strong incentive to remain here in Australia rather than to return to China (Tribunal reasons at [41]).

22    As to Ms Liang’s circumstances in her home country, the Tribunal found that her ties to China would not provide a significant incentive for her to return for several reasons. First, the Tribunal noted Ms Liang’s evidence that the level of wages in Australia was higher than in China, which the Tribunal considered gave her a financial incentive to remain. However, the Tribunal also considered her evidence of the more favourable economic conditions in China, which presented a significant incentive to return (Tribunal reasons at [34]). Secondly, the Tribunal noted evidence that Ms Liang’s assets in Australia exceeded the value of her assets in China, leading the Tribunal to conclude that she had a substantial financial incentive to remain in Australia (Tribunal reasons at [36]). Thirdly, the Tribunal considered Ms Liang’s evidence as to her familial ties in both Australia (her husband and daughter) and China (her parents, with whom she maintained daily contact by electronic means) and concluded that her ties to China would not provide a significant incentive for her to return (Tribunal reasons at [40]).

23    Having considered those matters, the Tribunal was not satisfied that Ms Liang had applied for a student visa to genuinely stay in Australia temporarily to study. Rather, it formed the view that Ms Liang intended to maintain an ongoing residence in Australia and to remain here permanently (Tribunal reasons at [44]-[46]). The Tribunal therefore found that she did not meet cl 500.212(a) of the Regulations, and accordingly was not satisfied that Ms Liang was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student as required by cl 500.212 (Tribunal reasons at [46]-[47]). Consequently, the Tribunal found that the second and third appellants did not satisfy cl 500.311 of the Regulations as they were not in the same family unit as a person who held a student visa (Tribunal reasons at [49]). The Tribunal therefore affirmed the delegate’s decision.

The primary judge’s decision

24    On 14 January 2022, the appellants filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision before the FCFCOA (Div 2). The application was heard on 15 November 2024 and the primary judge delivered judgment on 27 November 2024: Liang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1272 (PJ).

25    The application advanced seven grounds of review, the terms of which are set out in full at PJ[8].

26    In respect of grounds 1, 2 and 4, the primary judge found that those grounds were without merit, because the Tribunal had considered all of the issues raised in those grounds but had simply made a decision contrary to Ms Liang’s submissions after examining all of the evidence before it (PJ[19]). His Honour was not satisfied that the Tribunal had erred in so doing.

27    In respect of ground 3, the primary judge found that there was no basis for a claim that the Tribunal engaged in extreme illogicality or irrationality in arriving at its decision, considered against the principles espoused by the Full Court of the Federal Court in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496 at [60]-[61]. His Honour found that this ground was without merit in circumstances where the Tribunal had addressed the issues required by the Direction in a considered and reasonable way (PJ[19], [21]).

28    In respect of ground 5, to the extent that it raised an allegation of bias in addition to a failure to consider Ms Liang’s claims and evidence relating to the benefits of the proposed MBA, the primary judge rejected the allegation that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by actual bias as lacking any evidentiary basis (PJ[22]).

29    In respect of grounds 6 and 7, the primary judge found that the Court had no jurisdiction to review the complaints, as they related to the delegate’s decision, which is a “primary decision” by reason of ss 476(2)(a) and 476(4) of the Migration Act (PJ[23]).

30    Having dismissed each ground of review, his Honour found that the appellants had failed to establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal (PJ[24]-[25]) and, accordingly, dismissed the application for judicial review.

THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

31    By their Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 11 February 2025, the appellants appeal from the primary judge’s decision and raise three grounds in the following terms (particulars omitted):

1.     The Court at first instance erred in not finding that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) was affected by jurisdictional error in that it did not consider relevant considerations.

2.     The Court at first instance erred in not finding that the decision of the AAT was affected by jurisdictional error in that it erred in interpreting or applying the law.

3.     The Court at first instance erred in not finding that the decision of the AAT was affected by jurisdictional error in that it was legally unreasonable.

Ground 1

32    Ground 1 is comprised of eight particulars denoted (a)-(h).

33    Particulars (a)-(d) reagitate grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5 before the primary judge, respectively. As has already been noted, his Honour was satisfied that the Tribunal had considered all of the issues raised, and undertook a reasoned and considered examination of all of the evidence put before it, before making a decision contrary to Ms Liang’s submissions. Having considered the Tribunal’s reasons as summarised above, I am satisfied that his Honour was plainly correct to find that the Tribunal’s decision was free from jurisdictional error in the ways alleged in grounds 1, 2 and 4 below. I am not persuaded that there was any error by the primary judge in dismissing those grounds.

34    I am also not persuaded that there was any error by the primary judge in dismissing Ms Liang’s complaint in ground 5 that the Tribunal failed to consider her claims and evidence relating to the benefits of the proposed MBA. The Tribunal clearly did so.

35    To the extent that ground 5 before the primary judge also included an allegation of actual bias by the Tribunal, the issue is not quite so clear. As was the case before the primary judge, Ms Liang raised the complaint of actual bias by the Tribunal in the course of her oral submissions during the hearing of the appeal. It was not raised directly in her Amended Notice of Appeal. Rather, it was rolled up in Ground 3, which raises a complaint of legal unreasonableness. Particular (d) of Ground 3 on appeal alleges that the Tribunal “was legally unreasonable implicitly to find that the First Applicant’s sworn evidence of her intention genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily was untruthful”.

36    The Minister submits that Ground 3 was not raised before the primary judge and leave should not be granted to raise it on appeal. The Minister quite properly conceded that he would suffer no prejudice if Ms Liang were to be permitted to rely on the ground and submitted that, in any event, it was without merit.

37    Although the Amended Notice of Appeal is not explicit about reagitating the allegation of bias, it is clear enough that Ms Liang sought to argue on appeal that the primary judge had erred in failing to find error in the Tribunal’s apparent conclusion that her evidence was to be disbelieved – either because of actual bias or because that conclusion was legally unreasonable. The former purported error had been raised below; the Minister conceded that no prejudice flowed if the latter were raised for the first time on appeal.

38    In her oral submissions on appeal, albeit by way of evidence from the Bar table, Ms Liang said that “just at the very beginning of the hearing”, which was being conducted by telephone, “the Tribunal asked me a question, ‘Do you think I can believe you?’” It was this question that underpinned Ms Liang’s allegation of actual bias both before the primary judge and on appeal, although as matters transpired, its timing, and therefore its import, was alleged differently before the primary judge than on appeal.

39    The primary judge found that the bias claim “lack[ed] any evidentiary basis” and that “an examination of the reasons for judgment does not disclose any basis for such a finding” (PJ[22]). During the hearing of the appeal on 6 August 2025, I enquired of the Minister’s legal representative as to whether there was a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal in evidence and was told there was none.

40    However, in the course of preparing these reasons, I observed from the Appeal Book that an audio-recording had been made of the Tribunal hearing. It was listed in the index to the Appeal Book as “N/R” (i.e. not reproduced). The Court Book before the primary judge contained the same information. I relisted the appeal for further hearing on 26 August 2025 to receive submissions from the Minister as to whether I should receive the audio-recording into evidence in the circumstances of this case. Ms Liang again represented herself at this subsequent hearing. The Minister objected to my listening to the audio-recording, but submitted that if I were against him, it would be appropriate to file a transcript of the hearing.

41    As things transpired, I found it was unnecessary for me to listen to the audio-recording or to require a transcript. Ms Liang resiled from her statement at the first hearing of her appeal as to when the Tribunal had suggested it might not believe her. She agreed that the question had been asked by the Tribunal, as she had described in her fifth ground of review before the primary judge, in the middle of an exchange on a particular issue. In short, the Tribunal member had asked Ms Liang why he should believe her explanation about why she had not commenced her MBA studies during the long gap in her study history. In that context, the question does not carry the imputation it might have had the Tribunal in fact opened the hearing with the first question, “Do you think I can believe you?”, as Ms Liang had originally submitted.

42    Further, albeit these are matters upon which I place very little weight where a self-represented litigant is concerned, the letter dated 2 September 2021 informing Ms Liang of her Tribunal hearing was accompanied by a “Fact Sheet” titled “Information About Hearings”, which included the following:

Is the hearing recorded?

All hearings are audio recorded. You may ask us for a copy of the recording at the end of the hearing.

43    In his written submissions before the primary judge, which Ms Liang conceded she had read, the Minister referred to the serious nature of an allegation of bias and stated that Ms Liang “has filed no independent evidence to establish the precise questions asked by the member at the hearing”.

44    It seems to me that, having identified the problem with Ms Liang’s case in respect of bias, a model litigant ought to have alerted Ms Liang, as a self-represented litigant whose native language is not English, to the possibility of obtaining the audio-recording of the hearing before the Tribunal or a transcript thereof. It is unfortunate that the primary judge did not raise this matter with the Minister’s representatives below. It was obvious on the face of the Minister’s written submissions that the Minister knew of the existence of evidence which was material to an issue raised by Ms Liang, but failed to inform her of her right to access that evidence.

45    Nevertheless, in the circumstances of this particular case, I am satisfied that the audio-recording would have made no material difference to the resolution of the specific allegation made by Ms Liang. As the primary judge observed, nothing in the Tribunal’s reasons discloses any basis for a finding of bias, and no error of bias or prejudgment arises from the mere fact that the Tribunal had asked for an explanation as to a matter about which it was not then already satisfied. I am not persuaded that the primary judge erred in dismissing ground 5 below.

46    In addition to the matters raised in Grounds 2 and 3 of the Amended Notice of Appeal, particulars (e)-(h) of Ground 1 were not raised before the primary judge.

47    Particular (e) of Ground 1 is expressed in the following terms:

The AAT did not consider the possibility that the First Applicant may consistently have been a person who “intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily” within the meaning of clause 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994, while also being open to opportunities to remain permanently if they arose.

48    Ms Liang’s claim before the Tribunal was that she was a genuine temporary entrant for the purpose of undertaking further study. As Steward J found in Kaur v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2026 at [31], the factors in the Direction which must be taken into account are those which are the subject of substantial, clearly articulated claims or claims which clearly emerge from the material before the Tribunal. Contrary to Ms Liang’s contention on appeal, there was no evidence before the Tribunal that she had acknowledged that, while genuinely intending to only stay temporarily, she would also be open to opportunities to remain in Australia permanently if they arose. No such claim had been advanced by her. The Tribunal was therefore required to consider her claim as articulated under cl 500.212 and, under the Direction, was required to consider as part of its assessment that Ms Liang had previously applied for a permanent visa. The Tribunal did so. No error is disclosed.

49    Particular (f) of Ground 1 is expressed in the following terms:

The AAT did not consider as required by law and weigh the First applicant’s history of completing demanding courses of study including for a Master’s degree.

50    Ms Liang’s complaint is plainly misconceived. As set out previously, the Tribunal expressly considered her academic history at various points in its reasons, and also accepted that she was seeking a high-level MBA qualification consistent with her existing level of education for the purpose of changing her career path (Tribunal reasons at [26]). There is no basis for the contention that the Tribunal failed to consider those matters.

51    Particular (g) of Ground 1 is expressed in the following terms:

The AAT did not consider as required by law and weigh the First applicant’s history of compliance with Australian immigration law.

52    It was uncontroversial that the Tribunal, as it was required to do under the Direction, expressly considered Ms Liang’s immigration history. The Tribunal did not make any adverse findings against her by reason of the previous refusal to grant her a permanent visa and found that there was no other information before the Tribunal “to indicate that she had any other immigration issues either in or outside of Australia” (Tribunal reasons at [42]). On a fair reading, that was at least implicitly, if not expressly, a finding by the Tribunal that Ms Liang had a history of compliance with Australian immigration law.

53    Particular (h) of Ground 1 is expressed in the following terms:

The AAT did not consider as required by law and weigh the First applicant’s credibility, and the weight to give to her evidence as sworn evidence before the AAT.

54    The weight to be attributed to a party’s evidence is a matter solely within the remit of the primary decision-maker: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 41 per Mason J. In any event, the Tribunal did not make any specific finding as to Ms Liang’s credibility. While the Tribunal rejected various matters Ms Liang had advanced, and ultimately rejected her claim to be a genuine temporary entrant for study, those conclusions were reasonably open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it. I accept the Minister’s submission that this particular does no more than invite an impermissible merits review: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.

55    Ground 1 must fail. None of the alleged errors as particularised have been made out.

Ground 2

56    Ground 2 seeks to further agitate the issue raised by particular (e) of Ground 1 with respect to the Tribunal’s findings as to Ms Liang’s intention to stay temporarily in Australia.

57    Particular (a) of Ground 2 contends that the Tribunal erred in interpreting or applying the term “intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily” within the meaning of cl 500.212(a) of the Regulations. Given my findings with respect to particular (e) of Ground 1, it is plain that the Tribunal did not make any error of law in its interpretation or application of the genuine temporary entrant criterion under cl 500.212.

58    Particular (b) of Ground 2 is expressed in the following terms:

Further to particular (a) to this Ground, the AAT erred in assuming that if the First Applicant at some period between her previous studies and enrolling in the course a short time before the hearing desired to remain permanently in Australia, that meant that at the time of the decision she did not intend genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily within the meaning of clause 500.212(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994.

59    The determination of a person’s intention is a question of fact reposed solely in the primary decision-maker. In this case, the Tribunal was required to consider Ms Liang’s intention in respect of staying in Australia temporarily as at the time of its decision, applying cl 500.212, based on all of the material which was before it: Inderjit v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCAFC 217; 272 FCR 528 at [40]-[41]. Here, much as had occurred before the Tribunal below in Inderjit, the Tribunal formed the view that Ms Liang’s actions were consistent with an intention to use the student visa program to maintain an ongoing residence in Australia. That finding was reasonably open to the Tribunal on the material before it, particularly given its antecedent findings as to the gap period in which Ms Liang did not undertake study and as to the timing of both her student visa application and her enrolment into the MBA program at JCU.

60    I can discern no error in the findings impugned. Ground 2 cannot succeed.

Ground 3

61    As I have already said, Ground 3 alleges that aspects of the Tribunal’s decision were legally unreasonable. The test of legal unreasonableness is high – was the decision one that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ.

62    It will be apparent from the reasons above that I am satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was made with due regard to the merits of Ms Liang’s claims and upon proper consideration of the factors specified in the Direction. That extends to its findings in respect of Ms Liang’s failure to satisfy the genuine temporary entrant requirement, its findings in respect of incentives for Ms Liang to remain in Australia permanently, and its acceptance and rejection of different parts of her evidence, each of which are impugned in the particulars to Ground 3. Those findings were reasonably open on the material before the Tribunal. No error is established.

Disposition

63    In circumstances where the new grounds of appeal were largely rolled up with some grounds advanced below and overlapped others, and where the Minister disclaimed any prejudice, I will grant leave to raise the new grounds of appeal. Nevertheless, none of them have merit, nor do the original grounds. The appeal must be dismissed.

64    There is no reason why Ms Liang should not pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal, with the exception of the costs of the second hearing on 26 August 2025.

Associate:

Dated:    29 August 2025