Federal Court of Australia

Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations v Commonwealth (No 2) [2025] FCA 1037

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

[Orders 1-3 are included in the substantive decision in Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 1029]

4.    Pursuant to r 2.32(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on the ground referred to in s 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), it is ordered that the following documents are confidential:

(a) The Nation Reports comprising Attachments A to EE of Schedule C of the NSW Murray-Darling Basin Fractured Rock Water Resource Plan at Court Book Vol 3, tabs 1-25;

(b) The affidavit of Nadja Zimmermann affirmed 8 February 2025, unless the extracts from the Nation Reports quoted in paragraphs [26] and [28] are redacted;

(c) The submissions of the Commonwealth respondents filed on 20 December 2024, unless paragraph [33] is redacted;

(d) Annexure 1 to the amended interlocutory application filed on 11 April 2025, unless the words immediately after “Page 2660” to the end of the sentence at page 39, item 418 are redacted; and

(e) Amended Annexure 1 to the further amended interlocutory application filed on 3 June 2025, unless the words immediately after “Page 2660” up to “The 7 words ...” at page 83, item 418 are redacted.

5. Any person showing sufficient interest has liberty to apply on reasonable notice to the applicant to vary order 4.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWART J:

Background

1 These reasons assume familiarity with the reasons for judgment given in the principal proceeding: Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations v Commonwealth [2025] FCA 1029. The same abbreviations are used in these reasons as in the principal judgment.

2 On 6 May 2024, the final hearing in this proceeding was listed for 10 and 11 February 2025 and detailed programming orders were made to prepare the matter for hearing.

3 On 29 January 2025, some two weeks before the hearing, the applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking to vacate the hearing and have it relisted some months thereafter. The essential basis for the application was that it had recently come to the appreciation of the applicant that the Commonwealth respondents intended tendering 25 reports detailing the consultation efforts by NSW with First Nations – these “Nation Reports” are Attachments A to EE to Schedule C of the fractured rock water resource plan (FRWRP) and ultimately comprised volume 3 of the court book (1402 pages). Those reports contained, or were feared to contain, “culturally sensitive” information and “cultural knowledge” (together referred to as cultural knowledge) which the relevant Nations had not consented to being publicly disclosed. It was said that several months would be required for the applicant to consult with the relevant First Nations in order to identify the relevant cultural knowledge and then seek agreement with the Commonwealth respondents as to the exclusion of that information from the latter’s tender or appropriate suppression orders.

4 I heard the interlocutory application on 3 February 2025. I dismissed it. That was in part because there were other ways of protecting the First Nations’ interest in the cultural knowledge not being disclosed publicly during the course of the hearing. That is to say, I allowed the hearing to proceed on 10 and 11 February 2025 and said that I would consider interim suppression orders at that stage and final suppression orders at some later stage.

5 On 9 February 2025, the applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking suppression orders in respect of cultural knowledge. At that stage and thereafter the Commonwealth respondents have remained agnostic on whether or not the Court should grant the orders sought by the applicant. In contrast, NSW supports the applicant’s application for suppression orders.

6 On 10 February 2025, I made interim suppression orders pursuant to s 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) prohibiting the disclosure of the Nation Reports and paragraph [33] of the submissions of the Commonwealth respondents dated 20 December 2024 which reproduced some content from those reports. I programmed the applicant’s interlocutory application for hearing, although a standalone hearing on the application ultimately did not materialise. The interlocutory application was further amended, whereupon on 6 June 2025 I ordered that the application be determined on the papers.

7 Ultimately, the further amended interlocutory application dated 3 June 2025 presently before me seeks suppression orders in the following terms:

1.    Pursuant to ss 37AF(1)(a), and 37AF(1)(b)(i) and (iv) of the Federal Court Act the disclosure or publication of:

a. the content of the Nation Reports comprising Attachments A to EE of Schedule C of the NSW Murray Darling Basin Fractured Rock Water Resource Plan at Court Book Vol 3, Tabs 1-25 (Nation Reports) identified in Amended Annexure 1 of these orders;

b. para [33] of the submissions of the Commonwealth respondents dated 20 December 2024;

c. the extracts from the Nation Reports quoted in paras [26] and [28] of the affidavit of Nadja Zimmermann affirmed 8 February 2025;

d. at page 39, item 418 of Annexure 1 filed on 11 April 2025: the words immediately after “Page 2660” to the end of the sentence;

e. at page 83, item 418 of the Amended Annexure 1: the words immediately after “Page 2660:” up to “The 7 words…”, and

f. the yellow, blue and green highlighted content in the highlighted copy of the Nation Reports provided by the Applicant to the Court and Respondents

is prohibited until the expiry of the period provided for in R36.03 of the Federal Court Rules (Appeal Period) or, if an appeal is lodged, until the further order of the Court.

2.     The disclosure or publication of the information referred to in order (1) is expressly permitted between:

a.     the Federal Court judge presiding in the matter;

b.     essential court staff; and

c.     the Parties and their legal representatives.

3.     Upon the expiry of the Appeal Period, if no appeal is lodged, the materials referred to in order (1), above be returned to the Commonwealth.

4.     These orders do not operate in respect of copies of the Nations Reports referred to in order (1) other than those provided, tendered or disclosed in this proceeding.

8 It can be seen that on their face, the proposed orders are particularly complicated in respect of what is sought to be suppressed. Then, when one has regard to the Amended Annexure 1 which is a 121-page schedule of extracts from the Nation Reports and the colour coded version of the Nation Reports referred to in the orders, they become incomprehensively complicated. Moreover, it is prohibitively burdensome on the Court to go through every item in order to reach a state of satisfaction as to grounds for non-disclosure having been established. There are also 12 affidavits in support on the further amended interlocutory application. The burden on the Court by the way in which the further amended interlocutory application has been prosecuted is entirely disproportionate to what is at stake.

9 Because of those considerations, and because it is practically unworkable to carve out sections of the Nation Reports as proposed, in my view the application is best considered on the basis of orders suppressing the whole of the Nation Reports and any information extracted from them that is in other documents such as the parties’ submissions and the affidavits referred to in the proposed orders.

10 Also, the proposal that if no notice of appeal is filed the orders will last only until the time for filing such a notice expires does not work unless prayer 3 of the proposed orders in requiring that the relevant materials be “returned to the Commonwealth” means that they will be removed from the court file, if that is where they are, or removed from other places of storage if not on the court file. That may raise a point of some nicety as to what exactly constitutes the court file and what documents are on it because removal from the court file is governed by r 2.29 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) whereas different considerations or requirements may apply in respect of the removal of other documents. Certainly, the Commonwealth respondents’ submissions, Annexure 1 and Amended Annexure 1 are documents on the court file – they were filed as such. As tendered exhibits that were not “filed” (cf r 2.25), the Nation Reports may not be on the court file, but they certainly exist in electronic form in the Court’s electronic record of the proceeding. Such a document remains a “document in the proceeding” (cf r 2.32) and part of the “records of the Registry” (cf r 2.31).

11 The applicant submits that there is no legal requirement on the Court to retain documents once any and all appeals have been determined, or no appeal is brought within the applicable periods. On that basis, it submits that materials can simply be ordered to be removed from the court file once any and all appeals are finally disposed of. Those submissions do not engage with the circumstances in which documents can be removed from the court file or otherwise deleted or removed from the Court’s records.

12 It is to be observed that the proposed orders speak of prohibiting disclosure and publication. I apprehend that what is really at stake is that the applicant wishes to ensure that the Nation Reports, which are part of the evidence tendered in the principal case and which is for that reason in the Court’s records, not be disclosed by the Court to any third party. The applicant’s concern is not that the parties to the proceeding, all of which have the reports, will disseminate them further, and no order is sought that would operate against a non-party by prohibiting it from publishing information in the reports.

13 Having regard to the definitions of “non-publication order” and “suppression order” in s 37AA of the FCA Act, what is really sought is a suppression order – an order prohibiting or restricting the disclosure of information. More specifically, it is disclosure from the Court’s records which is sought to be prevented.

14 The basis on which suppression is sought is s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act, ie “the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”.

The cultural knowledge and consequences of disclosure

15 The applicant does not specifically set out the parameters of what comprises First Nations “cultural knowledge” in the Nation Reports. However, the Court was provided with an additional colour-coded copy of volume 3 of the court book indicating passages pressed for suppression in accordance with Amended Annexure 1. In short compass, the types of information indicated as being cultural knowledge include the history, stories, practices, laws, customs, spiritual beliefs and community concerns (environmental, economic, social and health) specific to consulted First Nations, and the identities of and quotations from participants providing that information. That aligns with the definition of “First Nations Cultural Knowledge” included in the contract signed between the State and its engaged consultants who undertook the consultation process documented in the reports: “Accumulated knowledge which encompasses spiritual relationships, relationships with the natural environment and the sustainable use of natural resources, and relationships between people which are reflected in language, narrative, social organisation, values, beliefs and cultural laws and customs.”

16 The cultural knowledge was obtained by NSW as part of preparing its FRWRP. As part of NSW’s statutory consultation requirements, the State commenced a program in cooperation with the applicant (MLDRIN) and NBAN which engaged consultants to contact each First Nation in the Murray-Darling Basin. Indigenous participants signed data use agreements regulating the terms on which the information would be received. Participants had the understanding that their information would be collected only for use as part of the water resource plan consultation and further disclosure would not occur. The contemplation of the special nature of cultural knowledge by the consultants (as evidenced in the terms of the agreements and the consulting contracts) at the time also support the view that this was a mutual understanding between First Nations participants and the State. The information gathered by the consultants was compiled in the Nation Reports, copies of which were then provided to the participating First Nations and, as mentioned, later annexed to the Central Document in the FRWRP that was given by NSW to the Authority and then to the Minister.

17 Affidavit evidence provided by Mr Fred Hooper, a Senior Traditional Owner of the Murrawarri Nation, makes clear that Murrawarri participants in the water resource plan consultation process would not have participated without confidentiality protections in place. Similarly, the affidavit evidence of Aunty Alice Williams, an Elder of the Wolgalu Nation, emphasises the importance to her and other Wolgalu persons of keeping the Nation’s cultural information non-public, especially where that information could be used for competing native title claims. I find that people of other First Nations consulted by NSW for the water resource plan process would more than likely feel similarly about disclosure of their cultural knowledge as identified in the colour-coded volume 3 of the court book.

18 Further, the affidavit of Ms Lana Hartwig, a Senior Project and Research Officer at MLDRIN, establishes that the objective of consultation would be impeded were cultural knowledge to be disclosed. The consequences would include erosion of the trust of Indigenous participants in consultation processes thereby preventing effective consultation from taking place in the future, and the exposure of identified participants to reputational damage and social retribution, as well as increased risk of destruction of cultural sites. The tenor of the evidence is that suppression is an indispensable requirement of the State’s engagement with Indigenous persons as part of its water management consultations. NSW’s position, by reference to its own evidence, is that consultation would be impaired without suppression orders. I find that First Nations people would be discouraged from participating in future consultation processes were the information in the Nation Reports to be made public from the Court’s records.

19 Thus, the evidence establishes the following propositions. First, the identified information is of an inherently sensitive and confidential nature from the perspective of First Nations participants in the consultation process. Secondly, that information was generally given under the understanding, and at times under a contractual commitment by NSW or its consultants, that the information was given confidentially and that that confidence would be maintained. Thirdly, if the identified information was to be made public the willingness of First Nations to engage in consultative processes with NSW and possibly other States and organs of government in the future (whether or not relating to the water management regime) would be substantially undermined. Moreover, there would be a considerable loss of trust by First Nations in NSW and possibly also in other States and organs of government at a broader level.

20 The applicant submits that non-disclosure of the cultural knowledge the subject of the proposed orders is necessary within the meaning of s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act either or both because of the inherently sensitive and confidential nature of cultural knowledge and because public disclosure is likely to “stultify the operation and purposes” of ss 10.52 and 10.53 of the Basin Plan 2012 (Cth), citing Chief Executive Officer of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v TAB Ltd (No 4) [2017] FCA 1532 at [19] per Perram J.

21 TAB Ltd was a very different case. The objective of the suppression orders there was to avoid stultifying the aims of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), whereby publication of the confidential information would enable  individuals to “circumvent, avoid or influence the processes and systems” implemented by TAB Ltd and its related entities to mitigate the money laundering and terrorism financing risks attending the wagering industry, in accordance with their statutory obligations (at [16]). Albeit tenuously, one can see there the link between the “operations and purposes” that were sought to be preserved and the administration of justice. There is no such link in the present case between the Water Act and related legislative instruments such as the Basin Plan and the administration of justice. It is therefore necessary to reason from first principles.

Principles

22 The simplest way to protect disclosure of the information in the present case would be to make an order under r 2.32(3) of the FCR that the Nation Reports and unredacted copies of the other documents are “confidential”. Under that rule, a person who is not a party to the proceeding would then not be entitled to inspect those documents.

23 However, once the Nation Reports were tendered in evidence in open court, in order to make such an order derogating from the principles of open justice the Court would have to be satisfied that a ground for suppression in s 37AG(1) was established, relevantly that the “confidentiality” order is necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. That is the position on the authority of Ferguson v Tasmanian Cricket Association [2021] FCA 1507 at [8] per Mortimer J; Ferguson v Tasmanian Cricket Association (No 2) [2022] FCA 125; 494 ALR 262 at [6] per Bromberg J; Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 at [44] and [91] per Jagot J. There is some debate in other cases about the soundness of the requirement of the establishment of a ground under s 37AG(1) before making a confidentiality order under r 2.32(3), particularly prior to the relevant information having been disclosed in open court rather than thereafter. See Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lee [2022] FCA 1307 at [19]-[20] per Bromwich J; Saw v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2024] FCA 1210; 305 FCR 340 at [24]-[27] per Perram J; Vardy v Titan Cranes and Rigging Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1410 at [34]-[44] per Shariff J. That debate is not engaged in this case because the case does not concern that earlier period.

24 Since the Nation Reports and other documents were received or relied on in open court, the applicant accepts that it must be established that it is “necessary” in order to “prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice” for a suppression order to be made. The applicant accepts that the weight of authority requires that also for a confidentiality order under r 2.32(3). It is therefore to that requirement that attention must be addressed.

25 Speaking broadly to the importance of open justice, French CJ in Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 stated it is “critical to the maintenance of public confidence in the courts” (at [20]). As mentioned, the suppression and non-publication power in s 37AF of the FCA Act, however, is a necessary departure from that high principle.

26 The considerations involved in the making of an order under s 37AF “are fairly well settled”: Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; 275 FCR 377 at [7] per Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ.

27 The Court must always “take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice”: FCA Act, s 37AE. As mentioned, s 37AG(1)(a) of the FCA Act turns on whether the order would be “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. The High Court in Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; 240 CLR 651 at [30] (Hogan v ACC) identified that “necessary” is “a strong word” and that “the administration of justice” is inherently tied to the exercise of federal judicial power, “a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest”.

28 Consequently, the onus of persuading the Court to make a suppression order has been described as “a very heavy one”: Computer Interchange Pty Ltd v Microsoft Corporation [1999] FCA 198; 88 FCR 438 at [16] per Madgwick J. As Edelman J stated in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741 at [8], the order “must be necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice, not merely that it is desirable to address a potential prejudice to the administration of justice” (emphasis in original). To this end, “[m]ere embarrassment or annoyance will not suffice” (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 12) [2013] FCA 533 at [7] per Perram J), nor “inconvenience, annoyance or unreasonable or groundless fears” (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 607; 331 ALR 68 at [30] per Foster J).

Consideration

29 On the protection of cultural knowledge from disclosure, Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 868; 305 ALR 1 in the native title context is instructive. Here, a suppression order was sought over certain anthropological material filed on behalf of the native title claimants. That material included what claim group members told an expert about “families, kinship, traditional boundaries and places, aspects of the Wardirba [custom], exercise of rights in country, dangerous places, religious beliefs and practices, aspects of Law business, apical ancestors and the use of some resources” (at [1986]). There was evidence to indicate that the Banjima people did not like to reveal “cultural or customary information”, with “far reaching social and spiritual consequences” for improper transmission (at [1999]-[2000]). Justice Barker observed (at [2032]):

In the circumstances of parties who are claimants in a native title determination proceeding, and who are, by the law which governs proof of native title, obliged to reveal customary knowledge in order to establish that they are members of a vital society which remains connected to its traditional country by its traditional laws and customs, there is every possibility that what is customarily secret to, or held confidentially by, certain elders (with the respect and understanding of other members of that society) will need to be revealed to the court and other parties to the proceeding. There may be considered a public interest in continuing to protect such information nonetheless, as it is that very information that gives life and meaning to the society for whose advantage the Parliament has enacted the NTA. To violate the confidentiality of such information, or to render useless the customary processes by which such information or knowledge is held and controlled, would be calculated to undo the society and so the purpose of the proceeding to which it relates.

30 His Honour ultimately declined to make the order sought as it was not considered necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice (at [2040]-[2041]). Where there had been “public discussion in open court of much of the evidence the claimants now seek to protect”, there was little utility in the order being made (at [2042]). See also Booth (on behalf of the Gunaikurnai Native Title Claim Group) v Victoria [2022] FCA 1395 at [41]-[43] per Murphy J.

31 The information at issue in this proceeding was tendered in open court, but it was not available to anyone other than the parties because of the interim suppression orders that operated at that stage. Also, counsel were careful not to refer to the relevant information in their oral submissions in such a way as to reveal it. It was also not necessary to refer to the cultural knowledge in the reasons for judgment – indeed, because of the way in which the case was decided the Nation Reports ultimately played no role at all in the reasoning of the Court. In the circumstances, the information has not been disclosed publicly in the proceeding. The question now, of course, is whether that situation should continue to be protected.

32 This Court regularly makes suppression orders in respect of commercial-in-confidence information. The reason for doing so was expressed by Perram J in Motorola Solutions Inc v Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 17 at [9] as follows: “There are cogent reasons for this which have variously been described in those cases, but they are generally associated with preserving the integrity of the litigious process, likely to be jeopardised if commercial competitors could benefit from court ordered production of trade secrets by parties to a suit.” Many of the cases in this area refer back to what was said by Bowen CJ in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parrish [1980] FCA 33; 29 ALR 228 at 235:

It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the very proceedings before the court should not be permitted to destroy or seriously depreciate the value of such confidential information. If it were otherwise, not only might the parties and members of the public consider the court was not paying proper regard to confidentiality but also it might open the way to abuse.

33 The position was explained as follows by Jagot J in Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (which was accepted as correct in Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 22; 296 FCR 272 at [63] per Thawley, Stewart and Abraham JJ):

[84]     Sections 37AE-37AL of the Court Act recognise that in order to do justice it is sometimes necessary that information filed or given in a proceeding not be disclosed or published. This is because justice will be undermined if people are not free to seek the exercise of judicial power confident that, amongst other things, their safety and the safety of others will not be compromised, that national or international security will not be prejudiced, and that the administration of justice will not itself be prejudiced: s 37AG(1). The administration of justice may be prejudiced in a variety of ways. If, for example, people cannot come to a court confident that some kinds of information can be protected from disclosure if necessary (such as commercially confidential information valuable to a person or a third party, or sensitive information about a person’s health, or personal information about parties or third parties of no more than prurient interest to others) then public confidence in and access to justice may itself be undermined.

...

[86]     While “mere embarrassment, inconvenience or annoyance will not suffice to ground an application for suppression or non-publication” (Keyzer [v La Trobe University [2019] FCA 646] at [29]) and the principle of open justice, that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, is fundamental (Scott v Scott [1913] UKHL 2; [1913] AC 417), the principle has never been absolute. The principle has always yielded to contrary necessity (an appropriately high bar specified in s 37AG(1), in contrast to the mere convenience or preference of parties).

34 In my view, the present case is analogous to cases of commercial-in-confidence and personal information. There is no reason why the Court should treat cultural knowledge as less deserving of protection than those categories – as explained in Banjima referred to above, there is a very high public value placed in the maintenance of the confidentiality of such information. MLDRIN, representing the interests of its members being many of the First Nations that participated in the consultations and in that process disclosed to NSW on a confidential basis their cultural knowledge, commenced the proceeding. At the time it did not know that the Commonwealth’s defence of the proceeding would entail the Commonwealth tendering the Nation Reports. When it discovered that that was going to occur it first sought to persuade the Commonwealth not to tender the reports or to limit their tender, and when that failed it sought to adjourn the proceeding in order to consult the affected Nations. As explained above, I refused the adjournment on the basis that the information could be protected from disclosure in the hearing, so the hearing went ahead and interim orders under s 37AI were made. In effect, MLDRIN was at a choice point – it could continue its proceeding in the vindication of its rights to review the decision of the Authority under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and risk the disclosure of the information by the Commonwealth, or it could discontinue its proceeding.

35 That is just the kind of circumstance that enlivens the need to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice by making a suppression order – to not make the order would undermine or detract from the ability of the applicant to enjoy its rights to pursue justice in this Court and it would undermine the confidence that members or sectors of the public have in the Court and its processes. The resulting prejudice from disclosure goes beyond mere reputational or commercial harm immediate to the applicant from engaging in proceedings, being “an inevitable part of open justice”: cf Lee at [90].

36 Being satisfied that the ground for a suppression order in s 37AG(1)(a) has been established, namely that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the power to make an order under r 2.32(3) is enlivened. I will therefore order that the Nation Reports not be disclosed to any third party seeking access to them on the court file.

37 Insofar as the secondary documents are concerned, being documents that include extracts of confidential cultural knowledge from the Nation Reports, the simplest way to deal with them is to make an order under r 2.32(3) that they are confidential and must not be disclosed to third parties unless the relevant parts of them are redacted.

38 The multi-coloured versions of the Nation Reports in the annotated copy of volume 3 of the court book were not tendered or relied on in open court and are not on the court file as they were not filed and they are not retained as documents in the proceeding so no non-party can get access to such copies of them as may exist. Therefore, no order is required in respect of them.

39 Recognising that non-parties to the proceeding may have an interest in having access to the documents, or the parts thereof, that I am satisfied should be the subject of orders under r 2.32(3), I will provide a general liberty to apply on reasonable notice to persons showing sufficient interest to vary the orders.

40 Because the order is made under r 2.32(3) and not s 37AF, the requirement under s 37AJ that the duration for which the order operates, which must be specified by reference to a fixed or ascertainable period or by reference to the occurrence of a specified future event, does not apply. Rather, the order is intended to operate in perpetuity. There is justification for that in the evidence, most notably that much of the information has been passed on over generations and will continue to be passed on to future generations. For that reason, there is no fixed, ascertainable or specified future event with respect to which the order can cease to operate. If I considered that I was obliged to put a limit on the operation of the order, I would provide for it to operate for a period of 10 years subject to further order. That would enable the applicant or another interested party to apply to extend the order.

41 No party sought costs.

Associate:

Dated:    29 August 2025

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES