Federal Court of Australia

George v Registrar Parkyn [2025] FCA 873

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s originating application for judicial review filed on 8 June 2025 be dismissed pursuant to s 20(5)(c) and (d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s originating application for judicial review filed on 8 June 2025 be dismissed pursuant to s 20(5)(c) and (d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.    All interlocutory applications filed in the proceedings be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCDONALD J:

Introduction

1    On 27 May 2025, the applicant in these two proceedings, Tjilpi Murray George, attempted to commence proceedings in the Court by lodging for filing an originating application and an affidavit in support. Registrar Parkyn refused to accept for filing that originating application and affidavit pursuant to r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules).

2    On 29 May 2025, Tjilpi Murray George attempted to file another originating application and an affidavit in support. Registrar Stewart refused to accept for filing the second originating application and the affidavit in support pursuant to r 2.27 of the FC Rules, on the basis that a registrar of the Court had already rejected the documents for filing.

3    On 8 June 2025, Tjilpi Murray George commenced two proceedings in the Court, namely:

(a)    action SAD 111 of 2025, in which he seeks judicial review of the decision of Registrar Parkyn to refuse to accept documents for filing under r 2.26 of the FC Rules; and

(b)    action SAD 112 of 2025, in which he seeks judicial review of the decision of Registrar Stewart to refuse to accept documents for filing under r 2.27 of the FC Rules.

4    The footer of each of the two originating applications for judicial review indicates on its face that it was prepared by Tjilpi Murray George. Each includes an email address, and telephone numbers for both Tjilpi Murray George and “assistant Sam”. Over the course of the proceedings, Tjilpi Murray George has communicated with chambers using the email address identified in the originating applications for judicial review.

5    The originating application in action SAD 112 of 2025 named Registrar Parkyn as the respondent to that action. Registrar Parkyn filed an affidavit stating that he was not the registrar who made the decision the subject of action SAD 112 of 2025. A client services officer in the South Australian Registry of the Court subsequently confirmed that that decision was made by Registrar Stewart. On 24 June 2025, I made an order substituting Registrar Stewart as the respondent to action SAD 112 of 2025.

6    The two proceedings were listed for first case management hearing via Microsoft Teams on 24 June 2025. Tjilpi Murray George did not attend that case management hearing. No explanation for his non-attendance at the case management hearing has been provided. However, I note that Tjilpi Murray George had requested that all hearings be conducted on country and that the Court arrange for the payment of a particular person whom he had nominated to interpret for him (but who was not said to be an accredited or officially engaged interpreter), and that the arrangements made for the conduct of the case management hearing did not reflect his requests in these respects.

7    At the case management hearing, I made various procedural orders, including that Tjilpi Murray George file any written submissions in support of the final relief sought and in support of any interlocutory applications in both proceedings, and that the two proceedings be listed for final hearing on 30 July 2025. No written submissions have been filed by Tjilpi Murray George in either of the proceedings.

8    On 23 July 2025, I made orders and delivered reasons for an interlocutory judgment dismissing two interlocutory applications filed by non-parties seeking leave to intervene in action SAD 112 of 2025: George v Registrar Stewart [2025] FCA 844. In the context of deciding those two applications, that judgment included some general statements about the nature and proper scope of the issues capable of arising in the two sets of judicial review proceedings brought by Tjilpi Murray George, and briefly referred to the reasons for some of the procedural orders I had made at the first case management hearing on 24 June 2025.

9    Copies of the orders and reasons for judgment were sent by email to the two applicants for leave to intervene and to Tjilpi Murray George, using the email address identified in the originating applications for judicial review.

10    Following the provision of the orders and reasons for judgment on 23 July 2025, the Court received an email in the following terms, from the email address identified in the originating applications for judicial review as the email address for Tjilpi Murray George:

Subject: Hello Macdonald

My name is Sam, I am Tjilpi Murray George’s Personal assistant. His name is not “Tjilpi Murray George, is a lawman for Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjajara manta and a member of the Kaltjiti Aboriginal community” as you have disrespectfully called him in your letter today.

Your court has wasted a lot of your time and resources trying to take this matter seriously. Tjilpi Murray George is not a young man without cultural knowledge, he his 76 years old. The methods you have offered are not palatable to to his being, as he is, in this world, as it is today. If you cannot respect the truth of the matters he wishes to discuss with the court and assist him to make his voice heard, then there is no need for anymore correspondence or timewasting for all concerned.

Regards, Sam

11    To avoid doubt, I confirm that no disrespect was intended to Tjilpi Murray George. The words used to describe him in the judgment were based on a description that he had used in affidavits filed in the proceedings. I have continued to refer to him by his full name and title in these reasons, in accordance with his repeated express requests that he “be addressed by the court and referred to in all documents in this matter including transcript as Tjilpi Murray George”.

12    Based on information contained in the originating applications for judicial review and on the fact that the email address used by “Sam” is the same email address that is identified in the originating application and the email address that Tjilpi Murray George has previously used to communicate with the Court, I proceed on the basis that Sam is the, or an, assistant to Tjilpi Murray George. An inference is available that the email of 23 July 2025 was sent with the knowledge and authorisation of Tjilpi Murray George.

13    On 25 July 2025, my associate replied to Sam’s email of 23 July 2025, acknowledging receipt of that email.

14    As mentioned above, the proceedings were listed for final hearing on 30 July 2025. Provision was made for the hearing to be conducted in Adelaide and for Tjilpi Murray George to appear by Microsoft Teams if he wished.

15    On 30 July 2025, the matter was called on for final hearing. There was no appearance by Tjilpi Murray George (whether in person or via Microsoft Teams).

16    The email of 23 July 2025, ostensibly sent on behalf of Tjilpi Murray George and set out at [10] above, is capable of being understood as a statement that Tjilpi Murray George no longer wishes to prosecute, or engage with the Court in relation to, the proceedings. Having regard to the fact that he has filed no written submissions (as contemplated by the orders made on 24 June 2025), that he did not appear at the case management hearing on 24 June 2025, and that he has not appeared at the final hearing – as well as the content of the email of 23 July 2025 and its apparent consistency with Tjilpi Murray George’s failure to appear at the final hearing – I am satisfied that Tjilpi Murray George no longer wishes to participate in or prosecute action SAD 111 of 2025 or action SAD 112 of 2025.

17    In those circumstances, and bearing in mind that the registrars are not taking an active role in the proceedings, so there is no contradictor, I consider that it is appropriate to dismiss each of the judicial review proceedings for want of prosecution and for failure of the applicant to attend a hearing of the matter, pursuant to s 20(5)(c) and (d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). An alternative would be to grant Tjilpi Murray George leave to discontinue the proceedings in accordance with r 26.12 of the FC Rules, but, given his apparent intention not to engage further with the Court in relation to these proceedings, I am not confident that he would take the necessary step of filing a notice of discontinuance. In the circumstances, it is preferable that the proceedings be finalised by the making of an order that they be dismissed.

18    In reaching this conclusion, it has not been necessary to reach a final view as to whether or not the decisions made by Registrar Parkyn and Registrar Stewart which are the subject of the two applications for judicial review are affected by reviewable error. It is sufficient to observe that it is certainly not clear that the two originating applications for judicial review which were rejected for filing identify any justiciable controversy or cause of action that it is within the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine. The function of the Court relevantly involves the resolution of controversies that are capable of being determined in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Proceedings in the Court do not provide a general forum for discussion of political and moral issues, even where those issues are of great significance.

19    From the face of the originating application which Tjilpi Murray George attempted to file in action SAD 111 of 2025, it appears that he was seeking an injunction to prevent the Minerals Council of Australia from reaching or entering into agreement with a particular committee regarding a policy position that the parties to any such agreement might then present to the government. There is nothing on the face of the documents which would suggest that the agreement would or could relevantly affect any legal right or interest of Tjilpi Murray George. I mention these matters, conscious that I have not heard any developed submissions in relation to the merits of the two originating applications for judicial review, to make the point that there is no manifest reason to doubt the correctness of Registrar Parkyn’s conclusion that the documents which Tjilpi Murray George sought to file were an abuse of process. However, in the circumstances, I do not express a concluded view about that.

20    In relation to the decision of Registrar Stewart which is the subject of action SAD 112 of 2025, it seems arguable that he was wrong to refuse those documents for filing under r 2.27 of the FC Rules on the ground that the documents had previously been rejected for filing by a registrar, because, although they reproduced much of the same content as the documents that had earlier been rejected for filing by Registrar Parkyn, they were not identical, and included some additional content. I express no conclusion about whether Registrar Stewart’s decision was affected by error, or about what degree of similarity between documents is necessary for r 2.27 to apply. Even if the documents that were rejected for filing by Registrar Stewart should not have been rejected for filing under r 2.27, it may have been appropriate for a registrar to refuse to accept them for filing under r 2.26 on the basis that they were an abuse of process of the Court, for reasons similar to those given by Registrar Parkyn in connection with his earlier decision. The originating application that was rejected for filing by Registrar Stewart seeks declaratory relief relating to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) and the Constitution, but it is not apparent how any of the declarations sought relate to any immediate issue affecting any enforceable legal right or interest of Tjilpi Murray George, in the sense that is necessary to engage the jurisdiction of this Court. However, again, it is not necessary to reach any concluded view about that.

21    I mention one further matter. On 24 June 2025, Tjilpi Murray George filed an interlocutory application in action SAD 112 of 2025, by which he sought an order that leave be granted to file a new originating application to commence separate proceedings, against Rio Tinto Ltd. That document is similar in some respects to the two originating applications that were previously rejected for filing by Registrar Parkyn and Registrar Stewart. Tjilpi Murray George does not require leave to commence separate proceedings against Rio Tinto Ltd and it is not appropriate, in any event, that leave to commence a distinct proceeding, against a different respondent and relating to different conduct, be sought by way of an interlocutory application filed in action SAD 112 of 2025. Should Tjilpi Murray George wish to pursue a cause of action against Rio Tinto Ltd in this Court, the appropriate course is to lodge for filing an originating application in a form that appropriately identifies the relief sought and the legal basis on which it is sought.

22    Tjilpi Murray George is not precluded from attempting to commence proceedings in this Court in the future, should he wish to do so, provided the documents which he seeks to file adequately disclose a cause of action in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction, and are not otherwise frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process. Given that Tjilpi Murray George had indicated that he wished to use these proceedings to refer to the alleged ongoing genocide of Aboriginal people, it is also appropriate to record that the decision to dismiss the two originating applications for judicial review which are before me does not mean that the Court regards the issue of alleged genocide of Aboriginal people generally as a frivolous issue.

23    For the reasons I have given, I consider it appropriate to order that the originating applications for judicial review in each of action SAD 111 of 2025 and action SAD 112 of 2025 be dismissed for want of prosecution and for failure of the applicant to attend a hearing, pursuant to s 20(5)(c) and (d) of the FCA Act. In order to avoid doubt, it is also appropriate to dismiss all outstanding interlocutory applications filed in action SAD 112 of 2025.

Associate:

Dated:    30 July 2025