Federal Court of Australia

Azad v Avant Insurance Limited (No 2) [2025] FCA 853

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Leave to amend in terms of the proposed statement of claim dated 30 May 2025 is refused.

2.    The proceedings are dismissed.

3.    There be liberty to the respondent to apply as to any order for costs of the proceedings.

4.    The applicant shall obtain the leave of a judge of this Court before commencing any further proceedings against the respondent or any person alleged to have been an officer, employee, agent or representative of the respondent in respect of matters that have been the subject of the present proceedings, namely his indemnity insurance arrangements with Avant Insurance Limited.

5.    Any application for leave pursuant to these orders shall be made by filing an originating application seeking leave to commence proceedings together with an affidavit in support attaching a draft of the proposed originating process and a draft statement of claim together with a written submission in support of the application for leave of no more than 10 pages.

6.    Unless otherwise ordered, any application for leave shall be determined on the papers.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLVIN J:

1    Australian courts do not start with a grievance and then direct the investigations and inquiries to be made. There are no examining judges for civil claims. Instead, the procedures adopted by the courts allow each party to present their case to the judge. Each party must comply with procedures that are designed to ensure fairness to both sides in the case. In modern practice, this is done through disclosure and a disciplined focus on what is genuinely the extent of the legal dispute. Although the system is described as adversarial, proceedings are conducted on the basis that all litigants and their representatives have a duty to communicate with other parties and the Court with due formality and civility.

2    The adversarial system of dispute resolution has a long common law history. It brings forth both sides of the case which can then be decided by an independent judge who has not been involved in the inquiries as to what happened or the decisions as to how to formulate the claim or identify possible defences. Each side presents to the judge its evidence as to the facts and its arguments as to the law. The judge then determines the issues that are genuinely in dispute and decides what, if any relief, should be granted.

3    Consequently, there are rules of procedure which require the parties to give notice of the nature of their case before the hearing so each side can prepare. Indeed, the adversarial system depends upon those procedures. The task of the judge is to supervise those procedures to make sure there is fairness as between the parties and to confine the final hearing to what is necessary to decide the case, ultimately adjudicating between the competing cases.

4    The process begins with the applicant party explaining the nature of the case that it seeks to advance, both as to the factual and legal basis for the claim. The applicant must also specify the terms of the orders that the Court is asked to make if the case is successful. It is the responsibility of the applicant to be able to describe a valid form of legal claim and of the defendant to identify the parts of the claim that are admitted and the parts that are denied and to otherwise describe the basis for a valid form of legal defence.

5    Different procedures are adopted by individual courts as to what the applicant must do to commence (or plead) a case. The documents which must be provided have different names, but they have three things in common. First, the applicant must provide a clear and concise statement setting out the essential aspects of what is alleged to have happened that is relevant to the claim. Second, the applicant must specify why those events, if proven to have occurred, mean that there is a recognised basis for a legal claim (often referred to as a cause of action). Third, the applicant must specify the relief that is sought. Importantly, the relief must be of a kind that the law recognises as being available to a person who demonstrates the existence of the alleged cause of action. If the applicant says that the same underlying controversy gives rise to claims against more than one respondent, then each of the three requirements must be met for each respondent.

6    The responding party is entitled to insist upon the applicant meeting these obligations before the case proceeds. Unless and until they are met, there is great unfairness to the respondent in being able to prepare its own case in response. This is sometimes explained in terms that the respondent is entitled to know the case that it has to meet. What the respondent is entitled to know is the essence of the factual and legal basis for the case advanced by the applicant, not every aspect of the evidence and arguments that will be advanced at the final hearing. The same obligation falls upon a respondent when it comes to the nature of its defence.

7    The true burden of these procedures is to set out a clear and concise statement of the party's case. Detail is no substitute for clarity. The final hearing is the time for detail. The claim together with the defence or answer defines the extent of the controversy. These 'pleadings' are also a means by which to scrutinise whether an applicant party has a proper basis to bring a claim and the responding party has an arguable defence. If not, the proceedings can be brought to an end at an early stage, thereby avoiding the need for a final hearing.

8    Parties are usually assisted in meeting these obligations by competent lawyers. In cases where parties are unable to obtain legal representation or where they exercise their right to personally conduct proceedings, the Court will explain those obligations. When parties conduct their own case, they are not expected to be able to plead their case with the same precision as a skilled lawyer. Some leeway, consistent with the fair conduct of the proceedings, will be allowed to a litigant in person. Nevertheless, the responsibility of an applicant to plead a case and for a respondent to state the nature of the defence must still be met before the case can proceed. The fair conduct of adversarial proceedings depends upon the parties discharging their responsibility in that regard. If an applicant is unable or unwilling to do so, the case cannot proceed. The failure to meet the obligation to clearly and concisely state the nature of the case that the applicant seeks to allege means that the foundation for the adversarial nature of the process has not been established.

9    It is a very considerable burden upon a responding party to be required by the Court to attend and respond to a claim brought by an applicant. It is a very serious matter for any party to invoke the Court's jurisdiction and thereby require a respondent to answer a claim. If an applicant is unable to explain to the Court the nature of the case and demonstrate its proper legal foundation then it is only fair for the respondent to be released from that burden. Consequently, in such instances, the proceedings will be dismissed. The dismissal is a consequence of the demonstrated failure to meet a fundamental procedural obligation that is essential to the fair conduct of proceedings, namely clearly and concisely stating a recognisable basis for a valid form of legal claim that is justiciable by the Court.

The present proceedings

10    Dr Darius Azad is a medical practitioner. He arranged professional indemnity insurance with Avant Insurance Limited. It is a kind of insurance that Dr Azad must have in place to be able to practice as a doctor. The provision of the insurance is the subject of a detailed system of statutory regulation.

11    The first policy that Dr Azad entered into with Avant was for coverage for the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022. Since then, Dr Azad appears to have been involved in a number of disputes that have caused him to seek indemnity from Avant in respect of legal costs. Issues have arisen as to whether there is liability to indemnify under the policies. Those matters have escalated and have led to Dr Azad making many claims about alleged failure by Avant to comply with aspects of the system of regulation. Dr Azad has not practiced medicine since April 2023.

12    In June 2024, Dr Azad commenced proceedings in this Court against Avant. At that time, he also sought urgent relief requiring Avant to pay him the amount of $10,000. Dr Azad explained to the Court that he had brought the application for urgent relief to prevent his impending homelessness and complete financial collapse. In effect, on the basis of his difficult personal circumstances, Dr Azad sought to enter judgment on part of his claim. He offered a personal undertaking to set-off the amount against the overall judgment that he expected to obtain against Avant in due course. His application for urgent relief was not accepted because no basis for an interlocutory order of that kind was demonstrated.

13    Dr Azad has conducted the proceedings as a litigant in person. He has resisted offers to refer his case for pro bono assistance. As will emerge, he has filed a number of documents in the proceedings. He has also appeared in person at a number of case management hearings. Copies of transcripts of those hearings have been provided to Dr Azad by order of the Court to assist him in the conduct of the proceedings.

14    Dr Azad is articulate and has displayed considerable industry. However, at times he has been intent on seeking to direct the way in which Avant should deal with the various claims that he has made rather than upon meeting his obligation to explain those claims and present supporting documentation. He has also been intent on pursuing claims on the basis that there is a need for the Court to provide some form of declaratory relief for the benefit of medical practitioners about the way the statutory scheme in respect of medical indemnity insurance applies to insurers. This has led Dr Azad to raise many allegations against Avant. Most of those claims allege contraventions of various statutory provisions. At times, some of the claims have been articulated as criminal conduct, or conduct in the nature of criminal conduct. Some of Dr Azad's correspondence has manifested personal animosity. More recently, Dr Azad has sought to include a number of officers and employees of Avant as respondents to the proceedings.

15    On a number of occasions, explanations have been provided to Dr Azad as to what is required to be included in a statement of claim. Various extensions of time have been given to provide Dr Azad with an opportunity to provide a statement of claim. Matters culminated in an order requiring Dr Azad to file and serve a proposed statement of claim that was expressly required to:

(a)    state the key factual matters and events relied upon to support the claim in chronological order and then specify each legal claim raised.

(b)    where the claim is based upon the policy of insurance, specify the provision of the policy relied upon for indemnity and the amount claimed under the policy.

(c)    not include legal argument, reference to legal authorities or lists of statutory provisions.

(d)    not include footnotes.

(e)    be no more than 40 pages and be in 12-point font, with 1.5 line spacing.

In these reasons, I will refer to these matters as the Ordered Pleading Requirements.

16    An order was also made which provided that if there was a failure to file and serve a proposed statement of claim that met the Ordered Pleading Requirements then Avant may move for orders that the proceedings be dismissed.

Avant's dismissal application and summary of outcome

17    On 30 May 2025, a proposed statement of claim was emailed to the Court by Dr Azad. Avant maintained that the document did not comply with the Ordered Pleading Requirements. On 10 June 2025, Avant brought an interlocutory application seeking orders that: (a) leave to file the proposed statement of claim be refused; (b) there be summary dismissal of the entire proceedings, alternatively various parts of the proceedings; and (c) alternatively, there be orders striking-out the whole, or particular paragraphs, of the statement of claim.

18    The summary dismissal application itself was founded upon a raft of alternative grounds that included: (a) claims that the proposed statement of claim did not meet the Ordered Pleading Requirements; (b) claims that the proceedings, alternatively parts of them, have no reasonable prospects of success; (c) claims that the proposed statement of claim, alternatively parts of it, do not disclose any reasonable cause of action; (d) claims that various parts of the proposed statement of claim are frivolous or vexatious; (e) claims that various parts of the proposed statement of claim are an abuse of the process of the Court; and (f) claims that various parts of the proposed statement of claim should not be allowed to be pleaded because they contain material that is scandalous, frivolous and/or vexatious, evasive and/or ambiguous and are likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay.

19    It would require considerable industry and mental gymnastics to deal with each of these alternatives individually. In my view, it is not necessary to do so because this is an obvious case where the whole of the proceedings must be dismissed. My reasons for that view can be summarised as follows:

(1)    the basic requirements to be met in relation to a statement of claim have been explained to Dr Azad on a number of occasions;

(2)    Dr Azad has been afforded ample opportunity to provide a statement of claim that discharges the obligation of any applicant who seeks to advance court proceedings in an adversarial system;

(3)    steps have been taken to assist Dr Azad in formulating any claim that he may have for alleged breach of indemnity in relation to legal costs that he has incurred for which he seeks to be reimbursed, yet Dr Azad has failed to express any coherent legal basis for the alleged failure by Avant to indemnify;

(4)    much of Dr Azad's claim is sought to be advanced as a kind of self-appointed regulator seeking to raise issues for determination that he considers should be addressed by the Court but do not concern any demonstrated basis for legitimate substantive legal controversy as between himself and Avant;

(5)    relatedly, many of the claims concern allegations of contravention that could only be advanced by the regulator under the statutory scheme;

(6)    Dr Azad has been intent upon ensuring the proceedings raise many issues that will take years to resolve;

(7)    despite the explanations that have been provided to Dr Azad, the proposed statement of claim has many obvious deficiencies which mean that it fails to perform the fundamental obligation of a pleading;

(8)    Dr Azad's communications with Avant and his dealings with the Court have displayed an unwillingness to confine the case to any reasonable claim for indemnity; and

(9)    no reasonably arguable basis has been demonstrated for the joinder of the proposed additional respondents.

20    Consequently, as to a very substantial part of the proceedings, I am satisfied that Avant has demonstrated that the proceedings have no reasonable prospects of success. Further, as to the whole of the proposed statement of claim, it is not a proper pleading. It is not expressed in a form that would be a meaningful disclosure of the nature of the case that Avant (and any other respondents) would be required to meet. Therefore, Dr Azad has failed to meet that basic procedural obligation. Finally, aspects of the way in which Dr Azad has approached the proceedings are properly characterised as an abuse of process in the sense that Dr Azad is seeking to use the proceedings as a kind of platform for wide-ranging and sustained complaint rather than as a genuine means of resolving, according to law, a legitimate legal controversy.

21    In the balance of these reasons, I will set out the basis for these conclusions. However, before doing so, I wish to address whether it might have been appropriate for a further opportunity to be afforded to Dr Azad to articulate a much narrower case focussed upon the claims to indemnity that form part of his proposed statement of claim.

Why dismissal is the appropriate form of order

22    As I will explain, it is possible that Dr Azad may be able to plead a much narrower case against Avant in which he advances a properly articulated claim for breach of indemnity. However, despite being encouraged to focus his case in that way, that is not the nature of the case that Dr Azad has sought to advance by these proceedings. Instead, he has consistently sought to use them to advance a litany of complaints and grievances about the way Avant has been communicating with him, the way he says Avant should be conducting its affairs and the way in which insurers like Avant should be required to offer policies of insurance. This amounts to a form of abuse of the Court's process that should not be countenanced.

23    Also, considerable time and expense has undoubtedly been incurred by Avant in seeking to understand and address the broad-ranging form of proceedings that Dr Azad has sought to advance against Avant. There have also been a number of case management hearings in which Avant has been required to participate. In those particular circumstances, it would be unfair to Avant to allow Dr Azad a further opportunity to try and turn these proceedings into a much narrower case about premiums and indemnity. It is more appropriate, in my view, for the present proceedings to be dealt with according to the terms in which they have been maintained by Dr Azad.

24    Also, given the history of the way in which these proceedings have sought to be conducted by Dr Azad, I have no confidence that any further pleading would be appropriately confined and would have the characteristics that I have described at the outset of these reasons.

25    Nevertheless, I consider it appropriate to recognise the possibility that Dr Azad may be able to commence more confined proceedings with appropriate pleadings that focus upon any arguable case that he may have to claim indemnity from Avant in respect of legal costs and disbursements. For that reason, I consider it appropriate to make provision for such a claim subject to leave first being obtained from a judge of this Court.

26    Accordingly, in my view, the appropriate course is for the present proceedings to be dismissed and for orders to be made requiring Dr Azad to obtain the leave of a judge before commencing any further proceedings in this Court against Avant or any of its officers that are in connection with the provision by Avant of medical indemnity insurance. A dismissal is the appropriate order to make clear that the type of proceedings that Dr Azad has sought to pursue are not proceedings that this Court would entertain.

The history of the proceedings

27    The matter first came before me as an application for urgent relief. At that hearing on 13 June 2024, I raised some issues with the form of application that had been used. I also provided a general explanation as to what was required when it came to preparing a claim. The explanation included the following:

The claim needs to say in a concise way what happened, that is, the facts that are relied upon. It needs to say in a concise way what the legal claim is that's being made, that is, the legal basis for the court being able to do anything, because the court only - is not a general grievance procedure. There has to be a matter of legal principle that the court is being asked to apply. And the document needs to say what relief is - that is, the orders that are being asked to have happen. And the document is not to be - at the time of filing the claim, it's not the time to argue the case, refer to law or make submissions. That all comes later in the court process. And including all of those kinds of materials in a claim can make it very difficult to understand and be very burdensome for somebody who receives it.

So a document shouldn't have all of that part of it, and that's one of the issues with your document. So the first issue is it has lots of argument in it rather than the other three things that I've identified, which is what happened in a concise, brief way; secondly, what is the legal basis for your claim in a concise way, that is, what is the legal principle that you are seeking the court to apply; and thirdly, what is the relief being sought? So the first issue is that the document doesn't do those things.

28    Later, I provided some further elaboration to the effect that the claim needed to include a short factual summary rather than argument. It needed to say what happened. I provided the following examples: 'I paid this amount of money on this day, I made a claim for this amount of money, the policy says that this amount of - this type of claim can be paid, but the claim was refused, and I claim the money. So that's what the claim needs to look like'. I then explained:

The purpose of a claim is to be concise and focused upon the particular issue. There may be many things that you're not happy with about how insurance arrangements exist, the general behaviour that you say has occurred in relation to dealing with your claim, but as I say, this court's not a place for grievance where the court supervises what might be thought to be unfair things. It focuses on legal principle, and we do see people in this court who get focused on what they consider to be, and it may be, unfairness that's happening in relation to the way they're being dealt with, or the way things are organised and the way government works or the way big companies work. But at the end of the day, this court requires anyone invoking the claim to be very specific about what they're seeking.

29    On 19 June 2024, Dr Azad lodged a document described as 'Concise Statement of Claims'. The document began with the following statement:

In this case, which I anticipate will be extensive for various reasons, the applicant will structure his argument based on 4 groups of legal provisions

1)    Group A: Statutes regulating the indemnity industry

2)    Group B: Legislations pertinent to this Court

3)    Group C: Laws concerning criminal liabilities

4)    Group D: Common Law provisions

(footnote omitted)

30    What followed was a brief summary of how Dr Azad came to arrange insurance with Avant and a very extensive list of the 'legal provisions' that Avant and its officers were said to have 'violated over the past 3 years'. The document then listed the relief sought which included many pecuniary penalties and claims that there should be 'Sentencing' in respect of alleged criminal liability. The statement also sought an injunction as well as what was described as a 'Premium Adjustment Order'. It also sought aggravated and exemplary damages.

31    Thereafter, the first case management hearing was conducted by Derrington J who has responsibility for the national insurance list. Justice Derrington is located in Queensland and Dr Azad appeared by video-link at the hearing. His Honour asked various questions of Dr Azad to clarify the precise nature of his claim. These questions included whether Dr Azad was claiming some sort of indemnity under a policy of insurance, whether there was a policy of insurance, what kind of insurance was in issue and the total value of Dr Azad's claims.

32    Counsel for Avant sought an order requiring an amended form of proposed pleading so that the precise ambit of the claim could be properly identified and Avant could understand the claims for indemnity that were being made. Justice Derrington proposed a more practical course to enable Avant to determine whether to grant indemnity. His Honour put the matter in the following way:

Surely, the best thing, and I know this isn't sort of following the rules technically, but surely the best thing that we could do is try and crystallise the issues and if Dr Azad will give your client whatever information it needs, then it can decide, and if it decides to indemnify, will do, and if it decides not to, then you will know that it's not and the reasons that it's not, rather than sort of spending money going around that mulberry bush.

33    His Honour also provided some explanation of Court process and procedure to Dr Azad. In that context, his Honour expressed concern that it was not possible to discern the nature of the claim being made by Dr Azad from the form of the pleadings.

34    In the result, Derrington J directed the solicitors for Avant 'to write to [Dr Azad] setting out in detail the information which [Avant] requires in order for it to make a determination on any claims which have been made to it by [Dr Azad]'. His Honour also directed Dr Azad to provide the information sought in the letter by a specified date 'to the extent he is able to do so'. The case management hearing was otherwise adjourned.

35    During the case management hearing, it was suggested by counsel for Avant that it may be an appropriate case for a referral for pro bono assistance, but Dr Azad was opposed to that course.

36    On 5 August 2024, the letter contemplated by the directions made by Derrington J was sent by Avant to Dr Azad. It began by noting that Avant had offered Dr Azad the opportunity to discuss the claims for which he alleged he was entitled to indemnity from Avant to see if a resolution could be reached, but that he was not prepared to do so. The letter referred to a list of the claims that Avant understood from previous communications had been made by Dr Azad. The letter set out the material that Avant needed to assess the claims made by Dr Azad. It did so subject to a number of reservations which reflected the 'claims made' nature of the relevant policies. It also said:

your failure to pay your full premium for the 2022/2023 and any part of your premiums for the 2023/2024 and 2024/2025 policy years means that Avant has no liability to indemnify you for any claim that was first made during, or arose out of facts or circumstances notified, during those policy years. You have a total accrued debt of $13,700.88 …

37    I mention the issue of unpaid premiums because it is one of the matters referred to in the proposed statement of claim.

38    The letter from Avant conformed to the direction made by Derrington J and set out in clear terms the information that was required for Avant to consider whether to indemnify as to each of the matters identified in the list.

39    Despite the direction by Derrington J for Dr Azad to reply, there was no response to the letter from Dr Azad prior to the adjourned case management hearing which took place on 2 September 2024. At that hearing, Dr Azad said that he did not have time to read the letter but that he was going to respond after the matter was transferred to Western Australia. He made reference to an aspect of his personal circumstances by way of explanation. He objected to Derrington J being the judge in the matter. Dr Azad described Avant as a 'criminal organisation' that was relying on time wasting.

40    His Honour directed that Dr Azad respond to the letter from Avant by 23 September 2024 and that Avant then provide a reply by 7 October 2024 in relation to its position on entitlement to coverage under any policies that it had issued. Dr Azad said the matter would need a statement of claim and that a concise statement would not be enough. As to the duration of the proceedings, Dr Azad said:

The matter is not going to be resolved instantly. We are in court to seeing each other for another two to three years, I promise you, because that's … the way that I deal with matters, and you will have seen me. It has been four years that I have been in this legal battle. It's not going to resolve. And I am going to be … in court like this for two to three years. The matter is very extensive.

41    The matter was then allocated to my docket. A case management hearing was held on 24 October 2024. At that time, Dr Azad again sought a form of order that part of his claim be paid to him based upon his personal circumstances. As to that interlocutory application, I explained that the Court does not have a jurisdiction to require a payment of that kind. The interlocutory application was dismissed.

42    As to the substantive part of the case, I raised the possibility that the parts of the claim in which Dr Azad sought reimbursement on the basis of alleged failure to indemnify be heard first so as to prioritise Dr Azad's concern to seek financial payment on that basis. However, in response, Dr Azad said that he wanted the case to be 'very expanded'. He said that he did not want the case to reach a very fast conclusion because it was very important to him for reasons that were not financial. He said it was a very important case. Dr Azad wished to proceed by statement of claim. He said it would take until the first week of December for him to prepare the statement of claim. Dr Azad also said there was a matter about joinder of one person.

43    As to what was required to be included in the statement of claim, I said:

Well, to be clear, a statement of claim is not - you've already shown considerable industry, Dr Azad, in understanding and researching the legal principles, but a statement of claim is not an argument. It is not a submission. It is a statement of the factual things that happened and a reference to and a description of the legal basis for the claim. In this case, for example, if the legal basis for the claim is that there was a policy that was issued and you have rights under that policy and the particular provisions of the policy, then you need to say that in your statement of claim. You do not need to provide an argument as to why you should win, that you file a statement of claim and the time for argument is much later.

So, the best types of statement of claim tell a story, they tell it in chronological order about what has happened, those events that are relevant and then say what the legal basis for your claim is.

44    There was a further case management hearing on 19 December 2024.

45    On the day before the hearing, Dr Azad sent an email to the solicitor acting for Avant. It included the following:

While I am making every effort to impart lessons in professional ethics and encourage an improvement in your conduct, I remain doubtful about the success of these attempts! Thus far, your unprofessional demeanour, along with that of [name redacted], reflects a level of callous arrogance that appears impervious to constructive guidance or reform! As I gradually move toward a more stable living situation and am able to review your submissions and statements more thoroughly, I am increasingly astounded by the extent of the breaches in professional standards - manifested in numerous dishonest and misleading statements, especially by you … !

It is hardly surprising that criminal organisations like the Medical Board and Avant find themselves reliant on unscrupulous and below-one-ounce-common-sense lawyers such as [name redacted] and yourself, whose conduct demonstrates a glaring absence of basic professional ethics and moral integrity.

46    By the time of that hearing, Dr Azad was seeking further time to file a statement of claim. Avant did not oppose an extension of time but sought self-executing orders that would provide for the proceedings to be dismissed if a statement of claim was not filed within the further time to be allowed.

47    In the result, Dr Azad was unable to participate in the hearing. He indicated to the Court by email that he would abide by any orders made by the Court. I made orders extending the time for filing a statement of claim until 10 February 2025. I gave reasons for doing so: Azad v Avant Insurance Limited [2024] FCA 1528 (noting that due to administrative error a copy of the part of the transcript recording those reasons was not provided to Dr Azad until early February 2025). The reasons included the following (at [4]):

In the absence of Dr Azad, I indicate that I have had an opportunity to consider the written submissions that he has provided in support of the position that he adopts for this case management hearing. In short, those submissions raise a number of issues about how this matter might progress. I am not persuaded that there should be any steps taken in these proceedings, unless and until there has been a proposed statement of claim filed which can then be considered and a view formed as to whether it is a document which enables the fair progress of these proceedings, having regard to the interests of all parties. Once that document is available, the Court can consider the other steps that should be taken. In short, the first thing that needs to happen in these proceedings is that there needs to be a pleading document that clearly and concisely states the case to be advanced and the issues that are to be raised by Dr  Azad in these proceedings, together with the factual matters that are to be relied upon to support the legal claims that are advanced as the basis for the relief that is sought.

The orders made specified a version of the Ordered Pleading Requirements.

48    In January 2025, Dr Azad indicated to the Court that he sought more time to file a statement of claim. A case management hearing was listed for 6 February 2025. On 17 January 2025, Dr Azad delivered written submissions for the purposes of the case management hearing. They were substantially in the same terms as submissions that he had provided for the previous case management hearing held on 19 December 2024. With due respect to Dr Azad, they manifest a particular characteristic of his approach to litigation. Rather than focus upon complying with the orders that have been made (or providing the information sought by Avant in order to consider any claim to indemnity), Dr Azad is distracted by seeking to instruct the Court (or Avant) as to the process that should be followed in dealing with his many complaints.

49    The submission began as follows:

Upon a recent review of the matter, the Applicant has developed a firm belief that there are fundamental issues, referred to as the Basic Problem Zones (Basic Problem Zones A - C), which must be addressed before meaningful progress can be made in this case.

The existence of these Basic Problem Zones has created significant uncertainty and ambiguity, which has rendered certain aspects of the current legal debate unclear. In some instances, it has obscured the very foundation of the discussion, making it difficult to establish a clear starting point.

The Applicant respectfully submits that resolving these problem areas through appropriate court orders and directions is crucial to enabling both the commencement and progression of a constructive and efficient legal process and debate.

In the following subparagraphs, I outline what I allege to be the Basic Problem Zones identified in this legal recourse. I reserve further discussion on these points for the hearing, should His Honour grant leave for this matter to proceed to debate …

(footnote omitted)

50    The document proceeded to explain the nature of the three 'Basic Problem Zones'. Of course, by that point Dr Azad had himself proposed the preparation of a statement of claim. Also, the Court had made clear that a statement of claim was required before the case could proceed. Many months had passed without a document of that kind being prepared by Dr Azad. Although the document was expressed in commendably conciliatory terms, it was not directed towards fulfilling the fundamental obligation of any applicant to disclose in clear and concise terms the factual and legal basis for the claim.

51    Dr Azad did not appear at the case management hearing on 6 February 2025. At that hearing I observed that the transcript of the hearing on 19 December 2024 that had been provided to Dr Azad had not included the reasons given on that occasion. I summarised the then current position in the following way:

What has occurred since then [that is, since 19 December 2024] is Dr Azad has now raised a number of matters as to why he needs more time. It seems to me in the circumstances where he's acting on his own behalf and this is effectively a last opportunity for Dr Azad to be able to put in a statement of claim or a proposed statement of claim of a kind that might enable these proceedings to be advanced, that that opportunity should be afforded to him. But it will be on the same terms as were made on the last occasion, and that the matter should come back before me for the purposes of a hearing to consider any document that has been filed and if whether it is appropriate for these proceedings to continue, having regard to what the position is at that time.

52    In the result, the time for compliance with the requirement to file the statement of claim was further extended until 17 March 2025. The orders incorporated the Ordered Pleading Requirements. A further case management hearing was listed for 25 March 2025. As had been done previously an order was made for a copy of the transcript to be provided to Dr Azad. The reasons given on 19 December 2024 were also formally published and provided to him.

53    On 14 March 2025, Dr Azad responded to an email from a solicitor acting for Avant on the topic of Dr Azad's proposal to join five individuals as respondents. The email was rude and replete with misunderstandings. It asserted that the lawyers involved were dishonest and unethical. It concluded with the following:

Your conduct throughout this matter, characterised by intentional obfuscation, misleading statements, and a flagrant disregard for professional obligations, has reached an unacceptable level. As I have previously cautioned, I have now made a decisive decision to formally seek a court order to restrain you from any further involvement in this case due to your unethical and improper actions. Additionally, I will be requesting that this matter be referred to the appropriate professional regulatory bodies for further examination.

54    There are other communications from Dr Azad of this kind to be found in the materials received on Avant's summary dismissal application.

55    On 24 March 2025, Dr Azad delivered a document that was said to be a 'nearly complete' version of his proposed statement of claim. He indicated that all that was to be added was a 'final Chapter titled Reliefs & Remedies'.

56    The document described as a proposed statement of claim ran to some 39 pages. It proposed the addition of four more respondents. It started with a description of the parties. It then had a section headed: 'Introduction & Basic Concepts' which began as follows (paras 7-10):

In this chapter, I intend to outline key concepts and provide a foundational understanding of the fundamental arguments presented within this Statement of Claim (SOC-1).

Due to multiple factors - most notably the intricate nature of this case, which has now evolved into a highly complex legal dispute - the process of drafting this pleading to the exacting standard required for submission to a superior court has been especially challenging. The applicant maintains that this complexity has been further exacerbated by the respondents' alleged widespread misconduct and continuous breaches of legal principles.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the difficulties in formulating this SOC have been exacerbated by the respondents' persistent obstruction and the unprofessional and evasive conduct of their legal representatives throughout these proceedings.

To overcome these challenges and enhance clarity, the applicant has prepared a structured table outlining the claims, titled the Applicant's Claims List Table. This table was separately submitted to the court last week and has also been integrated into this Statement of Claim, as outlined below.

57    After that there was a table enumerating 32 different types of claims. For each claim there was a general description of the 'causes of action', the identification of the 'involved respondents' and a list of the sections of various statutes. For some there was a 'further explanation'. This tabular form was like the approach that had been adopted in the 'Concise Statement of Claims' except that it had been expanded to include many more types of claim. It was a form of claim that Dr Azad had been told was not appropriate.

58    Later in the document the same 32 categories of claim were each described in the most general of terms. For example, claim 21 was expressed in the following terms:

By disregarding the content of the applicant's comprehensive letter (LET-1) dated 26/09/2023 - specifically, their failure to address the applicant's proposals outlined in Section E (presented in Paragraph 108) of that letter, for a good-faith resolution beneficial to both parties - the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 5th respondents are jointly and severally liable for breaching the following legal provisions:

i.    s. 27(1(b)(ii) of the MIRG

ii.    s. 37 of the MIRG

iii.    s. 13 of the ICA (Civil)

iv.    s. 13 of the ICA (Criminal)

v.    s. 180 of the CA

vi.    s. 991A of the CA

vii.    s. 1041 of the CA

[noting that each of the abbreviations were defined in an earlier part of the document]

59    The document lacked any of the basic characteristics that a statement of claim must possess. Those characteristics had been communicated to Dr Azad on a number of occasions. The document was completely ineffective as a means by which to understand the factual basis for the claims that Dr Azad sought to advance or the nature of the legal causes of action that he asserted. It disregarded the explanations that had been provided to him.

60    At the case management hearing on 25 March 2025, I expressed the view that the document did not meet the requirements of the order that had been made as to what needed to be included in the statement of claim (that is, the Ordered Pleading Requirements) and observed that it did not have any chronological statement of the key facts and events. I described it as a table about lots of claims and references to provisions in the legislation. I sought an explanation from Dr Azad as to why a document of that kind had been provided.

61    Dr Azad professed to be unaware that the statement of claim needed to have a chronological explanation of events. He said that some part of the chronology had been provided to Avant in a comprehensive letter sent a year and a half before. He indicated that he would rectify the defect and resubmit the document to the Court. Further explanations were provided to Dr Azad as to what was required. In particular, as to the claims that there was coverage under the policies of insurance for legal costs and disbursements incurred, the following explanation was provided:

So in order to make a claim of that kind, the facts that are relevant - are - that need to be in the statement of claim - are what was the nature of the claim? That is, the case that was being brought. What was the amount of cost that was insured? When did you ask the insurer to pay the amount? When did the insurer say that the amount wasn't paid? So there are all of the facts that need to be in the statement of claim, so the court knows what the nature of the claim is. And then, separately - once all of those facts are there - on the basis of those facts, a claim about why those amounts are said to be due. For example, there is a provision in the policy that says that the amount should be due. So that's what needs to be set out of the document. And I would not be obsessed with trying to formulate it in some kind of legalistic way. [It] just needs to be plain speaking. The story of what happened, and then the legal basis for it.

62    Despite the delay in providing the document and the fact that the document that had been provided did not conform to the Ordered Pleading Requirements, I determined that Dr Azad should be given further time to prepare an appropriate form of proposed statement of claim. I gave the following short reasons:

[The proposed statement of claim] is plainly out of time, and notwithstanding those matters, having regard to the fact the [applicant] is not legally represented, I form the view that it would be appropriate to allow a further opportunity to provide a proposed statement of claim that meets the requirement to be a concise statement of the factual matters relied upon, and the legal basis for the claims that are made, so that this court and the respondent can understand what the nature of the case is, uncomplicated by collateral allegations about all sorts of things that have happened in relation to communications with the insurer.

So for those reasons, I am going to afford you, Dr Azad, a further opportunity. To be clear, a document will need to be filed. It will need to meet the requirements that I have placed in the orders that have already been made and as have been further explained today. You should, I suggest, go back to the letter of 5 August 2024, and look at the information that was being asked for by the insurer there, and bear that in mind also when you prepare your statement of claim. And that being the case, I will now hear from you about how long you say you will need, and why, to prepare such a document.

(emphasis added)

63    Time for compliance was further extended until 23 May 2025.

64    On 20 April 2025, Dr Azad sent an email to the solicitors acting for Avant in which he referred to 'His Honour's emphasis on the need for me to revisit the letter issued by Avant and provided to me on 5 August 2024'. Dr Azad said that he would be forwarding documents and invoices to support the specific claims in separate emails. After that, some information was provided by Dr Azad to Avant. A response was provided by Avant as to why aspects of the claim for indemnity were not accepted after considering that information. In that regard, I note that there have been some payments made by Avant to Dr Azad by way of indemnity. They appeared to have been made in 2023.

65    On 30 May 2025, the document that has given rise to Avant's interlocutory application to summarily dismiss was emailed to the Court. As has been explained, Avant then applied for summary dismissal of the proceedings.

66    Dr Azad has prepared written submissions in opposition to Avant's interlocutory application for dismissal. They did not comply with directions that had been made concerning the submissions and, consequently, they were not accepted for filing. However, a copy was received by me and I have read and considered them. They begin with complaints about the conduct of Avant, expressed in the following way:

… the Respondent has once again exhibited a pattern of procedural irregularities and deliberate obfuscation - a pattern that has persisted since the inception of this legal dispute, and even extended to pre-litigation correspondence. Their conduct in the present application unmistakably reflects an abuse of process.

67    As to written submissions that had been made by Avant to the effect that Dr Azad could not advance claims seeking penalties for alleged contraventions, Dr Azad said:

While it is acknowledged that the core matter of the present proceeding is not, in strict legal terms, classified as a criminal matter, it nonetheless involves serious allegations of misconduct - some of which, as supported by several cited statutory provisions, may give rise to associated criminal matters …

Accordingly, this consideration should weigh heavily against the Respondent's attempt to prematurely terminate the proceeding. Such an approach may reasonably be viewed as an effort to circumvent thorough judicial scrutiny of the serious allegations at hand - including those with potential criminal dimensions - and is therefore inconsistent with the proper administration of justice.

68    The submissions dealt with authorities concerned with summary dismissal. They then turned to the submissions advanced by Avant as to alleged deficiencies in the proposed statement of claim. However, in those submissions, Dr Azad failed to address the substance of those concerns or provide any indication of the nature of the case that he sought to advance beyond that which might be gleaned from the proposed statement of claim itself. He made assertions to the effect that he had repeatedly provided comprehensive explanations and clarifications as to the nature and scope of the claims. On the materials before the Court, I do not accept that submission. Dr Azad has advanced many allegations of a very general kind. He has complained about the way in which Avant and its solicitors have communicated with him. He has prepared lists of numerous statutory provisions that he says have been contravened. What he has not done is explain with any clarity the factual and legal basis for those allegations.

69    Further, the written submissions contained indications that Dr Azad was persisting in attempts to advance claims on the basis that the Court should undertake some broad-ranging inquiry to provide a form of advisory opinion as to various aspects of the regulatory scheme that Dr Azad considered required judicial explanation. These aspects were not connected, or only tenuously connected, to the actual dealings between Dr Azad and Avant. For example, the submissions maintained that one of the claims raised an important question of law as to what was meant by the term 'universal cover obligations' a matter which was said to be 'expressly at the heart of this proceeding and which warrants full judicial consideration'. What was not explained was the way in which a recognisable claim based upon a cause of action that could be asserted by Dr Azad required that legislative term to be considered.

70    Otherwise, with respect to Dr Azad and making due allowance for the fact that he is seeking to conduct the proceedings as a litigant in person, much of Dr Azad's written submissions consisted of unhelpful and unfounded characterisation of the conduct of Avant as being in some way criminal, involving 'repeated misrepresentations and arrogant falsehoods' or an attempt to hinder the progression of the proceedings. The submissions contained no formulation of claims that might be a basis for the Court to conclude that, if a further opportunity to plead his case was afforded to Dr Azad, an appropriate form of statement of claim might be forthcoming.

71    In oral submissions, Dr Azad accepted that he could not bring a criminal matter but maintained that he could add to a civil matter an 'associated matter of criminal aspect of a conduct'. If that submission was intended to say that conduct that would amount to a crime could be the basis for a civil claim then that may be accepted. However, Dr Azad does not seek to formulate his claims in that way. Rather, many of his claims are simply allegations of contraventions for which he claims pecuniary penalties. The regulatory scheme has its own regulator. There is no articulated basis as to why an individual like Dr Azad may be able to bring proceedings for pecuniary penalties.

72    Dr Azad also said that one of his basic reasons for bringing the proceedings was because they were dealing with 'a very under regulated area in medical indemnity'. He also contended that there was a lack of precedents and authority that 'has made this [a] very vulnerable area'. He also said he was seeking to use the proceeding as a 'good chance to [have] further examination of the legal basis of this medical indemnity' and he wanted to use that chance. He also said that Avant was 'relying on their own definition of certain statutory provisions or terms that [haven't] been clarified in no authorities, like universal cover application, complying offer, comparison medical practitioner'. He said that these were yet to be defined and that was one of the reasons he was bringing the proceedings. He wanted the Court to give a proper definition of these basic matters and then 'try the question that if there is any right for the applicant to be tried or not'.

73    As I understand these submissions, they were proposing a kind of inquiry to be undertaken by the Court in the first instance about the meaning of key terms in the scheme of legislation regulating the provision of medical indemnity insurance. Then, once the Court had given a form of advisory opinion about those matters, the Court could see whether Dr Azad had any rights that could be the subject of some form of claim against Avant. These submissions misconceived the nature of the Court process.

74    Dr Azad also explained his attempts to put a structure around the claims in the proposed statement of claim. As I will explain, there is a clear structure to the pleading and Dr Azad is to be commended for that aspect of the document. However, the issue is not about whether the document is well-structured. The main issues are whether the proposed statement of claim is an appropriate form of document upon which Dr Azad can advance legal proceedings in this Court against Avant and whether the purpose for which Dr Azad brings the proceedings means they are an abuse of process.

75    As to the deficiencies with the proposed statement of claim, Dr Azad's position was that he had told his story as to his claim and that according to his story he believes that the sections of the law that he has referred to have been breached. He maintained that he did not need to explain why he believed according to his story that the section of law had been breached. He maintained that would be the work of submissions. With due respect, the proposed statement of claim is not of that kind because it does not tell the story of the basis for each of the very many claims that are sought to be advanced.

76    When pressed as to issues with the proposed pleading, Dr Azad also made submissions to the effect that the proposed statement of claim might need a further attempt to make it comply but that there was a core legal argument. He maintained that each of the 16 categories of claims that were referred to in the proposed statement of claim had a strong basis and there was enough in the proposed pleading for them to be tried. However, these generalised assertions do not assist. What Avant is entitled to know is the nature of the case it is being required to answer as to each and every claim. As is explained below, on the limited factual and legal basis that can be gleaned from the proposed statement of claim it appears there is no reasonable basis that is evident for Dr Azad to advance the various claims. They are either without apparent factual and legal foundation as causes of action or they concern claims for pecuniary penalties of a kind that are a matter for a regulator (assuming they otherwise have a basis, a matter about which I express no view).

The proposed statement of claim at issue

77    The proposed statement of claim runs to 48 pages. It is divided into chapters. Chapter A deals with the parties. Chapter B is headed 'background facts'. It explains the circumstances in which Dr Azad came to be insured with Avant. It then has 16 parts each of which appears to be intended to relate to a separate category of claims.

78    Chapter C is headed 'claims'. It too has 16 parts each of which appear to correspond to a part of Chapter B. However, there is no explanation at all of the legal basis of the category of claim the subject of each part. For example, part C-1; The Matter of Premium Claim says:

By reason of the matters pleaded in Paragraphs 15-27, the 1st, 3rd, 4th & 5th Respondents are jointly and severally liable for multiple breaches of statutory obligations, having contravened the following provisions across four consecutive financial years (2021-2022 to 2024-2025):

a)    Section 52C(2) of the MIA;

b)    Section 7A of the PSPSA;

c)    Section 75 of the ICA; and

d)    Section 50 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).

By reason of the matters set out in Paragraphs 15-27, the 1st, 3rd, 4th & 5th Respondents are jointly and severally liable for breaches of common law principles through the imposition of unfair contract terms - specifically, the charging of unreasonable premiums - across four successive financial years (2021-2022 to 2024-2025).

79    All other 'claims' take a similar form. That is to say, they are a list of statutory provisions that are said to have been contravened without any real elaboration as to why that is so and why Dr Azad has some form of basis for a civil claim as a result.

80    Chapter D is headed 'damages & reliefs'. It appears to specify the remedy that is sought for the claims described in each of the 16 categories of claim. In many instances, it seeks pecuniary penalties without indicating any basis upon which an individual can seek such penalties. In one instance, relief is sought on the basis that there has been significant prejudice caused to all medical practitioners. In others, there is reference to alleged lifestyle disruption and distress, as well as other formulations that indicate a compensatory claim but those matters are advanced as reasons for orders that do not concern damages or compensation.

81    In what follows I will address key difficulties with the proposed categories of claims. In most cases, the claims are proposed to be made against some or all of the proposed individual respondents on the basis of some form of accessorial liability by which they are alleged to be 'jointly and severally liable' for breaches of the statutory provisions listed in the pleading. I will deal with that aspect of the proposed statement of claim after dealing with the claims that are directed towards Avant.

Category 1: premium amounts

82    The pleaded factual claims refer to 'concerns' raised by Dr Azad as to premium amounts charged by Avant over a number of years. He refers to the financial strain in paying premium payments exceeding $5,000. He refers to objections raised by him about an alleged lack of transparency as to the calculation of premiums. He says that the 'premium dispute' is unresolved. He then says that the indemnity contract was cancelled in August 2024 with one of the cited reasons being non-payment of premiums.

83    An affidavit in support of Avant's dismissal application deposes to the extent to which premiums charged by Avant have been unpaid. Dr Azad has explained to the Court on a number of occasions that he has no available funds.

84    The claim that is sought to be brought alleges contraventions across four financial years 'for multiple breaches of statutory obligations'. Aside from listing four statutory provisions, there is no explanation at all as to the alleged legal basis for the claim. In addition, there is said to be a claim 'for breaches of common law principles through the imposition of unfair contract terms' which is said to be the charging of unreasonable premiums.

85    The relief sought on the basis that Dr Azad is alleged to have suffered significant financial pressure and emotional distress is an order for premium adjustment and for the imposition of pecuniary penalties.

86    Neither Avant nor this Court should be required to trawl through the list of provisions to determine their possible relevance. The nature of the legal basis for the claim should be evident on the pleading. Even so, for this claim, I will attempt to trace the provisions.

87    The first provision referred to is s 52C(2) of the Medical Indemnity Act 2002 (Cth). It deals with circumstances in which a medical indemnity insurer may require a medical practitioner to pay a risk surcharge and the limits upon such amounts. There is no basis pleaded for any claim that such a surcharge was included in the premiums charged to Dr Azad or, if it was, why it is said to have been not permitted.

88    The second provision referred to is s 7A of the Medical Indemnity (Prudential Supervision and Product Standards) Act 2003 (Cth). It specifies matters to which there must be regard in deciding whether a premium payable by an insured for particular cover is reasonable. It is not an operative provision. It is a statutory concept that is deployed in other provisions. Even assuming that there may be some operative provision of relevance within the legislation that deploys s 7A in a way that confers some form of private statutory right enforceable by someone like Dr Azad, there is no aspect of the proposed pleading that indicates why regard to the matters listed in s 7A would mean that the premium charged to Dr Azad was not reasonable.

89    The third provision referred to is s 75 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). It is a provision that requires an insurer to give reasons for certain actions in certain circumstances. They include an instance where, by reason of some special risk, less advantageous terms are offered to an insured. It is an offence provision. Even assuming that there may be some way in which a breach of that provision might be a basis for a civil claim, there is no pleading as to why Dr Azad's circumstances fall within the provision.

90    The fourth provision referred to is s 50 of the Australian Consumer Law. It provides that a person 'must not use physical force, or undue harassment or coercion' in connection with the supply of services. There is no hint of any factual basis for a claim of that kind.

91    Plainly, on the basis of the above analysis, no confidence could be reposed in the other lists of statutory provisions in the proposed pleading as possibly providing an arguable legal basis for a claim.

92    Otherwise, as to category 1, the allegation that there is some form of common law principle that might allow this Court to adjust an insurance premium on the basis of a general allegation of unfairness of the kind described in the claim is without support. The claim is devoid of any evident factual or legal basis.

93    Finally, there is the failure to identify any source of statutory or other power for the making of a 'premium adjustment' in the factual circumstances pleaded or for the Court to have jurisdiction to impose some form of pecuniary penalty at the instigation of Dr Azad (as distinct from a regulator entrusted with authority of that kind).

Category 2: coverage issues (individual issues for employment matters)

94    The apparent focus of this category of claims is exclusion from indemnity coverage for employment-related matters. Dr Azad regards the exclusion as being unexplained, discriminatory and unjustified. He says that the exclusion has 'significantly hindered' his ability to pursue justice in four separate legal proceedings. He also maintains that he is unable to say the extent of the legal fees and unpaid claims that should have been covered as the proceedings are ongoing.

95    As with category 1, there is a list of statutory provisions. There is no explanation as to why those statutory provisions might provide a basis for a civil claim in respect of the exclusion. The statutory scheme has defined terms which operate to limit the extent of the statutory obligations as to the provision of insurance cover. The claim does not engage with any aspect of that legislative scheme.

96    The provisions that are said to have been contravened include s 3 of the Medical Indemnity Regulations 2020 (Cth). It is the provision which identifies the Medical Indemnity Act as the source of the regulation-making power. There is no specific regulation that is said to be contravened.

97    The list also includes s 991A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It proscribes a 'financial services licensee' from engaging in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable 'in or in relation to the provision of a financial service'. There is no articulation in the proposed plea of any recognisable basis for a claim of that kind.

98    Also in the list of provisions allegedly contravened are a number of provisions of the Insurance Contracts Act. One of those provisions is s 13 which deals with the implied contractual provision of each party to an insurance contract to act towards the other with the utmost good faith. Again, there is no identification of conduct which is said to amount to a breach of that duty.

99    Like much of the proposed pleading, it is nothing more than a generalised assertion of breach of a list of statutory provisions without any content to the allegation.

100    There is also a claim expressed as a common law unfair contract term claim. The claim is devoid of any evident factual or legal basis.

101    The relief sought is an order that the 'prejudicial variations' to the insurance contract are void and of no effect as well as pecuniary penalties. As to the first, there is no evident cause of action to support relief of that kind. As to the second, as has been explained, no basis upon which Dr Azad can claim pecuniary penalties has been articulated.

Category 3: coverage issues (general issues for defamation matters)

102    The factual part of the pleading for this category of claims begins with the following statement:

While [the previous category] addresses a discriminatory exclusion that uniquely affects the Applicant, the present claim concerns a broader and systemic issue relating to the policies and conduct of the Respondent, which not only impact the Applicant but is also adversely affecting other medical practitioners.

103    The claims advanced by Dr Azad are not public law claims. They seek to advance causes of action in respect of his dealings with Avant as his indemnity insurer. However, both in his submissions to the Court and in the language used in the proposed pleading it appears that Dr Azad seeks to advance claims on the basis that he is bringing to bear some form of regulatory oversight. With respect, this purpose is entirely misconceived.

104    The claim seems to concern a provision in the policies which excludes cover for defamation where the alleged defamation is by another healthcare professional. It is alleged to be 'unreasonable and inconsistent with industry norms'. Otherwise, there is no plea as to why there is an obligation to provide such defamation cover under a regulatory scheme that is concerned with professional indemnity cover for medical practitioners.

105    The category of claims is said to affect Dr Azad because of three defamation proceedings that he has commenced for which he has been refused coverage.

106    The list of statutory provisions said to have been contravened is similar to the list for category 2. The relief sought is an order that the exclusion of coverage in product disclosure statements is void and of no effect and an order imposing pecuniary penalties. The relief is sought on the basis that there has been significant prejudice to all medical practitioners who have entered into indemnity insurance contracts with Avant.

107    It is not possible to discern a recognisable basis for a cause of action from these generalised allegations.

Categories 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15 and 16: indemnity for legal costs and disbursements for identified legal proceedings

108    Each of these categories relates to a claim for indemnity in respect of some form of legal proceedings in which Dr Azad has been involved. Beyond identifying these as claims for indemnity in respect of legal costs and disbursements, it is not possible to discern the nature of the issue between the parties. At its most basic level, a claim of that kind would need to identify the provision in the policy of insurance that was said to provide cover, the facts to show that a claim had been made, the facts to show that the claim had been rejected (or that time had passed without any adjustment of the claim by the insurer) and the basis upon which it was said that there was an obligation to indemnify.

109    There appear to be related claims that are sought to be made of unconscionable conduct as to the way in which the claims have been addressed. The basis upon which those claims are made is not evident from the proposed plea. There are references to the personal financial circumstances of the applicant but those matters in and of themselves would not found a claim of unconscionability. The same may be said in respect of reliance upon the utmost good faith provisions. There are also very generalised complaints about the way in which Avant is alleged to have dealt with Dr Azad. For example, there is an allegation that, despite request from Dr Azad, Avant has refused to engage in constructive conferral. An allegation of that kind is far too general to support the types of claims that are indicated by the list of statutory provisions in the proposed statement of claim.

110    Again, the relief sought includes pecuniary penalties without any demonstrated basis for Dr Azad to make a claim of that kind.

111    On the limited information that can be discerned from the proposed statement of claim, it is possible that there may be an arguable basis for the claims by Dr Azad for indemnity in respect of legal fees and disbursements. The difficulty is that Dr Azad has assiduously avoided engaging in a claims process in the usual way and then, despite being told of the need to do so, has failed to identify the precise basis upon which he says there should be indemnity for particular legal fees and disbursements. The closest that the proposed plea comes to doing so is in respect of certain costs associated with category 4. However, the claim is still deficient because it seeks to incorporate claims for pecuniary penalties and complain about matters relating to emotional distress and alleged acute financial and personal hardship without identifying the basis for claims of that kind.

112    As I have explained, as to the indemnity claims, Dr Azad has been afforded ample opportunity to advance those claims. Initially that was by the orders made by Derrington J (a process in which Dr Azad did not participate in any meaningful way). Then it was by a proposal to allow aspects of the indemnity claims to be addressed before any other claims. Later, it was by further information provided in case management hearings and by encouraging Dr Azad to respond to the letter that had been sent by Avant in accordance with the orders of Derrington J. Rather than conform to these attempts to assist with the Court's procedure, Dr Azad has been intent upon enlarging the proceedings for wider purposes and in advancing a large number of claims without being able to specify the factual and legal basis for those claims in a clear and concise way.

Category 6: issue of membership records

113    It appears that the insurance cover provided by Avant is on a mutual basis and there is a modest annual membership fee paid by insureds. The allegations made are to the effect that Avant has failed to meet 'clear legal obligations and expected industry standards by neglecting to issue proper, itemised invoices' to Dr Azad. It appears that the basis for this allegation is that Avant adopts a different practice to that observed by at least one other indemnity insurer. Precisely, what the nature of Dr Azad's concern may be concerning the membership fee invoicing is not evident from the proposed plea.

114    Avant is alleged to have contravened two statutory provisions concerning invoicing for membership fees.

115    The first provision is s 48 of the Medical Indemnity Regulations. It provides for a list of matters that must be included in an invoice given by a medical indemnity insurer relating to a contract of insurance that provides for professional indemnity cover. One of the matters is 'the amount of the membership fee for the practitioner or, if there is no such fee, a statement to that effect'. The plea does not allege a failure of that kind.

116    The second provision is s 75 of the Insurance Contracts Act. As has been explained, it is a provision that requires an insurer to give reasons for certain actions in certain circumstances. There is no part of that provision that relates to reasons for a membership fee.

Category 9: damaging and deceptive conduct

117    This category alleges 'mismanagement and undue delays' which are attributed to the conduct of one of the proposed respondents. There is a reference to a conflict of interest, which is said to constitute deceptive conduct. The complaint seems to be to the effect that the nature of the conflict of interest has not been disclosed. The nature of the factual and legal basis for the complaint is obscure. The listed statutory provisions include the civil obligations imposed upon directors and officers of corporations by the Corporations Act. They concern duties owed to the corporation. The conduct in relation to the conflict of interest is said to have caused 'significant distress, procedural disadvantage across various legal matters, and substantial prejudice to [Dr Azad's] ability to defend his legal rights'. Precisely why that may be so is not evident from the proposed plea. The only relief sought is pecuniary penalties.

Category 10: unilateral termination of indemnity contract

118    This plea refers to the cancellation of Dr Azad's insurance by Avant in September 2024. The proposed claim as to this category alleges that there was breach of statutory provisions and a failure to uphold the duty of good faith. It refers to the termination being based upon a failure to pay premiums and a court decision upholding Dr Azad's suspension from medical practice. Complaint is made that the termination occurred despite Avant being aware of Dr Azad's 'financial distress and precarious personal circumstances at the time' which is followed by reference to aspects of his personal circumstances. However, there is no indication as to why those matters might mean the failure to pay premiums would not be a proper basis for termination of the contract of indemnity. It is simply impossible to discern the basis for this claim which is said to involve contraventions of some 11 statutory provisions, a number of which have already been identified, namely provisions as to unconscionable conduct, breach of the duty of utmost good faith and the use of physical force, or undue harassment or coercion.

Categories 11, 12 and 13: failure in making a complying offer

119    Each of these three categories of claims are expressed in similar terms. They relate to each of the insurance contract renewals by Avant for the 2022, 2023 and 2024 years. The plea for each year is in similar generalised terms. For example, the plea for category 11 is as follows:

At the time of the first renewal of the insurance contract in mid-2022, the First Respondent failed to fulfil its statutory obligation to issue a complying offer to the Applicant. By that point, there were several ongoing and emerging legal matters that ought to have been acknowledged and incorporated within a properly structured renewal offer, in accordance with legislative requirements. Despite the Applicant later raising this issue with the Respondent, the same pattern of non-compliance and procedural breach was repeated in the two subsequent renewals (2023 & 2024), reflecting a continuing and systematic failure by the Respondent to adhere to its legal duties.

120    The statutory provisions listed as contravened for each category are the same. They include the utmost good faith and unconscionability provisions to which reference has been made. There is no plea of any basis for claims of that kind. There is also reference to s 22 and s 24 of the Medical Indemnity (Prudential Supervision and Product Standards) Act. Section 22(1) includes a requirement that an offer for insurance of the kind covered by that provision must be a 'complying offer'. That term is defined in s 24. It has a detailed list of requirements that must be met. Consequently, the respect in which Dr Azad says there has been a breach of s 22 is entirely devoid of any content or explanation. The basis upon which Dr Azad may bring a claim of that kind is not evident.

The proposed additional respondents

121    As has been mentioned, the proposed statement of claim identifies four individuals against whom claims are proposed. There is no formal application for joinder but it is clear that Dr Azad contemplates their joinder. Each is alleged to be an 'officer, employee and/or agent' of Avant. The basis for the proposed claims against each of them is that they are said to have been 'involved in' certain of the contraventions allegedly committed by Avant 'within the meaning of' s 79 of the Corporations Act. Although there are some limited references to factual events in which one of the proposed respondents was involved, for the most part the proposed pleading only refers to the proposed respondents in the list of statutory provisions that are said to have been contravened in respect of each category of claim. At that point they are said to be 'jointly and severally liable' for the contraventions.

122    There are many problems with these aspects of the proposed pleading. First, the Corporations Act provision does not apply to many of the statutory provisions relied upon by Dr Azad. Second, accessorial liability depends upon knowing participation in the actual events. There is simply no proposed plea of that kind to be found in the proposed statement of claim. Third, it appears that, in most instances, what is sought is a pecuniary penalty. As has been explained, there is no evident basis for a claim of that kind being brought by Dr Azad. Fourth, the basis for Dr Azad to bring a claim for alleged breach of the provision is not evident.

123    In addition, from a practical point of view it is difficult to see what could possibly be gained by joining the additional respondents. There is no suggestion that Avant would not have the resources to meet any judgment that may be obtained. Further, the proposed plea seeks to attribute vicarious liability to Avant for the conduct of each of the proposed respondents whilst at the same time maintaining that there is direct liability on the part of Avant. There is no suggestion that Avant is seeking to disassociate itself from the conduct of its employees.

124    In his written submissions, Dr Azad objected to Avant making submissions as to whether the proposed pleading could be allowed to proceed against the proposed additional respondents. Amongst other things it was said that Avant lacked any standing to make those submissions. The submission to that effect is misplaced. As an existing respondent, Avant has an interest in the scope of these proceedings and whether it is necessary to join other parties. It also has an interest in ensuring there is a proper basis for the joinder of any party on the basis that it is said to be vicariously liable for the conduct of that party.

125    In any event, this is an instance where all of the many deficiencies with the claim as against Avant mean that there is no demonstrated basis upon which there should be joinder of the proposed individual respondents.

Due regard to Dr Azad's position as a litigant in person

126    The nature and extent of the obligations of the Court where proceedings are being conducted by a litigant in person were recently considered in Chalik v Chalik [2025] NSWCA 136 at [67]-[72] (Bell CJ, Payne and Free JJA). The suggestion that there was a broad and general obligation on the part of a judge to ensure that a litigant in person did not, because of a lack of legal skill, fail to claim rights or put forward legal arguments was rejected. Their Honours referred to the following passage from the judgment of Samuels JA in Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSWCA, 16 June 1986) which was quoted with approval in Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36; (2018) 265 CLR 236 at [47] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ), namely:

… the absence of legal representation on one side ought not to induce a court to deprive the other side of one jot of its lawful entitlement … An unrepresented party is as much subject to the rules as any other litigant. The court must be patient in explaining them and may be lenient in the standard of compliance which it exacts. But it must see that the rules are obeyed, subject to any proper exceptions. To do otherwise, or to regard a litigant in person as enjoying a privileged status, would be quite unfair to the represented opponent.

(emphasis added)

127    In Chalik at [69] their Honours went on to say:

The question of the extent, if any, of assistance which a trial judge or appellate court should afford to an unrepresented litigant in civil proceedings is nuanced and has been the subject of many intermediate appellate judgments of this Court since Rajski was decided almost 40 years ago. Those decisions have emphasised that an unrepresented litigant should be provided with sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court to ensure a fair trial takes place.

(original emphasis)

128    It is not for this Court to undertake a partisan analysis of what has been presented by Dr Azad for the purpose of ensuring that he has not missed some arguable point: Mendonca v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NSWCA 84 at [21] (McCallum JA, Basten and Leeming JJA agreeing). The Court must maintain its independence and it must refrain from taking steps that would afford an advantage to one party over another: Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [309]-[316] (Beazley JA, Giles and Whealy JJA agreeing).

129    In my view, for reasons that have been given, Dr Azad has been afforded adequate information and explanation about what is required when it comes to the fundamental obligation to state clearly and concisely the nature of the case to be advanced. He has persisted in pursuing a different course. He seeks to maintain a form of generalised inquiry in Avant's dealings with him and, indeed, aspects of the way in which Avant conducts its overall business. In that regard, the overall claims that he seeks to make by the proposed statement of claim include the following:

a)    A comprehensive judicial examination of the Respondent's Product Disclosure Statements (PDS) and contractual documents, with the objective of standardising various clauses and ensuring their consistency with established legal principles and statutory requirements.

b)    A full assessment of the premiums charged by the Respondent to medical practitioners, to determine whether there is any legitimate or commercially justifiable reason for the significant disparity between the Respondent's pricing and prevailing market standards, including comparisons with other providers within the medical indemnity industry.

c)    A declaratory judgment from the Court providing clear, practical, and authoritative definitions for key statutory concepts that remain undefined or ambiguously interpreted in existing case law - such as the 'universal cover obligation' and the legality of 'contracting out' - to serve both as regulatory guidance and, where possible, as binding precedent for governing conduct across the currently under-regulated medical indemnity sector.

130    In doing so, Dr Azad seeks to advance these proceedings for an improper purpose.

131    In du Boulay v Worrell [2009] QCA 63 at [69] (Muir JA, Fraser JA agreeing), the obligations of litigants in person when it comes to matters of procedure were explained in the following way:

It may be that self-represented litigants should be afforded a degree of indulgence and given appropriate assistance. But if a self-represented person wishes to litigate, he or she is as much bound by the rules of Court as any other litigant. Those rules exist to facilitate efficient, fair and cost-effective litigation. The Court's duty is to act impartially and ensure procedural fairness to all parties, not merely one party who may be disadvantaged through lack of legal representation. The other party to the litigation is entitled to protection from oppressive and vexatious conduct regardless of whether that conduct arises out of ignorance, mistake or malice.

(footnote omitted)

132    When it comes to pleading a case, a litigant in person has the same burden as any other party: Rahman v Hedge [2012] FCA 68 at [10] (Perram J); and Mohareb v Lambert & Rehbein (SEQ) Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 126 at [35] (White J). Each is bound by the same duties as to the efficient conduct of litigation as a party who is legally represented: Edmonds v Barrington Winstanley Group Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 821 at [57] (Perry J).

General principles concerning alternatives advanced by Avant

133    Different issues are raised by the alternative foundations for Avant's application for summary dismissal.

134    Judgment may be entered where a party is in default of orders. The relevant principles were summarised by Anderson J in Fair Work Ombudsman v IE Enterprises Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 848 at [17]-[20]. It is a discretionary power that should be exercised with caution.

135    Separately, the Court will not allow its processes to be abused. As was explained in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Limited [2015] HCA 28; (2015) 256 CLR 507 at [25] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ):

Although insusceptible of a formulation which comprises closed categories, abuse of process is capable of application in any circumstances in which the use of a court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It can for that reason be available to relieve against injustice to a party or impairment to the system of administration of justice which might otherwise be occasioned in circumstances where a party to a subsequent proceeding is not bound by an estoppel.

(footnotes omitted)

See also Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612; and Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 392-393.

136    As to the form of the proposed statement of claim, the requirements of a pleading were summarised in the following way in Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland [2019] FCAFC 102; (2019) 269 FCR 349 at [28]-[30] (Middleton, Perram and Anastassiou JJ):

The question of whether a pleading adequately raises a claim or defence is not concerned with the expression of the pleading as a matter of style, or of phrasing, or the structure of the pleading. Neither is it concerned with the formality of the process by which the issues in the proceeding are identified; be it a statement of claim, statement of contentions, concise statement, points of claim or points of defence. The verbal formulation of the allegations of fact, or the contentions of law, need not conform to a particular style guide or to any pro forma template.

The sole objective of a pleading is to clearly identify matters in dispute and difference by and between the parties to the dispute. This objective necessarily involves expressing the factual basis of each claim or defence. It is necessary that the legal elements of each cause of action or defence are expressed by reference to allegations of fact required to establish each element. It is not necessary to plead the legal conclusions that follow from the facts, but it is often convenient to do so. These are trite propositions but nevertheless vital to ensuring that the pleading serves its purpose.

There should be no doubt about whether any particular cause of action is relied upon. At a minimum, the pleading should be pellucidly clear about the causes of action, or claims, relied upon by the applicant, including any claims made upon an alternative hypothesis. The explicit clarity with which a claim is expressed should ensure that there be no need for the opposite party to closely scrutinise the pleading in a process of textual construction to determine whether a particular fact is relied upon, or the purpose for which it is alleged, much less to decide whether a particular cause of action is raised. The same basic requirement applies to any defence raised in answer to a claim.

137    Where proceedings are finally determined, the Court's power extends to restraining the institution of proceedings 'which, in effect, seek to relitigate the substance of matters already determined in proceedings which have been disposed of in the Court': Hunter v Leahy [1999] FCA 1075; (1999) 91 FCR 214 at [14]-[17] (French J). As was explained by Whelan JA in Velissaris v Dynami Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 299 at [142] (see also [139]-[146]):

Orders can be made in exercise of a court's inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its own processes so as to restrain the institution of fresh proceedings without leave, where those proceedings are in substance an attempt to overturn a judgment already given and re-litigate a matter already decided.

See also the analysis by Livesey J in Georganas v Barkla [2021] SASC 47.

Conclusion

138    As I have explained, Dr Azad has been unwilling, despite the explanations he has been given, to seek to provide a statement of claim that is genuinely an attempt to discharge his obligations as an applicant when it comes to stating the case that he seeks to advance in terms that can be recognised as having a factual and legal basis. In addition, in my view, there is no reasonable basis to expect that he would do so if afforded a further opportunity.

139    Also, for reasons I have given, the proposed statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable basis for any claim.

140    Finally, Dr Azad seeks to advance the proceedings for the collateral purpose of seeking to undertake some broad-ranging inquiry into aspects of Avant's practices when it comes to issuing policies of medical indemnity insurance.

141    For each of those reasons, the appropriate order is for the proceedings to be dismissed.

142    As I have also explained, it is possible that Dr Azad may be able to formulate a statement of claim in appropriate terms, especially one that is focussed upon an alleged failure to indemnify in certain respects. I express no view one way or another. The material with which I have been presented is insufficient to do so. To that limited extent, I am not persuaded that a summary dismissal on the alternative ground that there is no merit in any aspect of the claims the subject of the proposed statement of claim is justified.

143    For that reason, and to that limited extent, the dismissal should not be seen to operate as an adjudication that Dr Azad has no reasonable prospect of being able to articulate a valid legal basis for a claim to indemnify in respect of the legal costs and disbursements as generally referred to in the proposed statement of claim. However, given the course of the present proceedings and having regard to the basis for my conclusions as to why the proceedings should be dismissed (particularly my finding as to abuse of process), I consider it appropriate to require Dr Azad to obtain the leave of a judge of this Court before being able to commence any further proceedings against Avant in respect of matters that have been the subject of the present proceedings, namely his indemnity insurance arrangements with Avant.

144    I will make directions for any such application for leave to be made by an originating application that is supported by an affidavit attaching a draft of the originating process and a draft statement of claim.

145    I am also persuaded that the proposed statement of claim fails to conform to the Ordered Pleading Requirements. However, it is the matters to which I have already referred that cause me to conclude that the proceedings must be dismissed.

146    As I have indicated, I will hear from the parties on the question of costs.

Associate:

Dated:    24 July 2025