Federal Court of Australia

George v Registrar Stewart [2025] FCA 844

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The interlocutory application filed by Uncle Robbie Thorpe on 18 June 2025 be dismissed

2.    The interlocutory application filed by Tjilpi Robert Stevens on 24 June 2025 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCDONALD J:

Introduction

1    The applicant in these proceedings, Tjilpi Murray George, is a lawman for Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjajara manta and a member of the Kaltjiti Aboriginal community. On 27 May 2025, Tjilpi Murray George attempted to commence proceedings in the Court by lodging for filing an originating application and an affidavit in support. Registrar Parkyn refused to accept for filing that originating application and affidavit pursuant to r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FC Rules).

2    On 29 May 2025, Tjilpi Murray George attempted to file a further originating application and an affidavit in support. Much of this second originating application was in identical terms to the application which Tjilpi Murray George had attempted to file on 27 May 2025, but it also included additional content which had not been included in Tjilpi Murray George’s first originating application. Registrar Stewart refused to accept for filing the second originating application and the affidavit in support pursuant to r 2.27 of the FC Rules, on the basis that a registrar of the Court had already rejected the documents for filing.

3    On 8 June 2025, Tjilpi Murray George commenced two proceedings in the Court, namely:

(a)    action SAD 111 of 2025, in which he seeks judicial review of the decision of Registrar Parkyn to refuse to accept documents for filing under r 2.26 of the FC Rules; and

(b)    action SAD 112 of 2025, in which he seeks judicial review of the decision of Registrar Stewart to refuse to accept documents for filing under r 2.27 of the FC Rules.

4    The originating application in action SAD 112 of 2025 originally named Registrar Parkyn as the respondent. However, Registrar Parkyn has filed an affidavit stating that he was not the registrar who made the decision the subject of action SAD 112 of 2025 and a client services officer in the South Australia Registry of the Court later confirmed that that decision was made by Registrar Stewart. Accordingly, on 24 June 2025 I made an order substituting Registrar Stewart as the respondent to action SAD 112 of 2025.

5    On 18 June 2025, Uncle Robbie Thorpe filed an application for leave to intervene in action SAD 112 of 2025 and an affidavit in support of that application dated 18 June 2025.

6    On 24 June 2025, Tjilpi Robert Stevens filed an application for leave to intervene in action SAD 112 of 2025 and an affidavit in support of that application, dated 20 June 2025.

7    Each of the applications for leave to intervene seeks a direction pursuant to r 9.12 of the FC Rules that the applicant to intervene be granted leave to intervene in the proceedings “to ensure that all questions in the proceedings are effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon”.

Background

8    Before turning to the applications to intervene, it is appropriate to say a little more about the two sets of judicial review proceedings and some of the interlocutory applications that Tjilpi Murray George has filed in those proceedings.

9    The substantive issues that properly arise in the judicial review proceedings are, first, whether the decision by Registrar Stewart to refuse to accept the documents lodged for filing by Tjilpi Murray George was affected by jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record, and secondly, if so, whether the application for relief in the nature of judicial review should be refused in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. One possible basis for exercising the discretion to decline relief would be if the Court were to form the view that there would be no utility in granting relief – for example, because, even if one or both of the registrar’s decisions were affected by error, the conclusion that the documents should be rejected for filing was correct.

10    Tjilpi Murray George has filed several interlocutory applications in the proceedings, seeking a range of interlocutory orders. These include interlocutory applications seeking orders that:

(a)    all hearings in the judicial review proceedings be conducted on country;

(b)    the Court arrange for payment of a particular person identified by Tjilpi Murray George (who I do not understand to be a qualified or officially engaged interpreter) to act as an interpreter for him;

(c)    the Premier of South Australia, the Hon Peter Malinauskas MP, be joined as a respondent to the proceedings for judicial review of Registrar Stewart’s decision to refuse to accept documents for filing; and

(d)    Tjilpi Murray George be given leave to file documents to commence separate proceedings against Rio Tinto Ltd.

11    I listed the two proceedings for first case management hearing via Microsoft Teams on 24 June 2025. I listed the first case management hearing in that way despite Tjilpi Murray George’s request that the Court conduct all hearings in the proceedings on country, because I was satisfied that it would be an inappropriate use of the Court’s resources to sit on country for the hearing of (or case management hearings in relation to) an application for judicial review of a decision of a registrar to refuse to accept documents for filing. The conduct of the hearing by Teams was designed to enable Tjilpi Murray George to be on country during the hearing if he wished.

12    Tjilpi Murray George did not attend the first case management hearing. On 24 June 2025, I made an order that the matter be listed for final hearing on 30 July 2025 and that any interlocutory applications filed by Tjilpi Murray George also be heard at that time.

13    I also made an order that any person wishing to intervene in the proceedings file an application for leave to intervene and any written submissions in support of any such application by 14 July 2025. I made that order because, by 24 June 2025, two persons had already filed applications to intervene in the proceedings. I also made an order that any applications to intervene be determined on the basis of written submissions and without an oral hearing. I considered that this was an appropriate way to deal with any applications to intervene, in light of the nature of the proceedings; the relatively confined issues that properly arise in proceedings of this kind; the content of the two applications to intervene and supporting affidavits that had already been filed; and the objectives identified in s 37M(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), namely:

(a)    the just determination of all proceedings before the Court;

(b)    the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;

(c)    the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload;

(d)    the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner; and

(e)    the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.

14    No further applications for leave to intervene were filed in action SAD 111 of 2025 or action SAD 112 of 2025. This judgment deals with the two interlocutory applications for leave to intervene in action SAD 112 of 2025 filed on 18 June 2025 and 24 June 2025, respectively. For the reasons that follow, both applications will be dismissed.

Relevant principles

15    Rule 9.12(2) of the FC Rules provides that, in determining an application for leave to intervene in a proceeding, the Court may have regard to:

(a)    whether the intervener’s contribution will be useful and different from the contribution of the parties to the proceeding; and

(b)    whether the intervention might unreasonably interfere with the ability of the parties to conduct the proceeding as the parties wish; and

(c)    any other matter that the Court considers relevant.

16    Rule 9.12 is “not intended to be prescriptive as to the factors to which the Court may have regard in determining whether to grant leave to intervene, but confers a broad discretion”: Australian Society of Otolaryngology Head and Neck Surgery Ltd v Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (No 2) [2025] FCA 34 at [7]. Some of the considerations that are generally relevant were identified by Snaden J in Lendlease Building Contractors Pty Ltd v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2020] FCA 240 at [11] as including:

(a)    whether, or to what extent, the applicant to intervene can point to an interest that is likely to be affected by the determination of the proceeding;

(b)    whether, or to what extent, the contentions or arguments that the intervener seeks to advance in the proceeding are likely to be advanced in any event by the parties; and

(c)    whether, or to what extent, a grant of leave to intervene might unduly complicate the efficient progression of the proceeding through to hearing and determination.

Application by Uncle Robbie Thorpe for leave to intervene

17    On 24 June 2025, Uncle Robbie Thorpe filed written submissions in support of his application for leave to intervene. Most of Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions are directed to matters that have only a peripheral, if any, connection to the proceedings before the Court, and do not identify any basis that would justify the unusual course of granting him leave to intervene in an application for review of a registrar’s decision.

18    Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions refer to three proceedings currently before the Supreme Court of Victoria in which he is the moving party, and which he describes in his affidavit dated 18 June 2025 as “concerning [his] charge of ongoing Aboriginal Genocide against King Charles III”. Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions assert that “the originating application against the so-called Minerals Council of Australia dated 29 May 2025 and the further originating application against Rio Tinto Limited dated 20 June 2025 necessarily involve issues of Aboriginal Genocide” (emphasis removed). He submits that “[t]he issues in both the said originating applications involve Our Aboriginal veto power and whether the denial of such a power is per se ipso facto genocidal and unconstitutional”.

19    Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions also refer to the offence of genocide contrary to Div 268 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). However, neither of the originating applications filed by Tjilpi Murray George seeks to charge any person with genocide pursuant to that provision.

20    Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions also refer to a decision made by a registrar of the Court in August 2024 to reject certain documents that Uncle Robbie Thorpe himself attempted to file at that time. He submits that the registrar who rejected his application has “views … that Aboriginal Genocide issues are ‘frivolous and vexatious’”. This submission misunderstands the issue that arises in connection with the exercise of the power in r 2.26 of the FC Rules. The question is not whether “Aboriginal genocide issues” are frivolous and vexatious. The question is whether the particular documents that are sought to be filed are frivolous or vexatious. An attempt to file particular documents may be frivolous or vexatious because, for example:

(a)    the content of the documents themselves does not make sense;

(b)    they identify relief that is sought but without adequately identifying any basis on which the Court might grant that relief;

(c)    they purport to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court in circumstances where the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction is not apparent and is not adequately identified; or

(d)    they seek orders of a kind which the Court has no power to make or which it would clearly be inappropriate to make.

21    The rejection of documents by which a person seeks to commence a claim that refers to Aboriginal genocide does not involve any determination by a registrar that the issue of Aboriginal genocide is frivolous or vexatious. In making a judgment about whether particular documents should be rejected for filing, a registrar is not required to form any general view about the issue of alleged Aboriginal genocide. The short reasons given by the two registrars for the rejection of the documents lodged by Tjilpi Murray George do not suggest that either of the registrars viewed the issue of Aboriginal genocide generally as frivolous or vexatious.

22    Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions assert that it is “clearly necessary” to join as respondents to the proceedings the Premier of South Australia and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth. It is not clear whether this submission relates to action SAD 112 of 2025 – which, as explained above, is an application for judicial review of a decision of a registrar to refuse to accept documents for filing – or whether it relates to the proceedings that Tjilpi Murray George attempted to commence had the documents he filed not been rejected by a registrar. In either case, there is no reason to doubt that Tjilpi Murray George can adequately advance arguments in support of his own interlocutory application to join the Premier of South Australia in the judicial review proceedings. This is a procedural issue and not one in respect of which the Court would normally grant leave to non-parties to intervene. On the basis of Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s submissions, I am not satisfied that, if I were to grant him leave to intervene, he would make a useful and different contribution in relation to the issue of who the parties to a judicial review of a registrar’s decision should be.

23    In his submissions, Uncle Robbie Thorpe refers to difficulties faced by Aboriginal people in accessing justice, and in particular, contends that the Court should accept documents for filing by email rather than through the established electronic filing system. This is not an issue that arises for decision in Tjilpi Murray George’s judicial review proceedings and intervention in the proceedings is not an appropriate way for this issue to be raised with the Court. Insofar as Uncle Robbie Thorpe addresses alleged difficulties encountered by Tjilpi Robert Stevens in filing his own interlocutory application for leave to intervene in these proceedings, I note that Tjilpi Robert Stevens was able to follow the procedures established by the Court and to file his application, and that his application has been considered.

24    Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s affidavit in support of his application for leave to intervene most relevantly states:

No reasonable person, and certainly no Aborigines and no member of the international community, could possibly describe the Rejected Documents as being “on their face” “vexatious”, “frivolous” or “an abuse of process” as they clearly concern ongoing Aboriginal Genocide.

This statement addresses an issue that may arise in Tjilpi Murray George’s application for judicial review. However, Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s opinion about this issue is not relevant. Assuming it is correct to describe the documents as “clearly concern[ing] ongoing Aboriginal Genocide”, the undoubted seriousness of that subject matter does not resolve the question of whether the filing of the documents would be vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of process, or whether the registrar who decided that they would be rejected for filing on that basis made a relevant error. The statement otherwise merely asserts support for a particular conclusion.

25    Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s application and submissions do not identify any basis on which his participation would assist the Court in identifying or addressing the issues that properly arise in the present proceedings. Indeed, having regard to his affidavit and written submissions, I consider that, if Uncle Robbie Thorpe were granted leave to intervene, the likely effect would be to distract from the real issues in the proceedings. This would be an inefficient use of the resources of the Court.

26    The question of whether a registrar made a relevant error in connection with the exercise of the power in r 2.27 of the FC Rules is a relatively straightforward and confined one, as is the issue of whether the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss Tjilpi Murray George’s application for judicial review even if he establishes an error in the registrar’s decision. There is no reason to doubt that Tjilpi Murray George will adequately advance the arguments in support of his application. There is no wider question of principle that arises in the judicial review proceedings. In particular, the present proceeding is not a test case and will not establish any wider precedent in relation to questions about alleged genocide of Aboriginal people.

27    Finally, Uncle Robbie Thorpe’s personal interests will not be adversely affected by any decision on the question of whether Tjilpi Murray George’s documents should have been accepted for filing. Notably, the present proceedings are not themselves the proceedings which Tjilpi Murray George was attempting to commence by filing those documents. If Tjilpi Murray George’s current applications were unsuccessful, that would not prevent Uncle Robbie Thorpe (or anyone else) filing an originating application in the Court to commence proceedings in connection with any matter in which the Court has jurisdiction, provided that originating application was not vexatious or frivolous or an abuse of process.

28    For these reasons, the application by Uncle Robbie Thorpe for leave to intervene in the proceedings is dismissed.

Application by Tjilpi Robert Stevens for leave to intervene

29    Tjilpi Robert Stevens did not file written submissions in support of his application for leave to intervene. I have had regard to the affidavit filed in support of that affidavit as his submissions. Much of his affidavit uses expressions that are very similar, and in some cases identical, to expressions that appear in affidavits already filed in the proceedings by Tjilpi Murray George. For example, Tjilpi Robert Stevens’ affidavit states:

1.    I am a lawman for Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara manta and known to all as Tjilpi (“old man” in Our Language) and request that the court respect this title in all documents in this matter.

2.    I do not recognise the jurisdiction of this foreign-invader court over me and my people, Our Law and Our Lands, but I come here out of necessity to get you to apply your own law to your own foreign-invader people and organisations.

3.    Our culture is oral and I will speak direct to the court urgently about Tjukurpa when the court arrives on country today with translation assistance as set out in the originating and interlocutory applications.

5.     I will refer to the current ongoing genocide of anangu by foreign-invaders on and about Country — view and download information at [website URL]

30    The Court would not be assisted by submissions of the kind foreshadowed by Tjilpi Robert Stevens. As in the case of the submissions identified by Uncle Robbie Thorpe, it is not apparent that they are relevant to the confined issues that properly arise on an application for judicial review of a registrar’s decision to refuse to accept documents for filing. Nor is there any basis to consider that Tjilpi Robert Stevens will add anything useful and different from what Tjilpi Murray George might say in support of his application.

31    Tjilpi Robert Stevens’ affidavit next refers to a letter which he wrote to Mr Malinauskas on 6 June 2025. That letter is annexed to an affidavit of Tjilpi Murray George dated 12 June 2025 which he filed in support of his interlocutory application to join Mr Malinauskas as a respondent to action SAD 112 of 2025. Tjilpi Robert Stevens’ affidavit then continues as follows:

7.    In that letter I said: “Open our office in Umuwa and all Communities again. Give the funding to Anangu in the Community, we’re entitled to the funding, funding should be given to all the Community and organisations” and I referred to Nganampa Health, the clinics and the schools.

8.    Now produced and shown to me and marked Annexure TRS 1 are true copies of

(i)    contemporaneous notes of three phone conversations with Regional Anangu Services Aboriginal Corporation (“RASAC”) on 18 June 2025.

(ii)    my email to RASAC General Manager CRAIG TURNOUR 9.59am 18 June 2025 and his reply the same day at 1.49pm.

9.    Copies of these court documents will be sent to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and to all United Nations Member States asking them to get the key foreign-invaders prosecuted for genocide and to get the International Court of Justice to rule that, in the absence of any treaty evidencing Our Consent, all Land here in so-called Australia is Anangu Land and the only Law here is Anangu Law. MAPITJA! (“Go away, don’t come back”).

(Emphasis in original.)

32    The documents comprising Annexure TRS 1 evidently relate to issues that have arisen about the collection of rent in connection with two buildings in the Fregon community.

33    None of the evidence filed by Tjilpi Robert Stevens is capable of bearing on the questions of whether a registrar erred in rejecting Tjilpi Murray George’s documents for filing or whether, if they did, the Court should nevertheless dismiss Tjilpi Murray George’s application for judicial review in the exercise of its discretion. The evidence filed by Tjilpi Robert Stevens also does not establish or explain a basis on which this Court could or would have jurisdiction with respect to the proceedings which Tjilpi Murray George sought to commence or, for that matter, the distinct issues to which Tjilpi Robert Stevens’ own affidavit relates.

34    I am not satisfied that Tjilpi Robert Stevens’ participation in the proceedings would assist the Court. On the contrary, if Tjilpi Robert Stevens were to participate it is apparent that he would wish to advance submissions that are irrelevant to the real issues that properly arise in the proceedings and would waste the resources of the Court. Otherwise, it appears that he wishes to add the weight of his support to Tjilpi Murray George’s case. That is not a basis on which the Court will grant leave to intervene.

35    For these reasons, the application by Tjilpi Robert Stevens for leave to intervene in the proceedings is dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    23 July 2025