Federal Court of Australia

Steele v Host-Plus Pty Limited as trustee for the Hostplus Superannuation Fund [2025] FCA 668

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The appeal be dismissed.

2.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HALLEY J:

A.     Introduction

1    This is an appeal pursuant to s 1057(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) from a determination made by the second respondent, the Australian Financial Complaints Authority Limited (AFCA), on 27 November 2024 affirming a decision of the first respondent (Host-Plus), as the trustee of the HostPlus Superannuation Fund (Fund), to pay 100% of the death benefit payable from the Fund in respect of the late Jennifer Cole (Deceased) to the Deceased’s spouse, Stephen Cole. The applicant is the son of the Deceased.

2    By an interlocutory application dated 28 April 2025 (application), Host-Plus seeks an order that the appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs on the grounds that the notice of appeal filed by the applicant (a) fails to raise a seriously arguable question of law for the purposes of s 1057(1) of the Corporations Act, (b) does not state any precise question of law as required by r 33.12(2)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules), and (c) does not state the grounds relied on in support of the relief sought, as required by r 33.12(2)(e) of the Rules.

3    The application was determined on the papers after both Host-Plus and the applicant filed written submissions. At a case management hearing on 29 April 2025, the applicant confirmed that he was content for the application to be determined on the papers without an oral hearing. On 27 March 2025, AFCA filed a submitting notice, while reserving the right to be heard on the question of costs.

4    The applicant contended that any submissions made by Host-Plus should be ‘dismissed or struck out’ because it was “no longer in the loop”, it had become “unnecessarily self-involved” and he was appealing a decision of AFCA, not Host-Plus. The submission was misconceived. Host-Plus has standing as the first respondent to make submissions to the Court.

5    For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the appeal must be dismissed with no order as to costs.

B.     Statutory framework and legal principles

6    Section 1055 of the Corporations Act authorises AFCA to make a determination in relation to a superannuation complaint.

7    AFCA has power under s 1055(6) to vary, set aside and substitute a decision or remit the matter to the decision-makers, but must not make a determination that would be contrary to law: s 1055(7). AFCA must give written reasons for its decision: s 1055A.

8    Section 1055(3) provides:

AFCA must affirm a decision relating to the payment of a death benefit if AFCA is satisfied that the decision, in its operation in relation to:

(a)    the complainant; and

(b)    any other person joined under subsection 1056A(3) as a party to the complaint;

was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

9    This Court’s jurisdiction in relation to a determination under s 1055 arises under s 1057, which relevantly provides:

Appeals to the Federal Court from determination of superannuation complaint

(1)    A party to a superannuation complaint may appeal to the Federal Court, on a question of law, from AFCA’s determination of the complaint.

…

(3)    The Federal Court is to hear and determine the appeal and may make such order as it thinks appropriate.

(4)    Without limiting subsection (3), the orders that may be made by the Federal Court on an appeal include:

(a)    an order affirming or setting aside the determination of AFCA; and

(b)    an order remitting the matter to be determined again by AFCA in accordance with the directions of the Court.

(5)    The Federal Court must not make an order awarding costs against a complainant if the complainant does not defend an appeal instituted by another party to the complaint.

10    The subject matter of an appeal pursuant to s 1057(1), and its scope, are confined to a question or questions of law. For that reason, it is important that the question or questions of law be stated with precision. A notice of appeal, either in the questions of law postulated, or in any accompanying grounds of appeal, should indicate why it is that, if the question of law is answered in the way for which the applicant contends, the appeal should be allowed and other consequential orders sought by the applicant made: Reeves v Nulis Nominees (Australia) Limited (Trustee) [2022] FCA 627 at [28] (Nicholas J).

11    It is not sufficient merely to assert that a question of law arises. Whether an appeal raises a question of law is a matter that must be addressed as a matter of substance. As the Full Court stated in Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315; [2015] FCAFC 92 at [94] in relation to an appeal on a question of law from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal:

In our opinion, the issue must be approached as one of substance. In cases of doubt, the Court should consider the notice of appeal, the alleged question or questions of law, the grounds raised, the statutory context, and the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision, and having considered all those matters, satisfy itself that there is in fact a question of law.

12    An appeal “on a question of law” includes (a) whether the administrative decision maker has identified the relevant legal test, (b) whether the administrative decision maker has applied the correct legal test, (c) whether there is any evidence to support a finding of a particular fact, and (d) whether facts found fall within a statute properly construed: Onassys v Comcare [2022] FCA 90 at [20] (Abraham J) (with respect to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) citing Commissioner of Taxation v Trail Bros Steel & Plastics Pty Ltd (2010) 186 FCR 410; [2010] FCAFC 94 at [13] (Dowsett and Gordon JJ).

13    It may sometimes be appropriate, particularly in appeals brought by litigants in person, to afford some latitude in relation to the precision with which the relevant question of law is identified: Reeves at [28].

14    The Full Court in Haritos at [104] approved the following observations by Mortimer J in Avetmiss Easy Pty Ltd v Australian Skills Qualifications Authority [2014] FCA 314 at [77] with respect to litigants in person:

Recognising minds differ on such matters, in my opinion a requirement that a notice of appeal be read fairly, rather than generously or benevolently, is a preferable approach. It provides more consistency with the role of the Court. It involves neither overzealous scrutiny, nor technicality, nor the imposition of a standard which in the circumstances it would be unreasonable to expect a non-legally trained person to meet. Fairness allows for the reading of a notice of appeal in its context: that is, reading all of the notice rather than simply that nominated as the “question of law.

15    It may even be appropriate in some cases for the Court to formulate the question in appropriate terms when it is apparent from either the notice of appeal or the applicant’s submissions that a question of law does arise: Onassys at [21] citing Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations v Ergin (2010) 119 ALD 155; [2010] FCA 1438 at [11] (Tracey J) and Rana v Repatriation Commission (2011) 126 ALD 1; [2011] FCAFC 124 at [14] (Kenny, Stone and Logan JJ).

16    A finding of fact may be affected by an error of law if AFCA has failed to take into account a relevant matter, or had regard to an irrelevant matter, or if the decision is unreasonable in the legal sense of that word: Reeves at [35] citing Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (1995) 59 FCR 6 at 12-13 (Davies and Beazley JJ with whom Hill J agreed).

17    Rule 33.12(1) and r 33.12(2) of the Rules provide that:

33.12 Starting an appeal – filing and service of notice of appeal

(1)     A person who wants to appeal to the Court under the AAT Act must file a notice of appeal, in accordance with Form 75.

(2)    The notice of appeal must state:

(a)     the part of the decision the applicant appeals from or contends should be varied; and

(b)     the precise question or questions of law to be raised on the appeal; and

(c)     any findings of fact that the Court is asked to make; and

(d)    the relief sought instead of the decision appealed from, or the variation of the decision that is sought; and

(e)     briefly but specifically, the grounds relied on in support of the relief or variation sought.

18    Rule 33.12(1) and r 33.12(2) are in Div 33.2 of the Rules. Rule 33.34 relevantly provides that the provisions of Div 33.2 apply to an appeal under s 1057 of the Corporations Act from a determination of AFCA, except that a notice of appeal must be filed in the Registry of the State or Territory in which the applicant ordinarily resides.

19    The Court has the power under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to dismiss or strike out a notice of appeal where the notice fails to state a question of law: see Onassys at [15]-[16] (in the context of the equivalent question of law provision in the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)) citing Haritos at [96] and Bittmann v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) [2006] FCA 1786 at [12] (Kenny J).

20    Rule 33.30 of the Rules provides:

33.30  Notice of objection to competency of appeal

(1)     A respondent who objects to the competency of an appeal must, within 14 days after being served with a notice of appeal, file a notice of objection to competency:

(a) in accordance with Form 68; and

(b) that, briefly but specifically, states the grounds of the objection.

(2)     The applicant carries the burden of establishing the competency of an appeal.

(3)     A respondent may apply to the Court for the question of competency to be heard and determined before the hearing of the appeal.

(4)     If a respondent has not filed a notice under subrule (1), and the appeal is dismissed by the Court as not competent, the respondent is not entitled to any costs of the appeal.

(5)     If the Court decides that an appeal is not competent, the appeal is dismissed.

21    Although the chapeaux to r 33.30(1) states that a respondent who objects to the competency of an appeal must file a notice of objection to competency within 14 days of being served with a notice of appeal, it is implicit by reason of r 33.30(4) and r 33.30(5) that a Court may dismiss an appeal if it determines that an appeal is not competent, whether or not an objection to competency has been filed. Textually, r 33.30 makes plain that a respondent may only recover its costs of the appeal that is dismissed as incompetent, including by way of example because it does not identify a question of law, if it has filed a notice of objection to competency within the prescribed period.

22    Finally, I recognise the inherent difficulty that litigants in person have in attempting to file appropriate court documents and making submissions, and I have taken those difficulties into account in my consideration of the application by Host-Plus to dismiss the appeal but bearing in mind that the overriding obligation on the Court is to ensure a fair trial for all parties and the touchstone at all times remains that of fairness: see SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445; [2013] FCAFC 146 at [37] (Robertson J) citing Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [309]-[316] (Beazley, Giles and Whealy JJA).

C.     Determination of AFCA

23    AFCA provided written reasons for its determination (Determination) to affirm the decision of Host-Plus to pay 100% of the death benefit of the Deceased to her husband, Mr Cole (Host-Plus Decision).

24    AFCA considered, in accordance with the rules of the Fund, the interests of the Deceased’s dependents, namely her husband and her two surviving children, being the applicant and his sister, Amie Cicciarello.

25    AFCA noted that the applicant and Ms Cicciarello were dissatisfied with the Host-Plus Decision, including for the following reasons:

The [applicant] and [Ms Cicciarello] are dissatisfied with this decision, including for the following reasons:

•    the trustee’s decision fails to consider their relative financial positions, as they are in financial hardship and [Mr Cole] is not

•    the trustee’s decision fails to consider matters immediately after the death of the deceased, as their father was involved in legal proceedings shortly after her death and they paid his legal fees

•    the trustee’s decision fails to consider the fact [Mr Cole] was the sole beneficiary under the deceased’s will

•    the deceased’s wishes were forged by [Mr Cole] and therefore should not be taken into account.

26    AFCA acknowledged that the applicant and Ms Cicciarello appeared to be facing financial hardships but was not persuaded that this meant that the Host-Plus Decision was unfair or unreasonable. AFCA found that neither the applicant nor Ms Cicciarello was financially dependent on the Deceased at the date of her death, and the Deceased’s death did not cause them financial hardship. AFCA considered that the main cause of the financial hardship appeared to relate to legal proceedings involving the father of the applicant and Ms Cicciarello (the former spouse of the Deceased) due to events that occurred after the death of the Deceased. AFCA considered that even if these events could have been foreseen by the Deceased, there was no evidence to indicate that the Deceased would have contributed to the legal fees of her former spouse.

27    AFCA was also satisfied that the Host-Plus Decision was consistent with the wishes of the Deceased. Mr Cole was the sole beneficiary of her will made on 10 May 2005, and on 31 May 2005 the Deceased telephoned Host-Plus and nominated Mr Cole as her preferred beneficiary. AFCA noted that the will was witnessed by two witnesses who appeared to be representatives of the Public Trustee, and the nomination of Mr Cole as the Deceased’s preferred beneficiary was recorded on annual statements sent to the Deceased every year after the change of preferred beneficiary in 2005.

28    AFCA concluded for the foregoing reasons that the Host-Plus Decision, in its operation in relation to the applicant, as the complainant, and the joined parties, Mr Cole and Ms Cicciarello, was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D.     Notice of appeal

29    In his notice of appeal, accepted for filing on 27 December 2024, the applicant stated that he appeals:

…from the entirety of the final determination handed down by both AFCA and Hostplus and wishes instead for an unbiased decision be handed down in an uncontaminated environment, excluding any evidence submitted by my sister Amie who has Bi­polar disorder and which should be considered inadmissible under ‘vulnerable persons,’ and so as to not also influence Federal court assessors.

(Italics in original.)

30    The applicant raised the following seven grounds of appeal:

Findings of fact that the Court is asked to make

1.    Is it highly probable that at least $80k of our mother’s money will be transferred immediately through to the spouses’ children to be spent on luxury, when taking into consideration that the spouse will lose his pension if he earns more than $100k per financial year, and with the total amount of money in question $180k?

2.    Did the solicitor who legally bound our mothers and the spouses will identically on the same day, in the same office value add to his product and set himself up for future work knowing through experience that the way both wills were written, was guaranteed to cause trouble further down the track with 3 children each involved, or;

3.    Did my mother and the spouse bind their wills identically without proportioning “who get what,” because it was very early days,(“we’ll sort that out later”) and mum no doubt planned on living a lot longer than she did, and anticipatingly would have wanted to have scrutinised her own children’s financial positions further down the track, but was unable to because of sickness and could not leave the house because of ulcerative colitis which is a vaccine bi-product, and was therefore also under the influence of heavily medication and did not have the capabilities to do that.

4.    If the spouse has since altered and changed his will post our mothers death to exclude my sister and I from receiving any of our mother’s property, does that act and omission render the word “wishes” null and void, and upon which AFCA and Hostplus have placed a great deal of emphasis and weight to form their final determination?

5.    If a Hostplus mother could sit back and watch on unemotionally whilst her own children suffered without chipping in even $10k towards their tragic cause, and the spouse can chop and change his will as he sees fit effectively dishonouring verbal agreements between my mother and him no doubt in place, why then would the trustee think that our mother would not have thought any differently and have wished at least something go to her own children to remember her by?

6.    Provide another example of a ‘family member’ becoming ‘dependent’ ‘around the date of death’ other than 'the families circumstances changing', and such as the deceased members youngest son suddenly dying and the father of the son facing serious charges in the Supreme court and where the spouse and his children are not family.

7.    Is it fair that the spouse and his children receive not only 100% of our mothers house which she purchased for $85k after our parents separation a decade before the spouse even moved into it, and which is now worth between $700k and $800k, but that they also receive 100% of our mothers death benefit money and 100% of everything else that our mother ever owned and including everything from their own mother?

31    The applicant sought the following orders in the notice of appeal:

1.    That the deadline for releasing our mother’s money to the spouse and his children is recognised (Today, the 24th of Dec 24) and that an Interim Stay order is sought and served on the trustee to prevent those funds being distributed so that I have further time to prepare my case for examination if further evidence is required to help decide upon this uncomplicated ‘trees in the forest’ matter.

2.    That the money remains in the Hostplus account until at least October next year so that accounting advice can be sought to minimise tax, and so that our father has a bank balance when he comes out of gaol because he is penniless courtesy of his corrupt defence lawyers who tried to set him up for a life sentence but were caught at the last minute and is Nethertheless [sic] still broke.

32    Finally, the notice of appeal identified the following grounds that the applicant relied upon:

1.    AFCA approach seen in attachments.

2.    The rules and the law.

3.    Federal court discretion.

33    The notice of appeal did not include any attachments, but in context it appears that the reference to the “AFCA approach” was a reference to the explanatory document created by AFCA entitled “The AFCA Approach to superannuation death benefit complaints” (AFCA Approach).

E.     Consideration

E. 1.     Compliance with s 1057(1) and the Rules

34    As framed, the grounds of appeal do not appear to raise any relevant question of law that might arguably impugn the Determination. Rather, they seek to challenge impermissibly the merits of the Host-Plus Decision affirmed by AFCA by reason of speculative contentions as to what Mr Cole may do with the death benefit, what oral agreements the Deceased and Mr Cole may have reached prior to the death of the Deceased, and what changes Mr Cole may have made to his will.

35    It is readily apparent that the notice of appeal as framed is directed at challenging factual findings that were made or are alleged should have been made by AFCA and does not raise any seriously arguable question of law for the purposes of s 1057(1) of the Corporations Act nor does it state any precise question of law as required by r 33.12(2)(b) of the Rules.

36    Further, the notice of appeal states briefly, but not with any specificity, the grounds relied on in support of the relief sought, contrary to r 33.12(2)(e) of the Rules. References to the “AFCA approach seen in attachments”, “[t]he rules and the law” and “Federal court discretion” are expressed at such a degree of generality that they are effectively meaningless.

37    For these reasons, the notice of appeal is defective, and the appeal cannot proceed on that pleading.

38    The issue then becomes should the appeal be dismissed or should the notice of appeal be struck out and the applicant be given leave to file an amended notice of appeal. The answer to that question turns on whether, after taking into account that the applicant is a litigant in person, it is possible to identify that, in substance, and read fairly as a whole, the notice of appeal raises matters that could be recast as raising seriously arguable questions of law.

39    In my view, the notice of appeal, in substance and read fairly as a whole, suggests that the allegations advanced by the applicant could be recast to raise two questions of law.

40    First, a claim of apprehended bias or actual bias.

41    Second, a failure to take into account relevant considerations.

42    I turn now to consider whether either of these claims, if recast as questions of law in an amended notice of appeal, would raise seriously arguable questions of law.

E.2.     Alleged Bias

43    It is well established that the test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision maker might not have brought an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the decision maker was required to decide: Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

44    The test for actual bias is “not whether a decision-maker’s mind is blank, it is whether it is open to persuasion”, namely a form of prejudgment that is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented”: Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 at [71]-[72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).

45    The applicant advanced the following submissions that could potentially be recast as allegations of apprehended or actual bias against AFCA:

AFCA are governed by a Board of Directors, which includes equal numbers of industry and consumer representatives. It is suspected that some of those board members are from the Banking industry, and clearly some of those consumer representatives have shares in the banking industry.

AFCA failed to report systemic issues, serious contraventions of the law and other reportable matters, set out under section 1052E of the Corporations Act, to regulators including the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) under RG 267 and or the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) when I reported to them the suspicious sale of my father’s house and my sisters virtual slavery to them on May 1 2024.

If AFCA were seemingly unable or unwilling to weigh up those critical contraventions and systematic errors, how were AFCA then expected to weigh up the difference between the costs of supreme court matters, excluding other costs associated with outside upkeep in comparison to the spouses’ children’s potential purchases of new fishing gear etc, and also considering that they are also getting 100% of our mothers house, their mothers house and every other conceivable asset?

10. AFCA are only 6.5yrs old and are already showing signs of Dereliction of duty, professional conduct unbecoming and Gross negligence. Standing before what they do regarding this matter, were they really in a position to be drawing lines in the sand from the outset?

(Italics in original.)

46    The claims, however, are advanced at a degree of generality that is manifestly inadequate to provide any rational or coherent support for any concern that the Determination was relevantly impugned by apprehended bias, let alone actual bias. Nor do they articulate any coherent or intelligible connection between the matters sought to be raised and the Determination made by AFCA. It is not apparent how having board members from the banking industry or with shares in the banking industry could provide any basis for a concern that the Determination was affected by apprehended or actual bias. They cannot give rise to any seriously arguable question of law.

E.3.     Failure to take into account relevant considerations

47    A failure by an administrative decision maker to take into account a relevant consideration can constitute a question of law. A failure to take into account a relevant consideration, however, can only be established as an error of law if the decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which they are bound to take into account in making their decision: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39 (Mason J). A decision maker is not to be criticised for not considering everything an affected party has chosen to include in an “exhaustive list of all the matters which the decision-maker might conceivably regard as relevant”: Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375 (Deane J).

48    The applicant sought to answer the submissions made by Host-Plus that he had failed to raise a seriously arguable question of law for the purposes of s 1057 or to state any precise question of law as required by s 33.12(2)(b) by submitting (as written):

13)    I have presented hundreds of pages of compelling evidence over the course of the last few years after coming home from my own work, excluding vast correspondence with other parties, and excluding other serious matters that I also had to contend with, and some of those laws that I have cited to support our claim for dependency would include:

a)    Precise sections of crimes Acts to support the fact that our father has been wiped out by corrupted legal industries and is now dependent on my sister and I, and hence us in turn on our mother.

b)    Precise sections of Mental Health Acts to support my father having been cleaned out by corrupted legal industries, and to support the fact that our mother in her final years was so heavily medicated that her ability to think clearly, judge and decision make were affected.

c)    Precise sections of Fair trading Acts, not only proving that my father’s Lawyer was a fake and a phoney who used misleading and deceptive conduct in an attempt to set him up for a life sentence so that his house could be swindled from him in appeal, but also to support various paragraphs from within the AFCA approach that compelled me to challenge their determination.

d)    Precise sections from within the NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT 2009 to prove beyond any mathematical doubt that my sister was issued a predatory loan designed to fail so that the banks could have the satisfaction of her working as a slave, have my father own nothing, become homeless and be expected to be happy with it.

e)    Precise sections of Federal Crimes Acts, from fraud, to aiding and abetting, to concealment.

f)    Above all, precise sections of the Corporations Act, and namely section 1057A stating that “the Court or a judge of the Court may make such order or orders staying or otherwise affecting the operation or implementation of the AFCA determination to secure the effectiveness of the hearing and determination of the appeal, and that the Court or a judge of the Court may make an order varying or revoking the first - mentioned order..

(Italics in original.)

49    The submission highlights the extent to which the applicant has not stated any precise question of law for the purposes of r 33.12(2)(b) and the profound difficulty in identifying any seriously arguable question of law that might impugn the Determination. Pointing to provisions of statutes that are alleged to have been contravened by third parties, including “corrupted legal industries” and “the banks”, does not identify any question of law for the purposes of an appeal pursuant to s 1057(1) of the Corporations Act against a determination made by AFCA.

50    Next, the applicant contended that AFCA had failed to comply with various provisions of the AFCA Approach.

51    By way of example, the applicant submitted that AFCA had failed to comply with statements made in [2.3] of the AFCA Approach. That paragraph included the following statement:

The purpose of a death benefit is primarily to provide for those people who were financially reliant on the deceased member at or around the date of death and who might have expected continuing financial support from the member.

52    The applicant submitted that:

Our mother was in her home which was a product of our parent’s separation 10yrs before the spouse even moved into it.

Obviously as biological children of the member, we each reasonably expected to inherit at least a portion of our mothers’ assets when she eventually passed. AFCA failed to consider the weight of that reasonable expectation as a genuine form of “expected continuing financial support from the member”.

AFCA would have the resources to investigate recently changed wills yet slanted the scales of fairness 100% and 45 degrees into the spouse and his children’s favour anyway, and that act is incredibly unfair, cruel and provocative.

53    The relevant enquiry required by [2.3], however, is cumulative. It is necessary to consider who was both financially dependent on a deceased member at the time of their death and might have expected continuing financial support from the member. These matters were addressed by AFCA in the Determination as explained at [24]-[26] above.

54    Finally, the extent to which the claims sought to be pursued by the applicant in the appeal are directed at factual findings made by AFCA with which he vehemently disagrees or factual findings that he maintains should have been made by AFCA is highlighted in the following paragraphs in the “Summary and conclusion” section of his submissions:

18) Considering our other serious personal matters involving our father and biological son of the deceased member, and having sleazily altered his last will and testament sneakily not long after our mother died despite having had 20yrs to do that, it is as though Steve and his family as our former neighbours have jumped our back fence whilst our backs were turned and cleaned us out of house and home, and I will feel robbed for the rest of my life because of it. That he has fleeced us of absolutely everything, is now also highly suspected of double dipping from his former wife, and the law seemingly recognises that disproportionalism and unfairness and supports it.

…

22) That the bottom line is this. Our father who knew my mother a hell of a lot longer than Steve ever did has been cleaned out by criminal defence lawyers, has no house because it has been stolen from him courtesy of the St George bank enabling and facilitating that act, does not even have enough money to buy a cabin in a Caravan park, is almost 80yrs old, will need to make alterations at some point in time to the house he is now effectively squatting in to accommodate his needs, has worked his entire life in goodwill towards retirement and has massive support.

55    AFCA considered whether there was any evidence from which it could be inferred that the Deceased would have contributed to the legal fees incurred by her former husband, the applicant’s father, as explained at [26]-[27] above.

56    For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that none of the allegations made by the applicant could give rise to a seriously arguable question of law that AFCA failed to take into account a relevant consideration.

F.     Disposition

57    Given the failure of the notice of appeal to raise any seriously arguable question of law or comply with r 33.12(2)(b) and r 33.12(2)(e) and the absence of any discernible seriously arguable question of law that might be advanced in an amended notice of appeal, the appeal must be dismissed.

Associate:

Dated:    20 June 2025