Federal Court of Australia

Seniors and Disabilities Best Access Group v Commissioner of Main Roads [2025] FCA 424

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The application filed on 23 April 2025 in Form 12 under r 7.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be taken to be an originating application made under s 46PP(1) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) and r 8.05 of the Rules.

2.    The respondent’s name be amended to the ‘Commissioner of Main Roads’.

3.    Until 4.30pm (AWST) on 22 May 2025, the respondent, whether by itself, by its officers, employees or agents or otherwise, be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining it from removing the balance of the pedestrian footpath that runs in a north/south direction between Scarborough Beach Road and Green Street terminating to the east of the junction between Green Street and Waterloo Street in Joondanna in the State of Western Australia.

4.    The application be relisted for further hearing as to the continuation, discharge or variation of the injunction granted in paragraph 3 of these orders at 2.15 pm (AWST) on 21 May 2025.

5.    The parties may apply on 48 hours’ written notice to vary or discharge the injunction granted in paragraph 3 of these orders.

6.    There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FEUTRILL J:

1    On 23 and 24 April 2025 I heard an urgent application for an interim injunction under s 46PP of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). At the hearing I made orders for limited interim injunction. At that time, I gave a brief oral explanation of my reasons and indicated that I would publish written and more detailed reasons later. These are those written reasons.

2    The first applicant is an unincorporated association of persons with disabilities known as the ‘Seniors and Disabilities Best Access Group’ or ‘SANDBAG’. Mr Krysiak, as the second applicant, is the convenor of SANDBAG and represents its members. Mr Krysiak, as the third applicant, is carer of his mother, a member of SANDBAG.

3    Mr Krysiak lodged a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission on behalf of SANDBAG members under s 46P of the Human Rights Commission Act alleging that certain acts, omissions or practices of the respondent (Commissioner of Main Roads) and the Western Australian Minister for Transport are unlawful discrimination. The alleged unlawful discrimination involves acts, omissions or practices alleged to be unlawful under Div 2 of Pt 2 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). Namely, indirect discrimination relating to access to premises and (or) the provision of services or making facilities available to the persons Mr Krysiak represents: ss 6, 23, 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act.

4    The alleged acts, omissions or practices of the Commissioner of Main Roads concern the design, construction and implementation of a certain roadworks at the intersection of Green Street, Main Street and Scarborough Beach Road in Joondanna, a suburb within the Perth Metropolitan Area, in Western Australia. The works involve modifications to the intersection that will result in the construction of a dual-lane roundabout and realignment of the roads meeting at the intersection. Amongst other things, a bus-stop will be removed from the intersection and a footpath that terminates to the east of the intersection at Green Street adjacent to Waterloo Street will be removed and replaced with a footpath that terminates to the west of the existing footpath adjacent to the eastern side of the island of the new roundabout.

5    The SANDBAG members allege that the design, construction and implementation of the roundabout and associated works results in indirect discrimination because the position at which the new footpath will terminate will make it unsafe, due to blind spots, for the members to cross the road. As a consequence, the SANDBAG members will be required to avoid using that footpath. The SANDBAG members also allege that the removal and relocation of the bus-stop will require the members to travel to a more distant location and, thereby, restrict their access to public transport.

6    Section 46PP of the Human Rights Commission Act provides, relevantly, that at any time after a complaint is lodged with the Human Rights Commission, on the application of the complainant, this Court may grant an interim injunction to maintain the status quo as it existed immediately before the complaint was lodged. Further, that a condition of granting the interim injunction cannot require a person to give an undertaking as to damages.

7    A complaint may be lodged in the Human Rights Commission by a person aggrieved by the alleged acts, omissions or practices on that person’s behalf or on behalf of that person or one or more other persons who are also aggrieved or by a person on behalf of one or more other persons aggrieved by the alleged acts, omissions or practices: s 46P(2)(a) and s 46(2)(c) of the Human Rights Commission Act. Mr Krysiak submits that he has made a complaint on behalf of the members of SANDBAG in accordance with s 46P(2) and relies on Executive Council of Australian Jewry v Scully (1998) 79 FCR 537 as authority for the proposition that he had sufficient standing to make such a complaint.

8    In Scully a question arose as to whether the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, as an unincorporated association, was a ‘person’ within the meaning of s 22(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), as it was then enacted, and, as such, could be a ‘person aggrieved’ for the purposes of that Act. Justice Wilcox concluded that an unincorporated association could not be a person aggrieved because it is not a juristic person. However, it was necessary to go behind the name and consider whether the juristic persons who constitute the unincorporated association are persons aggrieved by the allegedly unlawful discrimination. If they are, the complaint is competent because in law, though not in name, the complaint is made by the members of the association. In reaching that conclusion Wilcox J accepted that while in a court of law it would be necessary to name each member of the association individually as a party to the proceeding, in an administrative law context, it is sufficient to use the collective name of the members of the association: Scully at 547E-F, 548C. I accept that if members of SANDBAG meet the description of a ‘person aggrieved’ Mr Krysiak may have standing to make a complaint on behalf of those members under s 46P(2)(c) of the Human Rights Commission Act even if Mr Krysiak is not, himself, a ‘person aggrieved’.

9    There was no evidence before the Court of the members, constitution or other governing rules of SANDBAG nor of the manner in which the members have given Mr Krysiak authority to represent them as ‘convenor’. There was no evidence of where the members reside, the extent to which they crossed Green Street at the relevant point or used the bus-stop before the roadworks commenced. Nor was there evidence of any ‘disability’ (within the meaning of s 4 of the Disability Discrimination Act) of any member of SANDBAG. However, there was evidence that, as of 19 August 2016, SANDBAG had 20 members and Mr Krysiak was its sole office-holder. Mr Krysiak asserts in the complaint lodged with the Human Rights Commission that he represents a class of persons with mobility-related disabilities, with vision disabilities, with neurological, intellectual, psychological or cognitive disabilities and with combined disabilities. Therefore, I infer that members of SANDBAG have disabilities of these kinds. For the purposes of this application, I am satisfied that it is reasonably arguable that Mr Krysiak has lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission on behalf of one or more ‘persons aggrieved by the alleged acts, omissions or practices’. That is sufficient to give Mr Krysiak standing to make an application, as complainant, under s 46PP of the Human Rights Commission Act.

10    The power conferred on the Court under s 46PP is unusual in that it is a power to order an interim injunction in circumstances in which there is no pending proceeding in the Court. The status quo to be maintained is that associated with the complaint lodged with the Human Rights Commission. The power evidently serves a similar function to the grant of an interim injunction in a proceeding in a court, namely, to preserve the subject matter of the complaint-making and resolution process in the Human Rights Commission. Taking into account that an undertaking as to damages cannot be a condition of the grant of an injunction, the factors that the Court would take into account in the exercise of power to grant an interim or interlocutory injunction under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) may be considered as a useful guide to exercise of the discretionary power under s 46PP of the Human Rights Commission Act.

11    The principles governing the circumstances in which a court will grant an interim or interlocutory injunction are well-established and need not be restated at any length. The Court will typically have regard to interrelated matters of whether there is a ‘serious question to be tried’ and where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies. As to the first matter, the applicant must demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, preservation of the status quo pending determination of the proceeding. As to the second matter, the applicant must satisfy the Court that the injury likely to be suffered if the injunction were not granted outweighs the injury the respondent would suffer if it were granted. These matters are not distinct in that an apparently strong claim may lead to the grant of an injunction where the balance of convenience is fairly even. On the other hand, an injunction may be granted even where the claim is doubtful if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it. See, e.g., Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; 217 FCR 238 at [52]-[74]; Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (1985) 5 FCR 464 at 472.

12    In applying these well-known factors to an application under s 46PP of the Human Rights Commission Act, consideration of whether there is a ‘serious question to be tried’ must be focussed on the complaint-making and resolution process of the Human Rights Commission, not on whether, if that process were terminated without resolution, the complainant may obtain relief under s 46PO from the Court. Likewise, the ‘balance of convenience’ must be considered in the context of preservation of the utility of the Human Rights Commission process and, in particular, the potential for a conciliated resolution and not the utility of a prospective claim in the Court. See, e.g., Abraham v Housing Authority [2022] FCA 1145 at [35]-[44] (Jackson J) and the authorities there cited.

13    The functions of the Human Rights Commission include inquiring into and attempting to conciliate complaints of unlawful discrimination: s 11(aa) of the Human Rights Commission Act. Pt IIB sets out the process by which the Commission performs that function. The process commences with lodging a complaint under s 46P. It must be reasonably arguable that the alleged acts, omissions or practices in the complaint are unlawful discrimination: s 46P(1A). A complaint is referred to the President of the Commission and, after that referral, the President must consider whether to inquire into the complaint, terminate the complaint without inquiry and, unless terminated, inquire into the complaint and attempt to conciliate the complaint: s 46PD, s 46PF(1). There are various ways in which the President may terminate a complaint, including if the President is satisfied that the alleged acts, omissions or practices are not unlawful discrimination or there is no reasonable prospect that a court with jurisdiction under s 46PO would be so satisfied, the complaint is trivial, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, or there is no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation: s 46PH(1)(a), s 46PH(1B), s 46PH(1C). Otherwise, the President has power to obtain information and hold conferences in the exercise of the function of inquiring into and attempting to conciliate a complaint: ss 46PI – 46PN.

14    It is a matter for the President to decide whether or not to terminate Mr Krysiak’s complaint or to investigate and attempt conciliation of it. Therefore, beyond an assessment of the relative merit of the contention that the alleged acts, omissions or practices set out in the complaint are unlawful discrimination, it would not be appropriate for this Court, when considering if there is a serious question to be tried, to pre-empt the manner in which the President is likely to perform the functions under Pt IIB. In particular, it would not be appropriate to express a view on the extent to which the President may or may not exercise power to terminate the complaint without inquiry.

15    In the complaint Mr Krysiak alleges that in designing, constructing and implementing the roadworks the Commissioner of Main Roads imposed upon the SANDBAG members with disabilities conditions or requirements by which the members will be required to:

(a)    identify safe gaps in fast-moving, multilane, multiple directional, roundabout traffic in order to negotiate and travel across two crossing points on uncontrolled roundabout legs relying on the vigilance, courtesy and carefulness of motor vehicle drivers; and

(b)    adapt to a traffic environment expressly prioritised for uninterrupted vehicular flow, rather than for pedestrian access, and to do so without the availability of protective features that would accommodate members (including those with assistance animals) such as signalised pedestrian crossings, pedestrian refuges, audible or tactile crossing cues, or safe staging infrastructure.

16    Mr Krysiak contends that these conditions or requirements:

(1)    are not reasonable, having regard to the known and foreseeable impacts on persons with disabilities, the availability of less discriminatory alternatives and the prior warnings provided to the Commissioner of Main Roads;

(2)    have, or are likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with disabilities, particularly persons with vision disabilities (including guide dog users), persons with mobility-related disabilities, persons with neurological, intellectual, psychosocial or cognitive disabilities and persons with combined disabilities, compared with persons without disabilities;

(3)    result in a denial of equal access to public road infrastructure, in breach of ss 6, 23 and (or) 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act, and are inconsistent with the Commissioner of Main Roads’ obligations under international, Commonwealth and State disability access frameworks, including the State Disability Strategy and its Disability Access and Inclusion Plan; and

(4)    put persons with disabilities in unnecessary and increased danger in order to allow for questionably better traffic flow, as outlined in the complaint.

17    Section 6 of the Disability Discrimination Act provides, relevantly:

6    Indirect disability discrimination

(1)    For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if:

(a)    the discriminator requires, or proposes to require, the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition; and

(b)    because of the disability, the aggrieved person does not or would not comply, or is not able or would not be able to comply, with the requirement or condition; and

(c)    the requirement or condition has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with the disability.

(2)    For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) also discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if:

(a)    the discriminator requires, or proposes to require, the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition; and

(b)    because of the disability, the aggrieved person would comply, or would be able to comply, with the requirement or condition only if the discriminator made reasonable adjustments for the person, but the discriminator does not do so or proposes not to do so; and

(c)    the failure to make reasonable adjustments has, or is likely to have, the effect of disadvantaging persons with the disability.

…

18    It is reasonably arguable that, if the Commissioner of Main Roads requires or proposes to require the SANDBAG members to comply with the alleged conditions or requirements, that would involve discrimination on the ground of disability within the meaning of s 6(1) or s 6(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act.

19    Section 23 and s 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act provide:

23    Access to premises

It is unlawful for a person to discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person’s disability:

(a)    by refusing to allow the other person access to, or the use of, any premises that the public or a section of the public is entitled or allowed to enter or use (whether for payment or not); or

(b)    in the terms or conditions on which the first-mentioned person is prepared to allow the other person access to, or the use of, any such premises; or

(c)    in relation to the provision of means of access to such premises; or

(d)    by refusing to allow the other person the use of any facilities in such premises that the public or a section of the public is entitled or allowed to use (whether for payment or not); or

(e)    in the terms or conditions on which the first-mentioned person is prepared to allow the other person the use of any such facilities; or

(f)    by requiring the other person to leave such premises or cease to use such facilities.

24    Goods, services and facilities

It is unlawful for a person who, whether for payment or not, provides goods or services, or makes facilities available, to discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person’s disability:

(a)    by refusing to provide the other person with those goods or services or to make those facilities available to the other person; or

(b) \    in the terms or conditions on which the first-mentioned person provides the other person with those goods or services or makes those facilities available to the other person; or

(c)    in the manner in which the first-mentioned person provides the other person with those goods or services or makes those facilities available to the other person.

20    Section 4 of the Disability Discrimination Act defines ‘premises’ non-exhaustively to include a structure, building, aircraft, vehicle or vessel, and a place (whether enclosed or built or not), and a part of premises. Section 4 also defines ‘services’ non-exhaustively and relevantly to include services relating to transport and travel or services of the kind provided by a government, a government authority or a local government body.

21    The Commissioner of Main Roads is a body corporate established under s 7 and s 9 of the Main Roads Act 1930 (WA). The Commissioner is an agent of the State of Western Australia and has the status, immunities and privileges of the State under s 9AA of the Main Roads Act.

22    Section 15B of the Main Roads Act describes certain of the functions of the Commissioner of Main Roads as follows.

(1)    The Commissioner’s functions include the following –

(a)    to construct and manage the State’s network of highways and main roads, including shared paths, cycle paths and similar paths that form part of that network;

(b)    to carry out works in relation to highways, main roads and other roads in accordance with the provisions of this Act;

(c)    to carry out works connected with roads, including to construct or manage infrastructure associated with roads and traffic;

(d)    to carry out other main roads works;

(e)    to control or regulate traffic —

(i)    directly on highways and main roads; and

(ii)    on other roads in conjunction with local governments and other road authorities;

(f)    to undertake civil construction and other works for public purposes on behalf of government agencies or government owned entities, local governments or other authorities;

(g)    without adversely affecting its other functions —

(i)    to use the Commissioner’s assets for public purposes that are not necessarily connected with the construction or maintenance of roads; or

(ii)    to undertake activities that may use or exploit the Commissioner’s assets or services, including to use the Commissioner’s assets for purposes that may be commercial in nature; or

(iii)    to undertake other activities that may be commercial in nature, including to enter into agreements, leases or licences, to earn revenue or to make a profit;

(h)    the other functions conferred on the Commissioner under this Act or another written law.

(2)    The Commissioner may do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of the Commissioner’s functions.

…

23    Section 27A of the Main Roads Act confers certain powers on the Commissioner of Main Roads with respect to roads that are not highways, main roads or secondary roads as follows.

(1)    In this section —

relevant local government, in relation to a road, means the local government of the district in which the road is located;

road includes part of a road.

(2)    The Commissioner may carry out works on a road for the development of an area or for any other purpose, and the road need not be declared to be a highway, a main road or a secondary road.

(3)    The Commissioner must consult with the relevant local government before commencing works on the road under this section.

(4)    When the works have been carried out, the road is the responsibility of the relevant local government and must be maintained by the relevant local government.

(5)    The Commissioner and officers acting under this Act have the same functions with regard to roads under this section as are by this Act conferred on them regarding highways and main roads.

(6)    The provisions of this Act regarding highways and main roads, adjoining land and land on which environmental offset works are being carried out apply, as far as practicable and with appropriate modifications, to those roads and that land.

24    It is not in issue that the Commissioner of Main Roads has commenced roadworks involving modification of the intersection. None of the roads at the intersection is a highway, main road or secondary road within the meaning of the Main Roads Act. Therefore, the Commissioner of Main Roads is evidently exercising power under s 27A of the Main Roads Act. It is reasonably arguable that the Commissioner’s exercise of that power extends to the construction of the footpaths that are the subject of Mr Krysiak’s complaint. However, there is no material before the Court to establish a reasonably arguable foundation for a contention that the relevant roads, road reserves or footpaths are on land vested in or under the control of the Commissioner of Main Roads or that, upon completion of the works, the Commissioner will have responsibility for maintaining them.

25    It is doubtful that the footpaths and roads the subject of the complaint fall within the ordinary meaning of ‘premises’ in s 23 of the Disability Discrimination Act. Leaving to one side that difficulty, in the absence of ownership, possession or control of the applicable land, it is not reasonably arguable that any act, omission or practice of the Commissioner of Main Roads involves allowing or providing access to ‘premises’ or use of facilities in such ‘premises’. In my view, on the material before the Court, it is highly doubtful that the complaint has raised a reasonably arguable allegation of unlawful discrimination by the Commissioner under s 23 of the Disability Discrimination Act.

26    Regarding alleged unlawful discrimination under s 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act, the performance of a public function may, but need not, involve provision of services or making facilities available to a particular person or class of members of the public. Having regard to the public functions and powers of the Commissioner of Main Roads, I have reservations that the design, construction and implementation of the roadworks at the intersection and associated work concerning construction of footpaths involves the provision of services to SANDBAG members or making facilities available to the members for the purposes of s 24. Nonetheless, while I consider that there are conceptual impediments to SANDBAG members successfully establishing unlawful discrimination under s 24, there is good reason to consider the complaint reasonably arguable. The authorities illustrate that the concept of the provision of services in the context of anti-discrimination legislation is not straightforward and open to differing judicial views by first instance, intermediate appellate and ultimate appellate judges on the same facts: see, e.g., the discussion of the principles and authorities of Yates J in Robinson v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2012] FCA 770; 292 ALR 702 at [146]-[182], upheld on appeal in Robinson v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2013] FCAFC 64 at [165]-[168] (Siopis, Besanko and McKerracher JJ), and Banks-Smith J in EIX20 v Western Australia (No 2) [2025] FCA 28 at [93]-[107]. In my view, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to raise a ‘serious question to be tried’ for the purposes of s 46PP.

27    Ultimately, however, I do not consider that the balance of convenience favours an injunction of the kind SANDBAG members have sought on this application. While there is a conflict on the evidence as to precisely when they were commenced, the Commissioner of Main Roads has commenced and substantially completed the roadworks involving the realignment of the roads and construction of the roundabout. The works have been subcontracted to an independent contractor and the scheduled date for practical completion of the works, as a whole, is 10 July 2025.

28    As at 24 April 2025 the intersection was under traffic management and speed restrictions with part of Green Street closed. The final layout had been constructed. In order to re-open the road, with the new roundabout, the road was to be sealed with asphalt and some drainage modification works completed. That work was planned in the days after 24 April 2025 with the road to be reopened to multi-directional traffic on Monday 28 April 2025. After re-opening the road there will be ‘finishing works’ to be completed. These consist of kerbing, line-marking, filling gaps, construction of footpaths and tidying up. These works will be completed under traffic management and speed restrictions, but the road and roundabout will be open to traffic. If the remaining roadworks were injuncted the Commissioner of Main Roads estimates that it would incur delay costs of approximately $13,000 per day.

29    Mr Krysiak lodged the complaint with the Human Rights Commission around 7 April 2025. It appears that about ten days later Mr Krysiak first attempted to apply for an injunction in this Court. However, he had some difficulties with acceptance of documents for filing. An application was ultimately accepted for filing on 22 April 2025. The evidence of the Commissioner of Main Roads is that the work commenced in November 2024. The evidence of Mr Krysiak is that the construction work commenced in late March 2025 resulting in the removal of the relevant pedestrian access and crossing on Green Street. The evidence of the Commissioner of Main Roads is to the effect that the footpath that terminates at Green Street has not been removed, but it is not accessible to pedestrians because it is within the area of the works. Also, the new footpath that will terminate adjacent to the roundabout to the west of the existing footpath has not been constructed. Whatever the reason for the delay in applying to the Court, the roadworks component has now been substantially completed and traffic flow through the intersection will be impeded if that component is not completed as planned.

30    A significant component of Mr Krysiak’s complaint concerns relocation of the footpath which terminates at Green Street. He contends that the proposed new location will have the conditions and requirements of which complaint is made in the Human Rights Commission largely due to the alignment of the road creating ‘blind spots’ that will impede the timing of safe crossing of the road. Mr Krysiak submits that at the existing location, and before the works were commenced, there was a clear line-of-sight and the road could be crossed in two stages as there was an island that divided traffic travelling in each direction along Green Street. He submits that the roadworks completed thus far has resulted in removal of that island.

31    It follows that there is little that remains of the ‘status quo’ that existed immediately before the complaint was lodged. In these circumstances, the balance of convenience does not favour preventing completion of the roadworks and roundabout at the intersection. It is too late to prevent construction of the roundabout and realignment of the road. There is no justification for preventing completion of that component of the works. Moreover, to do so would result in significant continuing and unnecessary inconvenience to members of the public travelling through the intersection. It would also result in the Commissioner of Main Roads incurring unnecessary costs associated with delay of the works.

32    However, the existing footpath has not been removed and the new footpath has not been constructed. Therefore, for so long as that remains the case, the location of the footpath, line-of-sight, pedestrian refuge (island) and other considerations raised in Mr Krysiak’s complaint are matters that are capable of resolution through conciliation in the Human Rights Commission should the President decide to investigate and attempt conciliation of the complaint. Accordingly, the location of the existing footpath is part of the pre-complaint status quo that remains capable of preservation.

33    Having regard to these matters, I am of the view that the Commissioner of Main Roads should be restrained from removing the existing footpath to allow for the complaint-making and resolution process of the Human Rights Commission to take place in an environment in which the expense of removing the footpath has not been incurred and the expense of reinstating it would not have to be incurred. Given that the works are not scheduled for completion until 10 July 2025 such a restraint should not result in undue disruption to completion of the other works.

34    There is also evidence that it may take the Human Rights Commission 6 to 11 months to action the complaint after it has been accepted. I am not presently persuaded that the balance of convenience favours restraining removal of the footpath and completion of the works for that period of time. The new footpath will form part of a thoroughfare connecting the Glendalough train station with the local business district. Extended closure of the relevant footpath is likely to result in significant inconvenience to broader members of the public and increased cost of completion of the works.

35    Taking all these matters into account, I consider that the interim injunction should remain in place for 28 days. During that period, I expect that the Commissioner of Main Roads, as a model litigant, will co-operate with SANDBAG members with a view to having any investigation and conciliation of the complaint in the Human Rights Commission dealt with expeditiously if the President does not terminate it without investigation.

36    I have relisted the application for further hearing shortly before the end of the 28-day period. The purpose of that hearing will be to consider whether the injunction should be extended, varied or discharged. At that time, the then current state of the works, estimated time to completion and the progress of the complaint in the Human Rights Commission may be taken into account in the consideration of these matters. The parties will also have general liberty to apply in the event that circumstances substantially change before the end of the 28-day period.

Associate:

Dated:    30 April 2025