Federal Court of Australia

Sandilands v Registrar Parkyn [2025] FCA 358

File number(s):

NSD 235 of 2025

Judgment of:

WIGNEY J

Date of judgment:

11 April 2025

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal from decision of this Court dismissing applicant’s earlier application for an extension of time within which to institute proceedings in this Court – application dismissed

Legislation:

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 183

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20(3)(b), 24(1AA)(a)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 2.26, 2.27

Cases cited:

Sandilands v Registrar Parkyn [2025] FCA 41

Sandilands, in the application of Sandilands [2022] ACopyT 3

Tran v Singh [2019] FCA 70

Division:

General Division

Registry:

New South Wales

National Practice Area:

Other Federal Jurisdiction

Number of paragraphs:

12

Date of hearing:

Application determined on the papers

Counsel for the applicant:

The applicant was self-represented

Counsel for the respondent:

The respondent did not appear

ORDERS

NSD 235 of 2025

BETWEEN:

PETER SANDILANDS

Applicant

AND:

REGISTRAR NIC PARKYN

Respondent

order made by:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 April 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The applicant’s application for extension of time and leave to appeal dated 24 February 2025 and filed on 25 February 2025 be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WIGNEY J:

1    The applicant, Mr Peter Sandilands, has filed an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal a judgment of a Judge of this Court. That judgment dismissed Mr Sandilands’ application for an extension of time within which to seek judicial review of a decision of the respondent, a Registrar of this Court. For the reasons that follow, Mr Sandilands’ application must be dismissed. It is not only effectively incompetent, but also demonstrably without merit and the documentation filed by Mr Sandilands is manifestly deficient and defective.

2    The essential facts relating to Mr Sandilands’ application are as follows.

3    Sometime prior to June 2022, Mr Sandilands attempted to file documents in the Copyright Tribunal in which he purported to seek a determination of remuneration pursuant to s 183 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). On 7 June 2022, Justice Perram, then a Deputy President of the Tribunal, ordered that the Registrar not accept Mr Sandilands’ documents for filing, essentially because the documents did not disclose a cognisable claim under s 183(5): Sandilands, in the application of Sandilands [2022] ACopyT 3 (ACTD) at [5]. The documents also suffered from several formal defects: ACDT at [6].

4    In October 2023, Mr Sandilands sought to file documents in this Court, one which purported to be an application for an extension of time to commence proceedings seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s determination not to accept his documents for filing (the ACDT). On 13 October 2023, the respondent advised Mr Sandilands that he had refused to accept Mr Sandilands’ documents for filing pursuant to r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) because he was satisfied that they were, on their face, frivolous or vexatious (the respondent’s decision).

5    Over eleven months later, Mr Sandilands sought to file various documents in this Court which included a purported application for an extension of time within which to commence judicial review proceedings in respect of the respondent’s decision, as well as a document which purported to be an affidavit in support of that application. Mr Sandilands subsequently sought to file various other documents that appeared to relate to his purported application for an extension of time.

6    On 5 February 2025, a Judge of this Court, who I will refer to as the primary judge, ordered that the Registry be directed, pursuant to r 2.27(e) of the Rules, not to accept the Mr Sandilands’ application for an extension of time for filing: Sandilands v Registrar Parkyn [2025] FCA 41. The primary judge also ordered that Mr Sandilands’ application for an extension of time within which to challenge the respondent’s decision be dismissed. It should perhaps be noted that it was somewhat incongruous for the primary judge to both direct that Mr Sandilands’ application for an extension of time not be accepted for filing, and order that the application be dismissed, though ultimately nothing turns on that incongruity.

7    It should also be noted that the respondent filed a submitting appearance in the proceeding before the primary judge. While the respondent has not filed a submitting appearance in this proceeding, consistently with the approach he took in respect of the proceeding before the primary judge, he has played no active role in it.

8    On 25 February 2025, Mr Sandilands filed what purported to be an application for extension of time and leave to appeal the judgment of the primary judge. That document purported to set out the grounds of the application. I do not propose to rehearse those grounds. It is sufficient to note that they are nonsensical. They certainly do not articulate any rational or comprehendible, let alone reasonable, ground of challenge to the primary judge’s decision. Mr Sandilands also filed a document which purported to be an affidavit in support of his application, however that document was manifestly defective for various reasons, including because it had not been properly sworn or affirmed. Even putting the defective nature of the document to one side, the purported affidavit contained no rational or comprehensible, let alone admissible, evidence capable of supporting the application.

9    Mr Sandilands consented to the Court determining his application for an extension of time on the papers. He has not filed any submissions in support of his application or otherwise sought to be heard in respect of it.

10    Mr Sandilands’ purported application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal the judgment of the primary judge is effectively incompetent. That is because an appeal cannot be brought from a judgment refusing an extension of time within which to institute proceedings in the Court: s 24(1AA)(a) and s 20(3)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); see Tran v Singh [2019] FCA 70 at [36]. The judgment of the primary judge is such a judgment. It is immaterial that Mr Sandilands’ application purports to be an application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, as opposed to a notice of appeal: Tran at [38].

11    In any event, and to the extent that it might be said that Mr Sandilands might have a right to appeal the order made by the primary judge directing the Registry not to accept his application for an extension of time, Mr Sandilands’ purported application is, for the reasons already given, manifestly defective and does not articulate any rational or reasonable grounds upon which the judgment of the primary judge might be challenged. It is readily apparent that the primary judge was entirely correct to dismiss Mr Sandilands’ application for the reasons given, and that those grounds of appeal identified by Mr Sandilands, to the extent that any sense can be made of them, are entirely without merit.

12    Mr Sandilands’ application for an extension of time and leave to appeal must accordingly be dismissed. As the matter was determined on the papers, it is appropriate that there be no order as to costs.

I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wigney.

Associate:

Dated:    11 April 2024