FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nipps (liquidator), in the matter of i-Prosperity Pty Ltd (in liq) [2024] FCA 1527

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act), the first to fifth plaintiffs (the Liquidators) have approval to enter into, and cause the sixth to tenth plaintiffs (the Companies) to enter into, a proposed Litigation Funding Agreement substantially in the form of the agreement located at confidential annexure JN-V to the confidential affidavit of Jeremy Nipps sworn 30 October 2024 (Confidential Affidavit).

2.    Pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Act, the Liquidators have approval to enter into, and cause the Companies to enter into, a Priorities Agreement substantially in the form of the agreement located at confidential annexure JN-V to the Confidential Affidavit.

3.    Pursuant to s 477(2B) of the Act, to the extent required, the Liquidators have approval to enter into, nunc pro tunc:

(together, the NRFA Fee Agreements).

4.    Pursuant to s 37AF and s 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the following documents be marked marked confidential on the Court file, not be published, disclosed or accessed except pursuant to an order of the Court and that their contents be suppressed until the conclusion of any litigation (including any appeal) arising out of the winding up and affairs of the Companies:

5.    Pursuant to r 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), the Court determines that the Litigation Funding Agreement, the Priorities Agreement, the NRFA Retainer and NRFA Fee Agreements and any documents created as a result of entry into them are confidential and it would not be reasonable for the Liquidators to comply with a request to produce them to the creditor or creditors within the meaning of r 70-10(2)(a) and r 70-15(2)(a) of the Insolvency Practice Rules (Corporations) 2016.

6.    The costs of this application be costs in the liquidation of the Companies.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

1    By originating process dated 30 October 2024, the first to fifth plaintiffs, being Jeremy Joseph Nipps and Barry Wight of Cor Cordis, in their capacity as the joint and several liquidators (the liquidators) of the sixth to tenth plaintiffs (the companies), sought approval from the Court to enter into, and cause the companies to enter into, the following arrangements:

(a)    a proposed litigation funding agreement between LCM Funding Pty Ltd (LCM), the liquidators and the companies (the litigation funding agreement); and

(b)    a proposed priorities agreement between LCM, the liquidators, the companies, and others (the priorities agreement);

(together, the funding agreements) and, to the extent leave is necessary, approval nunc pro tunc to enter into the retainer agreements entered into with Norton Rose Fullbright Australia (NRFA) on 17 July 2020, 12 July 2021 and 18 June 2022 (NRFA retainer agreements).

2    Court approval is required for the litigation funding agreement and priorities agreement because the terms of both documents contain obligations which extend beyond three months: s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act). As discussed below, it is not clear that Court approval is required in respect of the NRFA retainer agreements, however the liquidators sought such approval out of an abundance caution.

3    The liquidators filed the following affidavits in support of their application, each of which were read at the hearing on 13 December 2024:

(a)    two affidavits of Mr Jeremy Nipps (being one of the two liquidators) sworn on 30 October 2024 (the first Nipps affidavit, and the second (confidential) Nipps affidavit); and

(b)    an affidavit of Ms Fiona Murray-Palmer, a solicitor employed by NRFA, the solicitors for the liquidators, affirmed 11 December 2024.

4    The liquidators also sought interim and final confidentiality orders pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) in respect of the second (confidential) Nipps affidavit and the portions of the liquidators’ written submissions that pertain to the matters addressed in that affidavit.

5    In her affidavit, Ms Murray-Palmer deposed to the steps taken by the liquidators to notify the companies’ creditors, and other persons and entities against whom the companies may have claims, of this application. None of the notified persons or entities sought to be heard on the application, and no person or entity appeared at the hearing of the application to oppose the orders sought.

6    On 13 December 2024, I made orders substantially in the form sought by the liquidators. These are my reasons for doing so.

Background

7    The sixth to ninth plaintiffs (the i-Prosperity companies) were part of a large and complex corporate group which commenced operations in Sydney in 2005, and engaged in funds management in Australian real estate investments for high net worth foreign investors, some of whom who were investors in what is known as the “Significant Investor Visa” program. Many of the entities were directed by Mr Menghong (Michael) Gu or Mr Zhou Zhang (Harry) Huang.

8    On 15 July 2020, Alan Lee Walker, Mr Wight and Mr Nipps (the administrators) were appointed as joint and several administrators of the sixth to eighth plaintiffs, as well as other related entities. On 19 August 2020, the administrators were appointed as liquidators of the sixth to eighth plaintiffs. On 17 September 2020, the administrators were also appointed liquidators of the ninth plaintiff. On 31 March 2021, Mr Walker resigned as a partner of Cor Cordis and as liquidator of the i-Prosperity companies.

9    Mr Gu and Mr Huang left Australia in around late July or August 2020 and have not been heard from since. Investigations by New South Wales Police into Mr Gu and Mr Huang are ongoing. Mr Gu was bankrupted on 10 August 2021.

10    On 23 November 2022, the Court reinstated the registration of the tenth plaintiff and appointed Mr Wight and Mr Nipps as liquidators of it, along with other related entities. The tenth plaintiff and its related entities were indebted to the sixth plaintiff for around $21 million and its assets appear to have been divested in around 2017 to a then related entity. Mr Gu and Mr Huang are both current or former directors of the tenth plaintiff.

11    At the time of the hearing, the liquidators had identified creditor claims of:

(a)    around $425 million against the sixth plaintiff;

(b)    around $23 million against the seventh plaintiff;

(c)    around $132 million against the eighth plaintiff;

(d)    around $2 million against the ninth plaintiff, which largely relates to an amount owing to the sixth plaintiff; and

(e)    around $7.11 million against the tenth plaintiff, which largely relates to an amount owing to the sixth plaintiff.

12    There are no substantial assets in the liquidations of the companies. As at 31 July 2024, the liquidators had $361,622.30 of cash in hand in connection with the i-Prosperity companies and associated companies, and $9,706.47 in connection with the tenth plaintiff and associated companies.

13    The liquidators have engaged in extensive efforts in the conduct of the administration and liquidation of the companies, as well as in investigating potential claims available to the companies which might result in returns to creditors. That work has included obtaining forensic IT services to capture and preserve the companies’ IT data in a usable format, serving notices to produce documents on a variety of parties, conducting public examinations, and obtaining an extension of time for bringing potential claims for the benefit of creditors under s 588FF(1) of the Act (the extension application). The extension application was granted by Button J on 22 November 2023: Nipps, in the Matter of i-Prosperity Pty Ltd (in liq) [2023] FCA 1446 (i-Prosperity 2023). An application for leave to appeal that decision was dismissed: Gong v Nipps (liquidator) [2024] FCAFC 102.

14    Through their work in investigating potential claims available for the benefit of the creditors of the companies, the liquidators say they have identified the following potential claims which are the subject of the proposed funding agreements:

(a)    against Crown Melbourne Limited (Crown), relating to very substantial sums received by Crown from the sixth, eighth and tenth plaintiffs, either directly or through payments made to Mr Gu or Mr Huang which were then passed on to Crown. The potential quantum of the claims is approximately $44.642 million in respect of funds that originated with the sixth or eighth plaintiffs and $4.77 million in respect of funds that originated with the tenth plaintiff;

(b)    against an individual, David Gong, relating to transfers made from the eighth plaintiff to Mr Gong in 2020, totalling approximately $18 million;

(c)    against Gong Capital Pty Ltd and/or Sino Pty Ltd, two related companies of Mr Gong, relating to the payments made by the sixth and eighth plaintiffs in relation to Gong Capital’s acquisition of the valuable leasehold for the Chatswood Central Shopping Centre. The potential quantum of the claims is approximately $5 million. There are also related claims against John Landerer and Regina Equities Pty Ltd in relation to an alleged loan of approximately $3.4 million owed by Regina Equities to the sixth plaintiff, which apparently relates to the Chatswood Central Shopping Centre payments. The Regina Equities loan was then allegedly assigned to Mr Gong on or around 17 January 2020 for the alleged consideration of only $1 million; and

(d)    other potential claims against Sino PT Pty Ltd of $21,775.5917 and Landerer & Co of $233,000.18.

15    The liquidators submitted, and I accept, that as there are no substantial assets in the liquidations of the companies, the further investigation and pursuit of the above claims for the benefit of creditors can only be achieved by the liquidators obtaining funding for such investigation and pursuit.

16    In early 2022, the liquidators obtained third party funding (original funding) to conduct public examinations of Crown, The Star Pty Ltd (Star), Pamela Pang (a Crown employee), and Mark Walker (a former employee of Crown and Star), and to obtain and review documents produced by Crown, Star and Mr Walker. Due to the voluminous amount of documents produced by Crown and Star, the original funding has been insufficient and further funding is now required in order to conduct the public examinations of Ms Pang and Mr Walker. Those examinations are required to ensure that the potential pursuit of claims against Crown and Star for the benefit of creditors are not based on incomplete information. In the second (confidential) Nipps affidavit, Mr Nipps set out the process by which the liquidators sought, negotiated, and obtained the original funding.

The application for Court approval under s 477(2B) of the Act

Statutory provisions and applicable principles

17    Section 477 of the Act grants a liquidator express powers to bring or defend any legal proceedings in the name of and on behalf of the company (s 477(2)(a)) and to appoint a solicitor to assist in the liquidator’s duties (s 477(2)(b)).

18    Section 477(2B) governs Court approval of a liquidator’s entry into agreements on a company’s behalf and states as follows:

Except with the approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or of a resolution of the creditors, a liquidator of a company must not enter into an agreement on the company's behalf (for example, but without limitation, a lease or an agreement under which a security interest arises or is created) if:

(a)     without limiting paragraph (b), the term of the agreement may end; or

(b)     obligations of a party to the agreement may, according to the terms of the agreement, be discharged by performance;

more than 3 months after the agreement is entered into, even if the term may end, or the obligations may be discharged, within those 3 months.

19    The Court’s role in considering an application under s 477(2B) is to satisfy itself, having regard to the liquidator’s commercial judgment, that there is no error of law, grounds for suspecting bad faith or any other good reason to intervene: Corporate Affairs Commission v ASC Timber Pty Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 109 (ASC Timber) at 118; Stewart, in the matter of Newtronics Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1375 (Newtronics) at [26]; Hurst, in the matter of Liquor National Pty Ltd (in liq) [2019] FCA 1581 (Liquor National) at [17]-[18].

20    In Lewis (liquidator), in the matter of Concrete Supply Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 841; 145 ACSR 459 (Concrete Supply), White J outlined (at [16]) the following principles which the Court applies when considering an application for approval:

(a)    the Court makes its assessment having regard to the purposes for which liquidators’ powers exist, including the serving of the interests of those concerned in the winding up, the achievement of what is necessary for the proper realisation of the assets of the company, and assisting in its winding up: Re HIH Insurance Ltd [2004] NSWSC 5 at [15]; Newtronics at [26(6)];

(b)    a primary consideration is the impact of the agreement on the duration of the liquidation and whether that is, in all of the circumstances, reasonable in the interests of the liquidation: In the matter of Opel Networks Pty Limited [2013] NSWSC 1245 at [7]; In the matter of One.Tel Limited [2014] NSWSC 457; 99 ACSR 247 at [30];

(c)    the Court’s approval is not an endorsement of the proposed agreement but merely constitutes permission for liquidators to exercise their commercial judgment: Re Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [2009] WASC 235 at [58];

(d)    generally, the Court does not refuse an approval unless there can be seen to be some lack of good faith, some error in law or principle or some real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator’s conduct: Re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 9 ACSR 83 at 85;

(e)    a court may refuse approval if the terms of the proposed agreement are unclear: Re United Medical Protection Ltd (No 4) [2002] NSWSC 516; 42 ACSR 218 at [45];

(f)    the role of the Court is to grant or deny approval to the liquidator’s proposal, not to develop some alternative proposal which might seem preferable: ASC Timber at 117; and

(g)    the Court does not simply “rubber stamp” whatever is put forward by a liquidator, but generally will not interfere unless there can be seen to be some lack of good faith, some error in law or principle, or real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct: Newtronics at [26(1)].

21    In the context of s 477(2B) orders relating to litigation funding agreements, in Needham, in the matter of Bruck Textile Technologies Pty Ltd (in liq) [2016] FCA 837 (Bruck Textile), Gleeson J stated (at [30]) that the factors relevant to assessing the good faith or prudence of a proposed litigation funding agreement include:

(a)    the liquidator’s prospects of success in the litigation;

(b)    the nature and complexity of the cause of action;

(c)    the extent to which the liquidator has canvassed other funding options;

(d)    the level of the funder’s premium;

(e)    the liquidator’s consultation with creditors; and

(f)    the risk involved in the claim, including the amount of costs likely to be incurred in the proposed litigation and the extent to which the funder is to contribute to the defendant’s costs if the action is not successful or towards any order for security for costs.

22    While the proper course is for s 477(2B) approval to be sought in advance, it is settled that approval can be ordered retrospectively: Concrete Supply at [22]; see also Dudley, in the matter of Freshwater Bay Investments Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2021] FCA 608; 152 ACSR 532 at [8].

The funding agreements

23    Court approval is required for the funding agreements because the terms of both documents contain obligations which extend beyond three months and therefore enliven s 477(2B). Approval is being sought in advance of the agreements being entered into.

24    As discussed below, I consider it appropriate that the funding agreements be subject to confidentiality orders. I will not refer to confidential information in these reasons, but have reviewed and considered unredacted versions of these documents and consider it appropriate to record that I have taken such information into account.

25    Addressing each of the Bruck Textile criteria in turn:

(a)    The liquidators have sought and obtained confidential and privileged advice from counsel as to the preliminary prospects of the claims against Crown and have discussed the Gong and Landerer claims with counsel and NRFA. I infer that the claims are not far-fetched or fanciful, and that further investigation of their prospects is warranted. I also note that the claims, as a subset of the broader claims identified by the liquidators in relation to the companies, were the subject of the Court’s consideration in the extension application, where Button J found that “the identified claims have sufficient apparent substance to warrant the Liquidators continuing to investigate them in order to ascertain whether they have sufficient merit, and prospects of recovery, to warrant litigation”: i-Prosperity 2023 at [60].

(b)    The causes of action are well-established in law, being equitable claims for knowing receipt and/or assistance and claims under the voidable transactions provisions of the Act.

(c)    I am satisfied with the extent to which the liquidators have canvassed other funding options, the details of which are confidential.

(d)    I am satisfied that the level of the funder’s premium, which is confidential, is reasonable.

(e)    I am satisfied of the appropriateness and adequacy of the liquidators’ consultation with creditors, the details of which are confidential.

(f)    The liquidators have considered, but have decided against, seeking creditor approval to enter into the funding agreements and opted to instead seek court approval by way of this application. This is for two reasons. The first is that the costs of convening creditors’ meetings for each of the companies is likely to exceed the costs of this application – particularly as not all of the companies have a committee of inspection in place, and because none of the informal proofs of debts of the over 400 asserted creditors of the companies have been adjudicated on. If the vote of a creditors’ meeting is controversial, the liquidators would be required to adjudicate on proofs of debt, which would be a time consuming and expensive exercise which is less efficient and more costly than bringing the present application. The second reason is confidential, but I am satisfied that it properly bears upon the decision.

(g)    I am satisfied, for the reasons stated in the liquidators’ confidential submissions, that the risk involved in the claim (including the amount of costs likely to be incurred in the proposed litigation and the extent to which the funder is to contribute to the defendants’ costs if the action is not successful or towards any order for security) is low.

26    The liquidators submit, and I accept, that entering into the funding agreements is in the best interests of creditors. The companies do not otherwise have any means to fund the potential Crown, Gong and Landerer claims, which have a significant potential quantum and could result in returns to the creditors which would otherwise not be available. The liquidators have engaged in extensive efforts to secure funding on the best possible terms, and those efforts have borne fruit. The funding agreements provide for substantial litigation funding and the ability to meet potential security for costs orders, while ensuring adequate protection for the companies against adverse costs orders.

27    I am therefore satisfied that there are no reasons to question the prudence or good faith of the liquidators’ entry into the funding agreements, nor any reason to question whether the entry into the funding agreements is a proper exercise of power or the liquidators’ judgment that it is in the best interest of creditors.

The NRFA retainer agreements

28    On 17 July 2020, Mr Walker, Mr Nipps and Mr Wight, in their capacity as administrators of the “iProsperity group”, entered into a retainer agreement with NRFA. This was for the purpose of obtaining advice in connection with the administration of the iProsperity companies, including any necessary court applications. After the companies were placed into liquidation, Mr Walker, Mr Nipps and Mr Wight continued to seek advice from NRFA. Subsequently, the liquidators entered into two further retainer agreements with NRFA which related to specific legal matters. The first, entered into on 12 July 2021, related to a Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding brought against one of the companies by a receiver appointed over a property registered in the name of Mr Huang. The second, entered into on 18 June 2022, related to the liquidators’ application to conduct public examinations and to advice on prospective claims.

29    The application of s 477(2B) of the Act to the NRFA retainer agreements is not clear. In Kitay v Frigger (No 2) [2024] WASC 113 at [79]-[91], Hill J collected and considered a number of authorities that considered the question whether a legal costs agreement is an agreement to which s 477(2B) applies. Her Honour concluded, at [91]:

… I consider that approval under s 477(2B) of the Act is required for agreements entered into by the liquidator as agent for or representative of the company, as well as agreements in the name of the company. However, approval is not required for entry into agreements by the liquidator in their own name. In determining whether the agreement has been entered into by the liquidator as agent for or representative of the company or in their own name, it is necessary to consider the substance of the agreement, whether the company is a party to the agreement or appears to have the status of a party under the agreement, and who receives the benefit of the services provided under the agreement.

30    The initial NRFA retainer was entered into for the purposes of NRFA advising the liquidators on steps they were required to take first in the administration and then the liquidation of the i-Prosperity companies. The liquidators acknowledged that, while it might be considered that some services provided under the NRFA retainer were services provided solely to the liquidators, as opposed to the liquidators as agents for the companies, the liquidators have since caused the companies to participate in litigation and have engaged NRFA to represent the companies in that litigation under the NRFA retainer, which steps were of benefit to the companies. In those circumstances, the liquidators have formed the view that the prudent course is to seek approval under s 477(2B) nunc pro tunc for entry into the NRFA retainer agreements.

31    The liquidators submitted that the retainer agreements are orthodox in form and substance for fee agreements between the liquidators and their solicitors, including for the liquidators of unfunded liquidations. In his second (confidential) affidavit, Mr Nipps deposed that “[o]n each occasion when Mr Wight or I executed the NRFA Retainer or the engagement letters …we understood the engagement was between NRFA and the liquidators rather than the Companies … when we provided ongoing instructions to NRFA under the NRFA Retainer, we considered we were doing so in our capacity as liquidators …”. For that reason, Mr Nipps originally considered that approval to enter into the retainer agreements under s 477(2B) was not required, as the liquidators were not entering into the retainer agreements on the companies’ behalf.

32    While I consider that there is doubt whether leave of the Court is actually required, for the following reasons, I consider it appropriate to grant approval under s 477(2B) for entry into the retainer agreements:

(a)    the terms of the retainer agreements are clear and there is nothing exceptional about them;

(b)    the decision as to which solicitors ought to be retained by the liquidators is a question for them to make, taking into account the interests of the creditors of the companies: Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 237 at [95];

(c)    no person has sought to oppose approval of the retainer agreements being granted;

(d)    there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that entry into the retainer agreements was other than a proper exercise of the liquidators’ powers;

(e)    the liquidators have explained the reason for their delay in seeking approval of the Court in respect of entry into the retainer agreements, and there is nothing in the evidence which indicates that the failure to immediately obtain approval under s 477(2B) of the Act was deliberate or anything other than inadvertent; and

(f)    the liquidation of the companies will not be prolonged due to the liquidators’ entry into the retainer agreements. The NRFA retainer is not limited in time and will operate as and when the liquidators seek services under it, and so it does not in any real sense impact on the duration of the liquidations of the companies: Re Jewels of Sydney Pty Ltd (in liq) [2024] NSWSC 538 at [43].

Application for confidentiality orders

33    The liquidators also sought interim and final confidentiality orders pursuant to ss 37AF and 37AI of the FCA Act with respect to the second (confidential) Nipps affidavit in its entirety (including all annexures), as it contains details of the negotiations the liquidators have engaged in with potential litigation funders, including the identities of the funders, the terms of the funding, the reasons for requiring funding, and a comparison between the funding proposals received. The annexures contain the liquidators’ correspondence with potential funders including applications for funding, the committee of inspection report, details of the liquidators’ arrangements with their solicitors, and the terms and amounts of litigation funding including the funding agreements themselves. The liquidators also sought suppression of paras 17-19, 21-24, 35-37, 38(a), 38(c)-(j) and 43 of the written outline of submissions filed in support of the originating process, along with any footnotes to those paragraphs.

34    Section 37AF grants the Court the power to make suppression orders, s 37AI gives the Court the power to make interim suppression orders, and s 37AG(1)(a) provides that one of the grounds for making a suppression order is that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. It has been accepted that the subject matter of an application for approval to enter into a litigation funding agreement is commercially confidential and sensitive and related to aspects of the litigation that any plaintiff, protecting its own interests and the integrity of the litigation process in which it is engaged, would take particular care to keep from the other party or parties to the litigation: Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v OneTel Ltd [2010] NSWSC 498 at [2]; Robinson, in the matter of Reed Constructions Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] FCA 594 at [59].

35    I accept the liquidators’ submission that suppression of the second (confidential) Nipps affidavit and its annexures is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The ability of the persons the subject of the proposed claims to know the limits of the funding marshalled against them and the terms of that funding would be prejudicial to the liquidators’ ability to prosecute those claims for the benefit of the creditors. Disclosure of this material would provide significant material and unfair advantages to the potential defendants, including in potential settlement negotiations. I also accept that the liquidators’ negotiations with potential litigation funders are commercially sensitive and confidentiality should be preserved so that, among other reasons, the liquidators are able to engage in further negotiations (if required) in the future without concern that those negotiations will be made public. I also accept that some of the annexures are subject to legal professional privilege and constitute working documents for the purposes of litigation, and should remain confidential. I will therefore make suppression orders over the entirety of the second (confidential) Nipps affidavit and its annexures.

36    With respect to the suppression orders sought over particular portions of the liquidators’ submissions, the submissions should only be redacted to the minimum extent required to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. For that reason I consider it appropriate to narrow the scope of the suppression such that redactions are applied only to paras 17, 21-24, 35-37, 38(a) (other than the first and last sentence of that paragraph), 38(c)-(g), 38(h)(ii), 38(i)-(j) and 43 of the submissions, and the accompanying footnotes to those pargraphs.

37    The liquidators also sought an associated order, pursuant to r 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) (which is contained at Sched 2 to the Act), that the funding agreements and the retainer agreements and any documents created as a result of entry into them be confidential and not available for inspection by creditors under rr 70-10 and 70-15 of the Insolvency Practice Rules (Corporations) 2016 (Cth). I accept the liquidators’ submission that such an order is appropriate in circumstances where the liquidators are unfunded and, if such an application for inspection was brought by creditors, the liquidators would be required to seek funding to defend that particular claim. I agree that it would be beneficial for the administration of this particular liquidation that the liquidators are not put to the cost of having to defend such an application for inspection. The proposed order will have the effect of avoiding any unnecessary debate about the confidentiality of the documents and the reasonableness of the liquidators’ refusal to make the documents available. I will therefore make the order sought, save that I consider that the order should be expressed in terms that the funding agreements and retainer agreements and any documents created as a result of entry into them are confidential and that it would not be reasonable for the liquidators to comply with a request to produce them to the creditor or creditors.

Associate:

Dated:    3 February 2025

SCHEDULE OF PARTIES