Federal Court of Australia

Nasir v Reynolds (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCA 1194

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), Mr Sajjad Nasir be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

A    INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1    In Storry v Parkyn (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 100, the Full Court (Lee, Feutrill and Jackman JJ) observed (at [2]–[7]) that it has become increasingly common for litigants in this Court to exercise their right to appear in person. Although most self-represented litigants behave courteously and are often forced to do so because of circumstances outside their control (and, in doing so, sometimes present valid claims and defences), a few self-represented litigants, unrestrained by the norms regulating the professional conduct of lawyers and aggrieved by a perceived wrong, become serial litigants obsessed with seeking vindication of their position and in doing so mount, often repeatedly, arguments which would never be advanced by a responsible practitioner.

2    Mr Nasir, the applicant in this proceeding, is unfortunately an example of this latter category of self-represented litigants.

3    These reasons assume familiarity with my judgment in Nasir v Reynolds [2024] FCA 1027 (judgment or J) and I do not propose to rehearse the relevant background, save to note that in Section F of my judgment, I made two observations about Mr Nasir’s conduct of this case.

4    The first concerned Mr Nasir sending emails to the Registry which contained, among other things, a number of scandalous allegations about Judges of the Court and its staff. During the hearing, I raised these emails with Mr Nasir and it is worth reproducing that exchange here (T38.4–26, 8 August 2024):

HIS HONOUR: Since I adjourned the first case management hearing, a very large number of emails have been sent to the registry of this court. Included in those emails have been what, on any view of it, are a number of scandalous allegations. Now – including allegations that both Wigney J and myself have engaged in corrupt conduct by accepting bribes from Oracle and also engaged in corrupt conduct by doctoring transcripts. Certain other allegations have been made … do you withdraw those allegations or do you maintain those allegations?

MR NASIR: I don’t want to - - -

HIS HONOUR: And I ask you to reflect, and I ask you to reflect closely on when you think you have a reasonable basis to make such serious allegations against judicial officers of the Commonwealth.

MR NASIR: I withdraw that, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Right. Now I don’t expect, Mr Nasir, to see any more emails from you to the Registry, or to any other person of that type, because I want to make it perfectly clear to you that if I do see such communications, then I will give close consideration as to whether any consequences should flow from that. Do you understand?

MR NASIR: Yes, well, I apologise for that. I’m sorry.

5    As I noted in the judgment (at [60]), in the light of Mr Nasir’s apology and withdrawal of the allegations, I did not propose, at that juncture, to take any action in relation to Mr Nasir’s emails. It has come to my attention, however, that since the hearing, Mr Nasir has resumed his inappropriate conduct and has bombarded the Registry, almost daily, with emails containing similar allegations about Judges of the Court, Court staff and other persons which may amount to a contempt of court. I will return to what I will call the contempt issue below.

6    The second matter was that coupled with his constant emails, Mr Nasir has lodged or filed a slew of “interlocutory applications” and other materials with the Registry which I concluded, on the basis of the material then before the Court, were either misconceived or legally incomprehensible (or both) (at J [61]). I set these applications out in the judgment (at [62]–[63]) and noted that as at the date of the hearing, Mr Nasir had lodged or filed approximately 19 interlocutory applications in this proceeding (NSD 725 of 2024) and the proceeding the subject of Mr Nasir’s application for leave to appeal (VID 701 of 2024) between 16 June and 22 August 2024. In another proceeding (NSD 431 of 2024) (now discontinued), Mr Nasir lodged or filed no less than 25 interlocutory applications between 16 April and 17 May 2024.

7    Mr Nasir’s conduct in lodging or filing what I described in the judgment as a “tsunami” of interlocutory applications and other materials has consumed considerable time and resources of the Court and its Registry staff and has diverted attention away from dealing with the resolution of legitimate and properly constituted proceedings. In the light of this conduct, I formed the preliminary view that it may be the Court could be satisfied that Mr Nasir has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts and tribunals (being the proceedings, final or otherwise, referred to in the judgment), and if this was established, that a vexatious proceeding order pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) could follow.

8    Accordingly, and in order to provide procedural fairness to Mr Nasir and allow him an opportunity to provide material concerning the question as to whether the Court ought not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to him (which I will call the vexatious proceedings issue), on 5 September 2024, I made the following orders:

2.     On or by 27 September 2024, the applicant:

(a)     file any material upon which he intends to rely to oppose an order (proposed order) being made in the following terms:

Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), Mr Nasir be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act.

(b)     notify the Registry in writing as to whether he wishes to have an oral hearing in relation to whether the proposed order ought to be made by the Court and, in the absence of such notification, the issue as to whether the proposed order ought to be made be dealt with on the papers.

3.     Any oral hearing in relation to the making of a vexatious proceedings order under Pt VAAA, Div 2 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is to be listed for hearing by the Court on a date to be fixed following 27 September 2024.

9    Mr Nasir did not request an oral hearing pursuant to Order 3 above, and despite sending many communications to the Registry, he did not file any material (being admissible evidence or submissions) directed to the substance of the issue as to whether the Court should proceed to make an order pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the FCA Act, pursuant to Order 2(a).

10    I have, of course, had regard to all the materials Mr Nasir has filed since the date of the order, notwithstanding that most of these materials were either abusive, or were otherwise misconceived, and/or rehearsed arguments raised previously by Mr Nasir. It is worth noting, however, that in two of these applications, Mr Nasir sought an “adjournment or extension” of the date referred to in Order 2(a) (first for a period of 12 weeks, then later for a period of 8 weeks) in order to “allow for the finalisation of a legal aid application and to obtain legal representation”.

11    I will take this as an application for an adjournment. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I am not prepared to grant any adjournment or extension. Mr Nasir has been given ample opportunity not only to file any materials he considered relevant to the vexatious proceedings issue, but to obtain legal representation in respect of that issue and issues concerning the separate question. Indeed, as early as 11 July 2024, during the first case management hearing, I said to Mr Nasir (T10.32–36):

HIS HONOUR … You’ve got a right under the Judiciary Act to represent yourself, but if you – there’s facilities for you obtaining legal advice if you wish, from community legal aid services and the like. And I would encourage you to do that, because matters of evidence and the like can often be somewhat tricky, but it’s entirely a matter for you.

12    In any event, to allow Mr Nasir a further period of approximately two months to obtain legal representation in circumstances where he has previously been encouraged to do so and been afforded procedural fairness would be contrary to the case management imperatives in Pt VB of the FCA Act to achieve the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. As the Full Court observed in Storry (at [7]), a fundamental aspect of doing more than paying lip service to the case management objectives is taking the necessary steps “to ensure that the whole of the Court’s business is managed efficiently” and to take active steps “to prevent the abuse of the Court’s processes when such abuses become manifest”. As will become evident, an adjournment would be delaying the inevitable and simply provide further time by which, if history is any guide, Mr Nasir will continue to send inappropriate communications to the Registry.

13    I will hence proceed to deal initially with the vexatious proceedings issue.

B    VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS ISSUE

B.1    The Relevant Law

14    In Storry (at [13]–[21]), the Full Court set out the law relevant to vexatious proceedings orders. What follows is drawn largely from that summary.

15    Section 37AO of the FCA Act is in the following terms:

37AO    Making vexatious proceedings orders

(1)    This section applies if the Court is satisfied:

(a)    a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or

(b)    a person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in an Australian court or tribunal.

(2)    The Court may make any or all of the following orders:

(a)    an order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the Court already instituted by the person;

(b)    an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in the Court;

(c)    any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.

Note: Examples of an order under paragraph (c) are an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail, an order to give security for costs and an order for costs.

(3)    The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of any of the following:

(a)    the Attorney‑General of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory;

(b)    the Chief Executive Officer;

(c)    a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding;

(d)    a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

(4)    The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

(5)    An order made under paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is a final order.

(6)    For the purposes of subsection (1), the Court may have regard to:

(a)    proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal; and

(b)    orders made by any Australian court or tribunal; and

(c)    the person’s overall conduct in proceedings conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including the person’s compliance with orders made by that court or tribunal);

    including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted,     and orders made, before the commencement of this section.

16    A number of terms used in s 37AO are defined by s 37AM(1). The relevant definitions of those terms are as follows:

Australian court or tribunal means a court or tribunal of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.

institute, in relation to proceedings, includes:

(a)    for civil proceedings—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started against a party; and

(b)    for proceedings before a tribunal—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started before the tribunal; and

(c)    for criminal proceedings—the making of a complaint or the obtaining of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged offender; and

(d)    for civil or criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal—the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary to start an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision made in the course of the proceedings.

proceeding:

(a)    in relation to a court—has the meaning given by section 4; and

(b)    in relation to a tribunal—means a proceeding in the tribunal, whether between parties or not, and includes an incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connection with, a proceeding.

proceedings of a particular type includes:

(a)    proceedings in relation to a particular matter; and

(b)    proceedings against a particular person.

vexatious proceeding includes:

(a)    a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b)    a proceeding instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c)    a proceeding instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and

(d)    a proceeding conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.

vexatious proceedings order means an order made under subsection 37AO(2).

17    Section 4 of the FCA Act defines “proceeding” to mean “a proceeding in a court, whether between parties or not, and includes an incidental proceeding in the course of, or in connexion with, a proceeding, and also includes an appeal”. The term “proceeding” encompasses the filing of an interlocutory application: Storry (at [24]); see also Ramsey v Skyring [1999] FCA 907; (1999) 164 ALR 378 (at 391 [59] per Sackville J); Matthews v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 1488 (at [92] per Reeves J).

18    The consequences of a vexatious proceedings order may include that the person the subject of the order is precluded from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, without the leave of the Court: s 37AQ(1)(a) of the FCA Act. As Wheelahan J observed in Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30 (at [6]), the Court’s power to grant such leave is fettered, because leave may be granted only if the Court is satisfied that the proceeding is not a vexatious proceeding: s 37AT(4).

19    A vexatious proceeding order has been described as an “extreme measure”. As the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Beazley P, Emmett JA and Sackville AJA) explained in Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 (at [56]):

… [A]n order restricting a person’s access to the courts is a very serious matter and thus an order under the VP Act is not to be made lightly. The purpose of the statutory power is not to punish the litigant for past misdeeds. The purpose is to shield other litigants from harassment and to protect the Court itself from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits.

20    But, as was said in Storry, although the order is, by its nature, exceptional and serious, these and similar observations in the cases should not mean that a judge should shrink away from making a vexatious proceedings order if the preconditions to it being made are established and if it is appropriate to do so. Although an order restricting a person’s access to the courts is not to be made lightly, the extent of the increasing disruption to the efficient management of the Court’s business caused by allowing vexatious proceedings to be instituted and maintained is also a serious matter. Further, it should be recognised that the consequence of a vexatious proceedings order is not to impose an insuperable barrier to litigation by a vexatious litigant entirely, but to control it by imposing a requirement for leave.

21    I now turn to the four cumulative conditions necessary to engage its operation, being that a person has: (1) frequently; (2) instituted or conducted; (3) vexatious proceedings; (4) in Australian courts or tribunals.

B.2    The Primary Proceedings

22    Before turning to the plethora of interlocutory applications lodged or filed by Mr Nasir, it is worth giving a brief chronological overview of the five proceedings the subject of these applications and the nature of the relief sought in each proceeding.

Nasir v State of New South Wales (Information and Privacy Commission) (NSD 431 of 2024)

23    Mr Nasir commenced this proceeding by way of an originating application dated 4 April 2024 brought under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act), seeking an extension of time to commence an application alleging that the respondents had engaged in unlawful discrimination under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA Act). The named respondents included, among others, the Commonwealth of Australia; the Director of Public Prosecutions; the Commonwealth Attorney-General; the Attorney-General of New South Wales; the Australian Prime Minister and Cabinet Office; the Independent Commission Against Corruption; and the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

24    The originating application followed the termination of a complaint by Mr Nasir to the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) without inquiry pursuant to ss 46PF(1)(b) and 46PH(1B)(b) of the AHRC Act (at J [2]).

25    Following Mr Nasir filing not less than 25 interlocutory applications between 16 April and 17 May 2024 (which applications sought, among other things, the joinder of new parties; the transfer of the proceeding to another Judge’s docket; and the removal of allegedly “fabricated” and “misleading” evidence from the Court file), Stewart J made the following order (Order 2 of the Orders dated 17 May 2024):

2.     On 11 June 2024 at 10.15am, the applicant appear before the Court and show cause why each of the interlocutory applications filed by him in the proceeding should not be:

(a)     Stayed pending the granting to the applicant of leave under s 46PO(3A) of the Act to make the principal application; and/or

(b)     Dismissed on one or more of the following grounds:

(i)     The interlocutory application is improper as an interlocutory application in the principal proceeding (rule 17.01);

(ii)     The applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the interlocutory application or part of it (rule 26.01(1)(a));

(iii)     the interlocutory application is frivolous or vexatious (rule 26.01(1)(b));

(iv)     no reasonable cause of action is disclosed (rule 26.01(1)(c)); or

(v)     the interlocutory application is an abuse of the process of the Court (rule 26.01(1)(d)).

26    On 7 June 2024, Mr Nasir filed a notice of discontinuance and unconditionally withdrew “the whole of the application” along with an apology.

Nasir v Reynolds (NSD 725 of 2024)

27    Shortly prior to discontinuing the proceeding NSD 431 of 2024, Mr Nasir commenced this proceeding against his former employer, Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (Oracle) and two of its officers, Ms Amy McCudden and Ms Catherine Reynolds, alleging that the respondents engaged in unlawful discrimination under the RDA Act.

28    I set out the relevant background to the proceeding and dealt with the separate issue concerning the construction of the relief in the judgment, and it is unnecessary to explain further the nature of the relief that was sought by Mr Nasir in the proceeding, save to note that Mr Nasir, between 16 June and 22 September 2024, lodged or filed approximately 22 interlocutory applications.

29    I will return to these interlocutory applications below.

Nasir v Reynolds (VID 701 of 2024) (Leave to Appeal)

30    On 22 July 2024, Mr Nasir filed a notice of appeal on which purported to institute an appeal against the Orders dated 11 July 2024 concerning the hearing of the separate issue. Mr Nasir alleged in the notice of appeal (which Wigney J treated as an application for leave to appeal (at J [4])), among other things, that the Order setting down separate issue for hearing “[went] beyond the scope of the case management powers under s 37P(2) of the [FCA Act] by prematurely determining a substantive legal issue that requires a full evidentiary hearing”. Three days later, on 25 July, Mr Nasir lodged an interlocutory application in which he sought an order staying the operation of the Orders dated 11 July 2024 and an order restraining Oracle and its officers from relying on those Orders (at J [5]).

31    On 1 August 2024, Wigney J dismissed the stay application. His Honour held that none of the proposed grounds of appeal raised by Mr Nasir had any apparent merit, and that accordingly, there was no basis for a stay of the Orders: Nasir v Reynolds (stay application) [2024] FCA 864 (at [30]). On 5 August, his Honour refused to grant leave to appeal on the same basis and dismissed the appeal application: Nasir v Reynolds (Application for leave to appeal) [2024] FCA 865 (at [28]) (at J [6]).

Nasir v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Limited (SYG 2108 of 2024)

32    On 30 August 2024, Mr Nasir commenced a claim under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) alleging contravention of a general protection in the FCFCOA. Mr Nasir contends that Oracle engaged in adverse action by, among other things, “drafting and enforcing the ‘Release Agreement’ dated 4 November 2022” with the intent to coerce or place undue influence or pressure upon Mr Nasir, in contravention of his workplace rights. The matter is next listed before Judge D Humphreys on 15 November 2024.

Nasir v Reynolds (NSD 1340 of 2024; NSD 1356 of 2024) (Applications for Extension of Time and Leave to Appeal)

33    On 20 September 2024, Mr Nasir lodged two applications titled “Application for Extension of Time and Leave to Appeal” seeking “leave to appeal from the judgment of Justice Lee Summary Judgement [sic] of dismissal given on 5/9/24 in Sydney”. Both applications are relevantly identical.

B.3    The Interlocutory Proceedings

34    Since the date I delivered my judgment, Mr Nasir has continued to lodge or file “interlocutory applications” and other materials with the Registry and, accordingly, it is necessary to supplement those references by setting out a comprehensive table (Table) listing the interlocutory applications lodged or filed by Mr Nasir in each of the proceedings referred to above, together with a brief description of the “relief” sought by Mr Nasir in each application.

B.4    Vexatious Proceedings?

35    Having identified the primary and interlocutory proceedings which Mr Nasir has instituted since April 2024, it is necessary to determine whether Mr Nasir has commenced proceedings which were vexatious in that they constituted an abuse of process or were instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds.

36    Before doing so, however, it is well to make three observations.

37    The first is that it will be obvious from my summary above in Section B.2 and the Table that the primary proceedings essentially concern the same subject matter; namely Mr Nasir’s allegation that Oracle (and its officers) engaged in unlawful discrimination and/or placed undue pressure on him to exit the company on terms and, in doing so, contravened various statutory norms. Indeed, the “relief” sought in Nasir v State of New South Wales (NSD 431 of 2024) mirrored the relief sought by Mr Nasir in this proceeding (NSD 725 of 2024), and the allegations raised in the Fair Work proceeding (SYG 2108 of 2024) are almost identical to the arguments which were advanced by Mr Nasir before me at the hearing of the separate issue.

38    The second is that it is plain that Mr Nasir has frequently instituted proceedings (as that term is defined in s 4 of the FCA Act) in Australian courts or tribunals. As is evident from the Table, Mr Nasir, between 16 April 2024 and the date of this judgment, has lodged or filed approximately 51 interlocutory applications in this Court and the FCFCOA. The real issue is not how frequently Mr Nasir has instituted proceedings, but whether those proceedings which may be characterised as vexatious were instituted frequently within the meaning of s 37AO(1)(a). As the Full Court observed in Storry (at [66]), the meaning of the word “frequently” is relative, and must be viewed in context: Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 (at [46]–[49] per Beazley P, Emmett JA and Sackville AJA). Indeed, the number of proceedings may be small if a litigant attempts to re-litigate or re-agitate issues previously determined: Fuller v Toms (at 545 [33]–[34]).

39    The third matter is that it would be an exercise in supererogation to deal with each and every proceeding (in this case, interlocutory application) separately. Notwithstanding some overlap, the vast majority of the applications lodged or filed by Mr Nasir can be categorised into various attempts, among other things, to:

(1)    make allegations of fraud and collusion against Judges of the Court and Registry staff (IA24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 49) (“collusion” applications);

(2)    join various parties to the proceedings (IA2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 28, 30, 34, 47) (“joinder” applications);

(3)    seek the “removal” of evidence from the proceedings (IA17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 45, 46) (“removal” of evidence applications); or

(4)    transfer the proceedings, stay or set aside orders of the Court (IA16, 25, 27, 35, 36, 39, 44, 50, 51) (“transfer, stay or set aside” applications).

40    As will be seen, the statutory conditions for the making of a vexatious proceedings order are satisfied by reference to only a handful of the interlocutory proceedings referred to in the Table (or, indeed, the relief sought in the applications simpliciter). For this reason, it is convenient to deal with the proceedings by reference to the categories above which plainly establish that Mr Nasir has frequently instituted vexatious proceedings in this Court.

“Collusion” applications

41    As noted earlier in relation to the contempt issue, in addition to inundating the Registry with scandalous allegations against Judges of the Court and Registry staff, Mr Nasir has lodged or filed numerous interlocutory applications containing similar allegations and sought (or seeks) “relief” based on those allegations. It is unnecessary to rehearse the detail of these applications (which is set out in the Table), save to note that Mr Nasir contends, in essence, that Judges of the Court and Registry staff are allegedly engaged in collusion with Oracle and, among other things, have fabricated hearing transcripts. In IA38, for example, Mr Nasir sought:

(1)     to vary the Order dated 11 July 2024 under r 39.05(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) on the basis that the order was allegedly obtained by fraud in “a deceptive hearing conducted by Justice Lee and misleading correspondence from the [Federal Court] Registry” who were “colluding” with Oracle Corporation;

(2)     a stay of proceedings; and

(3)     an urgent hearing.

42    In the application for leave to appeal before Wigney J, Mr Nasir lodged an interlocutory application seeking the following “relief” (IA42):

1.     Interlocutory orders sought

1.1.     The Federal Court and overall justice system are in a hopeless state, plagued by prevalent misconduct, corruption, influence, and favouritism, leading to obstruction and denial of justice, as exemplified by the orders made on 1/8/24 or 2/8/24.

1.2     Applicants seek to set aside the order dated 1/8/24 or 2/8/24, made irregularly and illegally, against good faith, under Federal Court Rules 2011 - Rule 39.05 on the following grounds.

2.     Grounds

1.3     Obtained by Fraud: The presiding Justice Wigney, the NSW registry, and lawyer Paul Brown colluded to coerce the applicant into an imaginary interlocutory hearing by employing various tactics. When these failed, they issued the under-application lodged notice of dispute against the registry emails and the so-called respondents' legal representative emails. The correspondence falsely refers to an interlocutory application on 23/7/24 and fabricates file number VID701/2024.

…

43    The “collusion” applications are manifestly without reasonable grounds and are vexatious proceedings. They also constitute an abuse of process.

“Joinder” applications

44    These applications broadly seek to “join” various parties to the dispute and it will suffice for present purposes to refer to three examples.

45    On 5 May 2024, Mr Nasir filed IA8 in which he sought orders to:

… include the matter against individual Jamie Saran Hamlin, the Australian Prime Minister & Cabinet, the Australian Attorney General's Office, and the Australian Federal Police, with the current Information and Privacy Commission and Oracle Corporation (NDS/4312024) [sic]

46    Two days later, on 7 May, Mr Nasir filed IA10 in which he alleged that the Information and Privacy Commission appointed “specialized [sic] staff to prevent the applicant from lodging complaints and coordinated systematic discrimination and fraud involving ICARE, SIRA, NCAT, and later AHRC”, and, on that alleged basis, sought the following “relief”:

1.     Inclusion of the matter against ICARE and SIRA with the current application to Oracle Corporation and Information and Privacy Commission (NDS431-2024).

2.     Apology from ICARE and SIRA and appropriate compensation.

47    Later, on 19 August (and the days following), Mr Nasir lodged interlocutory applications (IA47) seeking to join Ms Rachna Sampayo to the proceeding Nasir v Reynolds (NSD 725 of 2024) for “offenses [sic] under Section 46PN of the [AHRC Act] for perjury under oath and for providing false, misleading, fabricated, and misrepresented information”.

48    To the extent the “joinder” applications may be understood as applications to join parties pursuant to r 9.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), the proposed joinder of the parties nominated by Mr Nasir could not have been necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate all matters in dispute in the proceedings: see News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410 (at 524 per Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ). Indeed, the notice of discontinuance filed by Mr Nasir in Nasir v State of New South Wales (Information and Privacy Commission) (NSD 431 of 2024) (see above (at [7])) (which precipitated Nasir v Reynolds (NSD 725 of 2024)) was on the following “terms”:

1.     The application is withdrawn unconditionally, along with an apology. The initial application was intended to protect the applicant’s rights and was not meant to make any claims against State or Commonwealth Agencies.

2.     Proceedings have been initiated against the sole party involved: Oracle Corporation Aust Pvt Ltd and its nominated employees (case NSD725/2024).

3.     None of the State or Commonwealth Entities are part of the proceedings in case NSD725/2024.

4.     The withdrawal is immediate effective dated 7/06/24, regardless of any delays. The applicant does not have the ability to self-withdraw through the E-Lodgement Portal.

5.     The applicant also has limited communication ability for various reasons. Parties who could not be served for any reason must consider this final notice of withdrawal.

(Emphasis added)

49    Accordingly, the “joinder” applications were brought without reasonable grounds and are vexatious proceedings.

“Removal” of evidence applications

50    These applications seek to “exclude” evidence from the proceedings which Mr Nasir contends is variously “irrelevant”, “repetitious”, “deceptive and self-contradictory”, “misleading”, “inadmissible” and/or “malicious”. It will suffice to mention one example.

51    On 8 and 15 August 2024, Mr Nasir lodged interlocutory applications (IA46, 47) seeking an order pursuant to FCR 29.03(2) that the affidavit of Ms Rachna Sampayo affirmed 2 August 2024 (Sampayo Affidavit) be removed from the Court file on the various “bases” that the affidavit is: (1) an abuse of process; (2) “evasive and ambiguous”; (3) contains “falsification[s] under oath”; (4) frivolous or vexatious material; and (5) “irrelevant and abuse of personnel information”. Mr Nasir states in IA47 that:

[the] Applicant respectfully submit[s] that the affidavit of Rachna Sampayo should be excluded from these proceedings in its entirety. The evidence presented clearly demonstrates instances of blatant falsehoods and misleading statements made under oath. Furthermore, Ms. Sampayo’s inability to provide accurate information during cross-examination raises serious concerns about the veracity and authenticity of her affidavit, particularly considering the attestation from Singapore.

The inclusion of such a demonstrably unreliable and misleading document would unfairly prejudice the proceedings and hinder the pursuit of justice. We therefore urge the Court to exercise its discretion and exclude Ms. Sampayo’s affidavit from consideration

…

52    The Sampayo Affidavit was read on the hearing of the separate question on 8 August 2024 (T13.30) and I accepted Ms Sampayo’s evidence that she recollected what was said at the Zoom meeting the subject of her affidavit to the best of her ability (at J [34]–[35]). There is nothing to suggest that Ms Sampayo’s evidence ought be removed from the Court file on one or more of the grounds set out in FCR 29.03(1) or for the reasons suggested by Mr Nasir.

53    The “removal” of evidence applications were brought without reasonable grounds, are an abuse of process and are vexatious proceedings.

“Transfer, stay or set aside” applications

54    These applications variously seek to: (1) transfer a proceeding to another Judge of the Court; (2) stay the proceedings; and/or (3) to set aside orders of the Court. Most of these applications were brought based on the allegations highlighted above in relation to the “collusion” applications (see, for example, IA16, 25, 27, 49) or raised misconceived grounds for the institution of applications for leave to appeal (see, for example, IA35, 36, 39).

55    For these reasons, the “transfer, stay or set aside” applications were brought without reasonable grounds and are vexatious proceedings.

B.5    Consideration

56    It is beyond any serious argument that Mr Nasir has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals and, accordingly, the necessary preconditions for the exercise of the Court’s discretion to make a vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 37AO of the FCA Act exist.

57    I am amply satisfied that a vexatious proceedings order should be made in relation to Mr Nasir, for the following reasons.

58    First, and most importantly, the expense, burden and inconvenience of the misconceived and baseless proceedings brought by Mr Nasir, and the resulting disruption caused to the efficient management of the Court’s business, must be controlled. This case demands the Court’s intervention to prevent the institution of meritless and repetitious applications from diverting the Court’s attention and limited resources away from the resolution of legitimate and properly constituted proceedings.

59    Secondly, a vexatious proceedings order is necessary to protect Mr Nasir from the consequences of his own actions. There can be little doubt that Mr Nasir has wasted his time in prosecuting misconceived proceedings. Further, although I do not propose to speculate unduly, it is possible that Mr Nasir suffers from a fixation on these issues which gets worse the more he dwells on them; particularly in circumstances where I have observed a notable difference between his conduct in-Court and in his later intemperate written communications to the Registry. I will return to this below when dealing with the contempt issue.

60    Thirdly, in the absence of a vexatious proceedings order, I am satisfied that Mr Nasir will continue to mount misconceived and repetitious interlocutory and other proceedings, including those which seek to vindicate his allegations that the Court, Registry staff and other persons are engaged in “collusion” or “fraud”.

B.6    Conclusion

61    Accordingly, a vexatious proceedings order will be made in relation to Mr Nasir in the form set out in Order 2(a) to the Orders dated 5 September 2024.

B.7    Two Additional Remarks

62    Before turning to the contempt issue, it is appropriate to make two additional remarks.

63    The first is that following the preparation of these reasons in draft, Mr Nasir lodged a “Notice of Constitutional matter under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903” dated 7 October 2024. It states, among other things:

Nature of the Constitutional Matter

The constitutional issue remains the same as previously raised, due to fraudulent and corrupt conduct by Justice Lee and Justice Wigney of the Federal Court, who allegedly colluded in mishandling the matter. These concerns warrant the applicant’s escalation of the issue to the High Court of Australia under its original jurisdiction. …

64    The purported s 78B notice does not raise an issue arising in this proceeding under the Constitution or involving its interpretation and, for the reasons I have outlined above, I am satisfied that it is without merit and that an adjournment is unnecessary.

65    The second is that as noted above (at [33]), Mr Nasir has lodged an application for leave to appeal from my judgment and the Orders dated 5 September 2024. For obvious reasons, it would not be appropriate to make any order preventing Mr Nasir from pursuing that application for leave to appeal from the substantive and determinative orders made at the separate hearing, being Nasir v Reynolds (NSD 1340 of 2024; NSD 1356 of 2024).

C    CONTEMPT ISSUE

C.1    The Relevant Law

66    Section 31 of the FCA Act is the source of the Court’s power to deal with contempt of court. It provides:

Contempt of Court

(1)     Subject to any other Act, the Court has the same power to punish contempts of its power and authority as is possessed by the High Court in respect of contempts of the High Court.

(2)     The jurisdiction of the Court to punish a contempt of the Court committed in the face or hearing of the Court may be exercised by the Court as constituted at the time of the contempt.

67    One form of contempt of court is conduct which scandalises the court. This is a form of criminal contempt and is concerned to protect the authority of the judicial system and the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice. Although it is not possible to define exhaustively, the following conduct has been recognised as conduct which may amount to scandalising the court:

(1)    an allegation that a court or judge is corrupt: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Matters [2020] QSC 258 (at [49] per Jackson J);

(2)    an allegation that a judge is dishonest or has engaged in fraud: Martin v Trustrum (No 2) [2003] TASSC 50 (at [28], [36]–[38] per Slicer J);

(3)    conduct which impugns the impartiality of the court or judge: R v Collins [1954] VLR 46 (at 49 per Sholl J); or

(4)    conduct which imputes improper motives to those participating in the administration of justice: R v Arrowsmith [1950] VLR 78 (at 82 per Dean J)

(see Professor David Rolph, Contempt (Federation Press, 2023) (at 253–254, 284–286)).

68    The summary nature of the Court’s power to deal with contempt by way of scandalising the court is well-established: Re Colina; Ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 (at 393–394 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J). With that said, the jurisdiction of the courts to impose punishment for such conduct has been recognised as one that should be exercised sparingly and invoked only where the contempt is clear and beyond doubt: R v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434 (at 446 per Starke J). As Stephen J said in Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162 (at 174) about the process by which a judge causes a person to be charged with contempt of court and hears and determines such charge:

[the process should] not only be employed most sparingly but should rarely be resorted to except in those exceptional cases where the conduct is such that “it cannot wait to be punished” because it is “urgent and imperative to act immediately” to preserve the integrity of “a trial in progress or about to start”

C.2    The Relevant Publications

69    In the light of the sheer number of emails sent by Mr Nasir to the Registry, it will suffice for present purposes to set out a handful of Mr Nasir’s communications which, viewed individually or collectively, may constitute conduct which scandalises the court. I am also conscious that these emails contain serious allegations against Chapter III judicial officers and, accordingly, should be reproduced to the extent necessary.

70    On 10 April 2024, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Registry (and other Court addresses) after his lodgement was rejected by the Registrar:

71    On the same date, Mr Nasir sent a number of emails repeatedly referring to Registry staff as “bastards” and/or “racist bastards”.

72    On 18 May, Mr Nasir sent the following email to a Registrar’s assistant, copying the Registry (errors in original):

Dear Docket Judge Stewart ,

I am requesting detailed reasons for the order made after the covert meeting, updated on the case site at 9.30 A< and sent to an unknown entity (probably representing criminal Jamie Saran).

1. Details reason to vacate the case managment on 21/5/24.

2. Details reason of finding the interlocutory applications as Stayed pending the granting to the applicant of leave under s 46PO(3A) of the Act to make the principal application; and/or Dismissed on one or more of the following grounds: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) The interlocutory application is improper as an interlocutory application in the principal proceeding (rule 17.01); The applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the interlocutory application or part of it (rule 26.01(1)(a)); the interlocutory application is frivolous or vexatious (rule 26.01(1)(b)); no reasonable cause of action is disclosed (rule 26.01(1)(c)); or the interlocutory application is an abuse of the process of the Court (rule 26.01(1)(d)).

3. Reasons for not considering the actual orders requested with the application “inclusion of the matters with the principal application”.

4.Barring the applicant from making any lodgement (after the covert meeting).

5. Details reason for sharing the applicant personal information with an unknown entity .

6. Detailed reasons for asking the applicant to provide a show cause instead of making any submission when this judge Stewart knows neither applicant have a representation nor English is his first language. This is racial and language discrimination is not intentional but extremely shameful and malicious.

I also request disqualification/recluse Judge Stewart from this matter , the conduct of the proceedings and the order reflect extreme biased and racial prejudice. There are also apprehension of collisions.

Regards, '

Sajjad

(Emphasis added)

73    On 20 May, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Federal Court Marshal, copying in a number of other email addresses (errors in original):

Dear Registry,

I am concerned about the alteration of case data on the Federal Court portal. The morally and ethically corrupt Judge Stewart, whose integrity is highly questionable, along with the alleged accused, have removed two respondents from the portal. Please help restore the integrity of this information as soon as possible.

Additionally, I have lodged an application to change the docket judge from Judge Stewart, given his morally and ethically corrupt conduct and highly questionable integrity.

Regards,

(Emphasis added)

74    On the same date, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the “Information Service” for the AHRC, copying in the Registry (among others) (errors in original):

Dear Australian Human Rights Commission ,

I know you are busy filling up AHRC website with bogus OPCAT complaints after they cancel their visit , however would you mind lodging a complaint against this fraud judge Stewart of federal court , registry and Oracle Corporation for racial discrimination?

Regards,

Sajjad

75    On 31 May, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Registry (among others):

76    On 14 July, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, copying in the Registry, which provided (among other things) (errors in original):

Order Specifically Misrepresenting Facts:

While the specific order issued on July 11th may be a excluded matter ,however it reinforces the pattern of misrepresentation. The order's content aligns with Oracle Corporation's continuous misrepresentation of facts in this case. This raises further concerns about Justice Lee's impartiality and potential undue influence from Oracle Corporation.

Requested Investigation:

I urge the Ombudsman's office to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the following:

Misconduct by Justice Lee: Investigate potential bias, predetermination, abuse of judicial discretion, and any collusive relationship with Oracle Corporation.

Unauthorized Disclosures: Thoroughly examine the Federal Court Registry's repeated disclosure of protected information to Oracle Corporation and determine the extent of this practice.

Potential Corruption: Investigate whether these actions constitute corrupt conduct, collusion, or any other illegal activities involving the Registry, Justice Lee, Oracle Corporation, and other government entities.

Systemic Issues: Assess whether there are systemic failures within the Federal Court that allow for such misconduct and recommend appropriate remedies.

(Emphasis in original)

77    On 16 July, Mr Nasir sent the following email to two Administrative Appeals Tribunal addresses, copying in the Registry (errors in original):

Dear Administrative Appeals Tribunal,

I am writing to inquire whether the AAT has the authority to review a decision by the Federal Court registrar to keep an application pending, allegedly colluding with the respondent in exchange for financial or other benefits. The registrar's deliberate inaction seems to favor the respondent, Oracle Corporation, following corrupt practices and misconduct from registry staff and Judge Lee.

Regards,

Sajjad

(Emphasis added)

78    On 18 July, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the District Court Registry, copying in the Registry, stating (errors in original):

Dear District Court,

I am inquiring about the District Court's jurisdiction for applications under the AHRC. I would like to request a transfer of my application from the Federal Court to the District Court due to the persistent fraudulent conduct of Justice Lee and the Federal Court in exchange for financial or other benefits from the respondent, Oracle Corporation.

Regards,

Sajjad

(Emphasis added)

79    On 22 July, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Registry and an email address of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (errors in original):

Dear Privacy Officer,

I am not entirely sure what extremely corrupt Judge Lee and criminal elements of federal court Registry are attempting to attribute to me in collusion with a so-called lawyer through this hearing transcript. I have never consented to anything, especially to whatever extremely corrupt Judge Lee and criminal elements of federal court individuals from the Federal Court Registry are attributing in terms of consent.

Extremely corrupt judge Lee orchestrated a hearing with deceptive correspondence and latter is claiming to have some sort of consent about something that I am not sure what it is.

Please include this fraudulent consent with my complaint.

Regards,

Sajjad Nasir

(Emphasis added)

80    On 2 August, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Court’s query account (errors in original):

Dear Registrar of the Federal Court,

I am writing to lodge a formal complaint against corrupt judge Michael Andrew Wigney, Paul Brown (Baker & McKenzie), and the NSW Registry of the Federal Court. The registry, judge, and Paul Brown have persistently engaged in various fraudulent, misleading, and fabricated interlocutory applications, falsified file reference numbers, self-made decisions about adjournments, and issued threats and intimidations. The applicant was only able to see their emails on 30/07/24.

(Emphasis added)

81    On 6 August, Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Registry (errors in original):

Dear Registry ,

Please help processing these pending lodgements if there is no pending payments for liar fabricator Michael Bryan Joshua Lee & Liar Michael Andrew Wigney. Both the liar and the fabricator are obstructing lodgements since 2/8/24.

82    On 13 August (that is, following Mr Nasir’s apology referred to above (at [4])), Mr Nasir sent the following email to the Registry (errors in original):

Dear Victoria Registry,

The respondents have been served with the notice of appeal, which alleges that Judge Wigney and the Registry accepted financial benefits from Oracle Corporation to conduct a sham hearing. It is astonishing how Judge Wigney ever became a Federal Court judge, as he lacks even the most basic level of honesty.

…

83    On 5 September, Mr Nasir, between 3:46pm and 10:10pm, sent approximately 15 emails to the Registry in which he referred to me and Registry staff in the following (or similar) terms (errors in original):

Dear NSW Registry ,

Bastard Lee included a barely visible page after discussing with the respondents. I need him to provide a clear page or take it out if he cannot provide a clear page . Can he read it ?Bastard.

…

Also Bastard fabricated hearing transcript and now he iw including all kid of rubbish , Bastard

…

I bet Bastard Lee can even read 5 words from this page that he calling evidence . This is nothing but Evidence of bastard lee corrupt conduct .

…

Dear NSW registry ,

Please update regarding complaint against Bastard Lee , registry staff fabrication of hearing transcript with Oracle corporation.

Regards,

Sajjad

…

Dear NSW Registry ,

Please note the list of documents that Bastard Michael Lee needs to provide:

[1]     His fabrication of the hearing transcript with Oracle Corporation on 11/07/2024.

[2]     The illegible documents he submitted as evidence.

[3]     Various other fabricated pieces of evidence he included alongside the respondent's, but which

were maliciously rejected by the registry.

Once Bastard provide all these documents , I am happy to proceed for cost or victacious or anything else, however Bastard must provide these first. These are already served to dependents. Sharing with rest of the registries to let them know the psychopath who fabricate his own hearing transcripts.

C.3    Consideration

84    As is evident from the above, reference to only a handful of Mr Nasir’s emails to the Registry suggests he has published allegations that: (1) the Court or a particular judge (or judges) are corrupt; (2) a particular judge (or judges) are dishonest or have engaged in fraud; (3) a particular judge (or judges) are partial or biased; and (4) a particular judge (or judges) harbour improper motives. These allegations are, needless to say, very serious and entirely lacking in any factual foundation.

85    However, I do not consider at present any order to protect the administration of justice should be made to take these matters further.

86    First, Mr Nasir is defending extant New South Wales criminal proceedings which involve allegations as to the making of serious threats to Registry staff. It is doubtful whether commencing contempt proceedings against Mr Nasir would be utile in circumstances where the communications the subject of the criminal proceedings may overlap with communications the subject of any contempt proceedings, or in circumstances where such an order may interfere in some way with the ongoing criminal proceedings.

87    Secondly, as I have noted earlier, I have some concerns about Mr Nasir’s present condition. This has been exacerbated by emails received as recently as yesterday by the Registry which I will not detail, but which cause me to question his stability. This may also be a matter which is canvassed in the context of the ongoing criminal proceedings.

88    Thirdly, even if pursuing contempt proceedings was rendered necessary at some later time, I am not satisfied that this case presently warrants the intervention of the Court by referring the matter to the Principal Registrar for the institution of contempt proceedings.

89    I hasten to add that this is not to foreclose the possibility that it may be necessary to make such an order in the future, including depending upon the progress and outcome of the existing criminal proceedings. Mr Nasir’s concerning actions, which have continued right up until the delivery of this judgment, may later warrant the intervention of the Court to refer the matter to the Principal Registrar to bring a proceeding directed to the end of protecting the authority of the judicial system and public confidence in the administration of justice.

D    CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

90    For the above reasons, I make the following order:

1.    Pursuant to s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), Mr Sajjad Nasir be prohibited from instituting proceedings in this Court without making an application for leave to institute proceedings in accordance with s 37AR of the FCA Act.

Associate:

Dated: 15 October 2024