FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Taylor v Killer Queen, LLC (No 5) [2023] FCA 364
ORDERS
DATE OF ORDER: |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The parties are to confer and within 14 days of the making of these Orders provide to the Associate to Markovic J proposed orders giving effect to these reasons.
2. Insofar as the parties are unable to agree to the terms of the proposed orders referred to in Order 1 above, including the appropriate order as to costs, the areas of disagreement should be set out in mark up in the draft to be provided.
3. Pursuant to s 37AF and s 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and on the ground that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, the documents listed in Schedule 1 to these Orders are to be treated as confidential and are not to be disclosed to any person other than the parties to this proceeding, their legal representatives and to the Court for the purpose of this proceeding.
4. Order 3 above is to remain in place:
(a) in relation to the document at item 6 of Schedule 1 until 31 December 2023; and
(b) in relation to the balance of the documents itemised in Schedule 1 until 31 December 2026.
5. The proceeding be listed for case management hearing on 10 May 2023 at 9.30 am AEST.
6. The text of the reasons for judgment published today is to be published and disclosed only to the parties and their legal advisors.
7. By 4.00 pm AEST on 26 April 2023 the parties are to inform the Associate to Markovic J whether:
(a) the proposed redactions (shown in yellow highlight) to paragraphs [478], [533] and [536] of the reasons published in accordance with Order 6 above are to be maintained having regard to Orders 3 and 4 above; and
(b) they propose any further redactions as a result of Orders 3 and 4 above.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
8. The reasons for judgment will be published on 27 April 2023 at midday AEST and any redactions made in the reasons are made in accordance with Orders 3 and 4 above.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Schedule 1
# | Document | Category |
1 | Agreement between Killer Queen LLC and Purrfect Ventures LLC dated 16 September 2016 | 1 |
2 | Agreement between Purrfect Ventures LLC and GBG USA Inc dated 16 September 2016 | 1 |
3 | Agreement between DMG and Second Respondent dated 22 October 2004 | 1 |
4 | GBG e-commerce and URL rights acknowledgement, confirmation and consent letter dated 1 December 2017 | 1 |
5 | Email between Epic Rights and DMG dated 10 March 2020 | 1 |
6 | List of Katy Perry branded merchandise in Australia by Epic Rights | 2 |
7 | Confidential Exhibit SJ-6 – Membership Interest Purchase Agreement between GBG USA Inc and Hudson Fund, LLC | 1 |
8 | List of goods (Excel version included in electronic court book) | 3 |
9 | List of goods – additional goods | 3 |
10 | Agreement between Bravado International Group Merchandising Services, Inc. and H&M Hennes & Mauritz GBC AB | 1 |
11 | Operating Agreement of Purrfect Ventures LLC | 1 |
12 | Agreement between UMG Commercial Services, Inc dba Universal Music Group Brands and Killer Queen, LLC | 1 |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
1 This is a tale of two women, two teenage dreams and one name.
2 The applicant, Katie Jane Taylor, is a fashion designer. She is the registered owner of Australian trade mark no. 1264761 for the word KATIE PERRY (Applicant’s Mark) which is registered in class 25 for “clothes” (Registered Goods) with a priority date of 29 September 2008 (Priority Date). Ms Taylor has designed and sold clothes under the brand name “KATIE PERRY” since about 2007.
3 The second respondent, Katheryn Hudson, is a music artist and performer. In 2002 she adopted the name Katy Perry for the purposes of her professional music career and associated commercial merchandise licensing activities and, since that time, she has used that name for those purposes. I will refer to Katy Perry in these reasons as Ms Hudson. The first, third and fourth respondents to the proceeding are respectively Killer Queen, LLC, Kitty Purry, Inc and Purrfect Ventures LLC. As explained below, they are companies associated with Ms Hudson.
4 How Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson each came to be known by, and to use, the same name in their respective commercial activities, albeit with different spelling, is set out below. Suffice to say it is that fact that has led to this proceeding.
5 In summary, Ms Taylor alleges that the respondents have imported for sale, distributed, advertised, promoted, marketed, offered for sale, supplied, sold and/or manufactured in Australia, or to people in Australia, the Registered Goods bearing the word mark KATY PERRY and the other marks set out at [7] of her further amended statement of claim (FASOC) (see [267] below) (collectively, Katy Perry Mark) and further, or in the alternative, that the respondents have participated in a common design with certain retailers to carry out those acts. Ms Taylor alleges that by that conduct the respondents have infringed the Applicant’s Mark pursuant to s 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TM Act) or are liable as joint tortfeasors in the direct infringement of either some of the respondents or relevant third parties.
6 The respondents have filed a cross-claim seeking cancellation of the Applicant’s Mark pursuant to s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act on the grounds set out in s 88(2)(a), relying on ss 60, 42 and 43, and s 88(2)(c) of the TM Act.
7 On 7 April 2020 I made an order pursuant to r 30.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that all issues of liability, entitlement to additional damages for alleged trade mark infringement and all claims for declaratory and injunctive relief be heard and determined separately from, and prior to, all other issues and claims in the proceeding: see Taylor v Killer Queen LLC [2020] FCA 444. These reasons address those issues.
8 Putting aside the experts called by the parties in relation to the question of whether particular items of apparel are clothes or goods of the same description as clothes (see [288]-[376] below), there were only two witnesses.
9 Ms Taylor relied on her own evidence and the respondents relied on evidence given by Steven Jensen, a partner of Direct Management Group Inc (DMG), a talent management agency which has managed, and continues to manage, Ms Hudson’s career. Ms Hudson did not give evidence. Ms Taylor’s and Mr Jensen’s evidence, which respectively chronicles Ms Taylor’s and Ms Hudson’s careers and the development of their “brands”, insofar as it is relevant, is set out below. Both Ms Taylor and Mr Jensen were extensively cross-examined.
10 The respondents submitted that Ms Taylor was not a truthful witness and that the Court should not rely on her evidence except where it is against her interests or independently corroborated by documents in evidence. They set out aspects of Ms Taylor’s evidence which they submitted demonstrated her dishonesty. Those aspects principally concern events which took place in 2009 and I address them, where relevant, below including by making findings as to whether her evidence is accepted. However, I am not prepared to reject all of Ms Taylor’s evidence, except where it is against her interests or corroborated by documents in evidence, as urged by the respondents.
11 The events which led to this proceeding commenced many years ago. Ms Taylor did her best to recall them and, given that a significant period of time has passed since some of the relevant events took place, I accept that she may have been confused in some aspects of her recollection. As a general observation, my impression of Ms Taylor was that she was somewhat naïve, prone to a level of exaggeration and opportunistic. It became clear on a number of occasions that Ms Taylor attempted to fashion her evidence in a manner that she believed would best assist her case, rather than giving full and frank evidence to the Court. On other occasions, she was evasive in responding to questions put to her in cross-examination. On yet other occasions Ms Taylor gave answers to questions that could not be accepted, particularly in the face of other contemporaneous material. Although this approach by Ms Taylor to her evidence served to undermine my overall impression of her as a witness, it has not led me to reject the whole of her evidence.
1.1 Ms Taylor – background and early career
12 Ms Taylor was born Katie Jane Perry. Her biological father is Brian Perry and her mother is Suzanne Mary Skillen. Ms Taylor’s parents separated when she was 18 months old and her biological father did not play a large role in the early part of her life. Thus while growing up Ms Taylor adopted her step-father’s last name, Howell, and for much of her life she was referred to as Katie Howell, although she never formally changed her legal name to Howell.
13 Ms Taylor had a falling out with her step-father and, in the early 2000’s, “reached out” to her biological father and sought to have a relationship with him. Ms Taylor’s evidence was that, as a result, since about 2006 she has referred to herself as “Katie Perry”. Despite that evidence, in cross-examination, a number of matters became apparent.
14 First, Mr Taylor only referred to herself as Katie Perry socially, that is, among her friends, and for example, when making restaurant bookings, but remained as Katie Howell in legal documents. According to Ms Taylor at that time and at least until 2008, when she first became aware of Ms Hudson (see [127] below), she went by two names.
15 Secondly, at the time she left her job at David Jones in 2007 (see [49] below), Ms Taylor was still known to her work colleagues as Katie Howell, despite having decided in 2006 to refer to herself as Katie Perry. Ms Taylor explained that when she first took on the role at David Jones she was Katie Howell and that it “would have been weird” for her staff if she suddenly changed names so she remained as Katie Howell while at David Jones.
16 Thirdly, there was evidence that Ms Taylor continued to use the name Katie Howell beyond 2006 including in relation to services acquired and documents relating to her fashion business. Ms Taylor said that this was either because the documents were legal documents or because she went by both names, “Katie Howell” and “Katie Perry”.
17 In March 2015, following her marriage to Matthew Taylor, Ms Taylor changed her legal name to “Katie Jane Taylor”.
18 Ms Taylor wanted to be a fashion designer since she was 11 years old. She studied at the Fashion Business Institute and in 2003 she completed a Fashion Industry Certificate IV.
19 Ms Taylor has always worked in retail and fashion and, until she started her own fashion label, had the following roles:
sales assistant at Browns, South Molton Street, London (1999);
assistant store manager at Jag, Warringah, New South Wales (NSW) (2000);
buyer and store manager at Activate Pro Shop, Bondi, St Leonards, Mosman and Parramatta, NSW (2001-2002);
store manager at Oroton, Paddington and Centre Point, NSW (2003-2005); and
menswear sales manager working in executive menswear and with buyers’ agents in order to determine what menswear to stock at David Jones in Chatswood and Warringah, NSW (2005-2007).
1.2 Ms Hudson – background and early career
20 As set out above, the principal witness for the respondents was Mr Jensen, a partner of DMG which has its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California, United States of America (US or USA). Mr Jensen founded DMG with his partner, Martin Kirkup, in April 1985. A third partner, Bradford Cobb, joined DMG in 1998.
21 DMG manages artists’ careers or other talents with a view to assisting in achievement of their commercial and career goals. Other managers, agents and firms are responsible for other aspects of support and services required by the artists or talents including creative, processing engagements and work for which they are booked, marketing and sales, publicity, accounting, legal and tax services and so on. DMG works closely with the other managers, agents and firms providing services in carrying out its role.
22 Mr Jensen was introduced to Ms Hudson in 2004 by his business partner, Mr Cobb. At the time she was introduced as Katy Perry. Prior to meeting Ms Hudson Mr Jensen understood, from research he had undertaken in relation to her early career as well as publicity he had read, that Ms Hudson had adopted the name “Katy Perry” as her professional or stage name in about 2002.
23 Since July 2004, when Ms Hudson was about 19 years old, DMG has acted exclusively as her talent manager. Since that time, Mr Jensen, together with Messrs Kirkup and Cobb, has taken various steps to plan for and implement the development of Ms Hudson’s career as a successful music artist including engaging other relevant service providers as required, securing commercial opportunities for her, carrying out various actions and providing advice. Mr Jensen explained that each of his and Messrs Kirkup and Cobb’s respective roles overlap in that they each know what the others are doing but that, in terms of responsibilities, Mr Kirkup is concerned with marketing and record label interaction, Mr Cobb oversees the music aspect of Ms Hudson’s career and he is involved in Ms Hudson’s brand affiliations, real estate purchases and touring.
24 In undertaking his role as talent manager Mr Jensen has kept in regular and frequent contact with Ms Hudson, by calls and meetings, to discuss strategy for managing her career and to keep her informed of the actions DMG is taking. He also texts Ms Hudson regularly.
25 Ms Hudson has been active as a music artist since at least 2000. As a teenager she performed gospel music and in 2001 she entered into a music recording contract with Red Hill Records, the “youth” division of a Christian entertainment company, Pamplin. Pamplin ceased to operate and Red Hill Records closed in December 2001.
26 Mr Jensen understands, given his role as Ms Hudson’s talent manager, that during 2001 Ms Hudson released an album titled “Katy Hudson” which included the single “Trust in Me” which placed at number 17 on the Radio & Records Christian Rock Chart.
27 From September to November 2001 Ms Hudson toured the US and performed as an opening act on the Christian music artist Phil Joel’s tour, “The Strangely Normal Tour”.
28 In 2002 Ms Hudson moved to Los Angeles and adopted her stage name “Katy Perry”. This is a combination of the shortened form of her first name, Katheryn, and her mother’s maiden name, Perry, and was adopted to avoid confusion between her and the actress Kate Hudson.
29 Prior to DMG commencing as Ms Hudson’s manager in 2004 the recording label Java, affiliated with The Island Def Jam Music Group and music producer Glen Ballard, was Ms Hudson’s record company for a short period. During that time although Ms Hudson recorded music, it was not released as an album.
30 In 2004 Ms Hudson provided the background vocals for the song “Old Habits Die Hard” by Mick Jagger of the Rolling Stones which was featured as track one on the album “Alfie”. The album won the 2005 Golden Globe Award for best original song at the 62nd Annual Golden Globe Awards.
31 From the time that DMG started to represent Ms Hudson there was substantial activity associated with the planning and development of her career, including writing and production of music and seeking performing and recording opportunities. Mr Jensen was closely involved in those activities. At that time Colombia Records was already in place as Ms Hudson’s record company and work was proceeding on an album with Ms Hudson as one of two lead singers with the band “Matrix” although, the album was never released. The relationship with Colombia Records came to an end because of creative differences, including over Ms Hudson’s ambition for a career as a solo performing artist.
32 In October 2004 Ms Hudson was featured in an article titled “The Next Big Thing” in Blender magazine, a US music industry publication.
33 On 24 May 2005 Ms Hudson’s unreleased single “Simple” featured as track 11 on the soundtrack to the “Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants” released by Colombia Records. In 2005 Ms Hudson released a music video for “Simple”. The video currently has over five million views on a fan account on YouTube uploaded in 2007.
34 The “Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants” movie was released in Australia on 23 June 2005. It ranked as number eight on its opening and in its second weekend in cinemas. According to a website “Box Office Mojo”, which Mr Jensen described as an Amazon-owned box office revenue tracking website, the movie grossed just over US $1.3 million in Australia.
35 In November 2005 Ms Hudson collaborated with Payable On Death (P.O.D.), an American Christian “nu metal” band on its single titled “Goodbye for Now” and was featured in the music video for the song. In January 2006 the band, together with Ms Hudson, performed the single on “The Tonight Show with Jay Leno”.
36 Ms Hudson featured in a music video for the single “Cupid’s Chokehold” by US rock band “Gym Class Heroes” which was released on 28 November 2006.
1.3 Killer Queen, Kitty Purry and Purrfect Ventures
37 Killer Queen was incorporated on 27 August 2009 in California with Ms Hudson as its sole shareholder and officer. On 16 December 2011 Ms Hudson and Killer Queen entered into a deed of assignment pursuant to the terms of which Ms Hudson assigned to Killer Queen all of her “rights, titles and interests in and to” the trade marks and service marks and the federal registration and US and international registrations and applications listed in schedule A to the deed.
38 Kitty Purry was incorporated on 23 April 2008 in California. In its statement of information filed in 2016 it describes its business as “Entertainment – Music Touring”. Ms Hudson is the sole director, chief executive officer, secretary, chief financial officer and shareholder of Kitty Purry.
39 Purrfect Ventures was incorporated on 7 September 2016 in Delaware. Its initial members were Killer Queen and GBG USA Inc. As described at [234] below, in 2021 Hudson Fund, LLC, a company incorporated in 2016 with Ms Hudson as its sole member, acquired GBG’s shares in Purrfect Ventures.
1.4 Ms Taylor starts her own fashion label
40 In 2007, after leaving her role at David Jones, Ms Taylor started her own fashion label, a decision which was inspired by her travels in Italy the preceding year.
41 From the outset Ms Taylor had a clear vision of what she wanted her label to be; she wanted to design luxurious loungewear. She was aware, from working in retail and her experience buying clothes, that there was a niche market at the time for this type of garment. Ms Taylor described loungewear as “garments which are comfortable enough to be worn at home, but sufficiently aesthetic to be seen out and about in”. She wanted to create garments that women could dress up or down and which they felt good in “no matter their shape, age or size”. While Ms Taylor initially planned to design garments for women, she ultimately intended to expand her label into menswear.
42 Ms Taylor wanted to ensure that the process of designing and manufacturing her clothing was kept in Australia. She thought that a “Made in Australia” aspect of the brand that she wished to build would be an asset. It would help to show the sustainability of the label and to reduce the carbon footprint in production of the garments, which would be an attractive quality for the brand. Ms Taylor wanted to have control over all aspects of the manufacturing process to ensure the quality of the garments. Having them made in Australia would allow her to have greater control and oversight of the goods produced which she thought would ultimately make her business easier to run.
43 Ms Taylor was aware that having her garments manufactured in Australia would cost more but she considered that the quality and sustainability of the goods and the positive qualities of the brand would outweigh the costs and allow her to charge more for her clothing.
44 Another important aspect of Ms Taylor’s business was that she intended to donate a proportion of its proceeds to an Australian charity. Ms Taylor wanted her business to have a positive impact on the community and she thought that this would also confirm the positive identity which she wished for the brand. Since inception the “KATIE PERRY” label has donated to a number of charities including Lucca Leadership Charity, bushfire appeals, breast cancer events and refugee organisations.
45 Ms Taylor described the process she has adopted since 2007 to produce her garments. It is not necessary to set it out in detail but in summary it involves Ms Taylor sketching the garment, preparing more detailed line drawings, instructing a pattern maker to create a pattern from her line drawings, sourcing the fabrics, having a sample made, finalising the pattern and sewing the garment. Ms Taylor described it as an iterative process which includes testing the fit of the garment on a model or mannequin.
46 On 19 December 2006, prior to leaving her job at David Jones, Ms Taylor began to take steps to establish her business. She registered an Australian business number (ABN) under the name “PALMS”, which was the name she initially chose for her label as a nod to her mother’s shop. However, in either December 2006 or January 2007 she was dissuaded from using the name “PALMS” by a friend, Christina Andoniou, who told her that it made her think of old people in Florida. As this was not the image Ms Taylor wished to convey she decided instead to use her name, “Katie Perry”. Ms Taylor was aware that numerous designers used their own names for their brands, citing for example Carla Zampatti, Collette Dinnigan, Leona Edmiston and Oscar de la Renta. At the time Ms Taylor did not want her label to be associated with the name Katie Howell given her falling out with her stepfather.
47 Ms Taylor cannot now recall precisely when in 2007 she decided to change the name of her business from “PALMS” to “KATIE PERRY”. However, she believes that it must have been sometime before April 2007 as on 5 April 2007 she applied to register the business name “Katie Perry”, which was subsequently registered on 12 April 2007. For reasons which Ms Taylor cannot now recall she did not update the trading name associated with her ABN to “KATIE PERRY” until 7 August 2007.
48 On 2 May 2007 Ms Taylor registered a domain name for her business at www.katieperry.com.au. Ms Taylor had originally wanted to register the domain name www.katieperry.com because she dreamt of her brand going global. However, upon undertaking a search in about late April or early May 2007 that domain name appeared to be registered to a woman in the United Kingdom (UK) and, to this day, is still registered to that person. As she could not register the latter domain name Ms Taylor chose to register the Australian domain.
49 Ms Taylor left David Jones in February 2007. She thought that it would probably take some time to set up her new business. She was not only seeking to become a fashion designer but was also going to be running her own business and, until that time, Ms Taylor had only ever worked for others. Accordingly, after leaving her full time employment, in order to still earn money, Ms Taylor worked casually as a receptionist at a waxing salon and devoted her spare time to building her business. She estimated that in 2007 she spent about 30 hours per week developing her label and her business.
50 As this was the first time Ms Taylor was creating a business she sought out business training and, on 20 July 2007, she attended a business course for people starting their own businesses at Mosman Evening College. At the course Ms Taylor met other people who were in the same position as her including Manush Farhang who was also starting his own fashion label. Ms Taylor became friends with Mr Farhang and they helped each other out as they sought to establish their respective businesses.
51 On 21 August 2007 Ms Taylor registered an email address, katie.perry7@gmail.com. In her business, Ms Taylor used that email address as well as two emails associated with her domain name: info@katieperry.com.au and katie@katieperry.com.au.
1.5 Ms Taylor makes her first application for registration of a trade mark
52 On 29 August 2007 Ms Taylor attended an IP Australia business course at which she learnt about the process for, and importance of, applying for trade marks and designs for her business and about copyright. At about this time she also engaged Three Dimensional Communication to design business cards, letterhead and swing tags for her garments.
53 On 13 September 2007 Ms Taylor applied to register a trade mark for a fancy logo based on the logo on her business card. The prominent feature of the logo was the words “KATIE PERRY” in cursive font. She applied for registration of the trade mark in class 42 for “clothing and fashion designing” (First KP Trade Mark). At the time Ms Taylor had not appreciated that goods and services belong to different classes. It was only in 2008 that she came to understand that in order to obtain better protection she should seek to register a mark in relation to clothes which were the type of goods she intended to sell.
54 By letter dated 4 January 2008 IP Australia informed Ms Taylor that her trade mark application no. 1198609 for the First KP Trade Mark had cleared the examination stage of the registration process and that it would be advertised on 17 January 2008, which would commence the three month opposition period. The letter noted that if Ms Taylor paid the registration fee of $250 by 17 July 2008 and no one raised an objection within the three month opposition period, or sought an extension of time in which to do so, IP Australia would automatically register the First KP Trade Mark when that period expired. IP Australia also warned that if the registration fee was not paid by 17 July 2008, the trade mark application would lapse.
1.6 Launching the Katie Perry label – October to November 2007
55 In about October 2007 a friend of Ms Taylor’s, Cameron Paulinich, who was a gardener at Kambala School, a private girls school in Sydney, informed Ms Taylor that the students were hosting a fashion parade to raise money for charity and asked her if she wished to be involved. The event was titled “Catwalk for a Cure” and was to raise money for the National Breast Cancer Foundation. Ms Taylor’s name was put forward as a potential designer and she was selected to dress some of the students for the parade. By that time Ms Taylor had finalised several designs, but had not yet produced her garments at scale. She had only one or two of each style made up which she was using as samples to locate a suitable production house. Nonetheless Ms Taylor considered the Kambala fashion parade to be a great opportunity to promote the “KATIE PERRY” brand and her designs so she agreed to debut them at the event. On 31 October 2007, prior to the fashion parade, Ms Taylor sent a press release to Radio Northern Beaches and New Woman Magazine about the launch of her label which provided:
56 The Kambala parade took place on 2 November 2007. Ms Taylor considered it to be a success and posted about the event on her personal Facebook page. Ms Taylor did not set up a Facebook page for the “KATIE PERRY” brand until 8 January 2009.
57 The Kambala parade generated interest in Ms Taylor’s brand and she received verbal inquiries asking where her garments were available. Ms Taylor gave evidence that, given her inexperience, she was not as prepared as she should have been and was not in a position to take full advantage of the interest at the time. She had not yet ramped up production as she had not been able to locate a suitable production house nor had she set up a website at her registered domain name.
1.7 Ms Taylor establishes a production chain
58 As set out at [42] above, Ms Taylor wished to have her garments made in Australia. When starting out Ms Taylor found it very difficult to identify a suitable production house to manufacture her garments on a relatively small scale using her preferred fabric which was both reliable and reasonable in price. As a result, when Ms Taylor first commenced production she retained different people for each step of the production process, including pattern makers, fabric suppliers, cutters and manufacturers.
59 In order to gauge interest in garment colours and styles and to determine what to produce, on 15 November 2007 Ms Taylor undertook a survey of her friends and acquaintances. By the end of 2007 she was ready to produce her designs at volume but she still needed a production house willing to make the clothes in the smaller quantities required. After making enquiries, she identified a suitable candidate and from 2008 she began working with Kim Phung and his production house.
60 Ms Hudson’s career was also developing.
61 In about April 2007 Ms Hudson changed her record company to Virgin which was then owned by EMI. It merged with Capitol Records when Universal Music acquired EMI in 2012. Mr Jensen considered this to be a major development in Ms Hudson’s career because, based on discussions at the time with executives at Virgin, he understood it was committed to the development of Ms Hudson’s career as a solo artist which was her career ambition.
62 From that time there was increased activity associated with Ms Hudson’s career, in which Mr Jensen was closely involved, including continued writing, production and recording of music, promotion of Ms Hudson and her music and planning for commercial opportunities.
63 In November 2007, in advance of the planned release of a Katy Perry album, Ms Hudson’s single “Ur So Gay” and music video was digitally released on the youth oriented social media website, MySpace. It was immediately very popular and, without active promotion, it “went viral”. An Extended Play (EP) including the single was subsequently released and from 15 January 2008 was available for purchase (in a compact disk (CD)).
64 After its release the “Ur So Gay” single received publicity in:
(1) the US Out Magazine online in an article titled “You probably think this song is about you” dated 19 November 2007;
(2) the US McClatchy Tribune Business newspaper online, which was accessible in Australia from 5 December 2001, in an article titled “Katy Perry makes Bay Area debut: New Year’s show introduces buzz-worthy up-and-comer” dated 28 December 2007;
(3) the US Billboard Magazine online, which was accessible in Australia from 8 January 1994, in an article titled “The Billboard Reviews Singles” dated 12 January 2008; and
(4) a radio interview on the Johnjay & Rich Radio show on Phoenix’s 104.7 KISS FM station in April 2008 in which the artist Madonna mentioned Ms Hudson’s “Ur So Gay” single. A transcript of that interview prepared by the respondents’ lawyers includes the following exchange between Madonna and the two presenters:
Presenter 2: Do you have something geeky on your iPod that you love that you wouldn’t admit to many people?
Madonna: Geeky?
Presenter 2: Yeah, something that is not yours but just kind of out of context for you.
Madonna: Well I have a favourite song right now
Presenter 1: What’s that?
Madonna: It’s called … it’s called ‘Ur so gay and you don’t even like boys’
Presenter 2: [Laughing] That sounds awesome.
Presenter 1: That might be a song about me.
Madonna: Have you heard it?
Presenter 2: Is it…
Madonna: You have to hear it.
Presenter 2: Is it a children’s song?
Madonna: It’s by an artist called Katy Perry
Presenter 2: Let me look it up.
Presenter 1: Look it up while we see if we can find it
Madonna: Oh it’s so good. Check it out on iTunes.
Presenter 1: Sounds like the story of my life.
Presenter 3: Jesus John.
Presenter 2: Katy Perry.
65 According to Mr Jensen the “Ur So Gay” single was successful in several countries including the US, with over 500,000 sales and Gold Certification by the Recording Industry Association of America, and Brazil, with over 100,000 sales and a Platinum Certification by Pro-Musica Brazil. In 2008 the “Ur So Gay” single also peaked at number one on the American Billboard Hot Dance Single Sales Chart.
66 In late 2007 Mr Jensen observed that Ms Hudson’s popularity started to grow in Australia. This growth continued with the release of Ms Hudson’s singles in early 2008 and her album in June 2008, as described below. From at least early 2008 Mr Jensen considered that Australia was going to be an important market for Ms Hudson’s career.
67 In January 2008, in response to the positive reception and attention given to the “Ur So Gay” single, a seven inch vinyl version of it was released. It was available for purchase and was used on behalf of Ms Hudson as promotional merchandise.
68 From early 2008 Mr Jensen and others involved in the development and management of Ms Hudson’s career planned for her to undertake a number of promotional and performance activities before a worldwide concert tour scheduled to take place in 2009.
69 In addition in early 2008 Ms Hudson was invited to perform in the US summer at the “Warped Tour”, a US rock music tour which has operated since 1995, usually at outdoor venues, with a strong emphasis on punk rock. Its major sponsor has traditionally been the Vans skateboard shoe brand and the tour is often called the “Vans Warped Tour”. The “Warped Tour” later toured to some overseas countries.
70 On 8 April 2008 Ms Hudson performed the “Ur So Gay” single live on “Last Call with Carson Daly”, a US television variety program.
71 In April 2008 Mr Jensen was touring Australia with artist k.d.lang. While here he met with Michael Coppel, an Australian concert promoter. Mr Jensen mentioned Ms Hudson to Mr Coppel informing him that he should “look out for this artist”. Mr Jensen recalls that he said words to the following effect to Mr Coppel:
I encourage you to take note of Katy Perry. Let me know if you wish to be in touch with Katy’s local Australia record label EMI.
72 On 17 June 2008 Ms Hudson released her second studio album “One of the Boys” which included the song “Ur So Gay” and the singles “I Kissed a Girl”, “Hot n Cold”, “Thinking of You” and “Waking Up in Vegas”. The “One of the Boys” album and those singles ranked on international music charts. Following its release the album attracted media attention including in a number of Australian online publications such as:
(1) The Daily Telegraph newspaper, available in NSW, Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, which featured an article titled “Listen up: Album of the week”, dated 31 July 2008, which, among others, reviewed “One of the Boys”;
(2) The Herald Sun newspaper which featured an article titled “from gospel to gay” dated 7 August 2008;
(3) The Adelaide Advertiser newspaper which featured an article titled “Miss versatility” dated 7 August 2008;
(4) The Sunday Age newspaper which featured an article titled “One of the Boys: Reviews - CDs” dated 10 August 2008;
(5) The Brisbane Courier Mail newspaper which featured an article titled “CD Reviews” dated 14 August 2008, which included a review of the “One of the Boys” album;
(6) The Age newspaper which featured an article titled “One of the Boys: Music” dated 15 August 2008;
(7) The Brisbane Sunday Mail newspaper which featured an article titled “[POP] One of the Boys Katy Perry” dated 17 August 2008;
(8) The Townsville Bulletin newspaper which featured an article titled “cds: The title track is fitful and energetic and the lyrics tell of Katy Perry’s desire to be one of the girls not one of the boys” dated 21 August 2008;
(9) The AAP Bulletin Wire newspaper which featured an article titled “Katy Perry double hits Aussie top 10” dated 15 September 2008; and
(10) The Gold Coast Bulletin newspaper featured an article titled “CD Reviews” dated 16 September 2008 which included a review of “One of the Boys” album.
73 In anticipation of Ms Hudson’s participation in the “Warped Tour” Mr Jensen pursued merchandising opportunities. In addition:
(1) on 12 June 2008 he caused an application to register “KATY PERRY” as a trade mark for apparel in class 25 to be lodged in the US; and
(2) on 26 June 2008 he caused an application to register “KATY PERRY” as a trade mark for music, CDs and other goods in class 9 and for entertainment and other services in class 41 to be lodged in the US.
74 Mr Jensen and his colleagues at DMG arranged for a range of “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise to be specially designed and produced for the “Warped Tour” by a US company called Chaser. This included various clothing items and other merchandise including heart shaped glasses, lip balm (cherry chapsticks) and tote bags. At each concert during the tour there would be an official “Warped Tour” merchandise booth where fans could buy merchandise from the various bands who were performing. Mr Jensen and his colleagues at DMG planned and arranged for the Katy Perry section of the merchandise sales area to be colourful, fruit themed and “girly”, making it distinctive and different from the merchandise offered by other bands. An image of Ms Hudson at the “Warped Tour” “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise booth taken from a YouTube video appears below:
75 The “Warped Tour” commenced on 20 June 2008 in Pomona, California and ended on 17 August 2008 in Carsen, California. Mr Jensen attended some of the concerts and was otherwise kept informed by the tour manager and Mr Cobb, who also attended a number of the concerts, about all aspects of Ms Hudson’s performances, promotional events and merchandise. Ms Hudson performed about 40 concerts, performing on the main stage on every date of the tour except for 10 and 11 July 2008. On 20 June 2008, at the beginning of the “Warped Tour”, Ms Hudson performed her single “I Kissed a Girl”.
76 During the northern hemisphere summer of 2008 Ms Hudson’s commercial and career momentum increased. Mr Jensen observed that: Ms Hudson was very popular on the “Warped Tour”, attracting large audiences that sought out her performances; at the time her three singles, including “I Kissed a Girl”, were popular on radio and received extensive airplay; and, while the album “One of the Boys” was slower to gain sales following its release in 2008, it was ultimately successful. The “End of year chart – top 100 singles in 2008” published by the Australian Recording Industry Association (ARIA) shows that for 2008 Ms Hudson’s single “I Kissed a Girl” was at number six and her single “Hot n Cold” was at number 16.
77 During Ms Hudson’s 2008 performances and promotional appearances Mr Jensen observed that she was popular across a wide cross section of people, including teenage boys and girls. In 2008 Ms Hudson’s popularity quickly spread internationally including because of international coverage of her performances on the “Warped Tour” and because of the popularity of the singles she had released, including “I Kissed a Girl”, on radio in a number of countries such as the UK, Japan, Germany, France, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, Russia and South America.
78 Mr Jensen together with, among others, his partners and staff members at DMG and executives and staff members of the record company, proceeded in the northern hemisphere summer of 2008 with planning a substantial North American and international promotional tour for Ms Hudson during which she would undertake a range of scheduled events promoting her album. They included personal appearances, radio and television interviews, meet and greets with fans, small venue concert appearances, meeting local record label personnel and events aimed generally at increasing Ms Hudson’s visibility. The overseas markets for the tour included the UK, Canada, Germany, Spain, Mexico and Australia, as explained below, with the visits to take place in the last few months of 2008. During the tour, the concert dates in countries where Ms Hudson was to perform during her 2009 worldwide tour were to be announced.
79 In the course of 2008 Ms Hudson received publicity in Australian newspapers and magazines including The Age, The Brisbane Courier Mail, The Sunday Herald, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph and The Canberra Times. For example an article appearing in The AAP Bulletin Wire Australian newspaper dated 15 September 2008 reported:
80 Given Mr Jensen’s view about the importance of the Australian market to Ms Hudson’s career, by mid 2008 he considered that the next logical step was for her to include Australia in her 2008 promotional tour and in the itinerary for the 2009 world concert tour.
81 In July 2008 Mr Jensen corresponded with Mr Coppel by email in relation to Ms Hudson and her upcoming promotional visit to Australia and anticipated concert tour. An email dated 22 July 2008 with subject “Re: Katy Perry” from Mr Jensen to Mr Coppel included:
I am thrilled that you will be our promoter for Katy Perry in Australia. You’ll recall that I mentioned Katy to you when we ran into each other at the Intercontinental in Sydney. We have been managing Katy for the past four years, taking the time to develop her and set up the album for release. She might seem like an ‘overnight sensation’ to the outside world, but it’s been a long and involved road to get to where we are today. As you probably know, she’s doing incredibly well in North America and it’s now starting to ‘take off’ in the rest of the world. The success of the single, ‘I Kissed A Girl’ in Australia is phenomenal. And, we have high hopes for the album release on August 2. Needless to say, we’re very excited.
Katy is an edgy pop artist with a long career ahead if we do this right. She wrote (or co-wrote) all the songs on the album. She is a very determined woman, has a compelling personality, is sexy and extremely talented. You’ll know what I mean when you meet her .... she’s infectious and ambitious!
Again, I’m thrilled that you will be our ‘promoter’ partner in Australia, and we look forward to working together to build Katy’s concert career. I know Emma is in contact regarding the showcase gigs in October, and please know that management is available to help in any way possible. You’ll see Bradford Cobb, Katy’s primary manager at Direct Management, when he’s with Katy during the promotion trip. You’ll remember that Bradford was with the B-52’s when they played the Hordern Pavilion for you several years ago. I’m copying Bradford on this email so you have his contact information.
Cheers,
Steve
82 In August 2008 Messrs Jensen and Coppel exchanged further emails about Ms Hudson’s album debut on the Australian album charts, which came in at number 12.
1.9 The development of KATY PERRY merchandise
83 By July 2008, based on Ms Hudson’s success, her increasing popularity and in anticipation of her global concert tour, Mr Jensen considered that there was a significant commercial opportunity for sales, including online sales, of “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise. Accordingly, he commenced planning and carrying out various activities to take advantage of that commercial opportunity in all countries where Ms Hudson was popular at the time, including Australia.
84 From July to September 2008 Mr Jensen was involved in the planning and preparation for Ms Hudson’s promotional tour in 2008 and subsequent world concert tour in 2009, including her travel to and touring in Australia. At the same time Mr Jensen was also involved in activities related to promoting commercial opportunities for “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise. As to the latter Mr Jensen had Australia in mind as a market of interest and importance and considered that “KATY PERRY” branded apparel and other merchandise would be popular and would sell well in Australia including at concert venues, retail stores and online.
85 In July 2008 Mr Jensen commenced discussions in relation to “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise with Tom Donnell of Bravado International Group Inc., a merchandise company that operated in the music industry. In these reasons, I will refer to that company and any of its related entities, including Bravado International Group Merchandising Services, Inc, as Bravado. Bravado’s role was to arrange merchandise designs for approval and, when approved, to arrange for the manufacture and distribution of licensed merchandise for advertising and sale, including through other intermediaries and resuppliers.
86 Having worked with Bravado and Mr Donnell for 15 years, Mr Jensen was aware that Bravado provided branded merchandise to distributors for resupply to retailers including the supply of mass market merchandise to department stores for retail sale to consumers. The branded merchandise was advertised by the retailers and through other promotional activities and was offered for sale and sold to members of the public by the retailers.
87 In or about 2008 or 2009, before her first world concert tour, Mr Jensen introduced Ms Hudson to Mr Donnell and his colleagues at Bravado, including those involved in the design of products. Mr Jensen recalls that he had discussions with Ms Hudson about his prior experiences working with Bravado and that Ms Hudson accepted his recommendation that they work with Mr Donnell and Bravado.
88 Following the development of the internet in the 1990s, it was also Mr Jensen’s experience that branded merchandise was sold to members of the public through websites, where orders could be placed electronically or by calling an advertised telephone number. Since at least the late 1990s this was another channel of sales used by Bravado and Mr Jensen for artists for their branded merchandise.
89 By email sent on 22 August 2008 Mr Donnell provided Mr Jensen and others with proposed “I Kissed a Girl” designs noting that there would be “a few more to choose from in the master presentation coming next week”. Mr Jensen responded indicating that he and Mr Cobb would review the designs over the weekend and asked “[h]ow fast could we get this ready?”. By email dated 23 August 2008 Mr Donnell responded in the following terms (as written):
We will release to sell the day it’s approved on paper. About one week to sample and then a week to manufacture. Retailers and Etailers will determine distribution timeline, but would think product will land in the market four weeks from approval. Seems like a long time, but the key is circulating approved designs. Once buyers know have something to buy, they will lock in and wait for product to arrive.
90 By email dated 6 September 2008 from Shannon Biliske of Bravado to, among others, Messrs Jensen and Cobb, Ms Biliske provided the initial merchandise design concepts for “Katy Perry”. There followed an exchange of emails with feedback about the proposed online store.
91 By email dated 9 September 2008 David Weekes of Red Octopus contacted Mr Cobb inquiring if DMG was interested in enlisting its help with merchandise production or sales for Ms Hudson’s upcoming Australian tour. Mr Jensen forwarded Mr Weekes’ email to Mr Coppel. By email dated 11 September 2008 with subject “merchandise for Katy Perry’s upcoming Australian tour” Mr Coppel responded to Mr Jensen in the following terms (as written):
I’ve never heard of Red Octopus, and I think Derek is out of the business, isn’t he?
I have an on-going merch deal with Simon Lonergan at TSP, who handles any of my tours for which I have merch rights, as well as a bunch of major acts ((including RHCP, Pearl Jam, The Police, RATM, Christine Aguillera, Gwen Stefani etc), as well as local artists and start up club tours.
He has his own T shirt printing factories so can do quick turnaround and good pricing.
So I’m happy to sort out any merch requirements you have for the promo shows on a straight split of net income, if that suits?
92 On 11 September 2008 Mr Jensen sent an email with subject “katy perry retail merch” to Mr Donnell, among others, which included:
I don’t want to shock you, but we have one design approved for retail sale and should have one or two more by tomorrow. The approved design is attached. Let’s get rolling on this one.
sj
93 On 16 September 2008 Mr Jensen sent a further email to, among others, Mr Donnell with subject “Katy Perry/Approved t-shirt” which included:
The attached t-shirt is now approved for retail. I’d especially like to get this out in the UK, Europe, Australia and Japan quickly. How do we do that?
Let’s talk today about ‘where we’re at’ on retain merch. I’m in Cologne and available on my cell, XXX.XXX XXXX.
Cheers,
Steve
94 At the time Mr Jensen and his colleagues at DMG were also organising a “Katy Perry” doll (Katy Doll). The Katy Doll was designed by a Taiwanese/Canadian artist and fashion designer, Jason Wu, and made and sold by New York toy maker Integrity Toys. It was dressed in a belted gold mini dress and was inspired by the outfit Ms Hudson wore in the “I Kissed a Girl” music video. Only around 500 Katy Dolls were made and around 150 of them were distributed within the record industry for giveaways. It is now a collectible item. Mr Jensen recalls that in 2008 Ms Hudson ran a sweepstakes competition on her MySpace page and the winner was given a Katy Doll. The Katy Doll was available for purchase in late September 2008 on the Integrity Toys official website and was sold out on pre-orders as at 10 October 2008.
1.9.1 Launch of the Katy Perry webstore
95 On 24 September 2008 Mr Donnell informed Mr Jensen by email that the “Katy Perry web store” was live and ready to be linked to Ms Hudson’s homepage and provided a link. Mr Jensen reviewed the link and provided feedback by return email. Mr Jensen understood that launch of the webstore meant that “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise, including t-shirts and other apparel and merchandise, would be advertised, offered for sale and available for purchase from Bravado either online or by telephone order which could be placed from outside the US including by members of the public in Australia.
96 The evidence as to when the website went live was unclear. Initially Mr Jensen said that he understood it was from 24 September 2008. But that cannot be so given Mr Jensen’s email of 24 September 2008 requesting changes to the site and subsequent material shown to him. Indeed, in cross-examination Mr Jensen ultimately accepted that the webstore went live and was publicly available in early October 2008 and I find that to be so.
97 A screenshot, obtained from the Wayback Machine as at 10 December 2008, showing the “Katy Perry” webstore at katyperry.shop.bravadousa.com (Bravado Website) appears below:
98 Mr Jensen recalls that a few days after the “Katy Perry” webstore went live on the Bravado Website it also went live on Ms Hudson’s own website via a link which, in turn, automatically linked to the Bravado Website. Relevantly, an announcement dated 7 October 2008 on Ms Hudson’s official site provides:
Katy’s Webstore is Now Live!
Shop Katy Perry!
Click here to go to Katy’s official webstore now
Mr Jensen understood that members of the public from any country around the world, including Australia, who could access Ms Hudson’s website were able to purchase “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise through it.
1.9.2 Initial arrangements with Bravado
99 On 18 November 2008 Mr Donnell provided DMG with an updated confidential proposal for the distribution and sale worldwide for Ms Hudson’s upcoming world tour of “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise (November 2008 Proposal). A formal contract was not entered into with Bravado until 2011 (see [204] below). Until that time the terms set out in the November 2008 Proposal were treated by DMG and Bravado as binding and, according to Mr Jensen, they conducted themselves generally in accordance with the terms of that proposal until such time as they entered into a contract in 2011. The November 2008 Proposal set out the terms for the distribution and sale of merchandise including the percentage royalties payable in each tour country, which included Australia, and definitions of the terms “Tour Sales” and “Tour Profits”.
100 As set out below, “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise continued to be developed and sold. It was not in dispute that Ms Hudson was closely involved in the selection and approval of designs and items of merchandise to be offered for sale generally and in particular geographic regions.
1.10 Ms Hudson’s promotional tour – 2008
101 On 9 September 2008 Ms Hudson commenced her promotional tour in the UK. The other countries included in the promotional tour were France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Mexico and Australia. In each of the European cities to which she travelled Ms Hudson appeared and performed on television programs and at radio stations, was interviewed by magazines and news publications and participated in interviews and fan meet and greets. The tour was the subject of media in the UK, France and Spain.
102 In September 2008, before Ms Hudson’s arrival in Australia, there was publicity about her intended visit and the fact that she would be performing concerts in Sydney and Melbourne, with tickets going on sale on 12 September 2008. The Australian leg of the promotional tour ran from 10 to 14 October 2008. There were a number of articles published about Ms Hudson while she was in Australia during that period.
103 In an email dated 15 October 2008, with subject “Katy Perry is a true star…”, from Glenn Dickie, EMI Music Australia Label Manager Capitol & Virgin to, among others, Mr Jensen, Mr Dickie reported on the Australian leg of Ms Hudson’s promotional tour. His email included:
While Katy has been here we have covered nearly every major TV, Press and Radio in both Australia and New Zealand, had paparazzi fights that were caught on film and two rocking’ shows (with Melbourne 10 tickets off selling out) that really showed that Katy’s got the live skills to pay the bills and won a lot of sceptics over.
All of our hard work and attention to Katy and One Of The Boys is paying off as we are now GOLD on One Of The Boys continuing on from our platinum sales plus sales of I Kissed A Girl. Congratulations to everyone locally and internationally for this excellent achievement. Now it’s time to get to platinum!!!
We still have lots of TV, radio and press interviews to roll out over the coming weeks including what we expect to be great live reviews as well as Sunday nights ROVE performance that will air in New Zealand on Friday night.
…
TV advertising starts from next week to back up the tour and we should see One Of The Boys heading up the charts. One Of The Boys will be One Of The Must have Albums of this Christmas.
…
1.11 Filing of the application for registration of the Applicant’s Mark
104 As at 2008 Ms Taylor did not realise that she had not paid the registration fee for the First KP Trade Mark. An Australian trade mark search for trade mark application no. AU1198609 shows that the trade mark was advertised on 17 January 2008 but that it lapsed on 17 July 2008. It also shows that on 19 June 2008 “Registration Fee Reminder” correspondence was sent but on 2 July 2008 that correspondence was returned to sender. Ms Taylor explained that at that time she was no longer residing at the address she had used to apply for registration of the First KP Trade Mark and thus did not receive the reminder correspondence.
105 On 9 July 2008 Ms Taylor sent an email to IP Australia requesting a change of address to her PO Box in Spit Junction, NSW.
106 In about August 2008 it occurred to Ms Taylor that she had not yet paid the registration fee for the First KP Trade Mark. She called IP Australia and was informed that she could still register her mark but that she would have to pay late fees in addition to paying the registration fee.
107 It was at about this time or shortly thereafter that Mr Farhang informed Ms Taylor that he was going to apply for another trade mark in class 25. He advised Ms Taylor that she should do so too and that she should apply for a word mark because it would give her more protection if she wished to change her logo later. Following that discussion Ms Taylor made a decision to apply for a word mark in class 25. However, as her business was small and self-funded she did not consider that she could maintain two trade marks. Accordingly she decided to let the First KP Trade Mark application lapse and on 29 September 2008 she applied for registration of the word mark “KATIE PERRY” in class 25 for clothes, i.e. the Applicant’s Mark.
108 By letter dated 7 October 2008 IP Australia notified Ms Taylor that her trade mark application for the word mark “KATIE PERRY” had been received and filed as trade mark application no. 1264761 with a filing date of 29 September 2008.
109 On 18 December 2008 Ms Taylor received an early notice of acceptance from IP Australia for her word mark “KATIE PERRY”. IP Australia noted that trade mark application no. 1264761 had passed the examination stage and that the next step was advertising in order to give other people an opportunity to oppose registration of the trade mark.
1.12 The KATIE PERRY fashion label - 2008 to 2009
110 In or about May to June 2008 Ms Taylor was part of the New Enterprise Incentive Scheme, a government program for a Certificate IV in Business. Through this program Ms Taylor attended seminars in relation to small business management and, as part of the program, she prepared a business plan for her KATIE PERRY label.
111 Since 2007 Ms Taylor has accumulated a database of over 200 people. She sent Katie Perry newsletters on a monthly basis to the contacts in her database. The newsletter bore her logo, a message from her in relation to the brand and some images. In it she shared news about the progress of, and any updates on, the brand and made announcements about where she was going to be, what she was going to be doing, new products and so on.
112 In the early stages of development of her brand Ms Taylor considered wholesaling to high end boutiques and visited stores and events in preparation. For example, in September 2007 she attended Melbourne Fashion Week for inspiration, to undertake market research and to seek out boutiques she could potentially approach. Ms Taylor also considered selling goods at Paddington Markets, in Paddington, NSW. She wished to grow organically and use the markets as a launch pad to get customer feedback. At the time Ms Taylor considered Paddington to be a fashion hub and, prior to working at David Jones, had been the store manager at the Oroton store located in Paddington, across the road from the markets. She observed that the markets, which were open every Saturday, always had high foot traffic from both local and overseas visitors and she frequently visited there during her lunch break so she knew of the types of stalls that were there and the demographics of the customers. Ms Taylor understood that Paddington Markets focussed on high quality Australian made brands, Australian made fashion, jewellery and accessories and she considered that her Australian luxury loungewear would be well accepted at the markets.
113 Along with having physical presence Ms Taylor also planned to sell her garments through an e-commerce website. Although she had wanted to set up a website, since registering her domain name she could not do so until sometime later for two reasons. First, she needed the garments to be produced at volume and ready to be sold. Secondly, as far as she was aware e-commerce was not big with Australian suppliers and consumers at the time which meant that developing a suitable website with e-commerce facilities was not inexpensive. Therefore Ms Taylor decided to develop the website in stages.
114 In late 2007 Ms Taylor engaged Tanveer Kalani to prepare a landing page for her website. From January 2008 she worked with Mr Kalani to set up the website. For most of 2008, while it went through a number of variations, the website was fairly rudimentary. It was a “splash” screen with the Applicant’s Mark, and had details about the brand and contact details. There was no e-commerce facility. As at 18 July 2008 the website appeared as follows:
115 On 16 May 2008 Ms Taylor received a letter of approval from Paddington Markets accepting her application for registration as a stallholder.
116 By July 2008 high volume manufacturing of Ms Taylor’s collection was complete. Thus on 18 July 2008 Ms Taylor organised and supervised a photoshoot of the collection. One of the main reasons for obtaining high quality professional photos was for use on the online store. Copies of the photographs which were taken at the time were in evidence before me and included:
117 In anticipation of opening her Paddington Markets stall Ms Taylor organised for Eftpos merchant facilities with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and on 22 July 2008 was provided with a merchant facility number.
118 Ms Taylor opened her stall at Paddington Markets for the first time on Saturday, 2 August 2008. Although she had originally intended to have a stall there for only a few months, she maintained her stall at the market for around seven years.
119 In August 2008 Ms Taylor engaged David Waters of DJW Designs to set up an e-commerce website. From August to December 2008 she worked with Mr Waters to design and create a comprehensive website with e-commerce facilities and a platform where she could share more about herself and her brand through a blog.
120 By November 2008 Ms Taylor outgrew working from home and rented a storage unit. At that time she was also nominated as a finalist for the 2threads Fashion Awards in the “best up and coming designer” category.
121 In order to promote her brand Ms Taylor attended, and was part of, as many fashion related events as possible. In 2008 one of the main events in which she participated was the Duke of Edinburgh Award’s fundraising event, “Dressed to Kilt – a Tartan Fashion Extravaganza” held on 19 November 2008 at Doltone House, Jones Bay Wharf, NSW. Ms Taylor was asked by the organisers to design a garment with the theme “a touch of tartan” and her garment, along with those of other designers, was showcased and auctioned at the charity event.
122 By early December 2008 Ms Taylor’s website was up and running with an online store. To celebrate the launch she ran a promotion for the month of December for all online purchases. A copy of the website at www.katieperry.com.au as taken from the Wayback Machine appears as follows:
123 Ms Taylor also applied for and was allocated a stand to participate at the “Fashion Exposed” trade show to be held at the Sydney Exhibition Centre in March 2009. Ms Taylor had a stall showcasing her latest range of KATIE PERRY clothing. She spoke to numerous retailers hoping to have her label sold in their boutiques and, as a result, “picked up” a boutique in Kiama called “Classy Lady”. Unfortunately, as the boutique did not pay Ms Taylor for the stock it purchased from her, in about October 2009 Ms Taylor had to retrieve the leftover stock. Given this experience Ms Taylor decided to change her focus away from wholesaling. Although her clothing was still stocked in “Mushroom Boutique” in Queensland and in another local store, she no longer actively sought to wholesale her range but focussed her attention on her own stores.
124 Ms Taylor looked for a showroom which she could also use as a workspace, retail space, display room and for promotional events. On 1 April 2009 she signed a lease for a showroom at 2/87 Avenue Road, Mosman, NSW and on 4 June 2009 she launched the opening of the showroom with an event where she showcased and sold items from her collection.
125 Generally Ms Taylor would set up the showroom from Monday to Friday, opening it to the public from Tuesday to Thursday. If clients wished to attend at a different time they were able to make a private booking. On Saturdays she continued to sell her clothing at Paddington Markets. Ms Taylor’s showroom was on the second floor of the building at 2/87 Avenue Road, Mosman and she hung the clothes on the shop front. There was “KATIE PERRY” signage on the window, a “KATIE PERRY” light box on the street, which also displayed Ms Taylor’s website address, and another “KATIE PERRY” sign on the wall at the entrance to the steps which led to the showroom, which also displayed her website address. Even now people occasionally ask Ms Taylor questions about the showroom in Mosman. A photo showing the signage which appeared at the showroom appears below:
126 Since 2007 Ms Taylor has also actively posted on various social media platforms including Facebook and Instagram. Initially she promoted the “KATIE PERRY” brand on her personal Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/katietaylor30. On 8 January 2009 she established a Facebook page for her business at https://www.facebook.com/katieperryclothing/. Ms Taylor continues to share and promote her brand through Facebook and now has a “shop” tab where people can view various items and access them by a link to her website. In about 2013 Ms Taylor also set up an Instagram account for her clothing brand at https://www.instagram.com/katieperry.clothing/. Ms Taylor usually tries to upload a post on Facebook or Instagram every few days. Extracts from the “KATIE PERRY” Facebook and Instagram pages, printed as at 8 June 2021, are as follows:
Facebook:
Instagram:
1.13 Ms Taylor first hears about Ms Hudson
127 Ms Taylor first heard of Ms Hudson in July 2008. She was listening to the radio and heard Ms Hudson’s name and her song “I Kissed a Girl”. Ms Taylor bought the song on iTunes because she wanted to support an artist who had the same name as her. At the time she did not intend to listen to the song and she does not recall that she did so often, if at all. Ms Hudson’s style of music was not to Ms Taylor’s liking and she has never bought any of her songs again.
128 Prior to June 2009, when she received the correspondence described below, Ms Taylor:
(1) did not recall anyone ever mentioning Ms Hudson, her songs, her concerts or tours to her, whether or not with a reference to her own brand. But, in February 2021, in the course of reviewing documents for the purpose of this proceeding Ms Taylor found a Facebook post dated 20 October 2008 on her Facebook page about Ms Hudson. It was posted by Oscar Landa, a friend of Ms Taylor’s brother who Ms Taylor does not know well. A copy of the Facebook post, which Ms Taylor does not recall seeing prior to February 2021 and to which she did not respond, appears below:
(2) had not considered, or even thought about, Ms Hudson as a potential threat to her business. To the extent Ms Taylor considered Ms Hudson at all, she has no recollection of thinking there would be any issues between them but she thinks it is more likely that she simply did not turn her mind to Ms Hudson at the time.
1.14 Mr Jensen becomes aware of Ms Taylor’s application for the Applicant’s Mark
129 In about May 2009 Mr Jensen became aware, from the US lawyers acting for Ms Hudson, of Ms Taylor’s application for registration of the Applicant’s Mark for “clothes” in Australia. Mr Jensen was concerned that Ms Taylor’s purpose may have been to attempt to obtain a financial advantage from Ms Hudson who, at that time, was scheduled to be in Australia as part of her world concert tour in August 2009.
1.15 Correspondence between Ms Hudson and Ms Taylor
130 In May 2009 Mr Jensen authorised the US lawyers for Ms Hudson, who acted on his instructions, to send a cease and desist letter to Ms Taylor in order to attempt to stop Ms Taylor’s application for registration of the Applicant’s Mark. Those lawyers, in turn, instructed Australian trade mark attorneys, Fisher Adams Kelly, to send the letter.
131 At some point in the period 5 to 8 June 2009, shortly after the launch of her showroom, Ms Taylor received a letter from Fisher Adams Kelly dated 21 May 2009 (21 May 2009 Letter). Ms Taylor recalls being surrounded by empty champagne glasses from the showroom launch party when she read it. The 21 May 2009 Letter, which was marked “without prejudice”, included:
We act for Katy Perry of XXXX (“Our Client”), born Katheryn Elizabeth Hudson is an internationally known American singer, songwriter and musician whose career commenced in 2001. In particular, Our Client rose to fame in 2007 with her internet hit “Ur So Gay” and with her international debut “I Kissed a Girl”.
An extract taken from the “Wikipedia” website, in respect of Our Client on 20 May 2009 is enclosed.
NB: The “Wikipedia” extract can be obtained by entering either “Katy Perry” or “Katie Perry”.
Legislation:
Sections 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Commonwealth) provide as follows:
…
Your Activities:
Any use, by yourself, or anyone authorized by you, of the trade mark “Katie Perry”, in respect of “clothes” (or other goods), is liable to mislead or deceive consumers into believing that the goods were manufactured by, or under the authority of, Our Client, (Section 52;) or that the goods have the “sponsorship, approval or affiliation” of Our Client (Paragraph 53 (d)).
NB: “Katie Perry” has identical appeal to the ear as “Katy Perry”: and the respective marks are “substantially identical” to the eye.
…
Undertakings:
Our Client, therefore, requires that you give the following written undertakings by the close of business on Friday 29 May 2009:
(1) You will immediately withdraw Australian Trade Mark Application 1264761;
(2) You will immediately withdraw from sale, clothes (or any other goods) bearing the “KATIE PERRY” trade mark;
(3) You will immediately withdraw any advertising in relation to the “KATIE PERRY” trade mark, including withdrawing any websites or links thereto in respect to the KATIE PERRY trade mark; and
(4) You will not, in the future, use any trade mark or name “substantially identical or deceptively similar to “KATIE PERRY” or “KATY PERRY”.
Your acceptance of the above Undertakings can be affected by executing the “Acceptance of Undertakings” on the duplicate copy of this letter and returning same to us by the deadline.
Should you fail to give the written Undertakings, Our Client shall be entitled to take any such action as is considered appropriate to protect her reputation, without further notice to yourself.
132 Ms Taylor recalls that she cried upon reading the 21 May 2009 Letter. She feared that she was going to lose everything she had worked so hard to build. She had never received a letter in that form from lawyers before and she thought they were going to take everything from her.
133 Ms Taylor was aware that another letter dated 8 May 2009 had been sent by Fisher Adams Kelly to her PO Box address which enclosed a notice of opposition to the registration of the Applicant’s Mark. However, the first letter Ms Taylor recalls reading was the 21 May 2009 Letter. Ms Taylor explained that she did not check her PO Box very often and when she did, she would open all the mail at once. She had picked up the 21 May 2009 Letter because it was distinctive as it was in a large express post envelope. Ms Taylor was also aware that Ms Hudson had filed an application for an extension of time to file the notice of opposition (Extension of Time Application) at the time that she filed the notice of opposition.
1.16 Events leading up to registration of the Applicant’s Mark
134 Ms Taylor arranged to meet with Justin Betar, a lawyer to whom she had been introduced. At the time she recalls that Mr Betar said words to her to the following effect:
You’ve got a really good case, but this is going to cost you $20,000 and unless you have $20,000 to fight this, you should shut up shop now.
Ms Taylor did not have that type of money to spend on legal fees and so did not engage Mr Betar.
135 Ms Taylor felt intimidated and distressed by the ordeal. The legal world was foreign to her and she found even speaking to a lawyer intimidating. She felt as though she was being bullied into signing everything away when she had not done anything wrong. She did not want to give up on her label, which she loved, and decided that she was not going to do so without a fight. Ms Taylor had applied for her trade marks because that was recommended to her in the courses that she had attended. She never had Ms Hudson in mind when she planned, or worked on, any aspect of her business or when she filed her trade mark applications. Ms Taylor took, and still takes pride in, her label being Australian owned and 100% made in Australia, which she felt was always a significant aspect of the brand’s identity and one of her biggest marketing points. Having her Australian brand associated with an American singer was not what she wanted and she did not consider it to be positive for her business.
136 Ms Taylor sought guidance from her business mentor, Graham Lawrence, about the 21 May 2009 Letter. He referred Ms Taylor to a journalist he knew at The Australian newspaper, Lara Sinclair. Ms Taylor thought that Ms Sinclair would be interested in her story because the 21 May 2009 Letter had been sent on behalf of Ms Hudson and because it was about a small business being “up against” a singer. On 16 June 2009 the following article authored by Ms Sinclair (Australian Article) was published in The Australian:
The Australian Article was also published on News.com.au, was picked up by a number of media outlets both in Australia and internationally and MTV News published an article based on it.
137 Ms Taylor purchased a copy of The Australian Newspaper which she retained. She said that she “skim read” Ms Sinclair’s article at the time of its publication and agreed that it was “highly likely” that she read those parts of the article to which she was taken in cross-examination including commentary from:
(1) Trevor Choy, a trade mark lawyer, that “[f]ashion is a common area into which celebrities launch brands” and that “[a] lot of US popstars are moving into all sorts of merchandising, … [c]lothing is an obvious one for popstars”; and
(2) Trish Nicol, a fashion publicist, that “the singer had a feminine fashion style that would lend itself to a label of her own”.
However, Ms Taylor did not accept that when she read those parts of the article she understood that it was likely that in the future Ms Hudson would sell clothing under her own KATY PERRY brand in Australia.
138 Despite that, Ms Taylor accepted that as at September 2008, prior to Ms Hudson travelling to Australia on her promotional tour, she likely knew that music artists sold clothing bearing their names at concerts. She said that she did not think about whether Ms Hudson would be selling clothing of that type at her concerts but, had she turned her mind to it, it would have been readily apparent that Ms Hudson would do so.
139 On 16 June 2009 Ms Taylor received an email with the subject “The trademark issue” from Caroline Thomson, who has since become a friend of Ms Taylor’s. Ms Thomson’s email of that date is lengthy but includes:
Hi Katie,
I am David Thomson’s partner, who you know from the NEIS course.
He has just shown me the news report on the legal issue with the trademark and Katy Perry.
I was so angry with what they have done, that I felt the need to write to you. I know David is also dropping you an email, as we both see it as so unfair and really want to let you know we support you and will do anything we can to help.
…
I noticed on the news websites that Katy Perry herself said back in March she was looking at launching her own clothes line. Hence, the whole objection to your trademark I guess and trying to intimidate you to stop trading.
Ms Taylor accepted that she would have read Ms Thomson’s email on receipt. So much is apparent from Ms Taylor’s response of the same date. Thus, at least from that time, Ms Taylor must have been aware of Ms Hudson’s intention to launch a clothing line.
140 The email exchanges between Ms Taylor and Ms Thomson continued. On 17 June 2009 Ms Thomson sent Ms Taylor an email in which Ms Thomson set out her thoughts on a proposal for a petition. The email concluded in the following way (as written):
I believe Katy Perry is meant to coming out here in August as well so it will be interesting to see what reception she gets after you get going missus!!! Go for it!
141 Once again Ms Taylor accepted that she read Ms Thomson’s email some time after receipt on 17 June 2009 and before she responded to it on 28 June 2009. Ms Taylor also accepted that from that time she knew that Ms Hudson would be touring Australia in August 2009 but she said that she did not know what the purpose of the tour was, i.e. as a concert tour or some other form of promotional tour, and she did not consider whether Ms Hudson would be selling promotional merchandise while in Australia.
142 Also on 16 June 2009 Ms Taylor sent out a newsletter with links to some of the articles that had been published. The newsletter included (as written):
For Katie,
I need your support!
My Australian owned and Australian made label is under threat.
Lawyers, acting for the US Popstar Katy Perry (real name Katheryn Hudson), are attempting to stop me trading under my real name.
See the articles below for the details.
USA Popstar against the Australian label.
Katy Perry vs KATIE PERRY
As you can imagine after all the hardwork and loce I had put into my label it’s very scary.
As you can imagine, after all the hardwork and love I had put into my label, this is all very scary. However, I am determined to fight for the right to use my long established name (although I refuse to let you in on the secret of my age......)
Please support me, and all small Australian businesses, in our efforts against the Goliath’s of this world.
Stay True,
Katie Perry
143 Holding Redlich Lawyers, the Australian lawyers acting for Ms Hudson at the time, sent a letter dated 15 June 2009 to Ms Taylor at her PO Box (15 June 2009 Letter). Ms Taylor does not recall when she read the 15 June 2009 Letter. It informed her that she had “wrongfully applied for trade mark application number 1264761 for the mark ‘Katie Perry’ in respect of goods and services in class 25 (the trade mark)” and that Ms Taylor’s application was “opposed by Ms Perry”. The 15 June 2009 Letter continued:
This letter gives you one final opportunity to correct your wrongful behaviour and to give up the trade mark you have applied for.
Failure by you to do this will result in the very serious consequences that we outline below.
The 15 June 2009 Letter went on to describe “Ms Katy Perry”, that is Ms Hudson, and what it referred to as Ms Taylor’s unlawful conduct and then set out a demand in the following terms:
Despite our client’s rights to take immediate action against you, she will allow you a final opportunity to remedy your wrongful conduct. Our client demands:
(a) You immediately withdraw Australian trade mark application number 1264761;
(b) You immediately provide us with confirmation in writing that you have withdrawn Australian trade mark application number 1264761;
(c) You immediately undertake in writing that you will take all necessary steps to desist using the name “Katie Perry” in connection with clothes and other goods, including:
(i) immediately withdrawing from sale, all clothes and other goods which bear the trade mark; and
(ii) immediately withdrawing all forms of advertising which has been engaged by you in the promotion of the trade mark.
(d) You immediately undertake in writing that you will refrain for all time from using the name “Katie Perry” or any other name or mark which is substantially identical or deceptively similar to “Katy Perry”.
Ms Taylor was informed that she had until 4 pm on Friday, 19 June 2009 to comply with the demand failing which Ms Hudson would commence a proceeding against her. A draft originating application to be filed in the Supreme Court of Queensland was enclosed.
144 In June 2009, Mr Jensen became aware of further information about Ms Taylor from Ms Hudson’s US lawyers. He understood that inquiries in Australia suggested that she was an Australian clothing designer with a small business designing loungewear for mature women under the name “Katie Perry” and that she had no connection to the music or entertainment industry. Mr Jensen also became aware of media stories relating to Ms Taylor, including the Australian Article, which he recalled reviewing at or shortly after the time they first appeared. No threat of legal action was made by Ms Taylor at the time.
145 The additional information which Mr Jensen received and the media in relation to the trade mark issue was the subject of an email exchange between Mr Jensen and Ms Hudson:
(1) on 16 June 2009 Mr Jensen wrote:
We have learned that Katie Perry’s real name (the Australian fashion designer) is Katie Howell. She has ‘traded’ under the name of Katie Perry since 2007. Of course, this issue has been blown way out of proportion as we (you) have not tried to keep her from trading under her name, and have certainly not sued her for trademark infringement. This popped up as the lawyers were submitting applications for trademarking your name around the world, including Australia, and the system automatically submits an ‘objection’ if anyone is trading under your trademark or any trademark that is similar to Katy Perry ... and they do not have a registered trademark. Apparently, Katie Perry is not trademarked in Australia. This is a common practice, and just makes the lawyers (and us/you) aware of any potential conflicts so we can deal with them if necessary.
As is common in Australia, the tabloids have picked this up and made it into a ‘story’. We are arranging for some publicity (probably a press release) to clarify the situation, and want to have that in place by end of business tomorrow. We’ll keep you posted as we will probably want to include a statement from you. We’re on it!
In cross-examination Mr Jensen accepted that his statement made in his email to Ms Hudson that she had “not tried to keep [Ms Taylor] from trading under her name” was incorrect given the letters sent to Ms Taylor by Fisher Adams Kelly and Holding Redlich on Ms Hudson’s behalf; and
(2) on 17 June 2009 Ms Hudson wrote (as written):
I say keep me outta it entirely... Make it less important but release something from management, pretty much stating the facts. Like from the opening of this email, beside the Katy, to the ‘story’ part. Those exact words are great. Don’t soften it up, don’t apologize, nothing. Let me know what’s going out before it does pls...
Stupid bitches.
I wouldn’t have even bothered with this mtv hadn’t picked up this silliness.
Dumb bitch! Rawr!
146 At that time Mr Jensen authorised Ms Hudson’s US lawyers to instruct her Australian lawyers to attempt to resolve the matter on the basis of a mutually satisfactory co-existence arrangement. Based on the information he had about Ms Taylor, Mr Jensen was less concerned that Ms Taylor’s purpose in pursuing her trade mark application was to obtain a financial advantage over Ms Hudson. He did not consider there was any likelihood that members of the public would confuse clothing and other merchandise branded with the name “Katy Perry” with clothes designed and manufactured by Ms Taylor. However, he thought it was possible that members of the public might confuse Ms Taylor’s clothes with clothes with “Katy Perry” on them and that, if this occurred, it would not adversely affect Ms Taylor but might benefit her because of Ms Hudson’s popularity in Australia.
147 On 16 June 2009 Ms Taylor received a call from Paul Venus, a lawyer at Holding Redlich. The following day, 17 June 2009, Ms Taylor received an email from Holding Redlich attaching a letter (17 June 2009 Letter). The 17 June 2009 Letter provided (omitting formal parts and as written):
Thank you for talking with Paul Venus on 16 June 2009.
Background
Why you were contacted
In that conversation Paul explained to you that you had received letters of demand because Ms Perry and her business associates had concerns that you were seeking to unfairly take advantage of Ms Perry’s reputation in order to benefit your business.
It was explained that often counterfeiters and pirate clothing companies attempt to wrongfully trade off the hard earned reputation of international rock stars.
You agreed with Paul that counterfeiters are criminals and understood that people would be upset about their conduct.
Your response
You explained to Paul that you are not a counterfeiter and that you do not have any desire to trade in such a way that would pass off your business as being associated with our client.
You explained that your business has been established in Australia since about February 2007. It sells lifestyle clothing to women between 30 and 50 years of age. Your clients have a high disposable income and you expect that many of them would not be aware of the music that is performed by our client. They are mostly located in the high income areas of North Sydney but you noted that you do sell from a shop in Mosman Sydney, on the internet and have one stockist.
You explained that the clothing is conservative and comfortable and that it is similar to the clothing sold by Calvin Klein.
You thought that an association between the image that our client has and the business that you have created would actually be detrimental to your brand positioning.
You said that you have taken legal advice but do not have a lawyer acting for you at the moment.
You also said that you had a friend who had mentioned your situation to a journalist at the Australian newspaper and that as a result you had given an interview to that newspaper. That article was published on page 7 of the Australian Newspaper on 16 June 2009.
Resolving the matters of concern
You have also told Paul that you do not wish to enter into a long and costly dispute with Ms Perry and wish to resolve matters amicably.
Paul Venus said that there may be a way forward to resolve the matter. You and he discussed possible resolutions and he said that he would ask his client for approval to put a proposal to you.
The remainder of this letter contains the proposal that our client is prepared to agree to resolve this matter.
If you agree, then please sign the letter where indicated below. Please then fax the signed letter back to us on fax number (07) 3135 0599.
Once you sign the letter and fax it back to us then a legal agreement will be completed.
Agreement for resolution
In consideration of the mutual promises set out below, the parties agree as follows:
Promises by Katie Howell
1. You agree as follows:
(a) You will immediately withdraw Australian trade mark application number 1264761;
(b) You will provide us with confirmation in writing that you have withdrawn Australian trade mark application number 1264761;
(c) You will not attempt to file, whether by your self or by an agent, employee or through and associated company or with someone you have an association with, any trade mark application for a trade mark which is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the mark “Katy Perry”;
(d) You will not oppose or in any way challenge any trade mark application for the mark “Katy Perry” which is made in Australia by Ms Katy Perry;
(e) You undertake that you will:
(i) Not represent that you have any association, affiliation, sponsorship or approval from Ms Katy Perry or anyone associated with her;
(ii) Not sell any merchandise that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the merchandise which is sold using the “Katy Perry” name [to avoid misunderstanding this means merchandise similar to what is now sold by Katy Perry and does not stop you from selling the type of merchandise which you currently sell]; and
(iii) Not engage in any forms of advertising which might cause confusion between your business and Katy Perry and her business interests.
Promises by Katy Perry
2. We are authorised on behalf of Katy Perry and her business interests to promise that if you keep the promises that are set out above that she will not threaten to sue, or sue you for trade mark infringement, and will not take any other legal action against you.
148 Ms Taylor explained that, following publication of the Australian Article, the events the subject of it attracted significant media coverage. She received support from all around the world and, in particular, the Australian public, via calls, emails and online comments although, in cross-examination, she accepted the level of attention she received was due to Ms Hudson’s fame. On 17 June 2009, in the hope of obtaining suggestions, advice and help and to provide updates on the progress of the matter, Ms Taylor established a Facebook group called “Support for Australian designer Katie Perry” which is accessible at https://www.facebook.com/groups/117086615324. On 17 June 2009 Tom Kalikajaros, the husband of Ms Taylor’s manager from the time she worked at Oroton, added the following post:
149 Ms Taylor gave unsatisfactory and shifting evidence about her interaction with the posts made to the Facebook group she had established. First, she suggested that she did not read all of the posts and said that if she had not “liked” or commented on a post then she had not seen it. Then, upon further questioning, she accepted that, given the support coming from people joining the Facebook group, it was likely that she read the posts, that she does not recall reading all of them and that she must have read some.
150 For the following reasons I do not accept Ms Taylor’s evidence that she did not read all of the posts, including Mr Kalikajaros’ post set out above, added to the Facebook group page. First, Ms Taylor established the group for the very purpose of obtaining advice and help. In those circumstances it is inconceivable that she would not have read the posts to understand whether any advice or help was being offered. Secondly, in her evidence she said that “reading the supportive messages helped me to not give up” and she accepted this was a reference to, among other things, the messages posted on the Facebook group page. Thirdly and finally, on 26 June 2009 Ms Taylor posted a video to the group page thanking its members for their support. I do not accept that Ms Taylor would have posted a video to that effect unless she had read the messages that had been added to the page.
151 On 19 June 2009 Ms Taylor received an email from Mr Venus of Holding Redlich requesting that she call him. Ms Taylor recalls speaking to Mr Venus on or about that date in relation to the proposal set out in the 17 June 2009 Letter. She recalls they had a conversation to the following effect:
Mr Venus: Have you read the letter I sent you?
Ms Taylor: Yes, I have read it.
Mr Venus: Are you going to agree to what’s proposed?
Ms Taylor: I’m not going to agree to that. It needs to be fair, I’ve done nothing wrong.
Ms Taylor recalls that at that point in the conversation Mr Venus took on an aggressive tone and said:
You don’t know what the Americans are like and if you don’t agree to [the proposal], I’ll let the dogs out on you.
Following this conversation Ms Taylor felt more threatened and distressed.
152 During this period Ms Taylor was part of the Enterprise Network for Young Australians that provided access to funding, mentoring and education for young Australian entrepreneurs. On or about 22 June 2009 Ms Taylor sought the help of the Youth & Enterprise Legal Centre (YELC) which provides pro bono legal advice and services through the Enterprise Network for Young Australians. She was connected with Chris Hamilton, a lawyer with YELC, who commenced to act for her.
153 In the meantime, on 26 June 2009 Ms Hudson lodged an application for registration of KATY PERRY as a trade mark in Australia in classes 9, 25 and 41 (Ms Hudson’s TM Application). In relation to class 25 Ms Hudson’s TM Application was in respect of the following goods:
Apparel, namely, shirts, T-shirts, sweatshirts, sweat pants, jogging suits, gloves, sweaters, vests, skirts, dresses, shorts, pants, jackets, scarves, lingerie, boxers, underwear, robes, slippers, belts, hats, caps, visors, headwear and footwear.
154 On 29 June 2009 Ms Taylor posted a video message on her YouTube channel for Ms Hudson (29 June 2009 Video). She filmed the message with the Sydney Opera House in the background. She wanted Ms Hudson to watch the video as she believed that she had the power to stop her lawyers acting in the way they were and she wanted to stop Ms Hudson or her lawyers threatening her and, as she said in the video, “to leave [her] to carry on [her] dream that [she wanted]”. The 29 June 2009 Video is still able to be viewed on YouTube via the link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQjDeSu21qE. Ms Taylor accepted that at the time she posted the 29 June 2009 Video she knew that Ms Hudson was planning to tour Australia in August 2009 and that it was likely that clothing featuring the Katy Perry Mark would be offered for sale at her concerts.
155 A transcript of the 29 June 2009 Video was in evidence. It is convenient to set it out here:
Transcript from YouTube video posted by Katie Perry on 29 June 2009 named “Katie Perry’s message to Katy Perry”.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQjDeSu21qE
[0:06] Hi, I’m Katie Perry, the Australian Fashion designer, and this is a message to Katy Perry, the singer. This is the only way I know to contact you, so I hope that you do hear this.
[0:17] I’m an Aussie girl, I’m doing my dream, I have my Australian made loungewear, percentage goes towards Australian charities, all made here in Australia. I’m absolutely no threat whatsoever to you.
[0:30] I welcome you to come and visit my studio when you do come here for your concert in August. But at the moment the only people who are making any money from this are the lawyers. So I would love you to get in contact with me if you visit my website katieperry.com.au you’ll get an idea about my label and you’ll see that I’m absolutely no threat to you whatsoever and all of my contact details are there.
[0:54] I would love to just hear from you and hopefully between the two of us we can sort something out. Because I can say at the moment, the only people making money from this are the lawyers. You’re a girl who has a dream just like myself, I wish you all the success, but leave me to carry on my dream that I want.
[1:10] So Katy I look forward to hearing from you and I hope this reaches you. Thank you.
[1:14] End of video
156 Ms Taylor was cross-examined about what she intended to convey by the 29 June 2009 Video. She did not accept that in stating that she was “absolutely no threat whatsoever to” Ms Hudson, wishing Ms Hudson “all the success” and requesting that she be left “to carry on my dream that I want”, she had intended to convey that Ms Hudson could use the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes. Ms Taylor maintained that what she intended to convey, particularly by the first of those statements, was that she was no threat because she was a fashion designer and Ms Hudson was a singer.
157 On 30 June 2009 Ms Taylor sent an email with a link to the 29 June 2009 Video to Mr Venus and on 3 July 2009 she posted a link to the 29 June 2009 Video on her blog with the following accompanying post (as written):
On Friday I was suggested to me that rather then sitting back and wait till the hearing I should take things in my own hands and contact Katy Perry myself.
I mean is that not how we should all be. If you have an issue confront the person and try to come to an understanding before or even without any lawyers involved. And so I filmed the video clip click here to view .
I had no idea how or if she would see it be figured by putting it on YouTube there was more chance that someone would pass it onto her.
I hope that in the future large corporations/lawyers will try first to come to a solution before using bullying tactics.
A few people have mentioned about the publicity aspect of this whole case. I can honestly say my label and I were expanding nicely before any of this had occurred and I would not wish it on any person to be put in the position to think they could lose their dream/passion/business all of which are my life (my friends can vouch for the fact its been a long time since I have seen any of them and yes I am very much in a relationship with my label!!!)
The main reason I continue to have coverage on this is for other small business owners to know to not give in and when something is not right stand up.
As it stands I wish for this to all end positively and hope that when Katy comes for her concert she can visit the studio.
Stay True,
Katie Perry xx
In cross-examination Ms Taylor said that by her blog post she intended to convey that she wished for her dispute with Ms Hudson to end positively for both of them and that she be allowed to continue to run her business. Ms Taylor did not accept that she intended to convey that she was happy for Ms Hudson to use the Katy Perry Mark as she pleased provided she could use the Applicant’s Mark as she wished.
158 Mr Jensen recalls that in late June 2009 he viewed the 29 June 2009 Video and that he saw Ms Taylor’s blog post which referred, and linked, to the 29 June 2009 Video.
159 On 5 July 2009 an article was published in the Sydney Morning Herald which includes:
But Ms Perry, from Kirribilli, says she is a victim of opportunistic lawyers. “I know this happens to a lot of other small businesses … There is no confusion between the two of us. I’m a designer and she’s a singer. As soon as anyone looked at the website [there would be no confusion],” she said.
…
Nor can she afford a costly court showdown, which led her to post an appeal to the singer on YouTube. The pop star has reportedly watched the video.
“I’m absolutely no threat to you,” Ms Perry says in the clip. “I welcome you to come visit my studio … But at the moment, the only people who are making any money from this are the lawyers.”
If left no choice, Ms Perry will travel to Canberra for Friday’s hearing, but hopes the matter will be settled beforehand.
“Her lawyers have [come] back to me wanting to have a more amicable settlement,” she said.
160 In cross-examination Mr Jensen accepted that after Ms Hudson’s TM Application was made, the strategy in relation to dealing with Ms Taylor changed and, rather than demand that Ms Taylor withdraw her application to register the Applicant’s Mark, a co-existence arrangement was proposed. The intention of that strategy was to enable Ms Hudson to register KATY PERRY in Australia as a trade mark. On 1 July 2009 Holding Redlich sent a letter to Ms Taylor marked “without prejudice” which offered to settle the dispute in that way. The letter included:
Katy has been informed of your business, has seen your video and understands that you and she do not compete with each other. She agrees that you also have a valid and ongoing business.
It therefore would seem that both parties have legitimate rights and that those rights can co-exist without conflict.
She would therefore like to resolve this matter in an amicable way.
Offer to settle
Ms Perry offers to resolve all issues on the following basis:
1 You keep Australian trade mark application number 1264761 and our client will agree not to oppose that application or use of your mark and to cease the current opposition process;
2 You agree not to oppose or challenge any use or trade mark application for the mark “Katy Perry” made in Australia by our client; and to provide, if so requested, a letter of consent in support of this co-existence;
3 You and Ms Perry mutually agree not to sue each other in respect to any claims, whether now or in the future, arising out of or in any way related to the use of the names “Katie Perry” or “Katy Perry”.
You and Katy have legitimate business interests and must be given the benefit of your respective business rights. Accordingly, our client believes that it is mutually beneficial to resolve the situation now in an amicable and constructive manner rather than by litigating.
I would be grateful if you would respond to this letter within 7 days.
161 On 8 July 2009 Ms Taylor received a draft deed of agreement from Holding Redlich. Later that day Mr Hamilton sent a further draft of the deed to Holding Redlich marked up with proposed amendments which Ms Taylor had instructed Mr Hamilton to make. Among other things:
(1) the recitals to the draft deed included:
A Ms Hudson is known world-wide under the name “Katy Perry” as a renowned singer-songwriter, performing and recording artist and entertainer. Ms. Hudson has also established a world-wide reputation for her distinctive fashion style and merchandise.
B Ms Howell is a clothing designer from Sydney, Australia and the owner of a clothing retail business based in Sydney, Australia trading under the name “Katie Perry”.
(2) clause 2 of the draft deed set out the terms of the proposed co-existence arrangement between Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson. Together with the amendments proposed by Ms Taylor it provided:
2.1 Ms Hudson agrees:
(a) to withdraw the Notice of Opposition lodged in relation to the mark within 7 days of the date of execution of this Deed;
(b) not to otherwise oppose or challenge the use or registration of the mark in Australia;
(c) not to oppose or challenge any trade mark application for, or use by, Ms Howell of the words “Katie Perry” in relation to goods in class 25 - clothing, footwear, headgear (or the equivalent class in jurisdictions outside of Australia), in jurisdictions outside of Australia; and
(d) to provide, within 14 days of receipt of a written request from Ms Howell, a letter of consent in support of the co-existence of the trade mark “Katie Perry”, and to take all other reasonable steps required by Ms Howell to obtain registration, provided such application is made in class 25 - clothing, footwear, headgear (or the equivalent class in jurisdictions outside of Australia).
2.2 Ms Howell agrees:
(a) not to oppose or challenge, now or in the future, any application made by Ms Hudson to use or register as a trade mark the words “Katy Perry” in Australia;
(b) not to oppose or challenge any use or trade mark application by Ms Hudson for the words “Katy Perry” in jurisdictions outside of Australia; and
(c) to provide, within 14 days of receipt of a written request by or on behalf of Ms Hudson, a letter of consent in support of the co-existence of the trade mark “Katy Perry” in Australia and/or jurisdictions outside of Australia and to take all other reasonable steps required by Ms Hudson so that Ms Hudson can be in a position to obtain registration;
to refrain from, now and in the future, making derogatory comments in relation to “Katy Perry”, “Katheryn Hudson” or the dispute.
2.3 The parties agree that this Deed also binds any current and future transferees, licensees or assigns.
2.4 The parties agree to obtain written agreement from any current or future transferees, licensees or assigns that each of them is bound by the terms of this Deed.
(Mark-up in original.)
(3) as is apparent at that time Ms Taylor only suggested two changes to cl 2 of the draft deed, with the principal amendment concerning deletion of a unilateral promise on the part of Ms Taylor not to disparage Ms Hudson. She was otherwise content with the terms of that clause; and
(4) Ms Taylor also proposed an amendment to the draft deed by the addition of a new cl 3 in the following terms:
3 MUTUAL NON-DISPARAGEMENT
3.1 The parties agree not to disparage one another or make statements which would tend to cause damage to the personal or business reputation of the other.
(Mark-up in original.)
162 On 9 July 2009 Holding Redlich sent a further amended draft of the deed to Mr Hamilton. In that draft Holding Redlich on behalf of Ms Hudson proposed:
(1) a single amendment to cl 2 by amending cl 2.1(d) to reflect cl 2.2(c) (see above) as follows:
(d) to provide, within 14 days of receipt of a written request from Ms Howell, a letter of consent in support of the co-existence of the trade mark “Katie Perry”, and to take all other reasonable steps required by Ms Howell so that Ms Howell can be in a position to obtain registration, provided such application is made in class 25 - clothing, footwear, headgear (or the equivalent class in jurisdictions outside of Australia).
(Mark-up in original.)
That proposed amendment was of no concern to Ms Taylor; and
(2) an amendment to cl 3 as proposed by Ms Taylor by adding a new cl 3.2 in the following terms:
3.2 The parties agree that the obligation in clause 3.1 does not prevent Ms Hudson from responding to media enquiries relating to statements made to the press by Ms Howell prior to the execution of this Deed.
(Mark up in original.)
163 On 9 July 2009 Mr Hamilton provided a further amended draft deed to Holding Redlich in which the following amendments were proposed:
(1) in cl 1.1 the addition of the words “fair and reasonable” to the definition of “Disparage”;
(2) the addition of the words “in a fair and reasonable manner” to the end of cl 3.2; and
(3) the addition of a new cl 4.2(e).
164 By email sent on the morning of 10 July 2009 Toby Boys of Holding Redlich informed Mr Hamilton that Ms Hudson did not agree to the proposed amendments to the definition of “Disparage” and to cl 3.2 of the draft deed and circulated a further draft which sought to address the issue that arose in relation to those proposed amendments.
165 The Extension of Time Application was listed for hearing on 10 July 2009. Ms Taylor attended YELC’s offices with her mother that morning to finalise the deed and/or to listen in on the hearing by telephone. However, when Ms Taylor saw the most recent changes proposed to the draft deed she decided she would not sign it and the dispute did not settle. The hearing of the Extension of Time Application was adjourned by consent to 16 July 2009.
166 On 13 July 2009 Ms Taylor withdrew her instructions from YELC as she did not feel that her rights were being properly protected. She intended to represent herself and put up a post to that effect on Facebook following which she was contacted by a lot of people offering their support and advice. One of those people was Rebecca Dimaridis who referred Ms Taylor to her friend, Rebecca Stalenberg, a lawyer and trade mark attorney with Mark Your Territory. From 15 July 2009, Ms Stalenberg acted for Ms Taylor on a pro bono basis.
167 On 14 July 2009 Mr Venus sent an email to Elise Tenen-Aoki at Greenberg Traurig, Ms Hudson’s US lawyers, copied to Mr Thompson, which included under the heading “Trade Mark opposition hearing”:
Paul Thompson has advised in conference with you and I, that the application to extend the time to oppose [Ms Taylor’s] trade mark application will fail. In that circumstance, I recommend that Paul be asked to withdraw the application altogether.
In my opinion, there is no point running an application that will lose. The withdrawal of the application also does not limit the rights of our client to litigate the validity of the trade mark registration before a proper court of law.
Losing the application will further embolden [Ms Taylor], probably lead to more press coverage and make it harder to deal with her if that becomes necessary again. Withdrawing the application should take away [Ms Taylor’s] reason for complaint, in the short term and therefore limit the reason for press interest.
168 On 14 July 2009 at 9.30 am California time Ms Tenen-Aoki forwarded Mr Venus’ email to, among others, Mr Jensen. Her email included:
I think we should withdraw the application/extension request which is the subject of the hearing on Thursday. [Taylor] wants the attention and “pity” or support she is getting. I agree that withdrawing from the hearing and the opposition will take away her ability to play the victim.
169 By email dated 15 July 2009 marked as sent at 2.51 am Mr Jensen instructed Ms Tenen-Aoki that he was “fine with this strategy” and to “[p]lease move forward”.
170 It was agreed between the parties, pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), that:
(1) as at 14/15 July 2009 the time zone in Brisbane, Australia was AEST and the time zone in Irvine, California was PDT;
(2) AEST is UTC +10 and PDT is UTC -7, being a 17 hour time difference; and
(3) therefore when it was 2.51 am on 15 July 2009 in Brisbane, Australia it was 9.51 am on 14 July 2009 in Irvine, California, USA.
171 In cross-examination Mr Jensen accepted, on the assumption that California, USA was, as at 15 July 2009, 17 hours behind Australia, that his instructions to Ms Tenen-Aoki set out at [170] above were sent at 9.51 am on 14 July 2009, California time. The same conclusion must follow from the agreed facts recorded in the preceding paragraph.
172 On 15 July 2009 at 8.16 am Mr Venus sent an email to Ms Taylor which enclosed a letter from Holding Redlich (15 July 2009 Letter) with another offer to settle which was in the following terms:
1. Each person will not oppose the other’s current trade mark applications in Australia.
2. Each person will not challenge the use of the other person’s name on clothing in Australia [Katie Perry for Ms Howell and Katy Perry for Ms Hudson].
3. Each person will, if requested by the other person, take all reasonable steps to help the other person obtain registration of their current trade mark application in Australia.
4. Each person agrees not to disparage the other person.
5. Both persons agree to keep the terms of this agreement confidential, other than as required by a law or than to disclose the fact that an amicable resolution has been reached between them.
Later that day, at 12.18 pm, Mr Venus forwarded the 15 July 2009 Letter to Ms Stalenberg by email.
173 Ms Taylor instructed her new lawyers, Mark Your Territory, to decline the offer in the 15 July 2009 Letter. By letter dated 15 July 2009 Ms Stalenberg informed Holding Redlich, among other things, that (as written):
I have now had the opportunity to review those documents and discuss that offer in detail with my client. While my client instructs me that she is still willing to enter into settlement negotiations in order to resolve the matter amicably for both parties, my client is concerned that the latest offer only relates to applications in Australia. In addition, I make the following comments as to the latest settlement offer:
…
2. In order to be beneficial to my client, any settlement offer will need to at least address all territories that my client currently exports to, as well as those territories that my clients desires to enter into, in order to ensure that this dispute is fully resolved between the parties.
(Emphasis in original.)
174 In cross-examination Ms Taylor:
(1) accepted that she did not instruct Ms Stalenberg that she had any concerns about Ms Hudson using or licensing the use of the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes in Australia. She acknowledged that, if she had a concern about Ms Hudson doing so, she would have instructed Ms Stalenberg to indicate that to Ms Hudson’s lawyers at the time;
(2) accepted that at that time, i.e. in 2009, she understood that Ms Hudson was proposing to use or license the use of the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes in Australia, she had no concerns about that occurring and she never conveyed any different position to any of the respondents or their solicitors until her current solicitors’ letter of demand sent just prior to the commencement of this proceeding on 18 September 2019; and
(3) attempted to explain her evidence set out at (2) above by stating that while, given the terms of the proposed settlement deed, she knew that Ms Hudson wanted to be able to use the Katy Perry Mark on clothes, that was not to say that Ms Hudson was going to sell clothes. Rather, Ms Hudson wanted to protect her brand. Ms Taylor said that her understanding as at 2009 was that Ms Hudson was not necessarily going to be selling clothes in Australia.
175 Mr Venus forwarded Ms Stalenberg’s letter to Ms Tenen-Aoki shortly after its receipt. The email by which he did so records the time it was sent as 10.29 pm on 14 July 2009 California time which, based on the agreed facts, is 3.29 pm on 15 July 2009 Brisbane time.
176 Although it appears to be disputed, it is apparent, given the time difference and the agreed facts about that topic, that Mr Jensen’s instructions to Ms Tenen-Aoki to withdraw the Extension of Time Application preceded the despatch by Mr Venus of the 15 July 2009 Letter. However, there is no evidence that Ms Tenen-Aoki conveyed Mr Jensen’s instructions to Mr Venus prior to despatch of that letter. The only evidence before me suggests the contrary. By email sent on 16 July 2009 at 8.20 am Ms Tenen-Aoki informed Messrs Venus and Thompson that (as written):
I just spoke with the client. They want to know how much this has cost so far and how much the hearing would cost. I need to wpeak with both of you again. The bad press issue is very upsetting. The client does not want to go through with the hearing.
That is, despite the exchange between Ms Tenen-Aoki and Mr Jensen set out at [168]-[169] above taking place before despatch of the 15 July 2009 Letter the instructions given by Mr Jensen and the strategy that was agreed at that time was not conveyed to Mr Venus and Mr Thompson until 16 July 2009 which was after despatch of the 15 July 2009 Letter.
177 On 16 July 2009 Ms Hudson withdrew the Extension of Time Application.
178 In his affidavit Mr Jensen gave evidence that in mid July 2009 he formed the view that Ms Hudson’s interests were best served by avoiding further publicity relating to Ms Taylor and by avoiding incurring unnecessary legal fees. Mr Jensen considered that the appropriate way forward was for Ms Hudson’s legal representatives not to appear at the hearing before the Australian Trade Marks Office scheduled to take place imminently. He arranged through the US lawyers for this to be done. In cross-examination Mr Jensen said that, in coming to this view, he took the legal advice he had received from Holding Redlich into account, including that it left open the possibility of litigating at a later point in time. He also understood that it was possible that Ms Taylor could complain about trade mark infringement on the part of Ms Hudson at a future point in time if Ms Hudson used the Katy Perry Mark on clothes, that Ms Taylor may contend that Ms Hudson infringed the Applicant’s Mark and that there was at least a risk that Ms Taylor could be successful in such an action given her earlier use of the Applicant’s Mark in Australia.
179 Mr Jensen understood that the result of the withdrawal of Ms Hudson’s Extension of Time Application was that Ms Taylor’s trade mark application would not be opposed and that the Applicant’s Mark would most likely be registered. He was not concerned by this because he did not consider there to be any likelihood that members of the public would confuse clothing and other merchandise bearing the “Katy Perry” name on it with Ms Taylor’s clothes. At that time Mr Jensen also understood that, based on Ms Stalenberg’s letter dated 15 July 2009 (see [173] above), it was possible that Ms Taylor might make contact again and considered it most likely that, if that were to happen, it would be when Ms Hudson was in Australia later in 2009 on her world concert tour.
180 From June to August 2009, during the period of negotiation with Ms Taylor, Mr Jensen kept Ms Hudson informed of his views about the matter and the actions he proposed to take and Ms Hudson approved of those actions. Mr Jensen recalls that in about mid July 2009 he had an exchange with Ms Hudson to the following effect:
Mr Jensen: It will be better if we pull out of this and not go to this hearing which is going to run up legal bills and keep the media stories going. I am not concerned if we pull out and she registers her trade mark because the public would not confuse your Katy Perry branded tour merchandise with this lady’s clothes. We can see if this lady wants to negotiate and respond if she does. If we hear from her again, it will be when you are on your Australian tour.
Ms Hudson: Steve, I agree with your thinking. It sounds like it’s best for us to just move on.
181 As set out below, Ms Hudson went on tour in Australia in August 2009 and KATY PERRY branded apparel and merchandise was sold at her concerts. Mr Jensen was not aware that there was any contact on behalf of Ms Taylor with Ms Hudson’s lawyers in Australia or the US at the time. This led Mr Jensen to believe there was no real likelihood of subsequent contact and at all times thereafter he proceeded on that basis. If action had been taken by Ms Taylor in 2009, Mr Jensen would have re-considered the actions taken, at that time and subsequently, to have KATY PERRY branded apparel sold in Australia at Ms Hudson’s concerts and in retail stores. Mr Jensen opined that:
(1) if it had been necessary to re-consider those actions, that would have raised difficult and complex considerations;
(2) based on his experience as a talent manager and in dealing with merchandise arrangements for music artists, given the nature of Ms Hudson as a popular international female music artist, it would have been detrimental to her success and popularity if she could not use her name in connection with branded clothing merchandise in a market as important to a music career as Australia; and
(3) fans of a music artist such as Ms Hudson around the world, including in Australia, follow her music, public appearances and publicity about her in the US, Europe and other countries. They do so by accessing a range of television, radio and social media which is international. It would be very confusing if Ms Hudson’s fans in Australia were only able to be offered the purchase of merchandise with another brand that was different from KATY PERRY. If this were the case, many of the Australian fans would not want to buy merchandise without the artist’s name on it.
182 Mr Jensen was cross-examined about his views set out in the preceding paragraph. The following exchange took place between him and senior counsel for Ms Taylor, Mr Dimitriadis SC:
Mr Dimitriadis: And it’s fair to say isn’t it, having read those paragraphs, that the key consideration in your mind that you refer to is that it would have been detrimental, in your view, 5 for Ms Hudson not to be able to use the trademark Katy Perry with a Y in connection with branded clothing merchandise in a market such as Australia. Is that right?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: And that, doing the best that you can, would have been a very important consideration for you at the time in weighing this up?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: Can I suggest to you, Mr Jensen, that in fact it’s quite clear to you now, attempting to put yourself back into the situation you were in in 2009, that if action had been taken by Ms Taylor in 2009 you would have recommended to Ms Hudson to continue with the actions that you took in 2009 and subsequently to have Katy Perry branded apparel sold in Australia. That’s right, isn’t it?
Mr Jensen: ..... specific actions?
Mr Dimitriadis: I’m saying the actions that you did in fact take?
Mr Jensen: Yes.
Mr Dimitriadis: Yes. In fact, it’s quite clear to you, isn’t it, Mr Jensen, that if action had been taken by Ms Taylor in 2009 you would have recommended to Ms Hudson to continue with the actions that you took in 2009 and subsequently to have Katy Perry branded apparel merchandise sold in Australia at her concerts and in retail stores. That’s right, isn’t it?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: And it’s the case, isn’t it, that when Ms Taylor, through her lawyers, did commence an action in 2019, that is what occurred. In other words, Ms Hudson continued to sell Katy Perry branded merchandise, apparel merchandise, at least online, including into Australia; correct?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
183 Further, in cross-examination Mr Jensen accepted that: the decision to proceed with the sale of KATY PERRY branded clothes while on tour in Australia in 2009 without having a co-existence arrangement in place was made knowing that the Applicant’s Mark would become registered; if the Applicant’s Mark was to become registered it would be possible for Ms Taylor to take action against Ms Hudson for trade mark infringement for sale of KATY PERRY branded clothes; and there was a risk that Ms Taylor could be successful in such an action. Mr Jensen agreed that the strategy adopted at the time involved Ms Hudson taking a calculated risk.
1.17 Registration of the Applicant’s Mark and Ms Taylor’s continued business operations
184 On 21 July 2009 the Applicant’s Mark was entered on the Register of Trade Marks and on 6 August 2009 its registration was advertised.
185 Ms Taylor received a lot of publicity during the period of her dispute about registration of the Applicant’s Mark and struggled to balance the publicity with running her business. Thus after the Applicant’s Mark had been registered she engaged Nicholas Karandonis and his firm Power PR to represent her brand. By email dated 23 June 2009 Mr Karandonis confirmed his firm’s retainer noting, among other things that:
It was wonderful meeting with you today. You are a delight and I am thrilled to be representing you and your brand.
As we discussed, I am happy to hereby give you a written guarantee that we will carry any pr fees owing for work we generate until such time as your business can afford to pay us. We will not source any publicity without your prior approval and we will at all times advise in advance, as to which media agencies we would like to approach on your behalf and will only do so with your permission. Additionally, we will handle any media you direct to us free-of-charge and we will waive our standard monthly disbursement fee of $220.
I will personally handle your account and am available to you as may be required. You have my mobile number and please feel free to use it. You are now in my phone, so recognizing your number, I will happily take your calls.
I am attaching our client profile which I’d like you to fill in when you can and return to me please as well as our standard letter of engagement (as well as our rate card) which I’d ask that you sign and fax back or I can collect any day on my way to work. …
186 In late July or early August 2009 Ms Taylor became aware that Ms Hudson was scheduled to visit Australia on a concert tour. On 6 August 2009 Mr Karandonis sent an email to Mr Venus suggesting that Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson hold a joint press conference at which Ms Taylor would give Ms Hudson some of her clothing as a peace offering or an exclusive with a major network program. Upon receiving a copy of Mr Karandonis’ email, Mr Jensen declined the suggestions in it.
187 According to Ms Taylor: Mr Karandonis suggested the joint press conference without first speaking with her; he forwarded the email exchange with Mr Venus to her the day after it was sent; given what Ms Hudson had put her through, she would never have given any of her clothing to Ms Hudson for free; if Ms Hudson liked her clothing she could buy it; she had been clear with Mr Karandonis that he was not to deal with anything to do with the trade mark dispute; and Ms Taylor did not want her clothes to be associated with Ms Hudson.
188 Ms Taylor’s evidence to that effect is not supported by the contemporaneous documentary evidence. In particular:
(1) on 3 August 2009 Ms Taylor sent an email to Mr Karandonis in which she wrote (as written):
I hope you are had a lovely weekend. Have been thinking (which is always dangerous) that I think we need to go over future strategies and how exactly the wholesale agent part will work. I am in the process of making more items. Anyway let me know when you have some time this week.
PS Interested to know if you have heard back from the ‘other’ Katy Perry.
(2) Mr Karandonis responded by email sent on 4 August 2009. Relevantly his response included:
We have approached evil Katy’s record label and heard nothing. Can you please email me her lawyers contact details and I will go direct.
(3) in cross-examination Ms Taylor accepted that in response to Mr Karandonis’ request she provided him with Mr Venus’ email address.
189 In cross-examination Ms Taylor did not accept that the only reason Mr Karandonis requested Mr Venus’ email address was so that he could contact Mr Venus about the trade mark dispute between Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson and the proposal that there be a joint press conference. She said that Mr Karandonis could have been requesting Mr Venus’ email address and attempting to contact him about “anything” and that she did not know why he was contacting the lawyers. I reject that evidence. Given Mr Karandonis’ express representation in what appears to be his initial retainer email that he would not source any publicity without prior approval and the exchange of emails set out, I do not accept Ms Taylor’s protestations, made in cross-examination, that she was not involved in the strategy to seek a joint press conference with Ms Hudson and that she only knew of that strategy after Mr Karandonis had sent his email to Mr Venus. There simply could be no reason why Mr Karandonis would be requesting Mr Venus’ email address and then contacting him other than to discuss the 2009 trade mark dispute and the proposal for a joint press conference between Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson. I do not accept that Ms Taylor did not know about that proposal before it was put to Mr Venus.
190 That conclusion is also borne out by a subsequent media article which appeared in the daily publication MX on 13 August 2009 as follows:
191 In August 2009, after an interview with Ms Taylor, the following article appeared in WHO Magazine:
192 Ms Taylor became increasingly dissatisfied with Mr Karandonis after publication of the article in WHO Magazine. According to Ms Taylor, Mr Karandonis had told her that the article would be about her relationship with her mother and her fashion label but it was about the trade mark dispute, a topic with which she had explicitly requested he not deal. The payment arrangement between Ms Taylor and Power PR was such that Power PR would only be paid if it obtained publicity. Ms Taylor did not pay for the coverage in WHO Magazine as its content was not as promised, nor did she approve it. In about early 2010 Ms Taylor stopped working with Mr Karandonis and Power PR.
193 In November 2009 Ms Taylor was again nominated for the 2Threads Fashion awards in the “up and coming fashion designer” category. She did not receive the award but was honoured to be nominated for a second time.
1.18 The progress of Ms Hudson’s TM Application
194 On 10 September 2009 IP Australia informed Fisher Adams Kelly that it could not accept Ms Hudson’s TM Application. The adverse examination report which was issued set out the following reasons for not accepting the application:
Your trade mark is identical to or closely resembles the following earlier filed trade mark and is for similar goods or services:
1264761
• Your trade mark KATY PERRY closely resembles the conflicting trade mark KATIE PERRY because the trade marks are visually very similar and phonetically identical.
AND
• The goods you have claimed in class 25: ‘Apparel, namely, shirts, t-shirts, sweatshirts, sweat pants, jogging suits, gloves, sweaters, vests, skirts, dresses, shorts, pants, jackets, scarves, lingerie, boxers, underwear, robes, slippers, belts, hats, caps, visors, headwear and footwear’ are similar to goods claimed by the conflicting trade mark in class 25, these being: ‘Clothes’.
The report continued:
You can address this matter if you:
▪ Agree, in writing, to delete the following goods/services from your application:
Class 25: ‘Apparel, namely, shirts, t-shirts, sweatshirts, sweat pants, jogging suits, gloves, sweaters, vests, skirts, dresses, shorts, pants, jackets, scarves, lingerie, boxers, underwear, robes, slippers, belts, hats, caps, visors, headwear and footwear’
OR
• Provide evidence of prior use, honest concurrent use and/or other circumstances.
195 Mr Jensen subsequently gave instructions for Ms Hudson’s TM Application to be withdrawn in class 25. Ms Hudson’s TM Application, as amended by removing class 25, was later accepted and on 7 November 2011 Australian trade mark application no. 1306481 for KATY PERRY was registered.
196 Ms Taylor was aware of Ms Hudson’s TM Application and that an adverse examination report was issued. Ms Taylor considered filing a notice of opposition or approaching Fisher Adams Kelly about it. However, she understood that Ms Hudson subsequently withdrew the application in class 25 removing the need for her to contest it.
197 As at 2009 Ms Taylor did not understand that Ms Hudson or any of her related entities was infringing or was going to infringe the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Taylor thought that Ms Hudson was a singer and that her industry was music and entertainment which she considered to be completely different to her own, being fashion, design and textiles. Ms Taylor did not think, during this period, that Ms Hudson would be marketing, making or selling clothes or other related goods in Australia under KATY PERRY or otherwise. Ms Taylor said that her thoughts were confirmed after finding out Ms Hudson had dropped class 25 in her trade mark application. She was not aware at the time that when Ms Hudson toured she was selling clothes.
198 In some ways, the evidence recorded in the preceding paragraph is difficult to accept. It is undermined by: Ms Taylor’s evidence given in cross-examination that, at the time she was negotiating the proposed co-existence agreement with Ms Hudson, she understood that Ms Hudson was proposing to use or license the use of the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia and that she was not concerned about that (see [174] above); and the fact of those negotiations and the terms of the proposed settlement deed. However, the evidence, when considered holistically, also suggests, and I think the better view is, that Ms Taylor did hold that view during the course of the negotiations. But, after those negotiations failed, to resolve the trade mark dispute and once the Applicant’s Mark was registered and Ms Hudson’s TM Application was amended so as to exclude class 25 she considered that in fact Ms Hudson would not offer for sale or sell clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia while on tour in 2009. Despite all of her attempts to gain publicity while Ms Hudson was on tour in Australia in August 2009, Ms Taylor maintained that she was not aware that at the time Ms Hudson was selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark. Given my observation of Ms Taylor as somewhat naïve, this view of her evidence is completely plausible.
1.19 Ms Taylor and the KATIE PERRY label – 2010 to 2011
199 In 2010, 2012 and 2014 Ms Taylor applied for and received grants under the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Small Business Program. With the grant moneys Ms Taylor was able to create a new logo for her label and thereafter a new website, swing tags, labels and other promotional materials. The new logo is:
Ms Taylor continues to use this logo and a variation of it with the words “MADE IN AUSTRALIA” directly under it which appears as follows:
200 Throughout 2010 Ms Taylor attended numerous events to promote her label including the Fashion Forward Festival at Paddington Town Hall in May 2010 and Music Gallery event at Cottage Point, NSW in September 2010. In 2011 she also started to sell her clothes at the Mosman Markets and the Rocks Markets as well as continuing to do so at the Paddington Markets.
1.20 Ms Hudson’s career – 2009 to 2011
201 From January to November 2009, following the release of her album “One of the Boys”, Ms Hudson embarked on a world concert tour, “The Katy Perry: The Hello Katy Tour”, performing across 20 countries. The Australian leg of the tour took place in August 2009 and included four shows performed in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne. “KATY PERRY” branded apparel and merchandise was sold at Ms Hudson’s concerts in Australia.
202 Over the period of The Hello Katy Tour:
(1) on 13 May 2009 Ms Hudson performed her hit single “Waking Up in Vegas” on the television program “American Idol” in Los Angeles, USA;
(2) on 23 August 2009 Ms Hudson performed her hit singles “Ur So Gay”, “One of the Boys”, “Hot n Cold” and “I Kissed a Girl” at the V Music Festival in Chelmsford, England;
(3) on 14 September 2009 Ms Hudson attended the MTV Video Music Awards in New York, USA and was nominated for “Best Female Video” for her music video for “Hot n Cold”; and
(4) on 5 November 2009 Ms Hudson hosted the MTV European Music Awards in Berlin, Germany.
203 In the course of 2010 Ms Hudson appeared on, or performed at, the following shows or events:
(1) on 26 January 2010 she appeared as a guest judge on television program “American Idol” in Los Angeles;
(2) on 24 August 2010 she appeared on “The Late Show with David Letterman” in New York City where she performed her singles “Firework” and “Teenage Dream”;
(3) on 27 August 2010 she performed her singles “California Gurls” and “Teenage Dream” at the Rockefeller Plaza for the “Today” program;
(4) on 25 September 2010 she performed her single “California Gurls” and appeared on a comedy segment on NBC’s late night television show “Saturday Night Live”;
(5) on 17 October 2010 she performed her single “Firework” on the “The X Factor” television program in London;
(6) on 10 November 2010 she performed her singles “Teenage Dream”, “Hot n Cold” and “California Gurls” at the Victoria’s Secret fashion show in New York City; and
(7) on 8 December 2010 she appeared on the US daytime television talk show “The Ellen DeGeneres Show”.
204 On 10 February 2011, following the release of Ms Hudson’s album “Teenage Dream” and in anticipation of “Katy Perry: The California Dreams Tour”, Kitty Purry as grantor entered into an agreement with Bravado International Group Merchandising Services, Inc. in relation to the sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise, including during The California Dreams Tour, and the grant of licence rights in relation to the “KATY PERRY” name and trade mark (2011 Bravado Agreement). The 2011 Bravado Agreement was signed by Ms Hudson as an authorised representative of Kitty Purry. KATY PERRY branded merchandise was sold by Bravado Merchandising on the Australian leg of the tour.
205 At the time of negotiating the 2011 Bravado Agreement, Mr Jensen considered whether it was in Ms Hudson’s interests. He believed that it was because it gave Ms Hudson a significant commercial opportunity in relation to KATY PERRY branded merchandise to be offered to the public in connection with her musical activities, both at concert venues and via e-commerce. Mr Jensen discussed the 2011 Bravado Agreement and its principal commercial terms with Ms Hudson before it was concluded and recommended to Ms Hudson that she and Kitty Purry enter into it.
206 Mr Jensen does not recall giving consideration to Ms Taylor at the time of making his recommendation to Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry to enter into the 2011 Bravado Agreement. There had been no contact from Ms Taylor since the events of 2009 and Ms Hudson had toured in Australia since that time. At the time, Mr Jensen was not aware of any cases of members of the public being confused that clothes with the “KATY PERRY” name and brand on them were Ms Taylor’s clothes or otherwise associated with Ms Taylor. It did not occur to Mr Jensen that there would be any possibility that the public would be confused in that way. Had Mr Jensen had any concerns that the public would be confused that the KATY PERRY branded merchandise to be produced and sold under the 2011 Bravado Agreement was Ms Taylor’s or otherwise associated with her, he would not have recommended to Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry that they conclude the 2011 Bravado Agreement. Mr Jensen had no such concerns.
207 From February 2011 to January 2012, following the release of her third studio album titled “Teenage Dream”, Ms Hudson embarked on The California Dreams Tour performing 124 shows across 21 countries. The Australian leg of the tour included eight shows performed in Melbourne, Adelaide, Sydney, Brisbane and Newcastle between 28 April 2011 and 15 May 2011. On 1 May 2011, while in Australia, Ms Hudson performed her single “Firework” at the “Logie Awards” ceremony in Melbourne.
208 In addition, in 2011 Ms Hudson:
(1) won the award for best collaboration for her single “E.T.” at the “MTV Video Music Awards” in Los Angeles on 28 August 2011; and
(2) performed her single “The One that Got Away” at the “American Music Awards” show held on 20 November 2011. At that time she was also awarded the “American Music Special Achievement Award” for her accomplishment as the first female artist to have five number one singles from one album.
209 In 2012 Ms Taylor’s husband was transferred to Perth. As a result Ms Taylor gave up her Mosman showroom and her stalls at the various markets in Sydney from which she traded and moved to Perth. While there she held pop-up events which she described as “quite successful”.
210 In 2013 Ms Taylor and her husband moved back to Sydney. Ms Taylor opened a shop at 34 William Street, Paddington (Paddington shop) and attended various events including a VIP fashion and beauty event, a fashion parade for the Melbourne Cup and an event at Robert’s Restaurant in the Hunter Valley, NSW.
211 From 2013 to 2015 Ms Taylor also worked on board P&O Cruises cruise ships from time to time, presenting and showcasing clothing and judging runway shows.
212 In 2014 Ms Taylor held numerous events at her Paddington shop, launched her merino wool collection, launched a new service on her website for a personal styling service called “Style Me KP” and launched the “William St Collective” where different designers with products which were made in Australia shared a space in William Street, Paddington.
213 In 2015 Ms Taylor:
(1) closed the Paddington shop;
(2) was accepted as one of ten Australian designers to showcase at the “Common Threads” event in Hong Kong. Buyers from stores such as Harvey Nichols and other boutiques were able to view her collection;
(3) launched “Your Fashion, Your Way” in Sydney and Perth where clients could customise the colour and fabrics for the pieces in her collection. This initiative was successful and Ms Taylor took the idea all around Australia; and
(4) aside from her business, started working as a columnist writing monthly pieces for the Sydney Standard, a local paper, on fashion and style.
214 In 2016 Ms Taylor held numerous events in Sydney, Perth and Brisbane including a fashion parade and styling event at the Ken Duncan Gallery, pop-up stalls and “Your Fashion, Your Way” events. She also launched her current showroom in Glenmore Road, Paddington (Glenmore Road showroom).
215 In 2017 Ms Taylor started offering monogramming on merino wool. She held numerous events and launches at the Glenmore Road showroom and the “KATIE PERRY” label grew big enough to hire an in-house public relations and digital manager.
216 In 2018 Ms Taylor showcased the “KATIE PERRY” label at a charity event and launched the “Inspiring Women” campaign where she promoted women with their own businesses or who were making a difference in the world. Ms Taylor also presented, was a runway show judge, and showcased her label on a Carnival Cruise cruise ship for its Melbourne Cup Cruise.
217 In 2019 Ms Taylor continued to hold numerous events at the Glenmore Road showroom.
218 In 2020 Ms Taylor’s production house closed down due to the COVID-19 pandemic and she started to work with another production house. However, because of the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic she could not hold events at or open the Glenmore Road showroom for much of the year. At the time Ms Taylor’s main focus was on her online store where she launched facemasks and her range of bamboo trousers. Ms Taylor also undertook a brand refresh with a new brand style guide, colours and packaging.
219 In 2021 Ms Taylor launched a new website with a new host. The landing page of the new website is reproduced below:
220 Throughout the period Ms Taylor continued to promote the “KATIE PERRY” label. In doing so, Ms Taylor maintained a Facebook page and a YouTube channel. Ms Taylor’s posts on that media included references to Ms Hudson:
(1) on 9 February 2011 she posted an audio clip of presenter Ellie Mobbs from radio station 2DayFM mentioning her “Adelaide pants” when introducing Ms Hudson’s single “Teenage Dream”. Her accompanying message read:
Ellie Mobbs from 2day fm talk about Katie Perry Adelaide pants.
You can buy a pair at www.KatiePerry.com.au
(2) on 17 May 2013 she posted an audio clip of an interview with Tim Rosso which aired on radio station Mix 106.5. Her accompanying message read:
Listen as Tim Rosso chats with Australian designer, Katie Perry and the very funny advert he creates just for her.
The segment with Mr Rosso was called “Free ad Friday”. As part of the segment the presenters created an advertisement for the participant, in this case Ms Taylor and her KATIE PERRY label. The advertisement created for Ms Taylor, and other aspects of the interview, included references to Ms Hudson and puns based on the titles to Ms Hudson’s songs. In cross-examination Ms Taylor accepted that the whole of the audio clip was a discussion with the interviewer about her and Ms Hudson. While Ms Taylor did not accept that she was invited to participate in the segment because of her association with Ms Hudson it is clear, having regard to the transcript of the interview, that the entire focus of the interview, the “free ad” and the presenters’ interest in Ms Taylor was precisely because of the fact that the two women shared the same name, albeit with some differences in spelling;
(3) on 3 July 2017 she added the following post to her Facebook page:
Heard my namesake Katy Perry is in town and wore an Alex Perry dress. Imagine if Katy Perry wore Katie Perry !!
In cross-examination Ms Taylor denied that in adding the post she was trying to promote her business by reference to Ms Hudson and said that “it’s just a statement” and that she was just being funny. But it is clear that Ms Taylor once again took the opportunity to obtain publicity for her label by reference to Ms Hudson. That is the only conceivable reason why she would create such a post on her Facebook page on which she promoted her own label.
221 In 2012 Ms Hudson performed and/or released the following singles:
(1) on 12 February 2012 she attended and performed two songs at the 54th Annual Grammy Awards in Los Angeles. Ms Hudson’s single “Firework” from her third studio album “Teenage Dream” was nominated for a Grammy for “Record of the Year” and for “Best Pop Solo Performance”;
(2) on 13 February 2012 she released the single “Part of Me” as the lead single from her “Teenage Dream: The Complete Confection” album. The single debuted at number one on the Billboard Top 100 Chart, the US Hot Digital Songs chart, the Canadian Hot 100 and the New Zealand Singles Chart. It was certified double platinum by ARIA;
(3) on 31 March 2012 she performed her single “Part of Me” at the 2012 Kids’ Choice Awards in Los Angeles. Ms Hudson was nominated for a “Kids’ Choice Award” for “Favorite Female Singer” and her single “Firework” was nominated for “Favorite Song”. Ms Hudson won the Kids’ Choice Award for “Favourite Voice from an Animated Movie” for her performance as Smurfette in “The Smurfs” movie which was released in 2011; and
(4) on 20 May 2012 she attended and performed her single “Wide Awake” for the first time at the 2012 Billboard Music Awards in Las Vegas. Ms Hudson was nominated for ten awards including “Top Female Artist”, “Top Hot 100 Artist”, “Top Hot 100 Song” and “Top Radio Songs Artist”. She won the “Spotlight Award” for being the second person (after Michael Jackson) and first female artist in music history to have five consecutive number one singles on “Billboard Hot 100” from one album.
222 In 2013 Ms Hudson performed and/or released the following singles:
(1) on 10 August 2013 Ms Hudson released the single “Roar” which placed at number one on the Billboard Hot 100 Chart. Ms Hudson performed “Roar” for the first time on 25 August 2013 at the MTV Video Music Awards in New York, and again on 28 October 2013 on the television program “The X Factor” in Sydney;
(2) on 20 September 2013 Ms Hudson headlined the 2013 iHeartRadio Music Festival in Las Vegas performing an eight song set, including her singles “I Kissed a Girl” and “Firework”; and
(3) on 29 October 2013 Ms Hudson performed two songs on Channel 7’s breakfast television show “Sunrise” at the Sydney Opera House in Sydney as part of the promotional tour for her new album “Prism”.
223 In 2014 Ms Hudson:
(1) performed her new single “Dark Horse” at the British music awards show the Brit Awards in London on 19 February 2014; and
(2) was invited by US President Barack Obama to perform her single “Roar” on 31 July 2014 at the White House for a surprise concert at a dinner honouring the Special Olympics.
224 On 6 February 2014, following the release in 2013 of her fourth studio album, “Prism” and in anticipation of Ms Hudson embarking on a global concert tour in support of that album, Kitty Purry as grantor entered into an agreement with Bravado Merchandising in relation to the sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise including the grant of licence rights in relation to the “KATY PERRY” name and trade mark (2014 Bravado Agreement). The 2014 Bravado Agreement was signed by Ms Hudson as an authorised representative of Kitty Purry.
225 At the time of negotiating the 2014 Bravado Agreement Mr Jensen considered whether the 2014 Bravado Agreement was in Ms Hudson’s interest. He concluded that it was, as it presented her with a significant commercial opportunity in relation to KATY PERRY branded merchandise to be offered to the public in connection with her musical activities both at concert venues and through e-commerce. Prior to finalising the 2014 Bravado Agreement, Mr Jensen discussed it and its principal commercial terms with Ms Hudson and recommended that she and Kitty Purry conclude it.
226 Mr Jensen does not recall considering Ms Taylor at the time of making his recommendation that Ms Hudson finalise the 2014 Bravado Agreement. There had been no contact from Ms Taylor since the events of 2009 and Ms Hudson had since toured Australia in 2009 and again in 2011. Mr Jensen was not aware of any cases of members of the public being confused that clothes with the “KATY PERRY” name and brand on them were Ms Taylor’s clothes or otherwise associated with Ms Taylor. It did not occur to Mr Jensen that there would be any possibility that the public would be confused in that way. Had Mr Jensen had any concerns that the public would be confused that the KATY PERRY branded merchandise to be produced and sold under the 2014 Bravado Agreement was Ms Taylor’s or otherwise associated with her, he would not have made that recommendation. Mr Jensen had no such concerns.
227 From May 2014 to October 2015, Ms Hudson embarked on her world tour, “Katy Perry: The Prismatic World Tour”, performing 151 shows across 38 countries. On the Australian leg of the tour Ms Hudson performed 23 shows in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane in the period 7 November 2014 to 15 December 2014. KATY PERRY branded merchandise was sold at those shows.
228 In connection with The Prismatic Tour, Bravado operated “pop-up” stores selling “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise at Little Lonsdale Street, Melbourne between 12 and 18 November 2014 and at the Metro Theatre on George Street, Sydney between 21 and 28 November 2014.
229 On 1 February 2015 Ms Hudson performed at the Super Bowl XLIX halftime show in Phoenix, Arizona. Her performance was seen by 118.5 million viewers and was reported as the most-watched halftime show in history.
230 In 2016 Ms Hudson appeared at the following events:
(1) on 25 February 2016 she performed at the SAP Convention at Wailea Beach, Hawaii;
(2) on 3 April 2016 she performed a medley of songs with country singer Dolly Parton at the 51st Academy of Country Music Awards in Las Vegas;
(3) on 19 May 2016 she performed her singles “Roar”, “Teenage Dream”, “I Kissed a Girl” and “Firework” at the amfAR Cinema Against AIDS gala in France;
(4) on 28 July 2016 she performed at the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia; and
(5) on 15 October 2016 she performed at the Children’s Hospital Los Angeles “Once Upon a Time” gala.
231 On 16 September 2016:
(1) Killer Queen and Purrfect Ventures entered into an agreement pursuant to which Killer Queen granted to Purrfect Ventures an exclusive, non-transferrable worldwide licence, with the right to sub-license, to use the “Katy Perry Brand” in connection with “the development, design, manufacture, sale, marketing, distribution, promotion and/or advertising of approved Products … through permitted Channels of Distribution”; and
(2) Killer Queen, Purrfect Ventures and GBG entered into an agreement. Mr Jensen, who was closely involved in the negotiation of this agreement, described it as a contract for the global licence of the “KATY PERRY” brand as a fashion brand in relation to certain product categories,
(together, Purrfect Ventures Agreements).
The product categories for the purposes of the Purrfect Ventures Agreements relevantly included shoes.
232 In addition to the Purrfect Ventures Agreements, on 1 December 2017 Ms Hudson, Killer Queen and Kitty Purry provided GBG with an acknowledgement, confirmation and consent letter relating to e-commerce and URL rights.
233 Mr Jensen gave the following evidence about the Purrfect Ventures Agreements:
(1) by 2016 the “KATY PERRY” name and brand had appeared on clothing and other merchandise sold in Australia since 2009. To Mr Jensen’s knowledge, there had been no complaint by Ms Taylor about this and he was not aware of any cases of members of the public being confused that clothes and other merchandise with the “KATY PERRY” name and brand on them were clothes supplied by or otherwise associated with Ms Taylor. It did not occur to Mr Jensen that there would be any possibility that the public would be confused in that way;
(2) after several discussions with Ms Hudson and meetings between them and representatives of GBG, including its design team, he recommended to Ms Hudson that she proceed to have Killer Queen and the other contracting parties, who were entities associated with Ms Hudson, enter into the Purrfect Ventures Agreements. Had Mr Jensen had any concerns that the public would be confused that the “KATY PERRY” branded merchandise to be sold pursuant to those agreements was Ms Taylor’s, he would not have made that recommendation. However, Mr Jensen had no such concerns; and
(3) pursuant to the Purrfect Ventures Agreements, KATY PERRY branded fashion shoe collections and handbags are being sold in the channels and as permitted and approved under those agreements.
234 On 23 July 2021 Hudson Fund acquired GBG’s membership interest in Purrfect Ventures and, as described by Mr Jensen, in the “Purrfect Ventures venture” described at [231] above.
235 In 2017 Ms Hudson attended and/or performed at the following events:
(1) on 5 March 2017 she performed at the iHeartRadio Music Awards in Los Angeles;
(2) on 1 May 2017 she attended and performed at Vogue’s annual fundraising gala at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the “Met Gala”, in New York City;
(3) on 22 May 2017 she appeared on CBS’ television talk show “The Late Late Show with James Corden” in the Carpool Karaoke Primetime Special segment in Los Angeles;
(4) on 4 June 2017 she performed at the “One Love Manchester” benefit concert in Manchester, England in response to the suicide bombing carried out in May 2017 at Ariana Grande’s Manchester Arena concert;
(5) on 24 June 2017 she performed a 14 song set at the Glastonbury Festival in Somerset, England;
(6) on 30 June 2017 she made an in-store appearance at a Myer department store in Sydney to promote the “KATY PERRY” branded shoe range; and
(7) on 2 July 2017 she appeared and performed on the talent show “The Voice” in Sydney.
236 On 22 June 2017 Myer Pty Ltd and TEG Dainty Pty Ltd entered into a sponsorship agreement relating to “Katy Perry”. Pursuant to that agreement Myer was granted “the right to be the sole and exclusive principal and naming rights partner of the [Witness] Tour”. It provided for advertising and promotion by Myer and personal appearances by Ms Hudson including an in-store appearance to announce the Australian concert dates for the upcoming “Witness: the Tour” concert tour and to promote the KATY PERRY branded shoe range. The sponsorship agreement was amended by a sponsorship amending agreement dated 25 July 2018 between Myer and TEG Dainty.
237 By letter dated 11 October 2017 Mr Donnell, who had left Bravado in 2016 and was at the time with a company identified as “Blackout Merch”, proposed a “revised merchandising offer” for Ms Hudson for “Exclusive Tour, Wholesale, E-Commerce, & Non-exclusive Licensing” (October 2017 Letter). As far as Mr Jensen can recall there was no formal contract between DMG and Blackout Merch in relation to KATY PERRY branded merchandise and, for the commercial merchandising activities referred to in the October 2017 Letter and in a subsequent email exchange between Messrs Donnell and Jensen between 9 and 11 April 2018, the parties conducted themselves generally in accordance with those documents (which I will refer to together as the Blackout Merch Agreement).
238 Mr Jensen considered that the proposed commercial merchandising arrangements with Blackout Merch presented Ms Hudson with a significant commercial opportunity in relation to merchandise to be offered to the public in connection with her music activities, both at concert venues and through e-commerce. Mr Jensen discussed the proposed arrangements and the main commercial terms with Ms Hudson. According to Mr Jensen, Ms Hudson knew Mr Donnell and had worked with him for many years. Mr Jensen recommended that she proceed with the commercial merchandising arrangements through Blackout Merch for her Witness Tour.
239 Mr Jensen does not recall considering Ms Taylor in connection with commercial merchandising activities in 2017 and 2018 relating to the Witness Tour. As far as Mr Jensen was aware, Ms Taylor had not made contact since the events of 2009 and Ms Hudson had toured Australia since that time in 2009, 2011 and 2014. Mr Jensen was not aware of any cases of the public being confused that clothes with the “KATY PERRY” name and brand on them were Ms Taylor’s clothes or otherwise associated with Ms Taylor. It did not occur to Mr Jensen that there would be any possibility that the public would be confused in that way. Had Mr Jensen had any concerns that the public would be confused that the KATY PERRY branded merchandise associated with the Witness Tour was Ms Taylor’s or otherwise associated with her he would not have made that recommendation. He had no such concerns.
240 From September 2017 to August 2018, following the release of her fifth studio album “Witness”, Ms Hudson embarked on the Witness Tour performing 115 shows across 33 countries. By agreement dated 19 July 2018 TEG Dainty was appointed the promoter of the Australian leg of the tour which included 14 shows in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney between 24 July 2018 and 17 August 2018. KATY PERRY branded merchandise was sold at those concerts.
241 While on tour in Australia, pursuant to an arrangement between Myer and Scentre Shopping Centre Management Pty Ltd Group (Westfield), Ms Hudson appeared at Westfield shopping centres in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne and Brisbane. At each appearance, among other things, Westfield was required to provide suitable staging and to stage a display of “KATY PERRY” footwear on the stage. On 5 August 2018 Ms Hudson appeared in Melbourne at Westfield Southland. An article appearing in online newsletter Hit.com.au reported on her appearance:
Some People Lined Up Overnight To See Katy Perry At Southland Yesterday Thousands of fans showed up.
It’s not every day international popstars rock up at malls in Melbourne’s south east, so fans were in for a treat yesterday with Katy Perry made an appearance!
Celebrating her new shoe collection at Myer, the star participated in a Q&A as well as a meet and greet frenzy. We couldn’t even count how many selfies she took with the crowd. What a legend!
She wasn’t shy to praise her fans either, with some sleeping outside since 10pm the night before to be first in line for the appearance. It paid off, with a bunch of superfans getting a cheeky shoutout – some of them are going to EVERY SHOW on the Australian leg of her Witness World Tour!
…
This isn’t the first time Katy has ventured around Melbourne during her time down under. She went for a bike ride around Collingwood, checked out the Wonderland exhibition at ACMI and ate out at the Winter Night Market.
242 Photographs produced by Myer which were taken at Ms Hudson’s Westfield Southland appearance include:
And:
243 In July 2018 Ms Hudson was featured on the cover of Vogue Australia and an article about her appeared in that edition of the magazine.
244 In 2019 and 2020 Ms Hudson attended and/or performed at the following events:
(1) in February 2019 she appeared at the 61st Grammy Awards with Dolly Parton, Kacey Musgraves and Miley Cyrus for a tribute to Ms Parton. The awards ceremony was able to be streamed by Australian residents via Foxtel;
(2) on 14 April 2019 she performed with producer Zedd at the Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival in Indio, California, a major music festival held annually in the US. The festival was streamed through a partnership with YouTube. Ms Hudson’s surprise appearance was covered by both international and Australian media outlets. An article that appeared on PerthNow on 15 April 2019 reported:
Katy Perry has surprised fans with a performance at the Coachella music festival.
The US pop star appeared on the main stage alongside record producer Zedd to perform their single 365.
Perry, 34, appeared to huge cheers from the crowd at the California venue and looked striking in a red jumpsuit with a rhinestone overlay.
She told fans she “used to sneak in” to the festival, adding: “I’ve been doing Coachella for about 17 years.”
American Idol judge Perry had earlier teased her appearance on Twitter and a few hours before Russian-German producer Zedd was scheduled to take to the stage told fans to tune into the Coachella live stream.
Using the hashtag #GetYouAGirlWhoCanDoBoth, Perry said fans should finish watching American Idol before turning to Coachella.
Perry, a Coachella regular, had earlier been spotted with fiance Orlando Bloom and tweeted: “Feel like I’ve been doing full looks at @Coachella for as long as some of these people have been alive.”
The Coachella Valley Music And Arts Festival takes place each year over two weekends and regularly attracts some of the biggest artists to perform.
This year’s headliners are Childish Gambino, Tame Impala and Ariana Grande.
(3) on 18 September 2019 she appeared and performed on “The Ellen DeGeneres Show” in Los Angeles;
(4) on 8 March 2020 she performed at the ICC Women’s T20 World Cup Final in Melbourne;
(5) on 10 March 2020 she appeared on Australian news, current affairs and talk show television panel program “The Project” in Melbourne;
(6) on 11 March 2020 she performed at a one off concert called “Fight On” in support of the Australian Bushfire relief at Pioneer Park Recreation Reserve in Bright, Victoria; and
(7) on 14 May 2020 she appeared as a guest judge on the cooking game show “MasterChef Australia” in Melbourne.
245 Mr Jensen travelled to Australia with Ms Hudson to attend both the ICC Women’s T20 World Cup Final and the “Fight On” event. In Ms Hudson’s Instagram posts about the latter event she said that “Australia has always given me so much love and support so FIGHT ON is one way to return that love”. In a later post she recorded that 7,000 people attended the concert. Mr Jensen explained that Ms Hudson’s concert was the first in a series of events planned to bring tourism to bushfire affected areas but on the day of her performance all the other planned events were cancelled because the World Health Organisation declared the coronavirus a pandemic.
246 Between the release of “Witness” and Ms Hudson’s next album “Smile” (see [252] below), Ms Hudson continued to release singles. These included:
(1) the cover of “Waving Through a Window” from the musical “Dear Evan Hansen” on 2 November 2018 as part of the deluxe edition cast recording;
(2) “365” in collaboration with DJ and producer Zedd in February 2019. It charted at number 39 on the ARIA charts;
(3) “Never Really Over” in May 2019. It charted at number seven on the ARIA charts and was nominated for “Most Performed Pop Work” at the Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA) Awards in 2020;
(4) “Small Talk” in August 2019. It charted at number 33 on the ARIA charts; and
(5) “Harleys in Hawaii” in October 2019. It charted at number 36 on the ARIA charts.
247 In January 2020 Ms Hudson was featured on the cover of Vogue India. The cover photo was shot in Mumbai, India in November 2019 at a photoshoot which was also attended by Mr Jensen.
248 On 5 March 2020 Ms Hudson released the single “Never Worn White” with a music video which announced her first pregnancy with partner and English actor Orlando Bloom. The music video received over 10 million views in the first 24 hours after its release and as at July 2020 had over 31 million views.
249 On 15 May 2020 Ms Hudson released the single “Daisies” in anticipation of the release of her sixth studio album “Smile”.
250 On 23 May 2020 Ms Hudson appeared on American morning television program “Good Morning America” in New York City where she performed the single “Daisies” live via video-link as part of the “Good Morning America Summer Concert Series”.
251 Since 2017, Ms Hudson has been a judge on television show “American Idol” which until 2020 was broadcast in Australia by Foxtel. Contestant performances, including the judges’ critiques, are published by American Idol on its YouTube channel www.youtube.com/user/americanidol and are accessible by Australian YouTube viewers.
252 On 13 July 2020 Ms Hudson released the title track from her new album “Smile”. The release of the “Smile” album, originally planned for 14 August 2020, was delayed due to Ms Hudson’s pregnancy. In order to stay in contact with her fans while the album release was delayed, Ms Hudson livestreamed from her Instagram account every Sunday. The livestream was called “Smile Sunday” and there was a “shop” with merchandise available for sale as part of, and after, the livestream. Upon its release, the “Smile” album debuted at number five on the Billboard 200 Albums Chart in the US and reached number two on the ARIA charts in Australia.
253 Ms Hudson’s promotion of the “Smile” album included releasing four EPs, “Camp Katy”, “Empowered”, “Scorpio SZN” and “Cosmic Energy”, which compiled new songs with old according to a common theme. Mr Jensen explained, by way of example, that the “Cosmic Energy” EP, which was released to align with the great conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn on 21 December 2020, compiled 2020 single “Not the End of the World” with 2010 single “E.T.”.
254 In August 2020 Ms Hudson gave birth to her first child with Orlando Bloom, Daisy Dove Bloom. The birth was reported by the media in Australia.
255 On 21 January 2021 Ms Hudson performed at the inauguration of US President Joe Biden (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNZ8XCobUUM&ab_channel=KatyPerry). The Australian media reported on her performance.
256 In May 2021 Ms Hudson released the song “Electric” which was to be included on the compilation album “Pokémon 25: The Album” in celebration of Pokémon’s 25th anniversary. Mr Jensen explained that the compilation would feature music from a number of other successful musical artists, including Post Malone and J Balvin, and was due for release at the end of 2021. The partnership with Pokémon was accompanied by a range of merchandise available to be purchased online from a Pokémon microsite www.p25musicstore.com which could be accessed directly or through a link from Ms Hudson’s website.
257 Since the Witness Tour, Epic Rights has undertaken commercial merchandising arrangements for KATY PERRY branded merchandise (other than footwear and handbags which are subject to arrangements under the Purrfect Ventures Agreements). The relevant merchandise is that associated with Ms Hudson’s “Daisies” single, her “Smile” album and the Pokémon music video. Mr Jensen knew the principal of Epic Rights, Dell Furano, to be an experienced operator of commercial branded merchandise including for musical artists. In accordance with his general practice of communicating with Ms Hudson, Mr Jensen discussed the proposed arrangements with Epic Rights with Ms Hudson who accepted his recommendation that they proceed. The arrangements with Epic Rights are not the subject of a formal contract but are set out in an email dated 10 March 2020 (Epic Rights Email). There was evidence before me of online sales made by Epic Rights of KATY PERRY branded merchandise in Australia since the date of their appointment to 31 March 2021.
1.23 Ms Taylor’s decision to commence this proceeding
258 Ms Taylor said that back in 2009 she did not know that Ms Hudson or any of her related entities were intending to market or sell any clothes in Australia. As I have already found to be the case, that evidence is contrary to the evidence given by Ms Taylor in relation to her understanding at the time of negotiation of the proposed settlement of the 2009 trade mark dispute and the proposed terms of settlement for that dispute. During the period of those negotiations Ms Taylor was aware of an intention by Ms Hudson to sell clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia. However, I have also found that once those negotiations collapsed, Ms Taylor’s understanding shifted and she was unaware that Ms Hudson in fact offered clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark for sale in Australia in August 2009 (see [198] above).
259 Ms Taylor said that as far as she was aware Ms Hudson knew of her brand from at least 2009 and also knew that the Applicant’s Mark was registered.
260 Following the events of 2009 many people approached Ms Taylor and told her their stories of similar trade mark or court battles.
261 Ms Taylor’s business is a self-funded small business. She did not consider that she was in a financial position to engage lawyers and initiate legal proceedings about trade mark infringement. While she considered herself to be very lucky to receive pro bono legal advice in her dispute with Ms Hudson in 2009, she did not consider that anyone would act for her for free in litigation against Ms Hudson for trade mark infringement. She was aware that legal proceedings could cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars.
262 Ms Taylor was unaware of the concept of litigation funding until 2018 when she met Rob Silberstein of Silberstein & Associates. Mr Silberstein was introduced to Ms Taylor by Natalie Cohen who attended a seminar called “Mama Creatives Story Slam” held on 3 July 2018, at which Ms Taylor told her story about her interactions with Ms Hudson. Mr Silberstein is Ms Cohen’s husband’s cousin.
263 Given the family connection between Ms Cohen and Mr Silberstein, Ms Taylor thought she might be able to agree cheaper rates for the provision of legal advice by him in relation to a proposed action against Ms Hudson. When she met with Mr Silberstein he introduced the concept of litigation funding to her. Ms Taylor came to understand that the availability of litigation funding would mean that she would not have to pay the upfront costs of litigation, in exchange for the litigation funder taking a cut of any successful damages award or settlement moneys, and therefore considered litigation funding would make it possible for her to pursue litigation against Ms Hudson.
264 Once she was aware of this information Ms Taylor was determined to sue Ms Hudson for trade mark infringement, provided she would be able to secure an agreement with a litigation funder. It took some time for Ms Taylor to secure litigation funding. Ultimately LCM Operations Pty Ltd was identified as a firm prepared to fund the litigation.
265 On 24 October 2019 Ms Taylor commenced this proceeding.
266 On 1 November 2019, following commencement of this proceeding, an interview with Ms Taylor was aired on “A Current Affair” in the course of which Ms Taylor stated that for the past ten years she had had to watch Ms Hudson infringe the Applicant’s Mark. That is, as Ms Taylor accepted to be the case, as at that time she had been watching Ms Hudson infringe her trade mark since 2009. In cross-examination, the following exchanges took place between senior counsel for the respondents, Mr Darke SC, and Ms Taylor:
Mr Darke: In any event, do you recall doing an interview with A Current Affair on 1 November 2019?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: And you recall that you told the interview that, for the past 10 years, you had had to watch the second respondent infringe your trademark?
Ms Taylor: Sorry. Are you asking me a question? Sorry.
Mr Darke: The question was - - -?
Ms Taylor: Mmm.
Mr Darke: -.-.- do you recall that you told the interviewer from A Current Affair that, for the past 10 years, you had had to watch the second respondent infringe on your trademark?
Ms Taylor: I don’t recall saying that, but I’m – I – if I did say that, I mean, we’ve all seen A Current Affair then.
Mr Darke: You don’t deny saying that?
Ms Taylor: No.
Mr Darke: And if you did say it, you must have believed, mustn’t you, that the second respondent had been offering clothes for sales – for sale to persons in Australia under the Katy Perry mark since at least 2009?
Her Honour: Ms Taylor, are you able to answer that question?
Ms Taylor: Yes. No. Sorry. I was just trying to – to think. Yes.
Mr Darke: Yes. And you must have been watching that happen since 2009; correct?
Ms Taylor: No.
Mr Darke: What you told the interviewer was that for the past 10 years you had had to watch the second respondent infringe on your trademark; that’s right, isn’t it?
Ms Taylor: From my recollection, the - - -
Mr Darke: Just ask answer my question - - -?
Ms Taylor: Okay. Yes.
Mr Darke: You told the interviewer that for the past 10 years you had had to watch the second respondent infringe in your trademark, didn’t you?
Ms Taylor: Okay. I told the interviewer that.
Mr Darke: I’m sorry. I didn’t hear your answer?
Ms Taylor: I said – sorry. I said, yes, I did tell the interviewer that.
Mr Darke: Yes. And in order to say that to the interview, you must have – interviewer, you must have been watching the second respondent infringe on your trademark since 2009, mustn’t you?
Ms Taylor: I must have.
Mr Darke: Yes. So her Honour can take it, can’t she, that you have known of what you say is the second respondent’s infringement of your trademark since 2009; correct?
Ms Taylor: Going off the interview that I gave A Current Affair; correct.
Mr Darke: Yes. And you weren’t lying when you gave that interview to A Current Affair, were you?
Ms Taylor: No.
Mr Darke: You were being truthful; correct?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
And:
Mr Darke: You accepted yesterday that you’ve known since 2009 that clothes were being sold in Australia under the second respondent’s mark. Do you remember accepting that?
Ms Taylor: No.
Mr Darke: Could the witness be provided with a copy of yesterday’s transcript. Would you turn through, please, to page 52?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: Do you recall me asking you some questions yesterday about the A Current Affair interview you gave in November 2019?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: And you see at line 41, I asked you this question:
So her Honour can take it, can’t she, that you’ve known of what you say is the second respondent’s infringement of your trademark since 2009.
Ms Taylor: Right.
Mr Darke: Do you see that?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: And do you see your answer:
Going off the interview that I gave A Current Affair.
Correct?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: And then I asked you:
And you weren’t lying when you gave that interview to A Current Affair, were you?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: You said:
No.
And then over the top of the next page, 53 - - -?
Ms Taylor: Sorry.
Mr Darke: - - - I asked you:
You were being truthful, correct?
And your answer – although it doesn’t appear in the transcript, her Honour has already indicated that the correction will be made – was “yes”?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: Yes. And you agreed at that part of the transcript yesterday that you have known since 2009 that clothes were being sold in Australia under the second respondent’s mark, correct?
Ms Taylor: No, so I agree that when I gave my interview in 2019, by that stage, I had known that she had breached my trademark in 2009.
Mr Darke: No, no. Go back, please, to page 52 of the transcript?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: The question that I asked you was that:
You have known of what you say is the second respondent’s infringement of your trademark since 2009.
Ms Taylor: Now I do, yes.
Mr Darke: No, I said “you have known”, not “you know today”, but “you have known since 2009”, and you accepted that. Do you want to change that evidence now?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: I think the easiest way to deal with this is to take you to the transcript of the interview you gave to – with A Current Affair. You will find that in the cross-examination bundle behind tab 20. Do you see there the transcript of your A Current Affair interview in November 2019?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: And would you go down to about halfway down the page. Do you see there’s an entry with your name next to it, Katie Perry, Aus.?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: And you say in the second sentence:
For the last 10 years, I’ve had to watch her infringe on my trademark.
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: Yes. So you were saying that for the last 10 years up to 2019, you had had to watch the second respondent infringe on your trademark, correct?
Ms Taylor: That’s what I say in that.
Mr Darke: Yes. And so you must have known for the past 10 years that the second respondent was doing what you perceived to be infringing on your trademark, correct?
Ms Taylor: From that interview, I say that, yes.
Mr Darke: Yes, and what you said to the interviewer was truthful, correct?
Ms Taylor: No, I stand by that in 2009, I didn’t know that she was selling clothes.
Mr Darke: So, Ms Taylor, you say that now because I’ve pointed out to you the contradiction between what you said to the interviewer and what you put in your affidavit, but the truth is what you told the interviewer, correct?
Ms Taylor: No, the truth is what I put in my affidavit.
Mr Darke: You don’t - - -?
Ms Taylor: I stand by that a lot more than a media interview.
Mr Darke: You accepted yesterday, Ms Taylor, that you were truthful in your interview with this journalist from A Current Affair, correct?
Ms Taylor: I thought I was, yes.
Mr Darke: Yes. I asked you whether you were lying when you did the interview with A Current Affair and you said you weren’t, correct?
Ms Taylor: Yes. Yes.
Mr Darke: And I asked you whether you were being truthful and you said you were?
Ms Taylor: Yes.
Mr Darke: Yes. And the fact is that you were truthful in your interview with A Current Affair and you’ve lied in your affidavit; isn’t that right?
Ms Taylor: No. Why would I lie in an affidavit?
Mr Darke: You - - -?
Ms Taylor: That holds a lot more weight than a media interview.
Mr Darke: The simple fact is, Ms Taylor, that you knew that clothes bearing the second respondent’s mark were or would be sold to persons in Australia from 2009 onwards?
Ms Taylor: No.
267 Ms Taylor’s claim that the respondents infringed the Applicant’s Mark commences at [7] of the FASOC. For the purposes of the FASOC the term “Applicant’s Mark” has the same meaning as in these reasons, the term “Registered Goods” means “clothes” and the term “Registration Date” means the Priority Date for the Applicant’s Mark, namely 29 September 2008. At [7] to [11] of the FASOC Ms Taylor contends that:
7. From at least 24 October 2013 one of (sic) more of the Respondents have, or one of (sic) more of the Respondents have jointly, done one or more of the following acts (the Accused Acts): imported for sale, distributed, advertised, promoted, marketed, offered for sale, supplied, sold and/or manufactured, in Australia or to people in Australia, the Registered Goods or goods of the same description, bearing or in association with marks including but not limited to the following, in various colours:
(Each, an Infringing Mark, and, in any combination or collectively, the Infringing Marks)
Particulars
aa. That the Accused Acts were carried out by the Respondents jointly is established from at least the following matters:
i. the Second Respondent has at all times been the sole manager or member of the First Respondent and the CEO, CFO, secretary and director of the Third Respondent, and is the controlling mind of the First Respondent and Third Respondent;
i2. The First Respondent is a member of the Fourth Respondent;
ii. the Second Respondent personally advertises, promotes and/or markets the goods and services of the Respondents by way of:
1. appearances in person at product launches and in stores;
2. referring to such goods and services on social media and other websites (such as on Myspace, blogs, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram); and
3. referring to such goods and services by way of interviews and commentary in the news and media;
iii. the Second Respondent has claimed to be personally involved in the design of the goods referred to in paragraph 7; and
iv. the Second Respondent reserves, and has a practice of exercising, a personal contractual right of final approval regarding the form and manner of the use of the Infringing Marks on goods.
a. The Second Respondent has performed around 37 concerts in Australia between 24 October 2013 and the date of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, as further particularised in Schedule A. For the purposes of, or at, each of those concerts, the Respondents, jointly or severally, have engaged in one or more of the Accused Acts.
ba. Further, or in the alternative, the Respondents have, jointly or severally, since 24 October 2013, engaged in one or more of the Accused Acts through temporary “pop up” stores in at least Sydney and Melbourne (the Pop Up Stores).
b. Further, or in the alternative, the Respondents have, jointly or severally, since 24 October 2013, and continue to, engage in one or more of the Accused Acts including through at least the following websites:
i. www.katyperry.shop.bravadousa.com;
ii. katyperry.shop.musictoday.com/store;
iii. www.merchbar.com/pop/katy-perry;
iv. www.katyperrycollections.com; and
v. www.katyperry.com,
(together, the Named Websites).
c. Further, or in the alternative, the Respondents have, jointly or severally, engaged in one or more of the Accused Acts through at least the following retailers:
i. Target Australia Pty Ltd and/or its related entities, through its/their physical stores, and online stores at <www.target.com.au>; and
ii. Myer Pty Ltd and/or its related entities, through its/their physical stores, and online stores at <www.myer.com.au>,
(together, the Department Stores).
d. Further, or in the alternative, the Respondents have, jointly or severally, authorised third parties to engage in one or more of the Accused Acts through websites including:
i. the Named Websites;
ii. www.shopstyle.com.au;
iii. www.catch.com.au;
iv. www.ebay.com.au;
www.amazon.com.au;
vi. www.yoox.com/au;
vii. www.stylicy.com/au;
viii. www.shop.nordstrom.com;
ix. www.lordandtaylor.com;
x. www.ebay.com;
xi. www.gilt.com;
xii. www.amazon.com;
xiii. www.macys.com; and
xiv. www.amazon.co.uk.
e. Further particulars may be provided following discovery, evidence and other interlocutory processes of the Court.
8. Further, or in the alternative, one or more of the Respondents individually, or one or more of the Respondents jointly:
a. was or were a party to; or
b. further or alternatively aided, counselled, directed or joined in; and
c. thereby participated in a common design; and/or
d. further or alternatively, participated in a common design,
with the operators of the:
e. Pop Up Stores (if not the First or Second Respondents);
f. Named Websites;
g. Department Stores;
h. other websites listed particulars d.vi. to d.xviii. to paragraph 7,
to carry out the Accused Acts.
Particulars
…
9A. By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 7 and 8, the Respondents are each a joint tortfeasor in the doing of the acts pleaded in paragraphs 8.a. to 8.d., with the persons referred to in paragraphs 8.e. to 8.h, and each other.
9. Each of the Infringing Marks is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the Applicant’s Mark.
Particulars
…
10. The conduct referred to in paragraph 7 and/or 8 constituted use of the Infringing Marks as trade marks in respect of the Registered Goods and further or in the alternative, in respect of goods of the same description.
11. By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 7 and 9 to 10 above, or further or in the alternative, by reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 7 to 10 above, the Respondents have infringed the Applicant’s Mark pursuant to s 120(1) and (2) of the Act.
(Underlining and strike out omitted.)
268 In their Further Amended Defence to Further Amended Statement of Claim the respondents plead as follows in response to [7]-[11] of the FASOC:
7. In answer to paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim, the Respondents:
(a) say that:
(i) prior to the First Respondent’s establishment, the Second Respondent; and
(ii) after its establishment in August 2009, the First Respondent,
has provided to various persons from time to time licences of the KATY PERRY name, brand and trade mark on commercial terms including that provide for control of the quality of goods the subject of such licences, by the relevant Respondent;
(a1) say that from time to time since their establishment on 23 April 2008 and 7 September 2016 respectively, the Third and Fourth Respondents have provided to various persons from time to time licences of the KATY PERRY name, brand and trade mark on commercial terms including that provide for control of the quality of goods the subject of such licences, by the relevant Respondent;
(b) say that pursuant to the licences referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (a1) herein, various merchandise, including clothing, bearing the name, brand and trade mark KATY PERRY, in various colours and forms of stylisation, has been offered for sale, supplied and sold by persons including retailers to persons resident in Australia, including by way of online sales; and
(c) otherwise deny the allegations in the paragraph.
8. In answer to paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim, the Respondents:
(a) repeat paragraphs 7(a), (a1) and (b) herein; and
(b) otherwise deny the allegations in the paragraph.
9A. The Respondents deny paragraph 9A of the Statement of Claim.
9. In answer to paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim, the Respondents:
(a) admit that the trade mark KATY PERRY and each of the stylised trade mark representations appearing in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim is deceptively similar to the Applicant’s Mark; and
(b) otherwise deny the allegations in the paragraph.
10. In answer to paragraph 10 of the Statement of Claim, the Respondents:
(a) repeat paragraphs 7(a), (a1) and (b) herein;
(b) say, in relation to the merchandise referred to in paragraph 7(b) herein, that the name “Katy Perry” is used as a trade mark in relation to such merchandise by certain of the licensees referred to in paras 7(a) and 7(a1) under the control of one or more of the Respondents; and
(c) otherwise deny the allegations in the paragraph.
11. The Respondents deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Statement of Claim and:
(0) say further that the Respondents’ conduct in relation to “goods of the same description” as clothes does not infringe the Applicant’s Mark under section 120(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (the TM Act) because, in the case of such goods, the Respondents’ use of any sign is not likely to deceive or cause confusion,
Particulars
(a) say further that, by operation of section 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act, the Second Respondent’s conduct does not infringe the Applicant’s Mark because the Second Respondent uses in good faith the Second Respondent’s name;
Particulars
(b) say further that, by operation of section 122(1)(a)(ii) of the TM Act, the First Respondent’s, Third Respondent’s and Fourth Respondent’s conduct does not infringe the Applicant’s Mark because the First Respondent, Third Respondent and Fourth Respondent use in good faith the name of the Second Respondent, the predecessor in business of the First Respondent, Third Respondent and Fourth Respondent;
Particulars
(c) say further that, by operation of section 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act, the Respondents’ conduct does not infringe the Applicant’s Mark because:
(i) the Respondents use the trade mark KATY PERRY; and
(ii) any of the Respondents would obtain registration of the trade mark KATY PERRY in their own name if they were to apply for it:
Particulars
(d) …;
(d1) say further that, insofar as the Respondents are alleged to be joint tortfeasors with the operators referred to in paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim, the said operators are entitled to the benefit of the defences afforded by sections 122(1) and 124 of the TM Act and thus have not infringed the Applicant’s Mark;
(e) say further that the Applicant’s Mark is liable to cancellation from the Register of Trade Marks as alleged in the Cross-claim.
(Underlining and strike out omitted.)
269 The respondents do not press their defence based on s 124 of the TM Act and thus no longer press [11(d)] of their Defence or their reliance on s 124 of the TM Act insofar as it is referred to in [11(d1)] of the Defence.
270 Section 120 of the TM Act sets out when a registered trade mark is infringed and relevantly provides:
(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
…
(2) A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to:
(a) goods of the same description as that of goods (registered goods) in respect of which the trade mark is registered; or
…
However, the person is not taken to have infringed the trade mark if the person establishes that using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.
271 In relation to the term “deceptively similar”, s 10 of the TM Act provides that for the purposes of that Act “a trade mark is taken to be ‘deceptively similar’ to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion”.
272 Section 7(4) of TM Act provides that “use of a trade mark in relation to goods” means “use of the trade mark upon, or in physical or other relation to, the goods (including second-hand goods)”.
273 Section 122 of the TM Act sets out defences to a claim for infringement. The respondents rely on subs 122(1)(a) and (fa). They provide:
(1) In spite of section 120, a person does not infringe a registered trade mark when:
(a) the person uses in good faith:
(i) the person’s name or the name of the person’s place of business; or
(ii) the name of a predecessor in business of the person or the name of the predecessor’s place of business; or
…
(fa) both:
(i) the person uses a trade mark that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the first-mentioned trade mark; and
(ii) the court is of the opinion that the person would obtain registration of the substantially identical or deceptively similar trade mark in his or her name if the person were to apply for it; or
…
274 The applicable principles were not in dispute.
275 As set out above, a person infringes a registered trade mark if he or she uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered: see s 120(1) of the TM Act. A person also infringes a registered trade mark if he or she uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods of the same description as that of goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered: s 120(2) of the TM Act.
276 The respondents admit that the mark used by them, KATY PERRY, and each of the stylised trade mark representations set out at [7] of the FASOC is deceptively similar to the Applicant’s Mark. It is therefore not necessary to consider the question of deceptive similarity for the purpose of determining whether the respondents have infringed the Applicant’s Mark as alleged.
277 In Playgro Pty Ltd v Playgo Art & Craft Manufactory Ltd (2016) 117 IPR 489; [2016] FCA 280 the applicant brought proceedings for trade mark infringement. The applicant was the registered owner in Australia of trade marks for the word “PLAYGRO” and a Playgro device mark, including in class 28 in relation to games and playthings. The respondents were companies incorporated in Hong Kong, one of which was the registered owner in Hong Kong and China of a Playgo device mark. One of the respondents sold and delivered in China toys bearing the Playgo device mark to retailers Myer and Woolworths for sale in Australia. Under the sale contracts, title and risk in the goods passed to the retailers upon the respondent’s delivery of the goods to the retailers’ agents in China. Myer and Woolworths then offered for sale and sold the toys to customers in Australia.
278 Commencing at [121] Moshinsky J considered whether the respondents in that case used as a trade mark the Playgo device mark in relation to goods in respect of which the relevant Playgro trade marks were registered, playthings, in Australia. His Honour noted that, although s 120(1) of the TM Act does not refer expressly to use in Australia, standard principles of statutory interpretation require that, prima facie, s 120(1) of the TM Act be interpreted as referring to use in Australia, a conclusion which his Honour noted is implicitly confirmed, and extended, by s 4 of the TM Act which is headed “Application of Act” and sets out the areas to which operation of the TM Act extends.
279 At [122]-[124] of Playgro Moshinsky J set out the applicant’s and respondents’ competing submissions as to when a mark is used as a trade mark in Australia. At [125] his Honour found that the respondents had used the Playgro device mark in Australia in relation to playthings. His Honour observed that the starting point for consideration of the issue was the text of s 120(1) of the TM Act and its concepts, of which the central concepts were “use” and “use as a trade mark”. His Honour then surveyed the authorities in relation to those concepts, in particular referring to decisions in Estex Clothing Manufacturers Pty Ltd v Ellis & Goldstein Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 254 and E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 144. At [137]-[139] Moshinsky J said:
[137] Central to the reasoning of both Windeyer J and the Full Court in Estex was that the word ‘use’ was to be understood in the context of the definition of a trade mark which, under the Trade Marks Act 1955, meant a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods “for the purpose of indicating … a connexion in the course of trade between the goods and a person who has the right … to use the mark”. Once the word ‘use’ was understood in this sense, it followed that the overseas manufacturer continued to use its trade mark after property in the goods had passed to the Australian retailers, so long as the goods remained in the course of trade.
[138] The definition of “trade mark” in s 17 of the current Act is not expressed in the same terms, yet the essential function of a trade mark remains the same. This was explained by French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell J in Gallo (at [42]):
Whilst that definition [in s 17 of the Act] contains no express reference to the requirement, to be found in s 6(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), that a trade mark indicate “a connexion in the course of trade” between the goods and the owner, the requirement that a trade mark “distinguish” goods encompasses the orthodox understanding that one function of a trade mark is to indicate the origin of “goods to which the mark is applied”. Distinguishing goods of a registered owner from the goods of others and indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods and the registered owner are essential characteristics of a trade mark. There is nothing in the relevant Explanatory Memorandum to suggest that s 17 was to effect any change in the orthodox understanding of the function or essential characteristics of a trade mark. (footnotes omitted)
[139] Although Estex and Gallo were concerned with applications for the removal of registered trade marks for non-use, the consideration of ‘use’ of a trade mark in the passages referred to in paragraphs [127]–[138] above does not appear to be limited to that context, and seems equally applicable to an infringement context. This is consistent with the principle of statutory construction that words used consistently should be construed consistently, unless there is good reason to do otherwise: Queensland (Queensland Health) v Forst (No QUD 283 of 2007) (2008) 168 FCR 532; 249 ALR 145; [2008] FCAFC 96 at [41] per Black CJ, citing Craig, Williamson Pty Ltd v Barrowcliff [1915] VLR 450 at 452 per Hodges J; Franzon at CLR 618 ; ALR 386 per Mason J (with whom Barwick CJ and Jacobs J agreed).
280 At [140] Moshinsky J turned his attention to the concept of “use as a trade mark” stating:
Turning to the concept of ‘use as a trade mark’, this was discussed by the Full Court of this Court in Coca-Cola. In that case, which concerned alleged infringement of a trade mark, Black CJ, Sundberg and Finkelstein JJ said (at [19]):
Use “as a trade mark” is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods … That is the concept embodied in the definition of “trade mark” in s 17 — a sign used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else.
This passage was approved by French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ in Gallo (at [43]). See also Aristocrat Technologies at [112]–[118] per Nicholas, Yates and Wigney JJ.
281 At [142]-[143] his Honour relevantly concluded that:
[142] In the present case, the Playgo Device Mark was applied to children’s toys by Tai Way at the Dongguan factory under the authorisation of Playgo Craft and at the direction of Playgo Enterprises. The toys, with the Playgo Device Mark, were sold by Playgo Enterprises to Myer and WSL in China, for sale to customers in Australia. It is to be inferred that when Playgo Enterprises sold its products to Myer and WSL, it knew that the goods were to be offered for sale and sold to customers in Australia. Applying the concepts of ‘use’ and ‘use as a trade mark’ discussed above, the respondents used as a trade mark the Playgo Device Mark in Australia in that it was used as a ‘badge of origin’ to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and the respondents. …
[143] The facts of this case are materially the same as those in Estex. In each case, a foreign company affixed a trade mark overseas, sold and delivered the goods with that mark to an Australian retailer overseas, and the goods were (to the knowledge of the overseas company) to be sold to customers in Australia. Although it is true that in Estex, the foreign company was the registered proprietor of the trade mark in Australia, that fact does not appear to have played a part, or at least a significant part, in the reasoning of Windeyer J or the Full Court of the High Court in support of the conclusion that the foreign company used the trade mark in Australia.
282 More recently, in Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Allergan Australia Pty Ltd [2023] HCA 8 the High Court (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ) considered s 120 of the TM Act and in doing so set out the principles applicable to when a sign is used as a trade mark. At [24]-[25] the High Court said:
24 Whether a sign has been “use[d] as a trade mark” is assessed objectively without reference to the subjective trading intentions of the user. As the meaning of a sign, such as a word, varies with the context in which the sign is used, the objective purpose and nature of use are assessed by reference to context. That context includes the relevant trade, the way in which the words have been displayed, and how the words would present themselves to persons who read them and form a view about what they connote. A well known example where the use was not “as a trade mark” was in Irving’s Yeast-Vite Ltd v Horsenail, where the phrase “Yeast tablets a substitute for ‘Yeast-Vite’” was held to be merely descriptive and not a use of “Yeast-Vite” as a trade mark. Therefore, it did not contravene the YEAST-VITE mark.
25 The existence of a descriptive element or purpose does not necessarily preclude the sign being used as a trade mark. Where there are several purposes for the use of the sign, if one purpose is to distinguish the goods provided in the course of trade that will be sufficient to establish use as a trade mark. Where there are several words or signs used in combination, the existence of a clear dominant “brand” is relevant to the assessment of what would be taken to be the effect of the balance of the label, but does not mean another part of the label cannot also act to distinguish the goods.
(Footnotes omitted.)
2.3.1 Use of a trade mark on a website
283 As to whether use of a trade mark which is alleged to constitute infringing conduct on the internet uploaded to a website based outside Australia constitutes use for the purposes of s 120 of the TM Act, in Christian v Société des Produits Nestlé SA (No 2) (2015) 115 IPR 421; [2015] FCAFC 153 at [78] a Full Court of this Court (Bennett, Katzmann and Davies JJ) said:
It was, of course, necessary for Nestlé and Nestlé Australia to prove that the first A-SASHI logo had been used in relation to the goods in Australia but they discharged their burden in this regard. In Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone plc (2005) 143 FCR 479 (Ward Group) at [43] Merkel J explained:
[T]he use of a trade mark on the internet, uploaded on a website outside of Australia, without more, is not a use by the website proprietor of the mark in each jurisdiction where the mark is downloaded. However, … if there is evidence that the use was specifically intended to be made in, or directed or targeted at, a particular jurisdiction then there is likely to be a use in that jurisdiction when the mark is downloaded. Of course, once the website intends to make and makes a specific use of the mark in relation to a particular person or persons in a jurisdiction there will be little difficulty in concluding that the website proprietor used the mark in that jurisdiction when the mark is downloaded.
See also International Hair Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd v International Hair Cosmetics Ltd (2011) 218 FCR 398; [2011] FCA 339 where Logan J held that trade marks on a British website constituted use in Australia by marketing to Australians through a drop-down link to a page containing certain products marketed and sold in Australia.
284 As Merkel J further explained in Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone plc (2005) 143 FCR 479, once orders from Australia are accepted on an overseas based website, the website proprietors are considered to have intended to use and used the trade mark in issue in Australia. Confirmation pages and any emails associated with those orders may involve the explicit or implicit use of the trade mark in issue in relation to those orders in Australia: at [41] and [44].
285 Given the role of licensees in promoting and selling merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark, a principal aspect of Ms Taylor’s claim against the respondents is that they, or some of them, are liable as joint tortfeasors in breach of s 120 of the TM Act. At [150]-[154] of Playgro Moshinsky J summarised the principles concerning liability as a joint tortfeasor as follows:
[150] The liability of a joint tortfeasor was considered in Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574; 141 ALR 1. Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ said (at CLR 580; ALR 4):
As was said in The Koursk [[1924] P 140 at 159–160], for there to be joint tortfeasors “there must be a concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage”. Principal and agent may be joint tortfeasors where the agent commits a tort on behalf of the principal, as master and servant may be where the servant commits a tort in the course of employment. Persons who breach a joint duty may also be joint tortfeasors. Otherwise, to constitute joint tortfeasors two or more persons must act in concert in committing the tort.
[151] In the same case, Gummow J said (at CLR 600; ALR 19):
In England, Australia and New Zealand, criteria for the identification of joint tortfeasors are to be found in expressions used in The Koursk. Scrutton LJ there spoke of “two persons who agree on common action, in the course of, and to further which, one of them commits a tort”, saying that in such a case there is one tort committed by one of them “in concert with another”. Sargant LJ accepted the proposition that persons are joint tortfeasors when their “respective shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design” so that those who “aid or counsel, direct, or join” in commission of the tort are joint tortfeasors. (footnotes omitted)
[152] In Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 150 FCR 1; 65 IPR 409; [2005] FCA 972, which involved allegations of copyright infringement, Tamberlin J said (at [135]–[136]):
135 The authorities indicate that in order to make out a case of joint tortfeasor liability on the basis that copyright infringement is a statutory tort, it is necessary to establish that there has been a common design by the respondents to participate in or induce or procure another person to commit an act of infringement. In WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corporation Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 274 at 283; 77 ALR 456 at 465; 10 IPR 349 at 359, Gummow J points out that in circumstance where two or more persons assisted or concurred in or contributed to an act causing damage this is not of itself sufficient to found joint liability and there must also be some common design. In other words, there must be something in the nature of concerted action or agreed common action. It is not necessary that there must be an explicitly mapped out plan with the primary offenders. Tacit agreement between the parties is sufficient: see Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583 at 609 per Mustill LJ; Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd (No 4) [1992] 1 WLR 1112; [1992] 4 All ER 47 at 52; [1992] RPC 21 at 29 per Dillon LJ (with whom Leggatt LJ agreed). In Intel Corporation v General Instrument Corporation (No 2) [1991] RPC 235 at 241, Aldous J stated that:
that capacity to control will not establish a common design. It is the extent of the control actually exercised or the involvement which is relevant and, in particular, whether it amounts to a common design to do the acts complained of.
136 The relevant authorities were considered by the High Court in Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 580–581; 141 ALR 1 at 3, where the joint judgment referred to the necessity for two or more persons to act in concert in committing the tort. At 600, Gummow J cited with approval the comment of Sargent LJ in The Koursk [1924] P 140 at 159–60 that persons are joint tortfeasors when their respective shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a “common design” so that those who aid or counsel, direct or join in the commission of the tort are joint tortfeasors.
[153] … . In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd (2016) 329 ALR 522; [2016] FCAFC 22, Nicholas, Yates and Wigney JJ set out the above passage from Universal Music v Cooper and said (at [142]):
We respectfully agree with Tamberlin J’s summary of the authorities. We would add that it is not necessary that the parties to the common design intend to infringe. As Mustill LJ (with whom Ralph Gibson and Slade LLJ agreed) observed in Unilever Plc v Gillette (UK) Ltd [1989] RPC 583 at 602, it is not necessary to show “a common design to infringe … it is enough if the parties combine to secure the doing of acts which in the event prove to be infringements”: see also Unilever v Chefara Properties Ltd [1994] FSR 135 at 138.
See also Caterpillar Inc v John Deere Ltd (1999) 48 IPR 1; [1999] FCA 1503 at [21]–[25] per Carr, Sundberg and Kenny JJ.
[154] In Unilever Plc v Chefaro Pty Ltd [1994] FSR 135 at 138, Glidewell LJ said: “In order to show infringement by common design it is necessary for the plaintiff to show some act in furtherance of the common design — not merely an agreement.”
286 It is not alleged against Ms Hudson that she, in her capacity as a director of each of the corporate respondents, is a joint tortfeasor in infringing conduct by those respondents. Rather the claim against Ms Hudson is either that she directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark or that she was a joint tortfeasor in her personal capacity. Notwithstanding that, it is convenient to refer to the principles relating to the former question as they are of some relevance to the issues that arise.
287 In Hashtag Burgers Pty Ltd v In-N-Out Burgers, Inc (2020) 385 ALR 514; [2020] FCAFC 235 at [136]-[138], a Full Court of this Court (Nicholas, Yates and Burley JJ) set out the relevant principles. In summary their Honours considered that in order for a director to be jointly liable with the company as a tortfeasor, the director must be shown to have directed or procured the tort, he or she must have a close personal involvement and must be “so personally involved in the commission of the unlawful act that it is just that [they] should be rendered liable”, quoting from JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings (2016) 329 ALR 625; [2016] FCAFC 20 at [342]. The director must be acting beyond his or her proper role as a director: see JR Consulting at [351].
2.4 Clothes or goods of the same description as clothes
288 As set out at [106]-[107] above, the Applicant’s Mark is registered in class 25 for clothes. A question that arises in Ms Taylor’s claim for infringement of the Applicant’s Mark is whether certain types of merchandise sold in Australia bearing the Katy Perry Mark are clothes or goods of the same description as clothes. Given its impact on and relevance to the claim for infringement, it is convenient to resolve that question before turning to consider each of Ms Taylor’s claims that the respondents, or one or more of them, infringed the Applicant’s Mark either directly or as a joint tortfeasor.
289 In order to crystallise the dispute that arises between the parties, on 12 November 2020 I made an order requiring, among other things, the parties to identify:
(1) the categories of merchandise which were offered for sale bearing the Katy Perry Mark; and
(2) the extent to which they agreed that the merchandise within each category was either clothes or goods of the same description as clothes. A copy of the document which was produced by the parties pursuant to that order is Annexure A to these reasons.
290 As can be seen from Annexure A:
(1) it is agreed between the parties that the following categories of merchandise are clothes:
(a) t-shirts, tank tops, crop tops;
(b) athletic wear, sweatpants, hoodies, sweatshirts, pullovers;
(c) underwear, sports bras, undergarments, socks;
(d) jackets, vests;
(e) pyjamas, sweatpants, onesies; and
(f) scarves;
(2) there is a dispute between the parties as to whether the following categories of merchandise are clothes or goods of the same description as clothes:
(a) headgear, caps, hats, headbands;
(b) party costumes;
(c) decorative masks, decorative headwear (e.g. cat masks, cat ears, novelty glasses);
(d) boots, athletic sneakers, shoes, sandals, slippers, all of which fall under the broad definition of footwear;
(e) novelty jewellery, wristbands, bracelets and necklaces;
(f) handbags and purses; and
(g) bags and backpacks,
(collectively, Disputed Categories); and
(3) in relation to the Disputed Categories, Ms Taylor accepts that novelty jewellery, wristbands, bracelets, necklaces, handbags, purses, bags and backpacks are not clothes but contends that they are goods of the same description as clothes.
291 The parties each relied on expert evidence in relation to the question of whether the Disputed Categories are clothes or goods of the same description as clothes: Ms Taylor relied on a report prepared by Claire Beale; and the respondents relied on evidence given by David Andrew Bush. I set out their evidence below.
292 Ms Beale has a Bachelor of Arts (Fine Art) and a Bachelor of Arts (Textile Design) as well as a graduate certificate in Tertiary Teaching and Learning. She has had the following roles:
(1) from 1997 to 2008 she worked in the fashion industry as a retail sales manager and concessions coordinator in multiple locations in Victoria and NSW. This involved her working with buyers, managers and designers, contributing to product development, trend research, design feedback and visual merchandising schemes and managing sales teams in department stores;
(2) from 2008 to 2019 she was a lecturer at RMIT University teaching:
(a) Bachelor of Arts Textile Design;
(b) Bachelor of Textiles (Design) (Honours);
(c) Bachelor of Fashion (Design) (Honours); and
(d) Master of Fashion Design, Master of Fashion Entrepreneurship;
(3) from 2015 to 2019 she was programs manager, Bachelor of Arts Textile Design, Bachelor of Textiles (Design) (Honours), RMIT, which involved Ms Beale leading the management and delivery of the undergraduate Bachelor of Arts Textile Design degree program and more recently implementing and leading the Honours degree in Textiles Design;
(4) from January 2019 to May 2021 she was Executive Director, Design Tasmania. In that role she was responsible for providing strategic leadership and operational oversight. Her work focussed on commissioning, developing, managing and delivering an artistic and commercial program enabling designers to present their work in a formal gallery context. In part this role involved organising and curating fashion exhibitions, including commissioning artists and designers to produce work for the exhibitions; and
(5) throughout the period she worked at RMIT and Design Tasmania, Ms Beale continued to maintain her design practice with occasional freelance design work for bespoke projects ranging from designing clothing to giving general advice to designers concerning market impact of their brand.
293 For the purposes of providing her opinion Ms Beale assumed:
(1) “clothes” to be a catch-all term that applies to all items able to be worn or intended to be worn on the body;
(2) the term “clothes” or “clothing” refers to anything used to fulfil the basic physiological need to provide warmth and protection for the body from the elements but that fashion is an industry not just concerned with the production of necessary items for personal protection; and
(3) the overarching definition of “clothes” within the industry can be broken down into further and more specific categories based on function, purpose, construction method or consumer market.
294 Ms Beale was asked to provide her opinion on whether items in the Disputed Categories would fall within the definition of “clothes”. In summary, Ms Beale gave the following evidence:
(1) headgear, caps, hats and headbands – historically, within the fashion and textile industry, headgear (or millinery) has been a key element of dress considered as the “finishing touch” to an outfit. Ms Beale observed that headgear offers the body protection from the elements, which is a core function of clothing, and thus she considered headgear, caps, hats and headbands to fit within the definition of clothes;
(2) party costumes – party costumes are a subset of clothing which are classed as occasional wear, rather than everyday items, and would be within the definition of “clothes”. According to Ms Beale costumes incorporate the same basic elements of composition and construction as everyday clothes, even if they are not intended for long term use;
(3) decorative masks and headgear such as cat masks and cat ears – Ms Beale considered these items to be in the same category as party costumes and, while not part of everyday wear, to be classed as clothing;
(4) footwear – all footwear consists of the same basic elements of the sole, heel and upper. As footwear provides protection from the elements and is worn on the body Ms Beale considers it is clothing. She noted that shoes are a necessary element to complete many outfits and are selected for aesthetic as well as functional considerations by the wearer. Ms Beale would and has used the term “clothes” or “clothing” within the fashion and textile industry to encompass items including footwear and would expect others to consider footwear to be clothes for the same reason;
(5) novelty jewellery, wristbands, bracelets and necklaces – Ms Beale would not use the term “clothes” for these items. However, she said that it might be argued that such items are part of what would be understood as a fashion look and considered an important element of an outfit. Ms Beale would expect these items to be sold in a store which also sells clothes;
(6) handbags, purses, bags and backpacks – again, Ms Beale would not use the term “clothes” for these items. The primary function of handbags, purses, bags and backpacks is to operate as a receptacle for carrying, concealing and protecting items. Ms Beale noted that within the fashion system accessories are considered an important and complete subclass and designers will either simultaneously design specific accessories to be included within a clothing line or work with a specialist designer and manufacture under licence to produce them. Ms Beale would expect these items to be sold in a store which also sells clothes.
295 Mr Bush operates a consulting business. Prior to that he had a career in Australian retailing and wholesaling businesses working in roles relating to the procuring of merchandise from manufacturers and suppliers, and marketing and selling a range of merchandise over a period of some 30 years. In that period for approximately 25 years Mr Bush worked with Australian department store, David Jones, where he was responsible for managing a team which included product developers, merchandise buyers, merchandise planners and financial managers. His role also required: determining brand and product assortments based on customer purchase data and observation of consumer habits; following and anticipating fashion trends, maintaining relationships with brand suppliers, including negotiating and trading market terms; analysing performance relative to competitors, including by reference to category of goods and retail segment; collaborating with the store’s marketing team to develop marketing strategies; budget setting, forecasting and financial planning; and regular visits to the stores and its competitors nationally.
296 In the various roles Mr Bush has performed he has acquired knowledge and experience in relation to sourcing of merchandise from manufacturers and suppliers and marketing and selling a range of merchandise including apparel, footwear and accessories. His experience includes:
(1) dealing with manufacturers and suppliers of a wide range of merchandise overseas and in Australia in relation to the design, production, materials, cost and pricing of merchandise;
(2) production review which involves analysing product performance by reference to quality, gross margins, production lead times and overall efficiency;
(3) product review which involves analysing the performance of products through sales, price and profitability in different channels;
(4) competitive review which involves analysing competitors to identity the quality, price, assortment and distribution channels for their goods as well as their customer service and store environment; and
(5) reviewing internal business structures to improve financial outcomes, workplace and operational efficiency.
297 In Mr Bush’s experience the term “apparel” is widely used and generally refers to clothes.
298 Mr Bush was asked to address the following questions:
(a) By way of introduction and to clarify terminology, please identify the range of goods you consider to be encompassed by the terms “clothes” and “footwear”.
(b) Describe the nature and characteristics of footwear relative to clothes, including identifying similarities and differences.
(c) Describe the purpose and use of footwear relative to clothes, including identifying similarities and differences.
(d) Is footwear usually produced by the same manufacturers, relative to clothes?
(e) Is footwear usually marketed and/or distributed by the same wholesaler, relative to clothes?
(f) Is footwear usually marketed or sold by the same retailers, relative to clothes?
(g) Does footwear have the same class or classes of customers, relative to clothes?
(h) In relation to each of the kinds of goods below, address any additional comments in respect of the questions/topics above, concerning those goods relative to clothes, if not already addressed:
i. hats;
ii. party costumes;
iii. decorative masks and headgear;
iv. backpacks;
v. novelty jewellery;
vi. slippers;
vii. athletic sneakers;
viii. sandals; and
ix. boots.
299 Based on his understanding and for the purposes of his report, Mr Bush assumed that:
(1) clothes and footwear are different. He does not use the term “clothes” to refer to “footwear” or vice versa; and
(2) “clothes” include goods such as shirts, dresses, trousers and suits, but does not include footwear because there are significant distinctions between clothes and footwear as set out below.
300 Mr Bush considers that footwear’s primary function is to protect the feet when standing, walking, running and so on while clothing is worn on the body, which would otherwise be naked and exposed. He identified the following consequences of that difference:
(1) footwear is required to be robust, relative to clothing, meaning that there are generally more components in footwear than clothes although there are some exceptions. Some items of footwear, such as slippers and thongs (flip flops) for example, may not be robust; and
(2) given the purpose of footwear is to protect the foot while standing, walking, running etc., it is more important that footwear properly fits the foot than for clothes to properly fit the body as an ill-fitting shoe can cause damage to the foot. Accordingly, footwear is generally available in more sizes than clothing and is designed to accommodate both length and width of the foot.
301 Mr Bush noted that there are similarities in the design process for footwear and clothes. In each case there needs to be a design prepared and specified, including as to materials and measurements, and a pattern produced. However, while the design process may be similar, footwear and clothing are manufactured at different factories and, even where some businesses own both apparel and shoe manufacturing factories, the clothes and footwear do not originate from the same production line. This is because different machinery, skill sets, patterns and raw materials are required to produce footwear, on the one hand, and clothes, on the other. There are usually more components in footwear than clothes such that the machinery and operator skills are very different to those required to manufacture clothing.
302 In relation to distribution and marketing by wholesalers and retailers of footwear relative to clothes, in Mr Bush’s opinion, generally for both clothes and footwear there are three main contributors to the supply chain: manufacturers; brand owners/intermediaries/wholesalers; and retailers. He noted that:
(1) there are many specialist footwear brands which only deal with footwear and not clothes and many specialist clothing brands which only deal with clothes and not footwear; and
(2) while some brands deal with both footwear and clothes they do so by using different footwear and clothing specialist skills, staff, contractors and suppliers, reflecting the differences in the two types of merchandise.
303 Mr Bush observed that, in terms of retail display, footwear has different space requirements from clothes. Typically 80% of a retail store’s footwear is held in reserve and 20% displayed on the floor while the opposite is the case for clothing. He also observed that footwear requires a high level of customer service in measuring the foot or obtaining different sizes from storage or back of house reserve for the customer to try on, assisted by staff trained in fitting footwear.
304 As to retailers, according to Mr Bush they include department stores and standalone stores selling both clothes and footwear. Department stores include large stores such as David Jones and Myer, midmarket stores such as Target and discount stores such as Best & Less, Big W and Kmart. Standalone stores include specialist single and multi-brand boutiques at the high end of the market, a large group of midmarket branded chain stores, and numerous small or family owned businesses at the mid to lower end of the market.
305 Mr Bush observed that department stores selling both clothes and footwear typically display those product categories in different areas of the store and that within different departments some items may be displayed by brand and for other items, such as seasonal categories like coats and swimwear, all brands may be displayed together. He noted that mid to lower market department stores tend to be product category focussed rather than brand focussed. According to Mr Bush these differences reflect the specialised nature of footwear on the one hand and clothes on the other, the larger floor area in department stores and the different market levels to which retailers may wish to appeal.
306 Mr Bush said that retailers use specialist merchandise buyers who are responsible for procuring stock across different categories of goods and larger retailers may have branded buyers and development buyers. Branded buyers are responsible for buying merchandise offered by brand owners or their licensees and development buyers are responsible for developing product, in the sense of identifying gaps in their product range or price point and sourcing products to fill those gaps. Both development and branded buyers in larger retail businesses are specialised according to the kind of goods with which they deal and, in Mr Bush’s experience, product specialisation of buyers invariably separates footwear specialisation from clothing specialisation. Generally, except for small retailers, footwear buyers do not buy clothes, and apparel buyers do not buy footwear and there are subspecialisations within clothes, on the one hand, and footwear, on the other. According to Mr Bush, it is necessary to have specialisations between footwear and apparel because buyers need to have knowledge unique to those kinds of goods, both from an industry and consumer perspective.
307 In Mr Bush’s experience footwear is usually more expensive to transport than clothes because the former are heavier and bulkier than clothes. Each pair is packed in an individual box, followed by an outer box, while clothes take up less room and can be packed closely together in a small space without risk of damage. Because of the packaging difference and differences in the cost of production, there are different margin structures applicable to footwear and clothes.
308 According to Mr Bush, for clothing and footwear purchased online, footwear is likely to have a higher return rate because having a correct fit for footwear is more important than for clothes and some customers might buy two sizes to see which one is a better fit. He acknowledged that while this can happen for clothing as well, it is more prevalent in footwear.
2.6.2 The balance of the Disputed Categories
309 Mr Bush also provided his opinion on the remaining Disputed Categories, relative to clothes. He gave the following evidence:
(1) hats – hats have different modes of manufacture than clothes, requiring specialisation, and are therefore made in different factories;
(2) party costumes – although party costumes may be termed as apparel, a consumer would see party costumes as separate because they serve a different end use, are generally not well manufactured, may be expensive relative to the purchase price and the limited occasions for use and may be sold at different retail destinations than clothes;
(3) decorative masks and headgear – Mr Bush did not consider decorative masks and headgear to be clothes for the same reasons as for party costumes;
(4) handbags – handbags are similar to footwear in that they are not apparel but they form part of what is worn on the body or carried and for most people are considered when assembling an outfit. Handbags are usually sold in a similar way to footwear at category specific retailers or departments of large retailers, generally displayed by category and then brand;
(5) backpacks – Mr Bush does not consider backpacks to be clothes for the same reasons as he gave in relation to handbags. He considered backpacks to be even more different from clothes than handbags because, given they come from a heritage of outdoor activity, consumers do not typically associate them as being part of an overall brand image with clothes; and
(6) novelty jewellery (including wristbands and bracelets) – Mr Bush does not consider lower priced novelty jewellery, including wristbands and bracelets, to be clothes. These products have different manufacturing sources and require a different manufacturing process and skill set.
310 Section 120(1) of the TM Act concerns infringement of a trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which a trade mark is registered. The Applicant’s Mark is registered in respect of “clothes”.
311 As can be seen from Annexure A there is a dispute between the parties as to whether headgear, caps, hats and headbands; party costumes; decorative masks, decorative headwear (e.g. cat masks, cat ears, novelty glasses); and footwear are “clothes”, although the principal dispute and the focus of the parties’ submissions was in relation to footwear. In order to resolve this dispute it is necessary to determine the meaning of “clothes” as used in the Applicant’s Mark.
312 In Nikken Wellness Pty Ltd v van Voorst [2003] FCA 816 at [44], in the context of considering a claim for infringement of a trade mark, Wilcox J referred to the importance of the Register as follows:
… The Register is an official record open to inspection by members of the public: see s 209 of the Act. The Register is prima facie evidence of any particular matter entered in it: see s 210. A certified extract from the Register is admissible in legal proceedings: see s 211(2). Parliament must have intended the Register to speak for itself. People who peruse the Register, or an extract from it, must be able to act on the basis of what it says, without being obliged to make inquiries about the business history or previous conduct of the registered owner of the trade mark.
313 His Honour accepted that the specification of the goods or services entered in the Register is to be strictly construed: Nikken Wellness at [40].
314 However, in BP PLC (formerly known as BP Amoco PLC) v Woolworths Ltd (2004) 62 IPR 545; [2004] FCA 1362 at [12], in considering whether an amendment to a trade mark application was made contrary to s 65 of the TM Act, Finkelstein J said that he proposed to approach the construction of the application in issue in that case “in a common sense way”, he did not agree with the view that “some strict construction should be applied”, referring to Nikken Wellness at [40], and he agreed with the submissions made by the respondent in that case that “the application is to be construed from the perspective of an interested trader who wishes to gain an understanding of the trade mark register”. His Honour continued:
… The interested trader no doubt will examine the register with some care but, in the end, he (or she) will attempt to discern the identity of the mark without recourse to any special rules of construction such as those a lawyer might apply to statutes which take away important rights, patent specifications or to special provisions in agreements, like exemption clauses.
315 On appeal in Woolworths Ltd v BP PLC (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 97 a Full Court of this Court (Heerey, Allsop and Young JJ) upheld Finkelstein J’s approach to construction of the application for registration of the trade mark in issue. At [58] their Honours set out how the application for registration would have been understood and, in doing so, referred to the understanding of the trade mark that an interested trader, who wished to gain an understanding of the Register, would have had.
316 It was not in dispute that the word “clothes” is an ordinary English word. Usually, the construction of ordinary English words contained in a trade mark specification is a matter for the Court. On occasion, the Court may receive evidence on the question of application, that is whether the goods or services on which a mark has in fact been used fall within the scope of the trade mark properly construed: see Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd (2017) 345 ALR 205; [2017] FCAFC 56 at [185]-[195] (Greenwood, Besanko and Katzmann JJ); Bauer Consumer Media Ltd v Evergreen Television Pty Ltd (2019) 142 IPR 1; [2019] FCAFC 71 at [244] (Burley J).
317 It was also not in dispute that the task for the Court is to construe the word “clothes” in the context in which it appears and as it appears in the specification for the Applicant’s Mark. To that it should be added that the word “clothes” is to be understood from the perspective of an interested trader wishing to gain an understanding of the Register.
318 Ms Taylor submitted that the word “clothes”, particularly when used in the context of a trade mark specification, is a catch-all word which refers to items which cover or protect the body from the elements. She submitted that this is consistent with dictionary definitions.
319 The respondents submitted that, as a matter of ordinary English, the word “clothes” refers to garments or apparel which cover the body or torso, as distinct from the extremities or the head and feet. They said that, although a separate category of goods, footwear is analogous to headgear and like items, which are more readily and naturally classified as accessories rather than as clothes.
320 The word “clothes” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “[c]overing for the person; wearing apparel; dress, raiment, vesture” and in the Macquarie Dictionary as “garments for the body; articles of dress; wearing apparel”.
321 The parties agree that the ordinary meaning of the word “clothes” must be construed in context. To that end the specification for the Applicant’s Mark relevantly includes:
Good & Services
Class 25: Clothes
322 Despite their agreement on the question of principle, the parties differ on whether the relevant context includes the applicable class into which the TM Act divides goods and services included in the specification.
323 Ms Taylor submitted that the classification system is administrative only and does not govern the scope of registration, such that the content of a class cannot provide guidance as to the meaning of the registered goods. She said there is no requirement to describe a good or service in the manner or by reference to the terms used in the classifications and it is unrealistic to suggest that an interested trader seeking to gain an understanding of the specification should be expected to carefully parse the registered goods by comparison to what was included in the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks at the time of registration to obtain an understanding of its scope.
324 The respondents submitted that the meaning they attribute to “clothes” is supported by the classification system in place at the time that Ms Taylor applied for the Applicant’s Mark. They said that the classification system drew a distinction between clothes, footwear and headgear which provides compelling support for construction of the word “clothes” in the specification of the Applicant’s Mark as excluding footwear (and headgear). The respondents contended that any trader or other person considering the specification of the Applicant’s Mark in light of the goods covered by class 25 would naturally think that the selection of “clothes” necessarily excluded the other goods covered by that class, namely footwear and headgear.
325 Section 19(1) of the TM Act provides that a trade mark can be registered in accordance with the Act in respect of goods, services or both goods and services and that the registration of a trade mark may be in respect of goods or services of more than one class. Section 19(3) of the TM Act provides (and provided at the time that Ms Taylor applied for registration of the Applicant’s Mark) that:
The regulations may provide for the classes into which goods and services are to be divided for the purposes of this Act.
326 Regulation 3.1 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) titled “Classification of goods and services” relevantly provides, and provided at the relevant time, that:
(1) For the purposes of subsection 19(3) of the Act (which deals with the classification of goods and services):
(a) goods are divided into the classes of goods described in column 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1; and
(b) services are divided into the classes of services described in column 2 of Part 2 of Schedule 1.
327 Part 1 of Sch 1 to the Regulations describes the goods for item number or class number 25 as “Clothing, footwear, headgear”.
328 The question to be resolved is whether the context in which the term “clothes” is used in the specification for the Applicant’s Mark includes the relevant class, in this case class 25.
329 The respondents relied on two decisions which considered the role of the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of Registration of Marks established by the Nice Classification or classes of goods included in Sch 1 to the Regulations in construing the meaning of the goods in a trade mark specification.
330 In Flexopack SA Plastics Industry v Flexopack Australia Pty Ltd (2016) 118 IPR 239; [2016] FCA 235 Beach J considered whether there had been a breach of s 120(1) of the TM Act in circumstances where the first respondent admitted that the trade marks it used, “FLEXOPACK” and “FLEXOPACK AUSTRALIA”, were deceptively similar to the applicant’s trade mark. His Honour observed that the real question debated by the parties was the nature of goods or services in relation to which the first respondent’s trade mark was used or applied and whether they fell within the scope of the applicant’s trade mark for the purposes of s 120(1) of the TM Act: Flexopack at [71].
331 After noting that s 120(1) of the TM Act applies where the infringing use is in relation to goods or services that are the same as those for which the relevant trade mark is registered, his Honour identified the question before him to be whether the first respondent had used its trade mark in respect of “thermoplastic polymers (for packaging)”. That was because the applicant’s trade mark was registered in class 16 in relation to “thermoplastic polymers (for packaging)”: Flexopack at [72]-[73]. At [74] his Honour said:
I should say that I enquired of the parties what the Nice Classification said about the ambit of class 16. As a result, it was tendered in evidence (International Classification of Goods and Services, Part II; World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, 2006, Ninth Edition). Class 16 specifically refers to this class as including “plastic materials for packaging (not included in other classes)”. The explanatory note elaborates by giving examples of “plastic sheets, sacks and bags for wrapping and packaging” (page 16). The List of Goods in the Class Order also referred to “[p]lastic film for wrapping” (page 103). Notwithstanding the contents of this Classification, the Respondents suggested that it was unheard of, if not heretical, to construe the scope of the registration in the light of the Nice Classification. I must say that such a submission surprised me, particularly in light of the Flexopack Registration’s express reference to class 16. Now strictly, class 16 first takes its content from Schedule 1 to the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (see also reg 3.1). But Schedule 1 refers to “plastic materials for packaging (not included in other classes)” and the language of the Schedule reproduces the language of the Nice Classification. I do not see why I cannot refer to the Nice Classification as extrinsic material. But in any event, I am satisfied that the Flexopack Registration was identifying a type of plastic material for packaging.
332 In Trident Seafoods Corporation v Trident Foods Pty Ltd (2018) 137 IPR 65; [2018] FCA 1490 Gleeson J also considered the question of what goods fell within the scope of the applicant’s registered trade marks. After referring to s 19 of the TM Act and reg 3.1 of the Regulations her Honour noted (at [40]) that the classification of goods in the Regulations is the international classification published from time to time pursuant to the “Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks”. At [46]-[48] her Honour said:
46 Whether goods, relevantly, are within a statement of the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered is a question of construction of that statement: Nikken Wellness Pty Ltd v van Voorst [2003] FCA 816 at [44]. Shanahan expresses the view that the authorities suggest that the statement of goods and services should be strictly construed: see ‘Daiquiri Rum’ Trade Mark [1969] RPC 600, Ind Cooper Ltd v Paine & Co Ltd [1983] RPC 326 and Unilever Plc v Johnson Wax Ltd [1987] FCR 145, cited with approval by Wilcox J in Nikken Wellness at [40], [44].
47 According to Shanahan, the present view of the Registrar appears to be that the statement will be interpreted by reference to the goods or services in the statement. According to the Trade Marks Office Manual of Practice and Procedure, Pt 14.6.5, as accessed on 5 September 2018, where a claim is made in terms of a class heading:
[the claim] covers only the goods or services actually specified in the heading, or clearly encompassed by the heading. Such a claim does not cover all the items in the class, and is not equivalent to a claim for all goods or all services.
48 It is permissible to refer to extrinsic materials such as the Nice Classification to resolve any ambiguity in the statement: Flexopack S.A. Plastics Industry v Flexopack Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 235 at [74]. Where a statement refers to a class of goods, it should be construed in accordance with the classification in force at the date of registration: see Re Acetest Trade Mark [1967] FSR 315 (Ch D).
333 Thus it seems, based on these decisions, it is permissible to refer to extrinsic materials such as the Nice Classification or the classes of goods in Sch 1 to the Regulations to resolve any ambiguity in the statement of goods in respect of which a trade mark is registered.
334 Ms Taylor submitted that Flexopack and Trident are plainly wrong insofar as they permit regard to be had to the classes of goods in Sch 1 to the Regulations to resolve any ambiguity in the statement of goods in the specification for a trade mark. Ms Taylor said that was so because the classification is administrative only and does not govern the scope of the registration of a trade mark. By way of example, Ms Taylor noted that a good or service which is registered in the “wrong” classification is just as effective as one that is registered in the right class such that the content of the class cannot provide guidance as to the meaning of the registered goods.
335 Ms Taylor relies on Nikken Wellness at [43]-[45] where Wilcox J said:
43 Counsel also argue it does not matter that the wrong class is claimed. They quote the statement in Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (12th ed) at para 5-05:
‘Classification is primarily a matter of convenience in administration … What is of real importance in determining the rights of the parties, as has been pointed out, is the specification of goods or services entered on the Register and the validity of the registration.’
44 The submissions made by counsel for Nikken Wellness must be accepted. The Register is an official record open to inspection by members of the public: see s 209 of the Act. The Register is prima facie evidence of any particular matter entered in it: see s 210. A certified extract from the Register is admissible in legal proceedings: see s 211(2). Parliament must have intended the Register to speak for itself. People who peruse the Register, or an extract from it, must be able to act on the basis of what it says, without being obliged to make inquiries about the business history or previous conduct of the registered owner of the trade mark.
45 Although it is incongruous that class 10 was chosen, as the relevant class for the first category for which the subject trade mark was to be registered, this category must be construed according to its description. So construed, it clearly does not cover the goods themselves.
336 While the phrase “plainly wrong” has no fixed meaning, the threshold that must be established before I would depart from a decision of another judge in this Court sitting in the original jurisdiction is high. There must be conviction of error: see the discussion in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v FAK19 [2021] FCAFC 153 at [1]-[14] per Allsop CJ.
337 Insofar as the question which arises is concerned there is a tension between the decisions in Flexopack and Trident, on the one hand, and Nikken Wellness, on the other. In the former cases the Court said that regard could be had to the relevant Nice Classification or the description of the classes in Sch 1 to the Regulations where there is an ambiguity in the description in the specification. In the latter there was a focus on the primacy of the Register, its role and the fact that a person searching it is not required to go behind the Register to discover more. In coming to his view it is not apparent that Beach J was taken to the decision in Nikken Wellness or that there was any argument before his Honour about whether extrinsic material such as the Nice Classification could be taken into account in construing the goods or services included in the relevant trade mark specification. In Trident Gleeson J followed the decision in Flexopack. Again the extent of the argument about the issue before her Honour is not apparent.
338 While the argument put on behalf of Ms Taylor is of some attraction I am not convinced to the requisite level that the decisions in Flexopack and Trident are wrong. That being so, having regard to those decisions, to the extent there is any ambiguity, for the purpose of construing the word “clothes”, being the goods in the specification for the Applicant’s Mark, regard can be had to, and the relevant context includes, class 25 as described in Pt 1 of Sch 1 to the Regulations.
339 Class 25 (see [327] above) draws a distinction between clothes, footwear and headgear. It supports a construction of “clothes” as used in the specification for the Applicant’s Mark which excludes footwear and headgear and is limited to garments which cover the body but not the extremities of feet or the head. A trader considering the specification for the Applicant’s Mark in light of the goods covered by class 25 would think that the selection of “clothes” excluded the other goods covered by that class: footwear and headgear.
340 Even if I am wrong about that, in my opinion the ordinary meaning of clothes is garments that cover the body but not the feet (or the head). Clothes protect the body while shoes protect the feet. They serve different purposes, are made of different materials via different manufacturing processes and tend to be sold in different stores or different areas or departments of larger stores, such as department stores. That meaning is supported by the two dictionary definitions on which Ms Taylor relies (see [320] above), both of which refer to garments or coverings for the body or person suggesting that they are coverings for the torso and limbs, rather than the feet. Further, applying a common sense meaning, as urged by Ms Taylor, I would come to the same conclusion. That is the word “clothes” is not ordinarily employed to describe shoes or footwear and is inapt for that purpose. In my opinion, an interested trader wishing to gain an understanding of the Register would come to the same view as to the nature of the goods covered by the specification of the Applicant’s Mark.
341 Ms Taylor relied on the respondents’ admissions that:
(1) socks, which cover extremities, namely the feet, are clothes;
(2) scarves which are wrapped around the neck and not the body are clothes; and
(3) hoodies, which include a hood which covers the head, are clothes,
as highlighting the illogicality of the respondents’ position regarding footwear.
342 To the extent that these admissions are relevant and have any bearing on the ordinary meaning of the word “clothes” as used in the specification for the Applicant’s Mark, a matter about which I am doubtful, I do not think the admissions expose any illogicality in the respondents’ position.
343 As to socks, Mr Bush’s evidence, which I accept, is that socks are mercery and “a standalone item”, he would not necessarily classify them as clothes and a consumer would not necessarily ask for socks in the same breath as a piece of clothing. In any event, even if socks are considered to be clothes, they serve a different function to shoes. They provide warmth, comfort and in some cases decoration or colour, rather than protection of the feet.
344 As for scarves, they can be used for decorative, warmth or protective purposes. The same or similar materials are used to produce scarves as clothes and, in any event, the neck is not an extremity of the body.
345 The primary purpose of a hoodie is to cover the torso. That such a garment also has a hood which can cover the head does not detract from its principal use or purpose. A hoodie would not be classified as a hat or headgear.
346 It follows from the matters set out above that the same conclusion as I have reached in relation to footwear applies to headgear, caps, hats and headbands, decorative masks and decorative headwear (e.g. cat masks, cat ears, novelty glasses). As to the latter the conclusion that they are not clothes is compelling, even adopting Ms Taylor’s more expansive definition for clothes. Given their decorative nature, they could not be said to be items which cover or protect the body from the elements.
347 The final category is party costumes. I do not reach the same conclusion in relation to this category. Although party costumes may be sold in different types of stores, would not be worn regularly and may not be as well made, in terms of their durability, they serve the basic function of covering the upper body, i.e. torso and limbs, as opposed to the feet. That being so, in my view party costumes are clothes.
2.8 Goods of the same description as clothes
348 In the alternative, Ms Taylor contends that the Disputed Categories (including those addressed above i.e. headgear, caps, hats and headbands; party costumes; decorative masks, decorative headwear (e.g. cat masks, cat ears, novelty glasses); and footwear) are goods of the same description as clothes.
349 In Goodman Fielder Pte Ltd v Conga Foods Pty Ltd (2020) 158 IPR 9; [2020] FCA 1808 the Court was called upon to exercise its discretion under s 101(2) of the TM Act to permit a trade mark to remain on the Register notwithstanding that a ground for removal of the mark had been established. In seeking that relief the applicants submitted that certain goods, in that case garlic bread on the one hand and goods within the ready made meal category and pizza bases and pizza dough on the other, could be characterised as goods of the same description and that this was a factor in favour of retention or inclusion of those goods on the Register.
350 As the applicants’ contention also had significance in the context of the infringement case that was before the Court, Burley J set out the principles in relation to determining whether goods will be “goods of the same description” as goods for which a trade mark is registered. After observing that the question of whether or not goods amount to “goods of the same description” as those appearing in the Register arises in a number of contexts under the TM Act, including under s 120(2), at [278]-[286] his Honour set out a comprehensive summary of the relevant principles. It is instructive to set out that passage in full:
[278] The term “goods of the same description” has been the subject of judicial consideration under the present and previous versions of the Trade Marks Act, so much so that it is now considered a “term of art”: Davison M and Horak I, Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (6th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2016) at [35.505].
[279] In Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592 at 606; [1955] ALR 115; (1954) 1A IPR 465 at 466 (Southern Cross) the High Court (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Taylor JJ) observed that there may be many matters to be considered in determining whether one product is a good of the same description as another. One is the inherent nature of the respective goods. Others include: their respective uses; the trade channels through which they are each sold; their origin; their purpose; whether they are produced by one and the same manufacturer or distributed by the same wholesale houses; whether they are sold in the same shops over the same counters during the same seasons and to the same class or classes of customers; and whether they are regarded by those engaged in their manufacture and distribution as belonging to the same trade. No single consideration is conclusive in itself. The classifications contained in the schedules to the Trade Marks Act are not a decisive criterion.
[280] Broadly, it may be said that the authorities establish that there are three principal factors to be considered in this regard. They are: (1) the nature of the goods, including their origin and characteristics; (2) the uses made of them, including their purpose; and (3) the trade channels through which the goods are bought and sold. In McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick (2000) 51 IPR 102; [2000] FCA 1335 (McCormick) Kenny J said of the last of these (at [18]):
… it may be relevant to consider whether the goods being compared are produced by the same manufacturer or distributed through the same channels; whether they are sold in the same shops; whether they are sold to the same sort of customers; and whether those engaged in the manufacture and distribution of the goods are considered as belonging to the same trade: see Re Application by Jellinek (1946) 63 RPC 59 at 70–2; In Re John Crowther & Sons (Milnsbridge) Ltd’s Application (1948) 65 RPC 369 (Crowther’s Application) at 372; Re Whiting’s Application (1952) 69 RPC 219 at 221; and Reckitt & Colman (Aust) Ltd v Boden (1945) 70 CLR 84 at 94…
[281] Numerous decisions have grappled with the question of what will amount to goods of the same description. In McCormick instant batter was found to be of the same description as “spices, condiments, seasonings, extracts and essences for flavouring foods, herbs, sauces and gravies” (at [26]–[28]); in New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Company Ltd (1989) 86 ALR 549 at 565–6; 14 IPR 26 at 43 (NSW Dairy Corporation) Gummow J found that packaged cheese was not a good of the same description as flavoured milk; in Re J & J Colman Ltd’s Application (1929) 46 RPC 126 (Eve J), mustard and semolina were held not to be goods of the same description; in San Remo Macaroni Company Pty Ltd v San Remo Gourmet Coffee Pty Ltd (2000) 50 IPR 321; [2000] FCA 1842 at [36], an interlocutory decision (Goldberg J), it was not considered to be seriously arguable that pasta products, macaroni and spaghetti on the one hand and coffee on the other were goods of the same description. In E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan (Aust) Pty Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 386; [2009] FCAFC 27 (Gallo (FC)) at [72] the Full Court (Moore, Edmonds and Gilmour JJ) found that beer and wine were goods of the same description, overturning the decision of Flick J at first instance which was to the opposite effect.
[282] However, looking at the outcome of other cases on their facts is unlikely to be of great assistance. That is particularly because of the challenge to find consistency in those decisions absent a detailed knowledge of the evidence in each case: see Burrell R and Handler M, Australian Trade Mark Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2016) at p 239–240; Shanahan’s at [35.2010–35.2035].
[283] A focus on the policy underlying the term of art is more useful. The purpose of the test may be understood having regard to the general policy objective that underlies the Trade Marks Act as set out in Campomar at [42], namely in preserving the balance between the twin objectives of the interests of traders in protecting their goodwill and the interests of consumers in recognising a trade mark as a badge of origin and avoiding deception or confusion as to that origin.
[284] In Polo Textile Industries Pty Ltd v Domestic Textile Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 227; 114 ALR 157; 26 IPR 246 (Polo Textile Industries), where sheets and towels were found to be goods of the same description at FCR 241; ALR 171–2; 259–60, Burchett J said of s 23(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) (which allowed the Court to refuse an application to remove a trade mark registration for non-use in relation to any goods) at FCR 240; ALR 171; IPR 259:
[The object of s 23(2)] seems plainly to be the avoidance of confusion and deception in the market place, which would be likely to arise should a mark become available for use by two or more different companies, which are unrelated, upon goods of the same description. From that point of view, the expression “goods of the same description” is generally to be understood in such a sense that, if two different items are held not to fall within the expression, their sale under the same mark by different companies is not likely to lead to confusion or deception. That approach would seem to me to accord with the common sense business view recommended by Lord Evershed.
[285] This passage was quoted with approval by the Full Court in Gallo (FC) at [71]; see also …
[286] Accordingly, courts in recent times have consistently found it to be of significance that the policy underlying the expression “goods of the same description” is the need to avoid any confusion and deception in the market place which would be likely to arise should a mark become available for use by two or more different companies upon goods of the same description. That policy, when considered in the context of modern shopping practices in large stores where multiple products can be displayed near each other, such as in supermarkets, tends to expand the likelihood that products that at first blush are of quite different character and which are manufactured differently will nonetheless be goods of the same description because there is an increased likelihood that goods will be placed in close proximity to each other in the same store.
351 Bearing those principles in mind I turn to consider whether the Disputed Categories are goods of the same description as clothes.
352 Ms Taylor submitted that footwear and clothes fulfil the same purpose; they cover or protect parts of the body from the elements. She contended that the attempt by the respondents and Mr Bush to draw distinctions between footwear and clothes are unconvincing and that there is as much variation between types of footwear, e.g. ballet flats, flip flops or slippers, on the one hand, and leather boots or women’s heels, on the other, as there is between goods within the category of footwear and other kinds of goods which are accepted to be clothes.
353 The respondents submitted that having regard to the nature of footwear and its purpose, the origin and production of footwear and clothes and the trade channels through which each are bought and sold, footwear and clothes are not goods of the same description.
354 Footwear is, as the name suggests, worn on the feet and serves the purpose of protecting the feet while clothes are worn on the torso and limbs of the body. There are sub-categories of footwear which have specific uses, for example running shoes or other types of shoes designed and manufactured for various sports and presumably to assist performance, slippers which are usually worn indoors to keep the feet warm in colder weather, high heels and so on. Similarly there are sub-categories of clothes related to specific activities or occasions but in each case they have the same use; that is to cover the torso and limbs. There are items of clothing which could be categorised as protective, for example certain types of jackets. But, more broadly, clothes do not serve the same protective function as shoes.
355 Given the protective function of shoes, it is more important that footwear fits the foot properly than it is that clothes fit the body properly. As Mr Bush points out, significantly more damage will be done by ill-fitting shoes than by an ill-fitting item of clothing.
356 As to their manufacture, as I have already observed, footwear is generally required to be made of more robust materials and to have a more robust structure than clothes. Mr Bush explained that while the process for designing footwear and clothes may be similar, the two categories of goods are manufactured at different factories. Mr Bush acknowledged that some large conglomerate businesses may own both apparel and shoe manufacturing factories but even then footwear and clothes do not originate from the same production line because different machinery, skill sets, patterns and raw materials are required to produce footwear and clothes.
357 Both Ms Beale and Mr Bush gave evidence that footwear generally has more components than clothes. For that reason Mr Bush explained that different machinery and operator skills are required for fabrication of a dress as opposed to a shoe. Footwear production is also a specialisation because of the different raw materials used and the different manufacturing process. The latter requires, for example, the need to make a last, i.e. a moulded model of the internal shape of the shoe, and the need to glue or otherwise fasten the parts of the shoe, each made from different materials.
358 Mr Bush gave evidence about trade channels. In summary, the evidence establishes that:
(1) footwear and clothes are considered to be different product areas in the retail fashion trade. There are subgroups within each group for specialised sub-categories;
(2) generally, larger retailers have specialist buyers for different categories of goods and for different brands. According to Mr Bush the product specialisations of buyers nearly always separate footwear from clothing and in most cases, except for small retailers, footwear buyers do not buy clothes and apparel buyers do not buy footwear. That is understandable given the different nature of the two categories of goods, the need to understand consumer habits in relation to the two categories and the different methods of sizing;
(3) in larger stores, such as department stores, footwear and clothes will usually be displayed in different areas of the store while in smaller stores they may be displayed together, although according to Mr Bush this may be because of space constraints;
(4) there are specialist brands which only sell footwear and not clothes and vice versa; and
(5) in terms of online merchandising, Mr Bush explained that generally brands will present categories of merchandise as they would in-store so that footwear is presented in one category, accessories in another and so on. However, a customer can bypass that method of presentation by doing a search for a specific item or items or a specific brand, with the latter returning results for different categories of goods depending on the brand.
359 In my view, regard to these factors and the policy behind the TM Act, namely the need to avoid any confusion and deception in the market place which would be likely to arise were the same trade mark to be applied to the two types of goods being considered, on balance, footwear or shoes are not goods of the same description as clothes.
360 Ms Taylor submitted that the same analysis that applies to footwear applies to hats and headwear. She said that a woollen beanie is more like a knitted jumper than a boater.
361 The respondents submitted that hats generally have a different mode of manufacture from clothes which requires specialisation, and while there are exceptions, such as woollen beanies, they are a very small percentage of the market.
362 While hats might be displayed in stores in the same area as clothes, they generally require a different method of manufacture to clothes and are often made from different materials. Their function is for the most part to protect the head although some hats might be worn for purely decorative purposes. Mr Bush considered hats to be accessories rather than clothes. I accept that to be the case.
363 Based on the evidence before me and the policy behind the TM Act as set out above, hats and headwear are not, in my opinion, goods of the same description as clothes.
2.8.3 Decorative masks and headgear
364 My conclusions in relation to headwear or hats apply equally to this category.
2.8.4 Novelty jewellery, wristbands, bracelets and necklaces
365 Ms Taylor submitted that novelty jewellery, wristbands, bracelets and necklaces, which for ease I will refer to collectively as novelty jewellery, are goods of the same description as clothes. She said that while they fulfil a different purpose to clothes, they are often paired with clothes to complete an outfit and often sold in the same stores proximate to each other and to clothes.
366 The respondents submitted that novelty jewellery is not goods of the same description as clothes. Those items have different manufacturing sources and processes.
367 It was not in dispute that novelty jewellery, on the one hand, and clothes, on the other, have different uses and different purposes. The former are decorative while the latter are used to cover the torso and limbs. Without clothes a person would be naked. The same is not the case for novelty jewellery which is an addition to an outfit.
368 As to their manufacture, Mr Bush gave unchallenged evidence that novelty jewellery has a different manufacturing process and its production requires a different skill set to clothes.
369 As to trade channels, Ms Beale expected novelty jewellery to be sold in a store that also sells clothes. While the evidence before me did not go beyond that expression of expectation, I accept that would be so in the case of some stores. That said there was no evidence of the types of stores that would sell both clothes and novelty jewellery and how each category would usually be displayed and sold.
370 Having regard to these factors and the policy behind the TM Act, in my view novelty jewellery is not goods of the same description as clothes.
2.8.5 Handbags and purses, bags and backpacks
371 Ms Taylor made the same submissions in relation to this category of goods as she made in relation to novelty jewellery.
372 The respondents submitted that handbags and backpacks are similar to footwear, in that they are not apparel but form part of what is worn on the body or carried. They also submitted that the unchallenged evidence was that handbags are usually sold in category specific retailers or departments of retailers, generally displayed by category and then brand.
373 Clothes and bags, the term I will use to refer to handbags, purses, bags and backpacks, have different uses and purposes. Bags are functional in that they are used to carry items. Mr Bush noted that handbags are considered when assembling an outfit i.e. it is one element of the outfit; the others being clothing, accessories and footwear. Mr Bush’s evidence was that, apart from those with fashionable branding, he considered backpacks were even more different from clothes than handbags because they come from a heritage of outdoor activity and therefore consumers do not typically associate them with being part of an overall brand image with clothes.
374 There was no evidence before me as to the method of manufacture of bags. However, Mr Bush gave unchallenged evidence that handbags are sold in a similar way to footwear at category specific retailers or departments of large retailers, generally displayed by category then brand. There were some photos of retailers in evidence before me showing handbags displayed in the retailer’s window with clothes. However, I do not think that window displays are strictly the same as trade channels. A window display is for the purpose of showcasing the various goods on offer for sale in the particular store.
375 In my opinion, having regard to these factors and the underlying policy objectives of the TM Act bags, i.e. handbags, purses, bags and backpacks, are not goods of the same description as clothes. Cognisant of the caution given in Goodman Fielder (at [282]) about the assistance that could be gained from the outcome in other cases, given different facts, I note my conclusion is consistent with the conclusion reached on two different occasions by a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks: see Mossimo Inc v Bozzini Pty Ltd (2001) AIPC 91-663 at 39-119, 39-120 (where the delegate found that leather goods were not goods of the same description as clothing) and Mondi Textile GmbH v Pam Corporation (2000) AIPC 91-607 at 37-943 37-945 (where the delegate found that personal leather goods, including handbags, wallets and luggage, were not goods of the same description as clothes).
2.9 The Disputed Categories — conclusion
376 It follows from the above that, with the exception of party costumes which in my opinion are clothes, none of the goods in the remaining Disputed Categories are clothes or goods of the same description as clothes.
377 Bearing that conclusion in mind I turn to consider Ms Taylor’s claims of infringement.
2.10 Ms Taylor’s claims of infringement
378 Ms Taylor commenced this proceeding in 2019. Accordingly, having regard to the applicable limitation period, her claim for relief arising from the alleged infringing conduct relates to conduct which occurred after 24 October 2013. Ms Taylor has addressed the respondents’ alleged infringing conduct according to a number of distinct channels of sales. For ease, I adopt the same approach and structure in these reasons and consider each of the channels of sales identified by Ms Taylor in turn below.
2.10.1 First channel – Ms Hudson’s concerts
379 The first sales channel identified by Ms Taylor is concerts. In the relevant period, October 2013 to October 2019, Ms Hudson embarked on two concert tours which brought her to Australia: the Prismatic Tour and the Witness Tour. Ms Taylor alleges that in the course of each of those tours:
(1) the relevant licensee infringed the Applicant’s Mark by advertising, offering for sale and selling clothes and goods of the same description bearing the Katy Perry Mark and that the respondents are liable as joint tortfeasors; and
(2) in respect of some conduct Ms Hudson is directly liable for infringement of the Applicant’s Mark.
380 The conduct associated with each of these tours and whether the respondents are liable as joint tortfeasors and/or, in the case of Ms Hudson, whether she breached s 120 of the TM Act as alleged is addressed below.
381 As set out at [227] above, in 2014 Ms Hudson came to Australia as part of her Prismatic Tour. It was not in dispute that KATY PERRY branded merchandise was offered for sale and sold at her concerts at venues in Australia.
2.10.1.1.1 The parties’ submissions
382 Ms Taylor relies on the 2014 Bravado Agreement and its terms (see [393] below). She submitted that the rights of Kitty Purry, and thus Ms Hudson, to approve the designs and advertising by Bravado was not a mere contractual right but a right exercised almost universally and in meticulous detail by Ms Hudson.
383 Ms Taylor submitted that at the concerts KATY PERRY branded goods were offered for sale and sold at multiple merchandise stands under signs bearing the Katy Perry Mark which were only accessible to people who had bought tickets to see Ms Hudson at those concerts and that Ms Hudson personally promoted goods associated with the Prismatic Tour, including by means of her social media accounts.
384 Ms Taylor observed that the respondents have admitted, by [10(b)] of the Defence, that the Katy Perry Mark has been used by their licensees as a trade mark under their control. She submitted that, the use of the mark by Bravado during the Prismatic Tour was trade mark use in Australia which infringed the Applicant’s Mark as it occurred in respect of the sale of clothes (and goods of the same description) bearing the Katy Perry Mark at concerts in Australia. Ms Taylor further submitted that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry are joint tortfeasors with Bravado in that they engaged in a common design with Bravado in respect of, or counselled, directed, or joined in, the infringement. Ms Taylor contended that to be so for the following reasons:
(1) Killer Queen and Kitty Purry are both controlled by Ms Hudson who actively exercises control over those entities in respect of all of their actions. While Kitty Purry was the licensor to Bravado, it was licensed by Killer Queen, the owner of the Katy Perry Mark;
(2) Bravado used the Katy Perry Mark under the express control of Kitty Purry (and thus Killer Queen) pursuant to the 2014 Bravado Agreement which is use which would satisfy s 8(1) of the TM Act;
(3) the sales at the concerts occurred by means of close cooperation between Bravado and Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry. Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry transported Bravado’s stock to the concerts, Ms Hudson gave Bravado access to her performance venues and the exclusive right to sell in that space and undertook steps to prevent anyone else from selling in that space. Bravado could not have accessed the sales venues without the respondents’ approval and the only people who could access Bravado’s stalls were ticket holders attending a concert to see Ms Hudson;
(4) Kitty Purry and thus Ms Hudson did not merely have a contractual right of control over the design of the goods sold at Ms Hudson’s concerts. Ms Hudson closely and carefully exercised control and was aware, and personally approved, of and directed all goods to be sold in the merchandise stalls; and
(5) Ms Hudson personally promoted the goods to be sold at her concerts through her social media accounts.
385 Ms Taylor submitted that the Court should also find that Ms Hudson personally infringed the Applicant’s Mark by her use of the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in respect of clothes or goods of the same description where those goods were to be sold in Australia at her concerts. That is because use of a mark in the context of advertising them is taken to be use of the mark in respect of those goods and thus infringing conduct. Where the user of a mark knows that the goods will be sold in Australia, that conduct constitutes use of the mark as a trade mark in Australia.
386 The respondents accept that clothes were offered for sale at concerts performed by Ms Hudson during the Prismatic Tour in Australia in 2014 and that those sales were governed by the 2014 Bravado Agreement. They also accept that, insofar as those sales were of clothes or goods of the same description, Bravado infringed the Applicant’s Mark. However, they deny that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry are joint tortfeasors in respect of that infringement for the following reasons:
(1) that Ms Hudson controls Killer Queen and Kitty Purry is insufficient of itself to establish joint tortfeasorship on her part, let alone on the part of Killer Queen and Kitty Purry. Similarly, merely because from 2011 onwards Killer Queen was the owner of the Katy Perry Mark and a licensor of it to Kitty Purry does not establish joint tortfeasorship on its part, nor on the part of Kitty Purry;
(2) Ms Taylor oversimplifies the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement. It is not the case that Bravado could only use the Katy Perry Mark under the express control of Kitty Purry. To the extent that Kitty Purry had some control, that is insufficient to establish the requisite common design;
(3) while there is evidence of Ms Hudson consulting with and providing Bravado with her approval of particular artworks for goods sold under the 2014 Bravado Agreement, that is essentially where her involvement begins and ends. The evidence relied on by Ms Taylor does not go beyond the exercise of Kitty Purry’s right of consultation under the 2014 Bravado Agreement; and
(4) the conduct on which Ms Taylor relies was, to the extent it occurred, conduct of Kitty Purry and not the other respondents. It was Kitty Purry which exercised its contractual rights and thus engaged in the relevant conduct such that, if the conduct on which Ms Taylor relies is sufficient to establish her case of joint tortfeasorship in respect of the Prismatic Tour, it could only do so against Kitty Purry.
387 The respondents submitted that Ms Taylor has not specified the precise examples which constitute Ms Taylor’s alleged direct infringement of the Applicant’s Mark in promoting goods associated with her Prismatic Tour. To the extent Ms Taylor has identified advertisements in her opening submissions, the respondents deny any primary infringement of the Applicant’s Mark in relation to two of those advertisements. However, they accept that Ms Hudson’s conduct in promoting the “Roar jacket” sold in connection with the Prismatic Tour on her Twitter and Facebook pages on 19 October 2013 infringes the Applicant’s Mark, but that infringing conduct is subject to their defences to infringement and their cross-claim.
388 Save in one respect concerning Ms Hudson, the claim for trade mark infringement for the sale of clothes and goods of the same description as clothes sold in Australia in the course of the Prismatic Tour is a claim against Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry as joint tortfeasors. There was no dispute that Bravado, as licensee of the Katy Perry Mark and the vendor of clothes and goods of the same description bearing that mark, infringed the Applicant’s Mark at the relevant time in making those sales.
389 The question of whether Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry are joint tortfeasors depends on whether Ms Taylor has established that one or more of them acted in concert in a common action or design with Bravado, or that one or all of them aided, counselled, directed or joined in commission of the tort of infringement by Bravado. Mere facilitation is not sufficient.
390 In my opinion, when the facts on which Ms Taylor relies to make out her claim of joint tortfeasorship are considered, they establish liability on the part of Kitty Purry as a joint tortfeasor in relation to sale of the relevant goods during Ms Hudson’s Prismatic Tour in Australia but not on the part of either of Killer Queen or Ms Hudson. My reasons for reaching that conclusion follow.
391 Ms Taylor relies on a number of factors, which she says must be viewed together and not taken in isolation. I accept that is so.
392 The starting point is the 2014 Bravado Agreement.
393 That agreement was between Bravado, Kitty Purry as grantor and Ms Hudson as “Artist”. In summary, by that agreement Kitty Purry granted Bravado a licence to use Katy Perry trade marks and to sell KATY PERRY branded merchandise during the Prismatic Tour throughout the world. The agreement includes the following terms:
(1) clause 2 is titled “Tour Obligations” and, among other things, requires Kitty Purry to:
(a) provide Bravado with an itinerary of confirmed concert dates and advance ticket counts;
(b) “use its best efforts to carry BRAVADO’s designated vendor and the Licensed Products to and from each Concert Date given by [Ms Hudson]” during the term of the 2014 Bravado Agreement at no cost to Bravado. If Kitty Purry fails to provide the transportation then Bravado has the right to deduct any costs incurred by it as a result from Kitty Purry’s account;
(2) clause 3 is titled “Rights” and provides:
(a) at cl 3.01 that during the term of the 2014 Bravado Agreement, Bravado has the exclusive rights throughout the world (referred to as the “Territory”) to use the:
name(s) …, symbols, emblems, logos, designs, likenesses, visual representations, [Kitty Purry] owned and/or controlled service marks, and/or [Kitty Purry] owned and/or controlled trademarks (the “Licensed Property”) relating to [Ms Hudson] and/or the individual musicians who perform with [Ms Hudson] … either alone or in connection with other approved elements, in connection with the manufacture, advertisement, merchandising, promotion, distribution, and sale of any merchandise utilizing the Licensed Property including, but not limited to: … t shirts, jerseys, sweatshirts, hats, other apparel, clothing/sportswear lines, ...
(b) at cl 3.01(a) for the exclusive right to sell the “Licensed Products” on the site and in the surrounding area of Ms Hudson’s concerts. Kitty Purry is to include in its contracts with concert promoters a number of specified provisions including that Bravado has the exclusive right to sell the “Licensed Products” at the concert venues and Bravado is given adequate space to sell the Licensed Products; and
(c) at cl 3.03 that:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in paragraphs 3.01 and 3.02 above, with respect to sales of Licensed Products during the Term:
(a) (i) [Kitty Purry] shall have the right to consult with BRAVADO regarding the preparation of artwork to be used in connection with the Licensed Property and/or Licensed Products (“Artwork”) and the right to approve such Artwork, provided that such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. BRAVADO shall be responsible for arranging appointments with [Kitty Purry], at a mutually convenient time, sufficiently far in advance of the scheduled sale date of the applicable Licensed Product to allow [Kitty Purry] to timely exercise the above right of consultation and approval. [Kitty Purry’s] approval shall be deemed not given within seven (7) business days following [Kitty Purry’s] receipt of BRAVADO’S request therefor unless [Kitty Purry] notifies BRAVADO of [Kitty Purry’s] approval within such seven (7) business day period. After [Kitty Purry’s] exercise of such right of consultation and approval, BRAVADO shall have the right to prepare such Artwork and use the same on all Licensed Products as permitted hereunder. …
(b) BRAVADO shall obtain [Kitty Purry’s] prior approval regarding advertising in connection with the Licensed Products.
(3) clause 4 is titled “Procedures”. Among other things, it requires Kitty Purry to provide Bravado with artwork embodying the Licensed Property which is in its possession at specified times before the commencement of each tour and requires Bravado to provide samples of Licensed Products to Kitty Purry for its approval “as to quality and style” before they are sold. No Licensed Product is to be sold by Bravado without such prior approval, which is not to be delayed or withheld in bad faith;
(4) clause 8 is titled “Grantor’s Additional Warranties and Representations” and provides for warranties and representations by Kitty Purry to Bravado, warranties and representations by Bravado to Kitty Purry and a mutual indemnity clause. In addition, cl 8.09 refers to an agreement between Kitty Purry and Ms Hudson pursuant to which Ms Hudson grants to Kitty Purry all rights necessary to enable it to fulfil its obligations and to make all warranties and representations under the 2014 Bravado Agreement. It also provides that simultaneously with the execution of the 2014 Bravado Agreement Kitty Purry would deliver to Bravado an agreement between Bravado and Ms Hudson in the form annexed as Exhibit A to the 2014 Bravado Agreement; and
(5) Exhibit A to the 2014 Bravado Agreement is signed by Ms Hudson, “accepted and agreed to” by Bravado and “consented and agreed to” by Kitty Purry. It is addressed to Bravado and includes, among other things:
Pursuant to an agreement between Kitty Purry, Inc. (“Grantor”) and me, Grantor is exclusively entitled to all rights throughout the world (“my Merchandising Rights”) with respect to the use of my name (including professional names and sobriquets), symbols, emblems, logos, designs, likenesses, visual representations, service marks, and/or trademarks (“my Licensed Property”), in connection with the manufacture, advertisement, merchandising, promotion, distribution and sale of any merchandise utilizing my Licensed Property. I have been advised that Grantor is entering into a written agreement with you of even date herewith (“Agreement “), pursuant to which Grantor is agreeing to furnish such rights to you. I am familiar with each provision of the Agreement relating to my obligations, which include certain obligations with regard to my performance of live concert tours, and I approve all of such provisions of the Agreement unless otherwise defined herein, all terms shall have the same meaning as given them in the Agreement.
In consideration of your executing the Agreement and as a further inducement for you to do so (it being to my benefit that you execute the same), I hereby agree as follows:
…
394 The parties do not agree on the effect of the 2014 Bravado Agreement.
395 Ms Taylor contended that Bravado used the Katy Perry Mark under the express control of Kitty Purry (and thus Killer Queen) pursuant to the 2014 Bravado Agreement which would satisfy s 8(1) of the TM Act, that a licensor may be a joint tortfeasor with a licensee, relying on PDP Capital Pty Ltd v Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd (2021) 285 FCR 598 at [33] and [42], and that the sales at the concerts occurred by way of close cooperation between Bravado and the respondents as set out in the 2014 Bravado Agreement.
396 The respondents submitted that Ms Taylor has oversimplified the effect of the 2014 Bravado Agreement to the extent she says that Bravado could only use the Katy Perry Mark under the express control of Kitty Purry and that the obligations in it on which she relies are elements of quality control which are insufficient to establish the requisite common design to establish infringement. I disagree.
397 The 2014 Bravado Agreement governs the relationship between Kitty Purry, the licensor of the Katy Perry Mark, and Bravado who is, by the terms of that agreement, licensed to use the Katy Perry Mark in relation to the production and sale of merchandise for the purpose of the Prismatic Tour. The 2014 Bravado Agreement confers a licence on Bravado, sets out Bravado’s entitlements and its obligations in relation to the design, development and production of merchandise, sets out Kitty Purry’s obligations in relation to, among other things, ensuring the exclusivity of Bravado’s licence, its ability to sell merchandise at concert venues and its entitlement and obligations in relation to the approval of designs and the provision of artwork, provides for the fees and royalties payable to Kitty Purry in relation to the sales made and for the undertaking of an audit of Bravado’s accounts.
398 The 2014 Bravado Agreement does more than merely permit Kitty Purry to exercise quality control in relation to the merchandise to be offered of sale. The agreement governs the whole of the relationship between Kitty Purry and Bravado in relation to the use of the Katy Perry Mark in connection with the development and sale of the merchandise to be sold which bears that mark. Kitty Purry is involved in the process and earns revenue from the sale of the merchandise, as approved by it for sale and sold, at concerts performed by Ms Hudson pursuant to an exclusive licence to do so granted by it to Bravado. The fact that some of the terms in the 2014 Bravado Agreement are, as the respondents contend, “best endeavour” clauses is not to the point and does not detract from the fact that Kitty Purry assumed obligations to assist Bravado in its role of design, manufacture and sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise for their mutual benefit.
399 Ms Taylor refers to and relies on PDP Capital. In that case the respondent, Grasshopper Ventures Pty Ltd, was the owner of a trade mark which it had authorised other companies to use. The appellants, PDP Capital Pty Ltd and PDP Fine Foods (collectively, PDP), argued that Grasshopper’s authorisation of the use of the trade mark in question by other companies was capable of constituting trade mark infringement under the TM Act. Curiously, and for reasons that were not made clear, PDP did not bring a claim for liability as a joint tortfeasor against Grasshopper. At the commencement of its consideration of that argument, a Full Court of this Court (Jagot, Nicholas and Burley JJ) observed (at [41]-[42]):
41 The essence of PDP’s submissions on appeal is that Grasshopper should be taken to have engaged in an act of infringement by authorising one or more of the Valentine Companies to make and apply the New Wicked Mark to various products. In this sense they submit that Grasshopper’s conduct falls within that proscribed by s 120 of the Trade Marks Act. In our view, the primary judge was correct to reject that argument.
42 The facts of the present case do not frequently arise. This is because the well-established law in relation to joint tortfeasorship provides an available means by which an alleged infringer, who has not engaged in a primary act of infringement within s 120, may nonetheless be found to infringe: see, for instance, Hashtag Burgers Pty Ltd v In-N-Out Burgers Inc (2020) 385 ALR 514 (Hashtag Burgers) at [136]-[141] (Nicholas, Yates and Burley JJ). For unexplored reasons, joint tortfeasorship was not alleged in this case.
400 The Full Court went on to consider the legislative history of the relevant provisions of the TM Act and applicable authorities and, based on its construction of those provisions, rejected PDP’s argument that use of a trade mark in s 120 would incorporate authorised use within the meaning of s 7(3) and s 8 of the TM Act.
401 The issue that arose in PDP Capital does not arise here. That is while Bravado is, by reason of the 2014 Bravado Agreement, an authorised user of the Katy Perry Mark pursuant to s 8 of the TM Act, Ms Taylor does not allege breach of s 120 of the TM Act by Kitty Purry (or any of the other respondents) by reason of that relationship. Rather she says they are liable as joint tortfeasors. Ms Taylor’s written submissions suggest that the claim of tortfeasorship is established based merely on the authorised user relationship between Kitty Purry and Bravado. That relationship may provide the foundation for such a claim but it is not sufficient of itself to establish liability.
402 The next matter to consider is Ms Taylor’s contention that Kitty Purry’s, and thus Ms Hudson’s, right to approve any designs and advertising by Bravado was not only a contractual right but one which was exercised almost exclusively and in meticulous detail by Ms Hudson. In support of that contention Ms Taylor relied upon the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement and also other evidence which was before me which she contended established that Ms Hudson controlled approval of the design and other aspects of merchandise such as which products were to be brought on tour to Australia. By way of example an email dated 8 February 2014 from Ngoc Hoang (hereafter referred to as Ms Hoang-DelVecchio in these reasons), a DMG employee, to Mr Donnell of Bravado and Shannon Biliske, copied to Mr Jensen, with subject “merch approvals” includes:
Hi Tom and Shannon,
Great to see you Wednesday. Here are Katy’s further comments on the decks you printed for her.
Heaven Is Jealous Pink Tank
This is approved. Can it come with the pink panties as well? She would like it to say “Walking On Air” on the rear of the panties in the same font as the tank.
Ouija Text Adult Tee
She really likes this tee, but can she also see “Katy Perry” and “Dark Horse” on the bottom front of the shirt? Her name on one bottom corner; Dark Horse on the other. Once approved, she’ll want this on tour.
Smiley Repeat Sleeveless Tee
This is approved.
Hamsa Seal
She doesn’t think any of the Legendary Lovers stuff is going in the right direction. She really likes the Hamsa Seal, but can it be incorporated into an overall print, similar to the Smiley Repeat Sleeveless Tee, perhaps smaller and more frequent?
How We Do Emoji iPhone Case
Approved.
From the Design Approvals As Of 9.17.13 deck, she would like to bring the following items on tour:
Portrait Junior High-Low Tee
Retro Roarrr
Junglescope Leopard Print Raglan
Flower Sublimated Print
Cherry Blossom Junior Tee
Hologram Backpack
LP1720 Prism Poster
Tiger Jacket
Tri-Prism Tie-Dye (can we try this in a hoodie as well?)
Prism Tie-Dye
Birthday Balloons
Thanks!
N
403 There were numerous other emails of this nature in evidence before me. They demonstrate that Ms Hudson was closely involved in providing feedback on, and approving, the design of merchandise as well as identifying the merchandise she wished to bring on tour. Indeed, there was no dispute about Ms Hudson’s involvement in that regard. In cross-examination Mr Jensen candidly agreed that was so in the following exchange with senior counsel for Ms Taylor:
Mr Dimitriadis: In your experience as her music manager, Ms Hudson has had a very close involvement in the design and approval of clothes and other merchandise which is promoted and sold under the Katy Perry with a Y trademark, correct?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: And that includes clothes which have been sold into Australia, correct?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: Typically, Ms Hudson has the final say on any and all designs for clothes and other merchandise?
Mr Jensen: Yes, after collaborating with several different entities.
Mr Dimitriadis: Yes. Thank you. But typically, at least, on your understanding, the final approval comes down to Ms Hudson’s - - -?
Mr Jensen: Yes. Yes.
Mr Dimitriadis: And in fact, it would be fair to say that that is invariably the case; is that right?
Mr Jensen: Yes, it’s commonplace with artists of that nature.
Mr Dimitriadis: And particularly with Ms Hudson, I think it’s not putting it too high to say she always is the person who signs off on particular designs - - -?
Mr Jensen: It’s a collaborative process.
Mr Dimitriadis: Yes, I understand what you say. It’s collaborative and that there’s input from other people, correct?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: But the final decision is always Ms Hudson’s, correct?
Mr Jensen: After – after collaborating, yes.
Mr Dimitriadis: Thank you. And Ms Hudson also is the final decision-maker on which designs and which goods should be sold and where; that’s fair, isn’t it?
Mr Jensen: Yes.
404 Kitty Purry had a contractual right under the 2014 Bravado Agreement to approve the design of merchandise to be sold at concerts during the Prismatic Tour. The evidence relied on by Ms Taylor demonstrates the way in which those obligations and rights were, as a matter of practice, undertaken by Bravado and Kitty Purry. Ms Hudson was personally involved in decisions about the type, design and items of merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark to be offered for sale. But there is nothing unusual about that given her role as CEO and sole director of Kitty Purry and the fact that the merchandise to be offered for sale bore her name. Ms Hudson was, as the respondents submitted, the human agent through which Kitty Purry exercised its contractual rights. The evidence demonstrates that both Kitty Purry and Bravado acted in accordance with the obligations imposed on them under the 2014 Bravado Agreement, at least insofar as the design and approval of merchandise was concerned. There is no reason to conclude that they did not do so in relation to the other obligations imposed on them under that agreement. Indeed the evidence demonstrates that Kitty Purry, through its CEO and director, was intimately involved in the finalisation of the merchandise for sale at the concerts.
405 The respondents submitted that the “Accused Acts” as defined in the FASOC are not concerned with the appearance and design of the merchandise per se (which the evidence referred to above concerns) but with their importation, distribution, promotion and manufacture. They submitted that the “Accused Acts” involve steps such as identifying possible distributors/retailers, negotiating prices and other commercial terms with distributors/retailers, checking on orders and deliveries, dealing with disputes with retailers over goods not delivered, the quality of goods and any product recall issues and customer inquiries. The respondents said there is little, if any, evidence of their playing an active role in steps of this kind. However that submission takes too narrow a view of the available evidence.
406 First, the “Accused Acts” are defined at [7] of the FASOC (see [267] above). Secondly, as a preliminary step in the manufacture of goods, the goods must be designed. Kitty Purry was involved in the design process. Thirdly, in order to import goods, there must be a decision about which goods to import. Once again Kitty Purry gave input into that decision. Fourthly, in order to distribute goods the subject of the licence, the licensee must be permitted to do so. Kitty Purry provided that permission, as well as facilitating venues at which the goods were to be offered for sale.
407 For those reasons I am satisfied that Ms Taylor has established Kitty Purry’s liability as a joint tortfeasor in Bravado’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark. The evidence before me establishes that Kitty Purry acted in a common design with Bravado to design, manufacture and offer for sale merchandise which included clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia or, put another way, aided or joined in the commission of the tort by Bravado.
408 Finally, further facts identified by Ms Taylor as part of the factual matrix on which she relies to prove liability of the respondents as joint tortfeasors are that Ms Hudson controls Killer Queen and Kitty Purry and, while Kitty Purry was the licensor to Bravado, Kitty Purry was licensed by Killer Queen. Insofar as those factors are concerned:
(1) the fact that Ms Hudson is the controlling mind of both Killer Queen and Kitty Purry does not assist in establishing a common design on her part, including when considered in light of the other facts relied on by Ms Taylor;
(2) the fact of a close relationship between two companies, which I would infer to be the case in relation to Killer Queen and Kitty Purry given their common ownership and management, is not of itself sufficient to establish a common design. That is so even if there is overall financial and voting control and the companies regard themselves as a single economic unit (of which there is no evidence in this case): see Apotex Pty Ltd v Les Laboratoires Servier (No 2) (2012) 293 ALR 272; [2012] FCA 748 at [26]; and
(3) Ms Hudson was the owner of the Katy Perry Mark (at least in Australia) until 2011 when she assigned it to Killer Queen. Given the 2014 Bravado Agreement, I would infer that thereafter Killer Queen granted a licence to Kitty Purry to use that mark. The timing of and reasons for the grant of that licence was not the subject of evidence. In any event, the mere granting of a licence does not establish liability for joint tortfeasorship on the part of Killer Queen. There is no evidence that Killer Queen combined with any party in a common design to secure the doing of acts which amounted to the infringement by Bravado, including when viewed as part of the factual matrix relied upon by Ms Taylor.
409 Ms Taylor also contends that the Applicant’s Mark was infringed by the sale of clothes, or goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark directly by Ms Hudson by her personal promotion of goods to be sold at the Prismatic Tour concerts through her social media accounts. Ms Taylor does not in her written closing submissions in chief on infringement identify any particular examples of Ms Hudson’s social media posts or advertisements which she says demonstrate the alleged conduct. However, in her closing submissions in reply she submitted that to the extent she has relied on examples (in other parts of her opening and closing submissions) of the way in which Ms Hudson personally promoted clothes, those examples are no more than that i.e. examples, and are deployed to demonstrate a course of conduct on the part of Ms Hudson of promoting the goods sold at her concerts and thereby infringing the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Taylor submitted that it “is not practical, or sensible, to expect [her] to prove, and the Court to consider, each possible instance of personal promotion by Ms Hudson over a six year period”.
410 While the practicality of leading a large volume of evidence to establish particular conduct is a matter of which both the Court and litigants are mindful, in order for Ms Taylor to establish that Ms Hudson engaged in a “course of conduct”, in this case infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by advertising clothes or goods of the same description bearing the Katy Perry Mark to be offered for sale and sold in Australia during the Prismatic Tour via social media, the Court must have regard to all of the relevant circumstances and is not assisted by isolated examples of conduct.
411 In that regard as Ms Taylor asks the Court to consider each allegation of infringing conduct by reference to particular channels of sale, it is incumbent on her to point the Court to the evidence which she relies on to make good her claims in relation to each channel of sale. This must include not only evidence of the surrounding circumstances but the actual evidence of Ms Hudson promoting the impugned goods by way of her social media accounts. The Court should not be left to sieve through voluminous evidence (as is the case here) to identify sufficient instances of the alleged conduct to establish the alleged “course of conduct”.
412 That said some assistance is given:
(1) in Annexure A to Ms Taylor’s closing submissions on infringement where, under the heading “Documents which evidence Ms Hudson personally promoting goods/determining how goods are to be promoted” reference is made to 40 different documents. But, there is no description given of any of those documents or the claim of infringement to which they relate, e.g. by reference to particular channels of sale; and
(2) by the document titled “Sample of advertisements/promotions” provided pursuant to Order 4 of the Orders made by the Court on 29 October 2021 which required the respondents to provide Ms Taylor with a sample of advertisements or promotions undertaken throughout the period 24 October 2013 until the present day by or on behalf of Ms Hudson in respect of goods included in the Confidential List of Goods. The “Confidential List of Goods” is a lengthy list of goods prepared by the respondents in accordance with Order 5(a) of the 12 November 2020 Orders. Once again Ms Taylor does not identify which of these advertisements she relies on to make good her allegation of direct infringement on the part of Ms Hudson although given the dates of the Australian leg of the Prismatic Tour there could only be two contenders. They are:
(a) a tweet posted on 3 October 2013 by Ms Hudson advertising a Katy Perry Roar costume for Halloween; and
(b) a tweet posted on 19 October 2013 by Ms Hudson as follows:
413 In addition, Ms Taylor identifies a Facebook page also dated 19 October 2013 advertising the Roar jacket in connection with the Prismatic Tour and a series of posts on Ms Hudson’s Facebook page dated from 2014 to 2015 relating to accessory lines offered by Claire’s Inc, a retailer of accessories, jewellery and toys. For example:
414 These are the only examples of the allegedly infringing conduct which have been clearly identified. I address each one below:
(1) Ms Hudson’s tweet posted on 3 October 2013 promoting the Roar costume infringes the Applicant’s Mark. It is use of the Katy Perry Mark promoting or advertising for sale a dress up or party costume, a category of goods which I have found to be clothes. There was no dispute that this was use of the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in Australia;
(2) as set out above, the respondents accept that Ms Hudson’s tweet and Facebook post both dated 19 October 2013 advertising exclusive “merch” available by pre-order and, in particular, the Roar jacket in connection with the Prismatic Tour infringe the Applicant’s Mark; and
(3) Ms Hudson’s Facebook posts in relation to merchandise available at Claire’s Inc do not infringe the Applicant’s Mark for two reasons. First, they concern a line of fashion jewellery and accessories, a category of goods which I have found are not clothes or goods of the same description. Secondly, even if I am wrong about that, there is no evidence that these goods were available for purchase by consumers in Australia and thus that the posts constituted trade mark use in Australia.
415 In July to August 2018 Ms Hudson came to Australia as part of her Witness Tour. Once again, it was not in dispute that KATY PERRY branded merchandise was offered for sale and sold at Ms Hudson’s concerts performed at venues in Australia, albeit for this concert tour by Blackout Merch.
2.10.1.2.1 The parties’ submissions
416 Ms Taylor observed that the sale of goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia during the Witness Tour was governed by the Blackout Merch Agreement, the written terms of which are considerably less detailed than those of the 2014 Bravado Agreement. But, she submitted that the Court should find the arrangements between the respondents and Blackout Merch were, in practice, substantially the same as those with Bravado.
417 On the assumption that the Court would make the finding urged by Ms Taylor in relation to the relationship between the respondents and Blackout Merch, Ms Taylor submitted that her submissions in relation to the Prismatic Tour set out at [384(1)-(5)] above apply equally with respect to Kitty Purry, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson’s liability as joint tortfeasors in Blackout Merch’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark and with respect to Ms Hudson’s personal infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by reason of her use of the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes and goods of the same description by personally promoting those goods.
418 The respondents accept that during Ms Hudson’s Witness Tour to Australia in July to August 2018 clothes were offered for sale and sold and that those clothes were sold pursuant to the Blackout Merch Agreement. However, the respondents submitted that the Court would not make any finding that the arrangement with Blackout Merch was substantially the same as the arrangement under the 2014 Bravado Agreement and thus conclude that the alleged indicia of a common design that Ms Taylor relied upon with respect to the 2014 Bravado Agreement are equally applicable in relation to the Blackout Merch Agreement.
419 The respondents submitted that if, contrary to their submissions, the Court finds that the terms of the Blackout Merch Agreement were substantially the same as those in the 2014 Bravado Agreement, they rely on their submissions made in respect of Ms Taylor’s claims in relation to the Prismatic Tour (see [386(1)-(4)] above).
420 In relation to the allegation of direct infringement by Ms Hudson by her personal promotion of merchandise sold at the Witness Tour through her social media accounts, Ms Taylor points to one particular document, a screenshot of a WhatsApp thread between Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Ms Hudson about “Chained to the Rhythm” themed goods. The respondents submitted that it is unclear how this is said to be Ms Hudson personally promoting merchandise sold at the Witness Tour through her social media accounts. The respondents also note that Ms Taylor points to a screenshot of a WhatsApp thread between Ms Hoang-DelVecchio, Ms Hudson and Michelle Carnero about KATY PERRY branded goods in connection with a Christmas promotion. The WhatsApp exchange appears to be related to, among other things, a tweet by Ms Hudson promoting a “Cozy Little Christmas” hoodie, t-shirt, sweatpants and scarf. The respondents accept that this tweet amounts to direct infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Hudson, but make the admission subject to their defences to the infringement claims and the cross-claim.
421 As for the claim made in relation to the Prismatic Tour, Ms Taylor contends that the respondents are liable as joint tortfeasors with Blackout Merch for offering to sell and selling clothes, or goods of the same description, during the Australian leg of Ms Hudson’s Witness Tour. Ms Taylor also contends that Ms Hudson is liable for infringement by reason of her use of the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes and goods of the same description because of her personal promotion of those goods. Once again it is not in dispute that clothes, or goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark were sold in Australia during the course of the Witness Tour nor is it in dispute that they were sold pursuant to the terms of the Blackout Merch Agreement.
422 The Blackout Merch Agreement comprises the October 2017 Letter and a subsequent email exchange between Mr Donnell and Mr Jensen between 9 and 11 April 2018 (see [237] above). It is brief and, as Ms Taylor characterises it, “considerably less detailed than” the 2014 Bravado Agreement.
423 The October 2017 Letter is two pages in length. It is expressed to be a “revised merchandising offer” for Ms Hudson and provides for:
(1) the “Territory” in which the agreement will operate, being the world;
(2) the “Rights” granted, which were “Exclusive Tour, Wholesale, E-Commerce, & Non-exclusive Licensing”;
(3) the “Advances” to be made, I infer, to Ms Hudson;
(4) the “Royalties” payable for each category or channel of sales, i.e. tour, wholesale, e-commerce and licensing, and each region or type of product within those categories as applicable;
(5) the definitions of “Tour Sales”, “Tour Profits” and “E-Commerce Receipts”;
(6) an agreement by Ms Hudson “to provide transportation for a Blackout merchandising representative and product while on tour at no charge”; and
(7) the timing of royalty statements and payments, if due, and the treatment of art origination costs and of advances which are not recouped at the end of the term.
424 The email exchange between Messrs O’Donnell and Jensen between 9 and 11 April 2018 concerns the “royalty rates structure” paid for merchandise.
425 The first question to determine is whether, despite the less detailed terms of the Blackout Merch Agreement, I should find that the arrangements between Blackout Merch and the respondents were, in practice, substantially the same as those between Bravado and the respondents. If I do then it follows that my conclusions in relation to the respondents’ liability as joint tortfeasors would apply equally to this channel of sales. However, for the following reasons, I am not able to reach the conclusion as to the terms of the arrangement between the respondents and Blackout Merch urged upon me by Ms Taylor.
426 First, it was not in dispute that the Blackout Merch Agreement, like the 2014 Bravado Agreement, gave Blackout Merch exclusive rights in relation to merchandise to be sold bearing the Katy Perry Mark while Ms Hudson was on tour and required Ms Hudson to provide transportation of merchandise while on tour at no charge to Blackout Merch. However, it does not follow that in practice the balance of the detailed terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement applied equally to the arrangements with Blackout Merch or that in practice the arrangements between the respondents and Blackout Merch were the same as those between the respondents and Bravado.
427 Secondly, contrary to Ms Taylor’s submission, Mr Jensen did not say that was the case. Ms Taylor relies on the following evidence given by Mr Jensen in relation to the arrangements with Blackout Merch:
Mr Dimitriadis: And so is it the case that when Mr Donnell left Bravado, you or the respondent decided to take your business with him to Blackout Merch?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: And is it the case that following the transition from Bravado to Blackout Merch, in general terms, the process of merchandising, including the approval or non-approval of designs continued to work in a similar way to that which it had before?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
428 By this evidence Mr Jensen did not agree that the arrangements between the respondents and Blackout Merch were, in practice, substantially the same as those with Bravado. Rather, Mr Jensen agreed that “in general terms” the “process of merchandising”, including the approval or non-approval of designs for KATY PERRY branded merchandise continued to work in a similar way to that in which it had worked pursuant to the licence granted to Bravado.
429 Mr Jensen’s evidence does not establish that the same arrangements that were in place with Bravado more generally (as set out in the 2014 Bravado Agreement) applied to the arrangements with Blackout Merch. For example he did not agree that the respondents or any of them had a contractual right of approval under the Blackout Merch Agreement of the merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark which was to be offered for sale, that samples had to be provided, that there were warranties in relation to the quality of the goods produced, that the respondents or any of them had to use their best endeavours to ensure that Blackout Merch was able to sell the merchandise at Ms Hudson’s concert venues and so on, all of which were terms of the arrangement with Bravado.
430 As was apparent from emails which were in evidence between Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and, among others, Mr Donnell, during the course of the relationship with Blackout Merch, Ms Hudson continued to make suggestions in relation to the design of, and provide approval for, merchandise to be offered for sale. However, once again it does not follow from that practice that the arrangements with Blackout Merch were practically the same as those with Bravado. It does no more than demonstrate that Ms Hudson continued to be interested in, to consider and approve merchandise associated with her, despite there being no express term in the Blackout Merch Agreement giving any of the respondents a right of approval of the design or quality of the merchandise to be offered for sale nor of which merchandise was to be brought on tour. That is unsurprising given the likelihood that Ms Hudson would be interested in the development of her brand as it applied to merchandise and in the arrangements for the Witness Tour and would wish to protect her Katy Perry Mark and the reputation in the name “KATY PERRY”.
431 Thirdly, that Mr Donnell formerly worked for Bravado and transitioned to Blackout Merch, continuing to be the primary point of contact for the sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise, says nothing about the terms which governed the relationship, in a formal or practical sense, as between Blackout Merch and any of the respondents, beyond the terms contained in the Blackout Merch Agreement.
432 Finally, Ms Taylor relies on the paucity of detail in the Blackout Merch Agreement which she says undercuts any suggestion that the terms were, in practice, different. That contention does not rise above conjecture. The available facts, including the paucity of detail in the Blackout Merch Agreement, do not permit me to infer that the arrangements between the respondents and Blackout Merch were the same as those between the respondents and Bravado, particularly where the latter arrangements were the subject of a detailed written agreement: see Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness; James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd v McGuinness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [84]-[86].
433 Ms Taylor also contended that if there was a substantive change in the arrangements as between the respondents and Bravado, on the one hand, and Blackout Merch, on the other, one would have expected the parties to have documented those terms, given the continuity of relationship. However, as I have already observed, the only continuity of relationship was as between the respondents and Mr Donnell who had, in the four year period between the Prismatic Tour and the Witness Tour, changed employers. There was no continuity of relationship as between the two companies who employed Mr Donnell, Bravado and Blackout Merch. They were different corporate entities. I would not infer that there was any such expectation.
434 The only evidence of the arrangement between Blackout Merch and the respondents for the sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise during the Witness Tour is as set out in the Blackout Merch Agreement. Given its terms and the lack of any other evidence I would not conclude that the respondents or any of them acted in concert with Blackout Merch to secure the doing of acts that constituted infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Blackout Merch in its offering for sale and sale of clothes, and goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia during the Witness Tour. That claim is not made out.
435 I turn to consider Ms Taylor’s contention that Ms Hudson directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark by her use of the Katy Perry Mark in promoting for sale clothes and goods of the same description in connection with the Witness Tour. Once again Ms Taylor contends that there should be a finding of direct infringement based on a course of conduct, namely her practice of personally promoting the goods she sold at, in this case, the Witness Tour concerts, in the “relevant period”. Ms Taylor appears only to identify two examples of conduct by Ms Hudson which are said to constitute the alleged direct infringement. To that end, my comments at [410]-[411] above apply equally. That said, I consider the two examples relied upon below. The first is a WhatsApp thread between Ms Hudson and Ms Hoang-DelVecchio in relation to “Chained to the Rhythm” themed goods. There is nothing in this exchange which could amount to the promotion of clothes or goods of the same description to be sold during Ms Hudson’s Witness Tour. It is a private exchange in relation to some items of merchandise with no discussion of their public promotion or of where and when they are to be sold. The second is a WhatsApp thread between Ms Hudson, Ms Carnero and Ms Hoang-DelVecchio which discusses KATY PERRY branded goods to be offered for sale as part of a Christmas promotion which the respondents accept relates to a tweet by Ms Hudson promoting “Cozy Little Christmas” hoodies, t-shirts, sweatpants and scarves by reference to the Katy Perry Mark. The respondents accept that Ms Hudson’s tweet amounts to direct infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by her.
2.10.2 Second channel – Pop-up stores
436 The second channel of sales concerns pop-up stores which were established during the Prismatic Tour at the Metro Theatre, George Street, Sydney from 21 to 28 November 2014 and on Little Lonsdale Street, Melbourne from 12 to 18 November 2014 at which clothes, and goods of the same description, were sold.
437 As was the case in relation to concerts performed in Australia during the Prismatic Tour, Ms Taylor alleges that the respondents are liable as joint tortfeasors with Bravado in relation to the sale of clothes, and goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark at the pop-up stores and that Ms Hudson is directly liable for infringement of the Applicant’s Mark given that she personally promoted those goods by reference to the Katy Perry Mark.
2.10.2.1 The parties’ submissions
438 Ms Taylor observed that the sale of goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark at the pop-up stores was governed by the 2014 Bravado Agreement. She submitted that once again Ms Hudson exercised close control over which goods went into the store and that she personally promoted the pop-up stores. Ms Taylor relies on the same factual matrix as she relies on in support of her contention that the respondents were liable as joint tortfeasors in relation to the sale of clothes, and goods of the same description, at the Prismatic Tour concerts and repeats her submissions set out at [384(1)-(5)] above.
439 Ms Taylor also submitted that given Ms Hudson personally promoted those goods by reference to the Katy Perry Mark, the Court should find that Ms Hudson directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark.
440 The respondents submitted, for the same reasons as set out at [386(1)-(4)] above, that the Court would not conclude that any of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in respect of Bravado’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark in relation to this channel of sales. The respondents contended that in respect of Ms Hudson’s alleged “close control” over the goods that went into the pop-up stores, the email relied on by Ms Taylor is insufficient to establish Ms Hudson’s close personal involvement in this sales channel.
441 As to the contention that Ms Hudson personally promoted the pop-up stores on Facebook and Twitter and the allegation that this constitutes primary infringement by her, the respondents:
(1) accepted that there was direct infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Hudson in relation to three tweets on 11, 12 and 28 November 2014, but rely on their defences to Ms Taylor’s infringement claim and the cross-claim; and
(2) submitted, in relation to the “Katy Perry Melbourne Pop-Up Shop” Facebook page event and equivalent Sydney Facebook page event, both hosted by Ms Hudson, that whilst the pop-up stores are advertised and promoted on those pages, there is no indication in the extracts that are in evidence that the Katy Perry Mark was being used as a sign in relation to clothes or goods of the same description. Accordingly there is no evidence of use necessary to establish infringement by Ms Hudson of the Applicant’s Mark in respect of those Facebook pages.
442 It was not in dispute that during the Prismatic Tour in Australia stores selling merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark were established in Sydney and Melbourne for short periods. Those pop-up stores sold merchandise classified as “garments” and “other items” set out in a schedule that was in evidence before me. It was also not in dispute that the pop-up stores were set up under the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement.
443 Given that and the fact that both parties rely on their submissions in relation to the sale of clothes or goods of the same description by Bravado at the Prismatic Tour concerts in relation to this sales channel, my findings in relation to the former apply equally here. That is for the same reasons as are set out at [388]-[414] above:
(1) I am satisfied that:
(a) Bravado, as licensee of the Katy Perry Mark and the entity that was responsible for the advertising, offering for sale and sale of clothes, and goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark infringed the Applicant’s Mark; and
(b) Kitty Purry is liable as a joint tortfeasor in relation to the advertising, offering for sale and sale by Bravado of clothes, and goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark in the pop-up stores; and
(2) I am not satisfied that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson are liable as joint tortfeasors.
444 For completeness in relation to Ms Hudson’s liability I note that Ms Taylor also relies on an email dated 24 September 2014 from Ms Hoang-DelVecchio to Mr Donnell, copied to Mr Jensen, with subject “Re: Katy Pop Up Store New Items” in which Ms Hoang-DelVecchio notes, among other things:
Of the sweatshirts, she likes the Koala Doodle best, but can she see a deck of everything that’s being brought to Australia from the merch line we currently carry in the States?
This email does not change my conclusion that Ms Hudson did not act in concert with Bravado. To the extent she had any input in the goods to be sold she did so in her capacity as a director and officer of Kitty Purry. The email does not establish the close personal relationship or close control contended for by Ms Taylor and is not sufficient of itself, or in combination with the other facts relied on by Ms Taylor, to establish liability on the part of Ms Hudson as a joint tortfeasor.
445 Ms Taylor also contends that Ms Hudson directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark by promoting the pop-up stores on her social media sites. She relies on three tweets which appeared on Ms Hudson’s Twitter account and Facebook posts on pages hosted by Ms Hudson.
446 The three tweets in question were posted on 11, 12 and 28 November 2014 and are as follows:
447 As set out above, Ms Hudson accepts that these tweets constitute direct trade mark infringement by her.
448 The Facebook page events in question are substantially the same, save for comments which have been posted by others, and appear as follows:
449 The Facebook page events use the Katy Perry Mark and refer to the location and opening dates and times of the pop-up stores in each city. True it is that Ms Hudson’s use of the Katy Perry Mark was in relation to announcing an “event” and not in relation to clothes per se. However, the pop-up stores, which were the events being broadcast in the Facebook page by reference to the Katy Perry Mark, sold a range of merchandise, including clothes. So much is evident from the sales sheets in evidence before me. In advertising those stores the Facebook pages must necessarily be taken also to be advertising the goods to be sold in those stores. That is, Ms Hudson used the Katy Perry Mark in relation to promotion of the physical stores which necessarily must extend to promotion of the goods offered for sale in them: see for example Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd (2017) 345 ALR 205; (2017) 124 IPR 264; [2017] FCAFC 56 at [197]. It follows that I am satisfied that these Facebook page events constitute direct infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Hudson.
450 The third channel of sales concerns the sale of clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in the period 2014 to 2016 by Target Australia Pty Ltd in its stores and online through its website, target.com.au. The sales by Target were made during the currency of the 2014 Bravado Agreement.
451 Ms Taylor contends that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry are liable as joint tortfeasors with respect to Target and Bravado’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by using the Katy Perry Mark in Australia in respect of clothes.
2.10.3.1 The parties’ submissions
452 Ms Taylor relies on cl 3.01(b) of the 2014 Bravado Agreement and other documents which she submitted demonstrate Ms Hudson’s close control over the goods sold by Target. She contended that Ms Hudson’s involvement extended beyond the design of the merchandise to the manufacturing process because she provided input on the quality of the manufacturing by Target’s manufacturer and rejected samples as not acceptable.
453 Ms Taylor submitted that, in addition, Bravado was required to negotiate a specific royalty rate for the sales by Target with Ms Hudson and thus she must have had a specific awareness of what was sought to be sold and where in Australia.
454 Ms Taylor submitted that by reason of the conduct she relies on, both Target and Bravado used the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in Australia in relation to clothes, and the Court should find that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors with respect to this infringement as they had a common profit seeking design with both Target and Bravado to sell clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark to customers in Australia through Target.
455 The respondents repeated their submissions set out at [386(1)]-[386(4)] above and submitted that for those reasons the Court would not find that any of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in respect of Bravado’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark.
456 In relation to the allegation of “close control” over this channel of sales by Ms Hudson, the respondents submitted the evidence rises no higher than to demonstrate the degree of quality control that may be expected from a licensor and does not equate to Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry participating in a common design in the nature of a concerted action with Bravado to infringe the Applicant’s Mark.
457 It was not in dispute that two styles of t-shirt, pyjamas and a brief and singlet set bearing the Katy Perry Mark were marketed and sold in Australia by Target in its stores and online in the period 2014 to 2016 and that these sales were made under the umbrella of the 2014 Bravado Agreement. Relevantly cl 3.01(b) of that agreement gave Bravado the exclusive right, subject to the exclusions in Exhibit C of that agreement, to sell “Licensed Products through and by distribution to retailers”. There are no relevant exclusions.
458 Ms Taylor relied, in particular, on the following as evidence of Ms Hudson’s close control:
(1) an email dated 30 December 2013 from Ms Hoang-DelVecchio to Mr Jensen with subject “Re: Merch Designs/Australia” which included:
In general, she wants to see more Unconditionally, Birthday, Dark Horse and This Is How We Do Merch.
Here are the ones she wants to kill:
4, 7, 16-18, 24, 26, 27, 32-34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46-48, 49, 51-54, 56, 59-62, 64, 78, 80-82, 97, 108, 114, 119, 120.
She loves 28.
I explained the situation about Claire’s and Bravado not being able to do phone cases, so she wants us to somehow get to Claire’s that she likes 100-102 and 104.
(2) an email chain dated between 15 and 29 April 2014 between, among others, Trang Tran, Head of Production & Sourcing, Universal Music Group and Winsome Lee and Jennie Gardner of Target in relation to a proposed visit to a factory in China which included:
(a) an email dated 21 April 2014 from Ms Tran to, among others, Ms Gardner in which Ms Tran wrote:
On behalf of Natalie, I would like to provide the rationale behind the request for the visit of Jing Rong factory. As with any licenced entity, Bravado is no exception, it is a requirement that we conduct inspection of any new factory and provide report back to Bravado International of our finding before it can be given a tick of approval. Given that the product in development is Katy Perry who personally and very actively involved in all design approvals, it is even more important that we provide her great assurance. As I happened to be in the territory, the visit just seem logical.
(b) an email dated 26 April 2014 in which Ms Tran informed Ms Gardner that the factory visit had taken place the day before, they were in the process of providing a written report to “International” and they were confident that there would not be any issues;
(3) an email exchange between, among others, Rosa Pearce of Target and Tempe Biven, Sales and Product Manager, Bravado which includes an email dated 3 June 2014 from Ms Biven to Ms Pierce in the following terms:
Great thank you for sending this through.
We are currently placing Katy Perry with other departments now in order to delivery before her first concert date on 7th November, so we will need to look at confirming the product quite quickly. Bravado have provided an approved style guide to Target across categories for selection. This style guide which you have been given has already been approved by the artist. Developing new or changing current approved designs will require re-approval and unfortunatley (sic) at this stage we have an embargo on all Katy Perry approvals, which I do not foresee an uplift at this stage. This has been the same process across all departments in placing Katy Perry and not Bravado being difficult. Katy Perry is very hands on with all her product globally.
In saying this we would like to help work with you to put together some product that will work for your department within our approved style guide. I have combined the approved artwork that could work for this program and will go through the options we have to go with.
(4) an email dated 27 August 2014 from Ms Biven to, among others, Ms Pierce which included:
Our business has received feedback from Katy Perry Management on the Free Fusion Kids Sleepwear Production Samples. In summary the artist has requested revisions on each design submitted and the delay in our business reaching out to Target is we have been contesting and trying to overturn the decision made as we as a business understand the commercial impact for both parties especially given the design had been previously approved by the artist. However the artist will not move on decision.
Understand that the outcome is not ideal especially after your support for the brand and behind the scenes work to get this program up and running. Therefore in the best interest of our trading relationship our business has formulated a series of solutions that we would like to propose to assist your department given the situation of a cancelled set.
Feedback/Proposed Solution:
Katy Perry PP comments:
Prism Sleep Set:
Sleep Tee -
Feedback: Katy would like to see the colour punched up on this Tee as it is looking very washed out, this will need to be amended and revised sample resubmitted.
Solution: Our business understands the time implications associated with resampling, therefore Bravado will cover the air freight cost to ensure that the order reaches store to capitalise on the tour which starts 7 Nov – 15 Dec 2014.
Sleep Short -
Feedback: Katy would like to see a foil print on the back of the short. Bravado have sent through print options in foil and plain for approval.
Solution: Once an option has been approved by management we will send through artwork. Another Pre-Production Sample will need to be submitted and sent to artist for approval.
Our business understands the cost & time implications, therefore Bravado will cover the air freight cost and any additional screen charge to ensure that the order reaches store to capitalise on the tour which starts 7 Nov – 15 Dec 2014
Prism Nightie:
Feedback: Style has been rejected as artist has embargoed use of image. Whilst approved prior to the embargo artist has rejected and does not want to proceed with this graphic in the market place during the tour.
Solution:
…
I understand that this is the first time you are working with our business and this does not leave Bravado in the best of positions please note this is not how Bravado do business and rest assure the current issue with Katy Perry is impacting other retail partners globally.
(5) an email dated 28 April 2015 from Ms Hoang-DelVecchio to Mr Donnell, copied to Mr Jensen, with subject “Re: KP_Retail_Aus.pdf” in which Ms Hoang-DelVecchio wrote:
Tom,
Katy is opening to doing designs for Australia retail, but she feels we have better tour merch than these cuts.
Can you group together another bunch from tour for her to review?
Of the ones presented in the deck, she’s open to the two Sublimation Prints (with her head NOT cut off on the flower one), but she doesn’t like the drapes style of the shirts.
459 With the exception of the emails referred to at [458(2)] above, these emails demonstrate Ms Hudson’s involvement either by providing her views about and input into the proposed designs of items of clothes or by approval of designs for sale, including by requesting revisions. Clause 3.03(a)(i) of the 2014 Bravado Agreement gave Kitty Purry the right to consult with Bravado about the preparation of artwork to be used in connection with the “Licensed Property and/or Licensed Products” and to approve such artwork and cl 4.02 of the 2014 Bravado Agreement required Bravado to furnish samples of Licensed Products to Kitty Purry for approval prior to offering them for sale (see [393(2)(c) and (3)] above). To the extent Ms Hudson was involved in that process, as required by the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement, it was in her capacity as an officer of Kitty Purry. She was its chief executive officer and sole director.
460 The emails referred to at [458(2)] above concern the proposal for a factory visit with Ms Tran noting that it is a requirement that Bravado inspect any new factory and report back to Bravado International. Ms Tran also observed that given it was “Katy Perry” product and Ms Hudson was “personally and very actively involved in all design approvals”, it was important for Bravado to provide her, i.e. Ms Hudson, with assurance. This email exchange does not demonstrate Ms Hudson’s involvement with the manufacturing process. At its highest it confirms that Ms Hudson was involved in design approvals. As I have already found to be the case Ms Hudson’s involvement in that process was on behalf of Kitty Purry. Indeed, even Bravado’s role was limited. As Ms Tran explained in her email dated 29 April 2014 to, among others, Ms Lee and Ms Gardner:
As mentioned in the meeting, Bravado have no direct involvement in the order placement with the factory. It is business as usual for Target. Bravado only provide the flat image at the beginning for costing. Once target has placed order with factory, Bravado then will provide the production artwork and Bravado approves all the printing. Factory will not be allow to start production until Bravado has provided written approval of the PP.
For all other enquiries and information such as spec, delivery date, order deadline, quality, fabrication, quantity, styling etc... These are between Target Australia and Target Sourcing HK and ultimately with Factory.
461 In support of their contention that Bravado was required to negotiate a specific royalty rate for the sales by Target, Ms Taylor relies on two emails:
(1) an email from Natalie de Freitas of Bravado to Ms Gardner in which she said, among other things, that “in order for our business to calculate the royalty value we require the cost of good (sic) sold of the garments. The royalty calculation is based on cost of goods sold, brand (we have) and volume (we have). As this is a once off transaction our business needs to apply for royalty break from artist mgmt. based in LA”; and
(2) an email exchange between, among others, Ms Gardner and Ms de Freitas which appears to concern the timing and party responsible for certain payments including the timing of the royalty payment to Bravado.
462 It is not clear from these emails that Bravado was required to negotiate a specific royalty rate with Ms Hudson, as Ms Taylor contends. While the first of the emails suggests the need to apply for a “royalty break” from “artist mgmt”, there is no evidence of what in fact transpired in relation to that nor if Ms Hudson had any awareness of any subsequent request or negotiation for a “royalty break”. In any event cl 6.02(g) of the 2014 Bravado Agreement provided that for “sales by BRAVADO of Licensed Products through wholesale/retail distribution in the Territory to Mass Market discount stores”, which for Australia was defined as chain stores with greater than 30 stores, “BRAVADO shall accrue to [Kitty Purry’s] account a royalty equal to XXX (XX) less than the rates listed in sub-paragraphs 6.02 (a) – (e) above from such sales”. In other words there was a formula included in the 2014 Bravado Agreement for a fixed royalty rate for sales through stores such as Target.
463 The facts relied on by Ms Taylor do not evidence that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors with Bravado and Target in relation to their infringement of the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Taylor has not demonstrated that there was a common profit seeking design by all or any of them with Target and Bravado as alleged. While by the 2014 Bravado Agreement Kitty Purry granted Bravado a licence to use the Katy Perry Mark, including in relation to the sale of the relevant products through third-party retailers, and Kitty Purry had a right to approve designs sold through those retailers, and exercised that right, that is where its involvement ended. In contrast to the sale of the relevant merchandise at concerts and in the related pop-up stores, Kitty Purry had no responsibility for the transport of the merchandise and representatives of Bravado, for facilitating space in the venues where the merchandise was to be sold or for providing for or ensuring any other aspect of sale of the merchandise. Its role in relation to the sale of clothes by Target was limited to one of facilitation.
464 The fourth channel of sales concerns the sale of KATY PERRY branded footwear by Myer in 2017 to 2018. Ms Taylor contends that Ms Hudson and Purrfect Ventures directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark in relation to the sale of footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia and that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Purrfect Ventures are joint tortfeasors with Myer with respect to its infringing conduct in offering for sale and selling footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark.
465 Given my findings that footwear is not clothes or goods of the same description (see [339] and [359] above), Ms Taylor cannot succeed in relation to this channel of sales and it need not be considered further. However, for completeness and against the possibility that I am found to be wrong in those conclusions, I briefly consider Ms Taylor’s contentions.
2.10.4.1 The parties’ submissions
466 Ms Taylor submitted that pursuant to the terms of the Purrfect Ventures Agreements, Purrfect Ventures was budgeted to spend significant sums on advertising and, as was the case with the agreements with Bravado, Ms Hudson exercised close control over the development of merchandise, in this case footwear, bearing the Katy Perry Mark. Ms Taylor referred to media articles in relation to the development of the KATY PERRY branded footwear line published in August 2016, January 2017 and October 2018 in which statements were made by Ms Hudson or Ms Hudson’s former stylist, Johnny Wujek, who it seems assisted in the creation of the line, about the footwear collection. Ms Taylor submitted, based on statements in those articles, that Ms Hudson extensively promoted the KATY PERRY branded footwear on her social media and, as demonstrated by the examples listed in Annexure A to her closing submissions on infringement, there is extensive documentary evidence of Ms Hudson’s close involvement in the development of footwear designs and samples.
467 Ms Taylor submitted that it is not in dispute that from 2017 to 2018 Myer sold footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark to customers in Australia through its stores and online at myer.com.au. She contended that Ms Hudson not only promoted KATY PERRY branded footwear sold through Myer, including by attending a Myer store in Sydney on 30 June 2017 to promote the Witness Tour and range of footwear and by subsequent attendances at Myer stores in Perth, Adelaide, Melbourne and Brisbane in 2018 during the Witness Tour, but she also promoted the products through international channels such as the webstore at katyperrycollections.com which was operated by Purrfect Ventures.
468 Ms Taylor submitted that by means of this conduct Myer used the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in Australia in relation to footwear and Purrfect Ventures, as the licensee of the Katy Perry Mark, also used that mark as a trade mark in Australia in relation to footwear. Purrfect Ventures affixed the Katy Perry Mark to goods or used it in relation to goods and was clearly aware and intended that those goods be sold into Australia either through the arrangement with Myer or via websites which sold into Australia.
469 Ms Taylor also submitted that Ms Hudson used the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in Australia by means of her personal promotion of footwear at events held at Myer stores in 2017 and 2018 and her personal promotion of sales of the footwear to Australian customers via international websites.
470 Further and in the alternative Ms Taylor submitted that by reason of the same conduct Purrfect Ventures, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson are joint tortfeasors with Myer with respect to its infringing conduct. She contended that each of those parties entered into a common design to bring about the sale of KATY PERRY branded footwear in Australia through Myer and undertook steps jointly to maximise the sales arising from that common design.
471 The respondents make a number of admissions about the sale of footwear through this channel and the conduct of Ms Hudson and Purrfect Ventures, which I address below.
472 Insofar as Ms Taylor contends that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Purrfect Ventures are each liable as joint tortfeasors, the respondents made the following submissions.
473 First, they submitted that if Ms Hudson’s conduct in appearing at Myer stores amounts to direct infringement then it cannot also be relied upon to establish joint tortfeasorship against her. Secondly, insofar as Ms Taylor relies upon Ms Hudson’s close control over the development of footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark, the respondents submitted that the evidence goes no further than to establish Ms Hudson’s involvement in the design aspect of the merchandising process and the promotion of the footwear collection which is insufficient to establish that she, Killer Queen or Purrfect Ventures were acting in concert with Myer in respect of the acts complained of by Ms Taylor. Thirdly, the respondents submitted that the fact that Purrfect Ventures was the licensee of the Katy Perry Mark under the Purrfect Ventures Agreements and was aware that footwear would be sold in Australia under that agreement is insufficient to establish the requisite common design.
474 The respondents accept that if footwear was held to be clothes:
(1) the application of the Katy Perry Mark to footwear sold into Australia through the arrangement with Myer constituted direct infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Purrfect Ventures: see Playgro at [122]-[124]; and
(2) by Ms Hudson’s personal appearances at Myer stores in Australia to promote footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark in 2017 and 2018, she directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark.
However, in both cases if footwear was found to be goods of the same description, the respondents deny infringement of the Katy Perry Mark on the basis of the proviso in s 120(2) of the TM Act.
475 That leaves the claim that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Purrfect Ventures are liable as joint tortfeasors.
476 In relation to Ms Hudson and Purrfect Ventures, the claim that they are liable as joint tortfeasors is made in the alternative. As both Purrfect Ventures and Ms Hudson accept liability for direct infringement based on the conduct described above, they cannot also be liable as joint tortfeasors in relation to that same conduct.
477 There is evidence that Ms Hudson was active in providing her feedback and preferences in relation to designs of footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark. For example:
(1) by email dated 3 June 2016 from Ms Hoang-DelVecchio to Sarah Ader, copied to others, Ms Hoang-DelVecchio wrote:
Thanks, Sarah. In the meantime, here are Katy’s favorites. There are 25 styles here, so she knows we’ll have to narrow them down further. Looking forward to seeing how your choices overlap, and we can also narrow down some of the doubled styles once we figure out whether we’ve showcased the proper amount in each shape.
There followed photographs of a number of different shoes; and
(2) by email dated 18 June 2016 from Ms Hoang-DelVecchio to Ms Ader, copied to others, Ms Hoang-DelVecchio wrote:
Sarah,
She likes the overlay design.
She likes the sizing of her name and logo from the two-tone example (but not the two-tone design).
It should be black on nude (on black overlay).
“She” referred to in the email is clearly Ms Hudson.
478 The Purrfect Ventures Agreements, and in particular the agreement between Killer Queen and Purrfect Ventures, among other things, gave Killer Queen the right to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED ]. In other words, Killer Queen had the right to approve designs and use of the Katy Perry Mark and, by its designate, to provide “design direction”.
479 While these facts show that Killer Queen had and exercised its rights to provide design direction and approve the footwear to be offered for sale bearing the Katy Perry Mark, that is not sufficient to establish that it acted in concert with Myer in its sale of footwear through its stores and online via its website.
480 Similarly I am not satisfied that Ms Hudson’s promotion of the footwear by her appearances at Myer stores establishes that Killer Queen acted in concert with Myer or Ms Hudson in their respective acts of infringement. Killer Queen granted a licence of the Katy Perry Mark to Purrfect Ventures for the purpose of the design and manufacture of the footwear collection. Purrfect Ventures was aware that the goods were to be offered for sale in Australia but there is no evidence of the arrangements with Myer, other than the sponsorship agreement between Myer and TEG Dainty (see [236] above). Nor is there any evidence of any involvement by Killer Queen in the arrangements. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how Killer Queen acted in a common design with Myer. There are no particular facts, beyond Ms Hudson’s promotional activities, which are not sufficient by themselves, to establish that to be so.
2.10.5 Fifth channel – Bravado sales through other outlets
481 The fifth channel of sales concerns sales of KATY PERRY branded goods through Australian retailers Harris Scarfe and Best & Less. Ms Taylor contends that the position in relation to sales through these retailers is the same as in relation to the sales through Target and that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry are liable as joint tortfeasors with respect to the infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Harris Scarfe and/or Best & Less and Bravado.
2.10.5.1 The parties’ submissions
482 Ms Taylor only became aware of this channel of sales late in her preparation for hearing. She submitted that: Harris Scarfe and Best & Less were operated by Pepkor South East Asia Pty Ltd which entered into an agreement with Universal Music Australia Pty Limited trading as Bravado Merchandise (UMA) in relation to the distribution of goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark (Pepkor/UMA Agreement); and KATY PERRY branded goods were sold by each of Best & Less (financial years 2015 to 2019) and Harris Scarfe (2014 to 2017) to Australian customers. Ms Taylor contended that lately produced evidence also disclosed that UMA sold KATY PERRY branded goods through several other retail channels in Australia: Carisma CDs, Get Music-Sales, Sydney Aquarium and Kmart Australia in the period November 2013 to October 2016.
483 Ms Taylor submitted that there was no reason to think that the process of creation of goods for sale and the sale of those goods would have been any different to that documented in respect of Target. She said that Bravado remained the relevant counterparty and Ms Hudson’s practice was invariably to exercise control over the products which were to be sold. Ms Taylor submitted that the paucity of evidence in relation to these sales was largely due to the respondents’ failure to disclose the sales at an earlier date, when further evidentiary requests may have been able to be undertaken and evidence gathered.
484 Ms Taylor submitted that regardless, given the evidence which is before the Court, it should find that the reasoning in relation to Target applies equally in relation to the retailers in this channel.
485 The respondents acknowledged the late disclosure of sales of KATY PERRY branded goods through Harris Scarfe and Best & Less but contended that the original document which started the chain of inquiry was provided to Ms Taylor in response to a discrete inquiry and that the Pepkor/UMA Agreement was not discovered because, although it fell within category 1 of the categories for discovery, it was not within the respondents’ control, after reasonable inquiries were made. The respondents noted that no application for further and better discovery was made by Ms Taylor following their disclosure of the email which first identified the sales through these stores.
486 Based on documents produced on subpoena in relation to this channel of sales, the respondents accept that some clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark were sold by Best & Less in financial years 2015 to 2019 and by Harris Scarfe in 2014 to 2017 and that Bravado sold goods through the other channels set out at [482] above. However, the respondents submitted that the Court could not infer that the process of creation of those goods for sale and the sale of those goods was the same as in relation to sales through Target. They submitted that the Court cannot infer, from their failure to adduce evidence about these sales, that Ms Hudson exercised the same level of control over the design of products distributed through the other channels governed by the 2011 or 2014 Bravado Agreements. They contended that was particularly so where: documents evidencing that control were discoverable pursuant to categories 4 and 5 of the discovery ordered by the 12 November 2020 Orders; no such documents were discovered by them; and there is no basis to suggest that they have not complied with their discovery obligations.
487 It was not in dispute that some clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark were sold by Best & Less in financial years 2015 to 2019 both online and through its retail stores and by Harris Scarfe through its retail stores in 2014 to 2017 and that Bravado sold goods through Carisma CDs, Get Music-Sales and Sydney Aquarium. The respondents do not make any concessions in relation to sales by Bravado of clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark through Kmart Australia. However, the evidence before me shows that there were sales through that retailer of merchandise relating to the artist “Katy Perry” referred to as “FAP Katy Perry Tiger Strip” and “FAP Katy Perry Stars White” and described with the label “Bravado Fashion Apparel”.
488 There was only limited evidence in relation to this channel of sales before me.
489 It seems that the sales were most likely governed by the 2014 Bravado Agreement, rather than the 2011 Bravado Agreement, although their terms are substantially the same. The effect of the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement was to give Bravado the exclusive right to use the Katy Perry Mark “in connection with the manufacture, advertisement, merchandising, promotion, distribution and sale of any merchandise” and to give Kitty Purry the right to consult in relation to the preparation of artwork to be used in connection with the products and to approve the artwork. One critical difference is that only the 2014 Bravado Agreement grants Bravado the right to sell the “Licensed Products”, save for some express exclusions, through retailers.
490 By the UMA/Pepkor Agreement, among other things, Bravado agreed to appoint Pepkor as a non-exclusive distributor and reseller to “market, promote, distribute and resell the Bravado Products in the Territory through the Distribution Channels” for the period 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016. The “Territory” was defined as Australia and New Zealand, the “Bravado Products” were licensed merchandise products that bear “Artist Indicia” of or were related to the artists listed in Sch 1 to the agreement, which included Ms Hudson, and the “Distribution Channels” were the physical and e-commerce stores which were set out in Sch 2 to the agreement and comprised Best & Less, Harris Scarfe and Postie.
491 These agreements establish: first, Bravado’s non-exclusive licence to use the Katy Perry Mark on merchandise to be offered for sale to retailers; and secondly that Bravado, in turn, authorised Pepkor to distribute merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia and New Zealand through Best & Less and Harris Scarfe.
492 Ms Taylor relied on two email chains to demonstrate that Ms Hudson had provided her views in relation to proposed designs and merchandise to be offered for sale through Harris Scarfe.
493 First, an email chain between Ms Biven and Ms de Freitas with subject “Re: KATY PERRY – HARRIS SCARFE” which commences with an email dated 11 August 2014 from Ms Biven which includes (as written):
Just to provide an update we have had the Katy perry sleep short reinstated as HS do not want to put their factories in this position to absorb all costs. In saying that we have had the tropical brief for Katy perry rejected. Katy no longer likes the design and feels it does not tie in with her graphics. I have gone back to Shannon however she is not budging on this regardless that the CAD has been previously approved. This, I feel will mean the sleep short will too get rejected, leaving one 1 style left for Katy perry HS program.
This does not leave our business in a good light with HS and do not want to has this negative point against us when we are going into a new agreement. I am happy to go back to HS regarding the brief however thought I would run this past you first.
Please let me know your thoughts.
The balance of the email chain concerns Ms de Freitas and Ms Biven discussing the impact of Ms Hudson’s rejection of the design.
494 Ms Taylor submitted that the 11 August 2014 email from Ms Biven to Ms de Freitas shows that Ms Hudson was involved in providing her personal views about the style and her personal involvement in selecting the goods to be the subject of the use of the Katy Perry Mark through Harris Scarfe. I do not think so much can be taken from the email. It conveys Ms Hudson’s rejection of a design for the “tropical brief” because it “does not tie in with her graphics”. It is not apparent from the email that in rejecting the design Ms Hudson was doing so in her personal capacity or as an officer of Kitty Purry, the entity which had granted Bravado the licence and which had the right to approve artwork and designs. Moreover it is not apparent from this email that, in rejecting the design, Ms Hudson was aware that she was doing so in relation to merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark to be offered for sale by Harris Scarfe or, indeed, that any such merchandise was to be sold through that retailer.
495 Secondly, an email chain between Ms Biven, Ms de Freitas, Elizabeth Connor, George Collins and Gregory Sambrook, the latter three of whom were also with Bravado, in the period 28 March 2014 to 26 April 2014 with subject “RE: ***URGENT: APPROVAL REQUIRED: HARRIS SCARFE” which concerned the need for approval from ten different artists, one of whom was Ms Hudson, on designs for Harris Scarfe. By 15 April 2014 approval remained outstanding from five of those artists, including Ms Hudson. An email from Mr Collins to Ms de Freitas and Ms Biven dated 15 April 2014 included:
I feel your frustration, and trust me I’ve been really pushing, emailing and leaving voicemails for answers on these everyday this past week.
For whatever reason, A&R’s and Managements have been slow to respond with feedback.
…
Katy Perry – If I’m honest I doubt you will get an answer on this today. She has become a very difficult artist to work with as she simply just takes far too long to get back to us with approvals.
…
I know it’s annoying that we don’t always get feedback within 10 days. We really do push to at least receive some form of update within that time. But with artists like Katy Perry, Black Sabbath, The Doors, Slipknot etc (the big names) again and again their approvals do tend to take a little longer. I know this makes things very tricky for us all when we are trying to secure orders and its definitely something the A&Rs need to work on but for now it is the way it is.
…
496 The same email chain includes an email dated 25 April 2014 from Ms de Freitas to Mr Sambrook which included (as written):
Understand that the Katy Perry brand has presented challenges to our business.
Can we at min overnight approve the approved towel by mgmt that was featured in the approved style guide? I’m hopping we can take the same approach as per P!nk Style Guide if it has been approved by mgmt and there are no changes it’s approved mitigating the need an angst to go through the approval process. Please advise on approval status of the towel.
As regards other Katy Perry styles what is the ETA? Nervous we can going to start to loose orders for the brand in general given the length of time to achieve approval.
497 Ms Taylor submitted that this email chain demonstrates Ms Hudson’s personal engagement in the approval process for designs. That may be so but it does not demonstrate in what capacity Ms Hudson provides her approval. Further when the email chain is read as a whole it also demonstrates that Bravado understood it was dealing with the “Katy Perry brand” and that Ms Hudson was a “big artist” with a “big management team”, which suggests that there were a number of people involved in the process of obtaining approval.
498 Of itself that evidence does not establish the necessary elements for me to find that any of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry was a joint tortfeasor with Bravado and Harris Scarfe or Best & Less or any of the other vendors referred to above in their infringement of the Applicant’s Mark.
499 Given the paucity of evidence about how those sales came about, Ms Taylor submitted that there was “no reason to think that the process of creation of goods for sale and the sale of those goods would have been any different to that documented in respect of Target”. Even if that were so, it would not assist Ms Taylor given my conclusions in relation to that channel of sales. But, in any event, that is not an inference easily drawn and not one which I would draw in this case for the following reasons.
500 First, there is a dispute between the parties about the late production of documents relating to this channel of sales. Ms Taylor notes that the email which set her on a course of inquiry about sales through Best & Less and Harris Scarfe was only provided to her by the respondents’ solicitors on 1 November 2021, shortly prior to the commencement of the hearing. That is so. The respondents explain that the email in question was provided in response to a discrete inquiry by Ms Taylor’s solicitor and was not discoverable, which is an explanation that does not appear to be challenged. The UMA/Pepkor Agreement falls into a different category. That is, while the respondents concede that this document fell within category 1 of the discovery ordered by the 12 November 2020 Orders, they explain that it was not provided as part of their discovered documents because it was not within their control, following the making of reasonable inquiries, at the time discovery was given. Again this assertion does not appear to be the subject of challenge, at least in relation to this channel of sales and the attendant claim for infringement of the Applicant’s Mark. The material relied on by Ms Taylor was produced in answer to subpoenas issued at her request to UMA, Best & Less and Harris Scarfe.
501 Secondly, Ms Taylor contended that the respondents sought to minimise discovery by promising that their evidence in chief would address all channels through which goods were sold to Australian customers. Mr Jensen was cross-examined about this. The following exchange occurred between senior counsel for Ms Taylor and Mr Jensen:
Mr Dimitriadis: And, indeed, you were closely involved in that process for the respondents; correct?
Mr Jensen: One of several of us.
Mr Dimitriadis: Thank you. Now, you’re aware, are you not, from your involvement in relation to these proceedings that, from about March last year, Ms Taylor sought discovery from the respondents in relation to their commercial arrangements by which Katy Perry-branded goods were ultimately sold to customers in Australia?
Mr Jensen: Yes.
Mr Dimitriadis: And are you aware from your knowledge of the conduct of the proceedings that, at that time, the respondents resisted Ms Taylor obtaining that discovery before evidence was filed in the proceedings?
Mr Jensen: Can you repeat that?
502 Based on this evidence what was in fact proposed by the respondents was that discovery follow the filing of their evidence on the basis that their evidence would address certain categories of discovery that were sought. It remained open for Ms Taylor to seek further categories of discovery after the respondents filed and served their evidence if they were concerned that it was deficient in the extent to which it addressed all channels of sales.
503 The fact is that Mr Jensen did not cover this channel of sales in his evidence in chief. The respondents explain that was because the UMA/Pepkor Agreement was not within their control at the relevant time and because that agreement covered a number of artists, not just Ms Hudson, suggesting that because Ms Hudson was not the main focus or sole subject of the agreement it did not come to mind.
504 Thirdly, documents concerning Ms Hudson’s control were discoverable pursuant to categories 4 and 5 of the discovery ordered by the 12 November 2020 Orders which were in the following terms:
4. Documents which record or evidence communications to and from representatives of the Third Parties, and the Second Respondent or her immediate personal assistant(s) from time to time, regarding activities personally undertaken by the Second Respondent after 24 October 2013 in relation to advertisement, promotion or marketing, offering for sale, supplying and/or selling in Australia or to people in Australia clothes or Related Goods bearing, or otherwise in association with, the Alleged Infringing Marks.
5. Documents which record or evidence communications to and from representatives of the Third Parties, and the Second Respondent or her immediate personal assistant(s) from time to time, regarding the Second Respondent’s personal involvement after 24 October 2013 in the process of designing clothes or Related Goods bearing, or otherwise in association with the Alleged Infringing Marks where those clothes or Related Goods were subsequently offered for sale, supplied and/or sold in Australia to people in Australia.
505 As is apparent from the matters set out above, no such documents were discovered in relation to this channel of sales and, in particular, merchandise offered for sale through Best & Less and Harris Scarfe. Ms Taylor refers to a “laxness” in discovery but she did not bring any application for further discovery in relation to this channel of sales, does not suggest in terms that the respondents failed to comply with their discovery obligations in relation to categories 4 and 5 of the discovery ordered by the 12 November 2020 Orders and has not put before the Court evidence to suggest that is the case.
506 In light of the above, I would not draw the inference urged on me by Ms Taylor from the respondents’ failure to adduce evidence in relation to this channel of sales. As Ward CJ in Eq (as her Honour then was) observed in Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Pty Ltd in the matter of Combined Projects (Arncliffe) Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1778 at [738], after referring to the rule in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298:
Importantly, the Court may only draw an inference in appropriate circumstances, for example, where an uncalled witness is some who could reasonably be expected to shed light on the facts relied on by a party as the basis for the contended inference; and, an unfavourable inference may not be made solely because a witness was not called, rather the evidence must support the inference.
507 Ms Taylor’s claim against the respondents in relation to this channel of sales is not made out.
2.10.6 Sixth channel – websites
508 The sixth channel concerns sales of goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark through the following websites which Ms Taylor contends were or are operated by the respondents or their licensees, Bravado, Blackout Merch and Epic Rights:
(1) katyperry.shop.bravadousa.com i.e. the Bravado Website;
(2) katyperry.shop.musictoday.com/store;
(3) Epic Rights webstores operated from:
(a) merchbar.com/pop/katy-perry styled as the “Official Katy Perry Merch Store”;
(b) shop.katyperry.com;
(c) 25.pokemon.com/en-us/music/katy-perry; and
(d) amazon.com/stores/KatyPerry/Homepage/page/4309AAF4-4C21-4AF6-9FB778A5AB44D12B, being an Amazon webstore which was also referred to as the “Katy Perry Official Store”.
509 Relevant to this channel of sales is a list of websites provided by Mr Jensen, a copy of which is reproduced at Annexure B to these reasons (Verified List of Websites). Mr Jensen’s evidence in relation to the compilation of the Verified List of Websites was that he had made reasonable enquiries to identify:
(1) each website on which one or more items of “KATY PERRY Branded Licensed Merchandise” was advertised and/or sold into the Australian market during the period since 24 October 2013 (Relevant Period); and
(2) in relation to each such website, the “Merchandise Licensee” or other person or persons operating or controlling the website at the time the KATY PERRY Branded Licensed Merchandise items were advertised and/or sold:
(a) where Merchandise Licensees was defined to mean Bravado International Group, Inc, Bravado International Group Merchandising Services, Inc, Blackout Merch and Epic Rights LLC; and
(b) KATY PERRY Branded Licensed Merchandise was defined to mean the items included in a confidential list of goods provided by the respondents to Ms Taylor on 26 February 2021 and 31 March 2021.
510 The only website included in the Verified List of Websites that the respondents admit was operated or controlled by a Merchandise Licensee is the Bravado Website. The respondents do not accept that the balance of the websites identified by Ms Taylor (see [508] above) are operated or controlled by or any of the Merchandise Licensees or by them.
511 With that background, I turn to address each of the websites in relation to which Ms Taylor makes a claim.
512 From at least 24 October 2013 to about 2016 goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark were advertised, offered for sale and sold to customers in Australia through the Bravado Website. This website was linked to katyperry.com, which was Ms Hudson’s official website.
513 Goods were offered for sale through the Bravado Website, first, pursuant to the terms of the 2011 Bravado Agreement and, thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement. As I have already observed, the terms of the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the 2014 Bravado Agreement are substantially the same. In relation to the operation of webstores:
(1) clause 3.01(c) of the 2011 Bravado Agreement provided that Bravado had:
The exclusive right to build, host and administer the official [Katy Perry] webstore for [Kitty Purry] for the purpose of e-commerce/online sales on such site as they pertain to approved Licensed Products sold on Tour by BRAVADO and/or any other products which [Kitty Purry] hereby approves for sale on such site. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties hereby acknowledge and agree that [Kitty Purry] shall have the right, in its sole absolute discretion, to terminate the online rights granted to BRAVADO, at any time upon thirty (30) days prior written notice.
(2) pursuant to cl 3.01(c)(i) of the 2014 Bravado Agreement, Bravado was also granted the exclusive right to “build, host and administer the official [Katy Perry] webstore”. In addition, cl 3.01(c)(ii) provided that Kitty Purry agreed to use reasonable efforts to provide the following:
(A) a link to BRAVADO’S official webstore on [Ms Hudson’s] official website, Facebook page and/or twitter skin;
(B) “above the fold” banner placement on the official website for either primary or secondary banner location and consistent inclusion in the large rotating banner if there is one;
(C) “above the fold” banner placement on any “takeover” pages;
(D) have [Ms Hudson] autograph a minimum of four hundred (400) units of mutually selected Licensed Products during the Term hereof;
(E) accommodation pricing from [Ms Hudson’s] record label for purchasing of CDs and DVDs;
(F) approve a contest on the official webstore at least once a year; and
(G) coordinate with BRAVADO in the promotion and marketing of the Licensed Products by sending email blasts to their fan club lists and post news bulletins as to new Licensed Products, contests or special promotions, including facebook posts specifically referencing the web store, a featured item or promotion and tweets referencing the web store, a featured item or promotion.
514 It was not in dispute that clothes or goods of the same description have been advertised for sale and/or sold by reference to the Katy Perry Mark to customers in Australia from at least 24 October 2013 to 2016 through the Bravado Website. It follows that Bravado infringed the Applicant’s Mark in Australia by offering for sale and selling clothes and goods of the same description by reference to and/or bearing the Katy Perry Mark from that website to Australian customers.
515 Ms Taylor contends that the Court would find that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors with respect to Bravado’s infringement for the same reasons as they contend that to be the case in relation to their conduct in connection with the Prismatic Tour. That is Ms Taylor contends that because of: the terms of the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the terms of the 2014 Bravado Agreement and, in particular, Kitty Purry’s and thus Ms Hudson’s right to approve the designs and the way in which that control was exercised by Ms Hudson; the control Ms Hudson exercises over Killer Queen, the owner of the relevant mark, and Kitty Purry; and the way in which Ms Hudson exercised the right to control the design of goods and personally approved of and directed what could be sold and she personally promoted the merchandise, I would find that Killer Queen, Kitty Purry and Ms Hudson were joint tortfeasors with respect to Bravado’s infringing conduct.
516 I am satisfied in relation to the advertising, offering for sale and sales of clothes, and goods of the same description, bearing the Katy Perry Mark on the Bravado Website that Kitty Purry engaged in a “common design” with Bravado and is liable as a joint tortfeasor in relation to Bravado’s infringement. I have reached that conclusion for the following reasons:
(1) by the terms of the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the 2014 Bravado Agreement Kitty Purry granted Bravado an exclusive right to build a webstore to sell Licensed Products with Kitty Purry maintaining control over approval of designs to be offered for sale on the webstore. That is, as Kitty Purry granted a licence for Bravado to build and operate a webstore and to offer merchandise for sale globally Kitty Purry was aware of and indeed approved the goods which were offered for sale;
(2) by the 2014 Bravado Agreement, Kitty Purry granted Bravado further rights in relation to the webstore and its operation including co-ordinating with Bravado in the promotion and marketing of the merchandise offered for sale “by sending email blasts to their fan club lists and [posting] news bulletins” and Facebook posts referring to the webstore;
(3) a link to the webstore was maintained on Ms Hudson’s official site; and
(4) there was evidence that Kitty Purry, through its director, Ms Hudson, approved the design of goods to be manufactured and thus offered for sale by or through Bravado.
517 I do not reach the same conclusion in relation to Killer Queen and Ms Hudson. They were not party to the 2011 Bravado Agreement or the 2014 Bravado Agreement. They were no more than facilitators. In the case of Killer Queen, it granted a licence in relation to the Katy Perry Mark to Kitty Purry and, in the case of Ms Hudson, she signed the side agreement which appears as Exhibit A to each of the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the 2014 Bravado Agreement. Any involvement by Ms Hudson in approving designs was in her capacity as the chief executive officer and sole director of Kitty Purry.
2.10.6.2 katyperry.shop.musictoday.com/store
518 From about 2016 to 2020 goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark were advertised and sold to customers in Australia through a webstore at katyperry.shop.musictoday.com/store which was operated or controlled by Music Today LLC. It was not in dispute that, while that website was operated or controlled by Music Today, Blackout Merch used it as a channel through which to sell KATY PERRY branded merchandise. For ease I will refer to the website at katyperry.shop.musictoday.com/store as the Blackout Merch Website.
519 The circumstances in which the respondents came to deal with Blackout Merch and the terms upon which Blackout Merch became the licensee for sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise are described at [237] above. Pursuant to those terms, which are set out in the Blackout Merch Agreement, among other things, Blackout Merch was granted worldwide exclusive e-commerce rights.
520 Ms Taylor submitted that, for the reasons set out at [426]-[432] above and for the reasons set out below, the Court should find that the arrangements with Blackout Merch were substantially the same as those with Bravado concerning e-commerce and thus find that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors with respect to Blackout Merch’s infringement. Ms Taylor submitted that there is extensive evidence showing that Ms Hudson exercised close control over the Blackout Merch Website, and the nature of the goods to be sold on it, consistent with her arrangements with Bravado. She contended that examples of Ms Hudson’s control included providing comments on the layout of the webstore and promotions and approving, or not approving, promotional sales on the webstore.
521 The respondents admitted that Blackout Merch infringed the Applicant’s Mark in respect of the advertising and sale of clothes or goods of the same description through the Blackout Merch Website, subject to their defences to Ms Taylor’s claim for infringement and the cross-claim. However, they deny that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in Blackout Merch’s infringing conduct.
522 The first question is whether I would find that the arrangements with Blackout Merch in relation to e-commerce were substantively the same as those with Bravado. For the same reasons set out at [425]-[434] above, I would not conclude that the arrangements with Blackout Merch were substantially the same as those with Bravado regarding e-commerce or otherwise.
523 Ms Taylor relies on a number of emails to establish that Ms Hudson exercised close control over the Blackout Merch Website. They comprise:
(1) emails exchanged on 7 July 2017 and a further email dated 14 July 2017 between Mr Donnell, Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Mr Jensen respectively with subject “Re: Katy VIP & Tour” and “Re: Katy VIP Tour & Product Line Review” concerning the products to be developed for sale in, among other places, Australia;
(2) an exchange of WhatsApp messages, including messages from Ms Hudson, in which it seems that Ms Hudson provided comments on merchandise, albeit they are difficult to follow and somewhat cryptic;
(3) emails exchanged between Megan Karkoska of Merch Traffic, Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Mr Donnell in October to November 2018 in relation to offers to be made in relation to merchandise on the Blackout Merch Website and a new navigation option for the webstore. On each occasion that Ms Karkoska sought approval, Ms Hoang-DelVecchio responded. For example, on one occasion Ms Hoang-DelVecchio noted “[g]ood with me” and on another she stated “[w]e’re open to the new navigation…”. In providing her responses it is not apparent, at least on the face of the emails, that she discussed the proposals with Ms Hudson before doing so;
(4) emails from Ms Karkoska to Ms Hoang-DelVecchio, copied to Mr Donnell, seeking approval in relation to a Cyber Monday promotion and Black Friday sales for the Blackout Merch Website. Once again Ms Hoang-DelVecchio gave her approval without any apparent reference to Ms Hudson;
(5) an exchange of WhatsApp messages between “Katheryn, Michelle and You” about the “Katy Perry Official Store” and the captions to be included in the store;
(6) emails exchanged between, among others, Ms Karkoska and Ms Hoang-DelVecchio, copied to Messrs Donnell and Jensen, in relation to promotions to be offered on the Blackout Merch Website during November 2018 to April 2019. Once again, on their face, these emails do not evidence a need to seek approval directly from Ms Hudson, that such approval was sought or that there was any consultation with Ms Hudson in relation to the topics with which they were concerned. In each case Ms Hoang-DelVecchio gave approval for proposed promotions;
(7) an email exchange dated between 20 and 22 May 2019 between Ms Karkoska and Ms Hoang-DelVecchio, copied to Mr Donnell, in relation to the Memorial Day sale on the “Katy Perry Webstore”. Ms Hoang-DelVecchio approved the proposed graphics without any apparent recourse to Ms Hudson; and
(8) a series of emails in the period from June 2019 to February 2020 between, among others, Ms Karkoska and Ms Hoang-DelVecchio in relation to merchandise to be offered for sale, and promotions on the “Katy Perry Webstore”. Once again, it was not apparent on the face of these emails that Ms Hoang-DelVecchio or any other person sought Ms Hudson’s input or approval in relation to the queries raised by Ms Karkoska. In each case Ms Hoang-DelVecchio provided her comments or approval.
524 In my opinion, none of these emails or WhatsApp messages, either alone or collectively, evidence Ms Hudson personally, or on behalf of Killer Queen or Kitty Purry, having any significant input into this channel of sales. At most they show that Ms Hudson had some input into product design in respect of the goods. The evidence relied on by Ms Taylor does not demonstrate that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry were involved in the merchandising for the Blackout Merch Website and do not assist Ms Taylor in establishing that they are joint tortfeasors in respect of the sale of goods through that website.
2.10.6.3 Epic Rights webstores
525 Ms Taylor contends that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry are liable as joint tortfeasors with Epic Rights in relation to the sales of clothes or goods of the same description bearing the Katy Perry Mark through webstores at the following addresses:
merchbar.com/pop/katy-perry;
shop.katyperry.com;
25.pokemon.com/en-us/music/katy-perry (Pokemon Website); and
amazon.com/stores/KatyPerry/Homepage/page/4309AAF4-4C21-4AF6-9FB7-78A5AB44D12B (Amazon Website),
collectively, the Epic Rights Websites.
526 The following matters were not in dispute in relation to sales via the Epic Rights Websites:
(1) from March 2020 Epic Rights was the merchandise licensee holding exclusive e-commerce rights with respect to the Katy Perry Mark;
(2) the terms of the arrangement with Epic Rights are set out in the Epic Rights Email (see [257] above);
(3) all merchandise sold in Australia pursuant to the arrangement with Epic Rights was sold online, including through the Epic Rights Websites; and
(4) while the respondents do not admit in the Verified List of Websites that the Epic Rights Websites were operated or controlled by Epic Rights, they accept that Epic Rights used these websites as channels through which to sell clothes or goods of the same description bearing the Katy Perry Mark.
527 The respondents thus admit that Epic Rights infringed the Applicant’s Mark in respect of the advertising and sale of clothes or goods of the same description through the Epic Rights Websites, subject to their defences to Ms Taylor’s infringement claim and the cross-claim.
528 Ms Taylor submitted that the Court would find that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in Epic Rights’ infringing conduct because the Court would find that the agreement with Epic Rights was substantively the same as the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the 2014 Bravado Agreement regarding e-commerce.
529 Ms Taylor submitted that, as a matter of practice, Ms Hudson appears to have continued to exercise approval over the design of goods pursuant to the agreement with Epic Rights as well as the design and layout of the webstores and that she also continued to promote the goods offered for sale via the Epic Rights Websites.
530 Ms Taylor noted that: the webstore operated from merchbar.com/pop/katy-perry was styled as the “Official Katy Perry Merch Store” and was managed by Epic Rights; the website katyperry.com is Ms Hudson’s official website and therefore the webstore at shop.katyperry.com is located on Ms Hudson’s official website; and the Pokémon Website relates to a promotion and collaboration between Pokémon and Ms Hudson and other artists, including in respect of merchandise. As to the latter website, Ms Taylor contended that, through Ms Hoang-DelVecchio, Ms Hudson provided feedback in relation to the layout of the website and Ms Hudson and Killer Queen agreed to personally promote the merchandise sold through that webstore.
531 Ms Taylor submitted that the Amazon Website was controlled by Ms Hudson but was built by Epic Rights and that Ms Hudson, through Ms Hoang-DelVecchio, provided extensive feedback as to its content and format, which was also referred to as the “Katy Perry Official Store”.
532 Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry deny that they are joint tortfeasors with respect to Epic Rights’ infringement.
533 The terms of the arrangement with Epic Rights are sparse. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. No contract was ever entered into with Epic Rights.
534 In cross-examination Mr Jensen had the following exchange with senior counsel for Ms Taylor about the arrangements with Epic Rights:
Mr Dimitriadis: And Epic Rights, which is more recently the party who has been the merchandiser, is not associated with Mr Donnell; is that right?
Mr Jensen: That’s correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: Is it a Jessica (sic) Poulsen who is at least one of the contacts there?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
Mr Dimitriadis: Are you able to say that, in general terms, the arrangements with Epic Rights, in a practical sense, have continued in a similar way to the way in which the arrangements with Bravado and Blackout Merch worked?
Mr Jensen: Yes.
Mr Dimitriadis: In short, there has been no significant change to the way the merchandising and approval of designs works over the period?
Mr Jensen: Correct.
535 Despite Mr Jensen’s evidence that the “arrangements” with Epic Rights, in a practical sense, were similar to those with Bravado and Blackout Merch, I would not infer that the agreement with Epic Rights is substantively the same as the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the 2014 Bravado Agreement insofar as those agreements concerned e-commerce. That is so for the following reasons.
536 First, simply because the Epic Rights Email provides for the granting of exclusive rights to e-commerce to Epic Rights and provides for Mr Hudson to [REDACTED] [REDACTED], it does not follow that the detailed terms in the 2011 Bravado Agreement and the 2014 Bravado Agreement concerning e-commerce and approvals apply equally to the arrangements with Epic Rights.
537 Secondly, that conclusion does not follow from Mr Jensen’s statement that the arrangements in a “practical sense” continued to be the same. It could not be the case that because practical arrangements for aspects of the relationship with Epic Rights remained the same, the otherwise detailed terms in the Bravado agreements would apply to the arrangements with Epic Rights or that, for example, a contractual right of approval of design and choice of merchandise, was conferred on any of the respondents.
538 Ms Taylor also relied on other evidence in support of her contention that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors with Epic Rights in its infringing conduct. That evidence comprised:
(1) an exchange of emails between, among others, Jesper Poulsen, SVP, Artist & Brand Development, Epic Rights, Messrs Jensen, Kirkup and Cobb and Ms Hoang-DelVecchio in August 2020 in relation to a series of internet livestreams undertaken by Ms Hudson to promote her upcoming “Smile” album. Those emails report on the sales achieved during or as a result of some of those sessions and make suggestions for improving the volume of sales by, for example, requesting that Ms Hudson “mentions new merch items available …” and launched during the livestream. These emails do not evidence Ms Hudson promoting clothes or goods of the same description and can not support a finding that Ms Hudson, Killer Queen or Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors with Epic Rights. They contain peoples’ observations of what Ms Hudson did or did not do during a livestream and a request that she conduct the next livestream in a different fashion. Further, the exchange does not include any evidence that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry engaged in any conduct including approval of the design of merchandise;
(2) email exchanges dated between 12 and 24 August 2020 between, among others, Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Mr Poulsen and between Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Seth Decoteau of Amazon about the build and layout of the Amazon Website which Ms Hoang-DelVecchio ultimately approved in her email dated 24 August 2020 addressed to Mr Decoteau. Ms Hudson was not a party to any of these emails and there is no evidence that she was aware of or participated in the decisions being made. In any event, given their subject matter, the build of the Amazon Website, they could not support a finding that any of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry participated in a common design with Epic Rights. This is particularly so given that the Accused Acts as defined in the FASOC are not concerned with the design of a webstore (see [267] above);
(3) a series of WhatsApp messages between “Katheryn, Michelle, You” with subject “APPROVALS & DIGITAL” in which I infer “You” was Ms Hoang-DelVecchio. In those messages Ms Hudson provided comments on proposed wording for what appear to be digital promotions of merchandise. While not entirely clear, the exchanges appear to include discussion about posts to be placed on Ms Hudson’s Instagram account. Of themselves, these exchanges do not evidence Ms Hudson’s participation in a common design with Epic Rights. Once again they do not evidence Ms Hudson participating in any of the Accused Acts as defined in the FASOC. At their highest they demonstrate Ms Hudson making suggestions for the wording of posts to go on a particular site but there is no evidence as to what was eventually posted, the products, if any, to which the posts relate, in particular if those products included clothes or goods of the same description, and, on which sites the posts were intended to and did appear; and
(4) emails in April and May 2021 between Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Mr Poulsen in relation to the design of the Pokémon Website and an email exchange between Ms Hoang-DelVecchio and Zoe Gillespie of Capital Music Group, copied to others including Mr Poulsen, in the period 29 September to 14 October 2021 commenting on the merchandise to be included on the “Pokémon Merch Pop Up”. A number of observations can be made about these emails:
(a) first, in the initial email dated 29 September 2021 from Ms Gillespie in relation to the virtual store which Pokémon had decided to pursue, Ms Gillespie notes “Katy is not obligated to promote the store/experience” and in another email dated 8 October 2021 from Ms Gillespie in relation to that store, she notes again “of course nothing obligated by KP they will simply be posting the merch”;
(b) secondly, there is no evidence that Ms Hudson was included in these emails. To the extent approvals were given, they were given by Ms Hoang-DelVecchio; and
(c) thirdly, the emails do not evidence any involvement on the part of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry in any approval let alone importation, distribution, promotion, sale or manufacture of clothes or goods of the same description and do not evidence any common design with, or involvement in any infringing conduct on the part of, Epic Rights.
539 Ms Taylor also relies on the fact that the website katyperry.com is Ms Hudson’s official website and submitted that the webstore at shop.katyperry.com is located on Ms Hudson’s official website. She relies on an email in which Ms Hoang-DelVecchio describes the website as “Katy’s store”. But, none of those facts establish that Ms Hudson or, for that matter, Killer Queen or Kitty Purry acted in concert with Epic Rights and the operators of the websites shop.katyperry.com and merchbar.com/pop/katy-perry, Universal Music Group and Merch Bar Inc respectively, in respect of any infringement by them of the Applicant’s Mark. The descriptions of the site as the “Official Katy Perry Merch Store” and “Katy’s Store” are no more than descriptive labelling given to the site when referring to it.
2.10.6.4 katyperrycollections.com and the Amazon Website
540 Ms Taylor contended that on 1 December 2017 Kitty Purry, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson granted Purrfect Ventures access to and control over the domain katyperrycollections.com to operate an e-commerce website selling footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark. She submitted that clothes and goods of the same description bearing the Katy Perry Mark were advertised and sold to customers in Australia by Purrfect Ventures through this website.
541 Ms Taylor submitted that by means of its conduct in selling goods to customers in Australia Purrfect Ventures directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark as it used the Katy Perry Mark in Australia in respect of clothes or goods of the same description. She also submitted that by means of Ms Hudson’s conduct of promoting the sale of shoes in Australia she also directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Hudson guided customers in Australia to use this and other websites to buy KATY PERRY branded footwear.
542 Ms Taylor submitted that given Ms Hudson, Killer Queen and Kitty Purry’s role in authorising Purrfect Ventures’ infringement and in promoting those infringements the Court should also find that they were joint tortfeasors in Purrfect Ventures’ infringement.
543 Ms Taylor submitted that it appears that in 2021 footwear bearing the Katy Perry Mark was sold through the Amazon webstore at amazon.com/stores/KatyPerry/homepage/…. i.e. the Amazon Website. She contended that this likely arose out of Ms Hudson’s purchase of GBG USA, Inc’s shares in Purrfect Ventures in mid-2021. She repeated her submissions set out above in relation to sales through this webstore.
544 The goods offered for sale and sold through these websites were footwear. As I have found that footwear is not clothes or goods of the same description, Ms Taylor’s contentions that Purrfect Ventures and/or Ms Hudson breached the Applicant’s Mark in promoting and selling footwear through these websites and that Ms Hudson, Killer Queen and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in Purrfect Ventures’ infringement cannot succeed.
545 In the event that I am wrong in my finding that footwear is not clothes or goods of the same description, the respondents accept (subject to their defences to Ms Taylor’s infringement claim and the cross-claim) that Purrfect Ventures infringed the Applicant’s Mark by its use of the Katy Perry Mark in respect of footwear advertised and sold to customers in Australia through the website katyperrycollections.com and that Ms Hudson infringed the Applicant’s Mark in respect of her personal appearance at Myer stores (see [241] above).
546 However, the respondents do not accept that these matters make Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and/or Kitty Purry joint tortfeasors in respect of Purrfect Ventures’ infringement of the Applicant’s Mark. For the same reasons set out at [479]-[480] above I accept that to be so.
547 In relation to the Amazon Website, there is insufficient evidence for me to conclude that it was controlled by Ms Hudson, albeit it was built by Epic Rights. The Verified List of Websites indicates that webstore was operated or controlled by Amazon.com, Inc. Mr Jensen was not challenged about his evidence verifying that list including in relation to that website. Further, as I have already found to be the case (see [538(2)] above) there is no evidence that any of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry had any role in the build of the Amazon Website. In those circumstances, assuming I am wrong in my finding that footwear is not clothes or goods of the same description, I am not satisfied that Ms Taylor has made out any claim of direct infringement or a claim of joint tortfeasorship in relation to any of the respondents for the sale of footwear through the Amazon Website.
2.10.7 Seventh channel – other websites
548 Ms Taylor contends that a series of websites have advertised, offered for sale and/or sold KATY PERRY branded footwear to Australian customers. Those websites are:
shopstyle.com.au;
catch.com.au;
ebay.com.au;
amazon.com.au;
yoox.com/au;
stylicy.com/au;
shopnordstrom.com;
lordandtaylor.com;
www.ebay.com;
gilt.com;
amazon.com; and
macys.com.
549 Ms Taylor submitted that Purrfect Ventures has infringed the Applicant’s Mark by means of the sale of clothes and goods of the same description through these websites to Australian customers because Purrfect Ventures, as Killer Queen’s licensee, uses the Katy Perry Mark in respect of the goods and through these channels those goods have ended up in Australia in the course of trade. Ms Taylor also contended that Ms Hudson personally infringed the Applicant’s Mark by means of sales through the international websites by her promotion of the sale of footwear through these sources.
550 Ms Taylor submitted that the Court should find that Ms Hudson and Killer Queen are joint tortfeasors with Purrfect Ventures in respect of Purrfect Ventures’ infringement because Purrfect Ventures is the authorised user of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson is the controlling mind of both Purrfect Ventures and Killer Queen and Ms Hudson extensively promotes the sale of the footwear.
551 The respondents admit that KATY PERRY branded merchandise was advertised or sold to customers in Australia at points in time from 24 October 2013 from the following websites:
lordandtaylor.com;
catch.com.au;
amazon.com.au;
yoox.com/au;
stylicy.com/au;
shop.nordstrom.com; and
macys.com.
552 However, the respondents submitted in relation to:
(1) the website at ebay.com.au, that Ms Taylor has not demonstrated that the respondents or their licensees knew anything about these sales; and
(2) the balance of the websites, shopstyle.com.au, www.ebay.com, gilt.com and amazon.com, that Ms Taylor has not established that the use of the Katy Perry Mark on those sites constitutes trade mark use in Australia.
553 More generally, the respondents submitted that Ms Taylor had not established that any of them were joint tortfeasors in respect of the advertising and sale of goods pursuant to this channel of sales and that there was no evidence of their involvement in liaising with the operators of the websites so as to establish a common design.
554 As I have found that shoes are not clothes or goods of the same description, Ms Taylor cannot succeed in relation to this channel of sales to the extent it concerns the promotion and sale of shoes. Against the possibility that I am wrong in my opinion that shoes are not clothes, or goods of the same description, I address the websites that are in issue and the respondents’ more general submission recorded in the preceding paragraph in turn below.
2.10.7.1 shopstyle.com.au, www.ebay.com, gilt.com and amazon.com
555 The respondents submitted that Ms Taylor had not established that use of the Katy Perry Mark on the shopstyle.com.au, www.ebay.com, gilt.com and amazon.com websites constitutes trade mark use in Australia. They contended, relying on Ward Group at [43], that in the absence of evidence that the use of a trade mark on the internet uploaded on a website outside Australia is use specifically intended to be made in, or directed or targeted at, a particular jurisdiction there is unlikely to be a use in that jurisdiction when the mark is downloaded. By way of example they observed in respect of the evidence of advertising at gilt.com that there is no evidence that the KATY PERRY branded shoe shown there could be shipped to Australia. I address each website in turn.
556 The screenshot in evidence before me from the website gilt.com dated 4 May 2020 shows the following:
557 A further screenshot from the gilt.com website dated 7 May 2020 shows:
558 As at 7 May 2020 the gilt.com website also:
(1) indicated that shipping to Australia was not precluded during the COVID-19 pandemic nor was Australia nominated as a country from which orders could no longer be placed due to country import restrictions; and
(2) provided under the heading “How We Ship”:
Gilt partners with an organization called Borderfree to ship orders internationally. Borderfree allows us to provide an enhanced shopping experience for our non-U.S. customers, with the benefit of seeing product prices in your local currency, guaranteed order totals at checkout and no hidden fees. When you place an international order on Gilt, your transaction will be with Borderfree, but your Gilt Customer Service Representative will gladly assist you with your customer service needs. Simply email international@gilt.com in English to reach our Customer Service Representatives
559 The following things are apparent from this evidence: first, the “Katy Perry Jo Leather Pump” is offered for sale at a price shown in Australian dollars; secondly, as explained in the screenshot taken on 7 May 2020, non-US customers can see product prices in their local currency although when an international order is placed the transaction is with Borderfree; and thirdly, Australia is not a country to which sales are expressly precluded and in fact shipping is available to Australia. In addition, Mr Silberstein’s evidence is that “some purchased goods are able to be shipped to Australia”, although he does not explain which goods can be shipped or identify those goods, if any, that may be precluded from shipping.
560 The respondents submitted that the cost of shipping shoes is significantly different to the cost of shipping other sorts of goods. But this does not mean that shoes purchased on the gilt.com website could not be shipped to Australia. Given the evidence before me and the matters set out in the preceding paragraph I would infer that shoes could be purchased from the gilt.com website and shipped to Australia.
561 Contrary to the respondents’ contention, I am satisfied in relation to the gilt.com website that there was use of the Katy Perry Mark which was specifically directed or targeted at people in Australia such that there was use in Australia of the mark when it was downloaded.
562 I would reach the same conclusion in relation to the website at shopstyle.com.au. The screenshots taken from that website that were in evidence before me display the heading “Katy Perry – ShopStyle Australia” and the website’s address ends with “.au”. Both of these factors lead me to find that use of the mark on the website is directed or targeted at Australia.
563 The evidence before me establishes that goods including KATY PERRY branded shoes were offered for sale through amazon.com and that some goods were able to be shipped to Australia. The screenshots of the amazon.com website taken on 4 May 2020 that were in evidence before me demonstrate that:
(1) KATY PERRY branded merchandise, including KATY PERRY branded shoes, were offered for sale on the website;
(2) prices were shown for most but not all of the merchandise, but there was no explanation of why that was so. One possible explanation is that only those goods for which there was a price were able to be sold/shipped to Australia;
(3) Australia was included as an Amazon Global eligible country under the heading “AmazonGlobal Export Countries and Regions”. Users were guided to another part of the website, via a link titled “Search for Items Eligible for International Shipping”, to “learn how to search and browse items that are eligible for international shipping” and a note was included that “[t]here may be limitations on where and whether Amazon Marketplace sellers offer international shipping. For more information, go to Seller Supported Countries”; and
(4) there was no express evidence as to whether the KATY PERRY branded merchandise which was returned by the searches undertaken on behalf of Ms Taylor could be shipped to Australia.
564 Based on the facts set out above, I would infer that the use of the Katy Perry Mark on the website at amazon.com was use by the website proprietor in Australia. The evidence is sufficient to support a conclusion that the use was specifically directed at the Australian market.
565 Mr Silberstein explained that on 4 May 2020 a search was conducted of the www.ebay.com website for “katy perry” and the results were filtered to the category “Clothing, Shoes & Accessories”. A screenshot of the first page of the search results was in evidence before me. There were no past pages of the website and Mr Silberstein explained that past pages showing products relevant to the respondents did not appear to have been archived on the Wayback Machine.
566 The screenshot which Ms Taylor relied on demonstrated that KATY PERRY branded shoes and other merchandise was offered for sale. In each case a price and the additional cost for shipping is displayed. I pause to note that the argument relied on by the respondents in relation to the website ebay.com.au (see [552(1)] above) is not relied on in relation to this website.
567 Also in evidence before me is a screenshot taken on 7 May 2020 from the website’s page about “International purchases and shipping for buyers”. It described the “Global Shipping Program” and provided that Australia was an eligible country for that program for items delivered from the US and the UK. There is a note on the page described as a “Top Takeaway” that:
When you’re buying an item from a seller participating in the eBay Global Shipping Program, listings show an estimate of both shipping and import charges.
568 Once again, given the evidence before me I would infer that the use of the Katy Perry Mark on www.ebay.com was use by the website proprietor of that mark in Australia. Given the pricing, which included shipping prices, and that Australia was an eligible country for shipping from the US, I would infer that the use of the mark was targeted at the Australian market.
569 Ms Taylor relies on screenshots of pages from the ebay.com.au website in support of her contention that the website advertised, offered for sale and/or sold KATY PERRY branded footwear to Australian customers. Those pages were returned after a search was conducted for “katy perry” on the website and the results of the initial search were filtered to the brand “Katy Perry”.
570 The resulting screenshots show KATY PERRY branded footwear offered for sale through the website. For example the following page appears:
571 To the extent that there is any dispute about it I am satisfied that there was use of the Katy Perry Mark on the ebay.com.au website in Australia. The website is clearly targeted to Australian users given that it has an “.au” address and prices are shown in Australian dollars.
572 However, based on the evidence before me I am unable to identify the sellers of the KATY PERRY branded shoes or the nature of goods offered for sale, in particular whether they were new or pre-owned. The inclusion of the statement “or best offer” after the quoted price might suggest the latter. Further, there is no evidence that the respondents, or their licensees, knew anything about these sales and there is no basis upon which I would infer that they did.
2.10.7.3 Has there been direct infringement by Purrfect Ventures and/or Ms Hudson? Are Killer Queen and Purrfect ventures joint tortfeasors?
573 It has been established, either through the respondents’ admissions or the evidence relied on by Ms Taylor, that there was use of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia on each of the websites listed at [548] above.
574 That being so, Ms Taylor contends that Purrfect Ventures has infringed the Applicant’s Mark because it has used the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in Australia. She submitted that I should find that there will be relevant use for the purposes of s 120 of the TM Act even if Purrfect Ventures as the licensee and user of the mark is not aware that the goods will ultimately be offered for sale and sold in Australia, relying on Playgro at [139] (see [279] above) and the finding made by Moshinsky J in that case at [160].
575 However, here, in contrast to the facts in Playgro, there is no evidence based on which I would find that Purrfect Ventures, as licensee of the Katy Perry Mark for the purpose of the development, design, manufacture, sale, marketing, distribution, promotion and/or advertising of shoes and bags, or Ms Hudson, was aware that the merchandise was to be offered for sale and sold in Australia through these websites.
576 Ms Taylor also contends that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson are joint tortfeasors with Purrfect Ventures in respect of its infringement. Given my finding that Purrfect Ventures has not directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark this claim could not succeed. But, even if I am wrong about that, the mere grant of a licence by Killer Queen to Purrfect Ventures is not sufficient to establish that either Killer Queen or Ms Hudson, as the controlling mind of both companies, engaged in a common design with Purrfect Ventures in relation to the sale of the KATY PERRY branded merchandise on the websites in question.
577 It follows that Ms Taylor’s claim that Purrfect Ventures directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark and that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson are liable as joint tortfeasors in relation to the sale of clothes or goods of the same description bearing the Katy Perry Mark through this channel of sales would fail.
2.10.8 Eighth channel – Cotton On
578 Ms Taylor contends that a t-shirt bearing the Katy Perry Mark was sold through Cotton On Australia’s retail stores and via its website in 2020 and that such use constituted trade mark infringement by Cotton On. She submitted that given the overwhelming evidence regarding Ms Hudson’s practices in approving all goods bearing her name, the Court should find that Ms Hudson was aware of, and approved, the t-shirt design to be sold in Australia by Cotton On. She submitted that the Court should find that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in respect of Cotton On’s infringement.
579 The evidence relied on by Ms Taylor in support of her submission that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry were joint tortfeasors in respect of Cotton On’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark comprises website images of the t-shirt in question which were produced by Cotton On in answer to a subpoena. The Verified List of Websites includes the website cottonon.com/au, records that website as being operated or controlled by Cotton On Australia Pty Ltd and records that the t-shirt in question was offered for sale on that website in 2020.
580 The respondents accept that one t-shirt bearing the Katy Perry Mark was sold though Cotton On’s Australian retail stores and via its website in 2020 and that Cotton On’s use of that mark constituted infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Cotton On, subject to the respondents’ defences and the cross-claim.
581 There is no evidence that any of Killer Queen, Ms Hudson or Kitty Purry acted in concert with Cotton On in its infringing conduct. That Ms Hudson approved goods sold through other channels does not lead me to infer that she approved the design of a single t-shirt bearing the Katy Perry Mark for sale by Cotton On. There is simply no evidence that Ms Hudson in fact approved this design, that she was aware that this t-shirt was being offered for sale by Cotton On or that Killer Queen and/or Kitty Purry were aware of or involved in its sale by Cotton On in its stores or via its website.
582 It follows that Ms Taylor’s claim that Killer Queen, Ms Hudson and Kitty Purry are liable as joint tortfeasors in relation to Cotton On’s infringing conduct is not made out.
2.10.9 Conclusion on Ms Taylor’s claims of infringement
583 Ms Taylor has had limited success on her claims that the respondents infringed the Applicant’s Mark directly or that they are liable as joint tortfeasors. In summary she has established:
(1) that Ms Hudson infringed the Applicant’s Mark by:
(a) her tweet on 3 October 2013 promoting the Roar costume;
(b) her tweet and Facebook post both dated 19 October 2013 advertising exclusive “merch” available by pre-order and in particular the Roar jacket in connection with the Prismatic Tour;
(c) her tweet on 1 December 2018 promoting “Cozy Little Christmas” hoodies, t-shirts, sweatpants and scarves by reference to the Katy Perry Mark;
(d) her tweets posted on 11, 12 and 28 November 2014 promoting the pop-up stores; and
(e) her Facebook page events promoting the pop-up stores;
(2) Kitty Purry is liable as a joint tortfeasor in Bravado’s infringement of the Applicant’s Mark in advertising, offering for sale and selling clothes (or goods of the same description) bearing the Katy Perry Mark:
(a) during the Australian leg of the Prismatic Tour;
(b) at pop-up stores in Sydney and Melbourne, during the Prismatic Tour; and
(c) on the Bravado Website.
584 In response the respondents call in aid the defences addressed below and rely on their cross-claim as a complete answer to these findings.
2.11.1 The proviso in s 120(2) of the TM Act
585 Section 120 of the TM Act is set out at [270] above.
586 Section 120(2) of the TM Act, which provides that a person infringes a trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods of the same description as that of the registered goods, includes a proviso which is in the nature of a defence to a claim under that subsection. The proviso is in the following terms:
However, the person is not taken to have infringed the trade mark if the person establishes that using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.
587 The respondents rely on the proviso to the extent there is a finding that any of them has infringed the Applicant’s Mark by using the Katy Perry Mark in relation to goods of the same description as clothes. However, given my findings that none of the Disputed Categories are goods of the same description, the proviso has no work to do.
588 Against the possibility that I am wrong in relation to any of those findings I consider whether, in any event, the respondents would be able to rely on the proviso.
589 In Gallo at [76], a Full Court of this Court (Moore, Edmonds and Gilmour JJ) relevantly said the following about the proviso in s 120(2) of the TM Act:
… The words “as the person did” direct attention to the way in which, as a matter of fact, the alleged infringer has used the allegedly infringing trade mark. These concluding words pose a different question to that raised by the opening words of s 120(2) which, in the context of deceptive similarity, direct attention only to a comparison of the marks in the way already discussed. However, any conclusion about deceptive similarity would usually inform consideration of whether the actual use was likely to deceive or cause confusion. In a sense, an affirmative answer to the question of whether the alleged infringing mark was deceptively similar would be the starting point. If it was, then it would, in many instances, render it more likely (though not inevitable) that the actual use of the allegedly infringing mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion. Also relevant, in our opinion, would be the matters considered in determining whether the alleged infringer’s goods are of the same description as the goods in respect of which the registered mark is registered.
590 In Goodman Fielder at [364], Burley J observed that:
The defence may give rise to consideration of what additional features are used in conjunction with the trade mark, which may suggest that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion. This was alluded to by Yates J in Optical 88 (No 2) at [99] (emphasis added):
So too it is recognised that, for the purposes of considering infringement under s 120(1), it is beside the point that the alleged infringer has added other material to the impugned trade mark, even if those steps were taken to avoid the likelihood of deception: Saville Perfumery Ltd v June Perfect Ltd (1939) 1B IPR 440 at 452–3; (1941) 58 RPC 147 at 161 (Sir Greene MR) and at IPR 464; RPC 174 (Viscount Maugham); Lever Brothers, Port Sunlight Ltd v Sunniwite Products Ltd (1949) 66 RPC 84 at 89; Mark Foy’s Ltd v Davies Coop & Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 190 at 205; [1956] ALR 854; (1956) 1A IPR 470 at 478–9; Polaroid Corporation v Sole N Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 491 at 495; New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray Goulburn Co-operative Company Ltd (1989) 86 ALR 549 at 589; 14 IPR 26 at 66–7; Polo Textile Industries Pty Ltd v Domestic Textile Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 227 at 231–2; 114 ALR 157 at 162–3; 26 IPR 246 at 250–1. Considerations of this kind, if raised by an alleged infringer, are relevant when considering infringement under s 120(2) and may be relevant when considering infringement under s 120(3). However, the general position under s 120(1) is that infringement cannot be avoided by, for example, the use of additional matter if the mark itself is taken and used. Once again, if the test is not applied in this fashion a trade mark owner may be deprived of the monopoly conferred by registration.
591 At [365]-[366] his Honour continued:
[365] The learned authors of Shanahan’s suggest that the only aspects of a respondent’s use that should be considered relevant to the defence are those in some way peculiar to the respondent’s own product, such as the use of some special get-up or the inclusion of the respondent’s label of its company or business name (at [85.765]). The comparator, for the purpose of the defence, is not, however, against any actual use by the registered trade mark owner, but rather against the fair and normal use of its trade mark within the scope of its registration. Such an approach was adopted by the Full Court in Gallo (FC) at [78], no doubt to accommodate the statutory language “using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion” – the likelihood being judged against such notional use.
[366] In Lift Shop Pty Ltd v Easy Living Home Elevators Pty Ltd (2014) 311 ALR 207; 106 IPR 419; [2014] FCAFC 75 at [62], [67], [68] the Full Court (Besanko, Yates and Mortimer JJ) noted in obiter dicta that the primary judge’s findings that the term “lift shop” had an understood generic connotation, and that at the point at which certain web search results were displayed there was no respectable possibility of confusion that the respondent was associated with the applicant, were sufficient circumstances to give rise to the defence under s 120(2).
2.11.1.2 The parties’ submissions
592 The respondents submitted that the advertising and sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise to persons in Australia has been through merchandise sales directly connected with: Ms Hudson’s concerts and performances in Australia; pop-up stores associated with Ms Hudson’s touring of Australia; department stores; and websites. They submitted that, in other words, the advertising and sale of clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark has been closely tied to Ms Hudson’s personality and role as a popular music artist, known worldwide, including in Australia.
593 The respondents contended that much of the KATY PERRY branded merchandise is tied to Ms Hudson’s likeness, shows her signature or depicts other graphics associated with her likeness, her musical activities and song themes and lyrics which at all times since at least the Priority Date have been very well known. They submitted that given this close connection, any use of the Katy Perry Mark in relation to such goods has been unlikely to deceive or cause confusion with the Applicant’s Mark.
594 Ms Taylor made only few submissions on this issue. She said that if the Court accepts the evidence referred to by the respondents is sufficient to establish the proviso in s 120(2) of the TM Act, then those same submissions reinforce her own submission regarding the absence of any risk of confusion or deception pursuant to ss 42, 43, 60 and 88(2)(c) of the TM Act, which arise upon consideration of Killer Queen and Ms Hudson’s cross-claim. Ms Taylor submitted that the manner in which the respondents have marketed goods by reference to the Katy Perry Mark, and any reputation in that mark, is such that it has never been likely that Ms Taylor’s use (or any notional use) of the Applicant’s Mark on her clothes would deceive or cause confusion for the purposes of the TM Act.
595 The evidence before me establishes that the Katy Perry Mark has been used in connection with the advertising, offering for sale and sale of clothes in Australia in conjunction with Ms Hudson’s tours and the release of her albums as well as through websites and some retailers. In that regard I accept the respondents’ submission that the advertising, offering for sale, sale of clothes and the clothes themselves bearing the Katy Perry Mark have been closely tied to Ms Hudson’s role as a popular music artist in Australia. Indeed most of the clothes offered for sale and sold bear images of Ms Hudson or graphics that are related to her albums or individual songs. That is, there is a close connection between Ms Hudson and the use of the Katy Perry Mark on much of the merchandise offered for sale, including clothes and, to the extent I am found to be wrong, goods of the same description. That being so, I would comfortably conclude that the way in which the Katy Perry Mark was or is used is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.
596 That conclusion is reinforced by two further facts: first, Ms Taylor did not lead any evidence of actual confusion; and secondly, Mr Jensen’s evidence that by 2016 he was not aware of any cases of members of the public being confused that clothes and other merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark were those of Ms Taylor (see [233(1)] above).
597 I address the effect of my acceptance of the respondents’ submissions on this issue vis-à-vis the absence of any risk of confusion or deception in relation to Ms Taylor’s continued use of the Applicant’s Mark in the context of my consideration of the cross-claim below.
598 It follows from the above that, in the event that I am found to be wrong and some or all of the Disputed Categories are found to be goods of the same description as clothes, trade mark infringement would not be established in relation to those goods because of the operation of the proviso in s 120(2) of the TM Act.
2.11.2 Section 122(1)(a) of the TM Act – use of own name in good faith
599 To the extent that Ms Taylor has established that any of the respondents have breached s 120 of the TM Act, either directly or as joint tortfeasors, the respondents rely on s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act as a defence. In particular, Ms Hudson relies on s 122(1)(a)(i) in relation to any infringement by her of the Applicant’s Mark and, as Ms Hudson is the predecessor in business of Killer Queen, Kitty Purry and Purrfect Ventures, those respondents rely on s 122(1)(a)(ii) of the TM Act.
2.11.2.1 Who has the benefit of the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act?
600 Section 122(1)(a) of the TM Act provides that, in spite of s 120, a person does not infringe a registered trade mark when:
(a) the person uses in good faith:
(i) the person’s name or the name of the person’s place of business; or
(ii) the name of a predecessor in business of the person or the name of the predecessor’s place of business; or …
601 There is a dispute between the parties as to the construction of s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. Ms Taylor contends that, on a proper construction, neither a third-party (e.g. a licensee) who infringes a registered mark by using a person’s name or place of business or a joint tortfeasor can take advantage of the defence. In other words, Ms Taylor contends that the defence is limited to the person who infringes a registered mark by using in good faith his, her or its name or place of business. The respondents disagree and contend that a third-party can take advantage of the defence and that, to the extent they are found to be joint tortfeasors, they can rely on the defence.
602 The approach to be taken in construing a statutory provision was described at [14] of SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 by the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ):
The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.
(Footnotes omitted.)
603 In urging her construction Ms Taylor made three principal submissions.
604 First, Ms Taylor focused on the use of the definite article “the” appearing before the word “person” (in subs (1)(a)(i) and subs (ii)) and the possessive noun “person’s” (in subs (1)(a)(i)) and submitted that, given the repetition of the definite article, the person seeking to take advantage of the defence (and thus the person using the sign as a trade mark and infringing s 120) must be using that self-same person’s name, except if they are using the name of their predecessor in the business.
605 Secondly, she contended that the defence is, in its terms, narrow and personal, the person and their business are “mentioned in the same breath” and the place of business refers to a physical location. She submitted that it must be intended as the location of the business of that same person, or the predecessor in business.
606 Thirdly, Ms Taylor submitted that given s 122(1)(a)(ii) of the TM Act, the defence is only available to one person operating one business at a time, either the person using their name or their place of business or the person using the name of the person who is their predecessor in the business.
607 The respondents made submissions more generally about the operation of s 122(1) of the TM Act. They submitted that the doctrine of joint tortfeasorship is taken to apply on the basis that trade mark infringement is a statutory tort and, where joint tortfeasorship is established, there is but one tort committed by the joint tortfeasors. They contended that it follows that a finding that any of the respondents is a joint tortfeasor in another’s infringing conduct would be a finding that that respondent had infringed subs 120(1) or (2) of the TM Act, that being the relevant “tort”. The respondents said that it must follow that they are entitled to rely directly on the defences to infringement, that is, the defences to the statutory tort provided for in s 122(1) of the TM Act.
608 In the alternative, the respondents submitted that they are not liable as joint tortfeasors where the third-party operators identified by Ms Taylor (at FASOC [8]) have a defence to infringement under s 122(1) of the TM Act, relying on the reasoning in Smith & Nephew Plastics (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sweetheart Holding Corporation (1987) 8 IPR 285; (1987) AIPC 90-411 at 290. The respondents submitted that, to the extent that the third-party operators can rely on s 122(1) of the TM Act as a defence to infringement, so too can the alleged joint tortfeasors. That is, they contended that if the respondents licensed the Katy Perry Mark in good faith for use on the impugned goods, then the operators referred to by Ms Taylor at [8] of the FASOC, with whom the respondents are alleged to be joint tortfeasors, would also be able to take advantage of the defences in s 122(1) of the TM Act. They submitted that if those defences are made out, there can be no infringement of s 120 of the TM Act by those operators and thus no tort for which the respondents would be liable as joint tortfeasors.
609 In oral submissions, the respondents:
(1) drew attention to s 126(1) of the TM Act which provides for the relief that the Court may grant in an action for infringement of a registered trade mark. They submitted that the statutory remedies for infringement under the TM Act are available to Ms Taylor in this case against the respondents because a joint tortfeasor infringes the trade mark in suit. They contended that if that were not the case then Ms Taylor would have no entitlement to an injunction or to an account of profits or damages against them insofar as they were found to be joint tortfeasors. They submitted that it followed that when one focuses on the opening words of s 122(1), the starting point is that a joint tortfeasor is a person who infringes a registered trade mark; and
(2) submitted, having regard to the chapeau to s 122(1), that it is s 120 of the TM Act that creates the statutory tort of trade mark infringement. That is, anyone who infringes a registered trade mark does so because of the terms of s 120 and it does not matter whether that person is a primary infringer or a joint tortfeasor.
610 The respondents submitted that it follows from these two points that the words used in the chapeau to s 122(1) of the TM Act are perfectly apt to capture a person who would otherwise infringe a trade mark and include a joint tortfeasor. They submitted that Ms Taylor’s argument that s 122 of the TM Act does not apply to joint tortfeasors is contrary to the terms of the statutory provision and contrary to the context in which the section appears because it would be utterly absurd for the TM Act to impose statutory remedies for infringement against joint tortfeasors but not also to give joint tortfeasors the benefit of the statutory defences.
611 The starting point for determining the question of whether a third-party licensee and/or the respondents insofar as they are found to be joint tortfeasors can have the benefit of the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act is the text of that provision. In that regard, I make the following observations.
612 First, the chapeau to s 122(1) of the TM Act refers to “a person”. That is, it provides that in spite of s 120 of the TM Act, a person does not infringe a registered trade mark when one of the matters set out in subss (1)(a) to (g) is established. The use of “a person” in this context reflects the language in s 120 of the TM Act which sets out when “a person” is taken to have infringed a trade mark.
613 Secondly, in contrast, subs 122(1)(a) of the TM Act uses the definite article. The defence in that subsection can be called in aid when a person who is otherwise taken to have engaged in infringing conduct contrary to s 120 of the TM Act can establish that he or she uses the person’s name or the person’s place of business or the name or place of business of a predecessor in business, of the person. In the case of subs 122(1)(a)(i) that name or place of business must be the name or place of business of the person who is found to have infringed subs 120(1) or subs (2) of the TM Act. Taking use of a name as an example, only the person who goes by or uses that name, in this case Ms Hudson herself, can take advantage of the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. The person referred to in s 122(1)(a) and the person referred to in subs 122(1)(a)(i) are the same person. The same construction must apply to the person in s 122(1)(a) and the person’s place of business in subs 122(1)(a)(i).
614 Thirdly, I do not accept that the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act is only available to one person operating one business at a time. Rather its availability must be assessed by each act of infringement.
615 As for context, Pt 12 of the TM Act concerns infringement of trade marks. Sections 120 and 121 provide for the circumstances in which a trade mark is infringed and ss 122, 123 and 124 set out the circumstances in which a person does not infringe a registered trade mark. Insofar as s 122 is concerned, it sets out in subss (1)(a) to (g) and subs (2) circumstances in which, in spite of s 120, a person does not infringe a registered trade mark. In doing so, it provides for a number of different ways in which a person who might otherwise be taken to have infringed a registered trade mark under s 120 of the TM Act will not have done so. Each subsection needs to be considered on its own terms. A review of s 122 demonstrates that the defences provided for are not all limited in the same way as I have found to be the case for s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. For example, s 122(1)(d) provides that a person does not infringe a registered trade mark when the person uses the trade mark for the purposes of comparative advertising. On its face that subsection would have a wider application such that, in contrast to s 122(1)(a), a licensee or third-party user may take advantage of it.
616 The respondents rely on the decision in Smith & Nephew in support of their argument that they are not liable as joint tortfeasors where a third-party operator or licensee can take advantage of the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. In that case the plaintiff, Smith & Nephew Plastics Pty Ltd, commenced two proceedings for trade mark infringement against Fort Howard International Far East Ltd as defendant. Smith & Nephew Plastics was the registered proprietor of the word “Sweetheart” in class 21 for drinking cups and plastic food containers. The proceedings were commenced after the Comptroller-General of Customs had, at the request of the Smith & Nephew, seized goods pursuant to s 103(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) (1955 TM Act) consigned by the defendant bearing Smith & Nephew Plastic’s registered mark.
617 One of the contentions which the defendant relied on to demonstrate that the sale of its goods which had been seized by the Comptroller-General would not infringe Smith & Nephew Plastic’s registered mark was that use of the mark complained of, where it appears as part of the name of a company, is not infringement because of s 64(1)(a) of the 1955 TM Act. In relation to that argument at 290 King J said:
… This section provides that the use in good faith by a person of his own name is not infringement of a registered trade mark. It has been held that the use of a company name as a trade mark is protected by this provision: Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd [1962] RPC 265. The view has also been expressed that the name concerned need not be that of a defendant, but may be that of the manufacturer of the goods concerned: Baume & Co Ltd v A H Moore Ltd [1958] 1 Ch 907.
I think that where a person such as a manufacturing company has placed its name on goods in good faith, anyone who trades in those goods, and is thus prima facie liable to be sued for infringement, may take advantage of this defence. It has been argued on the basis of judgments of the House of Lords in Parker Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd, supra, that the protection extends to the use of a company name without reference to such features as “Ltd” and “Inc”. The question is whether such an abbreviation reduces the name used to less than the ordinary name of the person concerned: per Denning MR at 275.
618 In reaching her conclusion King J referred to the decision in Baume & Co Ltd v A H Moore Ltd [1958] 1 Ch 907, relying on it in support of the proposition that the name in s 64(1)(a) of the 1955 TM Act need not be that of the defendant but may be that of the manufacturer of the goods in question. In that case the plaintiffs operated a company which sold watches and was the registered proprietor of the trade mark “Baume”. The defendants carried on a business of importing watches which they sold to wholesalers, including watches bearing the mark “Baume & Mercier, Genève” or “Geneva”. The plaintiffs commenced a proceeding seeking to restrain the defendants either from infringing its mark or from passing off.
619 The Court of Appeal held that the defendants had infringed the plaintiffs’ mark unless they were entitled to the protection of s 8 of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK) (1938 Act (UK)). That section relevantly provided that “[n]o registration of a trade mark shall interfere with – (a) any bona fide use by a person of his own name or of the name of his place of business, or of the name, or of the name of the place of business, of any of his predecessors in business”.
620 In relation to the application of s 8 at 920 Romer LJ, who delivered the judgment of the Court, said:
Mr. Aldous, for the plaintiffs, contended before us that they are not. His argument, in summary, was that the section only protects a trader in the use of his own name if he uses it as the name of his business or on his stationery, invoices, etc., and that it does not protect him if he uses the name (assuming the likelihood of confusion) as a trade mark in respect of his goods; that the section was introduced into the Act ex abundanti cautela to show that the defence of bona fide user by a man of his own name as a business name which may be open to him in a passing off action is also available to him in an action for infringement of a registered trade mark. Mr. Aldous’s contention on this point would appear to have the support of a dictum of the Privy Council in de Cordova v. Vick Chemical Co. The Judicial Committee in that case was considering a section of the Jamaican Trade Marks Law which was the same, so far as relevant, as section 44 of the Trade Marks Act, 1905 (which was the forerunner of section 8 of the Act of 1938), and Lord Radcliffe said: “There is nothing in the section to suggest that it is directed specifically, if it is directed at all, towards protecting use by a person of a name or place of business or description by way of a trade mark.”
The expression of this view was, however, in no way necessary to their Lordships’ decision, and for ourselves we find some difficulty in accepting it. Section 8(a) is expressed in perfectly general terms, and we can see no sufficient warrant for confining its operation to the bona fide use by a trader of his own name as a trade name as distinct from using it as a trade mark. We do not accept Mr. Aldous’s suggestion that section 8 (the provisions of which were enacted in a somewhat narrower form by section 44 of the Trade Marks Act, 1905) was introduced merely ex abundanti cautela. It seems to us that its object was to ensure that the use by a man of his own name should be protected, provided that the user was bona fide, whether he traded under that name or whether he used it as a trade mark in respect of his goods; and, if the narrower interpretation for which Mr. Aldous contends is attributed to the section, it is difficult to apprehend the purpose of Parliament in enacting it at all. …
621 His Honour then went on to consider the meaning of “bona fide” used in s 8 of the 1938 Act (UK) before concluding at 921 as follows:
We would accordingly hold, were it necessary to do so, that the defendants were entitled to rely on section 8 of the Act as a defence to a claim for infringement, having regard to the finding of the judge that they acted in good faith.
622 In considering the application of s 8 of the 1938 Act (UK) the Court did not, in terms, state that a trader who used the name of a manufacturer in good faith on products which had been supplied to it by that manufacturer could have the benefit of the defence in s 8 of the 1938 Act (UK). Its consideration of the plaintiffs’ submissions in relation to the application of the section suggests that the defence is available to “the use by a man of his own name whether he traded under that name or whether he used it as a trade mark in respect of goods”.
623 It seems that the decision in Baume formed the basis for King J’s conclusion that a third-party trader in goods to which the infringing mark is affixed by a person in good faith and thus liable to be sued for infringement may take advantage of the defence in s 64(1)(a) of the 1955 TM Act. However, her Honour formulated her conclusion slightly differently insofar as who relevantly was required to show good faith in the use of their own name.
624 Section 64(1)(a) of the 1955 TM Act was similar in its terms to s 122(1)(a) and provided:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the following acts do not constitute an infringement of a trade mark:
(a) the use in good faith by a person of his own name or the name of his place of business or the name, or the name of the place of business, of any of his predecessors in business;
625 Even having regard to the decision in Baume, it is, with respect, difficult to see how her Honour came to her conclusion. First, the terms of s 64(1)(a) of the 1955 TM Act make the requirement that the name in question be that of the person using the infringing mark even more stark. Secondly, the observations in Baume were obiter. Thirdly, her Honour’s conclusion bifurcates the inquiry necessitated by s 64(1)(a) of the 1955 TM Act in that it focuses on the “good faith” of the manufacturer in using its name who is not the person who has engaged in the infringing conduct and who is seeking to take advantage of the defence.
626 In my view a proper construction of s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act does not permit a third-party trader, for example in the context of this case, Target, to take advantage of it. A person infringes a registered trade mark where s 120 of the TM Act is satisfied unless that person can bring him, her or itself within the terms of one of the defences in ss 122, 123 or 124 of the TM Act. Insofar as s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act is concerned it applies where the person who is found to have infringed a registered mark is the person who, in doing so, was using their own name or name of their place of business (or that of their predecessor). That outcome is not incongruous but is the result of the structure of the TM Act. As Ms Taylor observed it can be adequately dealt with in the market by indemnities which can be sought by traders in a mark from their licensors, suppliers or manufacturers.
627 The respondents raised two matters in support of their argument that s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act is available to them insofar as there is a finding that they are liable as joint tortfeasors.
628 The first was the effect of s 126 of the TM Act. That section sets out the relief which a court may grant in an action for infringement. Those remedies are available against a direct infringer and a joint tortfeasor. While the joint tortfeasor may by its actions infringe the registered trade mark, it does so because it acted in concert or had a common design with the direct infringer. In that way it breaches the statutory tort. It does not follow that the joint tortfeasor will have available to it all of the defences in s 122(1) of the TM Act.
629 The second was that where there is a finding of liability for joint tortfeasorship there is one statutory tort committed by the joint tortfeasors such that it must follow that the joint tortfeasors had infringed subs 120(1) or (2) and are thus entitled to rely on the defence in subs 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. However, a finding that a person is liable as a joint tortfeasor is not a finding that that person engaged in conduct in breach of s 120 of the TM Act. Rather, there is first a finding that a person breached subs 120(1) or (2) of the TM Act, i.e. the direct infringer who engaged in the primary act of infringement, and secondly a finding that another person is liable as joint tortfeasor because that person had a common design with the direct infringer to commit the tort, namely to engage in the infringing conduct. That latter person did not commit the specific act that contravened subs 120(1) or (2) of the TM Act. In PDP Capital, at [42] the Full Court expressed the concept in the following way:
… The facts of the present case do not frequently arise. This is because the well-established law in relation to joint tortfeasorship provides an available means by which an alleged infringer, who has not engaged in a primary act of infringement within s 120, may nonetheless be found to infringe: see, for instance, Hashtag Burgers Pty Ltd v In-N-Out Burgers, Inc (2020) 385 ALR 514 (Hashtag Burgers) at [136]-[141] (Nicholas, Yates and Burley JJ). …
630 Thus in this case insofar as there is a finding that one or more of the respondents is a joint tortfeasor with a person who has infringed the Applicant’s Mark, such as Target i.e. a third-party trader or a licensee, they will remain liable as joint tortfeasors in relation to that infringement (even if one of them may have been able otherwise to take advantage of the defence). That is because the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act is only available to the person who is using the mark and joint tortfeasorship liability only arises where the person in question is not directly using the mark.
631 It follows from the above that, in my opinion, neither a third-party trader or licensee such as Target or a joint tortfeasor, in this case Kitty Purry, is able to rely on the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act.
632 That said, for completeness I note that where the direct infringer can take advantage of the defence, i.e. where the direct infringer is using his, her or its own name or the name of their place of business, and does so successfully then there can be no liability as a joint tortfeasor with that person or entity because there has been no infringement of the registered mark.
2.11.2.2 Section 122(1)(a) of the TM Act and Ms Hudson
633 Given my conclusion set out above only Ms Hudson, who I have found directly infringed the Applicant’s Mark in the ways set out at [583] above, can take advantage of the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act.
634 As set out above, Ms Hudson relies on s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act, namely that she did not infringe the Applicant’s Mark because she used in good faith her own name.
2.11.2.2.1 “The person’s name”
635 Section 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act requires use by a person of that person’s name. At least in the UK, there is authority to the effect that the fact that the person’s name is not the name on his or her birth certificate does not affect reliance on the subsection. In Mercury Communications Limited v Mercury Interactive (UK) Limited [1995] FSR 850 at 860, when considering whether the trade mark in question was “use by a person of his name”, Laddie J said:
… A name is “that by which a person or a thing is known or called” (Chambers 20th Century Dictionary). An individual may be christened John Smith and that may well be the, or a, name by which he is known or called. But he may also be known as John or Johnny or Mr Smith. All of these are his names. Furthermore the actor born as Archie Leech was known and called Cary Grant and the author Samuel Clemens was known as Mark Twain. In each case the adopted name was no less the individual’s name.
636 To similar effect in Hotel Cipriani SRL v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd [2010] RPC 16 at [66] Lloyd LLJ said:
… in principle an individual ought to be able to use the defence in relation to an adopted name by which he or she is known for business purposes or generally, for example an actor’s stage name or a writer’s nom de plume.
637 Ms Taylor drew the Court’s attention to SAP Australia Pty Ltd v Sapient Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 169; [1999] FCA 1027 in which the respondents relied on s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act in defence to a claim of infringement of the applicant’s mark. Justice Wilcox found against the applicant on the issue of deceptive similarity so that it was unnecessary to consider the defences. Nonetheless, at [43] his Honour indicated that he would not uphold the defence relying on s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act, except in relation to use of “Sapient Australia”, as distinct from use of “Sapient Corporation” or simply “Sapient”. His Honour recognised that the entitlement in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act had been held to apply to the use by a company of the whole of its name other than the concluding word “Ltd”, referring to Parker-Knoll Ltd v Knoll International Ltd (No 2) [1962] RPC 265 at 275. However, Wilcox J considered that the concession in Parker-Knoll “ought not be extended by permitting the jettisoning of other elements of a company’s title, to the detriment of the rights of a registered trade mark proprietor”.
638 In Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd (2018) 259 FCR 514 a Full Court of this Court (Nicholas, Yates and Beach JJ) found at [208], contrary to the finding of the primary judge, that the second respondent’s use of the names “Anchorage” and “Anchorage Capital” was not within the scope of the protection afforded by s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act. The second respondent’s name was “Anchorage Capital Group LLC”. That said, there was no issue that its use of the name “Anchorage Capital Group” was within the scope of s 122(1)(a)(i). In making its findings, the Full Court referred to the discussion in Parker-Knoll and the obiter comments of Wilcox J in SAP Australia, among others.
639 The first question that arises is whether Ms Hudson can rely on the name “Katy Perry” for the purposes of s 122(a)(i) of the TM Act. The respondents submitted that the Katy Perry Mark is like Cary Grant and Mark Twain, the name by which Ms Hudson is generally known and thus the name which Ms Hudson can rely on for the purposes of the section.
640 Ms Taylor submitted, relying on SAP Australia and Anchorage Capital that, whatever be the position in the UK, the “own name” defence has been interpreted in a narrow fashion, that there is no suggestion in the authorities that a business can take advantage of the defence because it is trading under a business name and there is no difference in principle between a stage name and a business name.
641 The decisions on which Ms Taylor relies in support of her contention are inapposite to the present situation. They concerned uses by a company of abbreviations or variations of their corporate names, beyond simply omitting the words “Pty Ltd” or “Ltd”. Ms Hudson does not, to adapt Wilcox J’s characterisation, “jettison” any part of her name, she does not suggest or use an abbreviation of “Katy Perry” such as “Katy” simpliciter or a variation of that name. Rather she relies on her stage name which is her “adopted name” and the name by which she is known: see Mercury Communications (above).
642 Contrary to Ms Taylor’s submissions, in adopting this approach, there is no uncertainty as to the scope of a relevant name. The relevant name is the name by which the person is known. In the case of Archie Leech it was Cary Grant. In the case of Ms Hudson it is Katy Perry.
643 Ms Taylor suggested that if the standard becomes a name by which someone is known, it is unclear how widely one must be known by reference to that name, or by whom, or for how long and whether a nickname would be sufficient. As to the former, that may be a question of fact to be determined but, in the instant case, there is no dispute that Ms Hudson is known by the name “Katy Perry”. As to the latter, it does not arise in this case.
644 Finally, on this issue Ms Taylor submitted that if s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act extends to a name by which a person is known, there must be some objective criterion by which to assess whether a person is “known” by a name and, having regard to the context of the defence, this should be by reference to the nature of the trade mark use that constitutes infringement. Ms Taylor said, if the defence applies to names other than legal names, it should not extend further than a name by which someone is widely known in Australia in the particular trading context in question. Here, the trading context is the promotion and sale of clothes. At the relevant date, Ms Hudson was not known by the name “Katy Perry” in respect of clothes. I reject this submission. There is nothing in the TM Act or the authorities to support this.
645 Ms Hudson is known as “Katy Perry”. That is the relevant name for the purposes of consideration of the defence in s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act.
646 The other requirement of the defence in s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act is that use of the person’s own name be in “good faith”. The respondents submitted that use of the name Katy Perry has at all times been in good faith because it has occurred with an honest belief that no confusion would arise from it. They rely on Mr Jensen’s evidence that from 2009, while he accepted that there was a risk that the applicant could sue for trade mark infringement, he did not consider there was any likelihood that members of the public would confuse clothing and other merchandise with Katy Perry’s name on it with clothes from Ms Taylor.
647 Ms Taylor submitted that even if Katy Perry was Ms Hudson’s name for the purposes of s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act, she cannot take advantage of the defence because on 16 December 2011 she assigned the “rights, titles and interests in and to” certain trade marks “together with the goodwill of the business symbolized by” those trade marks “as part of the entire business or portion thereof to which The Marks pertain as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1060” together with all rights to sue for past infringement. She contended that therefore only Killer Queen can take advantage of the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act.
648 That submission can be disposed of immediately. As set out at [614] above, the availability of the defence is to be assessed based on the particular act of infringement. I accept that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson could not both have the benefit of the defence in relation to the same act of infringement. Here, the only relevant acts of infringement are those established against Ms Hudson. The terms of s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act do not preclude her reliance on it as a defence. The section permits the person who uses in good faith their own name to rely on it.
649 Next Ms Taylor submitted that it was not in contest that a necessary condition for establishing good faith is that the party relying on the defence must not think that there will be confusion or have an intention to divert trade by their conduct and that this condition is met in this case. Ms Taylor contended that the flaw in the respondents’ approach is to present that condition as sufficient to make out the defence. According to Ms Taylor, it is not. She submitted that the term “good faith” is broad and can be absent even if the person relying on it does not think confusion will result and does not intend to divert trade. Ms Taylor submitted that “good faith” requires the respondent to prove just that and not merely proof of the absence of bad faith or conscious dishonesty and that there is an objective component to the test based on what a trader should do.
650 In order to address these submissions and to consider whether Ms Hudson used her name, Katy Perry, in good faith it is first necessary to consider the authorities on the meaning of “good faith” in this context.
651 The defence in s 122(1)(a)(i) was considered in Anheuser-Busch, Inc v Budějovický Budvar, Národní Podnik (2002) 56 IPR 182; [2002] FCA 390. In that case the respondent contended that the trade mark Budweiser Budvar, and particular variations of it, was used as part of the first respondent’s corporate name. Relevantly, the first respondent had more than one name: one in English; one in French; and one in Czech. The defence failed.
652 In rejecting the defence Allsop J (as his Honour then was) accepted that use of the mark “Budweiser Budvar, National Enterprise” on the allegedly infringing articles was a use of the first respondent’s English corporate name. However, based on the evidence, his Honour concluded that the use was not in good faith. His Honour reasoned at [199]:
As is clear from the evidence of Mr Bocek and others in proceedings elsewhere (see [175]–[179] above), speakers of German and English do sometimes associate Bud with Budweiser and with Budvar and some will abbreviate these latter two words to Bud. The first respondent knew, I would infer, that Australia was a largely English speaking country. It knew that Anheuser-Busch had registered Budweiser and Bud here. Research was done in Australia, at least as to registration. Little useful detail of the research was given in evidence. From knowledge of the sales activities of Anheuser-Busch in many countries and the strong reputation of Anheuser-Busch in some countries, plainly the first respondent and Mr Bocek knew of the existence of a reputation for Budweiser in Australia but not, perhaps, of its level. …
653 At [214] Allsop J noted that the first respondent relied on the decision in Baume as follows:
The first respondent relied on what the Court of Appeal said in Baume & Co Ltd, above at 235, about the phrase “bona fide” in the equivalent United Kingdom legislation in the provision, which was as follows:
The next point which was discussed before us was as to the meaning of “bona fide use” in s 8. Danckwerts J, said that he understood that “bona fide” normally “means the honest use by the person of his own name, without any “intention to deceive anybody or without any intention to make use of the “goodwill which has been acquired by another trader”; and in that sense he acquitted the defendants of any want of bona fides in the present case. We agree with the learned judge’s definition of the term “bona fide” and we see no reason to attribute a different or special meaning to the phrase in its context in s 8. The mere fact in itself that a trader is using his own name which too closely resembles a registered trade name of which he is aware does not prevent the user from being “bona fide”, provided that the trader honestly thought that no confusion would arise and if he had no intention of wrongfully diverting business to himself by using the name. The truth is that a man is either honest or dishonest in his motives; there is no such thing, so far as we are aware, as constructive dishonesty. In our judgment, if a trader is honestly using his own name, then no action will lie for infringement of trade mark and any rival trader who thinks himself aggrieved must sue, if at all, for passing off.
654 At [216]-[217] Allsop J observed the following about the principles set out in Baume:
[216] Leaving this qualification to Baume & Co Ltd, above, aside, it is clear that the Court of Appeal required for there to be “bona fide use” that “the trader honestly thought that no confusion would arise”. No witness for the first respondent so deposed. No witness explained why it was thought inappropriate (if anyone did so think) to use Budejovický Budvar, Národní Podnik as the company name and why it was thought appropriate to use a name with Budweiser in it. Rather, the only explanation was that it is the English name in the court register. However, as I have elsewhere noted, the case was conducted on the basis that there was no paramount Czech law requiring the use of this name in Australia. The using of a name including Budweiser was informed by a moral claim and, no doubt, a belief in a legal claim. However, the likely existence of a reputation of its rival in the territory was known. At best, the first respondent was only unaware of its strength. In these circumstances, if it had been positively believed that there would be no confusion, I think someone would have said so. I think that if one were aware of the reputation of Budweiser and Bud in Australia, it would be tolerably clear that despite the get-up differences and the obviously European source, there could well be some confusion in consumers as to whether this Budweiser did, or did not, have some connection with the Budweiser with which they were familiar. If Mr Bocek, as he says, was not aware from his company’s research of the “level” or quality of the reputation of Budweiser in Australia, that does not assist his or the first respondent’s position. He knew of a reputation. He knew of wide sales around the world of Anheuser-Busch’s Budweiser beer. He must have known that, as was the fact, it could well be the case that the Budweiser reputation was not insignificant in Australia. It is hard to see how he and his company could be sure, or could hold the view, that no confusion would arise. They have not persuaded me that anyone did hold that view. In these circumstances, I think it can be said that, though the first respondent and Mr Bocek were not consciously dishonest, the first respondent did not use, and does not intend to use, its own name in good faith for the purposes of s 122 of the TM Act.
[217] The satisfaction of the requirements of good faith is not concluded by a conclusion of lack of fraud or lack of conscious dishonesty: Johnson & Johnson v Sterling Pharmaceuticals, above at FCR 355–6; ALR 731; IPR 32–3 per Gummow J, with whom Lockhart J agreed on this point. In Adrema Ltd v Adrema-Werke GmbH [1958] RPC 323 at 334, in a passage referred to with approval by Gummow J in Johnson & Johnson v Sterling Pharmaceuticals, above, Danckwerts J said at 334:
I think that the defendants knew that such use was likely to cause confusion, and they were determined to make use of the goodwill in connection with the machines which was associated with the word “Adrema”. It may be that the German company resented the loss of the trade marks and the claim that the goodwill in the United Kingdom associated with the name “Adrema” was the property of an English company which they had formed and of which they had lost control as a result of the war. But, in my view, these motives do not justify what the defendants have done or make that bona fide.
(Emphasis added.)
655 At [218] Allsop J concluded that, while the findings his Honour had made did not quite reach the level of that described in Baume, they had the same consequence. His Honour found that was especially so when consideration was given to “the undermining of the benefits and protections intended to be afforded to registration which would occur if the facts, as [he] had found them, were to be characterised as exhibiting good faith”. The findings to which his Honour referred were those made at [216] (see [654] above) to the effect that there was no evidence given by the respondents that they positively believed that there would be no confusion and they failed to persuade his Honour that anyone held that view.
656 Ms Taylor submitted that in Anheuser-Busch Allsop J was not focussed exclusively on the existence or absence of confusion but that it was also relevant to consider the respondent’s conduct more holistically. While his Honour considered all of the relevant conduct of the first respondent, it is clear that he did so in the context of applying the test in Baume as is evident from the findings at [216] where his Honour referred to the relevant evidence about use of the first respondent’s name, found that no one gave evidence that the first respondent held the belief that no confusion could arise from that use and found that it was hard to see, given the relevant facts, how the first respondent could convince him that that could be the case.
657 In Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 89 IPR 457; [2010] FCA 1380 at [161] Yates J, relying on Baume, stated that the term “in good faith” used in s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act means honest use. At [163] his Honour added that a use in good faith for the purposes of s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act does not cease to be in good faith when the likelihood of deception is brought to the notice of the alleged infringer. On appeal a Full Court of this Court (Cowdroy, Middleton and Jagot JJ) refused leave to the appellant to raise a new point to challenge this finding. This was because, as the point had not been taken before the primary judge, no evidence had been adduced about the use of the first respondent’s name in the future. But, in any event, the Full Court observed that it did not follow from the primary judge’s findings about the potential for confusion that any future use by the first respondent of its name would necessarily be other than in good faith and neither Baume nor Anheuser-Busch supported such a conclusion: see Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (2011) 197 FCR 67 at [74].
658 In Flexopack Beach J also considered the “own name” defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. At [108], his Honour said:
Third, the requirement that the use be “in good faith” is a requirement of honesty (Optical 88 at [161] per Yates J). This requires an honest belief at least at the time of adopting the mark that no confusion would arise by reference to the earlier trade mark’s reputation and that there was no intention to divert trade (Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 308 ALR 1; 105 IPR 1; [2013] FCAFC 153 at [73] and [74] per North, Middleton and Barker JJ). But this is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
659 At [109] Beach J noted that one of the issues that had arisen was whether use that might once have been in good faith could still be characterised as such once the respondent became aware of the existence of the trade mark owner, the registration of the trade mark and/or of potential confusion that might arise in the market place. At [160] his Honour addressed the issue in the following way:
Can such later “own name” use be in good faith where a respondent has been put on notice? In the United Kingdom, in Cipriani at [149] referring to Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] RPC 40; [2004] EWCA Civ 159, Arnold J discussed that it was necessary to stop once placed on notice. I take a similar position and would, generally speaking, answer such a question in the negative. If the defence does apply to an earlier period, it would not apply to continued use such as to excuse future conduct after receipt of the letter of demand where a respondent was put on notice of the applicant’s position and the potentiality for real confusion.
660 On this issue at [163] Beach J concluded that once a respondent has been put on notice and has knowledge of the potentiality for real confusion, it is difficult to see how the requirement of good faith could be made out. See too Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Henley Constructions Pty Ltd (2021) 163 IPR; [2021] FCA 1369 at [748]-[750].
661 For completeness I note that at [110]-[118] Beach J included the following further matters as principles applicable to s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act:
[110] Fifth, a lack of good faith may be found where the person acts in a deliberate manner to take advantage of another party’s reputation, in other words, is fraudulent or dishonest. But it does not necessarily follow, however, that in the absence of fraud or dishonesty, good faith is established.
[111] The test to be applied is in one sense objective. If a person does not take steps that an honest and reasonable person would take to ascertain the ability to use a trade mark, and has in effect taken a risk, then they are not acting in good faith. If the Respondents are to avail themselves of this defence they must show that their conduct was in good faith. The onus rests on them.
[112] Further, good faith might, for example, be shown by showing that legal advice was sought. …
[113] Sixth, the position in the United Kingdom, which deals with analogous legislation enforcing European Community Trade Marks, is not unhelpful in considering what conduct constitutes good faith. Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark Article 12 states as follows:
A Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using in the course of trade:
(a) his own name or address;
…
provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. (emphasis added)
[114] The United Kingdom applies an objective test. This provision was discussed by Arnold J in Hotel Cipriani Srl v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd [2008] (2008) 79 IPR 621; EWHC 3032 (Ch) at [142] to [152] (confirmed on appeal in Hotel Cipriani Srl v Cipriani (Grosvenor Street) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 110).
[115] Cipriani noted at [151] and [152] that the assessment of the defence required an objective consideration of the steps taken by the relevant person in adopting the company name. Such an approach is consistent with the approach taken by Allsop J (as he was then) in Anheuser-Busch, Inc v Budìjovický Budvar, Národní Podnik (2002) 56 IPR 182; [2002] FCA 390 at [193]-[219] (Anheuser-Busch Inc). The mere ignorance of the trade mark is not sufficient to enliven the defence. Moreover, a lack of fraud or a lack of conscious dishonesty does not establish the flip-side requirement of good faith. I accept though that Anheuser-Busch Inc has distinguishing features that are not present in my case.
[116] Seventh, in my view, good faith in s 122 is properly interpreted as requiring reasonable diligence to ascertain that a chosen name does not conflict with a registered trade mark.
[117] …
[118] If only subjective knowledge was relevant, a person could use the good faith defence despite not having taken any appropriate steps to inform himself of any relevant existing trade marks. This has the potential to undermine the utility of a registered trade mark. The reasonableness or lack thereof of the steps undertaken by the First Respondent in the choice of its company name is to be considered in light of the effect on the trade mark owner. If good faith were to be construed as merely being satisfied on the basis of a stated subjective belief that one did not know of the other, it could lead to a situation where one could justify trade mark use with one’s ignorance. The failure to make proper inquiries should not place a respondent in a better position than if such inquiries had been made.
662 His Honour found that the defence was not available in that case because the respondent’s belief that it was entitled to pursue the registration of the relevant mark was misconceived, it was in breach of the applicant’s rights and wishes.
663 Ms Taylor relied on a number of other decisions in which the Court concluded that the respondent in each case had not demonstrated use in good faith for the purposes of s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act. Each of those decisions turns on its own facts and it is not necessary to set them out here.
664 Based on the authorities set out above I would distil the following principles. First, in order to be able to rely on s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act Ms Hudson must establish that she uses her name, Katy Perry, in good faith. In turn in order to do so she must establish that use of the name was honest use. That is, applying the test in Baume, she must have honestly thought that no confusion could arise and that she had no intention of wrongfully diverting business to herself by using the name. Secondly, as observed in Anheuser-Busch at [217], satisfaction of the requirements of good faith is not concluded by a lack of fraud or lack of conscious dishonesty: see Anheuser-Busch at [217]. Thirdly, and to similar effect there may be a lack of good faith where the person acts in a deliberate manner to take advantage of another party’s reputation, i.e. acts dishonestly, but it does not necessarily follow that in the absence of fraud or dishonesty, good faith is established: see Flexopack at [110], and there may be a level of objectivity to the test as described in Flexopack at [111] (see [661] above).
665 I turn to consider the facts in this case and whether Ms Hudson has established that the use of her name, Katy Perry, was honest use.
666 Merchandise, including clothes, bearing the Katy Perry Mark was first developed and sold via the Bravado Website prior to the respondents having knowledge of the Applicant’s Mark. Mr Jensen became aware of the Applicant’s Mark in May 2009. But, Ms Hudson first used the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia after she became aware of the Applicant’s Mark and did so notwithstanding that her attempts to co-exist with Ms Taylor failed and with knowledge of registration of the Applicant’s Mark. Critically, Mr Jensen honestly believed that no confusion was likely to arise from the sale of clothes bearing Katy Perry’s name. In particular:
(1) in June 2009, when he authorised the US lawyers for Ms Hudson to seek to resolve the dispute with Ms Taylor on the basis of a mutually satisfactory co-existence arrangement, he did not consider there was any likelihood that members of the public would confuse clothing and other merchandise with Katy Perry’s name on it with clothes of Ms Taylor. Rather, he thought it was possible that the members of the public might confuse Ms Taylor’s clothes with those of Ms Hudson or her licensees and that, if this occurred, it would not adversely affect Ms Taylor and might benefit her given Ms Hudson’s popularity in Australia (see [146] above);
(2) in July 2009, when the Extension of Time Application was withdrawn, Mr Jensen was not concerned because he did not consider there was any likelihood that members of the public would confuse clothing and other merchandise with Katy Perry’s name on it with clothes of Ms Taylor (see [179] above);
(3) also in July 2009, when Mr Jensen discussed with Ms Hudson the intention to withdraw the Extension of Time Application he informed her that he was “not concerned if we pull out and she registers her trade mark because the public would not confuse your Katy Perry branded tour merchandise with this lady’s clothes”. Ms Hudson agreed with Mr Jensen’s thinking (see [180] above);
(4) when Ms Hudson was in Australia in August 2009 for The Hello Katy Tour, at which she sold KETY PERRY branded merchandise, Ms Taylor did not make contact which led Mr Jensen to believe that there was no real likelihood of subsequent contact. He thereafter proceeded at all times on that basis;
(5) when the 2011 Bravado Agreement was negotiated, and Mr Jensen recommended that Ms Hudson enter into it, he gave no consideration to Ms Taylor and at that time was not aware of any cases of the public being confused that clothes with the Katy Perry name and brand on them were Ms Taylor’s clothes or otherwise associated with Ms Taylor. At that time, it did not occur to him that the public would be confused in that way (see [206] above); and
(6) similarly when the 2014 Bravado Agreement was negotiated and Mr Jensen recommended Ms Hudson enter into it and the Purrfect Ventures Agreements were negotiated and entered into, Mr Jensen gave no consideration to Ms Taylor and at the relevant times was not aware of any cases of the public being confused that clothes with the Katy Perry name and brand on them were Ms Taylor’s clothes or otherwise associated with Ms Taylor (see [226] and [233] above).
667 None of this evidence, the effect of which is that Mr Jensen held an honest belief that no member of the public would likely confuse clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark with clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark, was challenged. It must follow, given the working relationship between Mr Jensen and Ms Hudson and that at all times, Ms Hudson acted on Mr Jensen’s recommendation, that Ms Hudson held the same belief.
668 Nor when one looks at the circumstances in which Ms Hudson used and uses her name could it be said that there was or is a lack of good faith on her part. First, it could not be said that there was no intention by Ms Hudson to divert trade way from Ms Hudson or to seek to make use of any goodwill in the Applicant’s Mark. That is because, at the time of first use there was no reputation in the Applicant’s Mark and, even many years later, there was and is only limited reputation in the Applicant’s Mark. Indeed the evidence demonstrates that Ms Taylor sought to obtain publicity for herself by reference to Ms Hudson rather than vice versa. Secondly, while Ms Hudson was aware of the Applicant’s Mark at the time she first used her own name on clothes in Australia and took a calculated risk in proceeding, that risk was taken in circumstances where Mr Jensen held an honest belief as to lack of confusion. Thirdly and similarly, Mr Jensen’s concession that he understood that Ms Taylor may sue for infringement and may be successful in such a claim is also to be viewed in the context of his belief that there was no likelihood of confusion.
2.11.3 Section 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act – would the respondents obtain registration of the Katy Perry Mark for clothes?
669 Section 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act (see [273] above) provides that a person does not infringe a registered trade mark when:
(1) the person uses a trade mark that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the registered trade mark; and
(2) the court is of the opinion that the person would obtain registration of the substantially identical or deceptively similar trade mark in his or her own name if the person were to apply for it.
670 The availability of the defence in s 122(1)(fa) is to be assessed as at the date of the first alleged infringing conduct. That is, the hypothetical registration for the purposes of s 122(1)(fa) is to be assessed at the date of the “person’s” first infringing use of the impugned mark: see Sensis Pty Ltd v Senses Direct Mail and Fulfillment Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 719 at [58]-[65]; Henley Arch at [672].
2.11.3.1 The parties’ submissions
671 The respondents submitted that Ms Hudson first allegedly infringed the Applicant’s Mark in late September or early October 2008 when clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark were first available for purchase by persons in Australia via the “Katy Perry” online store on the Bravado Website. They contended that for the other corporate respondents the earliest dates they could be said to have infringed are: for Killer Queen, 27 August 2009, being the date it was incorporated; for Kitty Purry, 10 February 2011, being the date of the 2011 Bravado Agreement; and for Purrfect Ventures, September 2016 given that it was incorporated on 7 September 2016 and the Purrfect Ventures Agreements (in particular the agreement with GBG) were entered into on 16 September 2016. The respondents submitted that Ms Hudson would have been entitled to register the Katy Perry Mark in class 25 for clothes at the earliest of those dates i.e. late September or early October 2008.
672 The respondents submitted that the Court would not conclude that Ms Hudson’s putative application for registration of the Katy Perry Mark would have been refused on the basis of s 44(1) of the TM Act (unless she could rely on s 44(3) or s 44(4) of the TM Act). They contended that, while for the purposes of s 44(1) of the TM Act they have admitted that the Katy Perry Mark is deceptively similar to the Applicant’s Mark, at the relevant time Ms Hudson would have established honest concurrent use of the Katy Perry Mark pursuant to s 44(3)(a) or alternatively would have established that, because of other circumstances, it was proper to register the Katy Perry Mark pursuant to s 44(3)(b) of the TM Act.
673 Insofar as honest concurrent use pursuant to s 44(3)(a) of the TM Act is concerned, the respondents submitted that the rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application for registration and that the principal criteria for determining whether registration should be permitted include: the “commercial” honesty of the concurrent use; the extent of the use in terms of time, geographic area and volume of sales; the degree of confusion likely to ensue between the marks in question; whether any instances of confusion have been proved; and the relevant inconvenience that would ensue to the parties if registration were to be permitted.
674 As to the “commercial” honesty of the concurrent use, the respondents submitted that the evidence establishes that Ms Hudson, and her agents and representatives, acted with “commercial honesty” or “common honesty” when they entered into negotiations with Bravado for the sale of KATY PERRY branded merchandise, including in Australia, in July to September 2008 and when the “Katy Perry” online store went live on the Bravado Website, at which time members of the public from Australia could access the website and purchase KATY PERRY branded merchandise. The respondents contended that there is no evidence that Ms Hudson or her agents were aware of Ms Taylor at that time and Mr Jensen’s unchallenged evidence was that he first became aware of Ms Taylor in about May 2009.
675 As to the extent of the use, the respondents submitted that while Ms Hudson’s use of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia in relation to clothes as at late September to October 2008 was limited, the Katy Perry Mark otherwise had a significant reputation at the time connoting the nationally and internationally famous pop star.
676 As to the degree of confusion likely to ensue between the marks, the respondents submitted that: because of the significant reputation of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia at the time and lack of reputation of the Applicant’s Mark, no confusion of the relevant kind would have been likely to ensue from registration of the Katy Perry Mark; the only confusion likely to ensue between the marks was that of goods to which the Applicant’s Mark was applied, connoting some sponsorship or approval of Ms Hudson; and such confusion could only benefit Ms Taylor and certainly would not inconvenience her. They submitted that confusion of this kind would have been likely to ensue whether or not the Katy Perry Mark was registered and so could hardly have been a reason for refusing to register that mark.
677 The respondents submitted that had Ms Hudson applied for registration of the Katy Perry Mark in late September or early October 2008 it would have been established that no instances of any relevant confusion had occurred and they contended that the same applies at all times up to the present day. They contended this is significant because where there has been a long period of concurrent use, as is the case here, the absence of evidence of actual confusion in the marketplace will support a finding of honest concurrent use and the balance of convenience will often favour the applicant for registration.
678 As to the relative inconvenience that would ensue to the parties if registration were to be permitted, the respondents submitted that factor would strongly favour registration of the Katy Perry Mark and that there could have been no inconvenience to Ms Taylor. As at late September or early October 2008, refusing to register the Katy Perry Mark would have caused significant inconvenience to Ms Hudson because, despite being well-established by reference to the “Katy Perry” name as a nationally and internationally famous pop star, she would not have been able to obtain trade mark protection for that mark in relation to goods in class 25.
679 The respondents submitted that the same reasoning on honest concurrent use under s 44(3)(a) of the TM Act applies in respect of each of Killer Queen, Kitty Purry and Purrfect Ventures as at the later dates relevant to them and, in respect of each of them, the case for registering the Katy Perry Mark pursuant to s 44(3)(a) of the TM Act would have been all the stronger at those later dates as use of the Katy Perry Mark had increased and a longer period had elapsed with no instances of any confusion.
680 In relation to s 44(3)(b) of the TM Act the respondents submitted that the circumstances found to be relevant in assessing “other circumstances” include use of the mark overseas, the absence of evidence of actual confusion resulting from prior use of the Katy Perry Mark, the low likelihood of confusion resulting from use of that mark and that the trade mark applied for is Ms Hudson’s name. They contended, having regard to those matters, it is clear that, at the relevant times, each of them would have been likely to obtain registration of the Katy Perry Mark in class 25, had they applied for it.
681 Ms Taylor submitted that the Court must determine when each of the respondents first used the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark on clothing in Australia and that on any view of the evidence that must have been after the Priority Date. She contended that was so because:
(1) Mr Jensen accepted that the Bravado Website was not accessible to the public until at the earliest October 2008, which was after the Priority Date;
(2) whatever Mr Jensen might have recalled, the documentary evidence indicated that the Bravado Website would not have been public until it was referred to on Ms Hudson’s website and blog between about 7 to 10 October 2008; and
(3) even in the absence of Mr Jensen’s admission or the documentary evidence, the respondents’ evidence indicated that the first infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Hudson could not have occurred until 2009 because the respondents’ evidence is not and has never been sufficient to constitute use of the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia via that website.
682 Ms Taylor submitted that the earliest evidence of infringement of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Hudson occurred in June 2009 when Ms Hudson applied for registration of the Katy Perry Mark in respect of clothes. That being so, there could be no honest concurrent use satisfying s 44(3) of the TM Act because the very first use by Ms Hudson of the Katy Perry Mark on clothes was infringing use. She submitted that the same principle applies with even more force with respect to the other respondents because their first uses of the mark occurred even later in time, after the Applicant’s Mark was registered.
683 For those reasons Ms Taylor submitted that ultimately the asserted good faith or otherwise of Ms Hudson or lack of confusion or any other factors are irrelevant and that there can be no concurrent use because the date of infringement, at which time the hypothetical question in s 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act is addressed, is the date of the first use and at that point in time there was no use at all.
684 The first question to address is when each of the respondents, and most relevantly Ms Hudson, first used the Katy Perry Mark as a trade mark in Australia on clothes.
685 On one view of the evidence, the earliest date of use by Ms Hudson of the Katy Perry Mark is October 2008 which was the date that I have found that the Bravado Website went live and was accessible via Ms Hudson’s website. However, Ms Taylor contends for a later date, namely June 2009 when Ms Hudson applied for registration of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia in relation to class 25 for clothes.
686 Whether that is so depends on whether the evidence is sufficient to establish use of the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia via the Bravado Website. A screenshot of the “Katy Perry” webstore as it appeared on the Bravado Website as at December 2008 appears at [97] above. It shows that there was an ability to ship “worldwide” and provided a general phone number for those outside the US to call to buy goods over the phone. Mr Jensen understood that any member of the public from any country around the world, including Australia, who could access the website was able to purchase KATY PERRY branded merchandise from it (see [98] above).
687 However, neither Mr Jensen nor any other person gave evidence that the Bravado Website could be accessed by people in Australia. Mr Jensen’s evidence rose no higher than a general understanding. There was no evidence that the use was specifically intended to be made in, or directed or targeted at, Australia. In Ward Group at [40]-[41] Merkel J relevantly said:
40 A similar approach has been taken in relation to publications or statements made on the internet. When such publications or statements are made to the world at large, and not to persons or subscribers in a particular jurisdiction, there is some difficulty in regarding them as having been made by a website in a particular jurisdiction. However, where the publication or statement is directed or targeted at persons or subscribers in a particular jurisdiction there is no difficulty in treating them as having been made and received in that jurisdiction: …
41 On the facts of the present case the first occasion on which the website proprietors would be considered to have intended to use and used the Restoria mark in Australia was when they accepted the orders placed by the trap purchasers in respect of the UK Restoria products in terms that used the Restoria mark. The reason I have arrived at that conclusion is that prior to that time the trap purchasers were downloading a representation made on the internet to the world at large, and not a representation intended to be made to, or directed or targeted at, them in Australia. Thus, I do not accept the contention made by the Ward Group that the use of the Restoria mark by the website proprietors on the internet, without more, was a use of the mark by them in Australia.
688 The same can be said here. While it may have been possible to buy goods from the Bravado Website and have them shipped to Australia, the website was not specifically directed to customers in Australia but was directed to the world at large. There is no evidence of anyone in Australia ever having placed any orders or having had such orders accepted by the operators of the Bravado Website in 2008, nor indeed of the website being specifically directed to people in Australia. For those reasons there was no use of the Katy Perry Mark by Ms Hudson in Australia in relation to clothes in October 2008 when the Bravado Website was first accessible.
689 Rather, the earliest evidence of use of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Hudson was on 26 June 2009 when Ms Hudson’s TM Application was lodged (see [153] above).
690 The respondents rely on s 44(3)(a) and (b) of the TM Act. That section relevantly operates where an application for a trade mark is rejected because it is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar or closely related goods and the priority date for the applicant’s trade mark in respect of its goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark for the similar goods: see s 44(1). In those circumstances the application for registration may be accepted if the Registrar is satisfied that: (a) there has been honest concurrent use of the two trade marks; or (b) because of other circumstances it is proper to do so.
691 Ms Taylor contended that as at June 2009, or even October 2008, the first use by Ms Hudson of the Katy Perry Mark would have infringed the Applicant’s Mark. That is Ms Hudson’s first use was also the first date of infringement. On that basis Ms Taylor contended that by June 2009 there could be no honest concurrent use capable of satisfying s 44(3)(a) of the TM Act and the defence under s 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act, insofar as it relies on s 44(3)(a) must fail, relying on Sensis at [65]. However, in Sensis the respondents conceded that if the time at which the defence in s 122(1)(fa) is to be assessed is at the time of the first infringing conduct, it would not be able to rely on s 44(3) of the TM Act because its first use of the infringing mark constituted the infringing conduct. No such concession is made by the respondents in this case.
692 The respondents rely on McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick (2000) 51 IPR 102; [2000] FCA 1335 in support of their contention that the fact that the date of first use is also the date of first infringement does not lead to the conclusion contended for by Ms Taylor and preclude their reliance on s 44(3)(a) of the TM Act. In McCormick the applicant appealed from a decision of a delegate of the Registrar permitting registration by the respondent, Mrs McCormick, of two word marks based on s 44(3) of the TM Act.
693 At [30] Kenny J, in considering whether there had been honest concurrent use of the trade marks in issue by Mrs McCormick, identified the following non-exhaustive factors as relevant to determining whether registration should be permitted pursuant to s 44(3)(a):
(1) the honesty of the concurrent use;
(2) the extent of the use in terms of time, geographic area and volume of sales;
(3) the degree of confusion likely to ensue between the marks in question;
(4) whether any instances of confusion have been proved; and
(5) the relevant inconvenience that would ensue to the parties if registration were to be permitted.
694 At [31]-[32] Kenny J said in relation to the “honesty of use”:
[31] The rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application for registration — in this case, 9 March 1992: ….
[32] The honesty of concurrent use refers to “commercial honesty, which differs not from common honesty”: see Re Parkington & Co Ltd’s Application (1946) 63 RPC 171 at 182. In that case, Romer J said at 181–2:
[T]he circumstances which attend the adoption of a trade mark in the first instance are of considerable importance when one comes to consider whether the use of that mark has or has not been a honest user.
695 Her Honour referred to Mrs McCormick’s concession that at the time she chose the name for her product, instant batter, she was aware that certain mixed herbs, paprika, pepper and basil products were sold under the applicant’s brand but she did not think there would be any confusion about the source of her product because, among other things, instant batter was a different product to any products that were being sold by the applicant. Her Honour concluded that the “mere fact that at the time when she and her husband chose the name McCormick’s [Mrs McCormick] knew of the company’s use of its marks on its products does not preclude a finding that she acted honestly” and accepted that Mrs McCormick’s initial adoption and use of the mark in issue was honest: McCormick at [33].
696 The respondents observed that Mrs McCormick’s first use of the trade marks in issue was after the applicant’s mark was registered and was thus infringing use but that did not preclude her reliance on s 44(3) of the TM Act and, despite the fact that she used her marks with knowledge of the applicant’s mark, her use was found to be honest.
697 There is no explanation in Sensis of how the Court came to conclude that because the first use by the respondent was infringing use, it could not avail itself of the defence in s 122(1)(fa) based on s 44(3) of the TM Act. That is hardly surprising given the respondent’s concession in that case. However, whether the result in Sensis must necessarily follow where first use of a mark is found to be infringing use is not a matter that I need to resolve. That is because, in any event, I do not think that Ms Hudson or any of the respondents can have the benefit of s 44(3) of the TM Act and thus succeed in their defence based on s 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act.
698 The relevant facts here are that:
(1) in May 2009 Mr Jensen, and it follows Ms Hudson, became aware of Ms Taylor’s application for registration of the Applicant’s Mark in class 25 for clothes;
(2) Ms Hudson, through her lawyers, commenced corresponding with Ms Taylor and threatened proceedings if she did not stop using her mark;
(3) that correspondence continued and Ms Hudson filed the Extension of Time Application;
(4) in the course of those events on 26 June 2009 Ms Hudson’s TM Application was lodged. Ms Hudson sought registration of the Katy Perry Mark in classes 9, 25 and 41;
(5) Ms Hudson’s strategy changed after lodgement of Ms Hudson’s TM Application and she attempted to negotiate a co-existence arrangement with Ms Taylor. But Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson did not reach agreement and ultimately Ms Hudson withdrew the Extension of Time Application;
(6) on 21 July 2009 the Applicant’s Mark was entered on the Register; and
(7) on 10 September 2009 IP Australia informed Ms Hudson that it could not accept Ms Hudson’s TM Application because the Katy Perry Mark closely resembled the Applicant’s Mark and the goods claimed in class 25 were similar to goods claimed by the Applicant’s Mark in class 25. Ms Hudson was invited to address the problem by deleting the goods in class 25 from her application or by providing evidence of “prior use, honest concurrent use and/or other circumstances”. She elected to do the former.
699 In my opinion, use of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia at the date of the first infringing conduct, did not amount to honest concurrent use. Ms Hudson made her application for registration of the Katy Perry Mark in class 25 having knowledge of the Applicant’s Mark and while in the midst of a significant dispute about Ms Taylor’s entitlement to use and register the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Hudson wished to register the Katy Perry Mark in relation to a broad range of clothes in class 25. She knew at the time that the Applicant’s Mark presented a problem for her insofar as her use of that mark in Australia on clothes was concerned.
700 In contrast to the facts in McCormick, Ms Hudson was not intending to use the Katy Perry Mark in relation to one particular product, nor to sell clothes bearing that mark in a discrete geographical area, as was the case with Mrs McCormick who sold her instant batter first from her caravan from where she also sold fish and chips and later from stores in north Queensland. Nor is there any evidence before me to suggest that at the time Ms Hudson’s TM Application was lodged Ms Hudson held an honest belief that no confusion would result or any evidence of extensive use of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia in relation to clothes as at June 2009. To the extent that there was use, it was very limited.
701 While the lack of demonstrated confusion and the question of relative inconvenience might favour registration under s 44(3)(a), those factors are outweighed by my finding as to the circumstances in which Ms Hudson first used the Katy Perry Mark in Australia. In my opinion, there was no honest concurrent use, and arguably no use at all beyond the lodgement of Ms Hudson’s TM Application, of the Katy Perry Mark as at the relevant date, the first date of infringing conduct.
702 These findings apply equally to Killer Queen, Kitty Purry and Purrfect Ventures to the extent they can avail themselves of the defence in s 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act.
703 For the same reasons I would not conclude that the Katy Perry Mark would be registered on the basis that there are other circumstances which meet the requirements of s 44(3)(b) of the TM Act.
704 It follows that, to the extent that Ms Taylor has made out her claim for infringement against any of the respondents, they cannot rely on s 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act as a defence.
2.11.4 Conclusion on availability of defences
705 Given my findings on infringement of the Applicant’s Mark, only Ms Hudson has established an entitlement to rely on one of the pleaded defences, s 122(1)(a)(i) of the TM Act. As a result she has not infringed the Applicant’s Mark.
706 As set out at [6] above, by their further amended statement of cross-claim two of the respondents, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson, seek an order under s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act that the Register be rectified by cancelling the Applicant’s Mark. They make their application pursuant to the grounds in s 88(2)(a), relying on ss 60, 42 and 43 of the TM Act, and s 88(2)(c) of the TM Act. For completeness I note that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson notified the Court: in opening that they no longer pressed their cross-claim insofar as it relied on cancellation under s 88(2)(a) on the basis that Ms Hudson is the common law owner of the Applicant’s Mark, relying on s 58 of the TM Act; and in their closing submissions that they no longer pressed their cross-claim insofar as it relied on cancellation under s 88(2)(a) on the basis that Ms Taylor applied for the Applicant’s Mark in bad faith, relying on s 62A of the TM Act.
707 Part 8 of the TM Act concerns the amendment, cancellation and revocation of registration of a trade mark. Division 2 of Pt 8 is titled “Action by court” and includes s 88 which relevantly provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 89, a prescribed court may, on the application of an aggrieved person or the Registrar, order that the Register be rectified by:
(a) cancelling the registration of a trade mark; or
…
(2) An application may be made on any of the following grounds, and on no other grounds:
(a) any of the grounds on which the registration of the trade mark could have been opposed under this Act;
…
(c) because of the circumstances applying at the time when the application for rectification is filed, the use of the trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion;
…
708 Sections 42, 43 and 60 of the TM Act provide:
42 Trade mark scandalous or its use contrary to law
An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if:
(a) the trade mark contains or consists of scandalous matter; or
(b) its use would be contrary to law.
43 Trade mark likely to deceive or cause confusion
An application for the registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services must be rejected if, because of some connotation that the trade mark or a sign contained in the trade mark has, the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
…
60 Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia
The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:
(a) another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and
(b) because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
Note: For priority date see section 12.
709 Section 89 of the TM Act sets out the circumstances in which the Court may not grant an application for rectification of the Register. It provides:
89 Rectification may not be granted in certain cases if registered owner not at fault etc.
(1) The court may decide not to grant an application for rectification made:
(a) under section 87; or
(b) on the ground that the trade mark is liable to deceive or confuse (a ground on which its registration could have been opposed, see paragraph 88(2)(a)); or
(c) on the ground referred to in paragraph 88(2)(c);
if the registered owner of the trade mark satisfies the court that the ground relied on by the applicant has not arisen through any act or fault of the registered owner.
Note: For registered owner see section 6.
(2) In making a decision under subsection (1), the court:
(a) must also take into account any matter that is prescribed; and
(b) may take into account any other matter that the court considers relevant.
3.2 Section 88(2)(a) of the TM Act
710 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contend that the Applicant’s Mark is liable to be cancelled pursuant to s 88(2)(a) of the TM Act because they could have opposed registration of that mark under s 60, s 42 and/or s 43 of the TM Act.
3.2.1 Opposition under s 60 of the TM Act
711 The first basis on which Killer Queen and Ms Hudson seek cancellation of the Applicant’s Mark is because they say that they could have opposed registration of that mark under s 60 of the TM Act. That is they contend that:
(1) before the Priority Date for the Applicant’s Mark, 29 September 2008, in respect of clothes, the Katy Perry Mark had acquired a reputation in Australia;
(2) the Applicant’s Mark had not acquired a reputation in Australia in respect of clothes;
(3) as a result of those matters, use of the Applicant’s Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; and
(4) it follows that registration of the Applicant’s Mark could have been opposed under s 60 of the TM Act and is liable to be cancelled under s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act on the ground set out in s 88(2)(a) of the TM Act.
712 In Monster Energy Company v Mixi Inc (2020) 156 IPR 378; [2020] FCA 1398 at [13]-[22] Stewart J summarised the principles relevant to the application of s 60 of the TM Act as follows:
[13] The purpose of s 60 is to provide protection for well-known marks, whether registered or not, by preventing the registration of a trade mark if there is a likelihood of deception or confusion because of the reputation of the well-known mark in Australia as at the priority date: Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Marks Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) at [4.10(1)].
[14] Reputation in this context connotes the “recognition of [the mark] by the public generally” and includes the credit, image and values projected by the trade mark: McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick (2000) 51 IPR 102; [2000] FCA 1335 at [81] and [85] per Kenny J.
[15] Reputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements in public media within the jurisdiction. It may be established by showing constant travel of people between other countries and the jurisdiction, and that people within the jurisdiction (whether residents here or persons simply visiting here from other countries) are exposed to the goods of the overseas owner. See ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 at 343; 106 ALR 465 at 505; 23 IPR 193 at 234 (ConAgra) per Lockhart J, but see also at FCR 348; ALR 510; IPR 239 with regard to limited use of statistics of international travel.
[16] The assessment of the reputation of a trade mark goes far beyond mere examination of sales or turnover of goods sold under the trade mark and contemplation of the advertising and promotional figures. The quantum of sales, advertising and promotions contribute to the “recognition” component of reputation. The credit, image and values projected by a trade mark attach to the “esteem” component of the reputation, as do the public events and other traders’ marks with which the owner of the trade marks in question chooses to associate the trade marks via sponsorships, cross-promotions, and so forth. See Hugo Boss AG v Jackson International Trading Co Kurt D Bruhl mbH & Co KG (1999) 47 IPR 423 at 436, adopted in McCormick at [85].
…
[18] The likelihood of deception or confusion from the use of the opposed mark must arise because of the reputation of the other mark. The relevant comparison is between the reputation of the prior mark derived from actual use of that mark, and a notional normal and fair use of the mark sought to be registered in respect of each of the goods or services covered by the specification. See Vivo International Corporation Pty Ltd v Tivo Inc (2012) 294 ALR 661; 99 IPR 1; [2012] FCAFC 159 at [113]–[114] per Nicholas J, Dowsett J agreeing.
[19] The use to which the opposed mark has actually been put is of limited relevance. That is because it is the notional normal and fair use of that mark in respect of each of the goods or services covered by the specification that is relevant, and the mark, as in this case, might only have been used in relation to a very limited number of those goods or services. However, evidence as to the way in which the mark has actually been used may be regarded, in the absence of any reason to suppose otherwise, as illustrative of what would be normal and fair: Electrocoin Automatics Ltd v Coinworld Ltd [2004] EWHC 1498 (Ch) at [21].
[20] The objection under s 60 of the TM Act is not based on the requirement that the allegedly conflicting marks are substantially identical or deceptively similar. The question is purely one of prior reputation. Nevertheless, the degree of similarity between the allegedly conflicting marks will be a relevant consideration to be taken into account when considering the likelihood of confusion resulting from use of the opposed mark. See Qantas Airways Ltd v Edwards (2016) 338 ALR 134; 119 IPR 271; [2016] FCA 729 (Qantas) at [142] per Yates J.
[21] The parties place different emphasis on the relevance of the prior mark not having acquired a reputation in respect of the specific goods or services that are the subject of the proposed application. MEC draws attention to McCormick at [85] where statements are made that the volume of a company’s sales does not directly establish that a significant number of people held the relevant marks, as distinct from the company’s products, in favourable regard, and to the statement in Qantas at [143] that the prior mark need not have acquired a reputation that is specific to the goods or services which are the subject of the opposed application. Mixi draws attention to the statements in GAIN Capital UK Ltd v Citigroup Inc (No 4) (2017) 123 IPR 234; [2017] FCA 519 at [148] and [169] per Markovic J, citing Hills Industries Ltd v Bitek Pty Ltd (2011) 214 FCR 396; 90 IPR 337; [2011] FCA 94 at [208], that where an opponent has a reputation in particular goods or services but that reputation does not encompass the goods or services for which registration is sought, that may be a basis for finding that the ground of opposition is not made out. See also Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Optum Inc (2018) 140 IPR 1; [2018] FCA 575 at [203] per Davies J; Rodney Jane at [87], [116] and [149]–[150].
[22] The tests for deception and confusion hinge on the question of whether or not a reasonable number of people may be caused to wonder if a trade connection exists between the marks: Explanatory Memorandum at [4.10(3)], Southern Cross at CLR 595; McCormick at [82]. A mere possibility of confusion is not enough — there must be a real, tangible danger of it occurring: Southern Cross at CLR 595. Evidence of actual confusion is not required: Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v Bali Co Inc (1973) 129 CLR 353 at 355; 1 ALR 443 at 450 per Barwick CJ.
713 In order to successfully rely on this ground as a ground for cancelling the registration of the Applicant’s Mark, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson must establish: first, that the Katy Perry Mark had acquired a reputation in Australia as a trade mark before the Priority Date, 29 September 2008; and secondly, that, because of the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark, the use of the Applicant’s Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
3.2.1.2 Had the Katy Perry Mark acquired a reputation in Australia before the Priority Date?
714 Ms Taylor contended that any reputation gained prior to the Priority Date, which she submitted was insignificant, if at all, was that of Ms Hudson as opposed to that of the Katy Perry Mark. That was because when Ms Hudson released music by streaming or CD the name “Katy Perry” when used in connection with that music was not trade mark use. It was use to describe the content of the CD or the music by reference to the artist performing the work.
715 Ms Taylor submitted that evidence that merely establishes the fame and reputation of Ms Hudson as a person, even if by reference to the name Katy Perry is not relevant. Similarly, Ms Taylor submitted that the various Australian media reports in evidence which reported on the release of, and reviewed, Ms Hudson’s singles and her “One of the Boys” album, were not trade mark use. Nor were they apt to create a reputation in a trade mark because the coverage referred either to actions of Ms Hudson personally or to the album or song names. In support of that submission Ms Taylor relied on two decisions: Musidor BV v Tansing (t/as Apple Music House) (1994) 52 FCR 363 and Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc (2005) 156 FCR 344. It is convenient to set out a summary of those decisions.
716 In Musidor BV a Full Court of this Court (Davies, Gummow and Heerey JJ) considered the question of whether the use in question was trade mark use. The appellant, Musidor BV, was the registered owner of the trade mark “Rolling Stones” for compact discs and sound recordings. The trade mark was applied to all sound recordings of the group “The Rolling Stones”. The respondent was in the business of selling compact discs of live music performances by a range of performing artists and music groups. He released two CDs in Australia for sale of sound recordings of live performances given by The Rolling Stones. Both the packaging and the discs bore the respondent’s label but the covers of the discs also bore the words “The Rolling Stones” above a photograph of the group.
717 The respondent commenced a proceeding seeking a declaration that his use of the words “Rolling Stones” on the covers of the CDs was not trade mark infringement. Musidor BV commenced proceedings for infringement of its registered trade mark. At first instance the Court found that it was not infringement of the trade mark “Rolling Stones” to sell CDs with covers containing those words. Musidor BV appealed. By a majority (Heerey and Gummow JJ), its appeal was dismissed.
718 At 376-377 Heerey and Gummow JJ said:
On the question of infringement, one asks whether in the setting of the packaging and on the discs themselves in which the words “The Rolling Stones” are depicted, that phrase appears as an expression which the manufacturer of the disc is using for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between him and the disc contained within the packaging.
Turning to the discs first released for sale, in our view the use on the packaging and on the discs themselves of the words “The Rolling Stones” would convey to the prospective purchaser that if that person purchased the disc and put it on a compact disc player there would emerge music of the well known group “The Rolling Stones”. It is of fundamental importance to the purchaser to be able to identify, before purchasing the disc, the particular musicians whose performance or whose music is recorded.
…
We accept the submission for the respondent that the words “The Rolling Stones” are not used for the purpose of indicating a connection in the course of trade between him and the discs or any other goods in respect of which the trade marks are registered. Rather, they are used here to identify a recording made many years ago of a live performance by those persons in the United States, which has been reproduced and embodied in the discs manufactured by the respondent. That is not a trade mark use by the respondent; cf News Group Newspapers Ltd v Rocket Record Co Ltd (supra) at 98; Unidoor Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc [1988] RPC 275 at 280; Re Polar Music International AB 714 F 2d 1567 at 1572 (1983). If it matters, there is force also in the further submission, that, as a practical matter, there is no other way in which identification readily can be made of the group, a sound recording of whose performance is embodied in the discs.
719 In Christodoulou the applicant sought a declaration that the respondents had infringed his registered trade mark for “The Hunchback of Notre Dame” by using it as a trade mark in connection with the film of the same name and on related products. One of the questions before the Court was whether, in each case, the sign was used (or procured to be used) as a trade mark. In answering that question at [45] Crennan J noted that the relevant inquiry involves consideration of the context, purpose and nature of each allegedly infringing use. Her Honour identified that the question to be asked was “whether the respondents’ uses of the words THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME are uses to indicate a relevant connection in the course of trade or to distinguish the respondents’ goods from those of other traders”. In each case her Honour found that the relevant uses were not uses as a trade mark and thus there was no infringing conduct.
720 In particular in relation to CDs, digital versatile discs and audio cassettes at [51]-[52] her Honour said:
51 In [Musidor BV] it was accepted by Gummow and Heerey JJ at 376-377 that the words THE ROLLING STONES used on the allegedly infringing CDs were not used for the purpose of indicating a connection in the course of trade between the respondent and the discs: rather, the words were used to identify a recording of a live performance of the band of that name. Their Honours noted at 377 that,
If it matters, there is force also in the further submission that, as a practical matter, there is no other way in which identification readily can be made of the group, a sound recording of whose performance is embodied in the discs.
52 Similarly, here, the Disney films are animated versions, namely cartoons, of a classic story. Without listening to the recordings themselves, it is apparent that the songs, music and animation which feature on the DVDs, CDs and audio cassette tapes are those which were featured in the Disney film versions of the Hugo story. By using the words THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME on the covers of their DVD, CD and audio cassettes, the respondents describe the contents of the recordings and there is no readily apparent way other than the use of such words to describe the contents accurately, so as not to mislead the consumer.
721 Ms Taylor also submitted that, in any event, the evidence did not establish there was a significant reputation in the Katy Perry Mark as at the Priority Date.
722 I turn to consider whether the Katy Perry Mark had gained a reputation in Australia as a trade mark prior to the Priority Date or whether any reputation obtained as at that date was simply that of Ms Hudson personally.
723 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson rely on the following evidence to establish reputation in the Katy Perry Mark prior to the Priority Date:
(1) Columbia Records’, which at the time was Ms Hudson’s record label, release of Ms Hudson’s single “Simple”, a track on the soundtrack for the film “The Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants”, which grossed over US$1.3 million upon its release in Australia on 23 June 2005;
(2) in November 2007 Ms Hudson’s release of the single “Ur So Gay” on MySpace and in January 2008 its release on CD;
(3) on 17 June 2008 Ms Hudson’s release of her second studio album “One of the Boys” which included the singles “Ur So Gay”, “I Kissed a Girl”, “Hot n Cold”, “Thinking of You” and “Waking Up in Vegas”;
(4) the publicity received by the “One of the Boys” album in many Australian newspapers and the fact that it was number seven in Sanity Music’s bestselling albums in the week prior to 7 August 2008;
(5) by 4 September 2008 “I Kissed a Girl” had been at number one in the Australian charts for six weeks;
(6) that the singles “I Kissed a Girl” and “Hot n Cold” were both in the Australian top ten in the week of 15 September 2008, were reported as numbers four and five respectively on iTunes in 2008 and were both in ARIA’s “End of Year Charts – Top 100 Singles in 2008” in Australia;
(7) Ms Taylor’s purchase of the single “I Kissed a Girl” in July 2008 from iTunes and her later report to a journalist that she found it “catchy”;
(8) Ms Taylor’s acceptance that from around July 2008 Ms Hudson was a nationally and internationally famous pop star; and
(9) Ms Hudson’s performances at the “Warped Tour” concert tour between 20 June and 17 August 2008 which was covered by journalists in North America and overseas. DMG pursued merchandising opportunities for Ms Hudson in connection with the tour which included registering the Katy Perry Mark for apparel in class 25 in the US and arranging for a range of KATY PERRY branded merchandise to be specifically designed and produced for the tour by a US company called Chaser.
724 There was no dispute that by the Priority Date Ms Hudson had released several singles and her “One of the Boys” album. Nor could there be any dispute that by that time at least the singles “I Kissed a Girl” and “Hot n Cold” and the “One of the Boys” album had achieved significant exposure in Australian media, the singles had been played on Australian radio and each had achieved a level of popularity given their respective rankings on the Australian charts.
725 Given the level of their popularity and the wide reporting in the media I would infer that those singles and the album had been widely marketed and indeed offered for sale. “I Kissed a Girl” and “Hot n Cold” ranked as numbers four and five on iTunes. It also follows that the marketing and the sale of those singles and the “One of the Boys” album was by reference to “Katy Perry”. In my opinion that name was not affixed to the singles or the album (or referred to in any marketing material in relation to them) merely to describe the performer of the singles and the songs in the album as was the case in Musidor BV. The use was as a trade mark. The name “Katy Perry” functioned as a badge of origin and indicated the source of the music. That is, when seen in context, the message conveyed by use of the name “Katy Perry” was as to the origin of the music.
726 In Musidor BV, the manufacturer of the CDs in issue was using the words “The Rolling Stones” to describe the live recording of a concert by that group which was reproduced on the CD. In contrast, here Ms Hudson was using her own stage name, “Katy Perry”, in connection with her own singles and album released by her to indicate a connection in the course of trade between her and those singles and her album.
727 While the media coverage relied on by Killer Queen and Ms Hudson does not constitute trade mark use, it includes numerous references to the “Katy Perry” name under which Ms Hudson was selling her singles and the “One of the Boys” album and, to that extent, refers to the Katy Perry Mark. It evidences the extent of Ms Hudson’s reputation before the Priority Date in Australia.
728 In relation to Ms Taylor’s submissions about the lack of evidence to establish Ms Hudson’s reputation in the Katy Perry Mark as at the Priority Date I note the following:
(1) I accept that Mr Jensen’s evidence about the periods from 2000 to 2002 and 2004 to early 2008 is irrelevant. During the earlier period Ms Hudson used her name “Katy Hudson” and the evidence in relation to the later period is limited to activity undertaken by Ms Hudson in the US. In any event, with one exception, the respondents do not rely on this evidence to establish reputation in the Katy Perry Mark prior to the Priority Date;
(2) the exception is the release of the music video for the single “Simple” from the soundtrack for the movie “The Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants”. The release of the film itself in Australia is not evidence of trade mark use as neither Ms Hudson nor the name “Katy Perry” are referred to in the film’s credits. Further, while the music video for “Simple” has had over five million views (see [33] above), there is no evidence before me as to the number of views as at the Priority Date or the extent to which the views were by persons in Australia. I did not take this evidence into account in coming to my views recorded above;
(3) I do not accept that there was no evidence that the single “Ur So Gay” received publicity in or was known to Australians. Indeed the contrary is true. For example:
(a) an article which appeared in The Courier Mail on 19 June 2008 reported that:
LA girl Katy Perry is being billed as America’s answer to Lily Allen. Her first single, Ur So Gay, was a minor internet hit but this latest single and its sexy video is really steaming things up. The song has been topping the iTunes chart. and is hitting Oz radio this week. Despite its massive radio and dancefloor potential. Perry is holding on to her indie cred: she’s about to go out on the Vans Warped Tour in the US, as well as appearing as herself in the daytime soap The Young and the Restless
(b) an article which appeared in The Guardian on 25 June 2008 reported on the song “Ur So Gay”. The introduction to the article provides:
This week Anna Pickard lets ‘US Lily Allen’ Katy Perry strip away her cynicism with her feisty break-up ditty Ur So Gay. ‘U’ being the ex and ‘Gay’ being used to be mean ‘metrosexual’, of course. Hell hath no fury and all that ...
(c) an article which appeared in The Herald Sun on 17 July 2008 included:
Clearly Perry and her peeps have decided the best way she can dent the charts is to play up some sort of queer angle. Sadly for ,her a debut single Ur So Gay - in which she disses an emo-esque ex for not eating meat and driving electric cars - failed to capture the public’s attention last year. This was primarily because it was a tuneless, attention-seeking piece of crap. …
While this article is critical of the song “Ur So Gay” it does not follow that because one music writer was critical of it no fame or reputation could have vested in the Katy Perry Mark as a result of its release. It is apparent from this article and the others referred to above that the single was available in Australia;
(4) I accept that the “Warped Tour”, during which Ms Hudson performed in the US, of itself cannot assist to establish reputation in the Katy Perry Mark in Australia; and
(5) I do not accept that it was only after the Priority Date that the “One of the Boys” album achieved success in Australia. Based on the evidence before me, including the media attention, I would comfortably infer that it achieved success and sales in the period prior to the Priority Date. True it is that it reached greater heights by 15 October 2008 when it was reported that the album was “gold” but, in order to reach that level by mid-October, there must have been significant sales and recognition of it prior to that date. It cannot sensibly be suggested that it only achieved success and the level of sales required for it to achieve “gold” in the two weeks from the Priority Date to 15 October 2008.
3.2.1.3 Is the use of the Applicant’s Mark likely to deceive or cause confusion?
729 Once the question of whether the reputation in the prior mark is established, as it has been in relation to the Katy Perry Mark, the next question to resolve is whether, because of that reputation, use of the Applicant’s Mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
730 The test for establishing whether use of a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion is summarised in Monster Energy at [22] (see [712] above). In short, a mere possibility of confusion is not enough; there must be a real, tangible danger of confusion occurring. It will be sufficient if as a result of use of the mark a reasonable number of people will be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products come from the same source.
731 The question of whether, because of the reputation in the other trade mark, the use of the first mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion is asked as at the Priority Date. However, evidence of use of a trade mark after the Priority Date may be relevant as later events may cast light upon the true position at an earlier date: see GAIN Capital UK Ltd v Citigroup Inc (No 4) (2017) 123 IPR 234; [2017] FCA 519 at [156]. Further, while it is not necessary to establish a reputation for the other trade mark in respect of the particular goods and services which are sought to be opposed, the distinction between those goods and the registered goods and services may be a relevant matter to consider. In GAIN Capital at [148] I relevantly observed that:
Where an opponent has a reputation in particular goods or services but that reputation does not encompass the goods or services for which registration is sought, that may be a basis for finding that s 60 is not made out. In Hills Industries Ltd v Bitek Pty Ltd (2011) 214 FCR 396 Lander J considered a ground of opposition under s 60 as it appeared prior to the 2006 amendments. His Honour had found that there was no reputation in Hills’ mark prior to the priority date but, in any event, went on to consider whether the use of the trade mark sought to be registered would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. His Honour observed at [208] that:
Assuming, contrary to my opinion, that the Hills’ mark had acquired a reputation, it had only acquired, at the priority date, a reputation in respect of set-top boxes. Hills did not contend for any other reputation. If that was the case, the use of the Bitek mark in respect of its goods was not likely to deceive or cause confusion because the goods were unrelated to a set-top box. Bitek’s goods specifically excluded set-top boxes. A consumer wishing to acquire a TV installation accessory or external antenna bearing the Bitek brand would not in my opinion be likely to be confused or deceived as to the origin or provenance of those products because of Hills’ mark’s reputation in set-top boxes. For that further reason, Hills could not rely upon s 60 to defeat Bitek’s application for registration.
See also Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Optum Inc (2018) 140 IPR 1; [2018] FCA 575 at [203].
3.2.1.3.2 The parties’ submissions
732 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that, because of the reputation of the Katy Perry Mark at the Priority Date, which had come to signify to the Australian public that, when used in relation to merchandise, such goods were supplied by or with the licence or approval of Ms Hudson, the use of the Applicant’s Mark in relation to clothes was likely to cause deception and confusion. They said that while Mr Jensen deposed that he did not consider that there was any likelihood that members of the public would confuse clothing and other merchandise bearing the Katy Perry Mark with clothes from Ms Taylor, there was a real possibility that the converse may occur. That is, because of the reputation of the Katy Perry Mark, members of the public might confuse Ms Taylor’s clothes with clothes bearing Ms Hudson’s stage name, “Katy Perry”, on them and members of the public might have cause to wonder whether clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark were connected to Ms Hudson.
733 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that this is particularly so when it is recalled that the likelihood of deception or confusion is to be considered by reference to any notional normal and fair use of the Applicant’s Mark. They said that, given that the Applicant’s Mark is registered (and, at the Priority Date, was sought to be registered) in respect of clothes generally, any notional normal and fair use of it would include use on the sorts of clothes generally sold by touring pop stars as distinct from the more conservative type of clothing actually made by Ms Taylor at the time. Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that would include use on items such as hoodies, t-shirts, tank tops and booty shorts and that it was “all but inevitable” that, as at the Priority Date, at a time when Ms Hudson was taking the world’s pop charts “by storm” and receiving regular media coverage, use of the Applicant’s Mark on clothes of that kind would have given rise to a real, tangible danger of a reasonable number of people being caused to wonder whether such clothes might not have a trade connection with Ms Hudson.
734 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contended that, consistently with Monster Energy at [21], it is no answer for Ms Taylor to assert that the reputation of the Katy Perry Mark was not specifically in respect of clothes, but largely in connection with music and entertainment services. They submitted that while there is authority to the effect that a lack of reputation of the prior mark in the goods for which the opposed mark is registered may be a basis for finding the ground of opposition has not been made out, that principle applies in circumstances where the goods or services in respect of which the opposed mark is sought to be registered are unrelated to the goods or services in which the prior mark has a reputation. Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that because the goods in respect of which the Applicant’s Mark is registered, clothes, are related to entertainment and music, being goods and services in which the Katy Perry Mark had a significant reputation before the Priority Date, the principle does not apply.
735 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contended that there is ample evidence showing that as at the Priority Date it was well known that clothing and fashion was a common area in which celebrities launch brands. They observed that Ms Taylor, albeit after being pressed in cross-examination, conceded as much. Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that because of this connection, a consumer perusing or purchasing clothing bearing the Applicant’s Mark would be caused to wonder if a trade connection exists between the two marks.
736 Ms Taylor submitted that the respondents have not established any likelihood of deception or confusion arising because of the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark. She said that Mr Jensen’s evidence on the issue is mere assertion and speculation and the Court could not place any weight on it.
737 Ms Taylor submitted that: while the question is asked as at the Priority Date, it is relevant to consider what as a matter of fact has occurred regarding deception or confusion after that date; she has continuously traded under the Applicant’s Mark from the Priority Date to the present day; and there is no evidence of any deception or confusion ever having arisen from her use of the Applicant’s Mark.
738 Ms Taylor submitted that, consistent with actual events, deception or confusion is inherently unlikely. Any minimal reputation that existed in the Katy Perry Mark at the Priority Date related to Ms Hudson as a performer, not the goods in relation to which the Applicant’s Mark was sought to be registered, i.e. clothes. She submitted that the absence of any suit for misleading or deceptive conduct against her since 2008 or any cross-claim in this proceeding seeking relief pursuant to the Australian Consumer Law (ACL), being Sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), is a useful guide as to whether s 60 of the TM Act could be satisfied. If the respondents were genuinely concerned that persons in Australia could or would be confused by use of the Applicant’s Mark they would not have merely filed a “defensive” cross-claim and Ms Hudson would not have sought co-existence with her in 2009, or at any time.
739 As to notional use, Ms Taylor submitted that at least by 2019 Ms Hudson had sold a wide variety of clothing, not simply merchandise style touring clothes. She submitted that while the respondents focus on the width of the notional use Ms Taylor could make of her mark, giving examples of clothes she could have sold which were more similar to the styles of clothes sold by Ms Hudson, it is also relevant to consider the increasing range of clothes sold by Ms Hudson over the period from 2008, some of which were similar to Ms Taylor’s style of clothes and none of which, on the evidence, led to any confusion with Ms Taylor’s use of the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Taylor submitted that it is wrong to imply that there was a clear distinction between the kinds of clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark and the Katy Perry Mark noting for example that her “Adelaide” top and pants were similar to sweatpants sold by the respondents or the sleepwear sold by Target bearing the Katy Perry Mark.
740 Having regard to the evidence before me and notwithstanding my finding that the Katy Perry Mark had a reputation prior to the Priority Date, I am not satisfied that, because of that reputation, use of the Applicant’s Mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion. That is, I am not satisfied that as at the Priority Date there was a real, tangible danger of a reasonable number of people being caused to wonder whether a trade connection existed between the Applicant’s Mark and the Katy Perry Mark. I have reached that conclusion for the following reasons.
741 First, the question is to be resolved as at the Priority Date. At that time the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark was in relation to entertainment and music. True it is that there is evidence of Ms Hudson’s intention to use the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes. That was the very reason why, in mid-2009, she attempted to resolve her dispute with Ms Taylor and to enter into a co-existence agreement which, if agreed by both parties, would have meant that each could use their respective marks in relation to clothes. It was also the case that in 2008 Ms Hudson offered merchandise including clothes for sale during the “Warped Tour”, although there is no evidence that Ms Taylor was aware of that fact. But that does not alter the fact that Ms Hudson’s reputation in the Katy Perry Mark as at the Priority Date was limited in the way described.
742 In my opinion, clothes are not related to entertainment and music as the respondents contend. It may be that popular music stars such as Ms Hudson lend their names (and trade marks) to be used in connection with clothes and sell merchandise at their concerts but that does not make a reputation in one thing, i.e. entertainment and music, related to another, in this case clothes. As a matter of fact, at the time Ms Hudson had not launched her clothing brand and the Katy Perry Mark had no reputation in clothing.
743 Secondly, there is simply no evidence of any confusion as at the Priority Date or since that time. As Ms Taylor pointed out, the respondents sought a category of discovery from her which would have uncovered any communication referring to Ms Hudson in the periods from 1 July 2008 to 1 July 2011 (covering the period leading up to the Priority Date) and 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2019, presumably in order to uncover any evidence of confusion. No such evidence was produced and none was tendered. That Ms Taylor has continued to use the Applicant’s Mark since the Priority Date without a skerrick of evidence of any confusion on the part of any member of the public tells against the existence of any deception or confusion in any person. This is so notwithstanding Ms Hudson’s increasing fame since the Priority Date.
744 Further in their submissions in support of the availability of the defence in s 122(1)(fa) of the TM Act in answer to Ms Taylor’s infringement claim the respondents submitted, on the question of confusion, that because of the significant reputation of the Katy Perry Mark in Australia at the time and the lack of reputation in the Applicant’s Mark no confusion of the relevant kind would have been likely to ensue from registration of the Katy Perry Mark (see [675]-[676] above). Among other things, they submitted that had Ms Hudson applied for registration of the Katy Perry Mark in late September or early October 2008 it would have been established that no instances of any relevant confusion had occurred and that was so at all times up to the present day. That is the respondents and thus Killer Queen and Ms Hudson accept that there was no confusion as at the Priority Date and that position has remained unchanged.
745 Despite those submissions and their acceptance that there has been no confusion, in the context of s 60 of the TM Act, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contend that the lack of actual confusion was because of the scale of Ms Taylor’s business at the time and the lack of reputation in the Applicant’s Mark as at the Priority Date. There is no dispute that Ms Taylor’s business was and is a small business. As at the Priority Date it was in a developmental stage and, despite progressing, it has not grown substantially. But the reputation in the Applicant’s Mark is not a relevant inquiry for s 60 of the TM Act. Section 60 calls for a comparison between the reputation of the prior mark derived from its actual use and a notional and normal fair use of the opposed mark.
746 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson’s reliance on Rodney Jane Racing Pty Ltd v Monster Energy Company (2019) 142 IPR 275; [2019] FCA 923 is misplaced. In that case Rodney Jane Racing Pty Ltd (RJR) applied for registration of three trade marks in relation to alloy wheels for car, each of which used the word “Monster” (RJR marks). The respondent, Monster Energy Company (MEC), a supplier of energy drinks, opposed the registration. Among others, MEC relied on s 60 of the TM Act as a ground of opposition. In setting out the applicable legal principles O’Bryan J observed that the parties’ submissions were at variance on a number of matters. This included at [88] that:
Third, there was some disagreement as to whether the use of the RJR marks before the priority date was relevant to the s 60 assessment. MEC submitted that the use or reputation of opposed marks is generally not relevant to the comparison of marks under s 60. The language of s 60 asks simply whether the use of the opposed mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion because of the reputation of the prior mark. The assessment is made by considering a notional normal and fair use of the opposed mark. MEC accepted that account could be taken of the notional consumer’s familiarity with an element of the opposed mark where that element has a degree of notoriety or familiarity of which judicial notice can be taken (such as the brand Woolworths): Woolworths at [61] per French J; CA Henschke & Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (2000) 52 IPR 42; [2000] FCA 1539 at [52]; Crazy Ron’s at [90]; Australian Meat Group at [41]. However, it submitted that that principle has no application to the RJR marks. RJR submitted that it is well established that, when assessing whether a party (here MEC) had acquired a distinctive reputation in a mark, third party usage of that mark “weighs heavily against the conclusion” (Yarra Valley Dairy Pty Ltd v Lemnos Foods Pty Ltd (2010) 191 FCR 297; 90 IPR 117; [2010] FCA 1367 at [256]–[257] per Middleton J) and that third party usage will make it more difficult for a party to establish that use of that mark is likely to deceive (Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Australia Pty Ltd (2014) 316 ALR 590; 107 IPR 333; [2014] FCA 568 at [580] per Murphy J, in the context of passing off and misleading or deceptive conduct). RJR submitted that it followed that use of the RJR marks before the priority date would be relevant to the s 60 assessment in so far as that use diminished the likelihood that the MEC marks had acquired a distinctive reputation in the word “Monster” (also relying on Colorado Group Ltd v Strandbags Group Pty Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 506; 243 ALR 127; 74 IPR 246; [2007] FCAFC 184 at [136] per Allsop J). That proposition was accepted by MEC.
747 In Rodney Jane Racing there was a question about third-party usage of the word “Monster” and its impact on whether MEC had acquired a distinctive reputation in its marks. That is because RJR argued that MEC could not have established a reputation in the word “Monster” as other traders (including RJR) had used that word as an element of their marks before the priority date. The authorities referred to demonstrate that third-party usage makes it more difficult to establish deception by use of the opposed mark. The parties accepted that it followed from that proposition that use of the RJR marks before the priority date would be relevant insofar as that use diminished the likelihood that the trade marks owned by MEC had acquired a distinctive reputation in the word “Monster”. That is very different to the facts before me. Here, there is no third-party use and Ms Taylor does not challenge the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark on that basis.
748 In Monster Energy at [19] Stewart J observed that the use to which the opposed mark has actually been put is of limited relevance but regard may be had to it, where there is an absence of any reasons to suppose otherwise, as “illustrative of what would be normal and fair use” (see [712] above). While the respondents accept that the assessment of s 60 is to be made by considering a notional normal and fair use of the opposed mark, they further submitted that that does not mean that the actual reputation of the opposed mark is entirely irrelevant to that assessment. The respondents submitted that the assessment of whether, because of the reputation of the Katy Perry Mark, the use of the Applicant’s Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion would be skewed without any consideration of the existing reputation of the Applicant’s Mark. In support of this submission, the respondents cited The Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd v Hoyt Food Manufacturing Industries Pty Ltd (2003) 61 IPR 334; [2003] ATMO 61 in which a delegate of the Registrar observed at [95]:
In addition, some consideration of the reputation of the applicant’s trade mark and the effects of that reputation may also be appropriate in these considerations. If the estimate is of the effects of the use of the parties’ trade marks, this estimate is likely to be skewed without a consideration of the existing reputation of the applicant’s trade mark and its effects.
749 The respondents are not assisted by their reliance on the cited passage in The Hoyts Corp. In that case, the applicant for registration of the opposed mark, Hoyts Food Manufacturing Industries Pty Ltd, had a turnover of many millions of dollars a year in relation to its goods which were sold under the opposed trade mark and which had, at the priority date, been in use for almost 40 years. The delegate found (at [98]) that the goods to which the opponent, Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd objected were goods “which the public [had], in the main, a better, or more realist, rational basis for any belief that the goods might originate with the applicant”. That is very different to the facts before me. I do not consider that the reputation of the Applicant’s Mark as derived from its actual use is of a comparable nature such that an assessment of the ground under s 60 of the TM Act would be “skewed” without having regard to it.
750 Thirdly, it is necessary to consider the notional and fair use of the Applicant’s Mark on the Registered Goods, clothes, in the course of trade and, in particular, whether such use would be likely to cause deception or confusion. The respondents submitted that I should consider use of the Applicant’s Mark on the types of clothes that are generally sold by touring pop stars: hoodies, T-shirts, tank tops and booty shorts. However, I am not convinced that there is the bright line of distinction between the clothes offered for sale by Ms Taylor bearing the Applicant’s Mark and those likely to be offered for sale bearing the Katy Perry Mark for which Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contend. The type of clothing designed by Ms Taylor, such as jogger style pants and t-shirts, are similar to those which might be offered for sale by a touring pop star and, in fact, were later offered for sale by the respondents or their licensees.
751 But, in any event, I do not consider that use of the Applicant’s Mark on clothes of the type identified by Killer Queen and Ms Hudson would have given rise to a real, tangible danger of a reasonable number of people being caused to wonder whether those clothes might not have a trade connection with Ms Hudson. While the Applicant’s Mark and the Katy Perry Mark are the same aurally, they differ, albeit slightly, visually, and even when affixed to the same types of clothing a performer such as Ms Hudson might offer for sale and sell, they would not cause deception or confusion. The difference in spelling of “Katie” is immediately apparent and the more conservative appearance of the Applicant’s Mark differentiates it from the Katy Perry Mark. Further, unlike the clothes to which the Applicant’s Mark is affixed, including items such as t-shirts, the clothes offered for sale by the respondents rarely bear only the Katy Perry Mark on them. Usually it is accompanied by graphics or photos of Ms Hudson.
752 In fact Ms Taylor used the Applicant’s Mark in relation to t-shirts as early as July 2008 (see [116] above) and as I have already found to be the case there is no evidence of actual confusion arising from the marketing and sale of that t-shirt (or any other clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark) at the Priority Date and no evidence of any confusion since. That is a powerful factor in this case.
753 While I am satisfied that the Katy Perry Mark had acquired a reputation in Australia at the Priority Date, I am not satisfied that, because of that reputation, the use of the Applicant’s Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. It follows that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson have not made out their ground for cancellation of the Applicant’s Mark based on s 60 of the TM Act.
3.2.2 Opposition under s 42 TM Act
754 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contend that registration of the Applicant’s Mark could have been opposed under s 42(b) of the TM Act because its use in relation to clothes would have been contrary to law as amounting to misleading or deceptive conduct in breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), as the law in force before the Priority Date, and constituting unlawful passing off.
755 In their further amended statement of cross-claim Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contend that:
(1) by no later than August 2008 the name, brand and trade mark Katy Perry had come to signify to the public in Australia, when used in connection with clothes and similar merchandise, that such goods were supplied by or with the respondents’ approval;
(2) the respondents had, before the Priority Date, a reputation in Australia in the name, brand and trade mark Katy Perry including in relation to clothes and similar merchandise;
(3) by reason of the matters referred to at (1) and (2) above, use of the Applicant’s Mark in relation to clothes would amount to misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 18 of the ACL (although as set out above and, more accurately, in their written submissions Killer Queen and Ms Hudson rely on s 52 of the TPA, the predecessor section which was in force as at the Priority Date) and constitutes unlawful passing off; and
(4) by reason of those matters, registration of the Applicant’s Mark could have been opposed under s 42(b) of the TM Act and the Applicant’s Mark is liable to be cancelled under s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act on the ground set out in s 88(2)(a) of that Act.
756 Section 52 of the TPA relevantly provides that a person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
757 The parties were agreed that where a party is unable to satisfy the requirements of s 60 of the TM Act it will be unable to establish breach of s 42(b) of the TM Act by reason of a breach of s 52 of the TPA or s 18 of the ACL. That is because the requirements to establish the latter are more onerous: see for example Monster Energy Co v Darma (2017) 128 IPR 54; [2017] ATMO 4 at [59]-[60].
758 It follows that, as I have not found that, because of the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark, use of the Applicant’s Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion, I could not be satisfied that by using the Applicant’s Mark Ms Taylor has engaged in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, contrary to s 52 of the TPA given the more onerous requirements to establish breach of that section. Accordingly, this ground of opposition is not made out.
3.2.3 Opposition under s 43 TM Act
759 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson contend that:
(1) before the Priority Date the Applicant’s Mark connoted Ms Hudson and/or Killer Queen and, when used in relation to clothes or similar merchandise, that the merchandise was supplied with their licence or approval;
(2) because of the connotation that the Applicant’s Mark has, its use in relation to clothes would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; and
(3) by reason of those matters, registration of the Applicant’s Mark could have been opposed under s 43 of the TM Act and it is liable to be cancelled under s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act on the ground set out in s 88(2)(a) of that Act.
760 As set out at [709], s 43 of the TM Act provides that an application for registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods must be rejected if, because of some connotation that the trade mark or sign contained in the trade mark has, the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
761 In Pfizer Products Inc v Karam (2006) 219 FCR 585 at [52]-[53] Gyles J said the following about s 43:
52 Section 43 does not have a long pedigree. It was enacted pursuant to Australia’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994, done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 (TRIPS). TRIPS and the 1992 Working Party Report led to the Trade Marks Bill 1994 (Cth) containing the following cl 42(2):
“An application for the registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services must be rejected if the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods or services would be likely to deceive or cause confusion regarding:
(a) the nature, quality, origin, intended purpose, or some other characteristic, of the goods or services; or
(b) any connection or relationship that they may have with any particular person.”
That Bill was enacted but never came into force. In the Trade Marks Bill 1995 (Cth) (and the 1995 Act) cl 42(2) of the 1994 Bill was replaced by what is now s 43 of the 1995 Act. The Explanatory Memorandum stated that cl 43 provides:
That an application for registration must be rejected if the trade mark … because of some signification inherent to it, would be likely to deceive or cause confusion regarding a characteristic of the goods or services.
(Emphasis added.)
It seems that the final form of s 43 is a wider version of the earlier clause with a similar purpose.
53 “Connotation” is a secondary meaning implied by the mark. The likelihood of deception or confusion must flow from the secondary meaning inherent in the mark itself. It is apparent that the underlying purpose of s 43 is a similar purpose to that lying behind ss 52, 53 and 55 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). It is to prevent the public being deceived or confused as to the nature of the goods offered by reason of a secondary meaning connoted by the mark in question, rather than, for example, deception by reason of similarity with other marks (TGI Friday’s Australia Pty Ltd v TGI Friday’s Inc (2000) 100 FCR 358 at [43]; McCorquodale v Masterson at [25]-[26]). Section 43 might well prevent the registration of HERBAGRA for classes of goods with no connection with herbal ingredients.
762 McCorquodale v Masterson (2001) 63 IPR 582; [2004] FCA 1247 concerned an appeal from a decision of a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks dismissing an opposition to registration of a trade mark. The respondent had applied to register a trade mark for use in connection with live roses that comprised the words “Diana’s Legacy in Roses”, pictures of doves and flowers and a stylised letter “D”. The applicants, who included the executors of the estate of Diana, Princess of Wales, opposed registration of the trade mark on a number of grounds including under s 43 of the TM Act. In relation to that ground of opposition, at [25]-[26] Kenny J said:
[25] …In an opposition to registration, s 43 of the Act requires an opponent to show that: (1) there is a connotation in the proposed trade mark or in a part of it; and (2) because of this connotation, the use of the proposed mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The connotation must be contained within the mark itself: see TGI Friday’s at FCR 365; ALR 134–5; IPR 520–1 per Wilcox, Kiefel and Emmett JJ.
[26] The word “connotation” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, UK, 1989, as meaning:
1. The signifying in addition; inclusion of something in the meaning of the word besides what it primary denotes; implication.
…
b. That which is implied in a word in addition to its essential or primary meaning.
In order for s 43 to apply, the court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood of deception or confusion arising because of the connotation within the mark, having regard to the nature of the goods or services to which it is to apply and other relevant considerations: see, for example, the discussion in Down to Earth (Victoria) Co-operative Society Ltd v Schmidt (1998) 41 IPR 632 at 644–5.
763 At [27] after referring to the observations of French J in Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 365 at [50] where his Honour, in addressing an opposition under s 44 of the TM Act, set out the principles which apply when considering the issue of deceptive similarity by reference to the decision in Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592 at 594-5, her Honour said:
… Allowing for the differences between ss 43 and 44 of the Act, these observations may assist in the construction and application of s 43. It must be borne in mind, however, that s 43 does not require that there be a conflicting trade mark. Section 43 concentrates instead on the effect of a connotation contained in the impugned mark.
764 Justice Kenny found that the ground of opposition was made out. At [60] her Honour concluded that:
As we have seen, the authorities recognise that, in circumstances such as these, the sponsorship or endorsement of the proprietor of the intellectual property in the name or image of a celebrity may well be implied. Whether or not it does is a matter of fact and degree. As I have said, I am satisfied that the words “Diana’s Legacy in Roses”, together with the stylised “D”, directly and immediately connote the late Princess Diana. The practice of licensing names and likenesses of celebrities, such as the late Princess, is now well recognised in the community. Although the Princess did not in her lifetime derive any personal profit from the use of her name and image, she plainly used (or permitted the use of) her name and image for the fundraising activities of the charitable causes that she supported. As already found, before the priority date, a relevantly significant sector of consumers knew of the fund and its licensing and charitable activities. The goods to which the impugned mark would apply have a real connection in the public mind with the late Princess. In all the circumstances, I find that the impugned mark would not only directly and immediately connote the late Princess, the impugned mark would also bespeak an association with the fund and the estate of the late Princess. There is a real likelihood that consumers would understand that goods bearing the impugned mark are in some way sponsored or approved by the fund or the Princess’ estate, even if they were ignorant about the specific details of the arrangements. The likelihood of this misunderstanding is sufficient to create a likelihood of confusion and deception in Australia, by reason of the connotation of the mark.
765 Section 43 of the TM Act is directed to the mark itself and is not concerned with any deception or confusion caused by the reputation in Australia of some of other trade mark: see Winton Shire Council v Lomas (2002) 119 FCR 416 at [19].
3.2.3.2 The parties’ submissions
766 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that before the Priority Date the Applicant’s Mark connoted Ms Hudson (who by 29 September 2008 had established significant reputation in Australia) and, when used in connection with clothes, that the merchandise was supplied with the licence or approval of Ms Hudson. They contended that because of that connotation use of the Applicant’s Mark in relation to clothes would have been likely to deceive or cause confusion and thus they could have opposed the Applicant’s Mark under s 43 of the TM Act.
767 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that as was the case in McCorquodale, because of Ms Hudson’s significant reputation by the Priority Date, and because it was well known at the time that clothing and fashion was a common area in which pop stars like Ms Hudson operated, consumers were likely to be deceived or confused in the belief that the clothes to which the Applicant’s Mark was applied were supplied with the licence or approval of Ms Hudson.
768 Ms Taylor submitted that s 43 relates to matters inherent to a mark and not to matters arising from a reputation which might develop in that mark, which is dealt with by s 60 of the TM Act. She contended that there is no inherent connotation in the Applicant’s Mark, only those which are alleged to arise from a reputation. This is because the Applicant’s Mark refers merely to an ordinary person’s name which is likely a name of many people in Australia apart from Ms Taylor. Ms Taylor submitted that therefore no one would consider that such a mark, of itself, connoted sponsorship or licence by one person over another unless, potentially, there was some kind of reputation that had vested in that name. Ms Taylor submitted that for the reasons she had already outlined in respect of s 60 of the TM Act, no such reputation would have vested in favour of any of the respondents by the Priority Date but, even if it had, any reputation had vested in the name “Katy Perry”, not “Katie Perry”. Ms Taylor submitted that there is no authority to the effect that a reputation that may vest in one mark is sufficient to give rise a connotation simultaneously in deceptively similar marks.
769 Ms Taylor otherwise repeated her submissions in relation to the question of deception or confusion for the purposes of s 60 of the TM Act, noting that the matters set out therein provide good reason to find that deception or confusion is not a real possibility for the purposes of s 43 of the TM Act.
770 The first question to resolve is whether as at the Priority Date there was a connotation inherent in the Applicant’s Mark as alleged by Killer Queen and Ms Hudson. As set out above, I am satisfied that by the Priority Date, the Katy Perry Mark had a reputation in Australia but it does not necessarily follow that the requisite connotation is present. Namely, that there is a connection between Ms Hudson and the Applicant’s Mark such that there is some association between them.
771 By the Priority Date Ms Hudson’s fame was on the rise. She had released a number of very successful singles and her album, “One of the Boys”. She was the subject of publicity and her singles and album were available for purchase in Australia. There can be no doubt that she had achieved recognition and a degree of fame.
772 However, I am not satisfied that there was a connotation in the Applicant’s Mark that it was associated with Ms Hudson and her music. The Applicant’s Mark was to be used, and was used, by Ms Taylor in relation to clothes. It connotes no more than that the designer or owner of the business producing and offering the clothes for sale was a person by the name of “Katie Perry”. As the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark (and Ms Hudson’s own reputation) was in music it is difficult to see how there could be any connotation of the type contended for by Killer Queen and Ms Hudson. The goods to be offered for sale under the Applicant’s Mark, clothes, had no connection to those with which Ms Hudson’s stage name and the Katy Perry Mark were connected at the time.
773 For those reasons I am not satisfied that the connotation as alleged by Killer Queen and Ms Hudson arose in the Applicant’s Mark such that its use in relation to clothes would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. Accordingly this ground is not made out.
3.3 Section 88(2)(c) of the TM Act
774 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson also contend that the Applicant’s Mark should be cancelled under s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act on the ground set out in s 88(2)(c) of that Act. That is, they contend that because of circumstances applying at the time when the cross-claim was filed, 20 December 2019, the use of the Applicant’s Mark by Ms Taylor is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
775 The question of whether use of a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion is a question of fact. As is the case with s 60 of the TM Act, in answering that question it is necessary to consider any normal and fair use of the mark (see [712] above).
776 In Dunlop Aircraft Tyres Ltd v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (2018) 262 FCR 76, commencing at [174], Nicholas J in considering the application of s 88(2)(c) of the TM Act and the question of whether use of a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion noted the relevant principles were summarised by Kitto J in Southern Cross Refrigerating Company v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1953) 91 CLR 592 at 594-595. At [175]-[178] and [180]-[181] his Honour relevantly said:
175 First, it is not necessary in order to find that a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion to prove that there is an actual probability of deception leading to a passing off. However, a mere possibility of confusion is not enough. There must be a real, tangible danger of confusion occurring.
176 Secondly, it is sufficient if the result of the use of the mark will be that a number of persons will be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt.
177 Thirdly, in considering the probability of deception all the surrounding circumstances must be taken into account including the circumstances in which the goods will be bought and sold and the character of the probable purchasers of the goods.
178 Another matter referred to by Kitto J that is of some importance in this case concerns the scope of the registration. His Honour noted that the onus on the applicant seeking to obtain registration of a trade mark in respect of the goods or a class of goods extended not only to showing that the use of the mark on those goods on which the applicant proposed to use the mark immediately would not deceive or cause confusion, but to all such goods or classes of goods in respect of which registration was sought.
…
180 The question whether the use of a registered trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion is a question of fact: Australian Co-operative Foods Ltd v Norco Co-operative Ltd (1999) 46 NSWLR 267 at [86]. In answering that question, it is necessary to consider any normal and fair use of the mark. In Re GE Trade Mark Lord Diplock, addressing the significance of evidence of actual confusion and what he referred to as the relevant hypothetical question, said at 321:
Where the question of the likelihood of deception or confusion arises upon an application to expunge a registered mark which has already been the subject of substantial use, the absence of evidence of actual confusion having occurred is a potent factor in determining whether or not the court should exercise its discretion to expunge the mark from the register. But it does not decide the relevant hypothetical question which must be answered in the affirmative before any question of discretion to expunge the mark arises: Would any normal and fair future use of the mark in the course of trade be likely to cause deception or confusion? If actual confusion in the past is proved, this is a strong indication that continued confusion is likely; but the absence of evidence of past confusion may be accounted for by the small extent to which the mark has been used or by special circumstances affecting its past use which may not continue to operate to prevent confusion in the future.
181 The authorities make clear that “normal use” in this context means normal and fair use for all goods or services covered by the trade mark registration in question and that, in answering the relevant hypothetical question, it is necessary to have regard to all legitimate uses to which the mark might be put by its owner: Vivo International Corporation Pty Ltd v Tivo Inc (2012) 294 ALR 661 at [114] and Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 at [72].
3.3.2 The parties’ submissions
777 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that as at the date of the cross-claim Ms Hudson’s reputation as a popular music artist, as well as in relation to clothes and related goods advertised and sold bearing the Katy Perry Mark, was very significant. They contended that reputation would have caused a purchaser of clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark as at 20 December 2019 to entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether there might not be some affiliation between those clothes and Ms Hudson, particularly given the probable purchaser’s reasonable expectation that famous music personalities, like Ms Hudson, often have their own fashion or merchandise line. Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that Ms Taylor was, comparatively, far less known to such purchasers, in particular given that as at the date of the cross-claim she had one showroom, a modest website and small gross sales numbers.
778 Killer Queen and Ms Hudson submitted that any notional normal and fair use of the Applicant’s Mark would include use on the sorts of clothes generally sold by touring pop stars, rather than the more conservative type of clothing designed by Ms Taylor at the time. They submitted that even at the Priority Date the use of the Applicant’s Mark on clothes of this kind would have given rise to a real, tangible danger of a reasonable number of people being caused to wonder whether such clothes might have a trade connection with Ms Hudson and that, since the Priority Date, Ms Hudson, including in respect of clothing and fashion, has only risen to further fame in Australia such that it is inevitable that as at the date of the cross-claim this same danger would exist.
779 Ms Taylor accepts that today Ms Hudson is, and by December 2019 was, an internationally famous pop star and that the Katy Perry Mark may well have developed a reputation in respect of clothes by December 2019. She submitted however that it does not follow that there was any relevant likelihood of deception or confusion arising because of the circumstances as they stood as at that time.
780 Ms Taylor submitted that s 88(2)(c) of the TM Act requires consideration of the circumstances as they in fact stood at the relevant time which includes the nature of Ms Hudson’s fame and any reputation in the Katy Perry Mark as well as the nature of Ms Taylor’s use of the Applicant’s Mark. She contended that, at least for similar reasons to those discussed in respect of s 60 of the TM Act, there is no reason to believe that because of the circumstances as they stood in December 2019, there was any relevant likelihood of deception or confusion arising from use of the Applicant’s Mark. Ms Taylor submitted there is no evidence of any such deception or confusion and Ms Hudson’s fame as at December 2019 is such that it reduces any likelihood of deception or confusion arising from another person’s use of a different although similar mark, rather than increasing it.
781 Ms Taylor submitted that as at December 2019 she had a business selling luxury loungewear and other women’s clothes under the Applicant’s Mark and there is no realistic possibility of any consumers thinking that such goods are somehow related to those of Killer Queen and Ms Hudson. If there was, one would have expected some instances of confusion occurring at some point in the 14 year period before that.
782 Ms Taylor submitted that while notional normal and fair use of the mark is relevant, it does not assist. She contended that at least by 2019 Ms Hudson had sold a wide variety of clothing, not simply merchandise style touring clothes, and that it is equally relevant to consider the increasing range of clothes she sold over the period from 2008, some of which were similar to Ms Taylor’s style of clothes. Ms Taylor repeated her submissions in relation to notional and fair use made in connection with s 60 of the TM Act (see [739] above).
783 The question to be resolved is whether, because of the circumstances which applied as at 20 December 2019, the use by Ms Taylor of the Applicant’s Mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
784 In order to establish that the Applicant’s Mark offends against s 88(2)(c) of the TM Act it is not necessary for Killer Queen and Ms Hudson to establish that there is an actual probability of deception. It is sufficient if Ms Taylor’s use of that mark will cause a number of people to wonder whether it might not be the case that the Registered Goods bearing that mark come from the same source as goods bearing the Katy Perry Mark. In assessing whether that is so it is necessary to take account of all of the surrounding circumstances which include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the relevant goods will be bought and sold, and the character of the probable purchasers of the goods.
785 It was not in dispute that by the date of the filing of the cross-claim, Ms Hudson had achieved international fame and that the Katy Perry Mark had a significant reputation. That that was so was clear from the extensive evidence before me chronicling Ms Hudson’s career trajectory (summarised above), her international reputation and recognition and the increasing range of merchandise marketed and sold to the public under the Katy Perry Mark, including by that time her shoe collection as well as other items of clothing.
786 By that time Ms Taylor’s “Katie Perry” label had online presence and was being showcased from her Glenmore Road showroom. Ms Taylor continued to design and offer for sale her loungewear under the Applicant’s Mark. That said, by reference to her total annual sales included in her Business Activity Statements, Ms Taylor’s business at the time was very modest. For example for the financial years ended 30 June 2019 and 30 June 2020 her total annual sales were $40,406 and $11,709 respectively. When viewed in light of Ms Taylor’s evidence that since 2012 her total annual sales included revenue earned from the sale of other products, such as Aventurine crystal water bottles and other goods which did not bear the Applicant’s Mark and which accounted for approximately 10% of total sales revenue, those figures and the size of Ms Taylor’s business is indeed very modest. It is fair to say that as at December 2019 Ms Taylor was far less well known than Ms Hudson and, by comparison, she and the Applicant’s Mark had a much lesser reputation and little public presence.
787 As to use, the likelihood of deception or confusion is to be considered by reference to any normal and fair use of the Applicant’s Mark. The Applicant’s Mark is registered for clothes. In this case that involves use of the Applicant’s Mark on the range of clothes offered for sale and sold by reference to the Katy Perry Mark. Killer Queen and Ms Hudson said that included use on hoodies, t-shirts, tank tops and booty shorts.
788 It is certainly arguable that given Ms Hudson’s heightened reputation by December 2019 a probable purchaser may be caused to wonder whether there might be a connection between clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark and Ms Hudson. That is, purchasers who encountered clothes such as hoodies, t-shirts, tank tops, booty shorts and other clothes of the type sold by popular music artists bearing the Applicant’s Mark may be led to wonder whether they came from the same source as clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark, particularly given the level of similarity between the two marks and because, by December 2019, Ms Hudson had a significant reputation.
789 That said, the following two matters lead me to conclude that, having regard to the circumstances applying as at December 2019, use of the Applicant’s Mark on clothes is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.
790 First, by December 2019 there was no evidence of any actual confusion despite both Ms Taylor and Ms Hudson having traded by reference to their respective trade marks for some ten years by that time. That is a matter which, although not decisive, is of some persuasion. By this time, Ms Taylor had been operating under and selling goods by reference to the Applicant’s Mark for at least ten years. It is fair to say that Ms Taylor had not achieved significant market penetration by December 2019 as is evident from the total revenue from sales achieved at around that time. This suggests that the Applicant’s Mark was not widely used, either by way of profile raising in relation to or on clothes, and may be an explanation for the absence of evidence of past confusion. That said, ten years is a long time and in that period Ms Taylor’s business and the Applicant’s Mark had online presence and continued to operate in an environment where Ms Hudson’s fame was on the rise. Despite that there was absolutely no evidence of confusion.
791 Secondly, the strength of Ms Hudson’s reputation and the reputation in the Katy Perry Mark is a compelling reason why a person would not be caused to wonder whether clothes bearing the Applicant’s Mark were from the same source as those bearing the Katy Perry Mark.
792 That was indeed the conclusion reached in Singtel Optus where Davies J, in the context of s 60 of the TM Act, considered whether use of the respondent’s marks was likely to deceive or cause confusion. At [205] her Honour found that the differences in the marks in issue (the OPTUM word and OPTUM logo marks versus the OPTUS mark) and the strong reputation attaching to the appellant’s OPTUS mark in relation to telecommunications made it unlikely that consumers would be likely to be confused or deceived by use of the respondent’s OPTUM marks.
793 Similarly in Delfi Chocolate Manufacturing S.A. v Mars Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 115 IPR 82; [2015] FCA 1065, again in the context of s 60 of the TM Act, at [28] Jessup J found that the respondent’s mark, MALTESERS, had “a very widespread, solid, reputation in the area of packaged confectionery”. His Honour continued at [29] as follows:
I do not consider, however, that that circumstance would make it any more likely that the notional consumer of confectionery would have cause to wonder whether products displayed and sold under the applicant’s mark were from a common source with those displayed and sold under the respondent’s mark. Indeed, with a stronger awareness of the respondent’s mark, I consider that such a consumer would be immediately struck by the differences between the two marks, as discussed above. He or she may observe the limited similarities between the marks and, because the subject of the presumptive interest would be confectionery, may assume that the products were of the same nature as those sold under the respondent’s mark, but, giving the matter a moment’s reflection, would readily conclude that those products were not Maltesers. As I say, the strong reputation of the respondent’s mark would, if anything, make that conclusion a more likely one.
794 Here the differences in the two marks are limited but as was the case in Delfi Chocolate, a “probable purchaser” when faced with an item of clothing such as a t-shirt or tank top bearing the Applicant’s Mark would, “giving the matter a moment’s reflection”, conclude that the clothes in question did not come from the same source as clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark. That is because of Ms Hudson’s undeniably significant reputation and that of the Katy Perry Mark as at December 2019. In that regard, it might be said that Ms Hudson is a victim of her own success: see Mars Australia Pty Ltd v Sweet Rewards Pty Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 354; [2009] FCA 606 at [32].
795 Accordingly, Killer Queen and Ms Hudson have not made out their ground for cancellation of the Applicant’s Mark pursuant to s 88(2)(c) of the TM Act.
3.4 Conclusion – s 88 of the TM Act
796 It follows from the above that Killer Queen and Ms Hudson have not made out any of the grounds for cancellation of the Applicant’s Mark under s 88(1)(a) of the TM Act.
797 That being so it is not necessary for me to consider the question of the exercise of my discretion to make a cancellation order either under s 88(1)(a) or s 89 of the TM Act.
798 Given my findings in relation to infringement (see [583] above) and as Kitty Purry has not established an entitlement to rely on any of the pleaded defences and Killer Queen and Ms Hudson have not succeeded on their cross-claim, it is necessary to consider the question of relief.
799 In an action for an infringement of a registered trade mark the relief a court may grant includes an injunction, which may be granted subject to any condition that the court thinks fit and, at the option of the plaintiff, damages or an account of profits: see s 126(1) of the TM Act.
800 Ms Taylor will be entitled to elect between damages or an account of profits, although she is not yet required to make that election. In the meantime she contends that as the Court has found, relevantly, that Kitty Purry has infringed the Applicant’s Mark and threatens to continue to do so, injunctive relief should follow. Ms Taylor also seeks additional damages pursuant to s 126(2) of the TM Act, entitlement to which is to be determined at this stage, although the determination of quantum of any damages is to be determined at a later date.
801 I address each of these aspects of relief below.
4.1 Is Ms Taylor entitled to injunctive relief?
802 The respondents contend that by reason of Ms Taylor’s laches, acquiescence and delay the Court should exercise its discretion to disentitle Ms Taylor from the injunctive relief sought and otherwise limit any account of profits (to the extent Ms Taylor elects to seek such an account).
803 The first question that arises is whether, as Ms Taylor contends, these equitable defences are available to defeat the statutory relief sought by Ms Taylor.
804 It has been observed that laches is an equitable defence which is not available in answer to a legal claim: see Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 340 (Deane J); Australian Olympic Committee Inc v Big Fights Inc (1999) 46 IPR 53; [1999] FCA 1042 at [387] Lindgren J, referring to the obiter comments of Deane J in Orr in the context of a claim for damages under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
805 In Harcourts WA Pty Ltd v Roy Weston Nominees Pty Limited (No 5) (2016) 119 IPR 449; [2016] FCA 983 in considering the impact of delay in commencing the proceeding on whether to grant an injunction under, among others, the TM Act McKerracher J observed at [57]-[58] that laches may not be available in answer to a legal claim in Australia, referring to the obiter remarks of Deane J in Orr and to the decision in Big Fights. However his Honour continued (at [58]) as follows:
… I find it difficult to discern any practical justification for the distinction between the grant of injunctive relief following a legal claim rather than an equitable claim. In reality, however, any decision as to whether or not to grant an injunction, and, if so, on what terms is discretionary.
806 In Harcourts McKerracher J was not prepared to recognise the applicant’s delay in commencing the proceeding in declining to grant an injunction that reflected the outcome of the litigation but was prepared to recognise it by reducing the period of time in which an account of profits would apply, broadly commensurate with the delay in commencing the proceeding: at [60].
807 There have, as identified by the respondents, been a number of other cases concerning infringement of intellectual property rights where laches has been taken into account on the question of relief.
808 In Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 Windeyer J refused to grant an injunction to restrain infringement of a registered trade mark where registration of that mark had expired: at 31. However, his Honour went on to consider whether the plaintiff was entitled to an account of profits, for which it elected at the commencement of the proceeding pursuant to s 65 of the Trade Marks Act 1955-1958 (Cth). At 32 Windeyer J observed that:
… The effect of s. 65 is to make expressly available in the case of the infringement of a registered trade mark the same remedies and relief as can be had in a passing-off action in the case of a common law trade mark.
The plaintiff whose mark has been infringed can choose between damages or an account of profits. He cannot have both. They are alternative remedies. In this s. 65 merely echoes old law, now trite for nearly a hundred years: Neilson v. Betts; De Vitre v.Betts.
(Footnotes omitted.)
809 His Honour turned to consider the relevant date from which an account of profits ought to be calculated, namely the date on which the defendant became aware of the plaintiff’s registered trade mark or an earlier date when the defendant was in fact infringing the mark. At 33 his Honour rejected “the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s dilatoriness amounts to laches altogether barring its rights to an account” but said it was a circumstance to be considered to determine when it was that the defendant first became aware of the trade mark. In doing so Windeyer J referred to the equitable origins of the law of trade marks. At 34 his Honour said:
The remedy of injunction, now provided by statute to prevent the infringement of a registered trade mark, reflects the history of the way in which equity protected and established a property in trade marks before they were recognized by statute. And the account of profits retains the characteristics of its origin in the Court of Chancery. By it a defendant is made to account for, and is then stripped of, profits he has made which it would be unconscionable that he retain. These are profits made by him dishonestly, that is by his knowingly infringing the rights of the proprietor of the trade mark. This explains why the liability to account is still not necessarily coextensive with acts of infringement. The account is limited to the profits made by the defendant during the period when he knew of the plaintiff’s rights. So it was in respect of common law trade marks. So it still is in respect of registered trade marks: …
810 In LED Builder Pty Ltd v Masterton Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 196 Sheppard J rejected the defences of laches, acquiescence and delay but, following the decision in Colbeam Palmer, held that any account of profits to which the applicant may be entitled under the Copyright Act would be limited to the profits made by the respondent during the period when it knew of the applicant’s rights: at 198. On appeal, this issue was not considered and, as Sheppard J’s findings of fact in relation to delay in commencement of the proceeding were not found to be erroneous, the respondent’s notice of contention that laches, acquiescence or delay was not a defence available to a respondent in a proceeding for infringement of copyright under s 115 of the Copyright Act, which related to an account of profits for infringement of copyright, was not considered: see Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1996) 33 IPR 417; (1996) 12 BCL 408 at 425 (per Lockhart J with whom Wilcox and Beazley JJ agreed).
811 In Knott Investments Pty Ltd v Winnebago Industries Inc (2013) 211 FCR 449 the appellant, Knott, argued, as a complete defence to the claim, that the respondent’s, Winnebago, course of conduct was deliberate and informed inaction which encouraged a belief in it that it could expend money in doing business under the “Winnebago” name. Winnebago became aware of Knott’s use of the name in 1985 but did not commence proceedings until 2010. Among other things Winnebago sought cancellation of the appellant’s trade mark under s 88(1) of the TM Act.
812 On appeal Knott sought to rely on the separate operation of laches, acquiescence and delay as a complete defence. At [51] Allsop CJ rejected Knott’s reliance on these defences, outside the estoppel claim it had made at trial, because it had expressly disclaimed its reliance on them before the primary judge in both opening and closing submissions. However, at [53] his Honour noted that while they should be rejected as a complete defence, aspects of them would be relevant to the question of relief and, in considering that question, at [67]-[68] Allsop CJ referred to the fact that Winnebago stood by, informed of the position, for 25 years while Knott expended money and built its business in part based on its own reputation and noted that it would be unjust to ignore these matters. At [95]-[107] Cowdroy J considered the defence of laches and considered that the injunction granted by the primary judge was unreasonable in light of the substantial delay on the part of Winnebago in bringing the proceeding. His Honour agreed with the relief proposed by Allsop CJ: at [107].
813 These cases demonstrate that laches and/or delay have been taken into account in determining relief in the face of claims of infringement of statutory intellectual property rights. The respondents do not seek to rely on laches or acquiescence as a complete defence to the claims of infringement but as a factor to be taken into account on the question of relief. Contrary to Ms Taylor’s submission, I do not accept that such defences cannot be raised and questions of delay and/or acquiescence cannot be taken into account in determining the appropriate relief to be granted.
814 The elements of the defence of laches are: (1) knowledge of the wrong; (2) delay; and (3) unconscionable prejudice caused to the opponent by the delay: see Crawley v Short (2009) 262 ALR 654; [2009] NSWCA 410 at [163] Young JA (with whom Allsop J, as his Honour then was, and Macfarlan JA agreed). At [164] of Crawley Young JA continued:
The key element is whether, in all the circumstances, “it would be practically unjust to give a remedy”: per Lord Selborne LC in Lindsay Petroleum Company v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239-240. Normally, that means that the defendant must show both delay and detriment suffered by the delay, Fisher v Brooker [2009] 4 All ER 789; [2009] 1 WLR 1764; [2009] UKHL 41 at [64] (Fisher) per Lord Neuberger with whom Lord Hope, Lord Walker, Baroness Hale and Lord Mance agreed.
815 It is necessary to consider each of these elements.
816 The first question to address is Ms Taylor’s knowledge. That is, from what date did Ms Taylor have knowledge of the wrong, i.e. the infringing conduct.
817 As at mid July 2009 Ms Taylor was aware that Ms Hudson intended to use the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes in Australia. That is apparent from the following:
(1) at the very least Ms Taylor “skim read” the Australian Article which reported, among other things, that fashion is a common area into which celebrities launch brands (see [137(1)] above);
(2) Ms Taylor read and responded to Ms Thomson’s email dated 16 June 2009 in which Ms Thomson observed that she noticed from news sites that in March 2009 Ms Hudson had said that she was looking at launching her own clothes line (see [139] above);
(3) the post on her Facebook group, “Support for Australian designer Katie Perry”, on 17 June 2009 by Mr Kalikajaros which set out the merchandise available for sale on the “Katy Perry website” including t-shirts, hoodies, tank tops and booty shorts. I have rejected Ms Taylor’s evidence that she did not read the posts added to her specially established Facebook group (see [148]-[150] above);
(4) the draft settlement deeds exchanged between the parties which included as recital A that “Ms Hudson has also established a world-wide reputation for her distinctive fashion style and merchandise” (see [161] above); and
(5) in cross-examination Ms Hudson accepted that in 2009 she understood that Ms Hudson was proposing to use or license the use of the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes in Australia, although she attempted to qualify this concession by saying that her understanding was that Ms Hudson was not necessarily going to be selling clothes in Australia (see [174] above).
818 Further, in cross-examination Ms Taylor said that since 2009 she has been concerned about one or more of the respondents infringing the Applicant’s Mark and ever since that time she has wanted them to stop doing so. She also conceded that in the course of an interview with A Current Affair which aired on 1 November 2019 she told the interviewer that she had watched Ms Hudson infringe the Applicant’s Mark for the past ten years.
819 However, on 21 July 2009 the Applicant’s Mark was registered. Ms Taylor described this as the “watershed” and submitted that it was not relevant that prior to her obtaining registration of the Applicant’s Mark and the dispute with Ms Hudson ending she might have been aware or suspected that Ms Hudson intended to sell clothes in Australia when she toured in August 2009. The only relevant matter was whether, after the watershed, she still thought or knew that Ms Hudson would sell clothes while on tour under the Katy Perry Mark.
820 The evidence does not establish that Ms Taylor knew of the infringing conduct as far back as 2009. It goes no higher than to establish that by mid July 2009 Ms Taylor knew that Ms Hudson sold clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark and that she intended to do so in Australia. Once the Applicant’s Mark was registered and Ms Hudson no longer sought to register the Katy Perry Mark in relation to clothes in Australia, Ms Taylor did not understand and was not aware that Ms Hudson was in fact going to sell and was selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark while on tour in Australia in August 2009. Given Ms Taylor’s limited business experience, and her general naivety including in her general business dealings, I accept that she could and did hold that belief following the collapse of the negotiations and the resolution of the Extension of Time Application by its withdrawal.
821 That in 2019 Ms Taylor said in her interview with A Current Affair that she had watched Ms Hudson infringe her mark for ten years does not alter my conclusion. Ms Taylor is prone to exaggeration and to painting herself in the best possible light at any given time. I have observed that she was prepared to tailor her responses to give what she perceived to be the answer that would lead to the best outcome for her in this proceeding. She clearly took the same approach to her interview where, with the benefit of hindsight, she referred back to what she then knew to be the case i.e. that the respondents had been selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia since 2009. Similarly, that she gave evidence in cross-examination about her belief at the time she was interviewed in 2019 for A Current Affair does not establish that she knew in 2009 that any of the respondents were in fact infringing the Applicant’s Mark.
822 It is not clear when Ms Taylor became aware of any allegedly infringing conduct on the part of the respondents, but it must have been after 2009 and before 2018 when she first met Mr Silberstein. However, there is simply no evidence before me based on which there can be a finding as to Ms Taylor’s first knowledge of the conduct of which she complains.
823 That being so, the respondents have not established a critical element of the defence of laches. Without a finding as to the date of Ms Taylor’s knowledge I am unable to ascertain the length of any delay and whether prejudice was caused to the respondents because of that delay.
824 There are two further matters which I note in this context.
825 First, because the proceeding was commenced in November 2019 Ms Taylor cannot, in any event, make any claim in relation to allegedly infringing conduct prior to 2013. While I accept that this does not cure any prejudice occasioned by delay, it does provide some protection where there has been a lengthy period between the first allegedly infringing conduct and the commencement of a proceeding.
826 Secondly, and insofar as the question of prejudice is concerned, it is relevant to note that the respondents used the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia despite knowing that:
(1) the Applicant’s Mark was registered;
(2) the Katy Perry Mark was not registered in Australia in class 25 for clothes;
(3) there was no co-existence agreement in place between Ms Hudson and Ms Taylor; and
(4) Mr Jensen gave evidence that after registration of the Applicant’s Mark he knew that it would be possible for Ms Taylor to successfully enforce the Applicant’s Mark against Ms Hudson for trade mark infringement if clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark were sold in Australia, the strategy of selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia in the face of likely registration of the Applicant’s Mark involved taking a calculated risk and, had Ms Taylor commenced a proceeding for trade mark infringement in 2009, he would have recommended that Ms Hudson do exactly as she did at the time and continue to sell apparel bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia (see [181] and [182] above).
827 The respondents rely on acquiescence “to refer to conduct by a person, with knowledge of the acts of another person, which encourages that other person reasonably to believe that his acts are accepted (if past) or not opposed (if contemporaneous)”: see Orr at 338.
828 The respondents rely on four particular acts by Ms Taylor which they contend encouraged Ms Hudson, and her representatives, to believe that Ms Taylor was happy for Ms Hudson to co-exist with her in the sense that she would not object to the application of the Katy Perry Mark on clothes so long as Ms Taylor could also continue with her business. They are:
(1) the YouTube message posted by Ms Taylor i.e. the 29 June 2009 Video (see [154] above). On 30 June 2009 Ms Taylor forwarded her YouTube message to Mr Venus, Ms Hudson’s lawyer, as she wanted Ms Hudson to see it. By the YouTube message Ms Taylor invites Ms Hudson to visit her studio when touring Australia in August 2009 and states that she is “no threat whatsoever” to Ms Hudson. In cross-examination Ms Taylor did not accept that in doing so she had intended to convey that Ms Hudson could use the Katy Perry Mark on clothes. That may be so but the message did convey her view that the two women could co-exist such that each could be left to pursue their “dreams” which I take to mean their respective business interests;
(2) Ms Taylor’s blog post made on 3 July 2009 (see [157] above) in which she said that she wished “for this to all end positively”;
(3) the article published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 5 July 2009 (see [159] above) which referred to Ms Taylor’s statement in the 29 June 2009 Video that she was “absolutely no threat” to Ms Hudson and which cites Ms Taylor as hoping the dispute would be “settled” before the hearing in the Trade Marks Office and stating that Ms Hudson’s lawyers had “[come] back to [Ms Taylor] wanting to have a more amicable settlement”. Mr Jensen said this article did not give rise to any concern that Ms Taylor might sue Ms Hudson for trade mark infringement because of Ms Taylor’s statement that there was no confusion between her and Ms Hudson. However, read in context that statement is qualified by the very next statement, namely that Ms Taylor is a designer and Ms Hudson is a singer; and
(4) at all times up to the withdrawal of the Extension of Time Application, Ms Taylor, both personally and through her lawyers, indicated that she was entirely happy to co-exist with Ms Hudson, the parties exchanged draft deeds and the only disagreement between them as to the terms of those deeds concerned proposed non-disparagement clauses.
829 The respondents submitted that, despite no agreement being reached, that context remains relevant to the Court’s assessment of the laches, acquiescence and delay defence and did not simply evaporate once the Extension of Time Application was withdrawn. They contended that the nature of the negotiations between the parties, coupled with Ms Taylor’s media statements to the effect that she was no threat to Ms Hudson, encouraged Ms Hudson and Mr Jensen to understand that, while there was a theoretical risk of Ms Taylor suing for trade mark infringement, it was not one of concern to them. They observed that even after the events of 2009 Ms Taylor continued to promote her business by reference to Ms Hudson and submitted that these were not actions of a trader disgruntled by infringing conduct but, rather, actions that reinforced Ms Taylor’s acquiescence in the infringing conduct.
830 It is difficult to see how, once the negotiations for entry into a co-existence agreement broke down, the respondents could take any comfort from them or the fact that they had come close to resolving their dispute. The fact is that they did not, the Extension of Time Application was withdrawn because of the advice Mr Jensen received that it would fail, which would attract further publicity and further embolden Ms Taylor, and the Applicant’s Mark was registered and remained registered. Added to that Ms Hudson’s TM Application was amended to remove class 25.
831 Similarly Ms Taylor’s message in the 29 June 2009 Video and blog post were made at a time when the Extension of Time Application was on foot, Ms Taylor felt that her business was under threat and she resorted to those messages in an attempt to resolve the matter, either by appealing to Ms Hudson directly or possibly attracting media which would pressure Ms Hudson into resolving the dispute. There is no reason to doubt that Ms Taylor believed at the time that both women could pursue their own businesses using the same name. But, it is difficult to see how once the negotiations broke down with no resolution of the dispute, the respondents could take any comfort from these statements in relation to future conduct. To the contrary, Mr Jensen acknowledged that in moving forward the respondents took a calculated risk.
832 While I do not think that those matters amount to acquiescence by Ms Taylor, the respondents also point to the fact that Ms Taylor continued to promote her business by reference to Ms Hudson. That is the case. Three examples of where she did so are set out at [220] above. They span the period 2011 to 2017. At no time when Ms Taylor attempted to improve her own profile by reference to Ms Hudson’s activities and career, did she complain about Ms Hudson, allege that she was infringing the Applicant’s Mark or refer to the fact that she was selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia. It is inconceivable that Ms Taylor, who felt sufficiently aggrieved by 2018 to approach Mr Silberstein, did not become aware of that latter fact at some point in that period. But the issue that remains is that the time at which Ms Taylor became so aware is not known. As a result, to the extent Ms Taylor may have encouraged Ms Hudson (and Mr Jensen) to believe reasonably that the respondents’ acts in selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark were accepted by her, Ms Taylor’s knowledge of the nature of the allegedly infringing conduct and the time from which she knew it was taking place is not known. Accordingly, it is not possible to make a finding as from when Ms Taylor may have acquiesced in the respondents’ infringing conduct and to thus take the conduct into account in considering whether to order an injunction or reduce the period in which Ms Taylor is entitled to an account of profits, should she elect for an account of profits rather than damages.
833 In my view, Ms Taylor is entitled to an injunction against Kitty Purry to restrain it from continuing engaging in infringing conduct.
4.2 Is Ms Taylor entitled to additional damages?
834 Section 126(2) of the TM Act empowers a court to include an additional amount in the assessment of damages for infringement of a registered trade mark if the court considers it appropriate to do so having regard to:
(a) the flagrancy of the infringement; and
(b) the need to deter similar infringements of registered trade marks; and
(c) the conduct of the party that infringed the registered trade mark that occurred:
(i) after the act constituting the infringement; or
(ii) after that party was informed that it had allegedly infringed the registered trade mark; and
(d) any benefit shown to have accrued to that party because of the infringement; and
(e) all other relevant matters.
835 In Truong Giang Corporations v Quach (2015) 114 IPR 498; [2015] FCA 1097 Wigney J observed at [132] that there was little authority concerning the application of s 126(2) of the TM Act but distilled the following principles (at [133]-[140]) having regard to its similarity to s 115(4) of the Copyright Act:
[133] First, it is not necessary that any amount of additional damages be proportionate to any award of compensatory damages: Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 IPR 763; [2008] FCA 746 (Futuretronics) at [17].
[134] Second, an award of additional damages involves an element of penalty: Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; 287 ALR 199; 95 IPR 95; [2012] FCAFC 9 (Facton) at [33], [89].
[135] Third, part of the function of an award of additional damages is to mark the court’s disapproval or opprobrium of the infringing conduct: Facton at [36].
[136] Fourth, the matters set out in s 126(2)(a)–(d) of the TM Act are not preconditions to an award of additional damages: Futuretronics at [17].
[137] Fifth, conduct which may properly be seen as flagrant includes conduct which involves a deliberate and calculated infringement, a calculated disregard of the applicant’s rights, or a cynical pursuit of benefit: Futuretronics at [19]; Facton at [92].
[138] Sixth, post-infringement conduct within s 126(2)(c) of the TM Act is unlikely to include the respondent’s conduct of the infringement proceedings. Such conduct is more relevant to the appropriate order as to costs: Futuretronics at [17]; Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith (2003) 59 IPR 191; [2003] FCA 1067 at [31]–[34]. That said, it is difficult to see why some aspects of the conduct, by a respondent, in defence of infringement proceedings, might not be relevant to the award of additional damages: compare Facton at [44], [69]. ...
[139] Seventh, an award of additional damages can encompass damages which, at common law, would be aggravated or exemplary damages: Futuretronics at [17]. The matters specified in s 126(2) of the TM Act are of a kind which are taken into account in determining whether a party is entitled to aggravated or exemplary damages at common law, but in the end result the damages to be awarded are not aggravated or exemplary damages, but additional damages, being of a type sui generis: Facton at [33]–[36], [91].
[140] In Halal Certification Authority Pty Ltd v Scadilone Pty Ltd (2014) 107 IPR 23; [2014] FCA 614 at [111], Perram J considered that if additional damages are appropriate, the damages to be awarded must operate as a sufficient deterrent to ensure that the conduct will not occur again.
836 Ms Taylor submitted that Ms Hudson’s conduct in using the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia was flagrant for the following reasons:
(1) as evidenced by her email sent on 17 June 2009 (see [145(2)] above) Ms Hudson held Ms Taylor in contempt, which fuelled the conduct in 2009 and to this day;
(2) there is no evidence of use of the Katy Perry Mark on clothes in Australia until after Ms Hudson became aware of Ms Taylor’s trade mark application;
(3) Ms Hudson sought at first to bully Ms Taylor out of her application for the Applicant’s Mark and then to have her co-exist, which Ms Taylor refused to do;
(4) Ms Hudson sought to register the Katy Perry Mark in respect of clothes but failed because of the Applicant’s Mark;
(5) Ms Hudson was aware that Ms Taylor might object to her using the Katy Perry Mark on clothes, that Ms Taylor could sue and that if she did she would have a substantial chance of success; and
(6) despite all of this knowledge she “breezily ploughed on” and sold clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia from August 2009.
837 The purpose of an award of additional damages is to mark the Court’s disapproval of the infringing conduct. That Ms Hudson expressed herself in somewhat colourful terms in the course of the negotiations in 2009 to her internal advisers does not, as Ms Taylor contended, demonstrate any contempt of Ms Taylor on her part and does not bear upon the question of additional damages. It was a private communication in which Ms Hudson expressed her frustration with the ongoing media attention and the issue generally.
838 The question of whether the conduct was flagrant requires consideration of whether the conduct involved a deliberate and calculated infringement, a calculated disregard of Ms Taylor’s rights or a cynical pursuit of benefit. In my view the following factors are relevant.
839 First, while Ms Hudson attempted to negotiate an outcome by which both she and Ms Taylor could co-exist and use their respective trade marks as they wished in Australia, those negotiations broke down and no agreement was reached. That said, I do not accept the characterisation of the correspondence which was first sent to Ms Taylor as bullying in nature. It made certain demands but, in the context of what was then occurring, it was not unusual. The two women were running their respective businesses with each wishing to use substantially the same trade mark for the same or similar goods. There is nothing untoward or unusual in those circumstances for one trader to make a demand of the other or to threaten proceedings in the event that certain things did not occur. This was and is, as Mr Jensen characterised it, a “normal business approach”.
840 Secondly, Ms Hudson withdrew her Extension of Time Application clearing the way for registration of the Applicant’s Mark.
841 Thirdly, Ms Hudson consciously decided not to attempt to satisfy the Registrar that she could register the Katy Perry Mark in class 25 for clothes by establishing, for example, honest concurrent use as she was invited to do. Rather she amended her application for registration of the Katy Perry Mark by removing class 25.
842 Fourthly, notwithstanding that she knew of the registration of the Applicant’s Mark and that the Katy Perry Mark was not registered in class 25, Ms Hudson (and the respondents) proceeded with the original plan to sell clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia. They took a calculated risk in doing so. Their action was deliberate in the sense that they did not let the fact of the Applicant’s Mark stand in their way, but proceeded notwithstanding that obstacle. They were prepared to, and did, take a risk. Knowing their conduct was infringing conduct, they engaged in what can only be described as a “calculated disregard of [Ms Taylor’s] rights”: see Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 IPR 763; [2008] FCA 746 at [19].
843 Fifthly, and on the other side of the ledger, the respondents submitted that their subjective intention in not intending to divert trade from Ms Taylor, because they believed that there was no risk of confusion, is relevant to a consideration of whether their conduct was flagrant. Mr Jensen’s evidence was that at various points in time, when recommending to Ms Hudson that she or any of the respondents enter into arrangements for sale of clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark, including in Australia, he was not aware of any case of confusion that clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark were Ms Taylor’s clothes or associated with Ms Taylor and it did not occur to him that any members of the public would be confused in that way. Had he held such a belief he would have acted differently and not recommended entry into the relevant arrangements.
844 That belief is in fact supported by a lack of evidence of confusion. It tells against the respondents acting in a deliberate or scandalous way but points to a belief on their part that there was in fact no confusion and thus no harm in their selling clothes bearing the Katy Perry Mark in Australia. It does not excuse their conduct but it ameliorates it in some way in that it demonstrates that there was no cynical pursuit of a benefit on their part.
845 Sixthly, and coupled with the preceding facts, the respondents submitted that Ms Taylor fails to recognise that, even without the Katy Perry Mark registered in class 25, they had a reasonably arguable defence to any alleged trade mark infringement based on the use of Ms Hudson’s name in good faith.
846 In Oxworks Trading Pty Ltd v Gram Engineering Pty Ltd (2019) 154 IPR 215; [2019] FCAFC 240, in the context of s 122(1A) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), a Full Court of this Court (McKerracher, Burley and O’Bryan JJ) observed at [69] that “[t]he reasonableness of arguments as to why there was no infringement is a relevant factor to take into account in considering whether the infringement was ‘flagrant’”.
847 In Fuchs Lubricants (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Quaker Chemical (Australasia) Pty Ltd (2021) 284 FCR 174 at [405] a Full Court of this Court (Beach, Moshinsky and Thawley JJ) considered the question of additional damages, again under s 122(1A) of the Patents Act, and whether the primary judge erred in his approach to considering whether there should be such an award. There the primary judge refused to award additional damages because he considered that the appellant’s supply (which was the infringing conduct) was reasonably defensible because it “had a reasonably arguable defence to the allegation of infringement based on its construction of the claims of the patent”: at [382]. After referring to the decision in Oxworks and the evidence before the primary judge the Full Court found that there was no evidence to establish that Fuchs considered the patents to be invalid at the time of its supply or otherwise considered that it had a reasonably arguable defence to infringement at that time: at [401].
848 At [403] their Honours identified another difficulty with the primary judge’s reasons which justified setting them aside. That is, that his Honour focussed on the reasonableness of the defence in the proceeding before him as opposed to whether, at the time of the relevant infringing conduct, the appellant had a reasonably arguable defence which was relevant to its conduct and the question of whether an award of additional damages was appropriate. At [405] the Full Court relevantly said:
But in any event, the existence of a defence at trial is not what was seen in Oxworks (at [66]) as “a strong factor telling against award of additional damages” (cf [848]). As the reasoning in Oxworks shows, it is the state of mind of the infringer at the time of the infringement that is relevant in this context. Of course, the existence of a defence at trial may be another relevant factor, but at this point of his Honour’s reasons he was purporting to deal with Oxworks.
849 In this case, at trial, the respondents relied on, among others, the use of own name in good faith defence in s 122(1)(a) of the TM Act. That defence was made out by Ms Hudson and there was nothing to suggest that it was hopeless or ought not to have been pursued by the other respondents in the context of this proceeding. However, there was no evidence that Ms Hudson or anyone else, including Mr Jensen, held any belief that they had an arguable defence to infringement based on s 122(1)(a) or any other part of s 122 of the TM Act. To that end, there was some apparent confusion in the written submissions as to whether the respondents purported to hold their belief in relation to s 122(1)(a) or s 122(1)(e) of the TM Act. However, it matters not which as there was no evidence one way or the other about any state of mind at the time of the infringing conduct: Ms Hudson did not give evidence in the proceeding; Mr Jensen gave no evidence on the issue; the respondents led no evidence as to advice Ms Hudson received on this issue; and the respondents maintained a claim of legal professional privilege over documents which could well be relevant to establishing this assertion, which was upheld when challenged: see Taylor v Killer Queen, LLC (No 2) [2021] FCA 680.
850 Ms Taylor also complains that this submission: was raised for the first time in written closing submissions; was not referred to in opening; is not pleaded; and it would be unfair to her to permit the respondents to advance the submission now. That is because it is based on a state of mind, in turn, that must have been based on advice received. Yet the respondents have withheld the contents of that advice from her so that it could not be tested. That may all be correct; it is certainly correct that it is not pleaded and it seems that the argument was put for the first time in closing submissions. But I do not need to determine the matter on that basis because, as I have already observed, there is no evidence of the respondents’ understanding at the time of the infringing conduct. The respondents have simply not discharged their evidentiary onus and cannot establish that they believed they had an arguable defence at the relevant time.
851 Having regard to these factors, on balance, I am persuaded that the respondents’ infringing conduct was such as to attract an award of additional damages in relation to the infringing conduct that has been established.
5. The respondents’ application for non-publication orders
852 In the course of the hearing, upon the tender of certain documents exhibited to Mr Jensen’s affidavits, on the application of the respondents, I made interim orders preserving the confidentiality of particular documents pending determination of the respondents’ application pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That application is made in relation to documents which fall within the following categories:
(1) current commercial agreements and documents;
(2) sales sheets and figures for merchandise sold at various of Ms Hudson’s concerts performed in Australia, retail outlets and pop-up stores; and
(3) confidential lists of goods provided by the respondents to Ms Taylor.
5.1 Statutory framework and applicable principles
853 Section 37AF of the Federal Court Act provides:
(1) The Court may, by making a suppression order or non‑publication order on grounds permitted by this Part, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of:
…
(b) information that relates to a proceeding before the Court and is:
(i) information that comprises evidence or information about evidence; or
(ii) information obtained by the process of discovery; or
(iii) information produced under a subpoena; or
(iv) information lodged with or filed in the Court.
(2) The Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate to give effect to an order under subsection (1).
854 The respondents seek their order on the basis of s 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court Act because it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
855 A suppression or non-publication order operates for the period determined by the Court and specified in the order. In determining the period the Court is to ensure that the order operates for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made: s 37AJ(2) of the Federal Court Act.
856 In Motorola Solutions, Inc. v Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 17 at [6]-[9] Perram J summarised the principles to be applied upon an application for a suppression or non-publication order as follows:
6 This Court has recently set out the principles to be applied when it is considering whether or not to make a suppression or non-publication order: Chief Executive Officer of Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre v TAB Limited (No 4) [2017] FCA 1532 (‘CEO of AUSTRAC v TAB (No 4)’) at [9]-[12]. The present application does not call for any greater elaboration of those principles but they may be distilled as follows:
(1) the FCAA contains Part VAA which relates to suppression and non-publication orders;
(2) the power of the Court to make such orders is contained in s 37AF and the grounds for making them are to be found in s 37AG which includes within it that ‘the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice’: s 37AG(1)(a);
(3) such an order is not lightly to be made. It must be necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice and not merely desirable: see Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651 at 666 [39]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741 at [8] per Edelman J;
(4) the Court may make any other order necessary to give effect to the primary order: s 37AF(2) of the FCAA.
(5) the order, once made, must remain in place no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose: s 37AJ(2); and
(6) the Court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice (s 37AE) but no balancing exercise need be carried out between the utility of the order and the interest which open justice assumes under the FCAA: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand (No 12) [2013] FCA 533 at [21].
7 In CEO of AUSTRAC v TAB (No 4), the Court concluded that disclosure of the confidential information in that case would have undermined the purposes of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) which was apt to prejudice the proper administration of justice. This was significant in the context of an Act of Parliament which had amongst its purposes the thwarting of terrorism financing.
8 It might be thought that the mere protection of commercial-in-confidence information, which is essentially what Hytera seeks in this case, fits less comfortably within the statutory words ‘necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice’. But this Court has held in a number of cases that commercial sensitivity can be an appropriate basis for making a suppression or non-publication order: ….
9 There are cogent reasons for this which have variously been described in those cases, but they are generally associated with preserving the integrity of the litigious process, likely to be jeopardised if commercial competitors could benefit from court ordered production of trade secrets by parties to a suit. That said, it is important to recall that the order must be necessary to protect the administration of justice. It can readily be imagined that a carte blanche approach to applications for s 37AF orders for which commercial confidentiality is claimed as a basis, would jeopardise the interest the public has in being able to access court documents under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) or to engage meaningfully with reasons published by the Court. As I have explained at [6(6)] of these reasons above, the safeguarding of that interest as a primary objective of the administration of justice is a mandatory consideration for the Court. Particularly is that so in cases such as the present, where the Agreement, and its interpretation, may become a central plank in the ultimate resolution of the proceeding, and thus, to the intelligibility of future reasons delivered by the Court.
5.2 Category 1 – current commercial agreements and documents
857 Ms Taylor did not object to the respondents’ application for an order pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court Act in relation to the first category of documents: current commercial agreements and documents.
858 The respondents seek that order in relation to nine current commercial agreements and documents comprising: the agreement between Ms Hudson and DMG; documents relating to merchandise licensing arrangements with Epic Rights; the agreements relevant to the GBG joint venture; the agreement between Universal Music Group brands and Killer Queen in relation to the partnership with Pokémon; and the agreement between Bravado and retailer, H&M, dated 1 January 2016.
859 Mr Jensen gave evidence about these agreements and why there would be a risk of detriment to the respondents as well as other parties to those agreements if their confidentiality was not maintained:
(1) in the case of Ms Hudson’s agreement with DMG, Mr Jensen’s evidence is that the talent management business is a highly competitive industry and if DMG’s competitors became aware of confidential matters which are the subject of that agreement such as remuneration, royalty rates and other commercial terms they may seek to take advantage of that information at the expense of DMG;
(2) as for the balance of the agreements and documents, Mr Jensen’s evidence is that they comprise the commercial terms and conditions secured by DMG for Ms Hudson and her companies and contain confidential and personal information to the parties to those agreements. Some of the agreements include royalty rates for different territories and different trade channels for merchandise as well as provisions about procedures and accounting. There would be risk of detriment to the respondents, DMG as their manager and the counterparties to the agreements if the information in them was not kept confidential as it could be used by rivals who may seek to secure a relationship through arrangements which are more favourable than those the subject of the current agreements; and
(3) it is DMG’s practice to keep these types of agreements and documents confidential. Mr Jensen emphasises, in his dealings with DMG staff members, service providers and with the particular artist, their confidentiality and sensitivity.
860 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to protect the documents and agreements which fall within this category. They contain trade sensitive information and the maintenance of their confidentiality will preserve the integrity of the litigation process which could be jeopardised if commercial competitors could benefit from Court ordered production of material which is commercially sensitive to a party to the litigation.
861 The respondents seek the order until 31 December 2026. According to Mr Jensen that is because the confidentiality in these agreements “continues indefinitely given the long duration of relationships, including commercial relationships, in the entertainment industry”. An order made pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court Act must be necessary to protect the administration of justice and thus the period for which an order is to operate must be for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made. Having regard to that requirement, I am satisfied, given the ongoing nature of these agreements and documents, that the order to be made should remain in force until 31 December 2026.
5.3 Category 2 – merchandise sales sheets and figures
862 The second category of documents is merchandise sales sheets and figures. There are seven documents in this category over which the respondents seek an order pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court Act. Ms Taylor opposes the making of an order in relation to this category.
863 Mr Jensen’s evidence is that, among other things, information in relation to “commercial returns and profitability of merchandise sales” are treated by him and DMG as sensitive, confidential and personal information of the artist and the manager and this is the case for Ms Hudson and DMG and is particularly so given Ms Hudson’s high profile. Mr Jensen also says that if documents such as these were not kept confidential he is concerned that:
(1) there would be adverse consequences for Ms Hudson;
(2) because of Ms Hudson’s high profile there is a potential for the media to use them (and other documents over which non-publication orders are sought) to criticise Ms Hudson and to convey an incorrect impression, which may exaggerate revenue and profits realised by her commercial arrangements, in circumstances where full information about Ms Hudson’s personal and financial affairs is not known and is private;
(3) this could result in negative publicity which could be detrimental to her career; and
(4) in the modern era with highly mobile communications and social media, such negative publicity can circulate widely in an uncontrolled manner and be highly negative for a popular figure, particularly one such as Ms Hudson who is so well known.
864 The respondents submitted that this category of documents, which records sales of merchandise sold through a variety of channels such as pop-up stores, retail outlets and at concerts, are confidential to and personal information of Ms Hudson and her associated entities, are not publicly available and are commercially sensitive. They contended that disclosure of them to their, DMG’s and the merchandise licensees’ competitors could adversely affect their commercial positions.
865 Ms Taylor submitted that Mr Jensen’s evidence as to potential damage by adverse media is speculative and in any event, this kind of damage is not relevant to the making of a non-publication order.
866 The documents in question record total sales at certain venues or through certain channels of sales over particular periods. In all cases, save one which records e-commerce sales from inception to 31 March 2021, the information is historical and records data from as far back as 2009 up to about 2016. Putting aside the document which includes more contemporary information, it is difficult to see how the historical data could be confidential in nature and how it could affect the respondents’, DMG’s or the merchandise licensees’ commercial positions, particularly where the evidence is that the respondents no longer deal with some of those merchandise licensees. Further Mr Jensen’s evidence as to adverse media attention is, as Ms Taylor submitted, purely speculative, and in any event, in the circumstances the risk of negative media attention and unfair media reporting is not a proper basis for an order pursuant to s 37AG(1)(a) of the Federal Court Act: see Jenkings v Northern Territory of Australia (No 4) [2021] FCA 839 at [66]-[70].
867 With one exception I decline to make an order pursuant to s 37AF(1) of the Federal Court Act in relation to this category of documents. The exception is the document which records information up to 31 March 2021 (court book, tab 24.16). It records more contemporary sales figures. Given its currency I accept that its contents are, as submitted, confidential and that its disclosure may damage the respondents and their merchandise licensees (who are likely to include current licensees) such that their commercial sensitivity should be protected for the purposes of preserving the integrity of the litigation process. I will make an order in relation to that document.
868 Once again the respondents seek the order until 31 December 2026 because of the long term relationships in the industry. However, as the document only records data up to 31 March 2021, in my view the purpose of the order will be achieved if it remains in place until 31 December 2023.
5.4 Category 3 – confidential lists of documents
869 The final category of documents comprises two lists of goods (court book, tabs 45 and 47). Those lists identify every item of Katy Perry branded merchandise and were brought into existence for the purposes of this proceeding and complying with Order 5(a) of the 12 November 2020 Orders. The first list of goods comprises 889 pages and provides a product number and description of the corresponding product and is arranged by calendar year. The second list of goods is a single page listing items described as “additional goods – May 2020 to March 2021”. Ms Taylor opposes the making of a non-publication order in relation to these documents.
870 Mr Jensen deposes that the respondents, licensees and DMG may suffer detriment if the lists of goods were available to commercial rivals because they may seek to use the information to benefit themselves and harm Ms Hudson’s interests in relation to her merchandise. Mr Jensen is also concerned that a rival merchandise company may seek to secure business from Ms Hudson or other artists to the detriment of the licensees who are now, and have been, involved and that a rival talent manager may seek to use the information with clients of DMG including with Ms Hudson to their advantage and to the disadvantage of DMG.
871 The respondents submitted that the lists of documents were compiled following a review of their confidential business records and contain commercially valuable material.
872 The lists of goods were compiled for this proceeding from the respondents’ business records. Ms Taylor suggested that they comprise publicly available information. That is only the case, to the extent one may be able to search websites and otherwise identify Katy Perry branded merchandise. The fact is that the lists of goods did not, prior to the proceeding, exist, and compiled in this form contain commercially sensitive information about the history of a large proportion of Katy Perry branded merchandise. Mr Jensen gives evidence about the detriment that could be suffered if confidentiality is not maintained in the lists of goods.
873 I am satisfied that in order to maintain the integrity of the litigation process an order pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court Act should be made in relation to these lists and that the order should be made until 31 December 2026. The order to be made will achieve its purpose if it remains in force until 31 December 2026 as sought by the respondents.
874 I have concluded that Kitty Purry, as joint tortfeasor, has infringed the Applicant’s Mark in the ways set out at [583(2)] above. Declarations giving effect to that infringing conduct should be made and an injunction ordered.
875 Ms Taylor has otherwise failed to establish her claims of infringement.
876 The respondents have failed in their cross-claim and it should be dismissed.
877 The proceeding will be listed for case management hearing for the making of orders giving effect to these reasons and to permit further steps to be taken in relation to any subsequent hearing for the quantification of damages.
878 The parties should confer and provide my Associate with draft orders giving effect to these reasons within 14 days of their publication, including in relation to the question of costs. If the parties are unable to agree on the terms of proposed orders they should jointly provide a single marked up copy of the proposed orders showing where the parties agree and disagree on their proposed terms within the same time. The proceeding will be listed before me to hear argument on the form of orders, if necessary, as well as for case management as contemplated in the preceding paragraph.
879 At this stage, I will make orders giving effect to the procedure set out in the preceding two paragraphs, orders pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court Act in accordance with my findings above and in relation to their effect on the process for the publication of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding eight hundred and seventy-nine (879) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Markovic. |
Associate:
Annexure A
Annexure B
NSD 1774 of 2019 | |
PURRFECT VENTURES LLC | |
KATHERYN ELIZABETH HUDSON |