Federal Court of Australia

Karpik v Carnival plc (The Ruby Princess) (Amendment Application) [2022] FCA 1232

ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    The respondents have leave to amend paragraph 176 of their defence by pleading that any failure to comply with the guarantees as alleged occurred only because of the act of the Australian government on 15 March 2020 to close the borders to any cruise ships that are not already en route to Australia.

2.    The respondents forthwith file an amended defence in accordance with order 1 and make the necessary arrangements for the updating of the court book.

3.    The applicant have leave to file any reply to the amended defence as soon as possible.

4.    The respondents’ interlocutory application to amend the defence be otherwise dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered ex tempore)

STEWART J:

Introduction and background

1    These are my reasons on the respondents’ application to amend their defence at the commencement of the trial. There is no dispute as to the applicable principles. With reference to the written submissions of the applicant, they may be summarised as follows.

2    The onus is on the party seeking leave to amend to persuade the court that such leave should be given: Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 at [17]. An application for leave to amend should not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable defence, subject to the payment of costs thrown away: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175 at [111]. Limits will be placed upon the ability of parties to effect changes to their pleadings, particularly if litigation is advanced and they have had a sufficient opportunity to identify the issues they seek to agitate: Aon at [112]. Other factors identified in Aon at [5], [30], [71], [93]-[95], [98], [102], [103] and [112]-[114] include:

(1)    prejudice to another party that cannot be adequately compensated by an award of costs, which would include the inevitable prejudice of unnecessary delay where that exists;

(2)    inefficiencies in the use of the court as a publicly funded resource arising from the vacation or adjournment of trials and the effects of delay on other litigants;

(3)    the explanation for any delay in applying for leave to amend;

(4)    the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system, which has a potential to be lost where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification;

(5)    the objective of doing justice between the parties and to other litigants;

(6)    the objective that the pleadings identify the “real” issues between the parties;

(7)    the overriding purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), namely to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible; and

(8)    the nature and the importance of the amendment to the party that is seeking it.

3    In September 2021, this class action was listed for trial to start on Monday of this week (ie, 10 October 2022) with an estimate of four weeks. The matter has been closely case managed, including a round-table case management conference on 30 August 2022. Although the parties had previously prepared, and I had ordered, a provisional list of common questions, at the conference I asked for, and was promised, a list of issues for the trial. That list was to include not only the common questions, but also the issues arising specifically in relation to the case of the lead applicant, Mrs Karpik. The trial was to proceed on only Mrs Karpik’s claim.

4    On 27 September 2022, which is to say less than a week before the trial was due to commence, I urgently listed the matter for case management at the request of the applicant because it was said that the respondents were late with respect to various pre-trial preparatory steps. At that hearing the joint position of the parties was that the commencement of the trial should be delayed to Wednesday, 12 October 2022 in order to make time for the outstanding pre-trial steps on both sides of the case to be taken. I acceded to that position and relisted the trial to commence on that day.

5    The causes of action advanced by the applicant arising out of the round-trip cruise of the Ruby Princess referred to as RU2007 are a common law claim in negligence and claims under the following provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL, being Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)): s 18 (misleading and deceptive conduct), s 60 (the consumer guarantee as to due care and skill), s 61(1) (the consumer guarantee that services are reasonably fit for particular purpose, referred to as the purpose guarantee) and s 61(2) (the consumer guarantee that services will achieve the desired result, referred to as the result guarantee).

6    In respect of the purpose and result guarantee claims, neither the applicant nor the respondents specifically pleaded s 61(3) or s 267(1)(c) of the ACL, whether by citing the provisions or by using the language of the provisions in such a way as to make it clear that the provisions were being referred to. Section 61(3) provides that the purpose and result guarantees do not apply “if the circumstances show that the consumer did not rely on, or that it was unreasonable for the consumer to rely on, the skill or judgment of the supplier.” Section 267(1)(c) relevantly provides that a consumer may take action against a supplier of services for breach of the purpose and result guarantees if the failure to comply with the guarantee did not occur only because of (i) an act, default or omission of any person other than the supplier, or an agent or employee of the supplier, or (ii) a cause independent of human control that occurred after the services were supplied.

7    The evidence shows that during the process of the parties trying to settle the list of issues it became apparent that the respondents wish to identify those provisions as being issues with respect to the purpose and result guarantees, whereas the applicant takes the position that such issues do not arise on the pleadings and have never been part of the case. The result is that on Friday, 7 October 2022, which is to say three days before the rescheduled commencement of the trial, the respondents served and filed an interlocutory application seeking leave to amend their defence to specifically raise issues relying on the identified provisions. That application was heard on the second day of the trial, after the parties’ opening submissions.

8    The principal position taken by the respondents is that it is for the applicant to establish that the identified provisions do not apply such as to cause her purpose and result guarantee claims to fail. That is to say, they say that in respect of s 61(3) she must establish that the circumstances show that she relied on, and that it was not unreasonable for her to rely on, the skill or judgment of the supplier. Also, with reference to s 267(1)(c), she must show that any failure by the respondents to comply with the relevant guarantee did not occur only because of the matters identified at [6] above as (i) and (ii). The applicant, in contrast, says that it is the respondents who bear the onus on those issues and that they therefore bore the responsibility of pleading them.

9    It seems doubtful to me that the applicant bears the onus on these issues. Several cases have decided, or at least accepted, the contrary in respect of s 61(3). See, for example, Rasell v Cavalier Marketing (Australia) Pty Ltd [1991] 2 Qd R 323 at 340 per Cooper J in respect of an earlier analogous provision in relation to the manufacturer’s guarantee of fitness for purpose; Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 733 (Moore No 2) at [435] per Garling J although it is not clear that the point was argued; Scenic Tours Pty Ltd v Moore [2018] NSWCA 238; 361 ALR 456 (Moore CA) at [82]-[83] per Sackville AJA by describing s 61(3) as a “defence”, [121]-[122] in identifying what the consumer must prove as the elements of the claims, [135] and [140]; Gill v Ethicon Sàrl (No 5) [2019] FCA 1905 at [3526]-[3527] per Katzmann J in respect of the analogous provision in relation to the manufacturer’s guarantee of fitness for purpose; Wade v J Daniels and Associates Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1708 at [332] per O’Bryan J.

10    The position would appear to be the same in respect of s 267(1)(c): Rasell at 340 in respect of earlier analogous provisions in relation to the manufacturer’s guarantee of fitness for purpose; Effem Foods Ltd v Nicholls [2004] NSWCA 332; ATPR 42-034 at [11] per Handley JA in respect of earlier analogous provisions in relation to the guarantee of merchantable quality; Moore No 2 at [124] and [127], [137], and [440]-[441] in referring to s 267(1)(c) as a “defence”; Moore CA at [309] also in referring to the provision as providing a “defence”; Capic v Ford Motor Company of Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 715; 154 ACSR 235 at [741] per Perram J in respect of the guarantee as to acceptable quality and the “defence” in s 271(2) which is relevantly analogous to s 267(1)(c).

11    The respondents’ answer to these cases is to submit that in none of them was the point specifically argued and that they are wrong. The respondents refer in that regard to the origins of the provisions in s 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (UK) (repealed). In particular, they submit that where in s 14(1) it was said that where the buyer makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required “so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill and judgment …”, it is clear that buyer must establish that reliance. That submission is supported by dicta of Lord Wright in the Privy Council in an appeal from the High Court of Australia dealing with the identical provision in the Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA) (repealed) in Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85 at 99. However, as the applicant points out, s 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) is differently worded, providing for the relevant guarantee to apply “except where the circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill and judgment of the seller”. That puts the onus to negative the buyer’s reliance onto the seller: Central Regional Council v Uponor Ltd 1996 SLT 645 at 648 per Lord Cameron of Lochbroom. Section 61(3) of the ACL is more closely analogous to s 14(3) of the UK Act of 1979 than it is to s 14(1) of the UK Act of 1893.

12    I agree with the respondents that it is neither necessary nor fruitful at this stage to determine the question of onus, particularly without having heard full argument on the question. The point for the present, however, is that r 16.02(1)(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 requires that a pleading “state the provisions of any statute relied on”. It has been held that that does not mean that a pleading must necessarily always expressly refer to a specific statutory provision which is sought to be invoked, but that it must be clear from the way in which the matter is pleaded that such an invocation is intended: ALDI Foods Pty Ltd as General Partner of ALDI Stores (a Ltd Partnership) v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [2020] FCA 269; 294 IR 407 at [82] per Flick J. See also Thomson v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2012] FCAFC 15 at [13].

13    What is apparent from that is that if the respondents took the view, as apparently they did, that the applicant had to exclude the operation of s 61(3) and bring herself within s 267(1)(c), then her pleading was clearly deficient. She has pleaded no allegations sufficient to satisfy those purported requirements; she makes no mention in her pleading on relying on the skill and judgment of the respondents, or the alleged failure of the guarantees not being only because of one or other of the matters in s 267(1)(c)(i) and (ii). The respondents should then have raised that deficiency at a much earlier stage, pointing out that the applicant’s pleading was deficient and that it accordingly did not disclose reasonable causes of action on the purpose and result guarantees. That the responsibility lay on the respondents in this regard is clear from the current state of the case law referred to above. Even if the respondents are ultimately correct in their contention that the applicant bears the onus on these issues (an issue in respect of which I express no concluded view), the current state of the case law and, I might add, commonly referred to commentary (ie, Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (44th ed, Lawbook Co, 2022) at [ACL.61.40]) is against that contention. The respondents should therefore have appreciated that the applicant may well have been relying on those authorities in not pleading those issues, and they should then have raised the issue and brought it to a head at a much earlier time. In that sense, the explanation for the amendments being sought at such a late stage is inadequate.

The pleadings

14    In order to deal with the respondents’ application to amend, it is necessary to identify the current state of the pleadings in relation to the purpose and result guarantee claims.

15    At [160]-[161] of the further amended statement of claim (FASOC), the applicant pleads that the respondents supplied services to the applicant and the passenger group members as passengers during the voyage of the Ruby Princess that departed Sydney on 8 March 2020. At FASOC [162] she pleads that the services comprised:

(a)     everything necessary to provide a 13-day recreational cruise including accommodation, meals, transportation and amenities, on-board activities, cleaning services, medical services as well as services to ensure the health and safety of Passengers; and

(b)     provision of information before embarkation, during the Voyage and during disembarkation about circumstances that may affect the services set out in (a).

16    To those paragraphs, the respondents relevantly plead in their defence that the second respondent

supplied or offered to supply the Passenger group members with goods and services during the Voyage that are reasonably necessary to enable them to have a safe and enjoyable cruise

but otherwise deny the allegations. Notably, the services identified by the applicant and, for the most part, admitted by the respondents, are expressed at a high level. They do not descend to a granular level of the specifics of the things to be done by the respondents in order to supply the services. The principal disputes with regard to the services to be supplied is whether they included “medical services as well as services to ensure the health and safety of Passengers” and the information services identified in FASOC [162(b)].

17    In respect of the purpose guarantee, the applicant pleads that she and the passenger group members made it known to the respondents that “the particular purpose for which they acquired the Services was to have a safe, relaxing and pleasurable 13-day cruise holiday and to ‘come back new’ that holiday” (FASOC [170]). The respondents admit that the passenger group members “impliedly made it known that they are desirous of having a safe, relaxing and pleasurable cruise holiday”. They otherwise deny the allegations.

18    In respect of the result guarantee, the applicant similarly pleads that she and the passenger group members made it known to the respondents that “the desired results of the Services was to have a safe, relaxing and pleasurable 13-day cruise holiday, and to come back new from that holiday” (FASOC [172]). The respondents similarly admit that the passenger group members “impliedly made it known that they are desirous of having a safe, relaxing and pleasurable cruise holiday” and otherwise deny the allegations.

19    In respect of the breach of the purpose and result guarantees, the applicant pleads that the services were not reasonably fit for the purpose and were not of such a nature, quality, state or condition that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result (FASOC [175]). The respondents deny these allegations. The particulars given by the applicant for the allegations are the following:

The Respondents failed to take the Reasonable Precautions [which are the Reasonable Pre-boarding Precautions and the Reasonable Post-boarding Precautions referred to below], such that:

-     the cruise was not safe, in that the Applicant and Passenger Group Members were exposed to a heightened risk of contracting Coronavirus on the Voyage;

-     the cruise was not relaxing or pleasurable, in that the Applicant and Passenger Group Members were distressed by the failure of the Respondents adequately to protect them from the risk of contracting Coronavirus on the Voyage, and were distressed that they had or would contract Coronavirus by reason of their exposure to the heightened risk of contracting Coronavirus on the Voyage;

-     several hundred Passengers contracted Coronavirus on the Voyage;

-     at least 28 Passengers died as a result of contracting Coronavirus on the Voyage;

-     by reason of the matters set out above, the Applicant and Passenger Group Members did not achieve the feeling of “com[ing] back new” from their holiday;

The cruise was cut short, such that the Applicant and Passenger Group Members did not receive a safe, relaxing and pleasurable 13-day cruise holiday.

The Applicant repeats the matters pleaded and particularised at paragraphs 130 to 146 above.

20    The matters pleaded and particularised at FASOC [130]-[146] as referred to in those particulars are matters relied on by the applicant for her contention that she and her husband did not “come back new” from their cruise. They include that Mr Karpik was hospitalised on account of having caught Covid on the cruise, he spent a long time in hospital and was reported to have come close to dying, and that Mrs Karpik was in isolation and unable to visit Mr Karpik. The matters pleaded are said to be consequences of the services not having been reasonably fit for purpose and/or of such a nature, quality, state or condition, that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result.

21    In FASOC [176] the applicant pleads that in the premises of the previous paragraph, ie, FASOC [175], the services failed to comply with the purpose and result guarantees. The respondents deny these allegations.

The proposed amendment to FASOC [175]

22    Turning now to the first of the amendments sought by the respondents. They seek to add to their denial of the allegations in FASOC [175] the following:

within the meaning of s 61(3) of the Australian Consumer Law, the applicant and the Passenger Group Members did not rely on, or alternatively, it was unreasonable for them to rely on, the skill or judgement of the respondents to:

a.    take the precautions alleged at paragraphs 42–43;

b.    ensure that the cruise was not cut short by the decision of the Australian Government to close the borders to cruise ships;

c.    prevent the occurrence of the matters alleged at paragraphs 130 to 146.

23    The precautions alleged at FASOC [42]-[43] are what are defined as the “Reasonable Pre-boarding Precautions” and the “Reasonable Post-boarding Precautions”. Their defined terms of reference reveal sufficiently for present purposes what they are. As mentioned, the matters pleaded at FASOC [130]-[146] are the consequences of the services allegedly not having been reasonably fit for purpose and/or of such a nature and quality that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result.

24    The proposed pleading seeks to invoke s 61(3) by pleading that the applicant did not rely on, or that it was unreasonable for her to rely on, the skill or judgment of the respondents to do, or to refrain from doing, very specific matters; the pleading addresses reliance, or non-reliance, at a particularly granular level in, in effect, pleading to the particulars given by the applicant. However, s 61(3) is not addressed at that level. It is addressed at the level of reliance on the skill or judgment of the supplier to provide the services to achieve the purpose. That is to say, that the services will be fit and proper for the purpose (in respect of the purpose guarantee) and that they will be of such a nature, and quality, state or condition that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the result (in respect of the result guarantee).

25    Thus, the proposed pleading is not targeted at the applicant’s reliance on the reasonable fitness of the services for the pleaded purpose or the nature and quality of the services to achieve the pleaded result, but rather at the highly specific ways in which the applicant says that the services failed, ie, the ways in which they were not fit for purpose or of the requisite nature and quality to achieve the result. These are not matters that a cruise passenger is likely to have ever turned their mind to prior to boarding, and the purpose and result guarantees do not require them to have done so.

26    The respondents wish to contend that the applicant did not rely on their skill and judgment in protecting her from Covid, submitting that that is not a “particular purpose” that she made known to them (T100:7-47). But it is not necessary for her to show that she had a more specific purpose than simply wishing to experience the services to be supplied by the respondents in connection with voyage RU2007 as pleaded at FASOC [120] – the “particular purpose” for which services are acquired need not be some special purpose and might only be the general purpose for which the services are ordinarily acquired: Moore CA at [221]-[226]. It may be that the applicant fails in establishing that the services to be supplied included “medical services as well as services to ensure the health and safety of Passengers”, or some combination of those services, but that is not a question of reliance on the skill and judgment of the respondents that the services would be fit for purpose or that they would be of such a nature and quality so as to be reasonably expected to achieve the result.

27    The consumer is required to plead the relevant services and her required purpose and result. It is open to the supplier in such circumstances to dispute the scope of the services and the making known of the required purpose or result, and to plead that the consumer did not (reasonably) rely on the skill or judgment of the supplier in supplying the services to achieve that purpose or that result, but s 61(3) does not enable a supplier to require a consumer to (reasonably) rely on the skill or judgment of the supplier to do or not to do a range of highly specific things in respect of which the services are said to have failed. To hold otherwise would be to require the consumer to have the skill and judgment of the supplier to be able to know the specifics of what the supplier must do and not do in order to fulfil the guarantees by supplying services that are fit for purpose or to be of such a nature and quality that they might reasonably be expected to achieve the required result. That would be to turn the guarantee on its head.

28    For those reasons, the proposed pleading is non-responsive to the applicant’s pleading and offers no reasonable defence to the pleaded case. It should be refused on that basis alone. I will return to other discretionary considerations.

The proposed amendment to FASOC [176]

29    The second of the amendments sought by the respondents is to elaborate on their denial of FASOC [176]. Correcting an error in the language acknowledged during argument, the respondents seek to plead that:

a.    the applicant cannot take action under s 267 of the Australian Consumer Law unless the applicant establishes that the failure to comply with guarantees as alleged did not occur only because of:

i.    an act, default or omission of, or a representation made by, any person other than the supplier, or an agent or employee of the supplier; or

ii.    a cause independent of human control that occurred after the services were supplied;

b.    further or alternatively, any failure to comply with guarantees as alleged occurred only because of:

i.    an act of a person or people other than the respondents, or an agent or employee of the respondents, who introduced the SARS-CoV-2 onto the ship;

ii.    the act of the Australian Government on 15 March 2020 to close the borders to any cruise ships that were not already en route to Australia.

c.    further or alternatively, to the extent the applicant claims that there was a failure to comply with the guarantees by reason of:

i.    people contracting coronavirus on the Voyage;

ii.    people who had been passengers on the Voyage subsequently dying from coronavirus;

iii.    the matters pleaded at paragraph 130 – 146 of the further amended statement of claim,

    these were causes independent of human control that occurred after the services were supplied and were the only causes of the failures.

30    Paragraph (a) seeks to squarely put the onus on the applicant to prove that the pleaded failures of the purpose and result guarantees did not occur only because of the matters identified in s 267(1)(c)(i) and (ii), whereas paragraph (b) pleads “further or alternatively” positively that those matters are the only causes of any failure of the purpose and result guarantees. For the reasons already given, it seems to me unlikely that the onus lies on the applicant on these issues. It would be wrong to determine that point at this stage. The factual and legal point in question, being whether or not any failure of the guarantees occurred only because of the identified matters, is adequately raised by paragraph (b) without the onus question being determined at this stage. I therefore disallow paragraph (a) and refer also to the further discretionary considerations I will come to.

31    There is also the consideration in relation to paragraph (a) in that it seems to plead that certain negative propositions are the applicant’s onus to establish, without pleading either that she cannot establish or has not established them. There is accordingly a drafting difficulty although no doubt it could easily be fixed.

32    Turning now to paragraph (b)(i), the point sought to be raised by the respondents is very specific. It is that any failure to comply with the guarantees occurred by reason of the introduction of the Covid virus onto the vessel by someone other than one of their agents or employees. That puts in issue a question of how the virus got onto the vessel. I am satisfied that that is a complex factual issue requiring detailed investigation which has not hitherto been done by the parties.

33    The respondents point to certain of the expert reports to show that there has been an investigation into the question of whether any crew members brought the virus onto the vessel and on that basis they say that the pleading does not raise a new factual issue and will not cause the applicant prejudice. However, the relevant reports of the experts seek to answer the following question: Was the risk of contracting Covid-19 heightened on the Voyage as compared to the risk of contracting coronavirus on a cruise ship to which certain assumptions did not apply as at 8 March 2020? The assumptions referred to set out a number of factual matters with regard to flu-like symptoms experienced by passengers and crew members on the prior voyage and on the voyage in question and influenza and Covid test results. However, there has apparently been no specific inquiry as to how the virus came to be on board the ship. Indeed, the Covid test results of crew members after the voyage ended would appear to be relevant to such an inquiry, yet the respondents denied those results to the applicant during the discovery process on the basis that they were irrelevant. Had the introduction of the virus onto the ship been recognised by the parties as an issue in the case, they may have taken quite different positions in relation to those test results.

34    I therefore accept the submission on behalf of the applicant that to definitively inquire into the introduction of the virus onto the vessel at this stage would be highly disruptive of the trial and would likely require an adjournment.

35    Insofar as paragraph (b)(ii) is concerned, a singular factual matter which is not in contest is sought to be relied on in order to advance an argument. That factual matter is that the Australian government on 15 March 2020 announced the closure of Australia’s borders to any cruise ships that were not already en route to Australia. It seems to me that the paragraph seeks to make available to the respondents an argument based on that factual matter. I do not see that it raises any particular prejudice for the applicant.

36    Turning now to paragraph (c), the respondents seek to be able to contend that any failure by them to comply with either the purpose or result guarantee occurred only because of causes that were independent of human control and that occurred after the services were supplied. However, the respondents do not identify any such causes. Rather, they identify the applicant’s pleaded consequences of the alleged failures by them to comply with the guarantees. That is to say, the pleading is directed at matters that were caused by failures to comply with the guarantees, rather than at matters that caused the failures to comply with the guarantees. The pleading is accordingly bad in law and discloses no reasonable defence to the pleaded claims.

37    Further, it is common ground, as I understand it, that the services upon which the applicant relies ended when she disembarked from the vessel. The fact that the consequences of the failure of those services are said to extend beyond that point, does not mean that the matters that caused any failure of the services extended beyond that point.

Discretionary considerations

38    As mentioned, this matter was listed for trial more than a year ago. To allow the amendments that I have indicated that I will disallow would put undue burden on the applicant and create prejudice for her in the conduct of her case. Insofar as the amendment to paragraph 175 of the defence is concerned, I am not satisfied that the question of the applicant’s reliance on the respondents’ skill and judgment, as opposed to on its representations, is already properly in issue in the proceeding and has been the subject of investigation and evidence. The reliance that she has pleaded, and is required to prove, in her ACL s 18 claim is quite different from the reliance on the skill and judgment of the respondents as suppliers of services in respect of the purpose and result guarantees. Allowing paragraph 175, and paragraph 176(a)(i) and (b)(i) as explained, would therefore likely cause a disruption of the orderly conduct of the trial, including an adjournment that would be prejudicial to the administration of justice and other litigants in the Court.

39    I also accept the applicant’s submission, with reference to Kaplan v Victoria (No 2) [2022] FCA 679 at [19] per Mortimer J, that “[t]he Court should only permit a very late amendment invoking an exception such as this when there is an adequately and full-expressed proposed pleading.” The respondents have not pleaded the respects in which it is said that any reliance by the applicant on their skill and judgment was unreasonable. In relation to the proposed paragraph 176(a), the respondents have not identified what act, default or omission of, or a representation made by, any person other than the supplier, or an agent or employee of the supplier, or what cause independent of human control that occurred after the services were supplied, was the only cause of any failure to comply with the guarantees.

Disposition

40    In all the circumstances, and taking into account the Aon factors, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, I disallow all of the proposed amendments save for that in respect of paragraph 176(b)(ii).

41    The Court orders that:

(1)    The respondents have leave to amend paragraph 176 of their defence by pleading that any failure to comply with the guarantees as alleged occurred only because of the act of the Australian government on 15 March 2020 to close the borders to any cruise ships that are not already en route to Australia.

(2)    The respondents forthwith file an amended defence in accordance with order 1 and make the necessary arrangements for the updating of the court book.

(3)    The applicant have leave to file any reply to the amended defence as soon as possible.

(4)    The respondents’ interlocutory application to amend the defence be otherwise dismissed with costs.

Associate:

Dated:    17 October 2022