Federal Court of Australia

CGZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 571

Appeal from:

CGZ18 & Anor v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 336

File number(s):

SAD 45 of 2020

Judgment of:

GREENWOOD J

Date of judgment:

17 May 2022

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – consideration of a contention that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to consider a claim said to have been plainly articulated by the appellants

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa)

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Division:

General Division

Registry:

South Australia

National Practice Area:

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Number of paragraphs:

47

Date of last submission/s:

22 September 2020

Date of hearing:

5 November 2020

Counsel for the Appellants:

Mr P Barnes

Solicitor for the Appellants:

Camatta Lempens

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms N Milutinovic

Solicitor for the Respondents:

Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

SAD 45 of 2020

BETWEEN:

CGZ18

First Appellant

CHA18

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

GREENWOOD J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MAY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.    Leave is granted to amend the notice of appeal so as to enable Ground 3 of the proposed amended notice of appeal to be relied upon.

2.    The appeal is dismissed.

3.    The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in an amount of $3,500.00.

4.    Pursuant to s 23 and s 37P of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), rule 1.32 and rule 1.36 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, these orders and the reasons for judgment in support of these orders are made and published from Chambers.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GREENWOOD J:

1    These proceedings are concerned with an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (now known as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)), the “primary court”, constituted by Heffernan J (the “primary judge”) dated 3 February 2020 dismissing an application for the grant of the constitutional writs under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) concerning a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) affirming a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the joint application of the appellants for a Protection (Class XA) visa.

2    The appellants seek leave to amend the notice of appeal to advance an additional Ground 3 in two parts, not advanced before the primary judge.

3    First, the Tribunal’s process of reaching its findings was hampered by the Tribunal’s failure properly to consider, weigh and assess, the country of origin material supplied to it by the appellants through submissions made by their legal representative.

4    Second, in so far as a “plain reading” of the decision record of the Tribunal demonstrates that the Tribunal Member did address the protection claim of the first appellant’s fear of persecution on the basis of the expected future conduct of the appellants, the dismissal of the claim was based on “irrational findings and therefore was in error”.

5    The appellants accept that it is necessary for them to demonstrate that it is in the interests of justice to now be allowed to pursue the amended ground of appeal and they also accept that they had the benefit of legal representation before the primary judge, and they do not suggest that there was any failure in relation to that representation. They seek leave to pursue Ground 3 as it is said to involve a question of law which they say has merit notwithstanding that the ground was not previously advanced before the primary judge. The Minister opposes the application for leave to rely upon the new ground (Ground 3). The question of leave will be addressed in the context of an assessment of the merits of the ground and its arguability.

6    The grounds of appeal framed by the existing notice of appeal and the two elements of Ground 3 sought to be agitated by leave, raise relatively short points.

7    By Grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal, the appellants contend that the primary judge engaged in error by failing to find that the Tribunal failed to address an integer of the appellants’ protection claim, namely, their fear of persecution on the basis of their “expected future conduct” should they return to Fiji, that is, that they would speak out against human abuses in Fiji and other conduct which does not align with their religious beliefs, or that they would remain silent for fear of retribution. The appellants contend that the primary judge ought to have found that in not addressing and making findings about that claim, the Tribunal failed to discharge its statutory review function. Those two elements of the Tribunal’s conduct are said to give rise to jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

8    Thus, as to those grounds, the questions are: Did the appellants make such a claim? Was such a claim, if made, addressed by the Tribunal?

9    As to proposed Ground 3, the appellants contend that the Tribunal disregarded country information put to the Tribunal on their behalf consisting of aspects of an Amnesty International Report published on 4 December 2016 entitled Beating Justice: How Fiji’s Security Forces Get Away with Torture; an Amnesty International Report published on 22 February 2017 entitled Fiji; and an Amnesty International Report published on 26 June 2017 entitled Fiji: Crackdown on Torture, Not Protests. These three reports (among other material) are referred to in a letter (submissions) put to the Tribunal on behalf of the appellants by their lawyers, Camatta Lempens, dated 30 August 2017.

10    The question in relation to Ground 3 is: Did the Tribunal disregard the letter of 30 August 2017 put to it by the lawyers for the appellants and the country information references in that letter?

11    The appellants (husband and wife) are Fijian nationals. They initially arrived in Australia on 27 October 2010 holding Class TR, Subclass 676 Tourist visas. They left Australia on 24 January 2011, returned on 11 March 2011, departed again on 2 June 2011 and most recently returned on 18 August 2011 holding Class TR, Subclass 676 Tourist visas. Those visas expired on 18 November 2011. They were then granted on-shore tourist visas on 15 November 2011 which expired on 18 February 2012. On 16 September 2013, over two years after returning to Australia on 18 August 2011 (and almost three years after their initial arrival in Australia on 27 October 2010), the appellants applied for Protection visas under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

12    Having regard to the questions in issue on the appeal, it is not necessary to recount the entire narrative of the claims and findings. It is only necessary to note the matters of emphasis put by the appellants in support of the appeal and any other matters relevant to the grounds of appeal.

13    The appellants contend that the Tribunal was not astute to the claim made by the male appellant that should he (and his wife) return to Fiji he would not be able to keep silent and that he would speak out about the truth as it relates to the truth of the Bible concerning peace, love, truth and joy in Fiji and that the political situation remained unstable and insecure for those citizens who do not agree with the government, which was the position of the male appellant, and that on the basis of his future protests about wrongs as he perceived them and his commitment to speak the truth, he would face a real risk of serious harm for articulating those views. Complementary protection was claimed under s 36(2)(aa) on the basis of the same facts.

14    As to the articulation of such a claim, the appellants emphasise that in the application for a protection visa, the male appellant was asked at Question 42: “Why did you leave that country [Fiji]?” and he said this:

With an illegal military gov. running the nation, suppressing the right of individual particularly staunch [M]ethodist, like myself, coupled with the fact that being a recipient of unethical, unfair treatment at my workplace, I decided from the outset to leave my beloved country [of] Fiji once the opportunity present[s] itself.

15    In answer to Question 44: “Have you experienced harm in that country?”, the male appellant said this:

The underlying fact is that the illegal military gov. had impose[d] radical changes to gov institution my workplace included directly affecting my position, overlooking every aspect of my career spanning 33 years to the day I retired, psychologically I’m affected, it hurts my integrity and ego.

16    In answer to Question 46: “Who do you think may harm/mistreat you if you go back?”, the male appellant said: “The Security Officers – Military Police Officers” and in answer to Question 47: “Why do you think this will happen to you if you go back?”, the male appellant said this (emphasised by the appellants in this appeal):

I intend to advocate for the return to democracy rule of my country and will actively join the movement F.D.F.M. in all its demonstration and meeting.

17    The reference to “F.D.F.M.” is a reference to the “Fiji Democracy and Freedom Movement” (“FDFM”).

18    The next matter emphasised by the appellants as framing a claim not addressed by the Tribunal is contained in a statement by the male appellant attached to the Protection visa application. The relevant matter is para 9 of the statement but in context it is important to note para 5 which is in these terms:

5.    After the [December] 2006 [Coup d’état] in Fiji led by army commander Voreqe Bainimarama, my position as chief steward brought me closely involved with the affairs of the church not only in our little church but to advocate for the bigger circuit activities in its focus to continue its affairs normally. However, it was not to be as the illegal regime kept a close watch banning all public and private meetings of the church in villages and nationally. Our legal Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase is an ordained member of the church and is respected and supported by almost all members of the church. Because he, Mr Qarase, hold[s] the powerhouse of support and followers it is my understanding it poses a big threat to Bainimarama, hence it is no wonder the military is more particularly concerned to tone down and cut off the mechanics of communication and activities of the church.

19    At para 9, the matter emphasised by the appellants is this:

9.    I have subscribed to be part of the movement to advocate for true democratic and a freedom fighter for my beloved Fiji and will participate in any demonstration for this purpose.

20    The appellants also emphasise that at the Protection visa interview on 17 September 2015, the male appellant said these things: he was persecuted due to his position within the Methodist Church including the government stopping the annual conference of the Church and its quarterly and monthly meetings; his rights were curtailed; he was threatened, marginalised and not allowed to voice his opinion; he was never promoted in his work as a prison officer due to his links with the Church; both appellants had joined the FDFM in 2013 and had taken part in a demonstration in Canberra on 27 September 2013 during which they participated in the ritual burning of the Bainimarama Constitution; he feared that upon his return to Fiji he would be harmed by the police and military due to his role as a lay preacher and his statements that the government was “going against the Bible”; and his wife expressed the view that her rights had been curtailed and that she too was unable to say anything against the government.

21    The next matter emphasised by the appellants is that in the letter (submissions) from their lawyers dated 30 August 2017, the lawyers said this at paras 9 and 10 on behalf of the male appellant:

9.    [The male appellant] feels, as a Methodist, that it is important for him to speak out against the injustices he has seen and continues to see perpetrated by the Fijian government.

10.    [The male appellant] has a demonstrated history of such outspokenness from his time as a public servant, and fears that he may be persecuted in future both for his past behaviour, and for any future conduct he is likely to engage in.

22    The letter of 30 August 2017 also attached a statutory declaration given by the male appellant in which he said these things:

29.    The people who caused the problems in the country that I feared then, are still in power now.

31.    I think I would come to their attention both because of my past actions, and also for what I would do in the future.

32.    If I go back to Fiji, I cannot be expected to keep quiet, and not say and do the things that God wants from me. I will keep speaking the truth of the Bible as it relates to reaching peace, love, truth and joy in our country.

33.    There has been no change, and the government still would not want me to say these things.

34.    There are many examples of people being harmed for speaking out. The Church has been silenced by the military, and told that they have no right to speak out about anything even now.

35.    If I were in my village, or anywhere in Fiji, and I saw something that happened that was not right, I would feel compelled to speak out about it.

36.    In that case, I might be arrested and tortured; even to the extent that I could die from my injuries.

37.    I would be constantly worried about my family; my wife, my kids and my grandchildren. I would think that, if those things could happen to me, then they could happen to them also.

23    These are the matters emphasised by the appellants as a clear articulation of a claim that was not addressed by the Tribunal. At para 12 of the Tribunal’s reasons, it identifies a short summary of the issues “raised by the applicants in this matter” as to whether they meet the requirements of the refugee criteria or the elements for complementary protection under the Act. The short summary of the issues is put this way by the Tribunal:

    they are staunch Methodist[s]

    they were members of the [FDFM] in Australia

    they have expressed their opposition to the 2006 coup in Fiji and the present government

    they are failed asylum seekers who fear harm as a result of time spent in Australia

24    At paras 13, 14 and 15, the Tribunal notes claims to fear harm from the Fijian government because of the male appellant’s past employment as a prison officer and Chief Steward working in the prison system in Fiji; a claim of psychological harm suffered by the second appellant resulting from her having observed mistreatment of her husband during his work as a prison officer; and claims made by the lawyers for the appellants that it was more appropriate to deal with the religious claims on the basis of a statement of political opinion as a “staunch Methodist”. At para 16, the Tribunal notes that many of the claims are overlapping.

25    The appellants contend that this summary of the claims does not reflect the claims described in the material emphasised above. In submissions, the appellants contend that an administrative tribunal which begins by inaccurately recording the components of a claim for protection, starts off on the “wrong foot” and unless there is a very clear indication later in the decision which corrects the mistake, the concern will remain that the tribunal has failed to appreciate the full extent of the claim thereby failing to deal with it properly. The appellants contend that the primary judge fell into error in failing to recognise the force of this proposition.

26    The difficulty with the contention that the Tribunal failed to address the claim made by the appellants is this. The reasons of the Tribunal have to be read in their entirety and statements in the reasons need to be read in the context of the analysis of the issues overall. For example, the Tribunal examined some of the observations of the delegate and at para 38 observed that the delegate had accepted that the male appellant may have been subjected to some discrimination during his employment because of his religious affiliation and role as Chief Steward but found that this would not amount to persecution. It observed at para 38 that the delegate noted that the male appellant had retired from his job in 2010 and would not be subject to the same treatment should he return to Fiji in the future. It notes at para 39 that the delegate found that the male appellant did not have a political profile that would put him within a category of people who were likely to be of adverse interest to the government and at para 40 the delegate had found that while the appellants were not supportive of the Fijian government, they had not been actively outspoken or public about their political beliefs since 2013 and the delegate observed that the appellants had not continued their activities with FDFM after moving to Adelaide in 2013.

27    Having noted those matters, the Tribunal makes observations about the declarations provided by the appellants to the Tribunal responding to those findings and the elements of those declarations are set out at paras 42 to 47. At para 48, the Tribunal notes the claim of the male appellant in terms which expressly refers to the language of para 32 from the declaration attached to the submissions from the appellants’ lawyers of 30 August 2017. At para 48, the Tribunal said this:

He claims there is a network of military personnel that can keep a watch on him. He claims he would come to their attention because of his past action and what he would do in the future. If he goes back to Fiji he “cannot be expected to be quiet and not to say and do the things that God wants from me. I will keep speaking the truth of the Bible as it relates to reaching peace, love, truth and joy in our country”.

28    In the face of this express recognition of the imperative to speak out, it is difficult to maintain the contention that the Tribunal did not recognise a claim to fear harm based upon the prospect that should he return to Fiji, he would feel compelled to speak the truth of the Bible when he sees conduct requiring him to speak out. Immediately after para 48, the Tribunal refers to the report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (“DFAT”) which is a Country Information Report on Fiji dated 14 April 2015. At para 49, the Tribunal notes that the male appellant said that he agreed that the DFAT report provided accurate information on the political background to the situation in Fiji, but the male appellant asserted that he did not agree with the conclusion in the report about the current situation in Fiji. The Tribunal notes that the male appellant claimed that the political situation remained “unstable and is insecure for those citizens who do not agree with the government”. The Tribunal observes at para 49 that the male appellant noted that the DFAT report confirmed that the police and military are continuing to monitor those who “speak against the government, being opposition leaders and some church leaders”. The male appellant claimed that the DFAT report did not address “how this same risk exists for those who are not necessarily opposition leaders, but who oppose the government like himself”. The first appellant claimed that “these are people who are not considered by the report to have a high profile”. The first appellant claimed that the risk which exists for people who have a high profile “is the same as the risk which exists for ordinary people like him”.

29    At para 51, the Tribunal observes that the male appellant acknowledged that he may not be known (generally) for having a profile in his Church and in his former workplace. However, he claimed to be well-known to have taken the position that he has concerning the government. At para 51, the Tribunal notes that the male appellant claims that people with lower profiles are also at risk.

30    The recognition at para 48 of elements of the claim as put in the declaration make it clear that the Tribunal took the declaration and the letter containing the submissions into account. The discussion at para 49 of the DFAT report about the risks the appellants might face is plainly in the context of claims that the appellant would feel constrained to speak out about wrongs as he would perceive them to be, and the discussion of the relativities between the risk faced by opposition leaders and high profile people be the same level of risk the male appellant would face makes clear that the Tribunal was considering a claim on the part of the appellants (and particularly the male appellant) to face harm should he return to Fiji and feel compelled to speak out about wrongs as he perceived them to be and especially about conduct which he perceived would offend the normative conduct of the Bible’s prescriptions.

31    At para 65, the Tribunal observes that it explained to the male appellant that it must assess his claims “looking to the reasonably foreseeable future” and in that context, the Tribunal noted that the male appellant had retired as a prison officer in October 2010 and had not been working for over seven years resulting in the Tribunal questioning the male appellant about what he feared would happen to him should he return to Fiji in the future. The male appellant claimed that he used to work with political prisoners and has a profile which would put his life in danger should he return to Fiji. He relied upon letters to the effect that should he return to Fiji he could be expected to “be imprisoned tortured and killed”. The Tribunal called into question the authenticity and reliability of the letters and at para 68 it notes that the male appellant said that his son worked in the prison system in Fiji and secretly smuggled the letters out of prison. However, the male appellant conceded that his son had prepared the letters but claimed that they were signed by political prisoners. At para 73, the Tribunal makes a finding that the claim that the male appellant was an advocate against the coups in Fiji was not supported by the male appellant’s evidence at the hearing and observed:

For example, the Tribunal notes that when questioned at the hearing the applicant conceded that he had no involvement in the 2006 coup in Fiji and did not take part in any political protest activity in Fiji. The Tribunal does not accept [that] the applicant was politically active and opposed to the government in Fiji and is a person of interest to the authorities in Fiji.

32    At para 74, the Tribunal said this:

The Tribunal find[s] that the letters are self-serving, lacking objectivity and have been prepared by the applicant’s son. The Tribunal does not accept the letters were written by the authors or represent their evidence. The Tribunal has given the letters little weight in assessing the application.

33    Commencing at para 75, the Tribunal begins to assess the applicant’s political profile and the claims that he would be a person of some interest should he return to Fiji. The observations at paras 83 and 84 lead to the observation at paras 85. The observations at paras 83 and 84 are these:

83.    The Tribunal does not accept the claim that the applicant was a threat to the security of the DCS [Corrective Services] or the government of the day. The Tribunal does not accept the applicant was viewed as anti-government when he worked as a prison officer and steward and this now puts his life in danger. There is no evidence that he was a threat to the government or faced serious harm/significant harm during his period of employment in Fiji or at any other time. As stated above the applicant retired at the age of 55 as a Corporal with full superannuation entitlements. The applicant has now retired from the DCS for over seven years. His career was not prematurely ended due to his political or religious profile after Bainimarama came to power in 2006.

84.    The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant’s work as a steward working with political prisoners has brought him to the adverse attention of the Fiji authorities and placed his life in danger should he return to Fiji. The Tribunal does not accept [that] the applicant’s conduct imputed him with an anti-government political opinion.

34    Looking to the future, the Tribunal said this at para 85:

85.    Looking to the reasonably foreseeable future the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant will face serious harm because of his religious beliefs and his work with political prisons (rebels) when he was employed as a prison officer and steward at the Korovou Prison in Fiji. The Tribunal finds that the applicant’s fear of persecution because of his imputed political opinion and religious beliefs as a staunch Methodist is not well-founded.

35    Commencing at para 87, the Tribunal considers the appellants’ claims having regard to their conduct since arriving in Australia in August 2011 and especially the question of their political involvement in Australia concerning the conduct of the Fijian government. The Tribunal found the evidence of the appellants to be vague and lacking in detail, and in order to illicit the conduct of the claims concerning that conduct, the Tribunal “had to prompt” the male appellant about his claims. The male appellant contended that he was engaged in protests against the Fijian Constitution.

36    However, at [91], the Tribunal notes that he could not recall the date, but ultimately nominated 2013. The male appellant was unable to recall other protest activity in which he had taken part in Australia. After further questioning, the male appellant said that he took part in a protest in Canberra in 2012. The Tribunal reminded the male appellant of the elements of his statement where he claimed that he took part in protest activity in 2016 in Sydney.

37    After reviewing further aspects of that matter, the Tribunal concluded at para 102 that the sole purpose for the appellants taking part in the protest in 2016 and providing photographs of participation in protests was to strengthen their claims before the Tribunal.

38    At para 115, the Tribunal notes that the male appellant described himself as an ordinary person in Fiji and the appellants confirmed at the hearing that they had not been involved in politics or protest activity in Fiji. At para 118, the Tribunal accepted that the appellants were staunch members of the Uniting Church and have been active volunteers in the Church since they arrived in Australia.

39    At para 119, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence to support claims that while living in Fiji the appellants “voiced their concern about the practices of the ruling government (political opinion)”. Also at para 119, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence to support the claim that because of their devotion to their Christian faith “they have spoken out against injustice towards others in Fiji”. These findings at para 119 are also relevant to the question of whether the Tribunal could be satisfied that it was likely that the male appellant would speak out as he asserted he would should he return to Fiji. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of past conduct of that kind. Having regard to the totality of the reasons, it is clear that the Tribunal comprehended the nature of the claim being made and dealt with it in its assessment of whether it could be satisfied of the relevant matters.

40    There is nothing in the analysis of the factual matters and the claims which suggests that the findings and determination of the Tribunal were based upon irrational conclusions or findings not supported by the rules of reason or an assessment of the evidence before the Tribunal.

41    Ground 3 is concerned with the proposition that the Tribunal failed to have regard to submissions put to it about country information. The contention is that the Tribunal failed to properly consider, weigh and assess the country information put to it by the appellants and in so far as the decision record of the Tribunal demonstrates that it did address the protection claim of the appellants based on their “expected future conduct” the dismissal of that claim was based on irrational findings and was therefore in error.

42    It is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it had regard to the submissions from the appellants’ lawyers of 30 August 2017 and particularly had regard to the declaration attached to the submissions referring to the claimed future conduct of the appellants should they return to Fiji. Although it is true that the Tribunal did not expressly refer to the Amnesty International Reports described earlier in these reasons and recited at footnotes 1, 2 and 3 to the submissions of 30 August 2017, it nevertheless remains clear that the Tribunal did have regard to the submissions.

43    Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the Tribunal at para 49, immediately after noting the matters at para 48, observed that it had discussed the DFAT report with the male appellant and noted the matters recited in the report with which the appellant agreed and those matters about which he did not agree. It is also clear that the Tribunal considered country information put by the appellants to the Tribunal regarding the prosecution of Fijians found guilty of sedition by the Fijian courts.

44    Otherwise, the Tribunal had particular regard to the information contained in the DFAT Country Information Report. It notes matters from that report at not only para 49 but also para 104 and extensively at para 114. The Tribunal weighed the country information it regarded as material and relevant to its deliberations in order to come to the statutory state of satisfaction for the purposes of s 36(2)(a) of the Act. Ultimately, that was a matter for the Tribunal and it is correct to say that the Tribunal’s use of the country information was entirely orthodox. It did not amount to jurisdictional error.

45    Finally, Ground 3 asserts that in assessing the claim of the appellants, its ultimate dismissal was based on irrational findings. There is nothing in the analysis conducted by the Tribunal which reflects a failure to analyse the evidence and the claims other than in accordance with the rules of reason. There is no doubt that an administrative decision-maker acting reasonably could have come to the same conclusions reached by the Tribunal. There is an evident and intelligible justification for the conclusions and they are based upon assessments reflecting a careful analysis of the evidence. The question is not whether minds might have differed and an alternative decision could have been reached. The decision reached by the administrative decision-maker was entirely within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness as those concepts are understood: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131], [135], Crennan and Bell JJ; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1 at [21]. At [26], the primary judge observed that the Tribunal “delivered reasons that were detailed and, in my view, showed a genuine intellectual engagement with the claims as presented by the applicants”. I accept that that observation is correct. The findings of the Tribunal including its adverse credibility findings were reached on rational grounds and were plainly open to it. Moreover, the Tribunal’s consideration of the motives for the participation by the appellants in the 2016 demonstration in Sydney was plainly open to it. The conclusions and findings were not affected by illogicality and the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in reaching the conclusions it reached.

46    However, having regard to the oral and written submissions, I am satisfied that leave ought to be given to amend the notice of appeal so as to enable Ground 3 of the proposed amended notice of appeal to be relied upon.

47    It follows that the appeal must be dismissed with costs fixed in an amount of $3,500.00.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Greenwood.

Associate:

Dated:    17 May 2022