Federal Court of Australia
Rakman International Pty Limited v Boss Fire & Safety Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 464
Table of Corrections | |
The medium neutral citation has been amended from “Rakman International Pty Limited v Trafalgar Group Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 464” to “Rakman International Pty Limited v Boss Fire & Safety Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 464”. |
ORDERS
DATE OF ORDER: |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The parties bring in agreed draft orders or, if agreement cannot be reached, competing draft orders, giving effect to these reasons and providing for the further conduct of this proceeding, by 4.00 pm on 10 May 2022.
2. The parties liaise with the Associate to Yates J to list the proceeding for further case management and the making of orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 641 of 2019 | ||
BETWEEN: | BOSS FIRE & SAFETY PTY LTD Applicant | |
AND: | TRAFALGAR GROUP PTY LTD Respondent |
order made by: | YATES J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 29 April 2022 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The parties bring in agreed draft orders or, if agreement cannot be reached, competing draft orders, giving effect to these reasons, by 4.00 pm on 10 May 2022.
2. The parties liaise with the Associate to Yates J to list the proceeding for the making of orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
ORDERS
NSD 1242 of 2019 | ||
BETWEEN: | TRAFALGAR GROUP PTY LTD Applicant | |
AND: | BOSS FIRE & SAFETY PTY LTD Respondent |
order made by: | YATES J |
DATE OF ORDER: | 29 APRIL 2022 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The parties bring in agreed draft orders or, if agreement cannot be reached, competing draft orders, giving effect to these reasons, by 4.00 pm on 10 May 2022.
2. The parties liaise with the Associate to Yates J to list the proceeding for the making of orders.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
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The disclosures in the Firestopit PDS and the presence or lack of innovative steps | [391] |
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[688] |
YATES J:
1 There are three proceedings before the Court involving common parties, which have been heard concurrently.
2 In the first proceeding (NSD 1589 of 2018), Rakman International Pty Limited (Rakman) and Trafalgar Group Pty Ltd (Trafalgar) sue Boss Fire & Safety Pty Ltd (Boss) and its sole director, Mark Prior, for infringement of Patent No. 2017101778 (the patent), in reliance on s 117(1) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (the Patents Act). Rakman is the patentee, and Trafalgar claims to be the exclusive licensee, of the patent.
3 The respondents deny infringement. Boss has cross-claimed, seeking revocation of all the claims. Boss has also cross-claimed against Trafalgar seeking relief pursuant to s 128(1) of the Patents Act for unjustifiable threats, and for relief on the basis that Trafalgar has contravened s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) (the ACL). The claims for relief under s 128(1) of the Patents Act, and the claims for relief based on contravention of s 18(1) of the ACL, concern a letter which Trafalgar sent to a number of firms and others engaged in the building industry, in which Trafalgar made a number of statements concerning Boss’s conduct and the fact that it (Trafalgar) had commenced proceedings against Boss for patent infringement.
4 The second proceeding (NSD 641 of 2019) is an appeal by Boss from a decision of a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks in opposition proceedings relating to Trade Mark Application No. 1736748 for the word FIREBOX (the 748 application). The applicant for the mark is Trafalgar whose registered corporate name, at the time of application, was Fire Containment Pty Ltd (Fire Containment). The delegate found that Boss had failed to establish the grounds of opposition on which it relied, and directed that the mark proceed to registration.
5 The third proceeding (NSD 1242 of 2019) is an appeal by Trafalgar from a decision of a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks in opposition proceedings relating to Trade Mark Application No. 1812214 for a composite mark which includes the word FYREBOX in stylised form and a stylised flame device (the 214 application). The applicant for the mark is Trafalgar whose registered corporate name, at the time of the application, was, once again, Fire Containment Pty Ltd. The delegate found that Boss had made out its opposition and refused to register the mark.
6 Rakman is, primarily, a holding company for various assets including intellectual property rights. It does not trade, other than to offer consulting services under the name “J-RAK Consulting”.
7 Fire Containment acquired certain assets of the business of Trafalgar Building Products Pty Ltd in May 2009. It then traded under the name “Trafalgar Fire Containment Solutions”, manufacturing and supplying fire containment products and systems. Fire Containment has since changed its name to Trafalgar Group Pty Ltd.
8 For ease of reference, it is convenient to refer to Rakman, Fire Containment, and Trafalgar as, simply, Trafalgar, unless it is necessary to distinguish between them. Similarly, it is convenient to refer to Boss and Mr Prior as, simply, Boss, unless it is necessary to distinguish between them.
9 For the reasons that follow, I have found that all claims of the patent are invalid. Claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 are invalid on the ground that the invention, as claimed in each claim, is not novel. Claim 5 is invalid on the ground that the invention, as claimed in that claim, does not involve an innovative step. Had I not found that the invention as claimed in claim 3 is not novel, I would have found that the invention, as so claimed, does not involve an innovative step.
10 It follows that Trafalgar’s claim of infringement against Boss under s 117(1) of the Patents Act is not, and cannot be, established. Had the claims of the patent not been invalid, Trafalgar’s case of infringement against Boss would have succeeded. However, its case against Mr Prior for infringement would not have succeeded.
11 I am not satisfied that Boss has established that Trafalgar made unjustifiable threats within the meaning of s 128(1) of the Patents Act. However, I am satisfied that Trafalgar contravened s 18(1) of the ACL by sending the letter to which I have referred.
12 As to the trade mark appeals, I have concluded that the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019 should be allowed. In light of that conclusion, and subject to hearing further from the parties, I have reached the provisional conclusion that the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019 should be dismissed.
13 In its patent case, Trafalgar adduced evidence from Mr Rakic, who is the director and company secretary of the applicants. It also adduced evidence from Mr Todd, who is Trafalgar’s Director of Innovation, and Mr Vickery, who is Trafalgar’s Chief Financial Officer and General Manager. Mr Rakic and Mr Todd were cross-examined. Evidence of a formal nature was also adduced from Ms Currey, a solicitor employed in the firm of solicitors acting for Trafalgar in the three proceedings. Ms Currey was not cross-examined.
14 In answer, Boss adduced evidence from Mr Prior, who is the director and company secretary of Boss. It also adduced evidence from Mr Bacon, the National Sales Manager of Boss; Mr Visser, the former Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Speedpanel Australia Pty Ltd; Mr Atkinson, the former Managing Director and Chairman of the United Kingdom company FSi Ltd; and Mr Ramunddal, the Chief Executive Officer of the Norwegian company Seltor Gruppen AS. These witnesses were cross-examined. Evidence of a formal nature was also adduced from Ms Sanders, a partner in the firm of solicitors acting for Boss, and from Mr Warzecha, a solicitor employed in that firm. Ms Sanders and Mr Warzecha were not cross-examined.
15 As I have noted, the patent case and the trade mark appeals have been heard concurrently. Mr Rakic and Mr Prior, for example, each gave evidence that was directed to all three proceedings. Because of the overlapping nature of the evidence, evidence in one proceeding was taken to be evidence in each other proceeding as well.
16 Evidence specifically directed to the trade mark appeals was adduced not only from Mr Rakic and Mr Prior but also, for Trafalgar, from Mr Wax, a Project Manager employed by Paladin Group and, for Boss, from Mr Falkiner, a former Passive Fire Services Manager at Wormald International; Mr Halliday, one of the founders and Managing Directors of Airport Consultancy Group Pty Ltd; Mr Talbot, the founder and Managing Director of Verified Pty Ltd; and Mr Bradley, a Construction Manager employed by Paladin Group.
17 In closing submissions, the parties made various criticisms of (some of) each other’s witnesses. With one exception, it is not necessary for me to recount these criticisms in this part of the reasons. I have considered and reflected on these criticisms in my assessment of the evidence. Where I have considered it necessary to make specific comment, I have done so in my discussion of that evidence.
18 The exception is Mr Prior’s evidence. Trafalgar made a sustained attack on Mr Prior’s credit. It submitted that Mr Prior’s evidence should not be accepted on any issue adverse to Trafalgar’s case, “unless corroborated by a genuine contemporaneous document”.
19 Trafalgar put the matter that way because it contended that Mr Prior had been involved in the creation of a number of documents adduced in evidence which, it claimed, were not created on the dates asserted by him. Trafalgar contended that Mr Prior’s creation of “highly significant documents … casts doubts about the veracity of his evidence and is illustrative of the steps he is willing to take to advance Boss’ interests in the proceeding”. This is really an allegation that Mr Prior falsified and fabricated evidence in aid of Boss’s case.
20 None of these claims were made good by Trafalgar. What is more, Trafalgar’s allegations of falsification and fabrication extended to documents which were, in fact, documents whose contents emanated from third parties for which Mr Prior could not have been responsible—for example, the Firestopit PDS prepared by Mr Atkinson, a digital image taken at FSi, and a digital image taken by Mr Ramunddal, all of which are discussed below. To the extent that these claims were advanced in cross-examination—and not all such claims were advanced in the cross-examination of relevant witnesses—they failed. I raise these matters, primarily, in fairness to Mr Prior and to make clear that I do not accept the submission which Trafalgar advanced in this regard.
21 This, however, was not the end of Trafalgar’s criticisms of Mr Prior’s evidence. Based on identified passages from Mr Prior’s cross-examination, Trafalgar submitted that the Court should have “serious doubts about the accuracy and reliability of [Mr Prior’s] recollection in circumstances where he was unable to recall basic matters during the same period which did not suit his case”. Trafalgar also submitted that Mr Prior presented as “a witness whose recollection of matters occurring in 2014 and 2015 was not as clear as he presented it to be in his affidavit and whose ability to recall matters occurring many years later was dictated solely by his self-interest in the proceeding”.
22 Trafalgar also submitted that the Court should conclude that aspects of Mr Prior’s affidavit evidence were implausible. This submission was coupled with the submission that the Court should find that Mr Prior gave deliberately false evidence concerning the fact that he had lost certain documents relating to the time that he said that Boss commenced using FYREBOX for certain products supplied by Abesco, and that he could not recall the name of the consulting company that he requested to recover emails and documents.
23 I do not accept these submissions. In particular, I do not accept that Mr Prior gave deliberately false evidence on the topic of lost documents and the steps that Boss had taken to recover documents. Further, I do not have particular concerns about Mr Prior’s ability to recall events. In that regard, I have exercised caution in accepting Mr Prior’s recollection of events that occurred some years ago, in the same way as I have exercised caution in accepting other witnesses’ recollections of such events.
24 There are, however, some aspects of Mr Prior’s evidence which have caused me concern. In the trade mark opposition proceeding below in relation to the 748 application, Mr Prior made a declaration in which he deposed to the total sales revenue received by Boss, in a particular period, from the sale of products bearing, or promoted by reference to, the FYREBOX trade mark. Leaving aside the question of whether the products did bear, or were promoted by reference to, the FYREBOX trade mark, Mr Prior accepted, in cross-examination, that the revenue recorded in the declaration for the products (to which he was referring) was grossly different to the revenue recorded in Boss’s sales records. When asked to explain this discrepancy, Mr Prior said:
No. I can’t give clarity on exactly how that happened. As I said a few minutes ago, I don’t recall writing this. I accept that it came from me; it was authorised by me. And certainly, in the declaration, there was a less level of detail and focus as there was in court proceedings. So I very much accept they’re different. I can see that. It’s in front of me.
25 Mr Prior accepted that, at the time he made his declaration for the purposes of the opposition proceeding, the declaration would be used to advance Boss’s interests over Trafalgar’s interests. When asked whether, by his answers in cross-examination, he was suggesting that the declaration had not been prepared with the degree of care that he (Mr Prior) thought the declaration should have been prepared, Mr Prior said:
I’m not sure I would put it like that. However, I would say that for Federal Court proceedings, there was considerably more and intensive research that went into this case than there was into a declaration, and evidenced by having different legal representation as well, with a considerably different focus on the depth of data they had to dig into. I don’t recall the legal advice I had in the preparation of the declaration; much of a discussion at all.
26 Relatedly, Trafalgar submitted that Mr Prior was being less than frank in his declaration, and also in his affidavits in the present proceedings, by giving the impression that significant sales of products had been made by Boss since 2013 using the FYREBOX trade mark when, in fact, on careful consideration, the evidence did not show this to be the case.
27 These criticisms of Mr Prior’s evidence are justified. They have led me to scrutinise Mr Prior’s evidence with some care. Having said that, my impression of Mr Prior in cross-examination was that he was careful, and responded directly and truthfully, in the answers he gave. As will become apparent, on a number of critical matters, Mr Prior’s evidence was, in fact, corroborated by other evidence, which I consider to be reliable.
28 Trafalgar adduced evidence from a number of experts in its patent case. It adduced evidence from Mr Harriman, who is a building and fire regulation consultant, and from Mr Hunter, who is a mechanical engineer. It also adduced evidence from Mr van de Weijgert, a fire safety engineer, whose evidence was directed to the standards applicable to fire protection devices in the United Kingdom and Europe.
29 Trafalgar also called evidence from Mr McKemmish, an expert in computer forensics. Mr McKemmish addressed the metadata recorded in electronic copies of documents that had been produced on discovery by Boss. Mr McKemmish was cross-examined.
30 For its part, Boss adduced evidence from Mr Page, who has expertise in the field of passive fire safety based on various roles he has had working with suppliers and manufacturers of passive fire safety equipment, subcontractors responsible for the installation of passive fire safety products, laboratories involved in the testing of passive fire safety products, and consultants to the building and fire safety industry. His experience has been gained predominantly in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
31 Four joint expert reports were provided. These were designated Part A (Mr Harriman, Mr Hunter and Mr Page); Part B (Mr Hunter and Mr Page); Part C (Mr Harriman and Mr Page); and Part D (Mr Harriman, Mr van de Weijgert, and Mr Page).
32 Mr Harriman and Mr Page were separately cross-examined. There were also a number of concurrent evidence sessions over Days 9 and 10 of the hearing: Mr Harriman, Mr Hunter, and Mr Page; Mr Harriman and Mr Page; Mr Hunter and Mr Page; Mr Harriman, Mr van de Weijgert and Mr Page; and a further session involving Mr Hunter and Mr Page.
33 The title of the complete specification of the patent (the specification) is: A Firestopping Device and Associated Method. The application for the patent was filed on 21 December 2017 as a divisional application of Patent Application 2016208262. The priority date of the claims is 12 February 2016 (the date of filing Provisional Application No 2016900475).
34 The specification describes the invention as relating to the field of passive fire protection, with embodiments of the invention finding application in the construction of buildings, such as residential apartment buildings and the like.
35 In essence, the claimed invention is a method of constructing a barrier (typically, a wall) and routing services (electrical cables, water pipes, and the like) through the wall deploying an element referred to in the specification as a “firestopping device”, but commonly referred to as a transit (or fire transit). The firestopping device is fastened to an external object (typically, but not necessarily, a soffit) and the barrier is constructed around the device. It is this feature which is said to distinguish the method of the invention from prior art methods.
36 In describing the prior art methods, the specification states:
In a typical prior art method for constructing a residential apartment building the walls are constructed prior to installation of the services such as electrical cables, water pipes, etc. In this prior art method, a hole is made in the wall for each of the services, which typically must be separated by a standard separation distance, such as 200 mm for example. This separation distance requires significantly larger overall areas for services, which severely limits the design options for construction. Additionally, the typical prior art method often requires ladders and the like to be set up and moved repeatedly. Each of the individual holes through which the services extend must then be separately sealed in a fire rated fashion, which can be time consuming and expensive.
37 The specification explains that an object of the invention is to overcome, or substantially ameliorate, one or more of these disadvantages, or to provide a useful alternative.
38 The specification continues by providing consistory statements for claims 1, 2, and 3 of the patent. It is convenient, at this stage, to quote all the claims, noting that Trafalgar alleges that Boss has infringed claims 1, 2, 3, and 5, and that Boss alleges (as I have noted) that all the claims are invalid:
1. A method of constructing a barrier having at least one service routed there through, the method including the steps of:
providing a firestopping device including: a first portion formed from a metallic material or a thermally insulative material having formations for fastening of the first portion to an external object; and a second portion formed from a metallic material or a thermally insulative material being separable from the first portion and being mateable to the first portion such that the first and second portions, when mated together, define the firestopping device; wherein the firestopping device has a first opening at a first end, a second opening at a second end and an internal volume intermediate the first and second ends, the internal volume and each of the openings being sized such that at least one service may extend through the firestopping device, and wherein an intumescent material is housed within the internal volume, the intumescent material being responsive to heat so as to swell within the internal volume;
fastening the first portion to an external object at a position that straddles the proposed positioning of the barrier;
positioning at least one service such that it is adjacent to, or in alignment with, the first portion;
positioning the second portion around the at least one service;
mating the first and second portions to each other such that the at least one service extends through the firestopping device; and
constructing the barrier around the firestopping device.
2. A method according to claim 1 wherein the first and second portions of the firestopping device are mateable to each other by at least one mechanical fastener without the use of any tools.
3. A method according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first portion of the firestopping device is a planar panel defining a pair of opposite sides each having a side wall extending therefrom.
4. A method according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the second portion of the firestopping device is U-shaped so as to define a base connected to a pair of opposed side walls.
5. A method according to any one of the preceding claims further including the step of marking a line on the external object so as to depict the proposed centre line of the barrier.
39 As will be clear, all the claims are method claims, and claims 2 to 5 are each dependent, directly or indirectly, on claim 1.
40 The specification describes non-limiting embodiments of the invention. In order to summarise the invention as described, I will focus on the first embodiment, which receives the greatest treatment in the specification.
41 In the first embodiment, the firestopping device is comprised of two separate portions which are mated. Consistently with the claims, these portions are referred to as, simply, the first portion and the second portion. The separability of the two portions allows the firestopping device to be used in the method that is claimed.
42 The first portion is a planar panel with a pair of opposing side walls. The first portion is provided with holes to facilitate the fastening of this portion to an external object. The specification explains:
… In typical implementations the object to which the first portion 2 is likely to be fastened is an overhead concrete slab, although other possibilities include wooden frame structures, walls, floors, service shafts, etc. Fasteners, in the form of bolts, screws, or the like, extend through the holes 3 so as to fasten into the concrete slab, thereby securing the first portion 2 in place.
43 The first portion is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 is an upper perspective view, and Figure 6 is a lower perspective view, of the first portion:
44 The second portion is described as U-shaped, so as to define a base with a pair of opposing side walls. The second portion is illustrated in Figure 7, which is an upper perspective view of that portion:
45 The specification describes features of the first portion and the second portion that provide means by which the two portions can be mated to provide the firestopping device. It is not necessary to dwell on these particular features. They do not feature prominently in the claims. Claim 2, for example, merely requires that the two portions are “mateable” to each other by at least one mechanical fastener, without the use of tools.
46 The first embodiment of the firestopping device is illustrated by Figure 1, which is an upper perspective view of the device:
47 The specification states that, in this particular embodiment, the second portion forms the base and “the majority” of the side walls of the firestopping device. This statement acknowledges that, in this particular embodiment, the side walls of the first portion also define, in part, the side walls of the device. Indeed, as I have noted, the first portion is described as a planar panel with a pair of opposing side walls. Figure 6 shows the opposing side walls by indices 10 and 11.
48 The specification continues:
... in other embodiments the second portion mates with the first portion so as to form one of the sides and/or the top of the firestopping device.
49 This statement discloses that, in other embodiments, the opposing side walls of the first portion provide the side walls of the firestopping device, with the second portion providing one wall of the device, including by acting as a “top” for the device.
50 The specification continues by explaining that, in the described embodiment, the firestopping device has openings (shown by indices 5 and 6 in Figure 1) and an intermediate, internal volume through which at least one service (not illustrated) extends.
51 The specification describes the placement of intumescent material within and outside the device to resist the passage of fire and smoke.
52 The specification then describes a method of constructing a barrier:
Either of the above-described embodiments of the firestopping device 1 or 19 may be used in a method of construction of a barrier having at least one service routed there through. For the sake of providing an example, we shall assume that the barrier is a wall. The method commences with the marking of a line 27 on the concrete ceiling 28, which depicts the proposed centre line of the wall. The installer then fastens the first portion 2 to the ceiling 28 at a position that straddles the proposed positioning of the wall. More specifically, the first portion 2 is bolted onto the ceiling such that its intumescent material 15 is centred over, and extends parallel to, the centre line of the proposed wall, as shown in figure 13. Hence the positioning of the first portion 2 on the ceiling 28 provides a visual guide as to where the services are to penetrate through the proposed wall.
Next the installer positions the services (not illustrated) such that they are adjacent to, or in alignment with, the first portion 2. More specifically, the services are typically suspended by fastening devices such as clips, clamps, etc., approximately 50 mm below the ceiling so as to extend below the first portion 2 and generally perpendicular to the intumescent material 15 of the first portion 2. Typically, the installer will be supported by a lifting mechanism, such as a scissor lift or the like, whilst running the services. This process doesn't require the threading of the services through a prior art style of firestopping device, which helps ease of running the services and minimises the potential for the services to be damaged by the firestopping device. It is also time efficient and therefore has the potential to yield cost savings for the construction of the building. It also has the potential to assist project managers to coordinate the activities of various tradesmen and sub-contractors.
The reduction in required space for the firestopping of these services allows for significantly more flexibility in design, and the application of a multi-service firestopping device provides an "all-in-one" solution, allowing easier certification and compliance procedures.
Once the services have been run, the second portion 4 is positioned around the services. That is, the side walls 7 and 8 of the second portion 4 are positioned on either side of the services, with the base 17 of the second portion 4 below the services. The second portion 4 is then slid upwards so as to mate the first and second portions 2 and 4 to each other as shown in figure 14. Hence, the services now extend through the firestopping device 1.
It is now possible to construct the wall 30, as illustrated in figure 15, around the firestopping device 1 using standard barrier building techniques. For example, the wall installer may now attach wall engaging formations, in the form of a head track, to the ceiling 28 and to the exterior of the second portion 4, to which a barrier material, such as plaster board for example, may be attached. Additionally, or alternatively, wooden frame work may be constructed, to which a barrier material, such as plaster board for example, may be attached. Alternatively, formwork may be positioned to allow the pouring of a concrete wall. These processes may be assisted with the use of the second embodiment of the firestopping device 19, as illustrated in figures 16 to 19, to which the wall engaging formations in the form of channels 20 are pre-installed.
The resulting wall 30 has the firestopping device 1, and the services (not illustrated), extending there through. A number of services may extend together through the firestopping device without requiring the approx. 200 mm separation between each of them that is applicable to some prior art techniques.
53 The specification describes the application of sealant around the inner perimeters of the first and second openings, and the placement of graphite impregnated foam and, optionally, thermally insulative wrap around the services, externally to the device.
54 There are two questions of construction. The first is the meaning of “around” as used in claim 1 to describe the positioning of the second portion when forming the fire stopping device. The second question is the meaning of “thermally insulative” as used in claim 1 to describe the material from which the first and second portions can be made.
55 Claim 1 defines a method in which, after the first portion of the fire stopping device is fastened to an external object, and after at least one service is positioned adjacent to or in alignment with that portion, the second portion is positioned “around” at least one service. The parties described this as integer 1.11.
56 The question that arises is: what does it mean to say that the second portion is positioned “around” the (at least one) service, bearing in mind that: (a) the specification describes an embodiment in which the second portion is U-shaped, but also refers to other embodiments in which the second portion forms one wall and/or the “top” of the device; and (b) in claim 1, the second portion is not expressly defined as having any particular shape or configuration.
57 The issue that divides the parties is this:
(a) Boss submitted that where, for example, the second portion is a planar portion and/or is the “top” of the fire stopping device (in other words, it has no side walls), positioning this portion, in the sequence described, cannot be positioning it “around” the (at least one) service because this portion can only form one side of the device.
(b) Trafalgar submitted that positioning this portion in the sequence described is positioning it “around” the (at least one) service because it would partially surround the service(s).
58 The parties advanced their competing constructions through the expert evidence of Mr Hunter (for Trafalgar) and Mr Page (for Boss). Both witnesses used as their starting point a dictionary meaning of “around”—namely, to “surround”. They reasoned that, as used in integer 1.11, “around” could not have this meaning. It must mean something less than surround. They agreed that if the second portion had the U-shaped configuration of the first embodiment, then it would be appropriate to speak of this portion being positioned “around” the (at least one) service in the step preceding the mating of the two portions to form the firestopping device. However, Mr Hunter went further. He contended that if the second portion was planar, and could thus only provide one side of the device, it would still be appropriate to speak of it being positioned “around” the (at least one) service.
59 Mr Hunter illustrated his view by the following diagram:
60 The effect of Boss’s submission is that by using the word “around” in integer 1.11, claim 1 confines the shape and configuration of the second portion to exclude a one-sided or substantially planar element, even though earlier integers in the claim do not do so. In developing its submissions on this question, Boss submitted that, even though the specification refers to other embodiments of the invention, in which the second portion forms but one side and/or the top of the device, these embodiments are disclaimed in claim 1 by the presence of integer 1.11. On occasion, Boss’s submissions went so far as to suggest that integer 1.11 effectively required the second portion to be a three-sided element.
61 The parties agreed that “around” is not used in claim 1 as a technical term or a term of art. They accepted that, as the question of construction is one for the Court to decide, the evidence given by Mr Hunter and Mr Page on this score is of limited assistance.
62 I think it is perfectly clear what claim 1 means when it uses the word “around” in integer 1.11, as I will now explain.
63 Claim 1 defines the firestopping device by reference to two “mateable” portions which, when mated, have an opening at one end, an opening at the other end, and an internal volume that is intermediate the two ends. The internal volume and the two ends are of a size that permits at least one service to extend through the device. The internal volume also houses the intumescent material.
64 Other than providing for these features, the method claimed in claim 1 is agnostic as to the shape or configuration of the firestopping device. The claimed method is also agnostic as to the shape or configuration of each, separate portion making up the device.
65 According to claim 1, the firestopping device is provided by: fastening the first portion to an external object in a particular position (straddling the position of the proposed barrier); positioning the (at least one) service adjacent to or in alignment with the first portion; positioning the second portion “around” the (at least one) service; and then mating the two portions so that the (at least one) service extends through the device.
66 When these sequential steps of claim 1 are recognised—appreciating that neither the firestopping device nor its two separate and “mateable” portions are required to be of any particular shape or configuration—the step of positioning the second portion “around” the (at least one) service means no more than positioning the second portion in relation to the (at least one) service (which is already adjacent to or in alignment with the first portion) so that, when the second portion is mated with the first portion to create the first and second openings at respective ends of the device and the intermediate internal volume, the (at least one) service is accommodated within the device.
67 In short, the word “around” does not function as a limitation on the shape or configuration of the second portion, so as to require the second portion to be something other than a one-sided or substantially planar element. It is simply referring to the positioning of the second portion so that the (at least one) service is accommodated within the device.
68 Boss submitted that its construction is supported by the further integer of claim 1—referred to by the parties as integer 1.13—“constructing the barrier around the firestopping device”. The gist of this argument is that integer 1.13 cannot mean constructing the barrier on one side of the firestopping device; it must mean constructing the barrier so as to surround the device on three sides. Therefore, the word “around” in integer 1.11 should be construed conformably with the word “around” in integer 1.13.
69 I am not persuaded that the use of “around” in integer 1.13 dictates the meaning of “around” in integer 1.11. “Around” in integer 1.13 is used in a different context to “around” in integer 1.11. The two integers speak to different relationships.
70 The contest about the meaning of “thermally insulative” arises from a subsidiary argument concerning integer 1.11 that was advanced through Mr Hunter with reference to Boss’s FyreBox device. Trafalgar contends that the supply of this device is an infringement of the patent because its use in accordance with Boss’s installation instructions would infringe claims 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the patent: s 117(1) of the Patents Act, read with s 117(2)(c). Alternatively, Trafalgar contends that the supply of this device is an infringement of the patent because Boss has reason to believe that it would be put to use in a way that would infringe claims 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the patent: s 117(1) of the Patents Act, read with s 117(2)(b).
71 The meaning of “thermally insulative” is also relevant to Boss’s challenge to the validity of the patent based on the ground of lack of utility.
72 The FyreBox device has two, separable portions which can be mated. One portion is a three-sided chassis. The second portion is described as a “bottom sliding lid”. The bottom sliding lid engages with the chassis. The two portions are held in place by four thumbscrews. The instructions direct that the bottom sliding lid be removed from the chassis by removing the four thumbscrews, and that the chassis then be mounted on the underside of a soffit or slab using mounting holes provided in the chassis.
73 It will be necessary to return to these instructions when considering the question of infringement. Of present importance is the fact that the bottom sliding lid is a substantially planar metal element that is fitted with smoke brushes at each of two opposing ends of the lid. The brushes are disposed perpendicularly. They are referred to in the instructions as “FR Smoke Seal Brushes”. Mr Hunter and Mr Page understood the letters “FR” to mean “Fire Resistant”.
74 The instructions direct that, after the services are installed, the lid be installed by resting it on flanges provided in the chassis, and sliding it into place. The instructions continue:
The Smoke Brushes will shape themselves around the penetrating services and when closed, the Smoke Brushes can easily be tucked into place by hand. Secure the lid using the four thumb screws provided ...
75 The subsidiary argument advanced through Mr Hunter is that the lid is one component comprising the substantially planar metal element and the smoke brushes attached to it, and that the step of sliding the lid into engagement with the chassis constitutes the step of “positioning the second portion around the at least one service”, within the meaning of integer 1.11.
76 This argument seeks to accommodate integer 1.11 in two ways. First, if the word “around”, as used in integer 1.11, has the literal meaning of “surround”—an argument which both expert witnesses rejected—then the smoke brushes “surround” the (at least one) service. Secondly, if only a second portion configured with at least three sides can be positioned “around” the (at least one) service, then that feature of claim 1 is satisfied by the lid of the FyreBox device because the planar metal element and the smoke brushes form a three-sided second portion.
77 This last-mentioned argument provoked more arguments—namely, (a) whether the lid (the planar element and smoke brushes) is formed from a metallic material or a thermally insulative material, as required for the second portion referred to in clam 1, and (b) whether the smoke brushes are, truly, “around” the (at least one) service if they are not “around” the (at least one service) for the entire length of the service as it extends through the device.
78 In light of my finding about the meaning of “around” in integer 1.11, it is not necessary for me reach a view on these arguments for that purpose. As a matter of substance, they add nothing to the construction I have found. Nevertheless, the first argument has a continuing relevance to Boss’s challenge to validity based on lack of utility. I will state my conclusions on both arguments as briefly as I can.
79 First, I do not accept that the smoke brushes are positioned “around” the (at least one) service for the purposes of integer 1.11. As I have explained, the word “around” in integer 1.11 means positioning the second portion of the firestopping device in relation to the (at least one) service so that, when the second portion is mated with the first portion of the device, the mated portions create the first and second openings at respective ends of the device, and the intermediate internal volume through which the (at least one) service is accommodated. The smoke brushes might, literally, “surround” the (at least one) service at each end of the completed Fyrebox, but it is the planar element of the FyreBox lid that is positioned “around” the (at least one service) so that, in combination with the chassis, it creates the openings for the device and the internal, intermediate volume through which the services extend and are accommodated.
80 Secondly, the fact that the smoke brushes happen to be attached to the “bottom sliding lid” of the FyreBox device is neither here nor there. I do not regard them as comprising part of the first portion or the second portion of the firestopping device that is described in the specification and defined in the claims.
81 Thirdly, claim 1 requires the first and second portions of the firestopping device to be formed from a metallic material or a thermally insulative material. It is silent on the composition of other elements that, in practice, might happen to be part of the firestopping device, but which are extraneous to the definition of the firestopping device in the claims. Whether the “fire resistance” of the brushes, which are extraneous to the claims, equates with them being formed from “thermally insulative” material is not a question that need be pursued.
82 Fourthly, Boss’s case on the meaning of this integer was advanced through Mr Page’s evidence. In a Joint Report prepared by Mr Page, Mr Harriman, and Mr Hunter, which was signed by them on 16 April 2020 (Joint Report Part A), Mr Harriman said that “thermally insulative” means “to restrict the passage of heat in a fire”. Mr Hunter agreed.
83 Mr Page said that his understanding of “thermally insulative” was similar to Mr Harriman’s view, but added that:
… the term referred to the ability of the device to restrict the passage of heat across it, including in fire situations where there could be 1200°C on one side of a barrier for an extended period (rerf 30 minutes), and there was requirement for the temperature to be kept to less than 180°C on the other side of the barrier.
84 Mr Harriman disagreed. He included the following section in Joint Report Part A:
Mr Harriman made the point that in his view the Patent did not specify that the invention needed to work solely in the case of a 1200°C fire. He added that another exemplary fire could be a smouldering fire of less than 200°C, or a sprinkler-protected fire of ~ 200°C. Mr Harriman noted that for such lower temperature fires, the foam would be important as it is the initial barrier which restricts the passage of heat and hot smoke across the device before the intumescent material is triggered (which occurs in the range 200-300°C). Mr Harriman added that in some of these lower temperature fires, the intumescent material may not be triggered at all. Mr Harriman stated that the example of the foam pads shows that ‘thermally insulative’ is therefore not limited solely to materials which can retain their integrity up to 1200°C (which he considers to be a ‘worst case’ fire). Mr Harriman stated that some materials used in firestopping devices (for example powder coat paints) are thermally insulative, but burn off well below 1200°C.
85 In Joint Report Part A, Mr Page agreed that the “invention” can be exposed to lower temperature fires. He said, however, that:
… the primary intent of the patent was to solve the problem of multiple services with a fire stopping device this term [sic] in itself suggests that the device must work at least equal to the external object which is being fitted around it.
86 I do not accept that the expression “thermally insulative” as used in the specification and claims has the qualified meaning given by Mr Page. The firestopping device defined in the claimed method is not one limited to use in fires of any particular temperature. I accept Mr Harriman’s evidence in that regard.
87 It is also to be understood that it is the intumescent material within the firestopping device that operates to “stop” the fire, not the first and second portions formed from a metallic material or thermally insulative material. The first and second portions are made from this material to retard the transmission of heat to enable the intumescent material to respond to the heat by swelling within the internal volume of the firestopping device to resist the passage of fire and smoke through the device. The evidence before me is that, in practice, the intumescent material, inside the device, will swell when the ambient temperature reaches 230°C.
88 I accept that, as used in the specification and claims, the expression “thermally insulative” has the meaning of “to restrict the passage of heat in a fire”.
Patent Validity: Legal principles
89 Boss challenges the validity of the claims of the patent on a number of discrete grounds.
90 First, Boss alleges that the invention, as claimed in each claim of the patent, is not novel in light of the public disclosure of certain documents, and in light of the public disclosure of certain firestopping devices in circumstances where, according to Boss, the manner of their installation was explained in terms which disclosed each and every step of the method claimed in claims 1 to 5 of the patent. All the disclosures involve fire transits manufactured by FSi Limited (formerly called Firestopit Limited), a United Kingdom company.
91 For the purposes of the Patents Act, an invention is to be taken to be novel, when compared with the prior art base, unless it is not novel in light of certain kinds of information, including (a) prior art information made publicly available in a single document or through doing a single act; and (b) prior art information made publicly available in two or more related documents or through doing two or more related acts, if the relationship between the two or more documents or two or more acts is such that a person skilled in the art would treat them as a single source of information: ss 7(1)(a) and (b).
92 When dealing with prior publication in a document or documents, the plurality in AstraZeneca AB v Apotex Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 99; 226 FCR 324 (AstraZeneca v Apotex) at 293, said that the touchstone for determining whether the prior publication discloses (anticipates) a claimed invention is stated in General Tire & Rubber Company v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company Ltd (1971) 1A IPR 121 (General Tire) at 138:
When the prior inventor's publication and the patentee's claim have respectively been construed by the court in the light of all properly admissible evidence to technical matters, the meaning of words and expressions used in the art and so forth, the question whether the patentee's claim is new for the purposes of s 32(1)(e) falls to be decided as a question of fact. If the prior inventor's publication contains a clear description of, or clear instructions to do or make, something that would infringe the patentee's claim if carried out after the grant of the patentee's patent, the patentee's claim will have been shown to lack the necessary novelty, that is to say, it will have been anticipated. The prior inventor, however, and the patentee may have approached the same device from different starting points and may for this reason, or it may be for other reasons, have so described their devices that it cannot be immediately discerned from a reading of the language which they have respectively used that they have discovered in truth the same device; but if carrying out the directions contained in the prior inventor's publication will inevitably result in something being made or done which, if the patentee's patent were valid, would constitute an infringement of the patentee's claim, this circumstance demonstrates that the patentee's claim has in fact been anticipated.
If, on the other hand, the prior publication contains a direction which is capable of being carried out in a manner which would infringe the patentee's claim, but would be at least as likely to be carried out in a way which would not do so, the patentee's claim will not have been anticipated, although it may fail on the ground of obviousness. To anticipate the patentee's claim the prior publication must contain clear and unmistakable directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented: Flour Oxidising Co Ltd v Carr & Co Ltd (1908) 25 RPC 428 at 457, line 34, approved in BTH Co Ltd v Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Co Ltd (1928) 45 RPC 1 at 24, line 1. A signpost, however clear, upon the road to the patentee's invention will not suffice. The prior inventor must be clearly shown to have planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee.
93 After referring to that passage, the plurality in AstraZeneca v Apotex said (at [294]):
294 The metaphor of planting the flag has been taken up in this Court. For example, in ICI Chemicals, the Full Court at [51], after noting the metaphor, remarked that, in that case, the appellant’s argument involved the skilled addressee rummaging through a “flag locker“ to find a flag which the prior art document possessed and could have planted. In Apotex Pty Ltd and Another v Sanofi-Aventis and Another (2008) 78 IPR 485 …, Gyles J at [91] adopted a different metaphor, remarking that “anticipation is deadly but requires the accuracy of a sniper, not the firing of a 12 gauge shotgun“. Each metaphor underlines the importance of the specificity required in order for a prior art document to anticipate an invention as claimed.
94 In order to be novelty-destroying, a prior documentary disclosure must provide information that is equal to the invention that is claimed: Hill v Evans (1862) 1A IPR 1 at 7; Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; 217 FCR 238 at [127]. In Mylan Health Pty Ltd v Sun Pharma ANZ Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 116; 279 FCR 354, the Full Court noted (at [82]) that:
82 … equality in this context refers to both the specificity of the information and its completeness. Unless these twin qualities are present, the prior disclosure will not be sufficient to deprive the invention of novelty.
(Emphasis in original.)
95 The same approach applies to public disclosure by an act or acts. Where, however, the prior art information is said to have been made publicly available by an act or acts, caution must be exercised in relying on the memory of witnesses in recounting the act or acts that are said to be anticipatory, given the fallibility of memory and the risk of reconstruction: Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v MWA Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 180 CLR 160 (CIG) at 165 – 166. As Besanko J observed in Aspirating IP Ltd v Vision Systems Ltd [2010] FCA 1061; 88 IPR 52 at [200], the correct principle is that a prior public use must be strictly proved, and evidence which is not corroborated must be scrutinised with care, particularly where it is evidence of events which occurred many years ago.
96 This is even more so where the evidence of the prior acts is constituted by recollections of the features of, and/or the manner of use of, equipment that is not in evidence before the Court. For example, in Old Digger Pty Ltd v Azuko Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 676; 51 IPR 43 (Old Digger) Von Doussa J said (at [156]):
156 The onus of proof is on the respondents to establish a clear case of invalidity: see Montecatini Edison SpA v Eastman Kodak Co (1971) 45 ALJR 593 at 595-596 per Gibbs J. The evidence adduced by the respondents as to the prior use of the invention is the oral evidence of witnesses to the alleged use based on their recollections of events years beforehand. The alleged use is said to have taken place in the course of trialling reverse circulation percussive hammers incorporating prototype face sampling drill bit assemblies. The particular assemblies have not been produced in evidence. Oral evidence led in these circumstances must be viewed with particular caution, partly for the reason that the memory of the witnesses is likely to have been influenced by other products seen in the meantime, and to reflect reconstruction on the basis of these later observations: see Commonwealth Industrial Gases Ltd v MWA Holdings Pty Ltd (1970) 180 CLR 160 at 165-166, and Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd & Others v Martin Engineering Co & Another (1990) 91 ALR 513 at 525 per Gummow J.
97 A further example is provided by Fieldturf Tarkett Inc v Tigerturf International Ltd [2014] FCA 647; 317 ALR 153 (Fieldturf). There, the case on lack of novelty was based on prior art information comprising both acts and documents. The acts concerned four installations of synthetic turf. The primary evidence was the recollections of a witness who was involved, one way or another, in each installation. The installation was carried out 25 or more years before the evidence was given. The claims were directed to a synthetic surface. A large number of claims were in issue. The claims specified features of the alleged invention in some detail. The claims in issue are quoted at [12] of the reasons for judgment. To illustrate the particular evidential difficulties in Fieldturf, it will suffice to quote claims 1 to 4:
1. A synthetic surface comprising a flexible backing member, parallel rows of synthetic ribbons, representing blades of grass, projecting upwardly from the backing member, the rows of ribbons spaced apart from each other from between 5/8 inch (1.588 cm) and 2 ¼ inches (5.715 cm), and the length of the ribbons, extending upwardly from the backing member, is at least twice the dimension of the spacing between the rows of ribbons, whereby the synthetic surface can receive an infill of particular [sic] material to approximately 2/3 the height of the ribbons such that a free length of ribbon extending above such infill can overlap with a corresponding free length of ribbon from adjacent rows to encapsulate such infill.
2. A synthetic surface for a sports playing field comprising a flexible backing member, parallel rows of synthetic ribbons, representing blades of grass, projecting upwardly from the backing member, the rows of ribbons spaced apart from each other, whereby the relationship of the length of the ribbons and the spacing between the rows is 2A ≤ L such that the length of the ribbons is at least twice the spacing; where A is the spacing between the rows, and L is the length of the ribbon measured from the flexible backing, whereby the synthetic surface can receive an infill of particulate material to approximately 2/3 the height of the ribbons such that a free length of ribbon extending above such infill can overlap with a corresponding free length of ribbon from adjacent rows to encapsulate such infill.
3. A synthetic surface having a flexible backing member, parallel rows of synthetic ribbons, representing blades of grass, projecting upwardly from the backing member, the rows of ribbons spaced apart from each other from between 5/8 inch (1.588 cm) and 2 ¼ inches (5.715 cm), and the length of the ribbons, extending upwardly from the backing member, is at least twice the dimension of the spacing between the rows of ribbons, the surface including a layer of particulate material on the backing member supporting the ribbons in a relatively upright position relative to the backing member 2A ≤ L such that the length of the ribbons is at least twice the spacing; and the particulate material having a thickness, T, which is substantially equal to 2/3 the length, L, of the ribbons, where A is the spacing between the rows, L is the length of the ribbon measured from the flexible backing and T is the thickness of the layer of particulate material.
4. A synthetic surface for a sports playing field wherein the synthetic surface comprises a flexible backing member, parallel rows of synthetic ribbons, representing blades of grass, projecting upwardly from the backing member, the rows of ribbons spaced apart from each other, the surface including a relatively thick layer of particulate material on the backing member supporting the ribbons in a relatively upright position relative to the backing member, whereby the relationship of the length of the ribbons and the spacing between the rows is 2A ≤ L such that the length of the ribbons is at least twice the spacing; and the particulate material having a thickness, T, which is substantially equal to 2/3 the length, L, of the ribbons, where A is the spacing between the rows, L is the length of the ribbon measured from the flexible backing and T is the thickness of the layer of particulate material.
98 The evidence of prior use, given by this witness, was described by Jagot J (at [95]) as a form of “self-reinforcing tapestry”. Her Honour noted (at [96]) the significant length of time that had elapsed since the installations were undertaken. She said (at [95]) that it was apparent that the witness had added, to his recollection, information which had been made available to him “over the past ten years”. She noted, further (at [97]), that the witness’s evidence was given with full knowledge of the claimed invention. At [98], she also remarked on the fact that the witness’s evidence changed over time, saying:
98 … It tends to reinforce the overall impression of reconstruction and forcing new information to fit within a framework first identified in 2004.
99 As I will later explain, I do not think that the particular difficulties illustrated in Old Digger and Fieldturf are present in the instant case, or at least present to the same extent.
100 It is convenient at this point to turn to the notions of inevitable result and implicit disclosure, and their role in determining whether an invention, as claimed, is not novel. These are aspects of the specificity and completeness which a prior documentary publication must have before it will be novelty-destroying.
101 As is made clear in General Tire, if a prior documentary publication contains clear instructions which, if followed, will inevitably constitute an infringement of the invention as claimed (assuming the claim to be valid), then the prior publication will be novelty-destroying. However, if the prior publication gives a direction which could be carried out in a way that would infringe the claim, but could also be carried out in a way that would not infringe the claim, the prior publication will not be novelty-destroying. In short, the “flag” will not have been “planted”.
102 Turning to implicit disclosure, it is trite that a prior documentary publication, which is alleged to be novelty-destroying, must be read through the eyes of the person skilled in the art. If an essential feature of the invention, as claimed, is not explicitly disclosed, the publication may still be novelty-destroying if the person skilled in the art would infer the presence of the feature from the document itself.
103 The decision in C Van der Lely N.V. v Bamfords Limited [1963] RPC 61 provides an example. In that case, the claimed invention was a hay rake having a combination of features, including a number of rake wheels arranged to be rotated by contact between the ground and consecutive teeth disposed on the circumference of the wheels. The question was whether the invention was anticipated by certain photographs of a prior art hay rake, even though the ground contact feature was not visible in the photographs. It was held that the invention was anticipated because the person skilled in the art would infer the presence of the ground contact feature from the photographs themselves.
104 There are limits to which this notion can be applied. As Jacob J cautioned in Hoechst Celanese Corp v BP Chemicals Ltd [1998] FSR 586 at 600 – 601:
… if what is said to be implicit in a document is given too much scope you will be blurring the distinction between lack of novelty and obviousness. On the other hand it must be right to read the prior document with the eyes of the skilled man. So if he would find a teaching implicit, it is indeed taught. The prior document is novelty-destroying if it explicitly teaches something within the claim or, as a practical matter, that is what the skilled man would see it is teaching him.
105 This caution was also emphasised by the Full Court in Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 898; 164 ALR 239 (Ramset). In that case, the invention was a method of using a quick release hoisting attachment (a ring clutch) for tilt-up walls. The method included remotely operating the lever arm of the ring clutch by means of a release cable (rope) attached to the distal end of that arm. The invention was alleged to have been anticipated by three advertisements. One advertisement depicted the hoisting attachment with a lever arm which had a hole at one end to which something could be attached. However, no release cable or release rope was illustrated. The appellant argued that the rope release method would be inferred by the person skilled in the art on reading the advertisements. The Full Court disagreed and held that the advertisements were not novelty-destroying.
106 At [25], the Full Court said:
25 In the present case, it is clear that the “pull rope” is an essential integer of the combination described in the patent. It is claimed as such in the claims by the words “a release cable attached to the distal end of the lever arm to remotely operate the lever arm by rotating it outwardly and downwardly to a predetermined degree relative to the wall section to rotate the bolt to the released condition and disconnect the ring clutch from the anchor”. This aspect of the combination is fundamental to the invention claimed, which aims at speedy and safe release of the clutch. Whether or not a skilled worker might deduce the desirability of adding such a feature, it cannot be said that any of the pictures in the advertisements, or anything said in them, infers that the device to which they relate involved the presence of this feature. The appellant argued that the alleged invention makes no “difference in substance from that which was known”, presumably by virtue of these advertisements. But this way of putting the matter, which departs from an investigation as to whether the essential integers of the combination were revealed, risks a coalescence between considerations of novelty and obviousness so as to create an amorphous test on which the modern law of patents has turned its back. In a case in which any allegation of obviousness has been deliberately abandoned, both fairness and clarity of thought require the Court to concentrate on the doctrine of novelty as posing a distinct test. The appellant's argument would reintroduce the confusion of the issues of novelty and obviousness which, earlier in this litigation, was introduced by the attack on the patent as not involving a new manner of manufacture. The sole question raised by the issue of novelty is whether the device to be seen by the skilled viewer as being depicted and in part described in the advertisements anticipated the Burke patent. That depends on whether all the essential integers were revealed in any one of those publications. It is not to be disposed of by a kind of confession and avoidance that acknowledges an integer is missing, but treats it as unimportant because, as the appellant asserts, it could easily have been worked out by a very small application of thought and experimentation. Any argument along those lines is inadmissible in principle, and betrays what seems to be the lingering influence of the approach the High Court has rejected. Considerations of the value, that is, of the magnitude or paucity, of the insight inherent in the advance made by the invention are considerations belonging to obviousness and not to novelty. So far as novelty is concerned, the attack on the patent must be rejected; whether or not the idea was brilliantly inventive, the respondents’ system did involve a new feature, claimed as such, which was essential to its safe and effective operation.
107 Thus, in a challenge to validity based on lack of novelty, it is not sufficient to say that, on reading the prior documentary publication, the person skilled in the art would see that the need for a claimed feature, which is not explicitly referred to or illustrated, is obvious. The question is whether the claimed feature would be (is) revealed to the person skilled in the art, implicitly, by the disclosure itself, based on that person’s understanding of the disclosure. This is a nuanced, but important, distinction. The plurality in AstraZeneca v Apotex said (at [311]):
311 Section 7(1) of the Act sets the precise boundaries of the information that is to be taken into account when assessing novelty. Common general knowledge, as a notionally organised body of information possessed by the person skilled in the art, does not fall within these boundaries.
108 Secondly, Boss alleges that the invention, as claimed in each claim of the patent, does not involve an innovative step.
109 For the purposes of the Patents Act, an invention is to be taken to involve an innovative step, when compared with the prior art base, unless the invention would, to a person skilled in the relevant art, in light of the common general knowledge before the priority date, only vary from certain kinds of information, in ways that make no substantial contribution to the working of the invention: s 7(4).
110 The kinds of information are (a) prior art information made publicly available in a single document or through doing a single act; and (b) prior art information made publicly available in two or more related documents or through doing two or more related acts, if the relationship between the two or more documents or two or more acts is such that a person skilled in the art would treat them as a single source of information: ss 7(5)(a) and (b). Each kind of information must be considered separately.
111 The approach to determining whether an innovative step is present was discussed by Gyles J in Delnorth Pty Ltd v Dura-Post (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1225; 78 IPR 463. At [52] – [53], his Honour said:
52 There is no need to search for some particular advance in the art to be described as an innovative step which governs the consideration of each claim. The first step is to compare the invention as claimed in each claim with the prior art base and determine the difference or differences. The next step is to look at those differences through the eyes of a person skilled in the relevant art in the light of common general knowledge as it existed in Australia before the priority date of the relevant claim and ask whether the invention as claimed only varies from the kinds of information set out in s 7(5) in ways that make no substantial contribution to the working of the invention. It may be that there is a feature of each claim which differs from the prior art base and that could be described as the main difference in each case but that need not be so. Section 7(4), in effect, deems a difference between the invention as claimed and the prior art base as an innovative step unless the conclusion which is set out can be reached. If there is no difference between the claimed invention and the prior art base then, of course, the claimed invention is not novel.
53 The phrase “no substantial contribution to the working of the invention” involves quite a different kind of judgment from that involved in determining whether there is an inventive step. Obviousness does not come into the issue. The idea behind it seems to be that a claim which avoids a finding of no novelty because of an integer which makes no substantial contribution to the working of the claimed invention should not receive protection but that, where the point of differentiation does contribute to the working of the invention, then it is entitled to protection, whether or not (even if), it is obvious. Indeed, the proper consideration of s 7(4) is liable to be impeded by traditional thinking about obviousness.
112 At [54], his Honour turned to consider the proper meaning of “substantial” as used in s 7(4): did it mean “great” or “weighty”, or did it mean “more than insubstantial” or “of substance”? After considering certain secondary materials, and earlier case law dealing with the expanded view of novelty expressed in Griffin v Isaacs (1938) 1B IPR 619—which is the provenance of the expression “make no substantial contribution to the working of the invention” as used in s 7(4)—Gyles J held (at [61]):
61 In my view the provenance of the phrase “make no substantial contribution to the working of the invention” indicates that “substantial” in this context means “real” or “of substance” as contrasted with distinctions without a real difference. That confirms my impression from construction of the words of the section itself.
113 Gyles J’s construction of s 7(4) was not disturbed on appeal: Dura-Post (Aust) Pty Ltd v Delnorth Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 81; 177 FCR 239 at [73] – [79] and [91]. As the plurality in the Full Court pointed out (at [73]):
73 Section 7(4) requires a comparison to be made between the invention as claimed in each claim with the information s 7(5) describes. That is, s 7(5) identifies the kinds of information to which the invention as claimed in each claim is to be compared. This information is particular kinds of prior disclosures. Section 7(6) requires that each such prior disclosure be considered separately. That is, the invention as claimed in each claim must be compared separately with each relevant prior disclosure.
114 In undertaking a claim by claim comparison with the prior art information, it should not be forgotten that a dependent claim includes the features that define the invention in the claim from which the dependency derives: Vehicle Monitoring Systems Pty Ltd v SARB Management Consulting Group Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 395; 101 IPR 496 at [222] – [223]. It is not the case that, in assessing the validity of a dependent claim, the innovative step must be found in the features added to the definition of the invention by that claim.
115 Thirdly, Boss alleges that the complete specification does not comply with the requirements of s 40(3) of the Patents Act in that the claims are not “supported by matter disclosed in the specification”.
116 This requirement of s 40(3) cannot be considered in isolation from s 40(2)(a) of the Patents Act, having regard to the explanation given by Burley J in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation v Wyeth LLC (No 3) [2020] FCA 1477; 155 IPR 1 (Merck v Wyeth) at [502] – [547] as to the operation of these provisions following the amendments to the Patents Act introduced by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) (the RTB Act). The parties were at one that this aspect of Boss’s challenge to validity should be considered in light of that explanation.
117 Section 40(2)(a) provides that a complete specification must disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant art. This requirement is directed to the sufficiency of the description of the invention given in the specification. In Merck v Wyeth, Burley J surveyed the United Kingdom law in relation to the concepts termed “classical insufficiency” and “Biogen insufficiency”. It is not necessary for me to repeat his Honour’s careful analysis. It is sufficient for me to note that “classical insufficiency” concerns the disclosure obligation of a patent specification under s 14(3) of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) (the UK Act) (the language of which is substantially reflected in s 40(2)(a) of the Patents Act) and “Biogen insufficiency” concerns the claim support obligation of a patent specification under s 14(5)(c) of the UK Act (the language of which is substantially reflected in s 40(3) of the Patents Act).
118 The disclosure obligation under s 14(3) of the UK Act has been interpreted to require the teaching of the specification to enable the skilled addressee to perform the invention to the full extent of the claims—conveniently referred to as an “enabling disclosure”. The requirement for claim support in s 14(5)(c) of the UK Act is directed to claim breadth, but it interacts with the s 14(3) requirement that the claims should, essentially, correspond to the scope of the invention, in the sense of not exceeding the scope of the invention, disclosed in the description given by the specification. In other words, the breadth of a claim must be supported (or justified) by the “technical contribution to the art” (meaning, the enabling disclosure of the specification).
119 In Merck v Wyeth, Burley J explained (at [527] – [529]):
527 “Classical insufficiency” is to be distinguished from “Biogen insufficiency” which is also considered under United Kingdom law to form part of the disclosure obligation. That overlap may be considered to be confusing at first, because Biogen insufficiency draws on the law of support, identified in s 14(5)(c) of the UK Act. However, as the cases in that jurisdiction explain, the reason for this is because the UK Act contains a “logical gap” arising from its drafting, in that whilst s 14(5)(c) imposes the claim support obligation as a statutory requirement for the grant of a patent, there is no concomitant provision whereby a granted patent that fails to satisfy the claim support obligation may be revoked. That gap was plugged when the House of Lords resolved that the claim support obligation fell under the umbrella of the requirement that the patent specification contain an enabling disclosure: Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1996] 10 WLUK 486; [1997] RPC 1 at 47 (Lord Hoffman, with whose reasons the other members of the House of Lords agreed). Accordingly, in the context of revocation actions, the UK courts sometimes (but not always) refer to a distinction between classical insufficiency and Biogen insufficiency, the former arising from s 14(3) and the latter arising from s 14(5)(c), but both falling within the unifying requirement that there be an enabling disclosure, and both being available as a ground of invalidity within s 14(3).
528 The main difference between the two is that the disclosure obligation under s 14(3) relates to the specification as a whole whereas the claim support obligation under s 14(5)(c) relates to the claims which define the invention: Generics UK (HL)at [19]. As Walker LJ said in Generics (UK) at [20]:
Ss 14(3) and (5)(c) operate together, as EPC Arts 83 and 84 operate together, to spell out the need for an “enabling disclosure”, which is central to the law of patents …The disclosure must be such as to enable the invention to be performed (that is, to be carried out if it is a process, or to be made if it is a product) to the full extent of the claims. The question whether there is sufficient enabling disclosure often interacts with a question of construction as to the extent of the claims …
529 In Terrell the learned editors summarised the distinction between classical sufficiency and Biogen sufficiency in the following terms at page 403:
The self-standing objection that a claim is broader than the technical contribution of the patent, even when it can be performed, is sometimes referred to as “Biogen insufficiency”. It is to be contrasted with “classical insufficiency” which is concerned with whether or not embodiments within the claim can be performed. Thus peculiarly under English law it is said that at patent can be insufficient even if it is possible to make everything within the scope of the claim, if the scope of the claims exceed the technical contribution.
120 Later, his Honour said with respect to the Patents Act (at [544] – [545]):
544 It is apparent from the language adopted in the sections and also from the Second Reading Speech and the Explanatory Memorandum that the intention of parliament in amending s 40(2)(a) and s 40(3) of the Patents Act was to align the law in relation to these requirements with that of the United Kingdom and Europe. That is not to say that all aspects of the approach adopted in the United Kingdom are to be adopted here. In particular, there is no warrant provided in the language of s 40(2)(a) to incorporate within the disclosure obligation a separate claim support obligation, in addition to the one within s 40(3). Nor is there any need to do so: failure to comply with either ss 40(2)(a) or 40(3) provides a basis upon which a granted patent may be revoked: s 138(3)(f). There is no gap in the Patents Act akin to the one in the UK Act referred above, and each ground is to be considered separately. Nevertheless, the law as it has developed in the United Kingdom and Europe in relation to the support obligation, when disentangled from classical insufficiency, provides guidance as to how s 40(3) should be approached.
545 The theme common to each ground, however, reflects what the Minister described in his Second Reading Speech as the cornerstone of the patent system, namely that in exchange for a monopoly on commercialisation, the patentee must tell the public how their idea works. As said in the Explanatory Memorandum, in exchange for the exclusive rights given to the patentee, the patentee must share with the public the information necessary to make and use the invention. This is the essential exchange between inventors and the public which has long been a feature of patent law in Australia: see Lockwood No 1 at [57].
121 Fourthly, Boss alleges that the invention, as claimed, is not useful.
122 In Lane Fox v Kensington and Knightsbridge Electric Lighting Company [1892] 3 Ch 424 at 431, Lindley LJ described utility, in the patent context, as follows:
The utility of the alleged invention depends not on whether by following the directions in the complete specification all the results now necessary for commercial success can be obtained, but on whether by such directions the effects which the patentee professed to produce could be produced, and on the practical utility of those effects. Can it be said that the invention as described in the amended specification was in 1878 a practically useful addition to the then stock of inventions? To judge of utility the directions in the amended specification must be followed, and, if the result is that the object sought to be attained by the patentee can be attained and is practically useful at the time when the patent is granted, the test of utility is satisfied. Utility is often a question of degree, and always has reference to some object. Useful for what? is a question which must be always asked, and the answer must be, Useful for the proposes indicated by the patentee.
123 The second requirement referred to by Lindley LJ—whether the object sought to be attained by the patentee is practically useful—is, in part, now qualified by the requirements of s 7A of the Patents Act, which stipulates that an invention is taken not to be useful unless a specific, substantial, and credible use for the invention, so far as it is claimed, is disclosed in the complete specification. Boss does not contend that the requirements of s 7A are not met in the present case.
124 Whether the object of the invention can be attained, assuming it to be a practically useful result, depends on whether the essential features of the claim, defining the invention, secure that outcome. Here, the principle is that all within the scope of the claim must be useful if the claim is not to fail for inutility: Welch Perrin & Co Pty Ltd v Worrel (1961) 106 CLR 588 at 601; WM Wrigley Jr Co v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1035; 66 IPR 298 at [138]. The object might not be capable of being attained because, for example, the claim omits some feature that is necessary for the invention to work as promised: DSI Australia (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Garford Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 132; 100 IPR 19 at [337] – [338]; or it may be that the claim includes, expressly, a feature whose presence means that the invention, as so defined, will not achieve the promised objective: Norton and Gregory Ltd v Jacobs (1937) 54 RPC 271 at 276 – 277.
125 Essentially, this aspect of utility—whether the object of the invention can be attained—is a function of claim breadth.
Patent validity: Lack of novelty
126 Boss alleges that the invention, as claimed in each claim of the patent, is not novel in light of disclosures made at two meetings, considered separately (the Speedpanel meeting and the Seltor meeting); made in the course of promoting devices described as the Pass-It Version 1, the Pass-It Version 2, and the Pass-It with butterfly screws; and made in a document described as the FSi drawings, before the priority date.
127 Boss’s challenge on lack of novelty focuses on fire transits manufactured by FSi Limited (FSi)—formerly called Firestopit Limited—in the United Kingdom. As these devices, and the documents describing them, feature prominently in this part of the case, it is convenient to commence with the evidence adduced by Boss in relation to the development, promotion, and supply of these devices.
128 Fire transits were not new at the priority date. If novelty exists in relation to the invention in suit, it is to the particular method of constructing a barrier that is claimed, not because of the use of a fire transit, as such, in relation to the installation of services.
129 At its most simple level, a fire transit is a device that extends through a fire resistant barrier (a wall, floor, or ceiling) to allow services to be routed through the barrier without loss of fire resistance.
130 Early fire transit systems were simple boxes or tubes packed with an intumescent material, allowing one or more services to be routed through the box or the tube. The system is designed so that, in the event of a fire, the intumescent material reacts to the heat generated, to expand and block the penetration completely, thereby preventing the spread of the fire through the penetration. The use of a fire transit allows all required services to be installed through a single fire-resistant penetration.
131 FSi has manufactured and developed fire protection systems since 2000. It is a business with an annual turnover of approximately £20 million.
132 In around 2009 or 2010, FSi commenced to develop a fire transit, which it called the Pass-It. As originally developed, the Pass-It was intended to be retrofitted into buildings and structures, especially those which did not have any fire-stopping technology, or where the previously installed fire-stopping systems were insufficient or improperly installed.
133 The early Pass-It was made from both metal and thermoplastic material (glass fibre). It required a person with experience in passive fire protection to install it.
134 Mr Atkinson, who is the founder, and now Chairman, of FSi, gave evidence that, in 2013, FSi developed a version of the Pass-It which was intended to be more user friendly, and to have an improved appearance.
135 This version had a two-piece steel shell forming an aperture. The first piece was formed into an elongated C-shape, and the second piece was formed into a much smaller C-shape to be fixed into the first piece. Services could be installed through the aperture. When installed, the services were surrounded by the outer shell, and also intumescent material encased in plastic packets housed on the inner surface of the shell pieces. Brushes were riveted to each shell piece, so as to be located at each end of the aperture that was formed. The function of the brushes was to block smoke and reduce noise passing through the device.
136 This version of the Pass-It could be installed in a variety of ways. It could be fitted into a wall, on a ceiling, or on a floor. It could be fitted as a complete unit, with the services routed through it later. It could also be split apart, by removing Phillips head screws holding the two pieces together.
137 When split apart, the two pieces could be fitted around existing cables, closed up (by re-inserting the screws), and then installed as a unit into an existing penetration. Alternatively, each shell piece could be installed separately. In this mode of installation, the elongated C-shape piece could be attached to the wall/ceiling/floor, followed by:
(a) installing the services, closing the two pieces (by re-inserting the screws), and then building the wall/ceiling/floor around the Pass-It; or
(b) closing the two pieces (by re-inserting the screws), installing the services, and then building the wall/ceiling/floor around the Pass-It; or
(c) closing the two pieces (by re-inserting the screws), building the wall/ceiling/floor around the Pass-It, and then installing the services.
138 In this mode of installation, the elongated C-shape piece was attached to the relevant structure by simply driving a bolt, self-tapping screw, or similar fastener through the steel casing.
139 Mr Atkinson identified this version of the Pass-It by reference to photographs, which show the device in a metallic grey or silver colour. He said that he sent a sample of this product to Mr Prior. He could not be certain of the date when this was done, but his evidence suggests that this was sometime in 2013. Trafalgar referred to this product as the Pass-It Version 0.
140 This version of the Pass-It underwent fire resistance testing on 28 November 2013. A report was prepared and issued by Exova Warringtonfire (Exova) on 24 January 2014 (the Exova 2014 Report).
141 Mr Atkinson said that, shortly after the issue of the Exova 2014 Report, FSi prepared a product data sheet for the Pass-It product. In fact, Mr Atkinson said that he created the document with Oliver Shaw, who was one of FSi’s salesmen at the time. The document was issued using the Firestopit name. It bears the Revision Date “28/03/2014” and the Revision Number “02” (the Firestopit PDS). It depicts the Pass-It as a red-coloured product. The Firestopit PDS is important to Boss’s case on invalidity based on lack of innovative step. It also has a role to play in Boss’s case on invalidity based on lack of novelty.
142 Mr Atkinson said that the Firestopit PDS was prepared from an earlier data sheet that had been prepared specifically for use by one of FSi’s United Kingdom distributers, Tecnica Fire Solutions, in about November 2013 (the Tecnica PDS). He said that the data from the earlier data sheet was contained in the Firestopit PDS.
143 Mr Atkinson said that, sometime between late 2014 and early 2015, FSi manufactured new versions of the Pass-It, with dedicated fixing lugs and green powder coating (part of the re-branding from the Firestopit name to FSi in the period 2013 to 2014 also involved changing from red-coloured products to green-coloured products). By this evidence, I take Mr Atkinson to mean that, in the period late 2014 to early 2015, FSi commenced to manufacture these new versions of the Pass-It. Trafalgar disputes this fact. I will return to that dispute.
144 Mr Atkinson described these versions of the product as comprising a two-piece steel shell. There were two configurations. In one configuration, the first piece of the shell was an elongated U-shaped element with four soffit fixing lugs formed into the upper part of the piece. The second piece was a smaller, U-shape panel which, in use, was fixed to the first piece using Phillips head screws. In the other configuration, the first piece of the shell was a short-armed U-shaped element with four soffit fixing lugs formed into the upper part of the piece. The second piece was an elongated U-shaped element which, in use, was fixed to the first piece using Phillips head screws.
145 It is not clear to me whether Mr Atkinson’s choice of the word “U-shape” for these elements is intended to convey a shape that is substantially different to the “C-shape” of the elements making up the steel shell of the earlier version (in Trafalgar’s parlance, the Pass-It Version 0). Nothing turns on that difference, if there be one.
146 Mr Atkinson identified these versions of the Pass-It by reference to photographs of two samples. The parties referred to these samples as the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2.
147 In the Pass-It Version 1, the fixing lugs are located on the piece with the elongated U-shape. In the Pass-It Version 2, the fixing lugs are located on the piece with the short-armed, U-shape.
148 Mr Atkinson said that he sent samples of these products to Mr Prior (amongst others) at this time.
149 Following a meeting in Melbourne on 23 October 2014, at which a Pass-It was displayed and discussed with representatives of Speedpanel Australia Ltd (the Speedpanel meeting, discussed below), and at which it was suggested that installation of the Pass-It could be improved if the two shell pieces could be opened and closed by hand, FSi considered various methods by which the two pieces could be separated and put together quickly and easily. Mr Atkinson said that one option considered by FSi was to use butterfly screws instead of the Phillips head screws. In 2015, this option was pursued in favour of other options. It provided an alternative to the versions with standard Phillips head screws.
150 Mr Atkinson identified this version of the Pass-It by reference to photographs. These photographs do not show the Pass-It with soffit fixing lugs. The parties referred to this version as the Pass-It with butterfly screws.
The Speedpanel meeting: 23 October 2014
151 In 2014, Speedpanel Australia Pty Ltd carried on the manufacture and supply of a product called “Speedpanel”—a panel forming part of a panel wall system designed to reduce the spread of fire between non-structural walls, shaft risers, and stairs by providing a physical fireproof barrier. The panel walls were built by placing the panels into brackets installed on the floor and ceiling known as “C-Track”. The main application for Speedpanels was in apartment buildings, where they would be installed between tenancies to provide protection against fire spreading from one apartment to the next.
152 On about 23 October 2014, a meeting was held at the company’s premises in Melbourne. This meeting was attended by Mr Visser and Mr Bacon (from Speedpanel), Mr Prior, and Mr Atkinson. The context of the meeting was the possible use of the Pass-It with the Speedpanel wall system. Speedpanels were difficult to cut through to make penetrations because they were made of steel and concrete.
153 Boss contends that, at this meeting, a Pass-It transit was displayed and demonstrated in such a way that it disclosed all the features of each claim of the patent. On the evidence before me, I am not persuaded that all the features were disclosed.
154 There is no doubt that the meeting occurred and that Mr Visser, Mr Bacon, Mr Prior, and Mr Atkinson, attended that meeting. There is also no doubt that the Pass-It product was discussed, with reference to a sample Pass-It. However, one important matter that is not clear is the version of the Pass-It that was at the meeting.
155 Mr Prior’s evidence was that he brought a sample of the Pass-It to the meeting, but the sample is not in evidence. Mr Prior does not identify or describe that sample, other than it was a Pass-It. Similarly, Mr Atkinson’s evidence is that a sample Pass-It was at the meeting, but he does not identify or describe it. Indeed, he could not recall how the sample was provided. Mr Visser could not recall, specifically, the colour of the sample, but he thought that it was red. It is likely, however, that this recollection in that regard was prompted by Mr Visser viewing the Firestopit PDS—which, as I have said, depicts the Pass-It as a red-coloured product—when preparing his affidavit evidence. Mr Bacon could not recall the colour of the sample at the meeting.
156 On the evidence before me, I am not prepared to accept, on the balance of probabilities, that the sample at the meeting was either the Pass-It Version 1 or Version 2. To start with, the evidence as to when the samples of these versions were sent to Mr Prior is quite unclear. Mr Prior’s evidence is that the samples were provided to him “in around 2014 or 2015”. However, Mr Atkinson’s evidence is that the samples were “manufactured new versions of the Pass-It” (with the dedicated fixing lugs and new green powder coating) and that manufacture took place “sometime between late 2014 and early 2015”. In cross-examination, Mr Prior accepted that it was possible that he received the samples of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 after the Speedpanel meeting.
157 Further, no witness gave evidence that the sample Pass-It at the meeting had dedicated fixing lugs. Mr Bacon’s evidence of the discussion at the meeting was that “one of the pieces of the box could be attached … to a soffit”. Mr Atkinson’s evidence was that he informed Mr Visser and Mr Bacon that the Pass-It could be installed before the wall is erected by “attaching one part of the Pass-It to the soffit using bolts or similar”, although he also said that he explained that the Pass-It device could be installed “using dedicated fixing lugs and bolts or similar”. Mr Prior’s evidence was that either he or Mr Atkinson said that the “slab-mounted installation method is achieved using fire resistant masonry fixing to attach the top part of the box to the slab”.
158 Mr Bacon’s, Mr Atkinson’s, and Mr Prior’s evidence of the description, given at the meeting, of the mode of attachment of the Pass-It, is no more specific than that. Had the sample been presented with dedicated fixing lugs, I cannot help but think that prominence would have been given to that feature when installation of the Pass-It was discussed. Only Mr Atkinson gave evidence to the effect that, in one mode of installation, the Pass-It device could be installed using “dedicated fixing lugs”. This rather suggests that, in fact, the sample at the meeting did not have fixing lugs. This, then, strongly suggests that the sample at the meeting was not the Pass-It Version 1 or the Pass-It Version 2.
159 Mr Visser’s evidence was different. He said that the sample had holes (to the best of his recollection, two holes) in the “top part”, which Mr Prior or Mr Atkinson said “could be used with masonry anchors to attach the open box to the concrete slab and thereby hold the box to the roof”. In cross-examination, he said that the holes he recalled were “one side of the gel packs”, meaning the sachets of intumescent material. None of the other participants at the meeting gave evidence to this effect or described the sample as having “holes … in the top part” or holes to “one side of the gel packs”. Thus, this part of Mr Visser’s evidence stands in stark contrast to the evidence of the other meeting participants.
160 I do not understand Mr Visser to be referring, in this part of his evidence, to the dedicated fixing lugs of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2. Mr Visser presented as a witness of considerable technical expertise (after all, he designed the Speedpanel). If the sample had the fixing lugs of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2, I think it is more likely than not that Mr Visser would have referred to them as such, or by a similar technical description. Had the dedicated fixing lugs been present in the sample, it is most unlikely that he would have referred to them as, merely, “holes … in the top part”. It is also most unlikely that Mr Visser would have referred to them as located on “one side of the gel packs” had the Pass-It Version 1 or Pass-It Version 2 been before him.
161 Also, when shown the Firestopit PDS, Mr Visser’s evidence in chief was:
I recall we discussed the testing which had been completed on the device I was shown during the meeting on 23 October 2014 but I cannot recall exactly what testing it had undergone.
162 It is to be recalled that the version of the Pass-It developed in 2013—a sample of which was provided to Mr Prior—underwent fire resistance testing on 28 November 2013, and the Exova 2014 Report was subsequently prepared and issued. According to Mr Atkinson, it was after this that the Firestopit PDS was prepared and published.
163 It is certainly possible, therefore, that this part of Mr Visser’s evidence refers to a discussion, at the Speedpanel meeting, of the testing undertaken by Exova in November 2013, as reported in January 2014. If so, it is also certainly possible that the sample being discussed at the Speedpanel meeting—and, hence, the sample at that meeting—was the so-called Pass-It Version 0, even though, in cross-examination, Mr Prior rejected the suggestion that the sample at the meeting was that version of the product.
164 Therefore, if accepted, Mr Visser’s evidence, on this aspect of the case, also does not support the sample being the Pass-It Version 1 or the Pass-It Version 2.
165 However, even though I accept Mr Visser as a generally reliable witness, I am not persuaded that his recollection of “holes … in the top part” of the sample discussed at the Speedpanel meeting is reliable. I therefore do not accept that particular part of his evidence.
166 This is not a criticism of Mr Visser. In his affidavit evidence, he was endeavouring to recall the meeting some four and one half years after it had taken place. In his oral evidence, he was endeavouring to recall the meeting more than six years after it had taken place. It is not suggested that he had any greater familiarity with the Pass-It sample beyond that one occasion when he was shown it .
167 I am wary of relying on Mr Visser’s recollection of the sample, in that particular respect, when it is based solely on recollection and that part of his recollection is not supported by the other witnesses who were at the meeting, particularly Mr Atkinson and Mr Prior who were uniquely placed to describe the features of the Pass-It product and the sample they were seeking to promote.
168 I am confirmed in this view because none of the samples provided to Mr Prior were said to have “holes … in the top part”. Further, the photographs in evidence of the so-called Pass-It Version 0, the Pass-It Version 1, the Pass-It Version 2, and the Pass-It with butterfly screws (which, in any event, only came into existence after the Speedpanel meeting), do not show “holes … in the top part”.
169 On the whole of the evidence, I am unable to conclude what version of the Pass-It was demonstrated and discussed at the meeting, or the precise configuration of the sample.
170 It is an essential feature of the claimed method that the first portion of the firestopping device has “formations for fastening of the first portion to an external object”. Boss has not established that the sample at the Speedpanel meeting had such formations. The highest that the evidence gets in relation to the disclosure of that feature is Mr Atkinson’s evidence that, in his explanation, he referred to the fact that the Pass-It could be installed using “dedicated fixing lugs”. However, I have strong reservations about the reliability of that evidence. The explanation recounted in Mr Atkinson’s affidavit is expressed in somewhat idealised terms and, like Mr Visser’s recollection, is based on his recollection of a discussion at a meeting that occurred a number of years before he made his affidavit. To compound matters, Mr Atkinson has presented and explained the Pass-It device on innumerable occasions over the years. I cannot be confident that Mr Atkinson’s evidence, in this regard, is not affected by what he has said, might have said, or believes he has said, on numerous other occasions. While I do not doubt Mr Atkinson’s honesty as a witness, and while it is possible that, at the Speedpanel meeting, he might have referred to installation of the Pass-It using “dedicated fixing lugs”, I am not prepared to find, on the balance of probabilities, that he did so.
171 Therefore, I am not satisfied, on the evidence before me, that the method claimed in claim 1 of the patent was made publicly available at the Speedpanel meeting. It follows from this finding that the method claimed in each of dependent claims 2 to 5 was not disclosed.
172 Further, as to claim 5, there is no evidence that, at the Speedpanel meeting, a method was disclosed which included the essential step of “marking a line on the external object so as to depict the proposed centre line of the barrier”. The evidence does not support a finding that that step was disclosed explicitly or implicitly during the course of that meeting.
The Seltor meeting: September 2015
173 Seltor Gruppen AS (Seltor) is one of the oldest construction firms in Norway. Mr Ramunddal is its Chief Executive Officer.
174 Seltor purchased mastic and mortar products (which are used to stop fire passing through penetrations for pipes and cables in fire resistant walls) from Boss since about 2008 to about 2015. After that time, Seltor engaged subcontractors to complete passive fire protection work on its building projects. The subcontractors are now responsible for buying the products used in undertaking this work.
175 The Seltor meeting took place in September 2015 at Seltor’s premises in Norway. The meeting was between Mr Ramunddal and Alex Knutson (from a Seltor subsidiary company), and Mr Prior. Mr Prior and Mr Ramunddal were friends as well as industry colleagues. They met at university in 2002. They had travelled together.
176 Mr Prior’s evidence is that he travelled to the United Kingdom, and then to Norway, in the period 14 September to 30 September, 2015. While in the United Kingdom, he visited FSi and obtained further samples of the Pass-It and at least one copy of the Firestopit PDS. His purpose in doing so was to make a presentation of the product to Mr Ramunddal.
177 At the Seltor meeting, Mr Prior gave Mr Ramunddal and Mr Knutson two samples of the Pass-It. In his evidence, he says he called the product the “Fyrebox”. He said he did so because that was the name that Boss was using, at the time, for the Pass-It product. In his evidence, Mr Ramunddal referred to the product as the “Fire Box”. Mr Prior says that, at the Seltor meeting, he also gave Mr Ramunddal and Mr Knutson a copy of the Firestopit PDS.
178 Mr Prior says that, at the Seltor meeting, he described the function and features of the “Fyrebox” and how it could be installed during the construction of a building. The substance of his evidence is that he disclosed the following matters:
(a) The “Fyrebox” is installed after the position of the walls is marked out.
(b) The “Fyrebox” is installed in a position that straddles the wall.
(c) The wall can be built after the “box goes up”. The pipes and cables can be installed at any time, so that “scheduling issues” are solved.
(d) The intumescent material is in white plastic sleeves inside the “Fyrebox”.
(e) To install the “Fyrebox”, it is first pulled apart and the top part is mounted to the slab with masonry fixings.
(f) The other part of the box then slides into the top part and is attached to the top part using the screws provided or a wing nut (which can be provided).
(g) The services can then be run through the “Fyrebox” or the wall can be built.
(h) If the services are run through the “Fyrebox” before the wall is built, it is possible to remove the lower part to “fit the services through” and then reattach it. It is also possible to install the services after the lower part is attached.
(i) Fire resistant brushes are provided at each end of the “Fyrebox”. These will be fire resistant for the first 10 minutes of the fire, after which the intumescent material will have activated. The brushes will be burnt away.
179 Mr Ramunddal’s evidence is consistent with Mr Prior’s evidence. Mr Ramunddal said that, at the meeting, Mr Prior described the following features of the “Fire Box”:
(a) It replaced traditional mortars and mastics to stop fire passing through penetrations for pipes and cables in fire resistant walls.
(b) It had a two-part steel case.
(c) The steel case had “four wings of steel” on the upper part, in which four holes were provided to allow that part to be attached to an upper concrete “deck”.
(d) The lower part could be connected to the upper part by either “normal” screws or wing screws.
(e) Brushes are provided to stop dust and other particles getting into the device.
(f) Sachets, containing “expanding fire resistant material” were attached to the inside of the steel frame. This material would expand and close the whole box in the event of a fire.
(g) The “Fire Box” was installed before the rest of the wall is put in place by removing the lower part and fixing the upper part to the concrete deck using the four wings of steel.
(h) The lower part could be attached to the upper part before the pipes and cables are installed or it can be attached after the pipes and cables are installed.
(i) If the lower part is attached to the upper part before the pipes and cables are installed, it is necessary for the plumbers and electricians to pull the pipes and cables through the brushes.
(j) If the lower part is attached to the upper part after the pipes and cables are installed, it is necessary for the plumbers and electricians to line up the pipes and cables with the pre-installed upper part.
(k) Once the lower part is attached to the upper part, the rest of the wall can be built around the completed “Fire Box”.
180 Mr Ramunddal said that he read the Firestopit PDS after the meeting to see if the “Fire Box” had the necessary approvals to permit its use in Norway. It did not.
181 Mr Ramunddal said that, after the meeting, he took a “photograph” (digital image) of the “Fire Box” samples. A copy of the digital image is in evidence. It has been tendered as Exhibit 7. It shows two samples of the Pass-It Version 2 with what appears to be a copy of the Firestopit PDS. The screen properties of the digital image show that it was taken on 23 September 2015.
182 Mr Ramunddal kept the two samples. They have been tendered as Exhibit 4. Mr Ramunddal also kept a copy of the Firestopit PDS. This has been tendered as Exhibit 5. The production of that document satisfied me that the document in the digital image is, in fact, the Firestopit PDS.
183 Trafalgar made a wide-ranging attack on the veracity of the evidence given by Mr Prior and by Mr Ramunddal. It did not dispute that Mr Prior visited Mr Ramunddal in Norway in September 2015, but it did dispute that they met for the purpose of the Seltor meeting. Indeed, the upshot of its submissions is that the Seltor meeting did not take place. Acceptance of that proposition involves the wholesale rejection of Mr Prior’s and Mr Ramunddal’s evidence on this topic.
184 As to Mr Prior’s evidence, Trafalgar submitted that I should not accept that Mr Prior visited FSi’s offices in the United Kingdom in September 2015 because Mr Prior’s evidence of that visit is not corroborated. Trafalgar also submitted that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document and that is was not publicly available before February 2016. By this, I take Trafalgar to mean that, as (on its case) the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document but one fabricated for the purposes of these proceedings, it was not, and could not have been, publicly available before February 2016.
185 Further in this regard, Trafalgar submitted that a brochure in the form of the Firestopit PDS could not have been collected by Mr Prior from FSi in September 2015 because, by that time, FSi had ceased using the Firestopit name, and FSi was using another PDS for the Pass-It, which adopted the FSi name in substitution for the Firestopit name.
186 Further, based on a photograph taken at an event described by Mr Atkinson as “the September 2015 ASFP UK seminar day”, which shows part of an FSi display, Trafalgar submitted that FSi was not distributing any version of the Pass-It with dedicated fixing lugs. This is one element of Trafalgar’s challenge to Mr Atkinson’s evidence that, in the period late 2014 to early 2015, FSi commenced to manufacture the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2.
187 Therefore, Trafalgar submitted that I should not accept Mr Prior’s evidence because it is uncorroborated, and requires me to accept that Mr Prior collected a brochure from FSi “in the wrong company name” and a product that was not available for sale by FSi at the seminar, in the very same month that Mr Prior visited Mr Ramunddal in Norway.
188 This attack on Mr Prior’s evidence is unconvincing. First, the fact that Mr Prior took samples of the Pass-It Version 2 and a copy of the Firestopit PDS to the Seltor meeting is corroborated.
189 Secondly, in light of that corroboration, I have no cogent reason to doubt Mr Prior’s evidence that he collected the samples and a copy of the Firestopit PDS while visiting FSi at that time.
190 In this connection, I think that Trafalgar makes too much of the photograph taken at the September 2015 ASFP UK seminar day. Mr Atkinson’s evidence on this topic was that FSi displayed the Pass-It, including versions with the soffit fixing lugs and butterfly screws, at most—not all—exhibitions at which FSi has presented since at least 2015. He suggested that, as it was FSi’s practice to present the latest versions of the Pass-It as such presentations, it is likely that versions with soffit fixing lugs with butterfly screws were presented at that seminar day.
191 Although not objected to, this part of Mr Atkinson’s evidence obviously involved speculation on his part. This evidence is hardly definitive of the fact that Pass-It versions with soffit fixing lugs or with the butterfly screws, were presented at the September 2015 ASFP UK seminar day. Those versions may or may not have been presented at that seminar. But, if they were not presented, it simply does not follow that FSi had not commenced to manufacture versions of these products in the period late 2014 to early 2015. Mr Atkinson’s unqualified evidence is that the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 were manufactured at this time and that samples were supplied to a number of FSi’s customers and distributors around the world. Mr Atkinson also produced copies of invoices relating to sales of these versions of the Pass-It in mid to late 2015.
192 Further, and in any event, the photograph itself is hardly definitive of the products that were presented at the September 2015 ASFP UK seminar day. Mr Atkinson’s evidence was that the photograph, on which Trafalgar relies, was taken by an unidentified person and subsequently posted on FSi’s Twitter page. The photograph shows the FSi stand as partly obscured. I would not rely on the photograph to find that versions of the Pass-It with soffit fixing lugs or with butterfly screws were presented at the seminar. But, similarly, I would not rely on the photograph to find that versions of the Pass-It with soffit fixing lugs or with butterfly screws were not presented at the seminar.
193 Further, even if physical samples of the Pass-It with soffit fixing lugs or with butterfly screws were not displayed, it does not follow that other material about these versions was not available to interested persons attending the seminar or that these versions were not promoted by those manning the stand by reference to the versions of the Pass-It that can be seen in the photograph.
194 Therefore, I do not accept that, based simply on the photograph taken at the September 2015 ASFP UK seminar day, no version of the Pass-It with dedicated fixing lugs was available to Mr Prior when he visited the United Kingdom and Norway in September 2015.
195 As to the Firestopit PDS, I am not persuaded that this document is not genuine. I deal with this question more fully in a later part of these reasons dealing with Boss’s challenge to validity based on a lack of innovative step. In order to deal with the particular submissions on the genuineness of the Firestopit PDS which Trafalgar advanced in the context of the Seltor meeting, it is sufficient for me to note the following matters.
196 The documentary evidence shows that there are Pass-It product data sheets that have been published under the Tecnica name and the FSi name, which each bear the Revision Date “01/11/2013” and the Revision Number “01”, and under the Firestopit name, which bears the Revision Date “28/03/2014” and the Revision Number “02”. There is also a Pass-It product data sheet published under the FSi name, which also has the Revision Date “28/03/2014” and the Revision Number “02”. Further, there is a Pass-It product data sheet published under the FSi name, which bears the Revision Date “15/11/2016” and the Revision Number “03”.
197 Mr Atkinson’s evidence was that numerous versions of product data sheets for the Pass-It were produced over time, each having slightly different content. These documents, and promotional material generally, were, he said, created at FSi in “a fairly ad hoc manner”. In cross-examination, Mr Atkinson rejected the proposition that where there are multiple versions of a product data sheet, a later version necessarily replaced an earlier version, so far as public availability was concerned.
198 Mr Atkinson said that FSi did not follow any strict document or version management procedures when creating new versions of documents. He also said that it was common for amendments or corrections to be made to product data sheets, and for the original documents to be overwritten or deleted in the process. He said further that FSi never created any branding or marketing guidelines regarding the use of the FSi brand, or any written instructions to implement the rebranding from “Firestopit” to “FSi”.
199 In light of this evidence, I do not accept that a brochure in the form of the Firestopit PDS could not have been collected by Mr Prior from FSi in September 2015.
200 Trafalgar’s contention that Mr Ramunddal’s evidence is unreliable and should not be accepted is based on the following propositions.
201 First, Trafalgar repeated its submissions that, in September 2015, FSi was not distributing any version of the Pass-It with dedicated fixing lugs, and that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document. Trafalgar contended, therefore, that the digital image (Exhibit 7) could not have been taken when Mr Ramunddal says it was.
202 Secondly, the sachets of intumescent material exposed in the photograph bear the date “12/01/15”. Trafalgar submitted that none of the other physical exhibits of transits tendered in this proceeding include date stamps in the manner shown in Mr Ramunddal’s digital image. Further, Mr Harriman gave evidence that intumescent material is not normally date stamped or provided with a “use by” date or the like. Trafalgar submitted that Mr Atkinson had no direct knowledge of FSi using date stamping in that way. Trafalgar submitted that, in these circumstances, the Court could have no confidence that Mr Ramunddal’s digital image is genuine.
203 Thirdly, Trafalgar contended that the Seltor meeting is not corroborated by any contemporaneous documents relating to the meeting, apart from the digital image. Further in this regard, Trafalgar pointed to the fact that Boss has not called Mr Knutson (who is also said to have attended the Seltor meeting) to give evidence. Further still, Trafalgar pointed to the fact that, in oral evidence, Mr Ramunddal said that he took the image to send a copy to his regional manager in South Norway. Trafalgar said that Mr Ramunddal did not refer to this fact in his affidavit or produce any email sending the image. Trafalgar submitted that sending the image to a colleague was “at odds” with Mr Ramunddal’s later view that the “Fire Box” could not be used in Norway, because it did not have the necessary approvals.
204 Fourthly, Trafalgar contended that the digital image taken by Mr Ramunddal is “staged” because the products are displayed to show the date shown on the intumescent material. Further, the camera used to take the image was capable of having its date setting changed. Trafalgar queried why the file properties show that the image was taken at 12.10 am on 23 September 2015 if, as Mr Ramunddal says, he took the image “shortly after the meeting”.
205 In addition to these propositions, Trafalgar submitted that, in his affidavit, Mr Ramunddal recited “very detailed oral instructions” which he said were provided by Mr Prior at the Seltor meeting. Trafalgar submitted that these instructions are not corroborated by notes. It submitted that it is inherently unlikely that detailed instructions were provided or that either Mr Prior or Mr Ramunddal could properly remember those instructions.
206 I reject Trafalgar’s first proposition, for the reasons I have already given.
207 As to Trafalgar’s second proposition, Mr Atkinson did not agree with the suggestion, put to him in cross-examination, that FSi did not deploy date stamping for its intumescent materials or any of its Pass-It devices. He said that specific customers would have their own packing specifications, but it was not his remit to understand these things.
208 Further, another example of intumescent materials in a Pass-It being date-stamped is in evidence. When challenged with the proposition that there was no regulation in the United Kingdom that required FSi to date-stamp its sachets of intumescent material, Mr Atkinson explained that there was another reason for date-stamping—namely, to link the material to a batch sheet as part of FSi’s factory control processes and management system for audit purposes.
209 Mr Harriman’s evidence that intumescent materials are not normally date stamped, or provided with a “use by” date or the like, does not mean that such materials never bear a date stamp or the like. The evidence simply does not disclose why the sachets of intumescent material shown in Mr Ramunddal’s digital image bear the particular labels shown, or who placed the labels on those sachets. In closing submissions, Trafalgar did not contend that Mr Prior or Mr Ramunddal placed the labels on those products.
210 As to Trafalgar’s third proposition, I have Mr Prior’s and Mr Ramunddal’s evidence that the Seltor meeting did take place in September 2015. Mr Prior’s travel itinerary is in evidence and shows him arriving in the United Kingdom on 16 September 2015 and departing Norway on 28 September 2015. Mr Prior’s flight tickets show him arriving in Oslo on 18 September 2015. I have no reason to doubt that Mr Prior and Mr Ramunddal met in September 2015 or, more importantly, that they met in the circumstances given in their evidence. I do not consider it necessary for Boss to have also called Mr Knutson to give evidence on that topic. There was no reason that required it to do so.
211 Mr Ramunddal’s evidence that he took the digital image to send to his regional manager in South Norway was elicited through cross-examination. There is no reason why Mr Ramunddal should have referred, in his evidence in chief, to his particular reason for taking the image. The relevant and important fact is that he took it. The evidence does not reveal whether Mr Ramunddal did, in fact, send the image to his regional manager. Even so, contrary to Trafalgar’s submission, I do not consider that taking the image, for that purpose, was “at odds” with Mr Ramunddal’s later realisation that the product he had been shown by Mr Prior did not (according to Mr Ramunddal’s understanding) have approval for use in Norway. That realisation certainly does not mean that the product was not of interest to Seltor.
212 As to the fourth proposition, I am not persuaded that the digital image taken by Mr Ramunddal was “staged” in the sense suggested by Trafalgar. When asked in cross-examination, Mr Ramunddal could not remember who placed the items as they are shown in the image. It was in the course of this line of questioning that it emerged that Mr Ramunddal had taken the image to send to his regional manager in South Norway. Mr Ramunddal said that it was quite a unique product and he wanted his manager’s opinion about it. It is unsurprising that, in those circumstances, Mr Ramunddal would take an image showing one transit in a complete state and one transit in a separated state. If the image was intended to reveal features of the Pass-It device, why would it not be “staged” to reveal those features?
213 As to the taking of the image, Mr Ramunddal said that he used a company camera. The camera was kept in the front office of Seltor’s premises, with three or four other cameras. These cameras were used in Seltor’s business for “quality measurement tasks in the construction project”. It was for this reason that the date setting on the cameras was “quite important”.
214 In cross-examination, Mr Ramunddal accepted that the date and time settings on the camera could be changed. He accepted that he did not know whether, at some point after the camera had been purchased, someone may have altered its date and time information. However, it was not put to Mr Ramunddal that he (or someone at his direction or with his knowledge) altered the date and time information on the camera or, more importantly, that he (or someone at his direction or with his knowledge) altered the date and time information on the camera for the purpose of recording a false date when the digital image was taken.
215 Considered in isolation, the time recorded for the taking of the image—12:10 AM—seems unusual. There could be any number of explanations for that time being recorded. For one thing, the image may have been taken at that time. But if, in fact, the image was not taken at that time, there are innocent explanations for the time setting. For instance, the setting of the AM/PM function of the 12-hour time clock might have been selected incorrectly at some time in the past, or simply ignored, well prior to the image being taken. Moreover, if the date and time settings of the camera had been tampered with for the purposes of taking the image, it seems hardly likely that, consistently with some fraudulent enterprise, a time setting would have been chosen that might raise suspicion and expose that enterprise.
216 Mr Ramunddal was not questioned about any of these matters. And, as I have said, it was not put to him that he altered the date and time information on the camera for the purpose of taking the image.
217 Trafalgar’s challenge to the veracity of the evidence given by Mr Prior and Mr Ramunddal in relation to the Seltor meeting really amounts to an allegation of fabrication that involves both Mr Prior and Mr Ramunddal. Trafalgar’s submissions were laced with the suggestion that, because of their relationship, Mr Ramunddal was a witness who would be prepared to conspire with Mr Prior to give false evidence at Mr Prior’s behest. I reject that suggestion. I have no reason not to accept Mr Ramunddal as an honest witness.
218 To summarise, according to Trafalgar the Firestopit PDS shown in the digital image is not a genuine document and, as at September 2015, the products shown in the image did not exist. Further, Trafalgar contended that the image was staged and that some unknown person purposely altered the date setting on the camera to record an event that did not take place.
219 On the evidence before me, this scenario is fantastical. It is based on theories which are not established by the evidence and which, taken as a whole, lack coherence. It also seems to envelope Mr Atkinson’s evidence concerning the creation of the Firestopit PDS and the date when the Pass-It Version 2 was first manufactured by FSi. However, I also accept Mr Atkinson as an honest witness. As explained in the next section of the reasons, I accept that the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 commenced to be manufactured by FSi in the period late 2014 to early 2015. I do not accept the likelihood that Mr Atkinson was mistaken about that matter. And, as I have said, I am not persuaded that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document. Indeed, it was not even put to Mr Ramunddal that he was not given a copy of the Firestopit PDS at the Seltor meeting.
220 I am satisfied, on balance, that the Seltor meeting took place, substantially as described by Mr Prior and Mr Ramunddal. I am satisfied, on balance, that Mr Prior brought two samples of the Pass-It Version 2 to the meeting and a copy of the Firestopit PDS. I am satisfied, on balance, that the information that Mr Ramunddal says he was given by Mr Prior with respect to the use and method of installing the “Fire Box” was, in fact, given.
221 In reaching this latter finding, I bear in mind the caution expressed in the cases about the care that must be exercised in considering evidence of prior acts based on recollection. I also bear in mind Trafalgar’s submission that, as recorded by Mr Ramunddal, Mr Prior’s instructions were “detailed” and not corroborated by notes. However, it is clear that Mr Ramunddal was not purporting to give a verbatim account of his meeting. He was intending to convey the substance and effect of information he had been given by Mr Prior. I do not accept that what he was told at the Seltor meeting with respect to the use and method of installing the “Fire Box” was beyond his accurate recollection, notwithstanding the passage of time. As Mr Ramunddal made clear in his oral evidence, as an engineer he was impressed by the product. He said that that is why he remembered it so well. It was, in his words, a game changer for the industry, especially for Seltor, even though, as events turned out, Seltor could not use it because it did not have Norwegian approvals. Also, unlike other cases dealing with evidence of prior acts, I have the physical evidence before me of the Pass-It devices that were presented to Mr Ramunddal at the Seltor meeting, as well as the digital image he took.
222 Mr Ramunddal was challenged in cross-examination on the preparation of his affidavit. I am satisfied that it contains his recollection, expressed in words of his choosing. He emphatically rejected the contrary suggestion. In so doing, he gave, as an example, the fact that he had difficulty in explaining, in English, the use of wing screws. He said:
… I had to search for those words, to explain the alternative way to – to mount it. So this is my words.
223 I am satisfied that, at the Seltor meeting, Mr Prior disclosed all the features of the method claimed in claim 1 of the patent, with reference to the Pass-It Version 2. I am also satisfied that, at the Seltor meeting, Mr Prior disclosed all the additional features of the method claimed in claims 2 and 4.
224 Trafalgar submitted that the evidence does not reveal that the Pass-It samples shown to Mr Ramunddal had the additional features of claim 3, where the first portion of the firestopping device is a planar panel defining a pair of opposite sides each having a side wall extending therefrom.
225 This submission is based on expert evidence given through the Joint Report prepared by Mr Hunter and Mr Page, which was signed by them on 16 April 2020 (Joint Report Part B).
226 Mr Page said that the device depicted in Mr Ramunddal’s digital image has a planar panel (which forms the top of the device), and two short flanges. In his view, claim 3 is not met unless the short flanges are considered to be “side walls”.
227 Mr Page’s view was based on his understanding that the term “side wall” means “something that extends more or less the full height of the device” and “should act as a wall (i.e. to contain something), not just to be an attachment point”. He acknowledged, however, that this is not how the term “side wall” is used in the specification:
The Patent describes similar short flanges as ‘sidewalls’ (see page 4, final paragraph, referring to items 10 and 11 which can be seen in figures 5 and 6). If these are ‘side walls’ then the flanges in … the Pass-It Box Version 2 (which are of a similar scale and have the same function) are also ‘side walls’. However, in my opinion, neither items 10 and 11 in the Patent, nor the flanges in … the Pass-It Box Version 2 can properly be described as ‘side walls’.
228 In the Joint Report, Mr Hunter expressed his agreement with Mr Page’s comments.
229 I do not accept Mr Page’s and Mr Hunter’s opinions that, in the Pass-It Version 2, the planar panel of the first portion of the device does not have, on each opposite side of the panel, a “side wall” extending therefrom.
230 The claims must be read in the context of the teaching of the specification, and construed accordingly. It is clear that, in using the expression “side wall”, the specification is intending that term to encompass the structure and geometry of the short flanges to which Mr Page and Mr Hunter refer, however else the expression “side wall” might be understood in other, and different, contexts and settings.
231 As the specification makes clear, these elements function, in part, as attachment points for the side walls of the second portion, with the second portion forming the base and “the majority of the side walls of the firestopping device”: specification pages 4 – 5; see [41] – [48] above. The fact that the flanges function as attachment points does not make them any less “side walls” for the purposes of the specification.
232 I am satisfied, therefore, that, at the Seltor meeting, the additional features of the method claimed in claim 3 were disclosed.
233 Boss submitted that, at the Seltor meeting, the additional feature of the method claimed in claim 5 was disclosed—the step of marking a line on the external object so as to depict the proposed centre line of the barrier. Boss relied on the opinions expressed by Mr Page and Mr Hunter on this matter in Joint Report Part B.
234 Trafalgar’s written closing submissions did not address this claim specifically. However, Trafalgar did dispute that Mr Prior gave detailed instructions about the use of the Pass-It Version 2, as Mr Prior and Mr Ramunddal had described. In this context, Trafalgar raised the unlikelihood that Mr Prior gave any instruction about the marking of a centre line.
235 I do not accept that the additional step of claim 5 was disclosed at the Seltor meeting—at least with the sufficient clarity to amount to an anticipation. Importantly, Mr Ramunddal’s recollection does not include any statement being made that reflects this step. The highest that Mr Prior’s evidence rises in this regard is that he disclosed that, after the walls are “marked out”, the device is installed in a position that would straddle the wall. Even if I were to accept this evidence, it falls short of Mr Prior disclosing the step of marking the centre line of the “barrier”, and it is not a disclosure of marking such a line on the external object to which the firestopping device is to be attached.
236 To the extent that Mr Page and Mr Hunter express the contrary view in Joint Report Part B, I do not accept their opinion. I put the matter this way because, even though, in their claim chart, they indicated (by signifying “yes”) their acceptance that the additional features of claim 5 were disclosed at the Seltor meeting, their conclusion was qualified, and also appears to involve legal judgments on their part, which I do not accept.
237 In this connection, Mr Page drew attention to the fact that, although there is mention in Mr Prior’s evidence about marking out walls, his instructions to Mr Ramunddal did not specify where the location of the walls was to be marked—that is, on the floor or on the soffit. In this connection, I also note that some of the evidence reveals the practice of marking wall locations on the floor.
238 Mr Page then drew attention to his own affidavit evidence where he discussed how he has installed a Pass-It Version 1. He also discussed his observation of how, consistently with his own method, other installers have installed such a device—which he described as “one way of doing this” (my emphasis). This way involved using a rotary laser to project a vertical plane (including onto a soffit) from a centre line marked on the floor.
239 There is no challenge to this evidence. I accept that, if this method were to be employed, it would satisfy the additional features of the method claimed in claim 5. I am not persuaded, however, that, at the Seltor meeting, Mr Prior made any disclosure about marking a centre line on the soffit (or on any other external object to which the transit is to be fixed). Further, I am not persuaded that the inevitable result of following the instructions given by Mr Prior at the Seltor meeting would be the marking of such a line.
240 I am not satisfied, therefore, that, at the Seltor meeting, Mr Prior disclosed, with sufficient clarity, the additional features of the method claimed in claim 5.
241 For these reasons, I am satisfied that claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the patent are invalid because, at the priority date, the invention, as claimed in each of those claims, was not novel.
242 Boss contended that all the claims of the patent are anticipated by the public display, demonstration, offer for sale, sale, and installation of the Pass-It Version 2, when taken with the instructions, given by Mr Atkinson, for use of the device.
243 Boss also contended that all the claims of the patent are anticipated by the Pass-It Version 1, taken with Mr Atkinson’s instructions, should I also accept that the accused product for s 117(1) purposes—the Fyrebox device—has the features of the firestopping device referred to in the claims.
244 Mr Atkinson gave this evidence with respect to these devices:
Since they were created I have presented [these] versions of the Pass-It … to many customers and potential customers. In most cases when I presented the Pass-It, I had a sample with me, as the device is relatively compact and easier to explain to customers when they are holding it in their hands and can easily see how the device works. I also explained the different installation methods available for this of Pass-It. In most cases I explained every option of installation available, although if the customer was only interested in one of the methods, or their intended use made a particular method irrelevant, I did not explain that method. …
245 Mr Atkinson then said that, when he explained the installation methods, he used words to the following effect:
Pass-Its can be installed in more than one way depending on your particular needs.
For example, a Pass-It can be installed in an existing wall by:
1. cutting a suitable sized penetration in the wall;
2. routing the services through that penetration;
3. splitting the Pass-It by removing the Philips head screws holding the two metal shell pieces together and reassembling it around the services by replacing those screws;
4. pushing the completed Pass-It into the penetration;
5. if necessary or preferred the fixing lugs can be bent 90° to attach them to the wall for a more secure fit (this helps if more services are expected to be routed through the device); and
6. sealing up around the edges of the Pass-It.
Steps 4 and 5 could also be completed before step 2 which would eliminate the need for step 3.
Or a Pass-It can be installed before the wall is erected by:
1. splitting the Pass-It by removing the Philips head screws holding the two metal shell pieces together;
2. attaching one part of the Pass-It to the soffit using the dedicated fixing lugs and bolts or similar;
3. routing the services under (or through, depending on which version of the Pass-It was used) the portion fixed to the soffit;
4. reassembling the Pass-It around those services;
5. erecting the wall around the Pass-It; and
6. sealing up around the edges of the Pass-It.
Or a Pass-It can be installed before the wall is erected by:
1. attaching the Pass-It to the soffit using dedicated fixing lugs and bolts or similar;
2. routing the services through the Pass-It;
3. erecting the wall around the Pass-It; and
4. sealing up around the edges of the Pass-It.
FSi makes Pass-It devices in different configurations, shapes and sizes suitable for a variety of different services or combinations of services. Different configurations of which piece of the shell has the soffit fixing lugs are available and the number of soffit fixing lugs can be altered depending on the required use. For example in some versions the piece designed to be fixed to the soffit has side walls which hang down and the piece that attaches at the bottom is effectively just a flat plate. In other versions the piece designed to be fixed to the soffit is just a flat plate with very small side walls and the piece that attaches has longer sidewalls which can be attached to the plate piece. In other versions not designed to be attached to the soffit the second piece can be attached on one side the fixing lugs would be bent and attached to the wall itself.
246 It appears to be common ground that the mere display, sale, and offer for sale of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 could not anticipate the invention as claimed. In and of themselves, these products do not disclose a method of constructing a barrier, let alone the particular method that is claimed—hence the importance of advancing this challenge to validity on the basis of the instructions that Mr Atkinson says he gave.
247 Trafalgar advanced two main contentions. First, it submitted that the Court should not accept Mr Atkinson’s evidence that the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 were manufactured in late 2014 early 2015. Secondly, it submitted that the Court should not accept that the “detailed oral instructions” recorded in Mr Atkinson’s affidavits were provided, as Mr Atkinson says they were.
248 As to the availability, before the priority date, of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2, Trafalgar submitted that: the photographs used by Mr Atkinson to illustrate those versions were taken in 2019; the invoices annexed to his first affidavit showing sales of the products in 2015 do not refer to “fixing lugs”; and Mr Atkinson’s evidence that these versions were manufactured in late 2014 and early 2015 was “fundamentally at odds” with FSi’s contemporaneous documents (FSi’s Technical Handbooks for 2014 and 2015, and certain products data sheets issued in the period 2013 to 2016). It also pointed, again, to what it says is the absence of those versions from the photograph taken at the September 2015 ASFP UK seminar day. I have already dealt with that particular matter.
249 There is no dispute that the photographs used by Mr Atkinson to illustrate the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 were taken on 3 April 2019. But Mr Atkinson did not suggest that the photographs were taken on any particular date. Indeed, as he made clear in his cross-examination, he did not know when the photographs were taken. Further, Mr Atkinson did not suggest that he had taken the photographs himself. Plainly, Mr Atkinson simply used the photographs as a convenient means to identify and illustrate the versions he was addressing in his evidence. Nothing turns on when, or by whom, the photographs were taken.
250 Mr Atkinson was not directly challenged on his evidence that the invoices he produced were invoices relating to sales of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 in mid to late 2015. I have no reason not to accept his evidence in that regard. It is true that the invoices do not, in terms, refer to the products as having fixing lugs. But no foundation was laid in the evidence to show that the products should have been described in the invoices in that particular way, or to suggest that it was, in some way, surprising or unusual that they were invoiced without describing them as having fixing lugs. These matters were simply not canvassed with Mr Atkinson in cross-examination.
251 Mr Atkinson was taken to FSi’s 2015 Technical Handbook (the 2015 Handbook) and 2014 Technical Handbook (the 2014 Handbook). These handbooks concern a range of different fire resistance products and systems. They each include a section on the Pass-It-Transit System, which is described in general terms.
252 For new installations, the 2015 Handbook says:
… simply slide the Pass-It through the pre-cast/cut aperture, then when ready, push the service (cable/pipe) etc. through the liquid intumescent.
253 For existing installations, the 2015 Handbook says:
… split the outer case, close the case around the required service, slide into place and fix the lid ensuring that the liquid intumescent pads are central to the shell.
254 The 2015 Handbook also says that the Pass-It is designed:
… to prevent the passage of fire between rigid floors, walls and flexible walls …
255 The same instructions are given in the 2014 Handbook. These instructions are no more than high-level statements which simply do not descend to the detail of how the Pass-It should be attached to the structures to which they were intended to be associated.
256 Mr Atkinson was also taken to FSi’s 2018 Technical Handbook (dated April 2018) (the 2018 Handbook), which does illustrate the Pass-It fitted to a soffit. He accepted that he could not point to any technical handbook from FSi after 2015, and before the 2018 Handbook, that described soffit mounting for the Pass-It device in similar terms. He accepted that the 2018 Handbook was the first technical handbook in evidence that shows the possibility of the Pass-It being soffit-mounted. He also said, however, that the 2014 Handbook and the 2015 Handbook refer to mounting the Pass-It between the wall and the floor.
257 Mr Atkinson also accepted that the product data sheets to which he was taken in the early part of his cross-examination—which did not include the Firestopit PDS—do not refer to the Pass-It being fitted to a soffit, as such. Even a product data sheet bearing the date September 2018, which shows examples of the Pass-It with fixing lugs, does not contain an express description of those products being available for soffit mounting. However, Mr Atkinson drew attention to the fact that that product data sheet does state that the described product is “designed to prevent the passage of fire between compartment floors and walls”.
258 In relation to the other data sheets, Mr Atkinson accepted that, where FSi described installation methods, it was FSi’s expectation that its customers would install the Pass-It in the manner described. He said, however, that those instructions showed mounting between the floor and the wall, in the floor, or in the wall.
259 Mr Atkinson explained these configurations in re-examination:
… inside the wall would be literally a preformed penetration in the flexible wall or a ridged wall and the box would slide in and you would either bend the tabs up or you would use a fixing bracket on one side to hold it in place. If it was between a wall and the floor, this was what has been termed as the soffit mounting. This is where the box is pre-mounted to the underside of the floor and then the wall is formed around the outside of that. Or in some cases, the wall and the floor are formed and then the hole – or the penetration is made for the seal or the box to go into it. And then, of course, the last one is through the floor where there is a precast hole or penetration in the floor and the boxes are mounted inside the floor.
260 I do not think that the product data sheets for the Pass-It to which Mr Atkinson was taken in the early part of his cross-examination (which, as I have said, did not include the Firestopit PDS) are as explicit as this explanation, although it is possible that those with knowledge of fire transits might understand them as conveying that explanation.
261 The fact that FSi’s technical literature does not illustrate the Pass-It with fixing lugs, or refer, in terms, to its availability for soffit-mounting, until 2018, casts some doubt on Mr Atkinson’s evidence that, sometime between late 2014 and early 2015, FSi manufactured new versions of the Pass-It with dedicated fixing lugs. However, I must consider this evidence with all the other evidence before me on this topic.
262 Another aspect of Trafalgar’s challenge to Mr Atkinson’s evidence was based on the fact that he did not produce, as part of his evidence in chief, design drawings for the Pass-It Version 1 or the Pass-It Version 2. While Mr Atkinson accepted that design drawings for these versions would have been created at some point in time, he explained that:
… it was quite often that we would manufacture or produce a sample or a design idea in the workshop first, and then go back and put finishing touches on the design drawing at a later stage.
263 This explanation was not challenged.
264 I do not think that Mr Atkinson’s evidence about when the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 were first manufactured is called into question simply because Mr Atkinson did not include design drawings as part of his evidence in chief.
265 Mr Atkinson’s evidence about when the Pass-It Version 1 and Pass-It Version 2 were first manufactured was not shaken by cross-examination. It was not suggested that his evidence was given falsely. Although it was put to Mr Atkinson that there was no Pass-It product with lugs (making it suitable for soffit mounting) that FSi offered for sale or promoted for sale before 12 February 2016, Mr Atkinson disagreed, and confirmed his evidence in chief on that subject. He also disagreed with the more specific proposition that, by 12 February 2016, FSi had not produced or offered for sale either the Pass-It Version 1 or the Pass-It Version 2. Further, Mr Atkinson rejected the proposition that FSi was only able to produce a device such as the Pass-It Version 1 or the Pass-It Version 2 upon receipt of correspondence from Mr Prior on 16 December 2015, which enclosed material relating to the testing of one of Trafalgar’s products. I deal with that correspondence when discussing the FSi drawings as anticipatory disclosures: [294] – [295] below.
266 For completeness, I also note that Mr Atkinson specifically disagreed with the proposition that FSi had not circulated the Firestopit PDS at any time prior to 12 February 2016.
267 Mr Atkinson impressed me as an honest and reliable witness who had a sound knowledge of FSi’s business and products at the times relevant to the present case. His evidence was given responsively and carefully to the questions he was asked. I think it most unlikely that he would be mistaken on a basic fact as to when the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 were developed.
268 On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 were in existence and available for supply when Mr Atkinson says they were—sometime in the period late 2014 to early 2015. This was before the priority date. I am confirmed in this view by my acceptance of Mr Ramunddal’s evidence concerning the Seltor meeting in September 2015, at which time Mr Ramunddal was given samples of the Pass-It Version 2.
269 However, the difficulty I have with this particular challenge to validity is that it depends, for the giving of instructions as to use of the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2, on unidentified conversations with unidentified individuals at unidentified times in unidentified circumstances. As I have recorded, all that Mr Atkinson was able to say was that, since they were created, he has presented the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2 to many customers and potential customers. He said that, in most cases, he had a sample with him, because the devices are relatively compact and are easier to explain and understand when a sample is present.
270 Mr Atkinson said that, on these occasions, he explained the different installation methods that are available for these versions. He also said that, on most occasions, he explained “every option of installation available”. However, he said that his explanation would be more limited if the customer was only interested in one method of installation, or if the customer’s intended use made a particular method irrelevant.
271 The explanation I have quoted at [245] above is, plainly, idealised. As accepted by Mr Atkinson in cross-examination, it does not purport to be an actual conversation that Mr Atkinson had with a particular customer at a particular time.
272 Evidence expressed at this high level of generality lacks the requisite precision as to time, circumstance, and content to provide a sufficiently reliable foundation for me to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the invention was disclosed with the particularity required for an anticipatory disclosure.
273 I therefore reject this particular challenge to the validity of the invention as claimed.
The Pass-It with butterfly screws
274 Boss contended that all the claims of the patent are anticipated by the public display, demonstration, offer for sale, sale, and installation of the Pass-It with butterfly screws, when taken with the instructions, given by Mr Atkinson, for use of the device.
275 Mr Atkinson’s evidence was that this version of the Pass-It was developed after the Speedpanel meeting, around mid-2015. He said that the Pass-It with butterfly screws, and the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2, have been on display since mid-2015 in FSi’s training room, which is used for meetings with customers almost every week to provide training in, and public awareness of, FSi’s products.
276 Mr Atkinson said that, when he showed customers these devices in FSi’s training room, he gave the explanation I have quoted at [245] above. In relation to the Pass-It with butterfly screws, he said that he also explained that the butterfly screws can be used with any Pass-It device in substitution for the Phillips head screws that are typically used.
277 As with the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2, Trafalgar submitted that the Court should not accept Mr Atkinson’s evidence that the Pass-It with butterfly screws was available and displayed from mid-2015. It submitted that Mr Atkinson’s evidence on this score was vague and contradicted by the contemporaneous materials.
278 Significantly, Trafalgar also suggested that photographs, taken in FSi’s training room, of the Pass-It with butterfly screws—which the parties agree were taken in 2018 and 2019—include images that have been falsified, because those images show sachets of intumescent material that are date-stamped “03 05 15”. This suggestion was made because some of the images also show the presence of a date stamper with a piece of paper. Trafalgar contended that the piece of paper shows “practice stamping impressions (of the same date as appears on the sachets)”. Trafalgar’s theory is that some unknown person or persons—presumably at FSi—staged the images of the sachets by fraudulently impressing them with the date “03 05 15” so as to portray that the products to which the sachets were attached were available at around that date. It was not suggested that Mr Atkinson was that person or that Mr Atkinson had any knowledge of such an event. Nor was this theory supported by any evidence as to who, at FSi, would be motivated to fabricate evidence for the purpose of this case.
279 Although I can see the date stamper, a stamp pad, and what are possibly multiple ink impressions on a piece of paper, I am unable to see with sufficient clarity the markings which Trafalgar says are “practice” stamping impressions of “03 05 15”. For all I know, the ink impressions could be of any number of different dates, none of which is “03 05 15”. Why several “practice” impressions of one date might be required was not explained. I am not persuaded that Trafalgar’s theory is anything more than hopeful speculation on its part.
280 I am prepared to accept that the Pass-It with butterfly screws was available when Mr Atkinson says it was. Once again, I am confirmed in this view by Mr Ramunddal’s evidence of the disclosures made at the Seltor meeting in September 2015, which included the oral disclosure that the lower part of the two piece device could be connected to the upper part by either “normal” screws or wing screws.
281 This finding, however, does not significantly advance this particular challenge to validity because, once again, Trafalgar submits that the Court should not accept that the “detailed oral instructions” recorded in Mr Atkinson’s affidavit were provided when this version of the Pass-It, was promoted.
282 My conclusion on that matter is that same as for the challenge based on the Pass-It Version 1 and the Pass-It Version 2. The evidence of the instructions that were given lacks the requisite precision as to time, circumstance, and content to provide a sufficiently reliable foundation for me to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the invention was disclosed with the particularity required for an anticipatory disclosure.
283 I therefore reject this particular challenge to the validity of the invention as claimed.
284 The FSi drawings are drawings that were prepared by FSi and sent by Mr Atkinson to Mr Prior by email on 2 February 2016. The drawings were preceded by email correspondence between Brookfield Multiplex Australasia (Multiplex) and Boss, commencing on 18 November 2015.
285 In that correspondence, Multiplex asked Boss to come up with a “service peno device”—meaning, a service penetration device—that would be suitable for services entering an apartment, which Multiplex stipulated as:
∙ Low Voltage cable bundle (around 20mm dia.) including MATV, intercom, security, EWIS, TV aerial
∙ NBN Conduit – usually a 20mm dia. PVC conduit – with our without cable
∙ Fire sprinkler line – Steel pipe at either 11/4” or 11/2” dia.
∙ Gas line – either in copper or CXL polyethylene – around 20mm dia.
∙ Rehau hot water line – around 20mm dia.
∙ Rehau cold water line – around 20mm dia.
∙ Occasionally a Rehau recycled water line – around 20mm dia.
∙ A/C refrigerant line bundle – around 60mm dia. Including 2 copper lines in insulation, and control cable
∙ Power cable bundle – either 1 or 2 - 2 core and earth 240V – around 30mm dia.
286 Multiplex proposed the following order of construction involving such a device:
1. Remove slab soffit propping and formwork
2. Markout on the floor all the apartment walls and wall types
3. Fix fire rated “service peno device” to soffit (likely by concrete nail gun)
4. Fire service contractor installs fire sprinkler line through “service peno device”
5. All other services contractors install through “service peno device”
6. Install drywall tracks, studs and noggins
7. Install fire rated plasterboard walls, including sealant to “service peno device”
8. Close-up “service peno device” for smoke and acoustics
9. Install ceiling to apartment and to hallway
287 It can be seen that Multiplex wanted a device that would be mounted on a soffit.
288 The email concluded:
Over to you to come up with the “service peno device” capable of taking all the above items through a typical - /60/60, or -/90/90, or -/120/120 firewall.
289 These figures refer to fire ratings.
290 Mr Prior forwarded this email to Mr Atkinson on the same day, asking for Mr Atkinson’s thoughts. Mr Atkinson responded on 19 November 2015, saying:
That is a very interesting number of services, albeit small in size. I am very happy that they would all fit in to the Largest size Pass-it box, we could construct the box to suit the width of the wall, making it a nearly flush fitting system. The “intumescent” that is used in the box will move than accommodate these services, I would suggest that we conduct some indicative testing to see how the results come out, we can get most of the services here to.
Shall we go ahead with an indicative test or would you like to jump straight in to a full test in Oz.
Will call later UK time to chat about things anyway before I jump ship to USA.
(Errors in original.)
291 It is clear from this response that Mr Atkinson considered the Pass-It to be suitable for this particular application, and that he was contemplating that the Pass-It would be installed within the wall and sit substantially flush with it.
292 Boss, through Mr Prior, responded to Multiplex later on 19 November 2015, saying:
We can prepare an indicative test of our product around all of these services – if its successful we can book it into Exova.
I understand (from D&E Air) the 90min wall system as single 16mm plasterboard each side of a 92mm stud. Can you tell me what [the] 60min and 120min wall systems are?
293 Multiplex subsequently provided the wall system details.
294 Further, in another email dated 19 November 2015, Multiplex said:
One thing to watch is – make the device easy to get the services in. Preferably open at the bottom during initial installation so the trades don’t pull their services through and damage – just clip the service to the underside of the slab and through the device. Once all are in place close up the bottom, frame the device out with studs/noggins and then apply the plasterboard.
Our OH&S didn’t like a hinged bottom hanging down. It is likely to be a hazard for trades working from a scissor.
295 On 16 December 2015, Mr Prior sent an email to Mr Atkinson:
Hi Carl
Just thought I’d give you a heads up on the Trafalgar version of this multi-service transit we spoke of developing. I have attached some photos of their transit set up for test last week, see attached.
Note the important factors for this application:
∙ Can be installed to the underside of the slab before the wall goes up – note the top dynabolts on the extended flange
∙ Can be loaded with pipes and services and then ‘closed off’ after all the trades run their services
∙ Will provide 120min integrity and insulation to the services we spoke about below. The Trafalgar intumescence looks to be roughly 10mm thick.
∙ A separate insulating wrap for the sprinkler pipe and copper is acceptable. Trafalgar is using a 300mm wide superwool wrap and black foam smoke seal (see attached images)
Have you had more thoughts on an FSI version? Would it be best to use plastic sleeves of HPE or a multi-layered intumescent with the mesh?
Looking forward to your feedback.
Mark
296 The “photos” referred to are of a Trafalgar test specimen installed at Exova’s testing facility at Dandenong in Victoria, in circumstances which I relate below. The email also attached an image of a diagram entitled “Apartment Entry Door – Fire Box Detail”. The diagram was prepared by Mr Tyler Brenchley from Multiplex. It shows a “fire rated services penetration box” mounted on a soffit.
297 It is to be remembered that, by this time, the Pass-It Version 1 and Pass-It Version 2 had already been made by FSi. Also, at the Speedpanel meeting in October 2014, the Pass-It was discussed as a two-piece transit that could be mounted on a soffit. The same information was disclosed with reference to the Pass-It samples discussed at the Seltor meeting in September 2015. Thus, the fact that the “service peno device” that Multiplex had sought was to be a two-piece device installed on a soffit, in which the services were to be positioned before the two pieces were joined, was not a new design concept for FSi or for Boss.
298 The device was, however, one that was to meet Multiplex’s requirements as set out in the email dated 18 November 2015, including that it was to accommodate a specific combination of services and, if possible, achieve certain fire ratings. At that time, Mr Atkinson was confident that the largest Pass-It could accommodate the specific combination of services, as reflected in his email to Mr Prior on 19 November 2015. However, the fire rating of the Pass-It with these particular services, installed as Multiplex wanted them to be installed, would need to be tested. Mr Atkinson also explained in his evidence in chief, and in re-examination, that the Pass-It had not undergone fire testing according to Australian standards. It had, however, been tested under European Standards (EN 1366-3:2009, to which I make further reference below).
299 On 2 February 2016, Mr Prior sent an email to Mr Atkinson seeking “an update on the multi-service Pass It”. Mr Prior also mentioned another request he had received from Multiplex, which was for a fire-rated solution when plumbing fixtures are installed in a wall cavity and penetrate through a fire-rated wall in an apartment building.
300 Mr Atkinson responded to this email on the same day. He attached “3 basic drawings of the proposed Pass-It Transit System” which would “sit on the underside of the soffit up against the face of the flexible wall …”. Two of the drawings are dated “20-01-16”. One drawing is dated “22-01-16”. These dates indicate that the drawings had been prepared before Mr Prior’s email of 2 February 2016 seeking an “update”. The drawings depict a transit mounted (or, in the case of one drawing, to be mounted) to the underside of a concrete soffit on the outside of a flexible wall.
301 Approximately two hours later, Mr Atkinson sent a further email attaching three further drawings. In that email, Mr Atkinson said:
Following the recent conversation please find attached two further details that cover the “internal” use of Pass-It hanging from the soffit and a drawing showing the “J” Bracket.
302 Two of the drawings are dated “20-01-16”. One drawing is dated “21-01-16”. These dates also indicate that the drawings had been prepared before Mr Prior’s email of 2 February 2016 seeking an “update”. The drawings depict a transit mounted to the underside of a concrete soffit within a flexible wall. These particular drawings are the FSi drawings which, Boss contends, anticipate the method claimed in claims 1, 3, and 5 of the patent, assuming that the Fyrebox device is held to be an infringement of those claims.
303 Trafalgar disputed that the FSi drawings are anticipatory disclosures. It argued that, in any event, the FSi drawings were derived from disclosures made to Multiplex by Trafalgar itself, and that these disclosures were made publicly available without Trafalgar’s consent. Trafalgar developed its case, in this regard, as follows.
304 According to Mr Rakic, Trafalgar fielded an inquiry from Multiplex in around late August 2015 in relation to Trafalgar’s range of products. An email, sent by Multiplex to Trafalgar on 2 September 2015, indicates that Multiplex’s interest was in two particular products—the Triplex 200 x 65 and the Maxi 350 x 125. The Multiplex email referred to certain services that it wanted to accommodate. It referred to these as “typical for a high rise apartment”. These services appear to be substantially the same services referred to in the email that Multiplex sent to Boss on 18 November 2015. The email asked:
Can you please confirm that these items can be placed directly to the concrete soffit, and that all the above services can be run through.
305 It is clear from this inquiry that Multiplex was seeking a soffit-mounted device.
306 Trafalgar responded by email on 4 September 2015, stating:
… The boxes you have seen in the catalogue would be a costly penetration as it uses three boxes in one peno. We have a Fyreclamp system that is designed and built at Trafalgar Manufacturing and can be made to size. John [Rakic] discussed that some services need to be in a separate box due to fire testing but we would like to discuss this with John expertise.
307 Mr Rakic and Ms Freel (also from Trafalgar) had a meeting with Multiplex in Melbourne at which time Mr Rakic said that he explained Trafalgar’s existing hinged Fyreclamp products and a “new soffit mounted solution” which Trafalgar had under development. Mr Rakic left a sample prototype of this product with Multiplex. Mr Rakic said that the prototype was “in one piece”, although in the meeting he informed Multiplex that the best solution that Trafalgar had under development was a “two-piece box design” in which the first piece would be attached to the slab, and the second piece would be attached to the first piece after the services had been run through.
308 Mr Rakic’s evidence is that, at this meeting, he was informed by Multiplex that it could incorporate the proposed product into a fire test it had booked in “the next few weeks”. The important thing to note is that this was testing that Multiplex had arranged for its own purposes on products of its choosing. This test was to be carried out at Exova’s testing facility at Dandenong in Victoria.
309 On about 26 November 2015, Mr Todd, Trafalgar’s Director of Innovation, attended the Exova facility and installed the test specimen. Mr Todd’s evidence is that, on completion of the installation, he requested the lab technicians at Exova to place a tarpaulin over the specimen to cover it. It is important to note that this was Mr Todd’s request, not Multiplex’s request. Mr Todd said that, at no stage during any of his interactions with Multiplex, did anyone suggest that this specimen, its features, or its method of installation, would be revealed to a third-party manufacturer, including Boss.
310 Mr Todd said further that, in his experience in the passive fire industry, including more than nine years of involvement with testing passive fire products, it is “standard industry practice” that activities at a testing facility take place in confidence.
311 The Trafalgar test specimen was tested at Exova on or around 14 December 2015.
312 Trafalgar’s response to this particular challenge to validity is that the Court should disregard the FSi drawings, having regard to s 24(1)(b) of the Patents Act, which provides:
(1) For the purpose of deciding whether an invention is novel or involves an inventive step or an innovative step, the person making the decision must disregard:
…
(b) any information made publicly available without the consent of the nominated person or patentee, through any publication or use of the invention by another person who derived the information from the nominated person or patentee or from the predecessor in title of the nominated person or patentee;
but only if a complete application for the invention is made within the prescribed period.
313 Leaving aside any question about its consent, Trafalgar’s response depends on acceptance that the FSi drawings were derived from the information in Mr Prior’s email to Mr Atkinson on 16 December 2015 about Trafalgar’s test specimen installed at the Exova test facility at Dandenong. Trafalgar’s case is that this information is constituted by the photographs attached to the email, and Mr Prior’s description of the Trafalgar test specimen. It also seems to be based on the diagram entitled “Apartment Entry Door – Fire Box Detail”.
314 The photographs show the Trafalgar test specimen installed in a wall penetration. It is attached to a soffit. Services are installed through the device. The photographs disclose little else about the features of the device. They do not disclose whether the device has each of the features of the firestopping device defined in claim 1 of the patent, or the additional features of the firestopping device defined in claims 2, 3, or 4.
315 Further, the photographs do not disclose the method by which the wall (barrier), in which the test specimen is installed, was constructed, or the method by which the services were positioned in it. In particular, they do not disclose whether, in installing the test specimen, each of the steps of the method claimed in claim 1 of the patent were undertaken, or the additional step of the method claimed in claim 5 was undertaken.
316 The diagram adds nothing of substance. It merely shows a “fire rated services penetration box” mounted on a soffit. It does not disclose whether the “fire rated services penetration box” has each of the features of the firestopping device defined in claim 1 of the patent or the additional features of the firestopping device defined in claims 2, 3, or 4. It does not disclose the method by which the wall, in which the box is installed, was constructed or whether, in installing the box, each of the steps of the method claimed in claim 1 of the patent were undertaken, or the additional step of the method claimed in claim 5 was undertaken.
317 Mr Prior’s description in the email of 16 December 2015 is more informative, but only slightly so. Of relevance to the method claimed in the patent is that the Trafalgar test specimen:
Can be installed to the underside of the slab before the wall goes up …
and that it:
Can be loaded with pipes and services and then ‘closed off’ after all the trades run their services …
318 When this additional information is taken with the photographs and the diagram, it still does not disclose all the features of the firestopping device defined in claim 1 of the patent. For example, there is no disclosure of a first portion having formations for fastening that portion to an external object. Further, there is no disclosure of a device having the additional features defined in claims 2, 3, and 4. It follows that there is no disclosure of the method claimed in claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the patent. There is also no disclosure of the additional step of claim 5.
319 For these reasons, neither the installation of Trafalgar’s test specimen at the Dandenong testing facility, nor Mr Prior’s email to Mr Atkinson of 16 December 2015 with its attachments, disclosed all the features of the invention claimed in the patent.
320 Further, I am not satisfied that the FSi drawings were derived from the installation of Trafalgar’s test specimen at the Dandenong testing facility or from the information provided in Mr Prior’s email to Mr Atkinson of 16 December 2015, in any event.
321 It is to be remembered that Multiplex had already set the task for Boss to come up with a “service peno device” that would accommodate a number of specified services, and be fixed to a soffit: Multiplex’s email of 18 November 2018. Multiplex had also said that, preferably, the device should be “open at the bottom during initial installation” to allow the services to be positioned before the “bottom” was closed up, which would then allow the device to be framed and the plasterboard applied: Multiplex’s email of 19 November 2018. These were Multiplex’s requirements. This was not information derived from Trafalgar.
322 Whilst I have no doubt that Mr Prior considered the Trafalgar test specimen to be useful commercial information about a competitive product which he should pass on to Mr Atkinson, the information which Mr Prior gave in his email of 16 December 2015 about that device added nothing of significance, in terms of the method claimed in the patent, to the instructions that Multiplex had already given to Boss. And, as I have said, the fact that the “service peno device” that Multiplex had sought from Boss was to be a two-piece device installed on a soffit, and in which the services were to be positioned before the two pieces were joined, was not a new design concept for FSi or for Boss. In his email of 19 November 2015, Mr Atkinson had already expressed his satisfaction that, subject to testing, the solution sought by Multiplex could be accommodated in the largest size Pass-It, which he contemplated would be installed within the wall.
323 For completeness, I find that the diagram prepared by Mr Brenchley was not information derived from Trafalgar. It was information provided by Multiplex in relation to its requirements for the installation of a “fire rated services penetration box” in relation to an “Apartment Entry Door”.
324 For these reasons, s 24(1)(b) of the Patents Act has no application to this challenge to validity. However, the question remains: Do the FSi drawings disclose all the essential features of the invention as claimed?
325 I am not satisfied that the FSi drawings do disclose all the features of the invention as claimed.
326 It is to be borne in mind that the invention is a method of constructing a barrier according to a particular sequence of steps. According to claim 1, those steps are: fastening a first portion of a firestopping device to an external object; positioning at least one service adjacent to, or in alighnment with, that portion; positioning the second portion around the service(s); mating the two portions; and then constructing the barrier around the firestopping device.
327 In and of themselves, the FSi drawings do not disclose any particular sequence of steps for constructing a barrier. They show a two-piece firestopping device attached to a soffit, in association and opening in a flexible wall, with a combustible (plastic) service pipe and cable bunches passing through the device.
328 It is possible that the flexible wall (the barrier) could be constructed according to the claimed method. But the FSi drawings do not give any instruction to do so.
329 Therefore, the FSi drawings do not stand as an anticipatory disclosure of the method claimed in claim 1. It follows that the FSi drawings also do not stand as an anticipatory disclosure of the methods claimed in claims 2, 3, 4, or 5.
330 Further, the FSi drawings do not disclose the firestopping device defined in claim 2 or the additional step of the method claimed in claim 5. There is also a question whether the FSi drawings disclose a firestopping device having the features of claim 3 or of claim 4. That question, however, need not be determined.
331 I therefore reject this particular challenge to the validity of the invention as claimed.
Patent validity: Lack of innovative step
Overview
332 Boss’s challenge to validity based on a lack of innovative step, as advanced in its closing submissions, focussed on the publication of the Firestopit PDS and claims 1 and 5 of the patent. However, its case on lack of innovative step was not confined to the disclosures of the Firestopit PDS or those claims. Boss also placed reliance on the prior art information on which it relied in its case on lack of novelty, and on other claims. It contended that if, contrary to its case on invalidity based on lack of novelty, the prior art information on which it relied did not disclose the essential features of the claims, then the invention, so far as claimed, only varied only in ways that make no substantial contribution to the working of the invention.
333 Boss’s written submissions continued:
For example, the specific geometry attributed to each portion in claims 3 and 4 makes no substantial contribution to the working of the invention. All that matters is that there is a first portion fixed to the external object and a second portion position around the services. A comparison between Pass-It Version 1 and Pass-It Version 2 demonstrates the point. If the Court finds that claim 3 or 4 is not anticipated because the claimed geometry is not disclosed, those claims would lack an innovative step.
334 This is as far as Boss’s case on lack of innovative step was developed with reference to the prior art information relied on for lack of novelty.
335 There are real difficulties in dealing with a generalised submission of this kind, which provides no greater articulation than an illustrative example. A case on lack of novelty can be defeated by finding that one feature of the invention, as claimed, has not been made publicly available before the priority date of the claim. It is not necessary for the Court to go further and make additional findings that other features of the invention, as claimed in a particular claim, were not made publicly available. However, for an innovation patent, any one of a number of variances between the invention as claimed and the prior art information might be enough to provide an innovative step to support a given claim.
336 The expectation in Boss’s submissions appears to be that, by simply providing an illustrative example, the Court, left to its own devices, will be energised to explore where all the possible variances might exist between the prior art information and the claims, and to determine for itself whether each of those variances, considered individually, do or do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed.
337 The Court should not be left in this position. It is the task of the party relying on a lack of innovative step to identify each and every variance between the prior art information and the invention as claimed, and to articulate, by reference to the evidence, why that variance does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed. This is the task imposed by s 7(4) of the Patents Act.
338 That said, the outcome of Boss’s challenge to the validity of the patent, based on a lack of innovative step, can be found, most directly, in my findings in relation to the disclosures made at the Seltor meeting. I have found that all the features of the method claimed in claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the patent were disclosed at that meeting. It follows that, with respect to the prior art information constituted by the disclosures at the Seltor meeting, only the additional, but undisclosed, step in claim 5—the step of marking a line on the external object to depict the proposed centre line of the barrier (integer 5.2)—now stands to be assessed as to whether that variance does or does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention.
339 It should be appreciated at the outset that there is no requirement in the claims that the firestopping device be centred. Claim 1 merely requires the step of positioning the first portion of the firestopping device so that it straddles the proposed positioning of the barrier. “Straddling” the proposed positioning of the barrier is not the same as centring the device on a particular line. “Straddling” may or may not involve centring the device. Claim 5 itself does not require the step of centring the device. It simply stipulates the step of marking the centre line of the boundary on the external object to which the first portion of the firestopping device is to be fastened. I am satisfied that this step does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention. It is, truly, a trivial addition to the method that is otherwise described and claimed. But even if claim 5 were to be construed as requiring the step of centring the device on the centre line that is marked, that step would also be a trivial addition to the method that is described and claimed. Therefore, although the invention claimed in claim 5 is novel, it does not involve an innovative step based on the disclosures made at the Seltor meeting and is, accordingly, invalid on that ground.
340 I add that, if I am wrong in my conclusion that, at the Seltor meeting, the additional features of the method claimed in claim 3 were disclosed—meaning that a firestopping device whose first portion is a planar panel defining a pair of opposite sides each having a side wall extending therefrom was not disclosed—then I am satisfied that those features—which are no more than specific aspects of the shape or configuration of the first portion—do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed. Therefore, had I not found that the invention as claimed in claim 3 is not novel, I would have found that the invention, as so claimed, does not involve an innovative step.
341 My findings on lack of novelty and, to this point, on lack of innovative step, are sufficient to determine the question of the validity of all the claims. Nevertheless—and bearing in mind the observations I have made above about the Court being left to its own devices—I will briefly refer to some other aspects of the prior art information discussed above as those aspects relate to the challenge to validity based on lack of innovative step.
342 As to the Speedpanel meeting, I am not satisfied that a firestopping device with a first portion having formations for fastening that portion to an external object, was disclosed (which the parties referred to as integer 1.4). This is a variance between the disclosures at the Speedpanel meeting and the invention as claimed in claim 1. It is, however, a variance that is common to all the claims of the patent. For the reasons given below in relation to the disclosures of the Firestopit PDS, I am not satisfied that this feature does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed.
343 As to the demonstrations of the Pass-It Versions 1 and 2, and the Pass-It with butterfly screws, I have concluded that the evidence of the asserted publication of the claimed method on these occasions is expressed at such a high level of generality as to time, circumstance, and content that it lacks the requisite precision to provide a sufficiently reliable foundation for me to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the invention was disclosed with the particularity required for an anticipatory disclosure. That inability leaves me in a position where I cannot rationally make the comparison required by s 7(4) of the Patents Act. Therefore, I am not prepared to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the invention, as claimed, does not involve an innovative step.
344 As to the FSi drawings, I have concluded that the FSi drawings do not disclose any particular sequence of steps for constructing a barrier. The sequence of steps for constructing a barrier lies at the heart of the invention, and is common to all claims. I am not satisfied that these features do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed.
345 Much time was spent, and much evidence was directed, to the Firestopit PDS and its genuineness as a document. For this reason, I will deal with this aspect of the case fully, including whether, based on that document alone, a lack of innovative step is established, even though, strictly speaking, it is not necessary for me to do so.
346 The Firestopit PDS describes the Pass-It Transit System as an intumescent device encased in a two-part steel shell that is designed to prevent the passage of fire between compartment walls. Amongst other things, it discloses that the Pass-It can be installed before the compartment wall is built by fixing it to the underside of a soffit during the construction phase of the build. In this application, the Firestopit PDS says that the top section of the device is fitted to the underside of the soffit. The services are then run through the “open space below” before the metal bottom section is attached. The wall can then be “built around the product”.
347 It is to be recalled that Mr Atkinson identified the Firestopit PDS as a document that had been brought into existence following the preparation and issue of a fire test report by Exova on 24 January 2014 in relation to the so-called Pass-It Version 0. Mr Atkinson said that the Firestopit PDS was prepared from an earlier data sheet that had been prepared specifically for use by Tecnica in about November 2013. This earlier product data sheet bears the Revision Date “01/11/2013” and the Revision Number “01”. The Firestopit PDS bears the Revision Date 28 March 2014 and also the Revision Number “01”. Mr Atkinson could not recall the exact date when the Firestopit PDS was created but, in cross-examination, he said that “it would have been produced around the date of the test”, meaning the Exova test which led to the Evoxa 2014 Report. In his evidence in chief, Mr Atkinson said that he always provided the Firestopit PDS during his presentations of the Pass-It.
348 In its written closing submissions, Boss directed attention to the requirement of claim 1 that the firestopping device have formations for fastening the first portion of the device to an external object (integer 1.4). Boss accepted that this feature is not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS. Based on Mr Page’s evidence, Boss contended that this feature does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention because an installer would simply create holes in the device to bolt it to a soffit.
349 Boss also contended that the additional step of claim 5—marking a line on the external object to depict the proposed centreline of the barrier (integer 5.2)—does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention. I have already concluded that that step does not make a substantial contribution to the invention as claimed.
350 Trafalgar’s response was that it has not been established that the Firestopit PDS is “genuine”. By this, I take Trafalgar to mean that it has not been established that the Firestopit PDS was ever made publicly available. Its case is that the Firestopit PDS is evidence that was fabricated for the purposes of these proceedings.
351 Trafalgar contended, alternatively, that it has not been established that the Firestopit PDS was made publicly available before the priority date of 12 February 2016. This contention assumes that it has failed in its contention concerning the genuineness of the Firestopit PDS.
352 Finally, Trafalgar contended that the Firestopit PDS does not disclose a number of the features of the invention as claimed, and that Boss has not established that these features do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention.
The genuineness of the Firestopit PDS
353 Trafalgar’s contention that Boss has not established that the Firestopit PDS is “genuine” is a curious way of putting the matter given that it is Trafalgar who has challenged the genuineness of the document. Trafalgar developed its case in the following way.
354 First, Trafalgar compared the Firestopit PDS with another Pass-It product data sheet in evidence. The two documents have the same Revision Date (“28/03/2014”) and the same Revision Number (“02”), except the latter product data sheet was published under FSi’s name, not the Firestopit name. It is to be recalled that there are also other Pass-It product data sheets in evidence.
355 Trafalgar pointed to the different contents of the two documents. On the one hand, the Firestopit PDS refers, in a number of places, to the Pass-It being suitable for pre-installation by fitting the device to the underside of a soffit. The other document did not include these statements; nor did the other Pass-It product data sheets in evidence. On the other hand, other aspects of the two documents are the same. Trafalgar relied, in particular, on the two documents having the same layout, headings, diagrams, and photographs.
356 Trafalgar also relied on the fact that it was only in its 2018 Handbook that FSi referred, in terms, to the Pass-It being soffit-mounted.
357 Trafalgar also pointed to (what it described as) the incongruity of the Firestopit PDS using the Firestopit name when the company had changed its name to FSi on 24 October 2013. Trafalgar pointed to the fact that the other Pass-It product data sheets in evidence (with the exception of another version that was created in 2012 and published under the Firestopit name, and the version published under Tecnica’s name) were published under the FSi name.
358 Trafalgar also relied on numerous typographical errors in the Firestopit PDS.
359 Secondly, Trafalgar submitted that the electronic copy of the Firestopit PDS which has been discovered by Boss does not contain metadata that can verify the identity of the author of, or the date of creation of, that electronic copy.
360 Thirdly, Trafalgar submitted that there are “a number of other documents adduced by Boss in these proceedings which are clearly not genuine and have plainly been attributed by Mr Prior with an earlier date than the evidence reveals or [have been] altered by Mr Prior”.
361 Fourthly, Trafalgar submitted that no other contemporaneous record has been produced by Boss that shows that the Firestopit PDS was created and made publicly available before the priority date. It submitted that Mr Atkinson accepted that the product data sheet for the Pass-It that was published under FSi’s name, and which had the same Revision Date and Revision Number as the Firestopit PDS, was distributed by FSi from about the end of March 2014.
362 Finally, Trafalgar submitted that the evidence did not establish that FSi was approved to use the Pass-It in soffit-mounting application in March 2014, casting further doubt on the “reliability and origin” of the Firestopit PDS.
363 I am not persuaded that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document.
364 The comparison that Trafalgar made between the Firestopit PDS and the other Pass-It product data sheets published under FSi’s name, including the product data sheet bearing the same Revision Date and Revision Number as the Firestopit PDS, raises inconsistencies that might be thought to be irregular. I do not accept, however, that these inconsistencies indicate, necessarily, that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document that was created by FSi.
365 I have already touched on aspects of Trafalgar’s submissions in this regard when considering a number of the submissions it advanced in response to Boss’s challenge to the validity of the patent for lack of novelty. It is to be remembered that Mr Atkinson’s evidence was that numerous versions of product data sheets for the Pass-It were produced over time, each having slightly different content. He said that these documents (even FSi’s promotional material more generally) were created in “a fairly ad hoc manner”. It did not follow that where multiple versions of a product data sheet were created, a later version necessarily replaced an earlier version, so far as the public availability of the documents was concerned.
366 Importantly, Mr Atkinson made clear that FSi did not follow strict document or version management procedures when creating new versions of documents. He also said that it was common for amendments or corrections to be made to product data sheets, and for the original documents to be overwritten or deleted in the process.
367 Mr Atkinson also emphasised that FSi did not have branding or marketing guidelines regarding the use of the FSi brand, or any written instructions to implement the rebranding from “Firestopit” to “FSi”.
368 I accept this evidence. It suggests that, while it might be argued that the Firestopit PDS contains anomalies, when compared to the other product data sheets in evidence, these anomalies can be explained by poor document creation, and poor document management, procedures.
369 These anomalies are not just present in the Firestopit PDS. Trafalgar drew attention to the fact that the Firestopit PDS has the same Revision Date and Revision Number as the Pass-It product data sheet published under FSi’s name, with which it was specifically compared. But, as I have noted, there are also Pass-It product data sheets that have been published under FSi’s name and Tecnica’s name which bear the same Revision Date (“01/11/2013”) and Revision Number (“01”). Although bearing the same Revision Date and Revision Number, there are differences in the text and layout of the two documents. Trafalgar does not contend that these are not genuine documents.
370 I have previously considered Trafalgar’s submissions that the other product data sheets in evidence do not contain an express description of the Pass-It being available for soffit mounting, and that it was only in its 2018 Handbook that FSi referred, in terms, to the Pass-It being soffit-mounted. I accept that these are relevant matters to consider, but they only form part of the evidence before me. Certainly, they do not stand as a sufficient reason, alone, to conclude that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document.
371 As to the typographical errors in the Firestopit PDS, Mr Atkinson rejected the suggestion that FSi would not publish a document with such errors. I accept his evidence. I observe that the Pass-It product data sheet published under Tecnica’s name also has apparent typographical errors, which are also present in the Pass-It product data sheet published under FSi’s name which bears the same Revision Date and Revision Number (although, as I have said, there are also differences in the text and layout of the two documents). I do not regard the presence of typographical errors in the Firestopit PDS as indicating, necessarily, that it is not a genuine document. It merely shows that it was a somewhat carelessly prepared document.
372 I turn now to Trafalgar’s submission that the electronic copy of the Firestopit PDS, which has been discovered by Boss, does not contain metadata that can verify the identity of the author of, or the date of creation of, that electronic copy. Mr Prior explained how this electronic copy was brought into existence.
373 Mr Prior’s evidence was that, when visiting FSi in September 2018, he had a meeting with Mr Atkinson and Mr Peach, who was, at that time, FSi’s Managing Director. Mr Peach showed Mr Prior copies of numerous historical data sheets and instruction sheets for the Pass-It. At Mr Prior’s request, Mr Peach made a copy of the Firestopit PDS.
374 On 26 October 2018, when he was back in Australia, Mr Prior scanned the copy of the Firestopit PDS that Mr Peach had made for him, so as to create an electronic version of the document that he could email to his solicitors. The scanning was done on his home printer. The electronic file was saved on a USB drive that was plugged into the printer. Once the electronic file was saved, Mr Prior removed the USB drive from the printer. He then plugged it into a laptop computer and sent the saved file to his solicitors. His evidence is that he did not make any alterations or modification to this electronic file. Further, no-one else had access to the electronic file between the time he scanned the copy Firestopit PDS and the time he sent the electronic file to his solicitors.
375 I accept this evidence. I note that Mr Atkinson was not cross-examined on Mr Prior’s meeting with Mr Peach, at which Mr Atkinson was also present. I have no reason to doubt the provenance of the document that Mr Prior said he had scanned. It came from FSi.
376 The electronic file was forensically examined by Trafalgar’s expert, Mr McKemmish. Mr McKemmish drew attention to what he considered to be an unexplained absence of metadata associated with the file, which raised questions about its creation. However, in cross-examination, Mr McKemmish accepted that there might be a legitimate reason for the lack of metadata associated with the file. He explained that data might be missing because of the particular version of the firmware in the printer.
377 As to Trafalgar’s submission that Mr Atkinson accepted that the product data sheet for the Pass-It that was published under FSi’s name, and which had the same Revision Date and Revision Number as the Firestopit PDS, was distributed by FSi from about the end of March 2014, I note that Mr Atkinson said that this product data sheet was “a form of brochure” (my emphasis). He did not accept that this was the only form of product data sheet for the Pass-It which FSi used at around that time.
378 Trafalgar’s submission that, in March 2014 (the Revision Date for the Firestopit PDS), the Pass-It was not approved for use in a soffit-mounting application, is based on evidence given by Mr van de Weijgert. Mr van de Weijgert is the Principal Fire Safety Engineer at International Fire Consultants Ltd. He expressed the opinion that the testing covered by the Exova 2014 Report did not mean that the Pass-It could be supplied for mounting to a soffit in the particular way depicted in the 2018 Handbook, so as to be compliant with EN 1366-3:2009 (the EN Standard), referred to in the Firestopit PDS.
379 Apart from Mr van de Weijgert’s evidence, this topic was canvassed in expert evidence given by Mr Harriman and Mr Page. Mr van de Weijgert, Mr Harriman, and Mr Page prepared a Joint Report (Joint Report Part D). Mr Atkinson also gave evidence on this topic. I accept that Mr Atkinson has specialised knowledge and experience in the field of fire testing, with knowledge of, and familiarity with, the standards under which the Pass-It was tested in the Exova 2014 Report.
380 I commence with Mr Atkinson’s evidence on this topic. Mr Atkinson said that Mr van de Weijgert’s opinion was based on an interpretation of the EN Standard that was much narrower than the interpretation that Mr Atkinson holds (and has held), and upon which FSi’s business has been conducted, including in relation to the promotion and supply of Pass-Its. Indeed, Mr Atkinson said that Mr van de Weijgert’s view was inconsistent with the EN Standard. Mr Atkinson considered that the Exova 2014 Report covered the Pass-It when mounted on a soffit because, in the testing covered by the Exova 2014 Report, the Pass-It was tested in a “worst-case location” (the position most likely to result in failure) and mounting the Pass-It on a soffit presented less onerous fire conditions for the device.
381 Mr Page also expressed the opinion that the Exova 2014 Report covered the Pass-It when mounted on a soffit, which he considered would be compliant with the EN Standard. However, his evidence in that regard might have been affected, in part, on a misreading of one section of the Exova 2014 Report.
382 Mr Harriman did not direct his opinion to the EN Standard as such. He did say, however, that the Exova 2014 Report does not contain an “opinion for variations” to the tested configuration (which did not involve the tested product mounted on a soffit). He said that if it was envisaged that the test product would be mounted on a soffit, then, at the very least, an opinion should have been included in the Exova 2014 Report stating that this variation to the fixing method was acceptable.
383 It is not necessary for me to come to a finding as to which of the opposing views is correct—that is to say, on whether the Exova 2014 Report covered the Pass-It when mounted on a soffit such that this particular application would be compliant with the EN Standard. It is to be remembered that this topic was only raised because Trafalgar contended that a lack of approval for the Pass-It to be mounted on a soffit reflected on the “reliability and origin” of the Firestopit PDS. It is sufficient for me to find, as I do, that the opinion advanced by Mr Atkinson is a legitimate view as to the scope of approval that FSi obtained through the Exova 2014 Report, which he reasonably held at the time that the Firestopit PDS was created and made publicly available.
384 Finally, I turn to Trafalgar’s submission that there are a number of other documents adduced by Boss in these proceedings which are clearly not genuine and have plainly been attributed by Mr Prior with an earlier date than the evidence reveals, or have been altered by Mr Prior. This submission was advanced, unreferenced, in Trafalgar’s written submissions. It is a serious, but unsubstantiated, allegation. It is, on the evidence before me, an unwarranted attack on Mr Prior, and I make no such finding.
385 On the whole, the evidence falls well short of establishing that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document, particularly in light of the evidence given by Mr Atkinson. In this connection, it is to be recalled that Mr Atkinson advanced the Firestopit PDS as a document emanating from FSi. Importantly, he said that he created it with one of FSi’s salesmen, Mr Shaw. He said that the document was created shortly after the Exova 2014 Report was issued. Mr Atkinson also said that he provided the Firestopit PDS to a number of FSi’s customers (some of whom he identified), including Boss (Mr Prior). He said further that he provided the Firestopit PDS to customers during presentations of the Pass-It to them.
386 The allegation that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document is really a challenge to Mr Atkinson’s evidence—namely, that the document had not been created and used as Mr Atkinson had said in his evidence in chief. And yet, Mr Atkinson was not challenged in cross-examination on these matters. The cross-examination went no further than challenging Mr Atkinson with the proposition that the Firestopit PDS was never circulated or distributed by FSi at any time prior to 12 February 2016. Mr Atkinson accepted that he could not give an exact date when the Firestopit PDS was created. He disagreed, however, with the proposition that FSi had not circulated the Firestopit PDS at any time prior to 12 February 2016.
387 I accept Mr Atkinson’s evidence as to the creation of the Firestopit PDS. I am satisfied that it was created at around the time that the Exova 2014 Report was issued and that Mr Atkinson was one of its creators. I am satisfied that the document was used commercially, and made publicly available, by FSi. I am satisfied that such use occurred before the priority date of 12 February 2016.
388 One such use occurred when Mr Prior obtained a copy of the Firestopit PDS before his visit to Mr Ramunddal in September 2015. A copy of the Firestopit PDS is shown in the digital image of the samples of the Pass-It Version 2 that Mr Ramunddal was given at the time of the Seltor meeting.
389 It is to be remembered that Trafalgar’s case is that the Seltor meeting did not occur. One reason it advanced for that contention is that the Firestopit PDS, which is shown in the digital image, is not a genuine document.
390 I have rejected Trafalgar’s case that the Firestopit PDS is not a genuine document and that the Seltor meeting did not occur. And, as I have said, it was never put to Mr Ramunddal that he was not given a copy of that document at the Seltor meeting. The digital image taken by Mr Ramunddal is evidence that the Firestopit PDS was made publicly available before 12 February 2016.
The disclosures in the Firestopit PDS and the presence or lack of innovative steps
391 As I have noted, Trafalgar contended that the Firestopit PDS does not disclose a number of features of the invention as claimed. It contended that Boss has not established that these features, taken individually, do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention.
392 I accept Trafalgar’s submission that the Firestopit PDS does not disclose integer 1.4 of claim 1, namely that the first portion of the firestopping device has formations for fastening it to an external object. As I have said, Boss accepted that this disclosure is not made. It contended, however, that this feature does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention because, based on Mr Page’s evidence, an installer would simply create holes in the device to bolt it to the soffit.
393 I am not satisfied that this feature does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention, it being borne in mind that “substantial” means no more than a contribution that is real or of substance. Where an invention is a method, a substantial contribution to the working of the invention can be constituted by a feature of the method that facilitates the ease and efficiency with which the method can be performed.
394 The presence of formations for fastening, as required by claim 1, means that the firestopping device is presented in a form which obviates the step of drilling holes or devising some other means of affixing the device to an external object. I am satisfied that this facility is a feature of substance.
395 Further, it is to be noted that the firestopping device houses the intumescent material that is activated upon exposure to the heat of fire, so that it swells within the internal volume of the device to resist the passage of fire and smoke. Absent the provision of formations for fastening the first portion of the device to the external object, the installer is tasked with not only devising a method of fastening the device to an external object, but also devising a method that does not interfere with the integrity of the intumescent material upon installation.
396 When responding to Mr Page’s evidence that, absent the formations, an installer would simply create holes in the casing of the device, Mr Hunter gave this evidence, which I accept:
… I am unable to agree with Mr Page that an installer would simply create holes in the metal casing without having seen the positioning of the intumescent sachets on the inside of the device, and whether it was in fact possible to create such holes in the metal casing without disturbing what is described as “liquid intumescent”. If, for example, the liquid intumescent ran the full length and breadth of the inside of the portion that needs to be fixed to the slab then creating such holds in the casing may be very difficult or impossible.
397 It follows from these findings that claim 1 is supported by an innovative step—integer 1.4.
398 Trafalgar contended that the following features of claim 1 are not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS: the step of positioning at least one service such that it is adjacent to, or in alignment with, the first portion of the firestopping device (integer 1.10); and the step of positioning the second portion of the firestopping device around the at least one service (integer 1.11).
399 I am not satisfied that these features are not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS. For this reason alone, the question of whether either of them makes a substantial contribution to the working of the invention does not arise. However, whether or not the features are disclosed in the Firestopit PDS, and whether or not they make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed, are not questions of determinative significance in my consideration of the Firestopit PDS, given my finding that integer 1.4, which is not disclosed, provides an innovative step to support claim 1.
400 Trafalgar contended that the following additional features of claim 2 are not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS: the first and second portions of the firestopping device are mateable to each other by at least one mechanical fastener (integer 2.2) without the use of tools (integer 2.3).
401 Claim 2 is dependent on claim 1. It claims a method according to claim 1, with additional features. It follows that if, by reference to the disclosures of the Firestopit PDS, claim 1 is supported by an innovative step, then so too is claim 2. Therefore, whether or not the additional features of claim 2 are disclosed in the Firestopit PDS, and whether or not they make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention, are not questions of determinative significance.
402 Even so, I accept that the Firestopit PDS does not disclose that the first and second portions of the firestopping device are mateable to each other by at least one mechanical fastener without the use of tools. In this connection, it is convenient to treat integers 2.2 and 2.3 as a composite feature.
403 In closing submissions, Boss did not dispute that this composite feature is not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS. It also did not contend that this composite feature does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention. Plainly, it does. The Speedpanel meeting led FSi to develop the Pass-It with butterfly screws, which FSi obviously considered an alternative that provided advantages which the Pass-It with Phillips head screws did not provide.
404 Trafalgar contended that the following additional feature of claim 3 is not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS: the first portion of the firestopping device is a planar panel defining a pair of opposite sides each having a side wall extending therefrom (integer 3.2). It also contended that the following additional feature of claim 4 is not disclosed: the second portion of the firestopping device is a U-shaped so as to define a base connected to a pair of opposed side walls (integer 4.2).
405 Claims 3 and 4 are dependent claims. Each is expressed to be a method according to “any one of the preceding claims”. In context, this means either claim 1 or claim 2. However, claim 2 is, itself, dependent on claim 1. Claims 3 and 4 are, therefore, dependent, directly or indirectly, on claim 1.
406 If, with respect to particular prior art information, the method claimed in claim 1 is supported by an innovative step, then the method claimed in claim 3, and the method claimed in claim 4, are necessarily supported by an innovative step, regardless of whether the additional features of the method claimed in those claims makes a substantial contribution to the working of the invention, because all the features of claim 1 are incorporated in each of claims 3 and 4.
407 Therefore, once again, whether or not the additional feature of claim 3, and the additional feature of claim 4, are disclosed in the Firestopit PDS, and whether or not they make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention, are not questions of determinative significance, given my finding that claim 1 is supported by an innovative step (integer 1.4).
408 Even so, I accept that the Firestopit PDS does not disclose the particular geometry of the first portion according to integer 3.2 or the particular geometry of the second portion according to integer 4.2. I am satisfied that these features do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as claimed.
409 Trafalgar contended that the following additional feature of claim 5 is not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS: the step of marking a line on the external object to depict the proposed centre line of the barrier (integer 5.2).
410 Claim 5 is a dependent claim, in the same way that claim 3 and claim 4 are dependent claims. I accept that integer 5.2 is not disclosed in the Firestopit PDS. As I have said, I am satisfied that this additional feature does not make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention as so claimed. Once again, this is without determinative significance because claim 5 is dependent, directly or indirectly, on claim 1 and, as the features of claim 1 are incorporated in claim 5, the invention as claimed in claim 5 is supported by an innovative step.
411 Therefore, in relation to the disclosures in the Firestopit PDS, Boss’s challenge to the validity of the claims, based on a lack of innovative step, fails.
Patent validity: Lack of claim support
412 As argued in closing submissions, Boss’s challenge to validity on this ground—that the claims are not supported by matter disclosed in the specification—has two aspects.
413 The first aspect is related to Boss’s contention as to the meaning of “around”: see [55] – [69] above. It argued that if the claims extend to positioning the second portion of the firestopping device on one side only of the services—as I have found—then the claims lack support.
414 This argument was not elucidated in submissions beyond the contention that the description of the alternative embodiment on page 5 of the specification “is insufficient to provide such support” and is “a mere statement of an alternative configuration” in respect of which “no technical contribution is provided”.
415 I reject that contention. It misconceives the obligation under s 40(3) of the Patents Act.
416 As I have previously explained, the method claimed in claim 1 is agnostic as to the shape or configuration of the firestopping device. The claimed method is also agnostic as to the shape or configuration of each, separate portion making up the device.
417 Nevertheless, the specification discloses that, in one embodiment of the invention, the first portion of the firestopping device is in the form of a planar panel defining a pair of opposite sides each having a side wall extending therefrom. In this embodiment, the second portion is U-shaped, which defines a base connected to a pair of opposed side walls. The second portion is mated to the first portion so that, together, they define the firestopping device. This is the embodiment I have described, with reference to the specification, at [41] – [47] above. It is also a form of the firestopping device falling within the method claimed in claim 1, and the more limited method claimed in claim 3 and in claim 4, of the patent.
418 Page 5 of the specification discloses the existence of “other embodiments” where the second portion of the firestopping device mates with the first portion to form one of the sides and/or the top of the firestopping device. No further description of this embodiment is given. But, by the same token, when seen in the context of the earlier description of the first embodiment, no further description is necessary. The technical contribution of the second portion, in this form, is described. None of the expert witnesses had any trouble understanding the configuration of this alternative embodiment. Moreover, it was with that clear understanding that Boss advanced its argument about the meaning of “around” as used in claim 1—as well as its argument that the meaning of “around” excludes this particular form of the firestopping device from the method of the invention. I have, of course, rejected both arguments.
419 I do not accept that claim 1 is not supported by matter disclosed in the specification. Undoubtedly, claim 1 extends to a method in which the second portion of the firestopping device, when mated with the first portion, forms one of the sides and/or the top of the device. However, this particular form of the device is, plainly, enabled by the description in the specification. As required by s 40(2)(a) of the Patents Act, the specification discloses it clearly and completely enough for the method to be performed using this particular form of firestopping device. Claim 1 does not travel beyond the technical contribution that is described. It is supported by matter disclosed in the specification, as required by s 40(3).
420 The second aspect of this challenge concerns claim 2, which claims a method in which the first and second portions of the firestopping device are mateable to each other by at least one mechanical fastener without the use of any tools. Boss contended that, although the specification discloses that the first and second portions are mateable without tools, this is exemplified by an embodiment in which the first and second portions are “click-lockingly” mateable to each other, and by an embodiment in which the first and second portions are mateable by an interference fit. Its case is that there is no disclosure of tool-free mating using a mechanical fastener.
421 I do not accept that claim 2 is not supported by matter disclosed in the specification. After referring to mating the two portions by “click-locking” them or by using an interference fit, the specification states:
Yet other embodiments make use of direct mechanical fixing for mating of the first portion 2 to the second portion 4, such as rivets, screws, etc. However, such embodiments are likely to be less desirable due to the increased effort required to mate the first and second portions 2 and 4.
422 This is, plainly, a disclosure that the two portions can be mated using a mechanical fastener. Having made that disclosure, it was not necessary for the specification to proceed by detailing each and every mechanical fastener that might be deployed for that purpose (although some are exemplified). The person skilled in the art can be taken to possess the wit to choose an appropriate fastener, including one that does not require the use of tools.
423 Once again, as required by s 40(2)(a) of the Patents Act, the specification discloses clearly and completely enough the method to be performed using this particular form of firestopping device. The limitation of claim 2 to a device in which a mechanical fastener can be used, without tools, to mate the two portions is supported by matter disclosed in the specification, as required by s 40(3).
424 Therefore, Boss’s challenge to the invalidity of the claims, based on lack of claim support, fails.
Patent validity: Lack of utility
425 This challenge to validity proceeds on a misunderstanding of the invention that is described and claimed in the specification. It is based on the qualified meaning given by Mr Page to the expression “thermally insulative”, which I have rejected.
426 It will be recalled that Mr Page’s evidence was that “thermally insulative” meant that the device must have the ability to restrict the passage of heat across it, including in fire situations where there could be 1200°C on one side of a barrier for an extended period (eg 30 minutes), and where there was requirement for the temperature to be kept to less than 180°C on the other side of the barrier.
427 In light of this evidence, Boss contended that, if “thermally insulative material”, as used in claim 1 in relation to the composition of the first and second portions of the firestopping device, includes material that cannot withstand the very high temperatures experienced by a firestopping device in a fire, “the invention claimed in the patent is not useful and does not meet the promise of the invention”.
428 There are a number of things to be said about this contention.
429 First, the invention that is claimed is a method of constructing a barrier “having at least one service routed there through”, it is not a firestopping device as such.
430 Secondly, and relatedly, the “promise” of the specification “to overcome, or substantially ameliorate, one of more of the disadvantages of the prior art, or to provide a useful alternative” is made with respect to the method of the invention, not with respect to a firestopping device as such. The specification makes plain the “disadvantages” of the prior art which are intended to be overcome or ameliorated, or in relation to which a useful alternative is intended to be provided. I have quoted the relevant passage from the specification at [36] above.
431 Thirdly, insofar as a firestopping device is to be provided as part of the claimed method, there is no requirement in the specification that it meet a particular fire rating, just as there is no requirement that the barrier constructed in accordance with the claimed method meet a particular fire rating.
432 Fourthly, the two portions of the device, which are to be mated, must be formed from a metallic material or a thermally insulative material. But nothing further is said about these materials. In particular, nothing further is said about whether these materials must achieve some particular result in use. I have accepted that, insofar as either portion of the device might be made from a thermally insulative material, the expression “thermally insulative” means no more than that the material restricts the passage of heat in a fire. The specification leaves it to the user of the method to choose the thermally insulative material that might be suitable for use in the particular application in which the method is performed.
433 In this latter regard, it is to be remembered that first and second portions are made from metallic or thermally insulative material so as to retard the transmission of heat and enable the intumescent material to respond to the heat by swelling within the internal volume of the firestopping device. When the intumescent material responds in this way, it resists the passage of fire and smoke through the device. Thus, it is not the case that the firestopping device must itself withstand the very high temperatures experienced in a fire.
434 Boss’s challenge to validity on this ground proceeds on the asserted non-fulfilment of a promise which is not made. It fails accordingly.
435 Claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the patent are invalid because the invention as claimed in these claims is not novel, based on the disclosures made at the Seltor meeting. Claim 5 of the patent is invalid because, having regard to the disclosures made at the Seltor meeting, the invention, as claimed in that claim, lacks an innovative step.
Introduction
436 Trafalgar alleges that Boss has infringed the patent under s 117(1) of the Patents Act by supplying the Boss Fyrebox device (the Fyrebox device) which, when used, infringes claims 1, 2, 3, and 5. Trafalgar further alleges that Mr Prior has authorised that infringement, or joined in a common design with Boss to do so.
437 As I have concluded that all claims of the patent are invalid, the question of infringement does not arise for determination. I will, nonetheless, express my conclusions on that question, for completeness, against the possibility that Trafalgar might seek to appeal from the findings I have made thus far.
438 Section 117 provides:
(1) If the use of a product by a person would infringe a patent, the supply of that product by one person to another is an infringement of the patent by the supplier unless the supplier is the patentee or licensee of the patent.
(2) A reference in subsection (1) to the use of a product by a person is a reference to:
(a) if the product is capable of only one reasonable use, having regard to its nature or design--that use; or
(b) if the product is not a staple commercial product--any use of the product, if the supplier had reason to believe that the person would put it to that use; or
(c) in any case--the use of the product in accordance with any instructions for the use of the product, or any inducement to use the product, given to the person by the supplier or contained in an advertisement published by or with the authority of the supplier.
439 Trafalgar relies on s 117(2)(c)—use in accordance with instructions (namely, a document entitled “BOSS Fyrebox Installation instructions” (the Boss installation instructions). It also relies on s 117(2)(b)—the supplier’s reason to believe that the product will be put to an infringing use although, as I will explain, reliance on this provision rises no higher than Trafalgar’s case based on s 117(2)(c).
440 Leaving aside a truly unnecessary debate about whether s 117(2)(b) applies in the present case, the dispute between the parties concerns only one matter: whether use of the Fyrebox device in accordance with the Boss installation instructions involves the step of “positioning the second portion [of the firestopping device] around the at least one service” as required by claim 1 (i.e., integer 1.11). This is the only feature that Boss contended was not disclosed in the Boss installation instructions.
The Boss installation instructions
441 The Boss installation instructions provide instructions for mounting the Fyrebox device under a soffit or slab and for mounting the device mid-wall. Those instructions are preceded by the following illustrations:
442 It can be seen that the Fyrebox device comprises a chassis and bottom sliding lid, which is attached to the chassis by four thumbscrews. The chassis is provided with mounting holes. The chassis and the bottom sliding lid each have fire retardant smoke seal brushes.
443 When mounting the Fyrebox device under a soffit or slab, the user is instructed, firstly, to;
Measure and mark the location of the proposed Fire Wall and mark the position where the Fyrebox is to be mounted on the underside of the slab/soffit. Ensure that the Fyrebox is centred at the Fire Wall, ie – ensure the centreline of Fyrebox straddles the centreline of the Fire Wall. (Fig.1)
444 Fig.1 is:
445 The user is then instructed, amongst other things:
(a) to remove the four thumbscrews and slide the bottom lid out of the chassis; to add a bead of sealant to the top of the Fyrebox to provide a fire seal between the Fyrebox and the slab surface; and to mount the chassis to the underside of the slab/soffit through the mounting holes provided in the chassis (step 3);
(b) to install the services through the Fyrebox (step 4);
(c) to install the lid by sliding it into place and securing it to the chassis with the four thumb screws (step 5). At this step the user is told that the smoke brushes will shape themselves around the services, They can also be tucked into place by hand; and
(d) to install the wall framing around the Fyrebox, if need be, and complete the wall lining installation (steps 6 – 7).
446 The instructions state that mid-wall installation is possible for new wall construction and for retrofitting the device to existing walls. For existing walls, the user is instructed to support the Fyrebox device in the required location via angle brackets, fixed to the wall surface only.
447 Boss contended that, as its Fyrebox device is not configured in the manner that is required for the claimed method, infringement under s 117(1) cannot be established. As I have discussed earlier, Boss’s case is that integer 1.11 imposes a constructional limitation on the shape and configuration of the second portion of the firestopping device, requiring it to be something other than a one-sided element. As, on its argument, the lid of the Fyrebox device is a one-sided element, Boss submitted that the Boss installation instructions do not involve use of a product according to the method of claim 1: the second portion of the firestopping device (the lid of the Fyrebox device) is not positioned “around” the (at least one) service. If that be correct then, necessarily, the Boss installation instructions do not instruct the use of a product according to the method of claim 1 and the dependent claims.
448 For the reasons given earlier, I do not accept that integer 1.11 imposes the constructional limitation for which Boss contends. Further, on the basis of my finding as to the meaning of “around” in integer 1.11, I am satisfied that the Boss installation instructions teach the step of positioning the second portion of the firestopping device (here, the lid of the Fyrebox device) “around” at least one service.
449 Given Boss’s acceptance that all other integers of the claimed method are to be found in the Boss installation instructions, I am satisfied that those instructions constitute, for the purposes of s 117(2)(c), instructions as to the use of the Fyrebox device in a method that infringes the claims of the patent, assuming the claims to be valid. It is not in dispute that Boss has supplied the Fyrebox device. Therefore, had the claims been valid, I would have found that Trafalgar has established its case of infringement against Boss under s 117(1) of the Patents Act.
450 Boss contended that, in the present case, Trafalgar could not place reliance on s 117(2)(b) of the Patents Act because the Fyrebox device is “a staple commercial product”, within the meaning of that provision; that is to say, it is a product that is supplied commercially for substantial non-infringing uses.
451 Given the conclusion on infringement I have reached, it is not necessary for me to reach a view on whether, additionally, Trafalgar could have had recourse to s 117(2)(b) in its infringement case. Indeed, Trafalgar’s “reason to believe” case under s 117(2)(c) is based on the fact that Boss issued the Boss installation instructions with respect to use of the Fyrebox device. Thus, on its argument, Boss had, by issuing those instructions, reason to believe that the Fyrebox device would be put to the instructed use.
452 It can be seen, therefore, that, to this extent, Trafalgar’s “reason to believe” case under s 117(2)(b) is indistinguishable from its “use … in accordance with … instructions” case under s 117(2)(c). In the circumstances, the question of whether the Fyrebox device is or is not a staple commercial product for the purposes of s 117(2)(b) is, truly, an unnecessary diversion.
Authorisation and Joint Tortfeasance
453 Trafalgar contended that Mr Prior had authorised Boss’s alleged infringement, or joined in a common design with Boss to infringe the patent, and is, therefore, jointly and personally liable with Boss for that infringement. Trafalgar’s case on infringement by authorisation purportedly derives from s 13(1) of the Patents Act. These allegations are denied in Boss’s and Mr Prior’s defence. Once again, although the question of Mr Prior’s alleged liability does not arise for determination, I will consider it for completeness.
454 As to liability for infringement by authorisation, it is important to be precise about the infringement that has been alleged.
455 Here, the invention is a method of constructing a barrier. The Dictionary in Sch 1 to the Patents Act makes clear that, in the case of a method or process, the word “exploit” includes (relevantly to the present invention) “to use the method or process” or to exploit “a product resulting from such use”. It is important to note, however, that the present case is not one where the use of the method or process results in a product that can, itself, be exploited.
456 Trafalgar has not alleged that Boss infringed the patent by exploiting the claimed method or by authorising another person to exploit that method.
457 The case against Boss on infringement is based solely on s 117(1) of the Patents Act—the supply of a product (the Fyrebox device), where the use of that product satisfies one or more of the circumstances in s 117(2) of the Act. Therefore, the contention that Mr Prior has authorised Boss’s infringement (or, alternatively, joined in a common design with Boss to infringe the patent) must be directed to the relevant infringing act—supply of the Fyrebox product.
458 However, as the invention is not a product, and as the Fyrebox device is not a product that results from use of the claimed method, the notion of authorisation, as derived from s 13(1) of the Patents Act, has no role to play when determining the question of Mr Prior’s alleged liability for infringement. Section 13(1) of the Patents Act does not speak of authorising an infringement of the patent but, rather, of authorising the exploitation of the invention. Supplying the Fyrebox device in not an exploitation of the invention. The case against Mr Prior of infringement by authorisation cannot succeed.
459 The allegation that Boss and Mr Prior joined in a common design to infringe the patent is an allegation of joint tortfeasance: Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 580 – 581; 600 – 602; Ramset at 256 – 257; Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd (2010) 185 CLR 449 at 507 - 508.
460 In JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings [2016] FCAFC 20; 329 ALR 625 (JR Consulting), the Full Court said (at [334] – [335]):
334 Where the same damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers, those wrongdoers may be either joint or independent tortfeasors and the law will regard them, uncontroversially, as joint tortfeasors in the commission of the same wrongful act in at least the circumstances of vicarious liability or “common intention”, that is to say, as to the latter, the “joint commission” of the same wrongful act giving rise to the civil wrong in suit. In The Koursk [1924] P 140 at 159, Sargant LJ put it this way: “There must be a concurrence in the act or acts causing damage, not merely a coincidence of separate acts which by their conjoined effect cause damage” [emphasis added].
335 As a matter of foundation principle then, in order for a director to be regarded as a joint tortfeasor with the company of which he or she is a director, there must be concurrence in the acts of both the company and the director causing the damage rather than coincidence of roles comprised of the company as an entity doing something and a director discharging duties as a director of the company doing that thing. This may be the implicit principled source of the notion articulated in the line of authority to the effect that the director must act, engage, so as to “make” the tort of the company “his or her own”, that is, a demonstrated concurrence in the acts giving rise to the civil wrong causing the damage in suit rather than a coincidence of rolls.
461 After discussing various formulations of the “necessary concurrence” in the acts of a director and the company that would constitute them being joint tortfeasors, the Full Court said (at [350] – [351]):
350 We suspect that there is ultimately not a great deal of difference between these lines of authority as the director must be shown to have directed or procured the tort and the conduct must, clearly enough, go beyond causing the company to take a commercial or business course of action or directing the company's decision-making where both steps are the good faith and reasonable expression of the discharge of the duties and obligations of the director, as a director. The additional component required is a “close personal involvement” in the infringing conduct of the company and inevitably the quality or degree of that closeness will require careful examination on a case by case basis. That examination might show engagement by the director of the kind or at the threshold described by Finkelstein J in Root Quality at [146] (as earlier discussed) which would undoubtedly establish personal liability in the director or a less stringent degree of closeness (perhaps described as “reckless indifference” to the company's unlawful civil wrong causing harm), yet sufficiently close to demonstrate conduct of the director going beyond simply guiding or directing a commercial course and engaging in (perhaps vigorously) decision-making within the company as a director.
351 Ultimately, the question, on the facts, is what was the conduct of the director said to go beyond the proper role of director so as to descend into the realm of “close personal involvement”?
462 Trafalgar submitted that Mr Prior is, and was, directly and closely involved in the conduct of Boss’s business, such as to be its “mind and will”. Mr Prior is, and was, Boss’s sole director and company secretary. According to Trafalgar, he is, and was, also the sole “owner and shareholder” of Boss through a related company Beaumont Products Pty Ltd (Beaumont Products). A company search shows that Beaumont Products holds all the issued shares in Boss. Beaumont Products does not trade. Mr Prior’s evidence was that Beaumont Products holds the shares in Boss as the trustee of a family trust. A company search shows that Mr Prior, in turn, holds all the issued shares in Beaumont Products Pty Ltd. He is also that company’s sole director and shareholder.
463 Trafalgar also relied on a handwritten organisational chart in Mr Prior’s notebook in which he described himself as “General Manager” overseeing other, identified management functions within Boss, although the purpose and function of that note is unclear. Whether it accurately represents or represented, Boss’s actual management structure, at any time, is also unclear. In any event, in their defence Boss and Mr Prior admit that, at all material times, Mr Prior was “the managing and controlling mind” of Boss.
464 In closing submissions, Trafalgar submitted that:
… the evidence indicates that Mr Prior has been directly and personally involved in Boss’ acts of selling, supplying and offering the Boss Device to customers in Australia, in the provision of instructional information for the use of the Boss Device, and in the advertising and demonstration of the Boss [Device] to customers.
465 The reference, in that quotation, to the Boss Device is to the Fyrebox device. The evidence cited by Trafalgar does not fully support that submission. The cited evidence certainly supports the proposition that Mr Prior was personally involved in supplying samples of the Fyrebox device to customers. And, as I have discussed, Mr Prior was involved in promoting Boss’s products, and soliciting business for Boss, such as at the Speedpanel meeting and the Seltor meeting. There is also evidence that Mr Prior was involved in design work for Boss. He also made decisions about trade mark applications. However, these activities were not carried out by Mr Prior in his own right. They were carried out as an officer, and as the servant or agent, of Boss itself. Contrary to Trafalgar’s submission, this is not a case where Boss was the alter ego for Mr Prior.
466 The fact that Mr Prior is and was the sole director and company secretary of Boss, and in a position to exercise control over Boss, is not disputed. In cross-examination, Mr Prior said that he was the person responsible for “the ultimate running of the company” and that “as the director [he carried] the ultimate responsibility for the actions of the company”. Specifically in relation to the period from November 2015 to May 2017, Mr Prior said that he was “the person with the highest level of responsibility in the organisation”.
467 When Mr Prior was cross-examined about the running of Boss (specifically, in 2015), the following exchange took place:
… [Y]ou were the person who is making the ultimate decision for running that company?---I’m not sure what you mean by ultimate. I didn’t make every decision.
Well, you said before when it comes to products you have the sign off. You’re the ultimate decision-maker. Correct? You said that before. Remember that?---No. I don’t remember that. By law I’m the – as a director I’m responsible for every decision the company takes, but I don’t make every decision in the company. There’s teams of people who have areas of responsibility. They make decisions. I carry the risk, the responsibility of the actions of the company. I understand that. I don’t make every decision day to day.
Well, let’s just go back to 2015 when there’s the approximately six or so people working there?---Mmm.
When it comes to – when it came to actually running the company and making decisions about how the company was to be run, what business it was to do, that was your decision to make, wasn’t it?---Not all decisions. No. We had managers who looked after areas.
Well, I’m talking about running – actually making decisions to run the company?---Mr Fox, I don’t understand what you mean by running.
I ..... All right. Well - - -?---You asked before if I made operational decisions. No. The operations manager made operational decisions. I didn’t make all sales decisions. The sales manager made those decisions.
So if there was a new customer, that is, you were going to supply new products to a customer, do you say that you would not have been involved in making decisions about supplying that customer with new products?---I didn’t say that.
Right. But you were involved with those types of decisions, weren’t you?---I didn’t say that either.
Would you say – if we go back to 2015, would you have described yourself to people as a hands-on manager of the company?---Not words I would use. No.
So you’re uncomfortable with me putting a question to you that is were you the person who was responsible for running the company?---I’m not uncomfortable with the question. No.
Can you answer it as yes or no?---I’m the responsible person. Doesn’t mean I make all the decisions.
Right. So back in 2015 you were the person responsible for running the company. Correct?---As a director. Yes.
Right. And it remained that way since, hasn’t it?---I’m still the director. Yes.
Well, you’re the managing director?---If you look at the company search, I’m still a director.
Well - - -?---I carry the responsibility.
But you – earlier you said that you call yourself either the managing director or the CEO. Correct?---Correct. I did say that.
Right. And there’s nobody else in the company which has a higher title than that, is there?---No.
468 This exchange forms part of the evidence on which Trafalgar relied to support the submission quoted at [464] above. But this evidence rises no higher than the fact that Mr Prior was fulfilling his role, and functioning, as a director in the conduct of Boss’s business and affairs.
469 To adapt the question posed by the Full Court in JR Consulting at [351]: on the facts, what was the conduct, in the present case, that went beyond Mr Prior’s role as a director of Boss and descended into the realm of close personal involvement in Boss’s alleged infringement? The answer to that question is: there was no conduct by which Mr Prior went beyond his role as a director. The supply of the Fyrebox device was Boss’s act, and its act alone.
470 For the foregoing reasons, and assuming that infringement by Boss had been established, I would not have found that Mr Prior was personally liable for that infringement.
Unjustifiable threats and contravention of s 18 of the ACL
471 Section 128(1) of the Patents Act provides:
128 Application for relief from unjustified threats
(1) Where a person, by means of circulars, advertisements or otherwise, threatens a person with infringement proceedings, or other similar proceedings, a person aggrieved may apply to a prescribed court, or to another court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the application, for:
(a) a declaration that the threats are unjustifiable; and
(b) an injunction against the continuance of the threats; and
(c) the recovery of any damages sustained by the applicant as a result of the threats.
472 Section 18(1) to the ACL provides:
18 Misleading or deceptive conduct
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
473 In September 2018, Trafalgar sent letters to participants in the building industry, informing them of its claimed patent rights. The letters were substantially in the same form. A representative sample is the letter sent on 7 September 2018 to John Groom at Hutchinson Builders. Hutchinson Builders is one of Australia’s largest privately-owned construction companies. It completes hundreds of construction projects around Australia every year. At the time the letter was sent, Mr Groom was the person at Hutchinson Builders who was responsible for fire compliance matters:
Dear John
Notice of patent rights- Innovation Patent No. 2017101778
You may be aware that Trafalgar committed substantial investment in developing its innovative FIREBOX range of passive fire protection products.
Given the innovative nature of these products, Trafalgar applied for patent protection, and has had granted and certified a patent for the method of constructing a fire barrier using a product with the features of the FYREBOX Slab-Mounted product.
Trafalgar became aware of the supply of product by BOSS Fire & Safety Pty Ltd, which BOSS calls the BOSS FyreBox Multi Service Cable & Pipe Transit. It is our firm belief that when the BOSS product is used to construct a fire barrier during building that use of the BOSS product will be use of the method protected by the claims of Trafalgar's patent.
Therefore supply of the BOSS product is a supply which infringes our patent rights.
Also, the use of the method of construction protected by the Trafalgar patent (eg by installation of the Boss product on Hutchinson Builders sites) will also infringe our patent rights.
Trafalgar sought to address these concerns with BOSS last month, but to no avail.
On 30 August, Trafalgar issued Federal Court proceedings against BOSS, alleging that BOSS has and will continue to infringe the patent by supply of the BOSS product.
We are seeking an injunction restraining further supply of the BOSS product, as well as compensation for the past supply of the product.
This letter is intended to provide you with information regarding the Trafalgar patent and we stress that Trafalgar is not intending to assert its patent rights against your use of the method protected by the Trafalgar patent. Rather we are addressing the infringement at the point of supply of infringing products by our Court action against BOSS.
If you would like any further information on this matter, please feel free to contact me.
474 The letter was on Trafalgar’s letterhead and signed by Mr Rakic as Managing Director of the Trafalgar Group.
475 On 10 September 2018, Boss’s solicitors wrote to Trafalgar’s solicitors concerning the letter that had been sent. Amongst other things, Boss’s solicitors said:
This letter contains unqualified assertions that the supply and use of our client's product will infringe your client's patent. In particular, this letter states:
Therefore supply of the BOSS product is a supply which infringes our patent rights.
Also, the use of the method of construction protected by the Trafalgar patent (eg by installation of the Boss product on Multiplex sites) will also infringe our patent rights.
We note that the letter indicates that “Trafalgar is not intending to assert its patent rights against your use of the method protected by the Trafalgar patent.” However your clients have not offered any undertaking not do so. In the absence of any such undertaking, your letter can clearly be perceived as a threat of infringement action against the recipients of these letter.
Furthermore, the unqualified assertions of infringement (which our client regards as misleading) are plainly calculated to have the effect of diverting business away from our client.
(Emphasis in original.)
476 After stating that Trafalgar’s conduct in distributing the letter constituted the making of unjustifiable threats, contravention of s 18(1) of the ACL, and possible unlawful interference with Boss’s contractual rights with its customers, the letter from Boss’s solicitors continued by seeking certain undertakings, including an undertaking to be given to Boss and recipients of Trafalgar’s letter that Trafalgar would not threaten or commence legal proceedings against any recipient in respect of the patent.
477 Trafalgar’s solicitors responded by letter dated 24 September 2018, stating that the demanded undertakings were not required because, in its letter, Trafalgar had made clear that it did not intend to “issue proceedings for infringement against the users of your client’s product”. Trafalgar’s solicitors said that this fact was also made clear in correspondence between the solicitors.
478 There are a number of things to be said about the Trafalgar letter.
479 First, the letter contains a statement, expressed as a firm belief, that, when the Fyrebox device is used to construct a fire barrier, then that use of the device will be the use of the method claimed in the patent.
480 This statement is a headline statement. It is, to say the least, misleading. It is simply not the case that each and every use of the Fyrebox device to construct a fire barrier is a use of the patent method. The Fyrebox device can be used to construct a fire barrier in numerous ways that do not take the steps of the claimed method. If it were necessary to decide the point, I do not accept that Trafalgar was ignorant of that fact at the time it sent the letter. The fact that the statement is unqualified is important. No reference is made in the letter to, for example, using the device in a particular way, such as in accordance with the Fyrebox installation instructions. It is a generalised, unqualified, and incorrect assertion as to the extent of Trafalgar’s patent rights. The statement is no less misleading because it is couched in terms of Trafalgar’s “firm belief”. Indeed, the expression of that “firmness” would only have served to reinforce, in the mind of a recipient, the correctness of the assertion being made.
481 Secondly, the headline statement is followed by the statement:
Therefore, supply of the BOSS product is a supply which infringes our patent rights.
482 This statement is expressed as an unqualified conclusion, and would be understood as such. It is based on the headline statement. It is equally misleading. To start with, the conclusion does not follow from the premise, for the reasons I have given. Further, and importantly, the findings I have made above on the validity of the claims of the patent mean that the unqualified statement of infringement that Trafalgar made in its letter is false because, as events have transpired, Trafalgar does not, and did not, have the rights it asserted.
483 I do not accept that Trafalgar’s use of “alleging” in the Trafalgar letter would have been taken as conveying that the lawfulness of Boss’s conduct was, realistically, contestable and that Trafalgar’s claims against Boss existed only in the realm of mere allegation, as Trafalgar’s closing submissions seem to suggest. Trafalgar also took the trouble to state that its patent had been “granted and certified”. In all likelihood, the reference to the patent having been “certified” would have conveyed to the recipients that there could be no doubt about the legitimacy of Trafalgar’s assertion of patent rights.
484 Thirdly, the Trafalgar letter makes this statement:
Also, the use of the method of construction protected by the Trafalgar patent (eg by installation of the Boss product on Hutchinson Builders sites) will also infringe our patent rights.
485 This statement is directed, unequivocally, to the use of the Fyrebox device in accordance with the method of the patent. As events have transpired, this statement is also false, given my findings on the validity of the claims of the patent. But, importantly, it is, according to its own terms, a separate, additional, and different statement to the headline statement. It serves to highlight that, in making the headline statement, Trafalgar was asserting rights of a breadth it never had.
486 For these reasons, I am satisfied that Boss has established that, by sending the letter—which was undoubtedly sent in the course of trade or commerce—Trafalgar engaged in conduct that contravened s 18(1) of the ACL.
487 I am in no doubt that Trafalgar sent the letter to warn off those whom it regarded as likely purchasers, or influencers of purchasers, of the Fyrebox device so that those persons would not purchase, or recommend the purchase of, the product or have any dealings with Boss in respect of that product. The letter states that Trafalgar was seeking relief to restrain further supply of the Fyrebox device. This was a clear and intended signal to likely purchasers and other recipients that any dealings with Boss in respect of the Fyrebox device would be in jeopardy and at a real risk of interruption by the action that Trafalgar was taking against Boss. It was also a clear signal that such dealings would likely be viewed unfavourably by Trafalgar in future dealings by the recipients with it.
488 There is evidence that the Trafalgar letter had its intended effect, and has resulted in loss to Boss. An example is provided by the events that followed the sending of the letter to Hutchinson Builders.
489 In early 2018, Boss promoted the Fyrebox device to Hutchinson Builders. Hutchinson Builders expressed interest in using the device in a large building project in Plummer Street at Port Melbourne. Meetings between Boss and Hutchinson Builders took place throughout 2018 to advance this prospect.
490 Meetings also took place between Boss and USG Boral. USG Boral was the supplier of a wall system to the Plummer Street project. As it happens, Trafalgar also sent its letter to USG Boral.
491 By August 2018, negotiations between Boss and Hutchinson Builders had reached an advanced stage with respect to the supply of the Fyrebox device for use in the Plummer Street project. The prospect existed that Hutchinson Builders might also use the Fyrebox device in its other residential projects. Boss had also worked with USG Boral to obtain fire testing of the Fyrebox device with USG Boral’s wall system. An initial approval report was issued on 21 August 2018. USG Boral had expressed interest in supplying the Fyrebox device as part of its own branded product offering.
492 However, in early September 2018, following the sending of the Trafalgar letter, negotiations between Boss and Hutchinson Builders, and Boss and USG Boral, came to an abrupt and complete end. When Mr Bacon, who was Boss’s National Sales Manager, became aware of the Trafalgar letter, he telephoned Mr Groom, expressing his hope that the Trafalgar letter would not “impact on the Plummer Street project”. Mr Groom’s response was:
I’ve spoken to our legal team and we don’t want to get involved in any legal issues with you or Trafalgar. The letter says we could get sued if we use your box. We’d prefer to stay away from it, as it could have additional costs for Hutchinsons.
493 According to Mr Bacon, Mr Groom expressed disappointment at this outcome because Hutchinson Builders had spent $30,000 on re-design work to accommodate the Fyrebox device. In the result, Boss has not supplied the Fyrebox device to Hutchinson Builders.
494 Boss has also lost contact with USG Boral. Mr Prior said that, on several occasions after September 2018, he has tried to telephone the person with whom Boss was dealing at USG Boral, Daniel Lim, to continue discussions on its use of the Fyrebox device. Mr Prior said that he has been unable to make contact with Mr Lim and that his voicemail messages have not been returned.
495 I am satisfied that, as a result of Trafalgar sending the letter, Boss has lost the opportunity to supply the Fyrebox device to potential customers. Instantiations of that lost opportunity are provided by Boss’s dealings with Hutchinson Builders and USG Boral. Boss has thereby suffered loss and damage.
496 The remaining question is whether, by sending the letter, Trafalgar made unjustified threats that would engage s 128(1) of the Patents Act.
497 The Trafalgar letter states:
This letter is intended to provide you with information regarding the Trafalgar patent and we stress that Trafalgar is not intending to assert its patent rights against your use of the method protected by the Trafalgar patent. Rather we are addressing the infringement at the point of supply of infringing products by our Court action against BOSS.
498 Trafalgar relies on this statement. It submitted that, on its face, the letter did not contain any threat to commence legal proceedings against the recipients of the letter, with the consequence that s 128(1) is not engaged: JMVB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Camoflag Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1474; 67 IPR 68 at [209]; Damorgold Pty Ltd v Blindware Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1552; 354 ALR 1 at [409]; Liberation Developments Pty Ltd v Lomax Group Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1180; 144 IPR 413 at [137], [141] – [142]. On the other hand, Boss relied on the reasoning in CQMS Pty Ltd v Bradken Resources Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 847; 120 IPR 44 at [170] and [186] to contend that the Trafalgar letter contained an implicit threat to commence infringement proceedings against the recipients
499 I am not persuaded that the Trafalgar letter contained a threat that engaged s 128(1) of the Patents Act. This question is to be considered objectively. So considered, the letter is sufficiently clear that Boss is the object of Trafalgar’s complaint, not Boss’s customers, and that Trafalgar’s court proceedings were and, impliedly, would be, against Boss. I reach this finding notwithstanding that, as relayed by Mr Groom to Mr Bacon, Hutchinson Builders interpreted the letter as a threat that it might be sued.
500 This is not to say, however, that recipients would not be warned off. As I have said, the Trafalgar letter was a clear and intended signal to likely purchasers and others that any dealings by them with Boss in respect of the Fyrebox device would be in jeopardy and at real risk of interruption by the action that Trafalgar was taking against Boss. It was also a clear signal that such dealings would likely be viewed unfavourably by Trafalgar in future dealings with it. But those signals stopped short of threatening legal proceedings against the recipients themselves.
Introduction
501 On 24 November 2015, Trafalgar (then, Fire Containment) filed the 748 application for the word FIREBOX. This is the priority date for the purposes of this application. Two days later, on 26 November 2015, Boss filed Trade Mark Application No 1737702 for the word FYREBOX (the 702 application). Then, approximately one year later, on 29 November 2016, Trafalgar (then, Fire Containment) filed the 214 application for the composite mark which comprises the word FYREBOX in stylised form and a stylised flame device (the FYREBOX composite mark):
502 This sequence of events sets the backdrop for the trade mark appeals which, as I noted earlier, concern the 748 application (NSD 641 of 2019) and the 214 application (NSD 1242 of 2019).
503 In the Trade Marks Office, Boss opposed both applications. It failed in its opposition to the 748 application, but succeeded in its opposition to the 214 application.
504 In the 748 application, Trafalgar seeks registration in Classes 6, 17, and 19 of the following goods:
Class 6:
Building products of metal for preventing the spread of fire
Class 17:
Products and materials for resisting fire and for preventing the spread of fire, for use in the building and construction industry; fire and smoke stopping products used to protect openings for services including collars, wraps, clamps, boxes, dampers and cable transits
Class 19:
Intumescent and non-metal materials and products for resisting fire and preventing the spread of fire, for use in the building and construction industry
505 In the Trade Marks Office, Boss opposed the 748 application on the grounds provided by ss 41, 42(b), 58, 59, 60, 62, and 62A of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (the Trade Marks Act). As I noted earlier, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks found that Boss failed to establish the grounds of opposition on which it relied, and directed that the FIREBOX mark proceed to registration.
506 In its notice of appeal in NSD 641 of 2019, Boss invokes the grounds provided by ss 41, 42(b), 58, 59, 60, and 62A. Boss opened its appeal on all grounds but, by the time of closing submissions, confined its case to a contest as to who, between itself and Trafalgar, is the owner of FIREBOX as a trade mark in respect of the relevant goods.
507 In this connection, it is to be noted that only a person who claims to be the owner of a trade mark can apply for registration of the mark under the Trade Marks Act: s 27(1)(a). However, s 58 of the Trade Marks Act recognises that, even though a trade mark application might be supported by a claim of ownership under s 27(1)(a), the registration of the mark can be opposed on the ground that the applicant is not, in law, the owner of the mark.
508 This is, now, the essential ground of opposition to registration of the 748 application. It concerns the question of when and in what circumstances prior use of a sign (which is said to constitute the trade mark) can defeat a claim to ownership that is made in a trade mark application.
509 In the opposition proceeding below, the delegate noted that there was no dispute between the parties that the goods specified in the 748 application are the “same kind of thing” as those the subject of Boss’s claimed prior trade mark use: 2019 ATMO 43 at [44]. The delegate also found that there is a total impression of resemblance between FIREBOX and FYREBOX such that they are appropriately regarded as substantially identical. Neither matter is in dispute in the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019.
510 In the 214 application, Trafalgar seeks registration in Class 9 for the following goods:
Fire control apparatus and equipment; apparatus and equipment for suppressing fires; fire extinguishing apparatus, equipment and installations; fire protection apparatus, equipment and installations
511 In the Trade Marks Office, Boss opposed the 214 application on a number of grounds—ss 42, 44, 58, 59, 60, 62, and 62A of the Trade Marks Act. The delegate noted that the opposition to the 748 application had been determined earlier in Fire Containment’s favour (as the trade mark applicant), but that the opposition was currently under appeal (in NSD 641 of 2019). The delegate explained that, for that reason, the examination of the 702 application had been, and remained, deferred pending the outcome of the appeal. The delegate said that this was because the 748 application was an impediment to registration of the 702 application, by reason of s 44 of the Trade Marks Act: 2019 ATMO 107 at [13].
512 The delegate nevertheless proceeded to determine the opposition to the 214 application, even though the “potential consequence” of the 748 application proceeding to registration was that the 702 application would, itself, be refused and no longer pose a bar to the 214 application on the s 44(1) ground: 2019 ATMO 107 at [14] – [15].
513 As matters transpired, the delegate determined the 214 application adversely to Fire Containment (as the trade mark applicant). The delegate concluded that, even though the 702 application had been deferred, and its ultimate fate was uncertain, it nevertheless blocked the registration of the 214 application by dint of s 44(1): 2019 ATMO 107 at [27].
514 The opposition to the 214 application was thus determined without knowing the outcome of the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019 or the ultimate fate of the 702 application. The wisdom of determining the opposition to the 214 application in those circumstances is open to question.
515 In the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019, the parties’ closing submissions were directed to the ground of opposition under s 44(1) of the Trade Marks Act, no doubt because this was the ground to which the delegate had directed his attention. The parties addressed two primary issues. The first was whether s 44(1) of the Trade Marks Act applies to the case at hand—the contest being whether the marks of the 702 application and the 214 application are substantially identical or deceptively similar. There was no contest that the applications are in respect of similar goods.
516 The second matter was whether, if s 44(1) does apply, the 214 application should, nevertheless, proceed to registration on the basis of either s 44(3)(a) or s 44(3)(b) of the Trade Marks Act. In closing submissions, Trafalgar made clear that its primary case, in that regard, was based on s 44(3)(b), particularly having regard to its contention that the 702 application would never proceed to registration in light of the 748 application the subject of the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019.
517 As I explain below, the focus on s 44 of the Trade Marks Act in the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019 is, ultimately, misdirected and without practical significance, given the outcome of the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019.
518 An “appeal” from a decision of the Registrar, including in opposition proceedings, involves an exercise of the original jurisdiction of the Court, not its appellate jurisdiction: Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020; 93 FCR 365 at [32]. In the case of an opposition, the Court determines, by the exercise of judicial power, whether the opposed trade mark application should succeed on its merits. It is not concerned with whether the Registrar discharged her duties, or arrived at her decision, according to law: Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 at 126. Thus, the appeal proceeds as a hearing de novo in which the Court approaches the matter “afresh and without undue concern as to the ratio decidendi of the Registrar”. Rowntree plc v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1988) 90 FLR 398 at 403. In conducting such a hearing, the Court proceeds on the evidence adduced before it. That evidence may be different to the evidence that was before the Registrar when making her decision.
Trade mark ownership: relevant principles
519 Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act provides:
A trade mark is a sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any other person.
520 The common law recognised trade marks as a form of incorporeal property, based on their public use. In GE Trade Mark [1973] RPC 297 (GE), Lord Diplock explained (at 325 – 326):
The right of property in a trade mark had special characteristics. One, which it shared with patents and with copyright, was that it was a monopoly, that is to say, it was a right to restrain other persons from using the mark. But it was an adjunct of the goodwill of business and incapable of separate existence dissociated from that goodwill. To be capable of being the subject-matter of property a trade mark had to be distinctive, that is to say, it had to be recognisable by a purchaser of goods to which it was affixed as indicating that they were of the same origin as other goods which bore the same mark and whose quality had engendered goodwill. Property in a trade mark could therefore only be acquired by public use of it as such by the proprietor and was lost by disuse. The property was assignable, transmissible and divisible, but only along with the goodwill of the business in which it was used.
521 However, modern trade marks legislation, including the Trade Marks Act, recognises that ownership of a trade mark can be acquired even if the mark has not been publicly used.
522 In each case—whether the mark has been used or is unused—ownership is based on local authorship. In this context, authorship means the origination or first adoption of the mark as and for a trade mark: The Shell Company of Australia Limited v Rohm and Haas Company (1949) 78 CLR 601 (Shell) at 628.
523 For unused marks, ownership rests on: the combined effect of authorship of the mark; the intention to use it in relation to goods or services; and applying for registration: Shell at 627.
524 For marks that have been publicly used, ownership rests on the combined effect of authorship and public use of the mark.
525 In Moorgate Tobacco Co. Limited v Philip Morris Limited (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 (Moorgate), Deane J said (at 432):
The prior use of a trade mark which may suffice, at least if combined with local authorship, to establish that a person has acquired in Australia the statutory status of “proprietor” of the mark, is public use in Australia of the mark as a trade mark, that is to say, a use of the mark in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connexion in the course of trade between the goods with respect to which the mark is used and that person: see, generally, Shell Co. of Australia Ltd v. Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd.; Re Registered Trade Mark “Yanx”; Ex parte Amalgamated Tobacco Corporation Ltd.; and the definition of “trade mark” in s. 6(1) of the Trade Marks Act. The requisite use of the mark need not be sufficient to establish a local reputation and there is authority to support the proposition that evidence of but slight use in Australia will suffice to protect a person who is the owner and user overseas of a mark which another is seeking to appropriate by registration under the Trade Marks Act.
(Footnotes omitted.)
526 It is important to emphasise that, in law, use of a trade mark means use of the mark in the course of trade.
527 In Australian trade mark law, the “course of trade” has a broad meaning, consistent with “for the purposes of trade”: W.D. & H.O. Wills (Australia) Ltd v Rothmans Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 182 at 191.
528 When discussing such use in Moorgate, Deane J said (at 433):
The Court was referred to a large number of cases and to some administrative decisions in which consideration has been given to what constitutes a use or user of a trade mark for the purposes of the statutory notion of proprietorship of the mark before registration. The cases establish that it is not necessary that there be an actual dealing in goods bearing the trade mark before there can be a local use of the mark as a trade mark. It may suffice that imported goods which have not actually reached Australia have been offered for sale in Australia under the mark (Re Registered Trade Mark “Yanx”; Ex parte Amalgamated Tobacco Corporation Ltd. or that the mark has been used in an advertisement of the goods in the course of trade: Shell Co. of Australia v. Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd. In such cases, however, it is possible to identify an actual trade or offer to trade in the goods bearing the mark or an existing intention to offer or supply goods bearing the mark in trade.
529 Moorgate concerned an application by the respondent (Philip Morris) for registration, under the Trade Marks Act, of the trade mark GOLDEN LIGHTS in respect of tobacco and tobacco products. The appellant (Moorgate) claimed that, at the time of that application, it was the proprietor, in Australia, of the trade mark KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS which, it said, deprived Philip Morris of proprietorship of the GOLDEN LIGHTS mark in respect of the relevant goods.
530 Moorgate’s claim to proprietorship of KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS was based on prior use—namely, the delivery, in Australia, on at least three occasions, of packets of cigarettes and associated advertising material displaying the name KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS. The delivery took place in the course of, and for the purposes of, nascent negotiations between Moorgate’s predecessor in business (Loew’s) and Philip Morris as to the possibility, at some indefinite future time, of Philip Morris entering into a licence to manufacture and market a product that would be an extension of an existing product line. There was, already, a licence agreement in place between Loew’s and Philip Morris, but it did not cover the possible new product under discussion. At the time of delivery of the packs of cigarettes and advertising material, there was no intention on Loew’s part that it would itself trade in the new product in Australia. Moreover, no decision had been made as to what name would be used for the goods, should Loew’s and Philip Morris enter into a new licence. The negotiations stalled when Loew’s sold its business to one of Philip Morris’ competitors.
531 When discussing the nature of the prior use relied on in that case to support a claim to proprietorship of KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS, Deane J said (at 433 – 434):
In the present case, there was not, at any relevant time, any actual trade or offer to trade in goods bearing the mark in Australia or any existing intention to offer or supply such goods in trade. There was no local use of the mark as a trade mark at all; there were merely preliminary discussions and negotiations about whether the mark would be so used. The cigarette packets and associated advertising material were delivered to Philip Morris to demonstrate what Loew’s was marketing in other countries and what Philip Morris might market, under licence from Loew’s, if it decided to manufacture and trade in the goods in Australia and to use the mark locally at some future time. There was no relevant trade in the goods in Australia and the delivery of the cigarette packets and associated material to Philip Morris did not, in the circumstances, constitute a relevant user or use in Australia of the mark “KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS” for the purpose of indicating or so as to indicate a connexion in the course of trade between the new cigarettes and Loew’s. It follows that Moorgate has failed to establish proprietorship of the mark “KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS” either at the time Philip Morris applied to register the mark “GOLDEN LIGHTS” or at the time when the licence agreement expired.
(Footnote omitted.)
532 In Settef SpA v Riv-Oland Marble Co (Vic) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 402, the plaintiff (Settef), an overseas company, sued the defendant for infringement of the registered trade mark RIV-OLAND. It was met with various defences, including that, at the time it had applied for registration, Settef was not the proprietor of the RIV-OLAND mark. The defendant also claimed that the mark should be removed from the Register for non-use. Settef sought to support its registration by reference to various activities in which it had engaged.
533 The trial judge, McGarvie J, explored the nature of trade mark use as discussed in the authorities. With respect to the evidence before him, his Honour found that some activities in which Settef had engaged did not constitute trade mark use, while other activities in which it had engaged did constitute trade mark use, of RIV-OLAND.
534 As to the former, McGarvie J (at 417 – 418) said of certain early activities:
… I consider that it follows from the authorities that a mark is used as a trade mark only if it is used with a view to facilitating or promoting the operation of a trading channel which in a business sense had already been opened to Australia. The mark must be used for the purpose of trade: W D & H O Wills (Australia) Ltd v Rothmans Ltd (1956) 94 CLR 182 at 191. The forwarding of samples and brochures is not sufficient to indicate that Settef was ready and willing to fulfil such orders as it received from Australia. The purpose of these items may well have been to ascertain whether there was a market in Australia sufficient for it to be worthwhile for Settef to export here. Use of the mark in such preliminary activities would not be use in the course of trade: Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 59 ALJR 77 at 83.
535 However, McGarvie J was satisfied that subsequent activities, in which Settef had engaged, did constitute trade mark use of RIV-OLAND. For example, in the context of considering the non-use case, his Honour said (at 439):
In my opinion the plaintiff made use of its trade mark in Australia through its transactions with J & P Applicators. Settef was ready and willing to supply Riv-Oland material to the Australian market through the trading channel to J & P Applicators. In the first consignment the mark was used in relation to the material by being used in the invoice and by being marked on the drum. It was a use in the course of trade although the drum was purchased to make samples to show to prospective customers and although only one drum of the material was sold: see the Thunderbird case (1974) 131 CLR 592 at 600-2. Sending the samples, brochures and catalogues to a trader who had agreed to distribute the product was also a use of the trade mark. In my opinion the use of the mark in the invoice and upon the three small tins supplied free of charge in the second consignment was a use in relation to the plaintiff’s goods in the course of trade. It was a use for the purpose of trade: Shanahan, Australian Trade Mark Law and Practice, p 27.
536 In Oakley, Inc v Franchise China Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 105; 58 IPR 452 Drummond J observed (at [29]):
29. The term “trade” in the context of the phrase in s17 the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) (sic) is undoubtedly a wide one. It encompasses a wider range of commercial transactions than the actual sale and purchase of marked goods. It has been held that “a use of a mark in an advertisement of goods is a use in the course of trade, and is of course a use in relation to the goods advertised”: The Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 422. The use of a mark on goods in conducting investigations as to whether there might be a market for those goods is unlikely to be a use of the mark in the course of trade: that will generally be the use of a mark in activities preparatory to the commencement of a course of trade. See Settef SpA v Riv-Oland Marble Co (Vic) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 IPR 402 at 417 - 418. But where the owner of a mark is able to show that it is committed to supplying marked goods to persons prepared to purchase them, activities preliminary to the actual commencement of selling the goods, such as the distribution of marked samples and marked brochures to agents, so that they could show them to prospective customers in soliciting business will probably amount to the use of the mark in the course of the trade: see Settef at 439; Woolly Bull Enterprises Pty Ltd v Reynolds (2001) 51 IPR 149 at 157 and cf Buying Systems (Australia) Pty Ltd v Studio Srl (1995) 30 IPR 517.
537 These elaborations are helpful in understanding the breadth of circumstances in which trade mark use can occur, but they do not set the metes and bounds of the activities that might be sufficient to constitute trade mark use in a given case. Each case requires an evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the use in question can properly be seen to be in the course of trade.
538 The preceding discussion assumes that the sign in question is being used with trade mark significance, in the sense of indicating the origin of goods or services to which the mark is applied. As the plurality in E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 15; 241 CLR 144 said (at [41]):
41 …Distinguishing goods of a registered owner from the goods of others and indicating a connection in the course of trade between the goods and the registered owner are essential characteristics of a trade mark.
539 In this connection, the plurality approved the following statement of the Full Court in Coca-Cola Company v All-Fect Distributors Ltd [1999] FCA 1721; 96 FCR 107 (at [19]):
… Use “as a trade mark” is use of the mark as a “badge of origin” in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applies the mark to the goods: see Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326 at 341, 351. That is the concept embodied in the definition of “trade mark” in s 17 — a sign used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else.
540 This is another aspect of trade mark use which calls for the exercise of an evaluative judgment.
Boss’s case on the 748 application: an overview
541 Boss’s case is that it has used the word FIREBOX, and then FYREBOX, as a trade mark in relation to three cable and pipe transit boxes—namely: a product supplied by Abesco Fire Limited (formerly, Abesco Limited) (Abesco), which Abesco sold under the name FIRECLAMP (the Abesco product); the Pass-It (from around 2014); and the Fyrebox device (from 2016).
542 Boss’s claim to ownership of the FIREBOX mark is based on its use of FIREBOX, and then FYREBOX, in 2014 and 2015 before the priority date of the 748 application (24 November 2015). The history of this use, as recorded by Mr Prior, is as follows.
543 In 2010, Boss began importing the Abesco product. Trafalgar also imported the Abesco product. On 29 April 2010, Trafalgar obtained registration (with effect from 7 August 2009) of a composite mark which includes the word FYRECLAMP in stylised form and a stylised flame device.
544 Mr Prior’s evidence is that he was concerned that this registration might prevent Boss from using Abesco’s own name, FIRECLAMP, for the product. (There is some suggestion in Trafalgar’s evidence that FIRECLAMP was the name that Fire Containment adopted, not Abesco. I do not need to resolve that difference). Mr Prior said that, although he considered using FIREBOX (amongst other names) at this time, he decided to use, instead, the name Intu-CLAMP. He said that he chose “Intu-” because it was an abbreviation for “intumescent”. He said that he chose “-CLAMP” because it was part of the name that Abesco used for the Abesco product, and it “referenced the operation of the product”.
545 On 25 September 2012, Boss obtained registration of “Intu-CLAMP” as a trade mark, with effect from 22 December 2011.
546 Sometime in 2013, Mr Prior determined that Intu-CLAMP was not a good name for the Abesco product. He said that he decided to use FIREBOX instead. He said that, from 2013, he began to use FIREBOX in relation to the Abesco product when discussing it with customers. He also said that he used FIREBOX, later, from “around” 2014, when he commenced to promote the Pass-It.
547 Mr Prior said that, in about May 2015, he decided to use FYREBOX rather than FIREBOX. He said that he adopted this variation to facilitate trade mark registration (given that registration of FIREBOX might face difficulty because it “comprised two common words joined together”). He said that, up to this time, much of his use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX was “oral”.
548 By the time of closing submissions, Boss confined its case on its prior use of FIREBOX and FYREBOX, in 2014 and 2015, to certain emails; certain aural uses; and certain documentary uses, expressed as “the Wormald data sheet”, “the product list”, and “the CPG documents”.
549 The evidence, particularly the evidence of aural use, is not always clear as to whether FIREBOX or FYREBOX was used on the occasions in question. Although somewhat discomforting, this lack of clarity is not of great moment. There is no difference in the pronunciation of the two words. Further, as I have said, the parties proceeded on the basis that, when used visually and aurally, FIREBOX and FYREBOX are, for trade mark purposes, substantially identical.
550 On 22 July 2014, Mr Prior sent an email to Mr Stephen Burton of Ferm Engineering. The email was a response to a request by Mr Burton for “slab/floor tests on these sealants …”. The evidence does not identify the sealants to which Mr Burton’s inquiry was directed.
551 In his response, Mr Prior said:
Unfortunately not, only wall seals (penetrations and linear gaps). Although these are the guys sampling our fire box cable transits for slabs, we have plenty of test data on them so no problems there. …
552 I am not persuaded that, objectively considered, the use in the email of the words “fire box” is trade mark use of FIREBOX. First, the use of “fire box” in the email is equivocal. It does not clearly show “fire box” functioning as a trade mark. Objectively, those words are equally likely to convey, and to be understood as, a purely descriptive reference to the nature and purpose of the cable transits. Secondly, the use, in any event, does not appear to be a use in the course of trade in relation to the supply of cable transits. The email is no more than a communication in relation to the availability (or otherwise) of test results.
553 On 19 February 2015, Mr Prior sent an email to Mr Mark Falkiner, then from Wormald. It is convenient to consider this email in the context of the Wormald data sheet, discussed below.
554 In submissions, Boss relied, principally, on conversations which Mr Prior had with Mr Ramunddal at the Seltor meeting; with Mr Visser and Mr Bacon at the Speedpanel meeting; with Mr Talbot (the Managing Director of Verified Pty Ltd); with Mr Halliday (one of the Managing Directors of Airport Consulting Group Pty Ltd); with Mr Bradley (a Construction Manager at Paladin Group); and with Mr Falkiner. Once again, it is convenient to consider the conversation with Mr Falkiner in the context of the Wormald data sheet. It is also convenient to consider the conversation with Mr Bradley when dealing with the CPG documents.
Conversation with Mr Ramunddal
555 Mr Prior’s conversation with Mr Ramunddal at the Seltor meeting (which took place in September 2015) can be put aside immediately. Although I accept that the Pass-It Version 2 was discussed with reference to the name FIREBOX or FYREBOX, the meeting, and hence the conversation on which Boss relies, took place in Norway. This evidence is not sufficient to establish trade mark use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX in the course of, or for the purposes of, trade in Australia. Boss did not suggest that s 228 of the Trade Marks Act (trade mark use in export trade) has any relevant application in the present case.
Conversation with Mr Visser and Mr Bacon
556 Mr Prior’s conversation with Mr Visser and Mr Bacon at the Speedpanel meeting (which took place in October 2014) is of a different character. It did involve the promotion of goods in Australia with a view to their sale in Australia by an established supplier in Australia of passive fire protection products.
557 Mr Prior’s evidence is that, at the Speedpanel meeting, he told Mr Visser and Mr Bacon that, in Australia and New Zealand, Boss called the Pass-It, the FIREBOX. He said that, at the meeting, Mr Atkinson continually referred to the product as the “Pass-It” which, Mr Prior says, he corrected by stating: “You mean FIREBOX”.
558 Mr Visser’s evidence was that, at the Speedpanel meeting, Mr Atkinson called the product a “Pass-It” and Mr Prior called it a “Firebox” (although Mr Visser was not certain of the spelling of the word).
559 It is clear from this evidence that Mr Visser understood the reference to “Pass-It” and “Firebox” as the name or brand of a product, not the description of a product. Mr Visser gave evidence of a conversation to this effect:
Prior: I am calling this product a Firebox when I supply it in Australia and New Zealand. This name is more consistent with other products in my range that start with “Fire”.
Visser: I think that is a better name for it. The market here would have no idea what a “Pass-It” is, and they will understand “Firebox” better.
560 Mr Visser said that, after this meeting, he had a number of conversations with Mr Bacon, and others outside Speedpanel (such as architects and builders), regarding the device shown at the meeting. Mr Visser said that in these conversations he referred to the device as FIREBOX. However, in cross examination, Mr Visser could not remember the dates of these conversations.
561 Mr Bacon also gave evidence regarding use by Mr Prior of FIREBOX as the product name of the device promoted at the Speedpanel meeting. Mr Bacon recalled Mr Prior saying at the meeting:
In Australia and New Zealand, we are going to call this a “Firebox”.
562 Mr Bacon said that, following the Speedpanel meeting, he continued to speak to Mr Prior by telephone approximately once every week. This continued until Mr Bacon left Speedpanel in 2017. One topic in these conversations was the testing of the Pass-It device for use with Speedpanel walls. Mr Bacon said that it was his intention that, once the testing of the device with Speedpanel walls had taken place, Speedpanel would acquire the device from Boss and offer it to purchasers of Speedpanel walls as a solution for sealing penetrations.
563 Mr Bacon said that, either during the Speedpanel meeting, or in one of his conversations with Mr Prior shortly after the meeting, he raised the question of why Mr Prior was using a different name for the Pass-It device. Mr Bacon’s evidence is that Mr Prior said:
FIREBOX is easier for consumers in Australia and New Zealand to recognise, because it’s consistent with the other products being supplied by [Boss] that start with … “Fire”.
564 Mr Bacon said that, in conversations with Mr Prior after the Speedpanel meeting, they both referred to the product as FIREBOX.
565 In submissions, Trafalgar discounted the significance of this evidence. It turned, firstly, to Mr Prior’s notes and Mr Atkinson’s notes of the meeting, which do not mention, in terms, the words FIREBOX or FYREBOX, or record any sale or offer to sell fire transits. The suggestion appears to be that, because none of these matters are mentioned in the notes, no discussion about fire transits took place, let alone a discussion in which the words FIREBOX or FYREBOX were used in relation to such devices.
566 I reject that suggestion. There is simply no doubt that, at the Speedpanel meeting, a Pass-It device was displayed, promoted, and discussed. The fact that the notes do not mention, in terms, the words FIREBOX or FYREBOX, and do not record any sale or offer to sell fire transits, does not gainsay that finding. It means no more than that the notes are incomplete, in the sense that they do not record every matter addressed at the meeting, let alone every detail of the meeting. Neither Mr Prior nor Mr Atkinson suggested that his notes were intended to be a complete record of all matters discussed at the Speedpanel meeting. My own observation of the notes is that they are, at best, skeletal.
567 Secondly, Trafalgar submitted that it is common ground that, at the time of the Speedpanel meeting, the Pass-It device was not able to be supplied to Speedpanel without being fire-tested with the Speedpanel wall panels. Trafalgar submitted that this testing did not occur until after the priority date of the 748 application. The suggestion, here, seems to be that the Pass-It device, whether called FIREBOX or FYREBOX, was not commercially available at the time of the Speedpanel meeting, such that any use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX in relation to the Pass-It device could not be trade mark use.
568 I do not accept that submission. At the time of the Speedpanel meeting, the Pass-It was an existing device manufactured by FSi in the United Kingdom and available for supply in Australia through Boss. In short, it was a commercial product that was commercially available. The fact that a potential customer, such as Speedpanel, might first require the Pass-It to be fire-tested with the customer’s own product before deciding whether to purchase the Pass-It, does not mean that the use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX in relation to the promotion, for supply, of the Pass-It, pre-testing, was not trade mark use.
569 Relatedly, Trafalgar submitted that any discussions at the Speedpanel meeting using FIREBOX or FYREBOX in relation to the Pass-It device were “preliminary discussions” of the kind referred to in Moorgate. However, the facts in Moorgate concerning the putative trade mark use of KENT GOLDEN LIGHTS are far removed from the display, promotion, and discussion of the Pass-It device at the Speedpanel meeting, which activities were clearly directed to achieving actual sales, in Australia, of that device to Speedpanel or, through Speedpanel, to its customers. Put another way, these activities at the Speedpanel meeting were, unambiguously, for the purposes of trade, and not merely prefatory negotiations about the prospect of trade.
570 Thirdly, Trafalgar submitted that there are difficulties in relying on the memories of witnesses to a conversation which, at the time of the hearing, took place seven years previously. It also submitted that, in giving their evidence, Mr Visser and Mr Bacon might have been influenced in their respective recollections by dealings with Boss in respect of FYREBOX branded products after the priority date of the 748 application.
571 Whilst I accept that caution must be exercised in accepting evidence of the recollection of such conversations, the fact is that both Mr Visser and Mr Bacon were unshaken in cross-examination of their recollection that Mr Prior used FIREBOX or FYREBOX at the Speedpanel meeting as the name for the Pass-It device which Boss was promoting for sale to Speedpanel. I accept their evidence, as I accept Mr Prior’s evidence on this topic.
572 I am satisfied, therefore, that, through Mr Prior, Boss used FIREBOX/FYREBOX as a trade mark in relation to relevant goods at the Speedpanel meeting, before the priority date of the 748 application.
573 On the same day as, and immediately following, the Speedpanel meeting, Mr Prior and Mr Atkinson attended a meeting with Mr Talbot at a pub in Southbank, Melbourne. At the time, Mr Talbot was the Managing Director of Verified Pty Ltd (Verified). Verified provided a system for tracking maintenance and repairs of property for businesses operating across multiple sites. It was not one of Boss’s customers.
574 Mr Prior arranged the meeting. He said that one reason for doing so was that Mr Talbot had been the National President of Fire Protection Association Australia (FPAA), the major fire industry association in Australia. At the time of the meeting, he was also the Independent Chair of Technical Committee FP-001 for Standards Australia relating to the maintenance of fire protection equipment. This committee is responsible for the development of, and amendments to, Australian Standard AS 1851-2021 “Routine Service of Fire Protection Systems and Equipment”. Mr Atkinson was, at that time, the chairman of a similar committee in the United Kingdom. Mr Prior said that he also arranged the meeting because it was common for him to catch up periodically with senior members of the FPAA to discuss market trends in general, and issues common to the industry.
575 Mr Prior’s evidence was that, at the meeting, he informed Mr Talbot that he and Mr Atkinson had just attended the Speedpanel meeting and had showed Speedpanel a new product from FSi called FIREBOX. When Mr Talbot asked what the product was, and what it did, Mr Prior told Mr Talbot that it bundled multiple service penetrations into one single device, saving time on site and reducing risk.
576 In his evidence, Mr Talbot gave a similar account of the conversation, although he could not recall the date of the meeting. Mr Talbot said that he remembered the meeting because the product that was discussed struck him as an innovative solution to what he regarded to be a common problem at the time. Mr Talbot recalled that “Mark’s supplier from the UK” (he could not recall Mr Atkinson’s name) explained the particular intumescent material that was used in the product.
577 When Mr Prior and Mr Atkinson met with Mr Talbot, they did not have an example of the Pass-It device with them. Mr Talbot said that, although the device “sounded to me like a great idea”, Verified was primarily concerned with maintenance. He said that he informed Mr Prior that Verified’s customers “would not be the people who would be installing a product like this”.
578 In cross-examination, Mr Talbot accepted that his meeting with Mr Prior, on this occasion, was “more a social catch-up”, meaning that this was the primary purpose of the meeting so far as he was concerned.
579 Boss relied on this discussion as “a business discussion” at which FIREBOX was used as a trade mark. Trafalgar submitted that this discussion was simply one that happened in a social setting, which “does not establish prior ownership for the purposes of s 58 of the [Trade Marks] Act”.
580 I accept that Mr Prior’s and Mr Atkinson’s meeting with Mr Talbot took place on the same day as the Speedpanel meeting and that, at that meeting, reference was made to the Pass-It by the name FIREBOX. However, I do not accept that this conversation was an activity in the course of trade or for the purposes of trade. I am satisfied that the meeting was, in substance, a social meeting and that discussion of the Pass-It device, albeit by reference to the FIREBOX name, was no more than a social conversation.
581 I am not persuaded, therefore, that this evidence, by itself, establishes trade mark use of FIREBOX that would defeat Trafalgar’s claim to ownership of the FIREBOX mark at the priority date of the 748 application. However, it is evidence that supports Boss’s claim that, at that time, it was using FIREBOX/FYREBOX as the name for the Pass-It device, which it was seeking to sell in Australia.
582 Mr Halliday is a Managing Director of Airport Consultancy Group Pty Ltd (ACG), which specialises in the planning and detailed design of airport projects, with a civil engineering focus. ACG’s engineering services include drainage plans, airfield pavement engineering, aircraft parking apron layouts, and upgrades.
583 Mr Prior’s evidence was that he had a meeting with Mr Halliday in (around) August 2014. He said that, prior to that meeting, he believed ACG’s business involved the design of airport terminals. He said that he thought that there might be opportunities for ACG, or its clients, to “use the FIREBOX product”. It is not clear on the evidence whether Mr Prior was referring to the Abesco product or the Pass-It device.
584 Mr Prior said that, at the meeting, an exchange to the following effect took place:
Prior: We have a cost-saving way of dealing with multiple fire rated penetrations for airport designs, called FIREBOX. We can handle multiple services into one single device and it’s super quick to install, it saves cost and improves risk. I’d appreciate it if we can discuss it being used in your terminal designs. It’s an exciting product and you should consider it.
Halliday: We don’t design airport terminals that are large enough for that to be considered. We do some smaller regional terminals, and we don’t consider very much fire protection in our office, but mainly we do civil work.
585 Mr Halliday’s evidence was somewhat different. He said that, since 2011, he has met with Mr Prior every six months, on average. He said that, at these meetings, he and Mr Prior discussed their respective businesses, and new products and developments. These meetings included discussion on whether there were opportunities for ACG to incorporate Boss products and the work it undertakes.
586 Mr Halliday said that, at the meeting, Mr Prior spoke “very excitedly” about a new product he was launching. Mr Halliday said that an exchange to the following effect took place:
Prior: There is an issue with fire passing through bulkheads, where the cables go through. The Firebox is a product that can be placed around the cable tray that goes through the bulkhead. If a fire occurs, there is an expanding foam in the walls of the box that prevents the passage of fire.
Halliday: It sounds great. I’m not working on any terminal projects at the moment, and that is where I can see it being used, but I’ll pass on this information to the electrical engineers I work with.
587 In cross-examination, Mr Halliday described his recounting of this exchange as “a generic understanding of the conversation that [he] had …”. He also described this exchange as a “general conversation” of a kind that would not be recorded (such as, for example, a formal meeting in a boardroom or a project-related meeting). He said that he was not familiar with a device called a “transit box”. He said that when he had his conversation with Mr Prior, he was not shown any sample of the product that Boss was intending to launch. He said:
… the way that Mark described it to me was that he had a prototype or he had a – he had gone through all the phases of building it to ensure that it was right to be released or launched. But for the fact of seeing and witnessing it with my own eyes I can say that I did not.
And he didn’t give you any information, did he, about when it was actually going to be released, this prototype that you describe; is that right?---I don’t recall.
You have no recollection of that part of the discussion; is that right?---That’s correct.
588 Trafalgar submitted that, taken at its highest, Mr Halliday’s evidence of his conversation with Mr Prior was “a discussion between friends over 7 years ago about a prototype which he did not see, had not yet been released to the market and was not able to use in any event”.
589 I accept that the conversation between Mr Prior and Mr Halliday took place in August 2014, and that a fire-stopping device was discussed using the name FIREBOX. Considered in its context, and despite the reliance placed by Trafalgar on Mr Halliday’s cross-examination, I accept that the conversation was more than a casual inquiry on a social occasion. It was a conversation that was directed to soliciting interest from ACG, through Mr Halliday, in acquiring a product called FIREBOX. The evidence does not disclose whether the product which Mr Prior had in mind was the Pass-It device or the Abesco product. There was, however, a product (whether it be the Pass-It device or the Abesco product) that Boss was willing and able to supply by reference to the FIREBOX name. Mr Prior’s and Mr Halliday’s conversation was directed to those commercial ends, even though it did not result in a sale of products. I am satisfied, therefore, that this conversation took place in the course of trade and that, in that conversation, FIREBOX was used as a trade mark.
590 In its written closing submissions, Boss adverted to other instances of aural use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX by Mr Prior which, it submitted, constituted trade mark use before the priority date of 24 November 2015.
591 Mr Prior gave evidence of conversations and meetings with representatives of Plumbers Supplies Cooperative (PSC). He said that, around late 2014 or early 2015, he had a meeting with Robert Ivanovski, PSC’s National Sales Manager, at which a conversation took place to the following effect:
Prior: I have a product you may be interested in, called FIREBOX. It’s a metal box with an intumescent material that you can use to put pipes through a wall.
Ivanovski: Can you get me a sample so I can show it to my customers?
592 Mr Prior said that, after this meeting, either on the same day or the next day, he delivered a sample of the Abesco product to Mr Ivanovski at PSC’s Caringbah office. Mr Prior said that, on giving the sample to Mr Ivanovski, he said:
Prior: This is the FIREBOX product I told you about.
593 Mr Prior said that, later, he arranged a meeting with Alan Thompson, PSC’s purchasing manager, at PSC’s head office at Auburn. This meeting was arranged through Leanne Freel, Boss’s then Business Development Manager. An email in evidence shows that the meeting was arranged for 24 February 2015, starting at 1.00 pm. As events transpired, Mr Thompson was unable to make the meeting. Matthew Vasallo attended in his place. Mr Vasallo was a member of Mr Thompson’s team.
594 Mr Prior said that, at this meeting, he presented all of Boss’s product range that was relevant to plumbing, “including FIREBOX”. He did not give evidence of any particular discussion at the meeting. However, Mr Prior kept a notebook. It contains notes of the meeting which include the words “Promote Fyrebox, HPE, H/R, pillows”. It was put to Mr Prior in cross-examination that this entry was made on a date other than 24 February 2015. The implicit suggestion in this line of questioning was that the entry was made by Mr Prior after the event, and dishonestly, for the purposes of supporting his case on first use of FIREBOX/FYREBOX as a trade mark. Mr Prior rejected that suggestion.
595 I am not prepared to accept, based on the notebook entry alone, that FYREBOX was used as a trade mark in the course of the meeting with Mr Vasallo on 24 February 2015. As I have said, Mr Prior did not give evidence of any particular discussion at the meeting. The notebook entry is no more than evidence of a topic of discussion, not the discussion itself. It cannot be taken as the equivalent of actual aural use. Thus, the evidence is not sufficient to establish aural trade mark use of FYREBOX on this occasion.
596 As to whether FIREBOX was used as a trade mark in Mr Prior’s earlier meeting with Mr Ivanovski, when Mr Prior said he introduced the Abesco product under that name, I accept that the meeting took place in the course of trade or for the purposes of trade. However, I am cautious about accepting evidence of aural use of a trade mark which is based on no more than individual recollection of a somewhat inconsequential conversation which took place some years beforehand, and which is not corroborated. It is true that Mr Prior was not cross-examined about the meeting. However, I am not persuaded that Mr Prior’s evidence alone provides a sufficiently reliable foundation for me to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the conversation took place using FIREBOX as a trade mark, as Mr Prior believes the conversation to have occurred.
597 Boss relied on three other meetings said to have involved aural use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX. These meetings were identified as a meeting between Mr Prior and Greg Pollard of Harvey Air Conditioning in March 2015; a meeting between Mr Prior and “Cameron” of D&E Air on 7 March 2015; and a meeting between Mr Prior and Paul Rosesworn of Bowsers on 10 March 2015. In each case, Mr Prior did not give evidence of any particular conversation. He relied, once again, on no more than entries in his notebook. As I have said, a notebook entry cannot be taken as the equivalent of actual aural use. Thus, the evidence is not sufficient to establish aural trade mark use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX on these occasions.
598 From January 2007 until November 2015, Mark Falkiner worked for Wormald International (Wormald) as a Passive Fire Services Manager. Wormald specialises in providing fire safety products including portable fire equipment and large-scale fire suppression systems for mining, marine, industrial, commercial, and retail use. It also delivers services in respect of, and maintenance for, fire safety products. Wormald operates Australia-wide.
599 Mr Falkiner’s role involved providing a range of passive fire services to Wormald’s clients. The services included conducting audits on existing passive fire installations to ensure Building Code of Australia (BCA) compliance, making recommendations for maintenance or upgrade works, performing maintenance and upkeep work on passive fire safety equipment, and installing passive fire safety products as part of rectification works and new building works. He was based in Newcastle and worked primarily on jobs involving nursing homes, government buildings, schools, hospitals, and universities.
600 While at Wormald, Mr Falkiner carried out an audit of passive fire safety, for BCA compliance, on campuses for the University of Newcastle. This led to Wormald being awarded a contract to carry out certain rectification work. As part of that work, he needed a solution that would allow him to pass numerous cables through walls or floors, and to add or remove cables at a later stage, while maintaining the fire rating of the wall or floor.
601 Mr Falkiner and Mr Prior knew each other from their joint participation in technical advisory committees for the Fire Protection Association of Australia (FPAA). Mr Falkiner said that he regularly spoke with Mr Prior about jobs that he (Mr Falkiner) was working on. This included Mr Falkiner enquiring whether Boss had products that might be suitable for use on projects with which Mr Falkiner was concerned.
602 Mr Falkiner’s evidence, as given in his affidavit of 26 August 2019, was that, in relation to Wormald’s work for the University of Newcastle, he had a conversation with Mr Prior to this effect:
Falkiner: I am looking for a solution that will allow me to take numerous applications in and out, through a wall. I want something that I can add cables to later, or repurposed to use the data cables in the future.
Prior: I have a product that can do that. It’s called a Firebox. It’s a metal box with an intumescent inside. Once it’s installed, you can take things in and out later.
603 Mr Falkiner said that, following this conversation, he purchased a number of these products from Boss. He initially used them on a limited number of the University’s sites. Mr Falkiner said that, subsequently, he purchased more of the products from Boss, which he used on jobs for Wormald with local theatre groups, and in some high-rise buildings.
604 I pause to note that the products which Mr Falkiner purchased from Boss were Abesco manufactured cable transit system products with which Mr Falkiner was familiar before his conversation with Mr Prior. Indeed, Mr Falkiner had also purchased these and other Abesco products from Trafalgar (Fire Containment), amongst other suppliers. His evidence was that, when he had his conversation with Mr Prior, he was not seeking a new product. Rather, he was seeking to obtain a “solution” from Mr Prior, without naming or identifying a particular product. His aim was to obtain appropriate products at the best price.
605 After installing a number of the Boss-supplied products for the University of Newcastle, Mr Falkiner was asked, by the University, to provide technical data that would enable it to specify the products on new projects. To this end, Mr Falkiner thought that he would provide the University with a document that contained Wormald’s details. His thinking was that if the University or its builders decided to use the products, they would buy them from Wormald who, in turn, would source them from Boss.
606 Mr Falkiner and Mr Prior worked together to produce a data sheet that could be provided to the University. A copy of the data sheet—which I discuss below—is in evidence. Mr Falkiner said that, after it had been prepared and provided to him, he gave hard copies of the data sheet to a member of the facilities management department of the University, whose name was also Mark. Mr Falkiner was unable to recall the gentleman’s surname. Mr Falkiner said that he discussed the product with “Mark”. He said that, in these conversations, he referred to the product by the name FIREBOX.
607 These events were recounted by Mr Falkiner in an affidavit. In that affidavit he said:
The events I described above stand out in my mind from my time at Wormald, because I remember that I thought Firebox was [a] very good product, and I was keen to promote it. To the best of my recollection, the initial work that I performed for University of Newcastle, my discussions with Mark Prior about Firebox, and the subsequent creation of the datasheet, all occurred around a year before the end of my time at Wormald, that is, in late 2014 or early 2015.
608 Mr Prior gave evidence substantially to the same effect. However, his recollection of the conversation with Mr Falkiner (on which Boss relies to establish trade mark use) is that he responded to Mr Falkiner by saying:
I have a product called FIREBOX that can do that.
609 This use of FIREBOX is different to the use recounted in Mr Falkiner’s affidavit and by Mr Falkiner in cross-examination.
610 Boss relies on an email chain from February 2015 which includes an email dated 19 February 2015 from Mr Prior to Mr Falkiner. The email contains a diagram under which the following words appear with reference to that diagram:
Also there is the fire box cable transit we spoke about at the last TAC – this will do multiple penos including sprinkler pipes.
I think you have the data sheetr (sic) already.
611 The abbreviation TAC refers to a Technical Advisory Committee of the FPAA of which Mr Prior and Mr Falkiner were members.
612 I accept that this email refers to the conversation between Mr Prior and Mr Falkiner at which Mr Prior told Mr Falkiner about a “fire box”. Given the date of the email, I am satisfied that the conversation took place before 19 February 2015.
613 Boss also produced a copy of a data sheet which, it says, is the data sheet which Mr Prior and Mr Falkiner prepared. The data sheet is a two-page document. It is headed “Fyre-Box by BOSS”. In this heading, the words “Fyre-Box” are depicted more prominently than the words “by BOSS”. In other parts of the document, the product is called “BOSS Fyre Box Cable Transits” or the “BOSS Fyre Box Transit” or, simply, the “BOSS Fyre Box”. The product, its features, and its application are described. The document includes a table describing a range of product identified by product codes. The data sheet bears the name “WORMALD”, and the Wormald logo, at the foot of each page.
614 Mr Falkiner’s affidavit notes that, having recounted the events (summarised above) to Boss’s solicitors, he was provided with a copy of a data sheet. He identified this as the Wormald data sheet he had earlier described. A copy of the data sheet was an annexure to one of Mr Prior’s affidavits. In identifying this document, Mr Falkiner noted, in particular, the spelling of “Fyre-Box”. He recalled joking with Mr Prior about this spelling—the use of the letter “Y” to spell “Fyre”—at the time, he says, Mr Prior first gave him the document.
615 Trafalgar submitted that Mr Prior’s evidence and Mr Falkiner’s evidence as to the date of creation of the Wormald data sheet should not be accepted.
616 First, Trafalgar submitted that there are no contemporaneous materials that verify the data sheet’s creation and use before 24 November 2015. The document, itself, is not dated. It submitted that, when Boss gave discovery of the original and published versions of the Wormald data sheet, it produced two electronic files—one file a pdf version of the data sheet that appears to have been created on 6 September 2017, and the other file a Word version of the data sheet that appears to have been created on 11 December 2019.
617 Secondly, Trafalgar pointed to a brochure, which Boss was using at around this time, for the Intu-CLAMP products. As I have previously explained, Intu-CLAMP is the name that Boss also used for the Abesco cable transit system products it was supplying. Trafalgar submitted that the only data sheet for the Abesco products that Boss was supplying, whose creation date has been verified to be before 24 November 2015, is the Intu-CLAMP brochure.
618 When the Wormald data sheet is compared to the Intu-CLAMP brochure it can be seen that the only material difference between the two documents is the name given to the products (FYREBOX and variants versus Intu-CLAMP) and the respective footers used for the documents. In the Wormald data sheet, the footer comprises Wormald’s name, logo, and associated contact numbers for fax and telephone. In the Intu-CLAMP brochure, the footer comprises Boss’s name, logo, and associated contact numbers for fax and telephone. In light of certain evidence given by Mr Prior, it seems more likely than not that the Wormald data sheet was created from a Word file of the Intu-CLAMP brochure, with the Wormald data sheet being saved as a Word file. Mr Prior said that, later, he created a pdf version of the Wormald data sheet from the Word file.
619 Mr Falkiner rejected the suggestion that the Wormald data sheet was not produced by Boss and provided to Wormald at any time before he left Wormald. He rejected the suggestion that, if a data sheet was provided to the University of Newcastle, it would have been the Intu-CLAMP brochure. In rejecting that suggestion, Mr Falkiner pointed, once again, to the unusual spelling, in the Wormald data sheet, of “Fyre”, which he recalled raising with Mr Prior at the time that Mr Prior gave him the Wormald data sheet.
620 Trafalgar submitted that the only evidence of Boss providing a product data sheet to a customer for the Abesco products before 24 November 2015 is an email sent by Mr Prior to Mr Craig (from Multiplex) dated 17 November 2015 to which Mr Prior attached an Intu-CLAMP brochure. This is different to the Intu-CLAMP brochure discussed immediately above. Mr Falkiner had no knowledge of the brochure attached to the email and said that this brochure had not been made available to him.
621 Thirdly, Trafalgar pointed to Boss’s accounting records for sales in the financial year ending 30 June 2016. These records refer to the products, which are listed in the Wormald data sheet by particular product codes, by the name Intu-CLAMP or similar names, not FIREBOX, FYREBOX, or some variation of those names. Boss does not dispute this fact. Mr Prior’s evidence was that Boss’s accounting systems were not updated to refer to FYREBOX until well after it began using FYREBOX to refer to cable transits.
622 Trafalgar submitted that given the existence of the Intu-CLAMP brochure, and Boss’s accounting records using the name Intu-CLAMP for the products in question, the evidence does not establish any objective commitment by Boss to trade using the name FYREBOX before 24 November 2015.
623 Fourthly, Trafalgar submitted that Mr Falkiner’s recollection of these events might not be clear given the passage of time and also the fact that, by the time of these events, Mr Falkiner was already familiar with the Abesco products, which had been sold under various names, by different suppliers, including Trafalgar.
624 Fifthly, Trafalgar submitted that the Court does not have before it the original version of the Wormald data sheet which Boss contends was used before 24 November 2015. It complains that no such document was discovered by Boss and that, if such a document existed, Boss should have taken the step of issuing subpoenas to Wormald and the University of Newcastle to obtain copies of the document.
625 The Wormald data sheet shows the words FYRE-BOX and FYRE BOX used as a trade mark in respect of relevant goods. Trafalgar does not dispute that fact. Nor does it contend that FYRE-BOX and FYRE BOX are not substantially identical to FYREBOX or, indeed, to FIREBOX. Its contention is that the Court does not have before it an example of the Wormald data sheet as originally created and that Boss has not established that the Wormald data sheet was, in fact, created before the priority date of 24 November 2015. As it put the matter in its written closing submissions:
Ultimately, the Court does not have the alleged document relied on by Boss before it to determine whether or not the document involved trade mark use before the priority date.
626 It is not entirely clear what Trafalgar means by characterising the Wormald data sheet as “the alleged document”. If, by that characterisation, Trafalgar seeks to contend that the Wormald data sheet is not a genuine document—meaning that it is a fabrication—then that contention was not put to Mr Falkiner. Mr Prior, on the other hand, was cross-examined on the genuineness of the electronic files produced by Boss on discovery. He rejected the suggestion that the particular Word and pdf files produced on discovery were not genuine records of Boss. Mr Prior was not directly challenged on the genuineness of the Wormald data sheet as such, although that challenge seems to be implicit in Trafalgar’s attack on the electronic files. Mr Prior was challenged with the suggestion that the Wormald data sheet had not been distributed to any person before November 2015. He rejected that suggestion.
627 I am satisfied that the Wormald data sheet, referred to in Mr Prior’s and Mr Falkiner’s evidence, is a genuine document that was created and used before the priority date. The precise date of its creation is not revealed in the evidence. In his evidence, Mr Prior suggested that the document must have been created before 19 February 2015 because, in his email to Mr Falkiner of that date, he referred to the fact that Mr Falkiner already had a data sheet. I am not satisfied, however, that the reference in the email to a data sheet is, in fact, a reference to the Wormald data sheet. It is more likely to be a reference to some other data sheet. I reach this conclusion because, in the same email, Mr Prior reminds Mr Falkiner of a cable transit they discussed at a TAC meeting. On the evidence before me, this meeting is likely to be the occasion when Mr Prior and Falkiner had their conversation when Mr Falkiner was seeking a “solution”. If so, it cannot be the case that Mr Falkiner already had the Wormald data sheet. The Wormald data sheet must have been created after that conversation and, on Mr Falkiner’s timeline of events, after Wormald had commenced to acquire the Abesco products from Boss for use in the University of Newcastle project.
628 Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the Wormald data sheet was created during the time that Mr Falkiner was an employee of Wormald. I am also satisfied that, while he was an employee of Wormald, Mr Falkiner provided the Wormald data sheet to the University of Newcastle. The thrust of Mr Falkiner’s evidence was that his conversation with Mr Prior (referred to above), the creation of the Wormald data sheet, and his production of that data sheet to the University of Newcastle, took place well before his employment with Wormald ceased. Further, the line of cross-examination pursued with Mr Falkiner was not that he did not supply a data sheet (with respect to the Abesco products) to the University of Newcastle while he was employed by Wormald, but that, if he did supply a data sheet, it would have been the Intu-CLAMP brochure—a suggestion which, as I have said, Mr Falkiner rejected. I accept Mr Falkiner’s evidence on these matters.
629 I am satisfied that the Wormald data sheet that is in evidence is a copy of the data sheet that was created for Wormald’s use. Mr Falkiner’s evidence confirms that to be the case. Before being presented with a copy of the Wormald data sheet that is in evidence, Mr Falkiner described its features from memory. His unprompted recollection accorded with certain specific features of the document he later identified as the Wormald data sheet. This leads me to conclude that Mr Falkiner’s recollection of the document, and his later identification of it, is sound.
630 I do not accept that these findings are gainsaid by the evidence going to the creation of the electronic files of the Wormald data sheet that were produced on discovery. Mr Prior gave an account of how the electronic files, that were produced on discovery, were created. These files were forensically examined by Mr McKemmish. Mr McKemmish said that the file properties of the two electronic files produced on discovery were inconsistent with Mr Prior’s explanation of when, and how, the Wormald data sheet was created. However, it became clear during the course of Mr McKemmish’s cross-examination that the date of creation of the electronic files he examined was not necessarily the date of creation of the underlying document that is, in fact, the Wormald data sheet.
631 The metadata for the Word file of the Wormald data sheet that Mr McKemmish examined indicate that it was created on 11 December 2019. And yet, the metadata also show that the file was “last printed” on 12 December 2011, well before this particular electronic file was recorded as having been created. Mr McKemmish accepted in cross-examination that this means that an underlying document was in existence before the creation of the electronic file he examined. He accepted that the explanation for the “creation” date of 11 December 2019 is that a pre-existing Word file was opened, and then saved as a new document, on 11 December 2019. Mr McKemmish also accepted in cross-examination that, even given the “last printed” date of 12 December 2011, there are circumstances in which a Word document can be opened and printed, without the “last printed” date updating to a new date.
632 There is no direct evidence of the precise form of the document that was opened on 11 December 2019, or of the precise form of the document that is recorded in the metadata as having been “last printed” on 12 December 2011. However, the cross-examination of Mr McKemmish reveals to me that the metadata of the files he examined in relation to the Wormald data sheet do not provide a reliable basis for drawing conclusions as to when the Wormald data sheet, referred to in Mr Prior’s and Mr Falkiner’s evidence, was, in fact, created. In the circumstances, I see no convincing reason why I should not accept the account given by Mr Prior and Mr Falkiner. I consider that account to be credible and likely.
633 As to the criticism that Boss had not taken steps to obtain a copy of the Wormald data sheet from Wormald or the University of Newcastle, Mr Prior explained in cross-examination that, in fact, he had approached Wormald to obtain a copy of the Wormald data sheet, but that his approach was both unsuccessful and inconclusive. He explained that the Wormald business had been sold. He said that when he made his inquiry, the current owner of Wormald referred him to the previous owner, and that when he inquired of the previous owner, he was referred back to the current owner.
634 I accept that Boss could have taken the step of seeking the issue of subpoenas to Wormald and the University of Newcastle for the Wormald data sheet, but I have no reason to think that, by taking that step, it is likely that any documents would have been produced. Certainly, Mr Prior’s inquiries of Wormald, which were not disputed, give no confidence that the Wormald data sheet would have been produced by Wormald.
635 Finally, I am satisfied that, for trade mark purposes, the creation of the Wormald data sheet and its production by Mr Prior to Mr Falkiner occurred in the course of trade. I am also satisfied that Mr Falkiner’s subsequent production of the Wormald data sheet to “Mark” at the University of Newcastle occurred in the course of trade.
636 This leaves the question of the trade mark significance, if any, of the email of 19 February 2015, and of Mr Prior’s and Mr Falkiner’s conversation referred to above. I am not persuaded that the evidence establishes that, on these occasions, FIREBOX was used as a trade mark.
637 As with the use of “fire box” in the 22 July 2014 email that Mr Prior sent to Mr Burton of Ferm Engineering (see above), the use of “fire box” in the 19 February 2015 email to Mr Falkiner is equivocal. The email does not clearly show “fire box” functioning as a trade mark. Objectively, those words are equally likely to convey, and to be understood as, a purely descriptive reference to the nature and purpose of the cable transits.
638 Mr Prior’s reference to “a Firebox” in the conversation, as recalled by Mr Falkiner in his first affidavit, is of the same character. I observe that, because the use on that occasion was aural use, the capitalisation of “Firebox”, in Mr Falkiner’s affidavit, is without significance. So too is the fact that, in that account, “Firebox” is represented as one word rather than two (“fire box”).
639 As I have noted, Mr Prior’s recollection of the conversation is different. His recollection is that he responded to Mr Falkiner’s inquiry by stating that he (Mr Prior) had a product that was called FIREBOX. This is, arguably, trade mark use. However, given the differing versions of the conversation on this point, I cannot say which version of the conversation is correct, even though I accept that the word “Firebox”, or words “fire box”, were used. For this reason, the evidence falls short of establishing trade mark use on that occasion.
640 The product list on which Boss relies is a document which Mr Prior said he created in August 2015 to assist some staff at Boss, as well as some third party distributors and resellers, to identify products in the Boss range. Mr Prior said that it was his experience that customers often inquired about products using one of several names that Boss had used, or even the name of a competitor’s similar product. He regarded the product list as a “tool” by which the names of products, that might be used by customers, could be matched to a particular product.
641 Mr Prior said that this document was not provided to all staff or distributors of Boss’s products. It was only provided to those who did not have good knowledge of the market and who were not likely to be immediately familiar with the names used by Boss or its competitors for equivalent products. Mr Prior said that he remembers providing a copy of the product list to Boss’s then receptionist, Clarissa The; Jerry Tanner from FireCorp SA Pty Ltd; and Toby Ginn from TLE Electrical Wholesalers in New South Wales.
642 The product list contains three columns: “Official Product Name”; “Commonly known as”; and “Competitor Products”. Relevantly, the document identifies in the “Official Product Name” column, the name “Intu-Clamp Cable Transit”; in the “Commonly known as” column, the name “Fyrebox Cable Transit”; and, in the “Competitor Products” column, the name “FyreClamp” (i.e., Trafalgar’s product).
643 Boss submitted that the product list is relevant in two ways. First, because (on its case) the product list was distributed to customers, it evidences trade mark use of FYREBOX. Secondly, it supports Boss’s case that there had been use of FYREBOX before the priority date because, at the date of the document’s creation, Boss considered that the common name of the product it was supplying (which was the Abesco product) was the “FyreBox Cable Transit”.
644 Trafalgar disputed the date of creation of the product list. It contended that Mr Prior created the product list on 15 June 2016, not in August 2015 as he had deposed.
645 Boss was required to give discovery of the original and published versions of the product list. It gave discovery of three electronic files in the form of Excel spreadsheets. These files were examined by Mr McKemmish. The metadata shows that each file was “created” on 15 June 2015 with a “last printed” date of 19 September 2017. Two files (Boss Schedule of Product Names.xlxs and Boss Schedule of Product Names (2).xlxs) have a “modified” date of 12 December 2019. One file (Boss Schedule of Product Names (3).xlxs) has a “modified” date of 20 September 2017.
646 Mr Prior said that he could not recall the exact date on which he created each file, or the order in which he created them. His recollection was that he created the first version of the product list “in around August 2015”, with two further versions created at later times. According to Mr Prior, all versions were in existence before March 2016. Mr Prior said that he did not access these files after they were brought into existence until around September 2017, when he accessed the file Boss Schedule of Product names (3).xlxs. He said that he accessed all three files in December 2019.
647 The document that Boss adduced in evidence is reproduced from the file Boss Schedule of Product Names (3).xlxs. The document contains the header “Boss Products Name Comparison to Competitors August 2015 selling tool.pdf”. Mr Prior said that he does not recall creating a pdf version of the product list. Further, he was not able to locate a file having the name of the document’s header. He accepted that the recorded creation date of each file is not consistent with his recollection of when he created the content of the files.
648 Mr McKemmish said that the file properties of the three files were inconsistent with Mr Prior’s evidence as to the date of creation of each file and his evidence that the files were created sequentially. Further, Mr McKemmish said:
In my experience, as a forensic consultant, documents that contain identical file names with numbering such as (1), (2) or (3) at the end of the file name, such as the “Boss Schedule of Product Names” documents, are documents that have opened from an email or USB device and saved to the same location on another device. As a function of a file existing with the exact name in that location where the second file is trying to be saved, the software used adds the (1), (2) extension to the file as necessary. This is typical where files, for example, are opened and saved locally from an email, or are downloaded from the internet and saved to local location on a PC.
649 However, in cross-examination, Mr McKemmish accepted that, regardless of the date of creation of the electronic files he examined, it is possible that the content of the files could have been created at an earlier time.
650 I am not satisfied that the product list was created before the priority date of 24 November 2015. Mr Prior’s evidence that the product list was created in August 2015 is based only on his recollection. The file properties of each file seriously undermine the accuracy of that recollection and, unlike the evidence relating to the Wormald data sheet, there is no countervailing independent evidence that supports Mr Prior’s evidence. Even though Mr McKemmish accepted the possibility that the content of the electronic files could have been created at an earlier time, Mr Prior did not give evidence that the content of the product list was created earlier than the electronic files themselves. In other words, on Mr Prior’s evidence, one of the files constituted the creation of the product list. There is no earlier “content” on which Boss can rely.
651 I would add that I do not place significant weight on the header of the document as evidence of the date of the document’s creation. I cannot be satisfied as to when the header was placed on the document. Further, the header appears to be a file name. As I have noted, Mr Prior cannot recall creating a pdf version of the product list. No file bearing that name appears to exist. I do not consider the header to be reliable evidence for the purposes of drawing inferences as to the date of creation of the document.
652 Even if the product list was in existence before 24 November 2015, I am not satisfied that Boss has established that it was used in the course of trade before that date. I do not accept that mere internal use of the document within Boss, for reference purposes, constitutes a use of the document, and hence FYREBOX, in the course of trade. Further, there is no evidence as to when, in fact, Boss supplied the document to any customer. This evidence falls short of establishing trade mark use of FYREBOX before the priority date.
653 Boss relies on a transaction which occurred between it and Commercial Plumbing Group Pty Ltd (CPG) on 30 October 2015. The transaction is evidenced by tax invoices and an adjustment note. These documents were obtained under subpoena from CPG and tendered by Boss as Exhibit 6. Mr Prior also annexed copies of these documents that had been reproduced from Boss’s own records, as well as a Packing Slip/Delivery Docket with respect to the same transaction. These constitute the CPG documents.
654 On their face, the CPG documents record a sale to, and return of products by, CPG. The products are described as: “Fyrebox Intu Cable Clamp 100mm Round”; “Fyrebox Intu Cable Clamp 150mm Round”; and “Fyrebox Intu-Clamp Transit 50mm Round”. The documents also record the sale of a product described as “Retrofit Pipe Collar – 150mm” which, apparently, was not returned by CPG.
655 The returned products are fire-stopping and smoke-stopping products into which cables (and, in the case of the transit, pipes) can be placed. The products contain intumescent material. A Technical Data Sheet in evidence describes Intu-Cable Transits as follows:
The Intu-Clamp Cable Transits consist of a square or round steel sleeve containing heat reactive intumescent polymer. Cables and pipes are placed inside the Intu-Clamp and set into place on the wall or ceiling. In a fire situation, the intumescence reacts to the heat and rapidly expands, sealing the cable sleeve and preventing the passage of fire and smoke.
656 The CPG documents provoked a degree of controversy. In its written closing submissions, Trafalgar submitted that there were a number of “unusual features regarding the transaction” which “cast doubt on whether the order for transit units recorded in the invoices took place”. Trafalgar referred to the following matters: the person named on the documents as having ordered them (“Aaron” (accepted to be Aaron Wax)) did not recall ordering the products, and had never seen or heard of them; the person named on the Packing Slip/Delivery Docket as having returned the products (Ben Bradley) had no recollection of being involved in the transaction and had not heard of a product called an Intu-Clamp; neither of the signatures on the Packing Slip/Delivery Docket recording the return of the products was Mr Bradley’s signature; and invoices sent to another customer (Coral Air Conditioning Pty Ltd in October, November, and December 2015, and July 2016) for the Intu-Cable Clamp 100mm Round and Intu-Cable Clamp 100mm Square did not contain reference to the word “Fyrebox” when identifying the products.
657 Trafalgar submitted that the CPG documents are “at best an anomaly” and do not reflect the manner in which the Intu-Clamp product was sold and invoiced by Boss before November 2015. Mr Prior was cross-examined on that particular matter. It was put to him that the use of FYREBOX in the CPG documents was an anomaly in the sense that the use was “an isolated event” and not consistent with Boss’s practice at the time. Mr Prior said that he would not use the word “anomaly”, but he accepted that the CPG documents were the first invoices that he could find which used FYREBOX with respect to the products.
658 The evidence does not answer the questions that Trafalgar raised in submissions. However, I do not think it can be said that the transaction did not take place. If, by raising that matter, Trafalgar was intending to assert that the CPG documents are not genuine, then it certainly did not squarely advance that proposition or put it to Mr Prior. Indeed, the only matter put to Mr Prior in that regard was that the use of FYREBOX in the CPG documents was an isolated event.
659 Trafalgar is unable to answer the fact that the CPG documents were produced by CPG pursuant to a subpoena that had been issued at Trafalgar’s request. CPG is a company that is independent of the parties to this case. There is no apparent reason why it would have the CPG documents in its possession other than as an incident of the transaction which they record. Therefore, I do not think that the genuineness of the documents, or the transaction they record, are seriously in question. Having regard to all the evidence, I accept that the CPG documents are genuine and that the transaction they record occurred in October 2015, before the priority date of the 478 application.
660 Trafalgar submitted that the use of “Fyrebox Intu Cable Clamp” and “Fyrebox Intu-Clamp Transit” in the CPG documents was not the use of the FIREBOX mark or the FYREBOX device mark. The burden of Trafalgar’s submission is that, in those renderings, FYREBOX cannot be separated from the complete description given in the documents.
661 I do not accept that submission. I am satisfied that the use of FYREBOX in the descriptions “Fyrebox Intu Cable Clamp” and “Fyrebox Intu-Cable Clamp Transit”, as used in the CPG documents, is use of FYREBOX as a trade mark. Further, I do not accept Trafalgar’s submission that this finding is gainsaid by the fact that the words “Intu Clamp” or “Intu-Clamp” are, themselves, inventions by Boss. I am satisfied that, in each description, the word FYREBOX was functioning as a trade mark in its own right.
662 Trafalgar also submitted that there is no evidence of the use of FYREBOX on the products referred to in the CPG documents or their packaging at the time of the transaction. That is so. But it does not follow from that fact that the use of FYREBOX in the CPG documents was not trade mark use. Use of a mark in commercial documents, such as invoices, can constitute trade mark use in the required sense: Thunderbird Products Corp v Thunderbird Marine Products Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 592 (Thunderbird) at 600 – 602.
663 It also does not matter that the use might be “isolated” or, as Trafalgar also put it in submissions, “ad hoc”. It has been held that if prior trade mark use has occurred on even one occasion it can be sufficient to deny a trade mark applicant the right to claim authorship and consequent registration of the mark in question: The Seven Up Company v O.T. Limited (1947) 75 CLR 203 at 211, and 216; Thunderbird at 600. But, in any event, I do not accept that Boss’s use of FIREBOX/FYREBOX was isolated, in light of the other evidence I have discussed.
664 This leaves Boss’s case that there was aural use of FIREBOX/FYREBOX by Boss in a conversation which Mr Prior had with Mr Bradley in 2015.
665 Mr Prior and Mr Bradley played in a local soccer team. Mr Bradley gave evidence that, at training or at matches, Mr Prior would often talk about some of the products that Boss supplied. Mr Bradley said that, on one occasion “in around 2015”, Mr Prior told him about a product called FYREBOX. Mr Prior explained that this product could take multiple products through a fire-rated wall, and only needed “a single sign off and certification instead of certification for every individual product”. Mr Bradley said that he was “excited” about the product because he thought it had the potential to “revolutionise the industry”. Mr Bradley said that, after Mr Prior had shown him the product, he saw promotional material for it and a sample. He described the sample as:
… a red rectangular box, which had an opening at each end of about 300mm x 200mm. It could be installed in a wall and had an intumescent material inside. Once installed in a wall, it allowed you to just push a pipe or whatever had to pass through the wall through the box.
666 Although, in his affidavit evidence, Mr Bradley referred to the product by the name FYREBOX, he accepted in cross-examination that, at the time of this conversation, Mr Prior did not spell the name of the product. Also, Mr Bradley could not say where or when he saw the promotional material for, or a sample of, the product.
667 On the evidence before me, I cannot be satisfied that the conversation to which Mr Bradley deposed occurred before 24 November 2015. Further, I am not satisfied that the conversation evidences use of FIREBOX/FYREBOX in the course of trade, in any event. I am not persuaded that the conversation was anything more than a casual one on a social occasion.
Conclusion on prior trade mark use
668 In closing submissions, Trafalgar drew attention to the following statement made by Mr Prior in a declaration lodged in the Trade Marks Office:
The Opponent’s First Trade Mark [meaning FIREBOX] was used colloquially as the alternative name for ‘Intu-Clamp’.
669 In that declaration, he also said:
In or about May 2015, it was the Opponent’s opinion that the Opponent’s First Trade Mark [meaning FIREBOX] could be identified by its customers as being a descriptive word and not as a badge of origin for the Opponent’s Product, and that there would likely be difficulties in securing the Opponent’s First Trade Mark with a registered trade mark. As such, the Opponent decided to slightly alter the spelling, and commenced implementing the change in using and referring to the Opponent’s Product as “FYREBOX” … in the months thereafter.
670 Trafalgar submitted that these statements establish that Mr Prior (Boss) used FIREBOX before November 2015 as a generic or descriptive internal reference to a product, in circumstances where the product itself was branded and referred to in all promotional and sales materials under other brand names. In this regard, Trafalgar also referred to the product list, which gave the “Official Product Name” for the Abesco Product as “Intu-Clamp Cable System”.
671 Trafalgar also challenged the date when certain entries in Mr Prior’s notebook referring to FIREBOX or FYREBOX or variations of these names were made, in particular whether they were made before the priority date of 24 November 2015.
672 It is not clear to me what Mr Prior meant when referring to FIREBOX as a “colloquial” alternative for Intu-CLAMP. Leaving aside Mr Prior’s notebook entries (which could not stand as trade mark use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX in any event), it is certainly clear from the other evidence before me that Mr Prior was using FIREBOX and FYREBOX, and variations of those words, in the course of Boss’s business, with respect to fire transits, well before 24 November 2015. Although I am not satisfied that some of these uses constitute trade mark use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX, I am satisfied that other uses were trade mark use, as I have explained.
673 Boss’s use of FIREBOX or FYREBOX as a trade mark, in the period before the priority date of the 748 application, was sporadic and somewhat random. This does not mean, however, that, on those occasions, Boss, through Mr Prior, was not using, or not intending to use, FIREBOX or FYREBOX as a trade mark. It is also not to the point that, in respect of the same products, Boss was, at the same time, using, additionally or alternatively, other trade marks.
674 I am satisfied that the use demonstrated by the evidence was such that, at the priority date, Fire Containment (now, Trafalgar) could not validly claim to be the owner of the FIREBOX trade mark. It follows that the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019 succeeds. The 748 application should be refused. The delegate’s decision to the contrary should be set aside.
675 As I have recorded, in the Trade Marks Office the opposition to the 214 application was determined on the basis of s 44 of the Trade Marks Act, having regard to the existence of the deferred 702 application. The delegate embarked on that determination recognising that the 702 application might ultimately fail and might no longer pose a bar to the 214 application on the s 44(1) ground: 2019 ATMO 107 at [15].
676 The delegate noted that Boss had opposed the 214 application on the grounds in ss 42, 44, 58, 59, 60, 62, and 62A of the Trade Marks Act. The delegate recorded that “the focal points of contention at the hearing centered on questions of ownership under s 58 and bad faith under s 62A…”. Even so, the delegate said that the ground that concerned him most was the s 44(1) ground: 2019 ATMO 107 at [10] – [11]. He determined the opposition on the s 44(1) ground and made no findings in relation to the other grounds of opposition.
677 In the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019, Boss maintained its opposition to the 214 application on a number of grounds including, importantly, s 58 of the Trade Marks Act, even though, as I have said, the focus of the parties’ submissions was s 44.
678 The abiding question in the appeals in NSD 641 of 2019 and NSD 1242 of 2019 has been: who, as between Trafalgar and Boss, is the owner, for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act, of the FIREBOX and FYREBOX marks in respect of the relevant goods?
679 As I have said on a number of occasions, the parties have accepted that, for relevant purposes, FIREBOX and FYREBOX are substantially identical. An issue in the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019 is whether FYREBOX and the composite FYREBOX mark are substantially identical or deceptively similar, so as to engage s 44(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
680 I am satisfied that FYREBOX and the composite FYREBOX mark are substantially identical. Despite the presence of the flame element, the dominating element of the composite FYREBOX mark is the word FYREBOX itself. Indeed, the composite FYREBOX mark, even with its flame element, is properly seen as no more than a particular rendering of FYREBOX, which would fall within the scope of the 702 application, should that application proceed to registration.
681 In light of my finding that Trafalgar cannot validly claim to be the owner of FIREBOX as a trade mark, and that the 748 application should be refused, the 748 application can no longer be an impediment to registration of the 702 application for FYREBOX on the s 44(1) ground, contrary to the delegate’s assumption when deciding the opposition to the 214 application: 2019 ATMO 107 at [13].
682 This does not mean, however, that there no longer remains a question about whether the 702 application should, or will, proceed to registration. Even if the 702 application is accepted (and I do not know whether it will be accepted), I have no reason to think that the application will not, in any event, be opposed. And if registration is opposed, I have no way of foretelling (nor should I attempt to foretell) what the outcome of any opposition might be.
683 If it be assumed that, for some reason, the 702 application does not proceed to registration (including because it is successfully opposed on some ground other than s 58), then it cannot block the 214 application, and the questions whether s 44(1) applies and, in turn, whether the discretion under s 44(3) should be exercised, fall away.
684 If, on the other hand, it be assumed that the 702 application proceeds to registration, it does not follow that s 44 then becomes decisive of the fate of the 214 application, as the delegate treated it to be: 2019 ATMO 107 at [27]. The impediment remains that Trafalgar cannot claim to be the owner of FYREBOX as a trade mark for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act—a ground of opposition maintained by Boss in the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019. If that ground of opposition holds good—as, arguably, it must, given the finding I have made in the appeal in NSD 641 of 2019—then the questions whether s 44(1) applies and, in turn, whether the discretion under s 44(3) should be exercised, are superfluous. Regardless of the answers to those questions, the 214 application cannot proceed to registration.
685 This seems to have been the considered position advanced by Trafalgar in closing submissions where, at T1020 (lines 18 – 20), leading counsel for Trafalgar said:
If we win the section 58 fight, your Honour will have to consider section 44. If we lose the section 58 fight and … Boss Fire win that, then this section 44 falls away. … they only need to win one ground.
686 Boss has won, and Trafalgar has lost, “the s 58 fight”. In light of this recognition, it is not appropriate that I make findings in relation to the issues raised by s 44(3). To do so would be supererogation in that, if it is not necessary to consider s 44(1) as a ground of opposition, then it is certainly not necessary to consider the consequential question whether the discretion in s 44(3) should be exercised.
687 In these circumstances, my provisional view is that the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019 should, simply, be dismissed. I will, nevertheless, permit the parties to make further submissions on that particular question, if they wish, after having had an opportunity to consider these reasons.
688 In light of these findings and conclusions, the parties should attempt to agree on draft orders in each proceeding. In the case of NSD 1589 of 2018, the draft orders should also provide for the further conduct of that proceeding. Agreed orders or, failing agreement, competing draft orders, should be provided to my Associate by no later than 4.00 pm on 10 May 2022. As I have said, the parties can make further submissions, if they wish, on the disposition of the appeal in NSD 1242 of 2019.
689 The parties should liaise with my Associate to have the three proceedings listed for the purpose of making orders and, in the case of NSD 1589 of 2018, for further case management.
I certify that the preceding six hundred and eighty-nine (689) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Yates. |
Associate:
NSD 1589 of 2018 | |
TRAFALGAR GROUP PTY LTD |