FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Caddick [2021] FCA 1443
ORDERS
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION Plaintiff | ||
AND: | First Defendant MALIVER PTY LTD Second Defendant |
DATE OF ORDER: |
In these orders:
Investor Funds means the monies received by either the first or second defendant from investors as itemised in Updated Annexure I, including amounts paid as “management fees”.
Out of Pocket Investors includes the investors whose “total estimated amount” owing is greater than zero as identified by the Receivers in the last column of Updated Annexure I.
Receivership Property means all property (as defined in section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) of the first defendant.
Receivers’ Report means the report prepared by Bruce Gleeson and Daniel Robert Soire as receivers of the property of the first defendant dated 15 February 2021.
Updated Annexure I means the updated version of annexure I to the Receivers’ Report, a confidential copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Bruce Gleeson sworn 12 May 2021 in this proceeding and identified with the heading “Updated Annexure I” (as updated from time to time).
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1. Each of the defendants, by providing financial product advice and dealing in a financial product, contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act in that they carried on a financial services business without holding an Australian Financial Services Licence:
(a) in the case of the first defendant, from about October 2012 and continuing until about November 2020; and
(b) in the case of the second defendant, from about June 2013 and continuing until about November 2020.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2. Leave be granted to the plaintiff to file and serve a third further amended originating process in the form provided to the Court on 30 June 2021, to be filed electronically by 5.00 pm on 23 November 2021.
3. Leave be granted nunc pro tunc to the plaintiff, pursuant to s 471B of the Corporations Act, to continue this proceeding against the second defendant.
4. Pursuant to s 1101B(1) of the Corporations Act, Bruce Gleeson and Daniel Robert Soire of Jones Partners of Level 13, 189 Kent St, Sydney NSW 2000 be appointed as joint and several receivers (Receivers) of the Receivership Property for the purpose of:
(a) identifying, collecting and securing the Receivership Property;
(b) to the extent necessary, ascertaining the total quantum of Investor Funds and any funds advanced by any interested party to the first defendant and the identity of all investors who, in the Receivers’ view, ought to be included as an Out of Pocket Investor as well as any interested party who may be a creditor of the first defendant;
(c) subject to Order 6 below, taking possession of and realising the Receivership Property;
(d) to the extent necessary, establishing an interest-bearing account with an authorised deposit taking institution nominated by the Receivers for the purposes of holding any net proceeds of realisation of the Receivership Property (Receivers’ Trust Account); and
(e) subject to Order 7 below, seeking directions in relation to the distribution of funds in the Receivers’ Trust Account.
5. The Receivers have the following powers:
(a) the power to do all things reasonably necessary or convenient to be done, in Australia and elsewhere, for or in connection with, or as incidental to the attainment of, the objectives for which the Receivers are appointed;
(b) the powers under s 1101B(8) of the Corporations Act;
(c) the powers set out in s 420 of the Corporations Act save for the powers set out in subs 420(2)(d), (h), (j), (m), (n), (o), (s), (t) and (u) and provided that, wherever in that section the word ‘corporation’ appears, it shall be taken to include reference to the first defendant;
(d) the power to seek directions from the Court regarding any matter relating to the exercise of the Receivers’ powers; and
(e) the power to require, by request in writing, any employee, agent, banker, solicitor, stockbroker, accountant, consultant or other professionally qualified person who has provided services or advice to the first defendant, to provide such reasonable assistance (including access to any documents, books or records to which the first defendant has a right of access or control) to the Receivers as may be required from time to time.
6. Before taking possession of or realising any of the Receivership Property, the Receivers shall:
(a) give notice to any interested party of their intention to do so and inform those parties in writing that they should:
(i) advise the Receivers within 15 business days if they object to the taking possession of or sale of any of the Receivership Property and specify the basis of their objection; and
(ii) provide documentary evidence in support of their objection; and
(b) seek directions from the Court in relation to their intention to do so.
7. Before making any distribution of funds in the Receivers’ Trust Account, the Receivers shall:
(a) give notice to any interested party of their intention to do so and inform the said parties in writing that they should:
(i) advise the Receivers within 15 business days if they object to the distribution of funds in the Receivers’ Trust Account and specify the basis of their objection; and
(ii) provide documentary evidence in support of their objection; and
(b) seek directions from the Court in relation to their intention to do so.
8. The above Orders do not affect the rights of any secured creditor holding a mortgage or other security interest over any of the Receivership Property.
9. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in these Orders is intended to limit the right of the Receivers to seek directions from the Court.
10. Immediately upon Order 4 above taking effect, the appointment of Bruce Gleeson and Daniel Robert Soire of Jones Partners of Level 13, 189 Kent St, Sydney NSW 2000 as receivers pursuant Order 5 of the Orders made on 15 December 2020 (Interim Receivers) be terminated.
11. Pursuant to s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act, the second defendant, Maliver Pty Ltd (ACN 164 334 918), be wound up.
12. Bruce Gleeson and Daniel Robert Soire of Jones Partners of Level 13, 189 Kent St, Sydney NSW 2000 be appointed as joint and several liquidators of the second defendant (Liquidators).
13. Order 7 of the Orders made on 10 November 2020 be varied and leave be granted to the plaintiff to provide the Liquidators with unredacted copies of the affidavits filed by the plaintiff in this proceeding.
14. The remuneration, costs and expenses of the Interim Receivers for the period from 15 December 2020 to 22 February 2021 be fixed in the sum of $188,017.84 inclusive of GST.
15. Paragraphs 9E, 9H, 19D and 26 of the plaintiff’s third further amended originating process and paragraphs 2-4 of the Interim Receivers’ interlocutory application filed on 2 March 2021 be stood over to a date to be notified.
16. Any party who wishes to make submissions in relation to the outstanding questions of costs referred to in Order 15 above is to file and serve written submissions, not exceeding four pages in length, by 13 December 2021.
THE COURT NOTES:
17. The redactions made in the copy of the reasons for judgment to be published on 24 November 2021 at 2.15 pm AEDT are made in accordance with the non-publication orders of this Court made in this proceeding.
18. The undertaking proffered by Bruce Gleeson and Daniel Robert Soire of Jones Partners that, if a possibility of conflict in or as between their roles as Receivers and Liquidators arises, they will approach the Court and give notice to the plaintiff and investors of that circumstance.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
[4] | |
[11] | |
[15] | |
[16] | |
[19] | |
[22] | |
[24] | |
[25] | |
[26] | |
[30] | |
[32] | |
[46] | |
[49] | |
[55] | |
[59] | |
[64] | |
[65] | |
[66] | |
[74] | |
3.4.2.2 Appointment of Maliver as advisor for the Wilson Super Fund | [77] |
3.4.2.3 Appointment of Maliver as advisor for Mr Wilson’s personal investments | [79] |
[84] | |
[86] | |
[90] | |
[93] | |
[105] | |
3.4.3.3 Establishment of the self-managed superannuation fund and associated bank account | [107] |
[111] | |
[117] | |
[125] | |
[130] | |
[135] | |
[141] | |
[148] | |
[150] | |
[159] | |
[169] | |
[185] | |
[197] | |
[201] | |
[203] | |
[204] | |
4.2 A financial services business without an AFSL – s 911A of the Corporations Act | [211] |
[213] | |
4.2.2 Have Ms Caddick or Maliver contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act? | [227] |
[236] | |
[256] | |
[285] | |
[285] | |
4.3.2 Appointment of receivers pursuant to s 1101B of the Corporations Act | [288] |
[296] | |
[309] | |
[315] | |
[317] | |
4.3.2.5 Should an order be made under s 1101B(1) of the Corporations Act? | [330] |
[360] | |
[369] | |
[381] | |
[384] | |
[396] | |
[398] | |
5.4 Conclusion on the Interim Receivers’ interlocutory application | [408] |
[409] | |
[411] |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 For many years Melissa Louise Caddick and Maliver Pty Ltd, the first and second defendants respectively (together the defendants), operated what might be described as a financial services business. However, as the events described below show, that business was not what it seemed.
2 On 10 November 2020 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) commenced this proceeding and obtained ex parte orders including orders restraining the defendants from dealing with their assets and requiring Ms Caddick to deliver up her passports. On 11 November 2020 ASIC served those orders on Ms Caddick at her residential address (Caddick Residence) and executed search warrants issued pursuant to s 39D of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act) including at that address.
3 On or about 13 November 2020 Ms Caddick’s partner, Anthony Koletti, informed the Australian Federal Police that he believed his wife to be missing. It was common ground between the parties that, since about 12 November 2020, Ms Caddick has been missing. That fact is not only a matter of understandable concern to a number of interested parties, including Ms Caddick’s family and clients of the financial advice business described below, but has also affected the conduct of this proceeding, the issues that arise for the Court’s consideration and their resolution.
4 As set out above this proceeding was commenced by ASIC on 10 November 2020 at which time it sought and obtained orders on an ex parte basis against Ms Caddick and Maliver. Thereafter, the proceeding was listed before the Court on a number of occasions in November and December 2020. Given her disappearance Ms Caddick did not appear but was, for a time, represented by her brother, Adam Grimley, pursuant to an enduring power of attorney in his favour. There was no appearance on any occasion for or on behalf of Maliver.
5 On 15 December 2020, on ASIC’s application, orders were made (December Orders) including:
(1) an order pursuant to s 1323(1)(h)(i) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) appointing Bruce Gleeson and Daniel Robert Soire of Jones Partners as joint and several receivers (Interim Receivers) of the Property (as defined) of Ms Caddick for the purpose of:
(a) identifying, collecting and securing the Property of [Ms Caddick];
(b) approving or making the payments from the Property of [Ms Caddick] permitted by Order 11 of the Orders made on 10 November 2020 as varied;
(c) ascertaining the amount of money received by [Ms Caddick] from funds paid to [Maliver] by investors for investment (Investor Funds);
(d) identifying any Investor Funds held by [Ms Caddick], any Property acquired by [Ms Caddick] with Investor Funds and any payments made by [Ms Caddick] to third parties with Investor Funds and any other dealings by [Ms Caddick] with Investor Funds; and
(e) ascertaining whether any money was paid directly to [Ms Caddick] by investors for investment and identifying the matters set out in paragraph (d) above in relation to any such money.
(2) an order requiring the [Interim Receivers] to provide to the Court and to ASIC a report regarding:
(a) the assets and liabilities of [Ms Caddick];
(b) an opinion as to the solvency of [Ms Caddick];
(c) the amount of Investor Funds received by [Ms Caddick];
(d) any Investor Funds held by [Ms Caddick], any property acquired by [Ms Caddick] with Investor Funds and any payments made by [Ms Caddick] to third parties with Investor Funds and any other dealings by [Ms Caddick] with Investor Funds;
(e) any money paid directly to [Ms Caddick] by investors for investment and any property acquired, any payments made and any other dealings, by [Ms Caddick] with such money; and
(f) the [Interim Receivers’] remuneration, costs and expenses.
(3) an order pursuant to s 472(2) of the Corporations Act appointing Messrs Gleeson and Soire as joint and several provisional liquidators (Provisional Liquidators) of Maliver and requiring them to provide a report to the Court and to ASIC in relation to the provisional liquidation of Maliver including:
(a) the persons who have paid money to [Maliver] for investment, the amounts they invested, and whether, and to what extent, these amounts have been repaid;
(b) identifying any bank accounts in which Investor Funds are held, any Property acquired with Investor Funds or any other dealings with Investor Funds;
(c) the assets and liabilities of [Maliver], including any assets in which [Maliver] has any legal or beneficial interest and an estimate of the value of each asset;
(d) an opinion as to the solvency of [Maliver];
(e) an opinion as to whether [Maliver] has proper financial records;
(f) an opinion as to the claims that may be available to the Liquidators for the recovery of funds for the benefit of creditors, including claims pursuant to Pt 5.7B of the Act;
(g) the likely return to creditors;
(h) any other information necessary to enable the financial position of [Maliver] to be assessed;
(i) an opinion as to whether [Maliver] has contravened any provisions of the [Corporations Act] and/or any other legislation; and
(j) any suspected contraventions of the [Corporations Act] by any directors or officers of [Maliver].
6 On 24 February 2021 the Interim Receivers and the Provisional Liquidators each filed their reports dated 15 February 2021 with the Court (respectively Interim Receivers’ Report and Provisional Liquidators’ Report and collectively Appointees’ Reports).
7 On 1 March 2021 the Interim Receivers filed an interlocutory application seeking a number of orders including an order that their remuneration, costs and expenses incurred in that capacity for the period 15 December 2020 to 2 February 2021 be fixed in the sum of $189,148.09 inclusive of GST or such other amount as the Court considers fit and proper and that the sum be paid out of Ms Caddick’s property in priority.
8 On 24 May 2021, among others, an order was made pursuant to s 23 or alternatively s 37P of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) for the appointment of counsel nominated by the President of the Bar Association of New South Wales to act as contradictor for the purposes of making submissions as contradictor to ASIC’s application for relief against Ms Caddick. I will refer to counsel so appointed as the Contradictor.
9 On 15 June 2021 leave was granted to ASIC to file a second further amended originating process.
10 On 29 June 2021, the first day of the hearing, I granted leave pursuant to r 2.13 of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Rules) to Barbara and Edward Grimley, Ms Caddick’s parents, to be heard in the proceeding without becoming a party to it.
11 By its second further amended originating process ASIC sought:
(1) declarations of contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act against each of Ms Caddick and Maliver;
(2) an order pursuant to s 1101B(1) of the Corporations Act appointing Messrs Gleeson and Soire as joint and several receivers (Receivers) of the Receivership Property (as defined) for the purpose of, among other things, identifying, collecting, taking possession of and realising that property and distributing the proceeds of its realisation to Investors (as defined) and any Interested Party (as defined), in accordance with this Court’s directions;
(3) an order that before realising any of the Receivership Property the Receivers shall:
(a) give notice to any Interested Party of their intention to realise the property and inform the said parties in writing that:
(i) Interested Parties should advise the [Receivers] within 10 business days if they object to the sale of any of the property, specify the precise nature of the property and the basis of their objection and provide documentary evidence in support of their objection;
(ii) in the case of the Real Property, that they seek the written consent of the occupiers of any such property, which is to be provided by the occupiers within 28 days of the date of the [Receivers] giving such notice, that they will vacate the said property by a date acceptable to the [Receivers];
(iii) in the event Interested Parties advise the [Receivers] of any objection to sale, the [Receivers] are required by the Court to re-list the matter and seek further directions from the Court in which case the Interested Party may be susceptible to an adverse order for costs.
(b) in the event the [Receivers]:
(i) receive no objections to the sale of the property within the notice period referred to in sub-paragraph 9C(a)(i) above; and
(ii) in respect of the Real Property, obtain the written consent of the occupiers of the Real Property to vacate the said property in accordance with sub-paragraph 9C(a)(ii);
the [Receivers] shall as soon as practicable following the expiry of the notice period referred to in sub-paragraph 9C(a)(i), and the agreed date for vacation of the Real Property, take steps to realise that property;
(c) in the event objections are received within the notice period referred to in sub-paragraph 9C(a)(i) above, or in the event the [Receivers] do not procure the written consent of the occupiers of the Real Property to vacate the property within the time period, and as provided for, in subparagraph 9C(a)(ii), the [Receivers] shall seek directions from the Court as to whether they are justified in taking all necessary steps to realise the property (in respect of which objections have been received or which the occupants have not agreed to vacate) having regard to the said objections and in doing so join all parties they consider necessary to be joined to any such application.
(4) an order pursuant to s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act that Maliver be wound up and that Messrs Gleeson and Soire be appointed as liquidators; and
(5) an order pursuant to s 90-15(1) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule, being Sch 2 to the Corporations Act, that the liquidators not take any steps to pursue any claims through any court proceedings that may be available to Maliver against any person or issue any examination summonses under Part 5.9 Division 1 of the Corporations Act without first seeking the Court’s approval and that they provide no less than 14 days’ written notice to ASIC of any such proposed application.
12 The second further amended originating process includes the following definitions:
“Interested Party” includes Anthony Koletti, [REDACTED], Adam Grimley and Edward and Barbara Grimley, National Australia Bank Limited as the mortgagee of the Real Property and the Investors identified by the [Receivers] from time to time.
“Investors” means the parties set out in Updated Annexure I.
“Real Property” means the real property located at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and contained in folio identifier [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and contained in folio identifier [REDACTED].
“Receivership Property” means:
(a) the Real Property;
(b) the Motor Vehicles;
(c) the Shares;
(d) the Caddick Services Trust Property;
(e) such of the Jewellery identified in Annexure B to Annexure H “Pickles Valuations Appraisal Report” of the [Interim Receivers’ Report] as is identified in the affidavit of Bruce Gleeson to be sworn in these proceedings as having been purchased using Investor Funds;
(f) any further real or personal property of the First or Second Defendant that the [Receivers] may determine was purchased using Investor Funds or funds provided by Edward Grimley, Barbara Grimley or Adam Grimley;
(g) any other personal property of the First Defendant that the [Receivers] may identify.
(Underlining omitted.)
13 In the course of the hearing ASIC sought leave to file a third further amended originating process. The key amendments are:
(1) the definition of “Receivership Property” has been amended to mean “all property (as defined in section 9 of the [Corporations Act]) of [Ms Caddick]”;
(2) an amendment to the date from which the declaration of breach of s 911A of the Corporations Act is sought against Ms Caddick;
(3) an amendment to para 9A(h) so that it is in the following terms:
(4) to the extent necessary seeking directions in relation to the distribution of funds in the Receivers’ Trust Account.
(5) amendments to para 9B which concerns the powers to be given to the Receivers, if appointed;
(6) the addition of para 9DD which provides:
(7) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in these orders is intended to limit the right of the [Receivers] to seek directions from the Court.
(8) the deletion of para 9M which sought to curtail the steps that the Liquidators could take if appointed such that they could not issue examination summons or pursue any claims available to Maliver through court proceedings without first seeking the Court’s approval and giving notice to ASIC.
14 The filing of the third further amended originating process should be allowed. Only Ms Caddick’s parents made submissions in relation to its filing. However, those submissions address the relief sought by the third further amended originating process, rather than the question of leave to file it, and are set out at [309]-[314] below.
15 ASIC relied on a significant volume of evidence which, in broad terms, included evidence given by: ASIC as to documents obtained and findings from its investigations into Maliver and Ms Caddick; the director of the entity that held the Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) which Ms Caddick claimed to hold; four investors regarding their dealings with Ms Caddick; officers of CommSec regarding the existence of CommSec Accounts referred to in documents provided by Ms Caddick to investors; and the Interim Receivers and Provisional Liquidators in relation to the work they have undertaken. It is neither possible nor, indeed, desirable to set out that evidence in full. It is summarised below to the extent it is relevant to the issues that arise for resolution.
16 Maliver was incorporated on 18 June 2013. Ms Caddick is the sole director, secretary and shareholder of Maliver.
17 ASIC is the authority that regulates the Australian financial services industry and is responsible for the supervision and granting of AFSLs pursuant to Pt 7.6 of the Corporations Act. Details of all AFSL holders and their authorised representatives are maintained by ASIC in registers within databases maintained by it pursuant to s 1274 of the Corporations Act which include the Australian Securities Commission on Time (ASCOT) database and the Seibel database.
18 Based on searches undertaken by ASIC on the ASCOT and Seibel databases, neither Ms Caddick nor Maliver currently hold or have previously held an AFSL, Maliver is not and has never been an authorised representative of an AFSL holder and since 9 October 2009 Ms Caddick has not been and is not presently an authorised representative of an AFSL holder.
3.2 Documents provided to investors by Maliver
19 Isabella Lucy Allen is an investigator in ASIC’s financial services enforcement team as part of the Office of Enforcement. Ms Allen has been the case officer in charge of the investigation into Maliver and Ms Caddick since its commencement on 8 September 2020. Ms Allen explains that as part of its investigation ASIC has obtained more than 50,000 documents which relate to Identified Investors, who are the 72 investors listed in the document described as “Updated Annexure I” to Mr Gleeson’s affidavit sworn on 12 May 2021 and which is described at [180] below. Those documents were obtained from the following sources:
(1) voluntary production by Identified Investors;
(2) 14 devices seized under a search warrant issued under s 39D of the ASIC Act at the Caddick Residence;
(3) Ms Caddick’s email account; and
(4) notices issued under s 30 of the ASIC Act.
20 Based on her review of documents obtained from the sources referred to in the preceding paragraph, Ms Allen has identified that:
(1) on and from Maliver’s incorporation, Ms Caddick generally provided the following documents to investors prior to the commencement of their investment:
(a) a financial services guide from Maliver (Maliver FSG);
(b) an appointment letter;
(c) a letter of authority;
(d) a document titled “Fact Finder”; and
(e) a document titled “Investor Risk Profile”;
(2) usually at the end of each month Identified Investors were provided with the following documents that appeared to be a summary of their investment:
(a) a document titled “Portfolio Statement” which purported to be a print out from an Identified Investor’s CommSec account listing that investor’s current shareholding; and
(b) a document titled “Transaction Summary Statement” which purported to be a print out from an Identified Investor’s CommSec account listing the shares that had been purchased or sold during a specified period through that investor’s CommSec account;
(together, Portfolio Valuations); and
(3) certain investors were also provided with the following documents:
(a) a document titled “Appointment & Implementation of Maliver Pty Ltd as your Adviser”;
(b) a document titled “Statement of Advice”; and
(c) a document titled “Request for personal information form”.
The documents listed at (1) and (2) above are more fully described below.
21 Based on her review of the documents obtained by ASIC, Ms Allen has ascertained in relation to the Identified Investors that 24 of them received a Maliver FSG, 27 of them received an appointment letter, 31 of them received an authority letter, 10 of them received a “Fact Finder”, nine of them received an “Investor Risk Profile” and 30 Identified Investors did not receive any of these pre-investment documents. Ms Allen provides the following explanation for the latter:
(1) seven of those Identified Investors became clients and made their investments prior to Maliver’s incorporation; and
(2) the balance were, for the most part, related to other Identified Investors (e.g. they were family members or a related entity, such as a self-managed super fund, of an existing investor). It appears that where that occurred, Ms Caddick did not reissue pre-investment documents setting up the client relationship, providing information about Maliver and seeking information about the client.
22 During the period 28 July 2018 to 11 November 2020 Ms Caddick provided a number of investors with the Maliver FSG. Based on Ms Allen’s review of the documentation obtained by ASIC there were five versions of the Maliver FSG, identified as follows:
(1) Maliver Financial Services Guide v 1.0.pdf;
(2) Maliver Financial Services Guide v 1.1.pdf;
(3) Maliver Financial Services Guide v 1.3 0814;
(4) Maliver Financial Services Guide v 1.8 0717; and
(5) Maliver Financial Services Guide v 1.8 012020.
23 Each version of the Maliver FSG included the following:
(1) under the heading “What is a financial services guide?”
The Financial Services Guide (FSG) is an important document. It is designed to provide information about the financial services provided by Maliver and its representatives. It aims to assist you in deciding whether to use the services we offer. It also provides you with an understanding of what to expect from your dealings with Maliver.
(2) under the heading “Who is responsible for the services you receive?”:
Maliver is an independent financial planning company and the holder of an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL); Licence Number [REDACTED]. As an AFSL holder it is Maliver who is responsible for the services that are provided to you. Your Adviser will be acting on behalf of Maliver when recommending both strategic solutions and products. Your Adviser does not act as a representative of any other licensee in providing financial services to you.
(3) under the heading “Who is my Adviser?”
Your Adviser is Melissa Caddick, who operates under the business name Maliver Pty Limited (A.C.N 164334918). Maliver is the holder of an Australian Financial Services Licence as issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC); Licence Number [REDACTED].
(4) under the heading “Remuneration received by Maliver”:
Maliver charges a yearly Portfolio Management Fee based on:
Total Funds Under Management at 0.75% inclusive of GST
24 The purpose of the appointment letter was to authorise the establishment of a CommSec account in the name of a particular investor. Such a letter, examples of which were in evidence before me, provided (with personal identifiers omitted):
25 The letter of authority sought confirmation from a new client that he or she had read the documentation provided. Such a letter, examples of which were also in evidence before me, were addressed to Maliver and relevantly provided (with personal identifiers omitted):
3.2.4 Fact finder and investor risk profile
26 The fact finder sought information from investors about their personal circumstances and financial situation. The investor was asked to complete the document by providing information including their full name, date and place of birth, nationality, marital status, contact details, employment status and details, and whether they have a will or insurance. It also contained a section for “adviser notes” and a table for the investor to list his or her assets and liabilities.
27 An investor risk profile sought to understand the risk appetite of the particular investor. It included at its commencement:
Your attitude to risk is probably the most important factor to consider before investing. To achieve higher returns, you will have to be prepared to accept a higher risk of capital loss. This is because the funds and assets that offer high returns are generally more volatile than those producing lower returns. It is what we call ‘risk/return trade off”.
We will recommend investment strategies to match your investments to your risk profile. Investing across the various investment sectors according to your risk profile is called diversification. For example, instead of investing only in property, or only in shares, you might invest proportion in both, or even include cash or fixed interest to create a balanced portfolio.
The workbook will help us to understand what type of Investor you can afford to be and will enable us to recommend a personal asset allocation tailored to your needs. Please complete questions below by circling the answer that most closely describes you for each question.
There followed a series of questions to which the client was asked to respond by picking the answer he or she considered to be most appropriate in each case.
28 The last page of the investor risk profile included the “investor profile” to be assessed against four categories: conservative, moderate, balanced, growth and high growth. Based on the answers given to each of the questions an investor was allocated points, the total of which determined which of these categories applied to the investor.
29 Finally, by signing the investor risk profile, the client was asked to acknowledge the following (as written):
I/We confirm that I/We have read though the Personal Risk Profile Questionnaire and I/We are comfortable with the above Personal Risk Profile selection.
I/We have discussed the potential risks fully with our Advisor and I/We fully accept the consequences of my/our
30 Ms Allen has located multiple Portfolio Valuations for each Identified Investor which, based on her review, she says were emailed by Ms Caddick to each Identified Investor. Ms Allen has extracted from the documents obtained by ASIC a copy of a covering email and attached Portfolio Valuation for each Identified Investor. An example of an email and the accompanying Portfolio Valuation for one of the Identified Investors, Katherine Horn, who has also given evidence (see below), is as follows:
(1) the covering email dated 31 March 2016 from Ms Caddick to Ms Horn provides:
Dear Kate,
attached please find portfolio valuations for the period ending 31 March 2016.
In the first 10 weeks of 2016, share markets were regularly described as turbulent. Globally, shares shed 11$ of their value between the start of the year and mid February. Predictions of a global recession were frequent and shrill. Oil and iron prices tanked. Adding further to the gloom, reports did their rounds of predicting a collapse in Australian house prices and bank shares.
Then, the widespread gloom dissipated. By mid March, key share indexes in the US and Australia, and surprisingly, those in emerging economies – had recovered most of their earlier losses. Bulk commodity prices shot upwards, with iron ore up by an impressive 66% from its low point. Bank shares were keenly sought.
Periodically, claims are made that Australian housing is in a bubble, house prices are about to crash and the prices of bank shares will crumble because of bad debts.
When sentiment on the global economy is fragile, the accumulation of even mildly negative news can drive share markets a lot lower and we have experienced this albeit with recovery since January 1, 2016.
There is now a more balanced outlook, with shares of companies with strong growth earnings. It is important to remember that it (sic) times of market stress, sensible diversification makes sense, which is how your portfolio is positioned.
Lets arrange a lunch or a Friday night dinner - let me know your schedule, missing you!!!!!
Kind Regards
Melissa Caddick
(2) the email attached:
(a) a single cover page on Maliver letterhead stating: “[a]ttached please find portfolio valuation for the period ending 31 March 2016”;
(b) a summary document titled “Kate Horn – RETURN V’S ALL ORDINARIES INDEX”;
(c) a CommSec portfolio statement showing shareholdings as at 31 March 2016;
(d) a CommSec transaction summary statement for the period 1 July 2015 to 31 March 2016;
(e) a CommSec portfolio statement summary for the period 1 July 2015 to 31 March 2016 showing dividend payments and cash deposits and withdrawals; and
(f) a CommSec portfolio statement dividend summary for the period 1 July 2015 to 31 March 2016.
31 By way of illustration, reproduced below are the documents referred to at [30(2)(b) and (c)] above:
And:
32 [REDACTED] is a certified financial advisor and the sole director and owner of [REDACTED] which provides financial planning, investment, superannuation and insurance advice services.
33 [REDACTED] first met Ms Caddick in about 2003 when she was the New South Wales Development Manager of Tandem Advice Pty Ltd which held an AFSL and was a dealer group owned by ING. [REDACTED] explains that a dealer group is a group of authorised representatives licensed to provide financial advice under a single AFSL. [REDACTED]’s role was to support and develop the businesses that were being brought under Tandem’s AFSL. This role required her to coach businesses to improve their processes and procedures and to assist with their growth, compliance and business development.
34 In that capacity [REDACTED] had frequent dealings with Wise Financial Services, which was part of the Tandem dealer group, and, in particular, with two of Wise Financial’s advisors, one of whom was Ms Caddick. [REDACTED] understood that Ms Caddick was a shareholder in Wise Financial which predominantly arranged superannuation for employees of its corporate clients but, over time, became more tailored in its offering and provided advice to individuals as well as corporate members.
35 [REDACTED] recalls that in 2005 Ms Caddick informed her that she was leaving Wise Financial. Thereafter, she had infrequent contact with Ms Caddick until about 2007 or 2008 when she bumped into her and they again established more regular contact.
36 In 2008 [REDACTED] established [REDACTED]. Her husband is its general manager and it does not currently have any employees. [REDACTED] and her husband work as consultants to [REDACTED].
37 From about 2009 [REDACTED] arranged personal insurance for Ms Caddick and members of Ms Caddick’s family.
38 In about 2009 [REDACTED] recalls having discussions with Ms Caddick during which Ms Caddick mentioned that she wanted to start her own advice business focusing on investment advice and assisting high net-worth clients. Beyond that [REDACTED] had no insight into Ms Caddick’s proposed business.
39 Initially [REDACTED] operated under the AFSL of [REDACTED] as a corporate authorised representative. However, in 2013 [REDACTED] applied for and obtained its own AFSL which permits it to provide investment, insurance, superannuation and direct equities advice. [REDACTED] has never appointed anyone as an authorised representative to provide service on its behalf under its AFSL and neither [REDACTED] nor her husband have allowed anyone to provide any service on behalf of [REDACTED] other than in the case of para-planning, compliance reviews and audits, for which external providers are usually hired.
40 By letter dated 20 June 2013 from [REDACTED], [REDACTED] informed Ms Caddick that [REDACTED] had recently been issued with its own AFSL by ASIC. The letter included:
As of 1st July 2013 I will no longer be licenced by our current Financial Services Licence provider, [REDACTED], rather I will operate under [REDACTED]’s new AFSL. [REDACTED]’s AFSL number as issued by ASIC is [REDACTED].
This in no way changes our relationship as your Financial Adviser, nor the plans we have put in place. Everything will stay the same unless you opt to retain PATRON Financial Advice as your Financial Services Licensee.
In this event please notify me within 30 days and I will advise PATRON who will allocate another adviser to look after you.
41 On 2 July 2013 [REDACTED] sent Ms Caddick a copy of the financial services guide developed for [REDACTED] titled “FINANCIAL SERVICES GUIDE Version 1.0 – 1 July 2013 [REDACTED]” and displaying AFSL number [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] FSG). As Ms Caddick was a client of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] understood that she was obliged to share the document with her. [REDACTED] explained that when a financial advice business comes under a new AFSL it has to advise all of its clients of the change to ensure that they are aware of a number of things including how to find the business, make a complaint and any material changes such as a change in licence number, services or fees.
42 The [REDACTED] FSG included the following:
(1) under the heading “What is a financial services guide?”:
The Financial Services Guide (FSG) is an important document. It is designed to provide information about the financial services provided by [REDACTED] and its representatives. It aims to assist you in deciding whether to use the services we offer. It also provides you with an understanding of what to expect from your dealings with [REDACTED].
(2) under the heading “Who is responsible for the services you receive?”:
[REDACTED] is an independent financial planning company and the holder of an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL); Licence Number [REDACTED]. As an AFSL holder it is [REDACTED] who is responsible for the services that are provided to you. Your Adviser will be acting on behalf of [REDACTED] when recommending both strategic solutions and specific products. Your Adviser does not act as a representative of any other licensee in providing financial services to you.
(3) under the heading “Who is my Adviser?”
Your Adviser is [REDACTED], who operates under the business name [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is the holder of an Australian Financial Services Licence as issued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC); Licence Number [REDACTED].
43 In or around July 2013 [REDACTED] had a telephone conversation with Ms Caddick during the course of which they had an exchange to the following effect:
Ms Caddick: Would you consider having me under your licence?
[REDACTED]: Let me talk to [my husband], I will think about it.
44 A day or so later, after speaking with her husband, [REDACTED] telephoned Ms Caddick and explained that she would not authorise or permit her to provide financial services on behalf of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] recalls that at the time she said words to the following effect to Ms Caddick:
We don’t want any risk. Having advisors doing whatever they want under our licence is a risk and I never wanted that.
And:
I never wanted to start a dealer group and I didn’t want the responsibility of supervision of other advisers.
[REDACTED] recalls that Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
That okay, no hard feelings. I understand and I will get my own AFSL.
45 [REDACTED] did not have any further discussions with Ms Caddick in relation to her request to operate under [REDACTED]’s AFSL and at no time has [REDACTED] given Ms Caddick or Maliver permission to operate under [REDACTED]’s AFSL.
3.4 Maliver’s client relationships
46 Annexure A to each of the Interim Receivers’ Report and the Provisional Liquidators’ Report is identical. According to the Interim Receivers and Provisional Liquidators, it sets out the typical steps undertaken by Maliver to procure an investment from its clients or investors. It is based on the Interim Receivers’ and Provisional Liquidators’ investigations as at the date of their respective reports, 15 February 2021, including interviews, analysis of bank and shareholding statements, meetings and correspondence with investors. The file note reflects the Interim Receivers’ and Provisional Liquidators’ understanding and, as ASIC accepted, is their opinion of the way in which Maliver and Ms Caddick operated, particularly in their characterisation of some of Ms Caddick’s conduct. While it must be viewed in that light, it provides a useful starting point to consider Maliver’s client interactions.
47 Annexure A includes:
1. Investors would generally be introduced to Ms Caddick via word of mouth / contacts.
2. Some investors were known to Ms Caddick in her day-to-day life and she built strong personal relationships with them.
3. Some investors were part of Ms Caddick’s immediate and extended family.
4. Ms Caddick would often provide a background story as part of her sales pitch to the investors which involved her:
a. receiving a big payout from her previous employment;
b. having a restraint of trade after leaving her previous employment;
c. managing a limited number of investors and only having space when investors closed their portfolios; and
d. boasting about her existing clients and their satisfaction with the returns achieved.
5. Ms Caddick would then discuss with the investors their personal financial position (if she did not know already), their goals and develop with them an investment strategy and risk profile.
6. Investor would be asked to sign a letter to CommSec authorising Melissa Caddick of [Maliver] to establish a CommSec Trading Account in the name of investors. The letter also authorised [Maliver] to act as the investor’s advisor. …
7. Depending on the type of investment (e.g., individual or SMSF), and existing bank accounts, investors would take steps to transfer funds to [Maliver’s] bank account or their SMSF bank accounts to commence investment. For certain investors, Ms Caddick and the investors would both attend the branch to open bank accounts which Ms Caddick was a signatory.
8. The Financial Services Guide provided by Ms Caddick to Investors … noted an AFSL of [REDACTED]. It also advised that the adviser (being Ms Caddick) will be acting on behalf of [Maliver]. [Maliver] charged an Annual Portfolio Management Fee on total funds under management at 0.75% inclusive of GST.
9. Certain sole beneficiary investors established their SMSF through Ms Caddick and had Ms Caddick as one of the Trustees as there is a requirement to have two (2) Trustees for a sole member SMSF.
10. Ms Caddick would organise the process of setting up the SMSF including any rollover from existing accounts. Documents would be signed by the investors to facilitate the rollover.
11. Investors would also sign a letter saying they have read the Financial Services Guide, Implementation, Fees & Brokerage and Fact Find. …
12. Once the funds were received by [Maliver] or into bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick, there would be a portfolio statement in the name of the superannuation fund provided to the investor showing the initial investment and portfolio composition. …
13. The investor would then receive a … monthly portfolio statements from [Maliver]. This would be enclosed in a letter from [Maliver] with a summary of their investment including the details of funds transferred, any withdrawals of their investment and portfolio composition (e.g., cash and shares) and a comparison between the investor’s ‘return’ and the All Ords Index return. …
14. For the SMSFs, every year a checklist would be sent to the Trustees in order for the superannuation accounting firms to complete the required financials and tax lodgements.
15. Investors would be sent a yearly invoice (on the anniversary of the initial investment) for the portfolio management fees that would be paid separately by the investors.
16. If the investors wanted to invest more, they did so and their monthly portfolio statements would be updated to reflect same.
48 ASIC relied on the evidence of four of the Identified Investors: Katherine Anne Horn, Cheryl Olga Kraft-Reid, Susan Margaret Coetzee and David John Wilson. I will refer to this subset of Identified Investors collectively as the Investor Witnesses. In summary, each of the Investor Witnesses describes how they met Ms Caddick, their decision to either, in the case of Ms Horn, engage Ms Caddick as her advisor or, in the case of the other Investor Witnesses, become a client of Maliver including the material they received, the establishment of self-managed superannuation funds, bank accounts and share trading accounts, and how reports were provided on investments and the client relationship was thereafter managed. In a number of respects their experiences were similar and bear out the general description included in Annexure A to the Appointees’ Reports. I set out below a summary of their evidence.
49 Ms Horn is a [REDACTED] and currently works as a [REDACTED]. She does have not a detailed understanding of investment products or the financial services industry. Prior to investing with Ms Caddick she held her superannuation in an industry super fund and also held some shares.
50 Ms Horn has known Ms Caddick for many years. She lived three doors down from Ms Caddick while growing up and she and Ms Caddick attended the same preschool and high school. Ms Caddick moved overseas when Ms Horn was in her 20s but upon Ms Caddick’s return to Australia they became “quite good friends”.
51 Ms Horn believes that she started investing with Ms Caddick prior to the incorporation of Maliver. She recalls hearing about Maliver in late 2014, sometime after she had made her first investment and soon after Ms Caddick married. In any event, Ms Horn considered that as far as her investments were concerned Maliver and Ms Caddick were one and the same.
52 Ms Horn recalls that in about 2012, just after Ms Caddick returned from overseas, she visited her at her home and they had a conversation during which Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
I am starting up a business for people in similar positions to you and me.
And:
Are you interested in investing your superannuation though me?
And:
I will invest your superannuation in shares.
And:
I will charge you a fee of 0.5 percent of funds under management. This is less than I charge other people, because you are my friend.
53 About a month later Ms Caddick again raised with Ms Horn the issue of investing her superannuation with her and they had another conversation about the topic during which Ms Caddick said words to the effect that “it is all very low risk and simple”. Ms Caddick did not provide Ms Horn with any documents, advertising or other informational material during their discussions. All of the information Ms Horn had about what Ms Caddick was intending to do came from their conversations.
54 Shortly thereafter Ms Horn agreed to take Ms Caddick up on her offer. She thought, given Ms Caddick’s experience in the finance industry, that she could achieve better returns than she would by investing with an industry fund. Ms Horn recalls that Ms Caddick’s explanation of how she would invest her superannuation in shares sounded very simple.
3.4.1.1 Establishment of and investment by the [REDACTED]
55 In about October 2012 Ms Caddick assisted Ms Horn to set up a self-managed superannuation fund styled “[REDACTED]” (KH Super Fund) and an account with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) styled “[REDACTED]” (KH Super Fund Account) and with the rollover of her superannuation from First State Super to the KH Super Fund Account. Ms Horn recalls that the latter was done in two tranches: an initial amount was rolled over in October 2012; and the balance was rolled over in 2013.
56 Ms Caddick provided advice on the contributions Ms Horn should make to the KH Super Fund and assisted her with its administration and management including organising for its audit by a superannuation accounting company.
57 Monthly statements for the KH Super Fund Account were provided to Ms Caddick. Initially Ms Horn sent a copy of each statement to Ms Caddick and, from a time in 2019 or 2020, they were sent directly to Ms Caddick at her post office box address which was the address listed on the account. Ms Horn did not allow Ms Caddick to access the KH Super Fund Account. She transferred funds as required by cheque or electronic funds transfer to accounts nominated by Ms Caddick.
58 In the period from October 2012 to June 2018 Ms Horn transferred $135,300 from the KH Super Fund Account to Ms Caddick and Maliver for investment and, in the period October 2013 to October 2019, Ms Horn transferred $14,461.26 from the KH Super Fund Account to Ms Caddick and Maliver for annual management fees.
3.4.1.2 Ms Horn’s personal investments
59 About one month after Ms Horn started investing her superannuation with Ms Caddick, Ms Caddick inquired whether she would like to create an investment portfolio to be managed by her, outside of her superannuation investments. Ms Horn recalls that Ms Caddick informed her that the dividends from any shares purchased would go into the cash section of her investment portfolio and that she would then reinvest those amounts. As a result Ms Horn did not expect to have funds transferred back into her account.
60 Ms Horn informed Ms Caddick that she was happy for her to create and manage an investment portfolio for her. She trusted that Ms Caddick had her best interests at heart and understood that she had experience in investing. Ms Horn’s goal was to build up sufficient funds to enable her to assist her children to pay for a deposit on a house when they were older and she believed that Ms Caddick may be able to help her to do that.
61 Ms Horn had a CBA Smart Access account in her name (CBA Personal Account). In the period from November 2012 to March 2019 Ms Horn transferred $488,050 from that account to Ms Caddick and Maliver, either via cheque or electronic funds transfer, for investment in her name. In the period October 2013 to October 2019 Ms Horn also paid approximately $16,600 in annual account management fees.
62 Ms Horn recalls that Ms Caddick only asked her to invest more money with her on one occasion when, in about March 2019, she told Ms Caddick about a term deposit she had. At the time Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
The interest rate isn’t very good. I can invest this for you.
After this conversation Ms Horn withdrew $170,000 from the term deposit and provided that amount by bank cheque, which appears to have been facilitated via the CBA Personal Account, Ms Caddick. This amount, which is included in the total referred to in the preceding paragraph, was the last amount Ms Horn invested with Ms Caddick. This was because she was happy with the value of her investment based on the quarterly updates (i.e. the Portfolio Valuations) she had been receiving.
63 In 2019 and 2020 Ms Horn was aware of payments being made by her family into her personal investment portfolio. According to Ms Horn, these payments were not paid by her via the CBA Personal Account but were paid by Ms Horn’s family members directly to Ms Caddick for the purpose of investment into Ms Horn’s investment portfolio. Although the evidence is unclear, they appear to comprise:
(1) two payments of $100,000 each made by Ms Horn’s mother on 23 September 2019 and 6 December 2019 respectively. Ms Horn identified these payments into her investment portfolio, which she believes were from the proceeds of sale of her father’s bank note collection after his death, in quarterly reports she received from Ms Caddick; and
(2) a payment of $500,000 made by Ms Horn’s mother on 6 May 2020 recorded in a Portfolio Valuation for the period ending 29 May 2020. Ms Horn recalls speaking with her brother, David Wilson, about an amount of $500,000 that her mother intended to transfer to her investment portfolio.
3.4.1.3 Interactions between Ms Horn and Ms Caddick
64 During the period in which she made her investments, Ms Horn had the following interactions with Ms Caddick:
(1) she spoke with Ms Caddick about once a fortnight. Ms Horn described these conversations as mostly personal in nature. It was uncommon for them to discuss business;
(2) she received emails, usually on a quarterly basis, with updates on her investments. There were two documents or sets of Portfolio Valuations provided, one for the CommSec account set up for the KH Super Fund and the other for her personal investments; and
(3) she met with Ms Caddick every year around October for an annual review of her investments, usually over lunch in the Sydney suburb of Brighton Le Sands which was halfway between Ms Horn’s and Ms Caddick’s homes. During these meetings Ms Caddick would inform Ms Horn which shares she had invested in, sometimes telling her why she had done so.
3.4.1.4 Summary of funds invested
65 By way of summary Ms Horn gives the following evidence:
(1) since 2012 she has paid $149,761.26 from the KH Super Fund Account and $504,637.97 from the CBA Personal Account to Ms Caddick and Maliver, inclusive of $31,099.23 in annual management fees. I pause to observe that there are a number of discrepancies in Ms Horn’s evidence regarding the total sums paid from those accounts;
(2) of that amount the KH Super Fund received a payment of $15,000 from Ms Caddick or Maliver to assist in paying a tax liability. No other amounts have been received. However, Ms Horn did not expect that investment returns would be paid because of her earlier conversation with Ms Caddick (see [59] above);
(3) the monies referred to at (1) above represent Ms Horn’s life savings and the majority of her superannuation; and
(4) as at 30 September 2020, based on the Portfolio Valuations she received, Ms Horn was under the impression that the KH Super Fund’s investment portfolio was valued at $831,688.06 and her personal investment portfolio was valued at $1,960,976.72.
66 Mr Wilson is a [REDACTED] who operates as a sole trader and is Ms Horn’s brother. Mr Wilson has a general understanding of financial products and investing. Prior to making investments with Ms Caddick he invested in shares both personally and via his self-managed superannuation fund.
67 Mr Wilson has known Ms Caddick since he was about eight or nine years old when his family lived a few doors down from Ms Caddick’s family. He recalls that Ms Caddick and her brother, Adam Grimley, attended the same primary and high schools as he did, that he and Mr Grimley were in the same school year and that Ms Caddick was in the same school year as Ms Horn. In about the late 1970s Ms Caddick’s family moved house and after that Mr Wilson did not see Ms Caddick regularly. He described his relationship with Ms Caddick as mostly professional.
68 On 7 November 2007 Mr Wilson established his self-managed superannuation fund styled the “[REDACTED]” (Wilson Super Fund), at the suggestion of his father and with the assistance of his accountant.
69 Mr Wilson’s father passed away in 2008 and Mr Wilson thereafter took responsibility for looking after his mother’s retirement savings. From 2008 to 2015 he managed those investments, which were primarily investments in shares.
70 Mr Wilson recalls that in about 2012 he learnt from Ms Horn that she had invested through Ms Caddick’s business. In about 2013 Ms Horn asked Mr Wilson to look at a set of documents provided by Ms Caddick in relation to her investment with Maliver. Mr Wilson recalls that he reviewed the documents, which appeared to be print outs from a CommSec account and a bank statement, and that he had a conversation with Ms Horn which included informing her that “it all adds up and everything seems fine”. Based on his conversation with Ms Horn, Mr Wilson understood that Ms Caddick had established a company, Maliver, through which she was offering financial advice and investment services.
71 In about late 2014 Mr Wilson had a conversation with his brother about, among other things, his role in managing their mother’s retirement savings. He recalls that his brother made a suggestion in words to the following effect:
Why don’t you think about giving the money to Melissa and then you don’t have the headache of looking after it?
Mr Wilson understood the reference to Melissa to be a reference to Ms Caddick.
72 At about the same time Mr Wilson recalls having a conversation with Ms Horn about the performance of her investments being managed by Ms Caddick and that Ms Horn informed him that they were “performing well”.
73 Mr Wilson believes that his brother made a phone call to Ms Caddick to arrange an in person meeting.
3.4.2.1 Mr Wilson’s first meeting with Ms Caddick
74 On 6 May 2015 Mr Wilson and his brother attended a meeting with Ms Caddick at the Caddick Residence. Mr Wilson recalls that the following exchanges took place at that meeting:
(1) he asked Ms Caddick how she would invest their money and recalls that Ms Caddick said words to the effect of her being “only interested in Australian equities, and only about ten”. By this Mr Wilson understood Ms Caddick to mean that she was only following and investing in about 10 Australian stocks at that time;
(2) he also asked Ms Caddick how she charged for her services to which Ms Caddick replied that she “charged an annual management fee of 0.75% of the total funds managed”; and
(3) he asked Ms Caddick whether she was a member of a professional body for financial advisors in response to which Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
Well are you a member of your professional organisation?
Mr Wilson replied that he was not. By this exchange Mr Wilson understood that Ms Caddick had decided not to join a professional body and that membership was a matter of choice.
75 During the meeting Ms Caddick showed Mr Wilson and his brother documents relating to a sample portfolio of shares to explain what she planned to do with their investments and the sort of documentation they could expect to receive. Mr Wilson recalls that he told her about his financial circumstances and that Ms Caddick drew up a draft investment strategy incorporating the relevant figures. Mr Wilson understood that the strategy was for Ms Caddick to make a selection from 10 Australian shares and invest on Mr Wilson’s behalf using a CommSec account and an associated CBA Commonwealth Direct Investment Account (CDI Account) which she would establish in his name.
76 During the meeting Ms Caddick also provided Mr Wilson with a copy of a Maliver FSG. Mr Wilson recalls seeing an AFSL on the first page of that document.
3.4.2.2 Appointment of Maliver as advisor for the Wilson Super Fund
77 On 11 May 2015 Mr Wilson received an email from Ms Caddick attaching a document titled “David Wilson SF DRAFT Recommendation” which, in turn, attached a number of documents including:
(1) a file note of Mr Wilson’s discussion with Ms Caddick outlining his financial situation and objectives;
(2) a pro-forma will;
(3) a document appointing Maliver as his advisor;
(4) an authorisation for Ms Caddick or Maliver to establish a CommSec account in the name of the Wilson Super Fund; and
(5) a “personal portfolio summary”.
Mr Wilson recalls that he read the documents provided and that he understood that to buy Australian equities Ms Caddick would establish a CommSec account in his name and an associated CDI Account.
78 On 22 May 2015 Mr Wilson signed a document authorising Ms Caddick or Maliver to establish a CommSec account in the name of the Wilson Super Fund. He understood that by doing so he was permitting Ms Caddick to establish that account in his name.
3.4.2.3 Appointment of Maliver as advisor for Mr Wilson’s personal investments
79 In about August 2016 Mr Wilson decided to ask Ms Caddick to invest his personal savings in the same way as she was already doing for the Wilson Super Fund. Mr Wilson recalls he made his decision to do this after reviewing the CommSec printouts he had regularly received from Ms Caddick in relation to the performance of the Wilson Super Fund, noting that the returns were significantly better than those for his personal share portfolio which he was managing himself.
80 On 22 August 2016 Ms Caddick sent an email to Mr Wilson which included:
lovely chatting with you earlier today.
I have put together a short form recommendation for you. What I mean by short, is that I haven’t included the FSG, renumeration (sic) structure as you are an existing client and the service you will receive on this additional portfolio will be same as current. However, if you are not satisfied with the service received or wish to change the regularity of reporting please don’t hesitate to discuss with me.
I have had a look at my diary, presently I am available to meet with you as follows:
...
Attached to the email was a document on Maliver letterhead bearing an AFSL number [REDACTED] which set out a proposed asset allocation for an initial contribution by Mr Wilson of $200,000 for four Australian listed securities and recommended fund allocation ranges for each security.
81 At the time Mr Wilson was using CMC Markets as his stockbroker which required him to have a Bankwest trading account connected to its platform. When Ms Caddick agreed to manage his personal investments, Mr Wilson set about liquidating his shares held on the CMC Markets platform so that he could transfer a sum of money to Ms Caddick for the purposes of her trading on his behalf.
82 Although Mr Wilson can no longer recall the exact date, he met with Ms Caddick on a date after 23 August 2016 at which time, he recalls, he signed documents.
83 On 30 August 2016 Mr Wilson signed documents provided to him by Ms Caddick in relation to the establishment of what he understood was to be his personal investment portfolio. Included with those documents was a letter authorising Ms Caddick “to establish a CommSec Trading Account in the name of [Mr Wilson] under the Corporate Entity of [Maliver]”. On the same day Mr Wilson paid $260,000, by way of cheque, to Maliver to be invested on his behalf.
84 According to Mr Wilson, in the period from 10 June 2015 to 18 March 2020 he transferred a total of $1.32 million to Maliver comprising:
(1) $630,000 by way of contribution to the Wilson Super Fund; and
(2) $690,000 for his personal share portfolio.
85 Mr Wilson made each of the payments referred to in the preceding paragraph based on what Ms Caddick had told him at the meeting on 6 May 2015 and the documents subsequently provided to him. He understood that Ms Caddick or Maliver would invest the funds on his behalf and on behalf of the Wilson Super Fund. Mr Wilson would not have transferred any money to Ms Caddick or Maliver had he known that those monies were not to be invested in that way. Mr Wilson also understood that Ms Caddick would transfer the money from the Maliver account to a CDI Account which she had established in his name and which was linked to a CommSec trading account also established in his name. He understood that upon transferring the money from the CDI Account to the CommSec trading account Ms Caddick would buy and sell shares on his behalf for the purposes of receiving a return on the invested funds.
3.4.2.5 Maliver’s management of the investments
86 Mr Wilson had the following interactions for the purpose of Maliver’s management of both his personal investments and those made by the Wilson Super Fund:
(1) on 11 May 2016, he met with Ms Caddick for his first annual meeting to discuss the Wilson Super Fund. At the meeting he authorised Ms Caddick to pay the yearly management fee by electronic funds transfer;
(2) in about May 2016, a “Tax Receipt” dated 9 May 2016 was issued for yearly management fees charged by Maliver to the Wilson Super Fund which was as follows:
(3) on 20 July 2016, Mr Wilson received an email from Ms Caddick attaching end of year financial year documentation for his records and for provision to his accountant;
(4) in about February 2017, Mr Wilson signed documents authorising Edmond Ong of Superannuation Accounting Services Pty Ltd to complete the annual accounting and auditing for the Wilson Super Fund and authorising Mr Ong to direct all correspondence to Ms Caddick;
(5) on 5 June 2017 Mr Wilson attended an annual meeting with Ms Caddick;
(6) in about June 2017 Mr Wilson was issued with two tax invoices dated 5 June 2017 from Maliver for yearly management fees for:
(a) the Wilson Super Fund. The tax invoice was in substantially the same form as the document set out at [86(2)] above but stated that the funds invested by the Wilson Super Fund had a market value of $721,436.20 as at 5 June 2017 and provided for a management fee, based on that sum, of $5,951.58 (incl GST);
(b) his personal investment. Once again the tax invoice was in substantially the same form as that set out at [86(2)] above but stated that the funds Mr Wilson had invested had a market value of $307,809.30 as at 28 April 2017 and provided for a management fee, based on that amount, of $2,539.51 (incl GST);
(7) on 5 June 2017 Mr Wilson received tax receipts dated 5 June 2017 for payment of the management fees referred to at [86(6)] above;
(8) between July and September 2017 Mr Wilson received copies of documents in relation to the end of year reporting being undertaken by Superannuation Accounting Services for the Wilson Super Fund;
(9) in about April 2018 Mr Wilson received tax invoices dated 30 April 2018 from Maliver for yearly management fees for the Wilson Super Fund and for his personal investments. Once again those tax invoices were in substantially the same form as set out at [86(2)] above. The invoice for the Wilson Super Fund stated that the funds invested had a market value of $785,349.35 as at 30 April 2018 and, based on that amount, a management fee of $6,479.13 was payable and the invoice for Mr Wilson’s personal investments stated that the funds invested had a market value of $402,803.54 as at 30 April 2018 and, based on that amount, a management fee of $3,213.13 was payable;
(10) on 7 May 2018 Mr Wilson attended the Caddick Residence for an annual meeting;
(11) between July and September 2018 Mr Wilson received correspondence in relation to the end of year reporting for the Wilson Super Fund;
(12) in about May 2019 Mr Wilson received tax invoices dated 7 May 2019 from Maliver for yearly management fees for the Wilson Super Fund and his personal investments, substantially in the form of the invoice at [86(2)] above. The tax invoice for the Wilson Super Fund stated that the funds invested had a market value of $992,950.22 as at 7 May 2019 based on which a management fee of $8,191.84 was payable and the tax invoice for Mr Wilson’s personal investment stated that the funds invested had a market value of $454,633.01 as at 7 May 2019 based on which a management fee of $3,750.72 was payable;
(13) on 15 May 2019 Mr Wilson attended the Caddick Residence for an annual meeting;
(14) between July 2019 and August 2019 Mr Wilson received correspondence in relation to the end of year reporting for the Wilson Super Fund;
(15) on 30 April 2020 Mr Wilson received an email from Ms Caddick attaching tax invoices dated 30 April 2019 for Maliver’s annual portfolio management fees and Portfolio Valuations. The tax invoice for the Wilson Super Fund stated that the funds invested had a market value of $1,003,002.78 as at 30 April 2020 based on which a management fee of $8,274.77 was payable and the tax invoice for Mr Wilson’s personal investments stated the funds invested had a market value of $947,232.29 based on which a management fee of $7,814.67 was payable;
(16) on 4 May 2020 Mr Wilson had an annual meeting with Ms Caddick which was held by telephone due to the COVID-19 pandemic; and
(17) between July 2020 and September 2020 Mr Wilson received correspondence in relation to the end of financial year reporting for the Wilson Super Fund.
87 In the period from 2015 to 2020 Mr Wilson also received regular updates about the investments made by the Wilson Super Fund and on his own account. Those updates generally included:
(1) printouts from the CommSec accounts set up in the name of the Wilson Super Fund and in his name, titled “Portfolio Statement” and “Transaction Summary Statement”;
(2) a document titled “EOFY Economic Commentary” which was a four or five page document from Maliver setting out insights into the economy; and
(3) documents sent at the end of the financial year comprising a CDI Account statement, holding statement, CommSec tax invoices and an investment strategy agreement.
88 Mr Wilson did not ask for or receive any payments from returns on his investments throughout the investment period.
89 On 30 April 2021 Mr Wilson contacted the Cronulla branch of the CBA to confirm the status of his accounts. Upon enquiring whether the two CommSec accounts and the two CDI Accounts in his name and the name of the Wilson Super Fund existed, he was informed that they did not.
90 Cheryl Olga Kraft-Reid is a [REDACTED].
91 Ms Kraft-Reid first became aware of Ms Caddick and her services through her sister in about December 2013. At the time her sister mentioned that Ms Caddick was running a business called Maliver, that she had invested money with Ms Caddick but that Ms Caddick was not taking on any new clients. Ms Kraft-Reid requested that her sister speak with Ms Caddick about taking her and her wife, [REDACTED] (who without meaning any disrespect and for convenience I will refer to as [REDACTED]), on as clients. Sometime after this conversation Ms Kraft-Reid’s sister informed her that Ms Caddick had agreed to do so. However, Ms Kraft-Reid did not contact Ms Caddick at that time.
92 It was not until 9 November 2015 that Ms Kraft-Reid contacted Ms Caddick by telephone to gain an understanding of the investment services she provided. Following their call Ms Kraft-Reid received an email from Ms Caddick setting out the documents which she required her and [REDACTED] to bring to a meeting which had been scheduled, namely tax returns, superannuation statements, loan statements and cash balance. Ms Kraft-Reid recalls going through her files to locate these documents.
3.4.3.1 Initial meeting with Ms Caddick
93 On 10 November 2015, Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife met with Ms Caddick at the Caddick Residence. Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that during the meeting:
(1) she asked Ms Caddick how many clients she had and what she was doing for those clients. In response Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
I am wealthy in my own right. I don’t need to do this – I’m doing it to help people, and it’s very much restricted to family and friends. I only have about 50 clients.
(2) she asked Ms Caddick how investing with her worked. Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that, in response, Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
You would be investing with Maliver directly.
And:
You need to set up a self-managed super fund and be the trustees. You then need to transfer the money from your existing superannuation accounts to Maliver. I will then use the money to trade shares on your behalf on the stock market and the income from that will grow your super fund.
There was then discussion about the possible names for the proposed self-managed super fund, the amount that they had already accumulated in superannuation at the time and the performance of Ms Kraft-Reid’s superannuation account which at the time was held with AMP. Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
I can do better than your current super with AMP.
And:
There isn’t someone like me at AMP watching the market and investing in shares to grow your super the way I can.
94 Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that she had a conversation with Ms Caddick to the following effect:
Ms Kraft-Reid: I am sitting on about $330,000 in super and I want to retire when I’m 60. What I want is for, by that time, the amount in my super account to be comfortable.
Ms Caddick: That is do-able.
Ms Kraft-Reid: I have 15 years to work and as close to one million would be great for me. I would be willing to go a bit higher in risk to get that.
Ms Caddick: That is achievable.
Ms Kraft-Reid: [My wife] and I would like to live off the growth of our super, not the principal.
Ms Caddick: That is absolutely possible.
95 The conversation then turned to compliance issues. Ms Kraft-Reid said words to the following effect:
Because we would be the trustees on the super fund but you would be operating on our behalf, how would be sure you would be meeting all the compliance requirements for a self-managed super fund?
In response Ms Caddick opened the cupboards in her office to show Ms Kraft-Reid folders relating to investments made by her family members, including their contents. Ms Kraft-Reid was left with the impression that Ms Caddick’s filing system was meticulous and efficient.
96 Ms Caddick also informed Ms Kraft-Reid that there would be an auditor, its role and the annual fee that the auditor would charge. Ms Kraft-Reid recalls asking in relation to the auditor “what do they check”. In response Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
They check I’m managing your fund because you’re the trustees and I would be operating on your behalf.
And:
They will check the transfers from your existing super funds to Maliver, that all required taxes are being paid, and the money from my trading is going back into the self-managed super fund account.
And:
They will check Maliver’s trading and management of your account is meeting all the requirements.
97 Ms Kraft-Reid understood that their Maliver managed superannuation fund account would be separate to the bank account which she and her wife would have to set up as trustees of their self-managed super fund and into which funds from their existing superannuation accounts would be transferred.
98 Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that she and her wife asked further questions about the work of the auditor. In response, Ms Caddick took another client file and showed them some of the auditor’s reports that had been prepared for that client, including a compliance check list.
99 Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that there were three chairs and a long table in Ms Caddick’s office and that Ms Caddick showed her and [REDACTED] her set up. Ms Kraft-Reid observed that there were two very large screens on Ms Caddick’s desk: one showing the CommSec platform and the other showing what Ms Kraft-Reid understood to be the ASX. Ms Kraft-Reid told Ms Caddick that she had a personal CommSec account because she traded shares herself and inquired whether Ms Caddick could invest on her behalf through that account. Ms Caddick said that she could not and that she would set up an account for Ms Kraft-Reid.
100 During the meeting Ms Caddick provided Ms Kraft-Reid with the following documents in a plastic folder: a Maliver FSG (Verison 1.3 – August 2014) bearing AFSL [REDACTED]; a five-page document bearing a handwritten annotation “SAMPLE CLIENT REPORT”; a two-page document titled “PROPOSED ASSET ALLOCATION & MANAGEMENT RULES FOR CLIENT & ADVISER”; and a three-page document titled “APPOINTMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF MALIVER PTY LTD AS YOUR ADVISER” which displayed at the bottom of each page “Maliver Pty Ltd (AFSL [REDACTED]) – Implementation, Fees, Brokerage, Vision, Value”.
101 Ms Caddick informed Ms Kraft-Reid that Maliver would be remunerated by way of an annual fee of 0.75% on the total funds under management and that there would be a brokerage fee of $100 for trades.
102 Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that [REDACTED] inquired of Ms Caddick whether she was insured to which Ms Caddick responded “of course” and referred them to page 6 of the Maliver FSG. Under the heading “Resolution of Complaints” included on that page is information about the Financial Ombudsman Service Limited and ASIC. A section titled “Compensation Arrangements” appearing on page 7 of the Maliver FSG includes the following:
Maliver is covered by professional indemnity insurance satisfying the requirement under the Corporations Act for compensation arrangements. This cover is designed to compensate retail clients for losses they suffer as a result of a breach by Maliver in the obligations outlined in the Corporations Act.
103 During the meeting Ms Caddick started to complete a “fact finder” document which was about Ms Kraft-Reid’s and [REDACTED]’s reasons for investing and assessment of their risk tolerance. Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] took the document with them and completed it over that afternoon and the following day and returned it to Ms Caddick.
104 Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that at the conclusion of the meeting Ms Caddick summarised her answers to questions that she had asked throughout the meeting, including in relation to the steps involved in establishing a self-managed super fund and applying for a tax file number (TFN), ABN and bank account. Ms Caddick told Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] that they should arrange to meet her at the bank to go through how to open the necessary account and they discussed when to transfer money from their existing individual superannuation accounts to Maliver, the paperwork involved and Ms Caddick’s role in the paperwork.
3.4.3.2 The decision to invest with Maliver
105 Following their meeting Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife decided to invest approximately $440,000 of their superannuation with Ms Caddick. That decision was based on: Ms Caddick’s qualifications listed on pages 2 and 3 of the Maliver FSG; Ms Kraft-Reid’s belief that there was independent oversight of Ms Caddick’s business based on the audit reports that Ms Caddick had shown her in the course of their meeting and the section at pages 6-7 of the Maliver FSG on complaint handling and compensation; Ms Caddick’s apparent high level of organisation and efficiency, which Ms Kraft-Reid inferred from her observations of Ms Caddick’s office set up and files; the fact that Ms Caddick had been closely linked to Ms Kraft-Reid’s family for about 25 years, having been close friends with her sister, who had invested with her, as had her brother; and Ms Caddick’s remarks to the effect that her management of their self-managed super fund would make Ms Kraft-Reid’s retirement at 60 “doable” and that growth in her superannuation to about $1 million was “achievable”.
106 Having made the decision to proceed, Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife rang Ms Caddick to inform her that they would like her to manage their superannuation fund. Ms Caddick informed them that she would send them some documents to sign, including a trust deed.
3.4.3.3 Establishment of the self-managed superannuation fund and associated bank account
107 Ms Kraft-Reid set about working with Ms Caddick to set up the [REDACTED] (Kraft-Reid Super Fund):
(1) on 2 February 2016, Ms Kraft-Reid signed a letter, which had been drafted by Ms Caddick, addressed to Edmond Ong of Superannuation Accounting Services which enclosed a completed Superannuation Accounting Services form titled “Set-up a new SMSF” for the establishment of the Kraft-Reid Super Fund. The form was signed by Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife and dated 11 October 2015. The covering letter also provided:
Please be advised that we request all correspondence in regards to establishing, conducting the annual compliance service, notice of TFN and ABN together with all ATO notices for the [Kraft-Reid Super Fund] be forwarded to:
Primary Contact Details
Mrs Melissa Caddick
PO Box W4
WATSONS BAY NSW 2030
…
Please note that Melissa will be responsible for providing Superannuation Accounting Services with EOFY documentation to enable completion of accounts. If you have any queries during this period please refer all enquiries to Melissa.
Melissa looks forward to receiving the Trust Deed for the [Kraft-Reid Super Fund].
(2) on 10 February 2016 Ms Caddick sent an email to Ms Kraft-Reid reporting that she had received the trust deed for the Kraft-Reid Super Fund and that a pack of documents was being sent for her and her wife’s signature and return. Ms Caddick also noted that she was awaiting the TFN and ABN;
(3) upon receipt of the pack of documents referred to in the preceding subparagraph, Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife signed and returned them to Ms Caddick. They were a document titled “[REDACTED] application for membership”, a deed poll, a document titled “resolution of the trustees of the [REDACTED]”, a trustee declaration and a superannuation trust deed;
(4) on 2 March 2016 Ms Kraft-Reid was informed by email from Ms Caddick that she had received the TFN and ABN for Kraft-Reid Super Fund and that the next step was to establish a bank account.
108 On 22 March 2016 Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife attended the Five Dock branch of the CBA with Ms Caddick for the purposes of establishing a CDI Account. Ms Kraft-Reid describes her time at the bank setting up the account in some detail. Among other things, she recalls that:
(1) Ms Caddick explained that the purpose of the account in words to the following effect:
We need a bank account associated with the SMSF to facilitate the transfer of the money. To release money from your super account it will have to go to another account affiliated with the SMSF.
And:
The money in the account will used to pay fees.
You will need a cheque book and a deposit book.
(2) she was clear that she and her wife did not want Ms Caddick to have the authority to withdraw or transfer any money without their signatures; and
(3) when setting up the mailing address to receive correspondence Ms Caddick said that “it would be better for it to go to my PO Box at Watson’s Bay. Then every month I’ll send you the account statements”. Ms Kraft-Reid does not recall having any concerns about this because, as part of the account set up, she arranged for the new account to be added to her existing CBA Net Bank portal which would enable her to check the account online whenever she wished. Accordingly, she nominated Maliver’s post office box as the mailing address for the account as suggested by Ms Caddick.
109 The CDI account styled “Kraft-Reid Super Fund Account” (Kraft-Reid CDI Account) was used as a conduit for transferring funds from Ms Kraft-Reid’s and her wife’s pre-existing superannuation funds to Maliver. At the time, their existing superannuation funds redeemed their investments by depositing the funds into the Kraft-Reid CDI Account. Between April and June 2016, following the rollover of funds from their existing superannuation funds as described below, Ms Kraft-Reid made out three cheques for a total of $440,000 from the Kraft-Reid CDI Account to Maliver and posted those cheques to it at its post office box address.
110 In October 2018 Ms Kraft-Reid electronically transferred a further $50,000 from the Kraft-Reid CDI Account to Maliver’s account.
3.4.3.4 Rollover of funds to the Kraft-Reid Super Fund
111 On 23 March 2016 Ms Caddick sent an email to Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] which, among other things, attached documents from AMP for signature by Ms Kraft-Reid for the purpose of effecting a rollover of the funds in her superannuation account held with AMP to the newly established Kraft-Reid Super Fund. Ms Kraft-Reid signed and returned the documents on 27 March 2016.
112 On 15 April 2016 Ms Caddick sent an email to Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] which included:
Attached please find documentation in relation to [REDACTED]’s [REDACTED] Redemption.
We banked the cheque today to the SMSF CBA bank account.
Please retain a copy of this on file.
Once the funds have cleared (allow up to 3 business days), please draw a cheque as follows:
Maliver Pty Limited $100,000.00
You can return this to me in one of the Express Post Envelopes that I sent to you earlier this week.
Upon receipt I shall attend to establishing the SMSF trading accounts.
Prior to establishment of the Kraft-Reid Super Fund, [REDACTED] superannuation was held with [REDACTED].
113 On 19 April 2016, Ms Kraft-Reid sent a cheque drawn on the Kraft-Reid CDI Account for $100,000 to Maliver. Ms Caddick confirmed receipt of the cheque by email dated 23 April 2016.
114 By email dated 24 April 2016 Ms Kraft-Reid informed Ms Caddick that her “super has moved into our account” and that “$338,977.30 was deposited on the (sic) 22 April”. This represented the amount rolled over from Ms Kraft-Reid’s AMP account. In response Ms Caddick sent an email which included:
Please draw a cheque for $300,000.00 payable to Maliver Pty Limited.
Forward in one of the Express post envelopes I sent to you.
Upon receipt I shall advise and establish the trading account. We are very very close to getting fully set up and operational!
Ms Kraft-Reid understood the reference to “establish the trading account” to mean that Ms Caddick would establish a CommSec account in the name of the Kraft-Reid Super Fund for the purposes of using the fund’s assets to buy and sell shares on behalf of her wife and herself.
115 On or about 26 April 2016, Ms Kraft-Reid wrote a cheque for $300,000 in favour of Maliver and posted it to Maliver at its post office box address.
116 On 28 April 2016, Ms Kraft-Reid received an email from Ms Caddick which included:
please be advised that we have today received cheque for $300,000.00 and this has been banked.
Once the funds are cleared we will attend to placing in the market.
Based on what Ms Caddick had told her during their initial meeting, Ms Kraft-Reid understood that when Ms Caddick used the words “placing in the market” this meant she would start buying shares and using those funds in the share market.
3.4.3.5 Ongoing relationship and dealings with Maliver
117 In about May 2016 Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] met with Ms Caddick at the Caddick Residence for an annual meeting. During that meeting they discussed the amount that [REDACTED] would be able to withdraw from the Kraft-Reid Super Fund as a monthly pension payment once she retired. Ms Kraft-Reid recalls that they had a conversation to the following effect:
[REDACTED]: How much can I take?
Ms Caddick: How much would you like?
[REDACTED]: $1,100 per month
Ms Caddick: We’ll that’s achievable
[REDACTED]: Is there a maximum I can take out before I start getting taxed?
Ms Kraft-Reid could not recall Ms Caddick’s answer to the last question posed but does recall that during the meeting it was agreed that [REDACTED] would take $1,200 a month.
118 [REDACTED] retired in July 2017 and, from that point on, Maliver deposited monthly pension payments for her into the Kraft-Reid CDI Account.
119 During the meeting referred to at [117] above, Ms Caddick provided a handwritten note to Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED]. The note set out the following:
1. [REDACTED] – set up a $200 p/m direct debit to SMSF CBA investment acct.
2. Ch/Fa - $40,000 to be drawn via cheque to Maliver - express post envelope.
3. call Adam
120 Ms Kraft-Reid understood this note in the following way:
(1) by the first point [REDACTED] was to set up a direct debit from her company bank account to the Kraft-Reid CDI Account which would be contributions to her superannuation. Those funds would then be transferred to Maliver. In fact from 17 June 2016 to 17 April 2017, on the 17th day of each month, $200 from [REDACTED]’s company account was transferred into the Kraft-Reid CDI Account. Those funds remained in the Kraft-Reid CDI Account and were never transferred to Maliver;
(2) by the second point Ms Kraft-Reid understood that, as a further $40,000 had been rolled over from AMP and deposited into the Kraft-Reid CDI Account, she or [REDACTED] should write a cheque for $40,000 to Maliver and send it by express post to Ms Caddick; and
(3) by the third point Ms Kraft-Reid understood that she should call their accountant, Adam Murphy, to inform him that [REDACTED] was retiring so that he could arrange [REDACTED]’s affairs and ensure that everything else was ready for her to do so.
121 Maliver continued to manage the Kraft-Reid Super Fund’s investments. Ms Kraft-Reid sets out correspondence received from, and other interactions with, Ms Caddick in relation to those investments commencing in June 2016 as follows:
(1) on 6 June 2016 Ms Kraft-Reid received a copy of a statement for the Kraft-Reid CDI Account for May 2016 which showed a balance of $50,672.29;
(2) on 3 July 2016 Ms Kraft-Reid requested Ms Caddick to withdraw $35,000 from the Kraft-Reid Super Fund and that it be paid into [REDACTED]’s personal account to enable [REDACTED] to purchase a car. Ms Caddick replied by email of the same date which included:
Just as a thought, I have had a look at your CBA DIA account we set up together at Five Dock. As at 31 May the account balance was $50,672.29.
I am about to send out the 30 June 2016 Portfolio Valuations. You will see that I did commence purchasing for your fund last week and am still sitting on approx $150k cash.
I’d suggest at this time do an EFT from the CBA DIA. BSB [REDACTED] Account No.: [REDACTED].
Let me know your thoughts.
(3) by email dated 18 July 2016 Ms Caddick provided three letters in relation to the $200 monthly contributions to be made by [REDACTED] into the Kraft-Reid Super Fund for signing by [REDACTED] and return to her;
(4) under cover of a letter dated 25 October 2016 from Maliver, Ms Kraft-Reid was provided with a “Rollover cheque from AMP for the amount of $2,796.29, together with a copy of the original AMP Rollover Benefit Statement” and asked to deposit the cheque into the Kraft-Reid CDI Account;
(5) by email dated 29 May 2017 Ms Caddick provided the “yearly invoice”. The attached tax invoice was issued by Maliver and was for “Yearly Review & Portfolio Management Fee” at “0.75% of Funds Under Management”. It included:
Initial Investment $ 440,000.00
Market Value @ $ 495,880.00
Total (ex-GST) $ 3,719.10
GST 10% $ 371.91
Invoice Total $ 4,091.01
(6) on 18 May 2017 Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife attended an annual review with Ms Caddick at the Caddick Residence;
(7) on 8 July 2017 Ms Kraft-Reid received an email from Ms Caddick informing her that she had “facilitated the transfer of $15,000.00 from the CBA trading account to [her wife’s] CBA working cash account” as the pension payment for [REDACTED] for the 2017-2018 year;
(8) on 11 April 2018 Ms Kraft-Reid received an email from Ms Caddick attaching a tax receipt for payment of Maliver’s annual fee which stated that the funds invested currently had a market value of $520,580 and that the management fee of 0.75% had been calculated based on that sum;
(9) on 30 September 2018 Ms Kraft-Reid and Ms Caddick exchanged emails. Ms Kraft-Reid inquired whether the sum of $50,000 she had transferred from her superannuation held with AMP to the Kraft-Reid CDI Account should be left there or should be “put to use in investments”. Ms Caddick responded that “[w]e can certainly place the funds in the market” and provided details of Maliver’s bank account to facilitate transfer by EFT;
(10) on 15 April 2019 Ms Kraft-Reid received an email from Ms Caddick attaching a tax receipt for payment of Maliver’s annual fee services which stated that the funds invested had a market value as at 5 April 2019 of $715,900 and that a 0.75% management fee had been charged based on that figure;
(11) on 15 October 2019 Ms Caddick sent an email to Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife which included:
just a heads up, I have liquidated APT from the portfolios. The reason being there have been a few negative reports out in the past 2 weeks. One of the found (sic) directors has left and now has the ability to dump his stock and 2 analyst reports are siting (sic) it as very over valued and could decrease by 50% in the next 12 months. Thought it better to lock in profit than for it go backwards.
(12) on 27 April 2020 Ms Kraft-Reid received an email from Ms Caddick attaching a “portfolio valuation and yearly tax invoice for our telephone meeting scheduled on Wednesday 29 April 2020 @ 11am”. The Portfolio Valuation for April 2020 and tax invoice showed that as at 27 April 2020 the market value of the Kraft-Reid Super Fund’s investment with Maliver was $814,050. The tax invoice calculated a fee of 0.75% plus GST on that amount payable for services provided by Maliver;
(13) on 29 April 2020 Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife participated in a telephone call with Ms Caddick in which they discussed transferring [REDACTED]’s pension payments in a lump sum of $30,000 to the Kraft-Reid CDI Account for the period July 2020 to June 2021. Later that day Ms Caddick confirmed by email that the transfer had been effected;
(14) by email dated 24 August 2020 Ms Caddick informed Ms Kraft-Reid that:
we have spoken with AMP this morning.
Your account balance as at 20 August 2020 is $49,102.46.
What I suggest is that we transfer $40,000.00 to the self managed superannuation fund. Retaining a balance of $9,102.46 so as to retain all your current insurances.
We will complete the forms and send to you via express post to sign and return in an enclosed express post envelope.
(15) in about September 2020 Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] participated in a telephone call with Ms Caddick during which they discussed the value of their portfolio, which was about $922,000, and the shares in which Ms Caddick had invested, how particular companies were doing well, the sale of their Afterpay shares during the previous period, Ms Kraft-Reid’s plans for retiring in seven years and that they were on track to do so with their portfolio potentially being valued at $1 million plus, [REDACTED]’s annual drawdown being left at $2,000 per month with Ms Caddick confirming, in response to [REDACTED]’s inquiry, that she was only drawing down the investment growth and not the superannuation base and their agreement to carry on “as is” with no new changes or investments.
122 Ms Kraft-Reid also notes that over the period she invested the funds of the Kraft-Reid Super Fund with Maliver, she received Portfolios Valuations and copies of account statements for the Kraft-Reid CDI Account.
123 On Monday 30 November 2020, after there had been media coverage about Ms Caddick, Ms Kraft-Reid contacted CommSec to inquire about their trading account, During her conversation, the representative of CommSec with whom she spoke said words to the following effect:
The numbers aren’t real.
And:
Your account doesn’t exist.
124 In total Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife invested $490,000 with Maliver, [REDACTED] received the sum of $123,200 and they are therefore out of pocket in the sum of $366,800. In addition Ms Kraft-Reid and [REDACTED] have paid $9,469.99 to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), $7,490 to Superannuation Accounting Services and $21,007.89 to Maliver in management fees.
125 Susan Margaret Coetzee was also a client of Maliver. She is married to [REDACTED].
126 In 2009 Mr and Mrs Coetzee purchased a [REDACTED] business. Mrs Coetzee has worked at that business since that time as an office assistant.
127 Mr and Mrs Coetzee lived in the same part of Sydney as Ms Caddick’s parents who they first met in 1997 and with whom they became friends. It was through that connection that they first met Ms Caddick around Christmas time in 1998 when attending a function at her parents’ home. Over the years Mrs Coetzee would see Ms Caddick socially at various events organised by her parents.
128 From Mrs Coetzee’s interactions with Ms Caddick’s mother, she became aware that Ms Caddick was working in financial advice and funds management and that she had been a partner at Wise Financial but had sold her shares in the business to her then business partner.
129 In about 2014 Mrs Coetzee became aware that Ms Caddick was providing financial advice services. She understood that Ms Caddick would be able to assist her and her husband by managing the investments of their self-managed super fund, [REDACTED] (TC Super Fund). Based on her discussions with Ms Caddick’s parents, she understood that Ms Caddick offered a tailored service, offering financial and investment services to a small client base.
3.4.4.1 Initial meeting with Ms Caddick
130 In about October 2014 Mrs Coetzee received a call from Ms Caddick during which Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
I have an opportunity to take on more investors and wanted to offer an investment opportunity to you and [your husband]. Mum mentioned to me that you may be interested.
Thereafter Mrs Coetzee discussed the opportunity with her husband and set up a meeting with Ms Caddick.
131 Mr and Mrs Coetzee met with Ms Caddick on 23 October 2014. At the time Mrs Coetzee provided Ms Caddick with information about the TC Super Fund and informed Ms Caddick that her husband intended to retire within 10 years and that they were looking to build up their superannuation to facilitate retirement. At the time of this meeting TC Super Fund had approximately $917,000 in assets held mainly in cash with a small proportion held in shares. Mrs Coetzee recalls that during the meeting she had a conversation with Ms Caddick to the following effect:
Mrs Coetzee: [My husband] and I have been thinking of investing in property rather than shares, what do you think about that?
Ms Caddick: I would advise against investing in property. You can expect much better returns when investing in shares. When investing in shares you have much more flexibility, and the asset can be liquidated quickly. As you are approaching retirement, I would strongly advise you to invest in shares, rather than in property.
132 Mrs Coetzee also recalls that during the meeting Ms Caddick discussed the benefits of investing a greater proportion of TC Super Fund’s assets in shares. She recalls they had a conversation to the following effect:
Ms Caddick: You currently only have approximately 15% of your super fund’s assets allocated to shares. At the moment, the cash assets in the fund are not giving you a good return. I would suggest that you allocate 70-80% of the fund’s assets towards purchasing shares. This approach will offer you a significantly better return on your investment. Giving (sic) that you are looking to retire you will want to take advantage of that.
Mr Coetzee: I think at this stage, we want to invest more in shares, but we would only want to invest 50% of the fund’s assets in shares which is $450,000.
Mrs Coetzee: Yes, I think for the time being, let’s start with 50% and we will see how that goes.
Ms Caddick: That’s fine, we can discuss this again down the road.
133 During the meeting Ms Caddick also advised Mr and Mrs Coetzee that she would charge an annual management fee which would equate to 0.50% of their total holding.
134 At the conclusion of the meeting Mr and Mrs Coetzee agreed to retain Ms Caddick’s services. Mrs Coetzee recalls that Ms Caddick gave her a form to sign, although she cannot recall what it was, and told them that further paperwork would be provided via email.
3.4.4.2 Engagement of Maliver as financial advisor
135 On 27 October 2014 Ms Caddick sent an email to Mrs Coetzee titled “Financial Advice” which included:
attached please find Financial Advice based on our meeting held last Thursday 23 October 2014.
The document is somewhat lengthy and includes all authorities together with blank Binding Death Benefit Nominations for [REDACTED] if required.
Please don’t hesitate to contact me with any queries prior to our next scheduled meeting on Thursday 6 November 2014. I will have the original document together with authorities that we may review and sign together.
I look forward to meeting with you then and proceeding to implementation.
Hoping you are both well and had a lovely albeit very hot weekend.
Attached to the email were the following documents:
(1) a file note of the meeting held on 23 October 2014 on Maliver letterhead bearing AFSL [REDACTED];
(2) a death benefit nominations form;
(3) an authority letter to Maliver dated 6 November 2014 authorising Ms Caddick to establish a CommSec account in the name of TC Super Fund and Mr Coetzee;
(4) a proposed asset allocation for each of TC Super Fund and Mr Coetzee dated 27 October 2014;
(5) a copy of the Maliver management rules which recorded on each page AFSL [REDACTED];
(6) a Maliver FSG dated August 2014; and
(7) an acknowledgement and engagement letter addressed to Maliver dated 6 November 2014.
136 Mrs Coetzee makes the following observations:
(1) she recalls seeing the AFSL number and finding it in the file note and financial services guide attached to the email referred to in the preceding paragraph. She says that having seen this she assumed that Maliver and Ms Caddick had the necessary licence to carry out the services to be provided; and
(2) the information sheet attached to the email indicated a 0.50% management fee. Mrs Coetzee said that this was usually invoiced after they had their annual meeting with Ms Caddick each year and paid directly, rather than being deducted from their investment.
137 Upon reviewing the documents attached to the email sent on 27 October 2014 Mr and Mrs Coetzee signed the authorities from TC Super Fund to CommSec and Maliver, the proposed asset allocation document for the TC Super Fund and the acknowledgment and engagement letter addressed to Maliver and returned those documents to Ms Caddick.
138 Prior to investing with Ms Caddick and Maliver, Mr and Mrs Coetzee had obtained advice and agreed to change the trustee of the TC Super Fund to [REDACTED]. After making the change in trustee they applied to Macquarie Bank Limited for the issue of a new cheque book for the [REDACTED] held with that bank reflecting the change. It was agreed with Ms Caddick that this account would be used to transfer funds to and from Maliver as required. As a new cheque book had not arrived by 6 November 2014, the proposed further meeting with Ms Caddick scheduled to take place on that day was postponed. However, as Mr and Mrs Coetzee had signed all the requisite authorities and disclosure forms, Ms Caddick collected the documents from them and subsequently confirmed their receipt by email dated 7 November 2014.
139 On about 20 November 2014 Mrs Coetzee received the new cheque book from Macquarie Bank and drew a cheque in the sum of $450,000 which Ms Caddick collected that afternoon.
140 On 26 November 2014 Mrs Coetzee received an email from Ms Caddick which relevantly included:
Just letting you know that the accounts have been established and I have commenced purchasing stocks.
As end of month is later this week I will forward you the reports then as currently a work in progress.
141 Mrs Coetzee never received confirmation from the CBA that a CommSec account had been established but she assumed that it had from the monthly reports emailed to her by Ms Caddick which included the CommSec account details. Mrs Coetzee did not have access to the CommSec account and did not speak to the CBA about it prior to 27 November 2020.
142 Mrs Coetzee believed, based on the monthly reports she received from Ms Caddick, that their money had been transferred to the CommSec account for the purpose of share trading and that all returns from trades went straight to the CommSec account. Relevantly, at the end of each month Ms Caddick would send an email to Mrs Coetzee attaching reports about the investments with Maliver, namely a Portfolio Valuation. Upon receiving the reports it was Mrs Coetzee’s practice to review them with Mr Coetzee. The reports, some of which were in evidence before me, were in the same form as set out at [31] above.
143 Mrs Coetzee trusted Ms Caddick to make changes to the TC Super Fund share portfolio as she saw fit. From time to time Ms Caddick would call her to discuss changes she proposed to make to the share portfolio and, at the end of each financial year, Ms Caddick would provide her with an investment strategy document for review and signature by her and Mr Coetzee. The investment strategy document dated 30 June 2016 was in evidence before me. It set out investment objectives, circumstances of the fund, member insurance, members’ investment profile, investment strategy, asset allocation and review and monitoring.
144 Apart from the monthly reports, once a year Ms Caddick sent Mrs Coetzee an “Economic Insights Document” summarising her views on the market for the preceding 12 months. In addition, from 2014 until 2020, at the end of each financial year Ms Caddick sent Mrs Coetzee or the accountants for Mr and Mrs Coetzee an email attaching copies of the CDI Account bank statements for the financial year, the CommSec financial year summary report, holdings statements and dividend statements.
145 During the period in which Mr and Mrs Coetzee made their investments they met with Ms Caddick at least once a year to review their portfolio. These meetings took place on 26 November 2015, 21 February 2017, 4 June 2018 and 27 August 2020. As far as Mrs Coetzee can recall there was no annual meeting with Ms Caddick in 2016 or 2019. During those meetings:
(1) Ms Caddick discussed how their investments were progressing and addressed any queries;
(2) according to Mrs Coetzee Ms Caddick appeared to be very organised and professional and took detailed notes of their discussions. Following the meeting Ms Caddick would email a file note of their discussions to Mrs Coetzee;and
(3) Ms Caddick would provide her annual invoice and, on some occasions, would also email a copy of the invoice to Mrs Coetzee. After payment of the invoice Mrs Coetzee would receive a tax receipt for her records.
146 Apart from their annual meetings Mr and Mrs Coetzee would intermittently meet with Ms Caddick to discuss their investments. During these meetings, Ms Caddick would often advise them to invest more money into shares.
147 Mrs Coetzee says that, having reviewed the monthly reports, within the first few months of her and her husband’s decision to invest with Ms Caddick in 2014, she was pleasantly surprised by the returns they were receiving on their investment. Upon receiving the monthly reports she would sometimes compare the number of shares and their market value in those reports against the prices listed on the ASX website. According to Mrs Coetzee she never observed any inconsistencies between the figures and, as it appeared that their investment was doing well, she and her husband wanted Ms Caddick to continue to provide them with her services. However, despite the fact that their initial investment was doing well and Ms Caddick’s suggestions to the contrary, Mrs Coetzee did not want to invest any more money into shares. They were nearing retirement and Mrs Coetzee was comfortable with the TC Super Fund having a 50% shareholding and 50% cash holding and did not wish for this allocation to change. Accordingly, they did not increase their initial investment from the original $450,000.
3.4.4.4 TC Super Fund ceases its investment with Maliver
148 On or about 19 February 2019 Mr and Mrs Coetzee had a meeting with Ms Caddick to discuss their investment plan. Mrs Coetzee does not recall what was discussed but she recalls that at the conclusion of the meeting Ms Caddick said words to the following effect:
I am concerned about how far behind your accountant is with completing the tax returns for the [TC Super Fund]. I think it best that we close your account for the time being to enable you and [Mr Coetzee] to resolve the accounting matters, once that is settled and once you and [Mr Coetzee] decide what you want to do about your retirement, we can revaluate (sic) and reinvest.
149 By email dated 21 February 2019 Ms Caddick informed Mrs Coetzee that:
as per our meeting, CBA account has been closed, an amount of $100,000.00 and $92,293.83 has been EFT’d to the Macquarie Bank Account.
We have sold total holdings of NUF, JBH, NCM & MQG all funds will be forwarded to Macquarie Bank account (see attached contract notes).
These transactions close the account that was under my adviser number.
Funds will be in Macquarie Bank account as follows:
22/2/19 $41,490.01 Sale of NUF
25/2/19 $616,607.96 Sale of JBH NCM MQG
Prior to reinvesting we need to get a plan in place on what you and [your husband] are proposing re: retirement. We will then evaluate the market and reinvest by setting up a new account that your accountant can have access to.
Have a nice afternoon.
Based on her review of the bank statements for the Macquarie Bank cash management account Mrs Coetzee observed that Ms Caddick had deposited a total of $850,391.80 into that account over the period 19 February 2019 to 25 February 2019.
3.4.4.5 TC Super Fund retains Maliver again
150 Mrs Coetzee was extremely happy with the return that she and her husband had received on their initial investment and wanted to retain Ms Caddick’s services once more. In June 2019 Mrs Coetzee contacted Ms Caddick by email about renewing their investment.
151 On 24 June 2019 Ms Caddick sent two emails to Mr and Mrs Coetzee. In the first she confirmed that she would be happy to reinvest the funds. In the second she wrote:
Happy to reinvest, however have your SMSF accounts been completed?
We would require Superannuation Accounting to do the accounts for [the TC Super Fund]. This would mean we would require a copy of the completed accounts and audit as at 30 June 2019 from you accountant.
We would require a copy of the Macquarie Bank Statement on a monthly basis so that we could conduct the monthly reconciliation of the fund. Superannuation Accounting charge $1,125 per annum to prepare the accounts and audit. We provide Superannuation Accounting with all required compliance documentation.
If you can let me know how much you would like to reinvest that would be terrific. We are currently investing into Bingo (BIN) Afterpay (APT) Macquarie (MQG) and waiting for a few other stocks to come off.
Look forward to hearing from you soon and we can make a time to catch up.
Have a good day.
152 On 4 July 2019 Mr and Mrs Coetzee met with Ms Caddick to re-establish their investment for the TC Super Fund. At that meeting they provided Ms Caddick with a series of documents and signed a retainer for Superannuation Accounting Services. On 9 July 2019, Mrs Coetzee drew a cheque in the sum of $450,000 in favour of CommSec and provided it to Ms Caddick.
153 Mrs Coetzee recalls that on 10 July 2019 Ms Caddick telephoned her and said words to the following effect:
Sue, I am very sorry but my dog has somehow gotten a hold of the cheque you gave and chewed it up, I won’t be able to deposit it.
And:
I am sorry to ask you this but would you be able to draw a replacement cheque made out to the Maliver Trust? I can come by and collect it this afternoon.
Mrs Coetzee says that she was a little taken aback by this request and had some reservations about making the cheque out to the Maliver Trust but, due to her longstanding relationship with Ms Caddick, she proceeded to make out a second cheque as requested.
154 Mrs Coetzee recalls Ms Caddick called her again on 10 July 2019 and that during that conversation she said words to the following effect:
I have commenced purchasing stocks. I will send a monthly report to you in a few weeks (sic) time.
155 From 20 July 2019 Superannuation Accounting Services was retained to prepare the annual returns for the TC Super Fund. Mrs Coetzee did not deal with Superannuation Accounting Services directly, all dealings were through Ms Caddick. On 25 August 2020 Mrs Coetzee received an email from Ms Caddick which, in turn, attached the TC Super Fund financial statements, tax return, member statements and an ATO payment slip for the 2020 financial year as well as an invoice from Superannuation Accounting Services for preparation of the accounts for the TC Super Fund for the year ended 30 June 2020. The latter document is the only invoice Mrs Coetzee has received from Superannuation Accounting Services.
156 Mrs Coetzee’s last contact with Ms Caddick was on 2 November 2020 when she received an email from her attaching a Portfolio Valuation for the month ended 30 October 2020.
157 On 27 November 2020 Mr and Mrs Coetzee attended the Kogarah branch of the CBA to access the CommSec accounts which had been set up by Ms Caddick. At the time they had a conversation with Mr Kumar, an employee of the CBA. Among other things, Mr Kumar informed them that they did “not have any records of those accounts on [their] system” and that “these accounts were never opened with us”.
158 Mr and Mrs Coetzee, via the TC Super Fund, invested a total of $900,000 with Maliver, having invested $450,000 in 2014 and a further $450,000 in July 2019. Following the sale of their share portfolio in February 2019 Mr and Mrs Coetzee received the sum of $850,391.80 from Ms Caddick. Accordingly, Mr and Mrs Coetzee are currently out of pocket in the sum of $49,608.20 and for the management fees paid to Ms Caddick in the period from 2014 to 2020.
3.5 Evidence given by officers of CommSec
159 David Campbell Smith is the head of compliance for Commonwealth Securities (referred to as CommSec) and Jennifer El-Azzi is a CommSec compliance manager. They each gave evidence.
160 CommSec is Australia’s largest online stock broking firm which, among other things, offers brokerage services through its trading platform. It opens and closes accounts on behalf of its customers and accepts instructions for the purchase and sale of securities through these accounts.
161 Mr Smith has access to and is familiar with CommSec’s computer systems and electronic databases that maintain records of account holders and documents used in the course of and for the purposes of CommSec’s business. CommSec maintains business records in its internal databases called CommSee and Customer Service Console (CSC). Mr Smith explains that the CommSee systems stores, among other things, account opening and account maintenance documentation and the CSC database is used for the maintenance of trading histories, account statements and order audit trails. Relevant records are retrieved by staff by entering a customer’s identifying details, such as name or account number, into the relevant user interface. It is then possible to generate copies of records associated with the customer or the customer’s account, including the details of trades transacted on the account.
162 On 15 March 2021 ASIC provided Mr Smith with a bundle of Portfolio Valuations (i.e. documents titled “Portfolio Statement” and “Transaction Summary Statement”) for particular individuals and a copy of a spreadsheet comprising 125 rows and divided into columns from A to K of which:
(1) columns A to D set out personal information such as name, date of birth and ACN or ABN, where known and/or applicable;
(2) columns E and F set out the identifiers for the Portfolio Valuations referrable to each individual or entity, assigned by ASIC;
(3) columns G and H, headed respectively “Caddick Portfolio Valuation account number” and “Caddick Portfolio Valuation account name”, include the account number and account name taken from the Portfolio Valuations for each individual or entity; and
(4) columns I, J and K , headed respectively “Does the Portfolio Valuation account number match a CommSec account number for the individual?”, “Is there a genuine CommSec account that matches the Caddick Portfolio Valuation account number?” and “Comments”, were empty.
163 Mr Smith requested Ms El-Azzi to undertake an investigation in order to complete the spreadsheet provided to him by ASIC by populating columns I, J and K with her findings. Ms El-Azzi did so by conducting searches on the CSC database and recording her findings on the spreadsheet in columns I, J and K. The completed spreadsheet was tendered in evidence. I will refer to it as Exhibit DCS-1.
164 In summary, the results of Ms El-Azzi’s investigations as recorded in Exhibit DCS-1 were as follows:
(1) there was one instance in which the account number recorded in the Portfolio Valuation documents matched, and the account name substantially matched, the account details within the CSC database. However, the information concerning the securities held in that account as recorded in the Portfolio Valuations did not match the information on the CSC database;
(2) in most cases the account numbers recorded in the Portfolio Valuations matched a genuine CommSec account within the CSC database. However, the account details recorded in the CSC database did not match the name included in the Portfolio Valuations. That is, the account numbers in the Portfolio Valuations were genuine CommSec account numbers but the names recorded in the Portfolio Valuations for those account numbers did not match the CommSec investor recorded in the CSC database; and
(3) in some cases the account numbers included in the Portfolio Valuations did not match any account number in the CSC database.
165 On 26 April 2021 ASIC provided Ms El-Azzi with four further sets of Portfolio Valuations for two additional investors. Ms El-Azzi conducted searches of the CSC database in relation to the account number and investor name included in those additional documents. She found that, while the search results in each case returned a valid CommSec share trading account, the account details included in the CSC database for those accounts did not match the names recorded on the Portfolio Valuations provided to her.
166 Ms El-Azzi was instructed by Mr Smith to undertake a comparison of the Portfolio Valuations against documents he described as an “authentic CommSec Transaction Summary Statement” and an “authentic Portfolio Statement” (together, CommSec generated statements). The CommSec generated statements, both of which displayed details from a dummy CommSec account, were generated by Ms El-Azzi using the CSC database.
167 Ms El-Azzi is not a forensic document expert and it seems that her comparison of the Portfolio Valuations and the CommSec generated statements was based on her visual inspection of the documents. For reasons that were not explained, Ms El-Azzi reported the results of her comparison exercise to Mr Smith who then gave evidence about the differences Ms El-Azzi had observed. They included:
(1) for the transaction summary statement:
(a) the version in the Portfolio Valuations includes the note “INT=Internet” and “BRK=Broker”. There is no such note in the CommSec generated document;
(b) the version in the Portfolio Valuations includes the field “Payment Method for Cash Withdrawals”. This field is not included in the CommSec generated document;
(c) the version in the Portfolio Valuations divides transactions under the headings “Total Buys” and “Total Sells”. This division does not exist in the CommSec generated document. In the latter, transactions are arranged based on the date the trade was executed beginning with the latest trade.
(2) for the portfolio statement:
(a) the version in the Portfolio Valuations includes a table with the fields “Contract no.”, “Transaction Date”, “Description”, “Debit”, “Credit”, “Balance” and “Closing Balance”. These categories do not exist in the CommSec generated document;
(b) the version in the Portfolio Valuations includes the columns “Stock Code”, “Closing ($)”, “Units”, “Market Value”, “Profit ($)” and “Return (%)”. These columns do not exist in the CommSec generated document. A CommSec portfolio statement has four columns: “Code”, “Units”, “Price ($)” and “Value ($);
(c) the version in the Portfolio Valuations displays the date and time that the statement was generated in, by way of example, the format “20/12/16 6:00 PM (Sydney time)” while a CommSec generated portfolio statement would have displayed the same date and time in the format “Thurs 20 Dec 2016 6:00PM (Sydney time)”; and
(d) the version in the Portfolio Valuations does not include the “Share Holdings Summary Charts” which are incorporated in the CommSec portfolio statement.
168 Mr Smith concluded, based on the comparison of the characteristics of the CommSec generated documents against the Portfolio Valuations provided by ASIC undertaken by Ms El-Azzi, that the Portfolio Valuations provided by ASIC are not genuine.
169 Mr Gleeson gave evidence in his capacity as joint receiver of Ms Caddick’s property and as a provisional liquidator of Maliver in support of ASIC’s application.
170 Since the completion of the Appointees’ Reports Mr Gleeson has undertaken further work aimed at:
(1) identifying and verifying the amounts advanced by “Investors” (as defined) prior to the incorporation of Maliver and the accounts into which those amounts were paid;
(2) finalising the summary of the amounts advanced by “Investors” to Ms Caddick or Maliver and the amounts returned to Investors (which is recorded in Updated Annexure I as to which see [180] below);
(3) determining the extent of “false and misleading documents” supplied to Investors;
(4) verifying Ms Caddick’s ownership of assets and ascertaining whether she holds any assets not previously identified in the Interim Receivers’ Report;
(5) tracing what happened to “Investor Funds” (as defined) after they were received by Ms Caddick or Maliver;
(6) determining the source of deposits into Ms Caddick’s bank accounts to identify whether she had any other sources of income or assets to acquire property;
(7) liaising with Investors/creditors; and
(8) liaising with ASIC regarding investigations and findings.
171 Mr Gleeson says that the further tasks he has undertaken have enabled him to progress his analysis and reach conclusions in relation to Ms Caddick’s and Maliver’s assets and liabilities, in particular in relation to:
(1) the identity of Investors, the amounts invested by them and the funds returned to them;
(2) tracing monies used for the purchase of assets held by Ms Caddick or Maliver;
(3) ascertaining that Ms Caddick and Maliver had no substantial income from October 2012 other than monies advanced by Investors or funds received as a result of property acquired with “Investor Funds” (as defined); and
(4) reviewing and updating key preliminary findings in the Appointees’ Reports with a view to reaching final conclusions in respect of a number of matters.
172 Relevantly, Mr Gleeson defines:
Investors to mean individuals, companies or self-managed super funds who advanced money to Ms Caddick and, following its incorporation, Maliver for the purpose of those funds being invested in their names, predominantly in shares, to generate financial returns; and
Investor Funds to mean money received by Ms Caddick or Maliver from Investors, including money purportedly paid for management fees.
I will adopt these terms for the purpose of setting out Mr Gleeson’s evidence.
173 Based on his investigations Mr Gleeson has identified 37 accounts in the name of Ms Caddick or Maliver or operated by Ms Caddick. In the latter category are credit card accounts and accounts in the names of members of Ms Caddick’s family or jointly held by Ms Caddick and a member of her family. The 37 identified accounts include:
(1) a National Australia Bank (NAB) account in the name of “ML Caddick” with BSB [REDACTED] and Account No. [REDACTED] (Caddick NAB Primary Account);
(2) an NAB account in the name of Ms Caddick with BSB [REDACTED] and Account No. [REDACTED] (Caddick CDI Account);
(3) an NAB account in the name of Ms Caddick with BSB [REDACTED] and Account No. [REDACTED] (Caddick 4254 NAB Account);
(4) an NAB account in the name of Maliver with BSB [REDACTED] and Account No. [REDACTED] (Maliver NAB Primary Account);
(5) an NAB account in the name of Maliver with BSB [REDACTED] and Account No. [REDACTED] (Maliver NAB Secondary Account);
(6) an American Express credit card account in the name of Ms Caddick for the card ending [REDACTED] (Caddick AMEX); and
(7) a Citibank account in the name of Adam Grimley with BSB [REDACTED] and Account No. [REDACTED] (Grimley Citibank Account).
174 Staff under Mr Gleeson’s supervision and direction analysed the bank statements in relation to the bank accounts held or controlled by Ms Caddick. That analysis sought to identify:
(1) the source of deposits into Ms Caddick’s bank accounts for transactions generally above $5,000 on a materiality basis focussing on:
(a) Investor Funds;
(b) deposits from CommSec accounts;
(c) deposits by Mr Grimley and by Ms Caddick’s parents;
(d) the identification of any other sources of amounts paid into the accounts;
(e) deposits from the sale of Ms Caddick’s assets;
(f) reconciling transfers between other bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick; and
(g) deposits of less than $5,000 “made on a constant and prolonged basis” such as child support payments made by her former husband;
(2) withdrawals and payments from Ms Caddick’s bank accounts of $1,000 or above on a materiality basis focussing on:
(a) Investor repayments;
(b) payments attributable or traced to assets such as jewellery, artworks and luxury goods;
(c) credit card payments;
(d) mortgage repayments;
(e) reconciling transfers between other bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick;
(f) cash withdrawals/advances; and
(g) travel expenses;
(3) the source of deposits into Maliver’s bank accounts for transactions focussing on:
(a) Investor Funds;
(b) reconciling transfers between other bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick; and
(c) identifying whether there were other sources of funds paid into the accounts; and
(4) withdrawals and payments from Maliver’s bank accounts of $10,000 or above on a materiality basis focussing on:
(a) Investor repayments;
(b) payments attributable to asset purchases;
(c) credit card payments;
(d) mortgage repayments; and
(e) reconciling transfers between other bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick.
175 Based on the analysis undertaken, the only sources of funds into the 37 identified bank accounts in the period between October 2012 and December 2020 are:
(1) Investor Funds in the sum of $30,195,674;
(2) net proceeds of sale from Ms Caddick’s Kensington property in about April 2014 in the amount of $430,572.81;
(3) Ms Caddick’s parents on 7 April 2017 in the amount of $1,154,390.48;
(4) “Hock Your Frocks” in the amount of $35,195.50 between December 2019 and November 2020;
(5) Mr Grimley in the amount of $126,000 between November 2018 and August 2020 which are described as rental payments, $18,000 between June and October 2020 and $125,000 between August 2012 and September 2014;
(6) Ms Caddick’s former husband in the amount of $71,398 for child support between February 2013 and October 2020; and
(7) dividends from shares, proceeds from the sale of shares, proceeds from “Flog Your Furniture”, proceeds from the sale of a diamond ring and cash advances from credit cards.
176 Mr Gleeson sets out the following matters by way of summary:
(1) the amounts received from “Hock Your Frocks” and the sources identified at [175(7)] above would not have been possible but for the Investor Funds received when allowing for Ms Caddick’s pattern of personal expenses between 16 October 2012 and 15 December 2020;
(2) given the relatively insignificant amount Mr Gleeson is of the view that it is not commercially viable to further investigate whether the goods sold by Ms Caddick through “Hock Your Frocks” were purchased with Investor Funds;
(3) the proceeds of sale from the Kensington property in about April 2014 were exhausted in meeting Ms Caddick’s living expenses or used to purchase assets, such as shares, that are no longer owned by Ms Caddick. In addition Ms Caddick used Investor Funds to pay her former husband a sum of $402,000 to satisfy her obligations under a binding financial agreement pursuant to s 90C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) dated 25 January 2013;
(4) the amount advanced by Ms Caddick’s parents was used by Ms Caddick to pay for living expenses, for purchase of a diamond ring and was transferred between accounts controlled by Ms Caddick including CBA direct investment account no [REDACTED] which was linked to a CommSec account and a CommSec US dollar account, both of which were in Ms Caddick’s name and comingled with other moneys in that account, including Investor Funds provided for the purchase of shares. However, Mr Gleeson notes that Ms Caddick’s parents assert that the funds advanced by them give rise to an entitlement to a property situated at [REDACTED] (Edgecliff Property); and
(5) moneys paid by Mr Grimley were used by Ms Caddick to pay for her living expenses and intermingled with funds held in other accounts operated by Ms Caddick which contained Investor Funds. The extent of the intermingling of moneys in the relevant accounts means tracing has not been reasonably possible.
177 Mr Gleeson says that:
(1) subject to the claim made by Ms Caddick’s parents in relation to the Edgecliff Property, he is able to reasonably conclude that the assets currently held by Maliver or Ms Caddick that were purchased after October 2012 were purchased using Investor Funds or with the proceeds from property acquired with Investor Funds;
(2) the view he expressed in the Interim Receivers’ Report, that most but not all of the assets held in the name of Ms Caddick have been sourced from Investor Funds, continues to be correct. There is evidence that assets such as jewellery and artworks were purchased prior to October 2012 and the receipt of Investor Funds;
(3) at all relevant times Maliver had no source of funding other than Investor Funds and the motor vehicles acquired by it were acquired with Investor Funds; and
(4) Maliver and Ms Caddick received the benefit of Investor Funds from 16 October 2012 and used those funds to purchase various assets.
178 Mr Gleeson’s investigations have revealed that when Investor Funds were paid either into the Grimley Citibank Account or the bank accounts of Maliver or Ms Caddick, they were used to pay for living expenses, meet mortgage payments for the Edgecliff Property and the Caddick Residence or to purchase property in the name of Maliver or Ms Caddick. Mr Gleeson says that Investor Funds were also transferred to other bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick and that the frequent transfers between accounts means that Investor Funds have been intermingled with a number of accounts which has made it difficult to determine for what particular amounts advanced by Investors were ultimately used. In Mr Gleeson’s opinion the extent of the intermingling of funds supports the conclusions in the Appointees’ Reports that Ms Caddick treated the financial affairs of Maliver and her personal affairs as one.
179 Mr Gleeson’s investigations have confirmed that Investors advanced money to Ms Caddick and, following its incorporation, Maliver for the purpose of those funds being invested in their names, principally in shares, to generate financial returns. However, that money was not so invested but, instead, was used to meet Ms Caddick’s personal expenses and to purchase assets in her name.
180 Since 15 February 2021 Mr Gleeson and his team have prepared a further detailed excel spreadsheet which updates the Investor information set out in Annexure I to the Interim Receivers’ Report. It is this document that is referred to as Updated Annexure I. Updated Annexure I sets out the Investors who contributed funds for investment with Ms Caddick or Maliver; whether the Investors invested as individuals, companies or through a self-managed superannuation fund; for each Investor, the amounts paid, including for management fees; the date on which payments were made by each Investor to Ms Caddick or Maliver; the bank accounts into which each Investor paid the relevant portion of Investor Funds; and the amounts, if any, returned to Investors by Ms Caddick or Maliver.
181 Mr Gleeson says that in summary Updated Annexure I shows that between 2 August 2011 and 11 November 2020 Investors:
(1) advanced a total of $30,195,674 to Maliver or Ms Caddick for investment purposes;
(2) advanced an amount of $501,784 for management fees charged by Maliver based on purported portfolio values; and
(3) received repayments of $8,526,787.
182 Mr Gleeson observes that of the amount:
(1) repaid to Investors (see [181(3)] above) an amount of $1,419,450 was paid to certain Investors over and above their total investment i.e. they received a profit on their total investment. In Updated Annexure I, Investors in this category have been noted as having a nil claim; and
(2) of the amount paid for management fees (see [181(2)] above) an amount of $35,200 was paid by Investors who received a profit on their total investment. In Updated Annexure I those Investors have also been noted as having a nil claim.
183 Mr Gleeson says that, after deducting the amount repaid to Investors (excluding the profit elements referred to in the preceding paragraph), the total amount owed to the remaining Investors referred to as Out-Of-Pocket Investors is $23,554,921. I observe that that amount does not account for potential unjust enrichment or uncommercial transaction claims regarding any fictitious and possible inflated returns paid to investors which, as the Provisional Liquidators note, would need to be investigated in a liquidation.
184 Mr Gleeson has undertaken a tracing exercise and gives evidence explaining his analysis of the sources of funds received by Maliver and the uses to which those funds were put which underpin his conclusion that the assets held by Ms Caddick and Maliver were acquired with Investor Funds. It is only necessary to set that evidence out in relation to the acquisition of the Edgecliff Property.
185 Mr Gleeson undertook a tracing analysis in relation to the funds used to purchase the Edgecliff Property and to meet payments under the loan taken out for its purchase of that property, referred to as the MC Home Loan. His analysis was undertaken by reference to three categories of funds: the deposit funds, the settlement funds and the loan repayments.
186 The contract for sale of the Edgecliff Property shows Ms Caddick as purchaser, a purchase price of $2,550,000 and a 10% deposit of $255,000.
187 On 29 November 2016 a cheque for $255,000 payable to Sotheby’s, the vendor’s agent, was drawn on the Caddick NAB Primary Account for the deposit. Mr Gleeson has identified that between the period from 22 November 2016 to 28 November 2016, prior to the drawing of that cheque, four deposits were made into the Caddick NAB Primary Account as well as the sources of the funds for those deposits.
188 The funds required to settle the purchase of the Edgecliff Property were to be funded as to:
(1) $1.8 million from the MC Home Loan; and
(2) $621,012.60 by Ms Caddick.
189 As to the amount provided by Ms Caddick Mr Gleeson’s investigations have revealed that on 18 January 2017 an amount of $627,813.35 was debited from the Caddick NAB Primary Account with the narration “Balance Required for Settlement”, that the balance of that account immediately prior to the withdrawal was $630,846.24 and, of that amount, $625,000 was transferred from the Maliver NAB Primary Account on 16 January 2017. In turn, the monies from the Maliver NAB Primary Account were transferred from the Maliver NAB Secondary Account.
190 Mr Gleeson’s tracing analysis shows that the monies which were transferred into the Maliver NAB Primary Account originally came from deposits in the Caddick CDI Account via the Caddick NAB Primary Account which were sourced from the sale of shares through CommSec.
191 Lastly, Mr Gleeson analysed the source of funds for payments made towards the MC Home Loan, which was an interest only loan for the first five years. It is not necessary to set out the movements in that account save to note that, according to Mr Gleeson’s analysis, monthly interest payments were accrued and were direct debited from the Caddick 4254 NAB Account which, in turn, was serviced mainly by payments from the Caddick NAB Primary Account and also from the Maliver NAB Primary Account.
192 Ms Caddick’s parents have lodged two caveats over the Edgecliff Property dated 7 and 18 December 2020 respectively. In the first caveat they claim a beneficial interest under a resulting trust arising from their payment of part of the purchase price paid by Ms Caddick on purchase of the Edgecliff Property and in the second caveat they claim, by reason of an agreement between them and Ms Caddick, an estate or interest in the Edgecliff Property as joint tenants for life or their earlier vacation of that property.
193 In a letter dated 21 December 2020 from William James (William James December Letter), Ms Caddick’s parents’ lawyers at the time, those lawyers set out the basis upon which Ms Caddick’s parents make their claim to have an interest in the Edgecliff Property. Relevantly that letter includes:
(1) as to the first caveat:
In respect of the property … (the Edgecliff Property), we are instructed that:
a. on 7 April 2017, Mr and Mrs Grimley sold the … (Connells Property) and at settlement, were provided with a bank cheque in the amount of $1,154,717.09, $1,000,000.00 of which was provided to Ms Caddick to apply in and to the purchase of the Edgecliff Property, which Mr and Mrs Grimley would have an interest in with Ms Caddick. Mr and Mrs Grimley were also to live in the property for the rest of their lives or until they decided to vacate the Edgecliff Property to live somewhere else, an event which has not happened. Mr and Mrs Grimley have lived in the Edgecliff Property since its acquisition. To that end, please find enclosed:
a. an email dated 28 November 2016 and attached thereto, a spreadsheet recording the source(s) of the funds to be contributed towards the purchase price of the Edgecliff Property; and
b. a settlement statement dated 7 April 2017 in respect of the sale of the Connells Property;
b. the $1,000,000 was applied towards the purchase price in circumstances where it was always Ms Caddick’s, and Mr and Mrs Grimley’s, intention that that money be strictly for their benefit and not for the benefit of Ms Caddick in any way; and
c. notwithstanding that Ms Caddick is the legal owner of the Edgecliff Property, it was always the intention of Ms Caddick and Mr and Mrs Grimley, that Mr and Mrs Grimley own the Edgecliff Property to the extent of their respective initial contributions to the purchase price (i.e. 37.37%).
(2) as to the second caveat:
The interest supporting the Second Caveat is borne out in the enclosed email dated 22 November 2016 from Ms Caddick to Mr Grimley. This email records the following agreement:
a. that Mr and Mrs Grimley would contribute $1,000,000 to the purchase of the Edgecliff Property and thus, along with Ms Caddick, be owners;
b. that Ms Caddick would remain as sole proprietor of the Edgecliff Property upon the understanding that she grants an estate or interest in the land to Mr and Mrs Grimley, as joint tenants, for life, or their earlier vacation of the land (we note that this arrangement is also reflected in clause 48 of the enclosed Last Will and Testament of Melissa Louise Caddick);
c. that the aforementioned life interest be enjoyed, rent free, by Mr and Mrs Grimley but that on their death, or earlier vacation of the Edgecliff Property, their interest is to be left to Ms Caddick and her brother Mr Adam Grimley, as joint tenants; and
d. that, to begin with, Ms Caddick would pay utilities and improvements in respect of the Edgecliff Property but, as a matter of fact, in respect of the utilities listed below, on and from the dates listed below, Mr and Mrs Grimley would thereafter pay same:
i. Woollahra Municipal Council rates from 31 August 2018 to 20 November 2020 in the amount of $3,557.02;
ii. Sydney Water charges from 24 April 2017 to 3 November 2020 in the amount of $2,472.21; and
iii. Energy Australia gas charges from 31 January 2018 to 14 July 2020 in the amount of $1,627.06,
(please see enclosed spreadsheet outlining individual payment dates, amounts and confirmation numbers).
We also note that, although not reflected in the above agreement, Mr Adam Grimley has been satisfying the mortgage repayments in respect of the Edgecliff Property from, on or around, November 2018, in the amount of $6,000 per month. Accordingly, Mr Adam Grimley may have an interest in the property however, to what extent, we are uncertain.
(Emphasis in original.)
194 In a letter dated 8 June 2021 from Baker McKenzie (Baker McKenzie June Letter), Ms Caddicks’ parents’ current lawyers, those lawyers further elaborated on Ms Caddick’s parents’ claim regarding the Edgecliff Property. Relevantly, that letter includes:
Primary Claim: Edgecliff Property
Our clients’ primary claim is that part of the Edgecliff Property was and remains held on (constructive) trust for them. This is based on our instructions that our clients have contributed about $1,122,500 to the Edgecliff Property on the following bases.
1. There was an agreement between our clients and Ms Caddick that they would contribute $1 million towards Ms Caddick’s purchase of the Edgecliff Property in return for a corresponding interest of at least 37.37% in the Edgecliff Property and a tenancy for life (the Agreement);
2. In accordance with, and in reliance upon, the Agreement and Ms Caddick’s representations to the same effect as the Agreement (the Representations), our clients:
a) sold their family home located at [REDACTED] (the Connells Point Property);
b) paid $32,450.40 (the balance of the deposit from the sale of the Connells Point Property) to Ms Caddick towards the equity in the Edgecliff Property;
c) paid $1 million from the sale of the Connells Point Property to Ms Caddick to be applied towards the equity in the Edgecliff Property;
d) have resided, rent-free, in the Edgecliff Property from 17 March 2017 to date;
e) since 22 February 2017 have paid for repairs; significant renovations to the kitchen, bathrooms and balcony; utilities and strata fees for the Edgecliff Property totalling almost $90,000.
3. If it was not for Ms Caddick’s Representations and the Agreement, our clients would have sold the Connells Point Property in due course and purchased a more affordable property in Sydney’s southern suburbs in their own names.
(Emphasis in original.)
195 Based on work undertaken by him, Mr Gleeson makes the following observations in relation to the Edgecliff Property and the claim made by Ms Caddick’s parents in relation to it:
(1) Ms Caddick’s parents paid the following sums into the Caddick NAB Primary Account:
(a) $32,450.40, being half the deposit from the sale of their property situated at Connell’s Point (Connell’s Point Property), on 3 April 2017; and
(b) $1,154,390.48, from the sale of the Connell’s Point Property, on 7 April 2017;
(2) the Edgecliff Property was purchased by Ms Caddick before the Connell’s Point Property was sold. Therefore Ms Caddick’s parents did not contribute to the purchase price for the Edgecliff Property;
(3) based on his analysis of amounts paid out of the Caddick NAB Primary Account after Ms Caddick’s parents deposited $1,154,390.48 from the sale of the Connell’s Point Property in to it, that money was used by Ms Caddick to pay for living expenses and to purchase a diamond ring, was transferred between other bank accounts controlled by Ms Caddick and was comingled with other funds in that account including Investor Funds. Mr Gleeson observes that while an amount of $580,000 was paid into the MC Home Loan, the same amount was withdrawn within one month, comingled with other funds and used to pay Ms Caddick’s living expenses and to fund share purchases;
(4) between the period 22 October 2012 and 2 October 2020 Ms Caddick transferred a total of $266,500, $262,500 of which Mr Gleeson has confirmed was paid by Ms Caddick to her parents. These payments, of $4,000 each, were usually made at the start of each month and were identified by reference to the description used on bank statements and from bank traces; and
(5) records obtained by ASIC included a spreadsheet prepared by Ms Caddick detailing rental income to be received by her for the Edgecliff Property which suggests that Ms Caddick may have received rental income of $2,000 per month between March 2017 and June 2018 and $6,000 per month between November 2018 to February 2020 from Mr Grimley. However, Mr Gleeson’s review of Ms Caddick’s and Maliver’s bank statements has not identified receipt of rental income of $2,000 per month.
196 Mr Gleeson says that, given the matters set out above, the claim by Ms Caddick’s parents, which he assessed in the Interim Receivers’ Report to be at best a claim to a life estate, may ultimately need to be determined by the Court, and that he would need to obtain further information and legal advice regarding their claim.
3.6.2 Other claims raised by Ms Caddick’s parents
197 The Baker McKenzie June Letter also sets out Ms Caddick’s parents’ secondary claim in relation to “safekeeping money” (Safekeeping Money Claim) and an alternative claim as creditors (Alternative Claim) in addition to their primary claim in relation to the Edgecliff property. Relevantly, it says:
(1) as to the Safekeeping Money Claim:
Secondary Claim: “Safekeeping” money
As identified in William James’ letter to you dated 9 February 2021 (copy attached), our clients provided:
(a) Ms Caddick with $154,717.09 (being part of the proceeds of sale of the Connells Point Property) on or about 7 April 2017; and
(b) Maliver Pty Ltd with $111,073.61 (being the proceeds of a personal injury claim of Mrs Grimley) on 12 May 2017,
in each case to hold on their behalf and distribute to them in smaller payments (usually $4,000) for living expenses.
We are instructed that our clients have not been paid out these amounts in full. We are endeavouring to confirm our instructions on the precise balances that our clients assert are outstanding.
At this stage, our clients reserve their position on the characterisation of these claims, and the precise amount of them.
(2) as to the Alternative Claim:
Alternative Claim
If our clients are unsuccessful in their claims as articulated above, and without derogating in any way from those claims, they will be creditors:
(a) of Ms Craddick (sic) for the amount of approximately $1,122,500 comprising the sums identified in paragraphs 2(b), (c) and (e) above; and
(b) of either both of Ms Craddick (sic) and Maliver Pty Ltd in respect of the outstanding amounts owing in respect of the “safekeeping” claims articulated above.
198 The Baker McKenzie June Letter attaches, among other documents, a letter dated 9 February 2021 from William James which, in turn, encloses a spreadsheet apparently provided by Ms Caddick to her parents and which purports to detail the balance of the safekeeping money owed to her parents as at 9 November 2019 (WJ February Letter Spreadsheet).
199 In relation to the Safekeeping Money Claim Mr Gleeson makes the following comments:
(1) his investigations have confirmed that a sum of $111,073.61 was transferred to the Maliver NAB Primary Account on 12 May 2017;
(2) interest appears to have been charged on the safekeeping money but he has not been provided with any details of the terms of the agreement or interest rate charged;
(3) the WJ February Letter Spreadsheet suggests that $79,000 of the safekeeping money was repaid to Ms Caddick’s parents. Mr Gleeson has confirmed using bank traces that $53,000 was paid by Ms Caddick or Maliver to her parents;
(4) the WJ February Letter Spreadsheet also suggests that the safekeeping monies were used to pay Ms Caddick’s son’s school fees in 2019. Mr Gleeson has identified that Ms Caddick paid a sum of $37.401.09 from the Caddick AMEX in 2019 but, because Ms Caddick may have already used the safekeeping money for her own personal expenses and exhausted them by that point, it is unclear whether the school fees were paid using safekeeping money or Investor Funds; and
(5) he would require further information reconciling all payments received by Ms Caddick’s parents from Ms Caddick and Maliver and further legal advice to determine how those amounts should be classified.
200 In relation to the Alternative Claim Mr Gleeson gives the following evidence:
(1) in another letter dated 14 December 2020 from William James to ASIC, which was also attached to the Baker McKenzie June Letter, Ms Caddick’s parents assert that they purchased shares prior to the year 2000 which were held in a CommSec account, with account number [REDACTED] in the name of Melissa Grimley;
(2) Commsec have advised that there was an account set up in the name of Miss Melissa Grimley, which was opened in 1999, with a matching account number but which has no transactions on it;
(3) a spreadsheet sent from Ms Caddick to her parents suggests that:
(a) $55,000 was redeemed from managed funds and placed in a “Macquarie CMT” account on 15 June 2011;
(b) $20,000 was redeemed from “CFS Imputation Fund” for a loan repayment on 12 June 2012; and
(c) Ms Caddick’s parents received $117,000 in drawdowns for the period 1 July 2010 to 1 January 2013;
(4) Mr Gleeson has not identified any deposits of $55,000 or $20,000 into bank accounts operated by Ms Caddick but has identified a number of other payments during that period, though it is unclear whether they are attributable to those deposits:
(a) $5,000 paid from the Grimley Citibank Account on 31 October 2012;
(b) $4,000 paid from the Caddick NAB Primary Account on 3 December 2012; and
(c) $4,000 paid from the Grimley Citibank Account on 3 January 2013; and
(5) Mr Gleeson would require further information regarding the Alternative Claim in order to assess it.
201 As noted at [3] above Ms Caddick has been missing since about 12 November 2020. While a subject of some sensitivity her whereabouts and status are relevant to the issues that arise in the proceeding. However, there was only minimal evidence about that topic. In summary:
(1) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; and
(2) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].
202 The Coroner may direct an inquest, though it is not known whether that will occur.
203 I turn to consider each of the prayers for relief which ASIC presently seeks.
4.1 Leave to proceed against Maliver
204 By para 24A of the third further amended originating process ASIC seeks an order that, to the extent necessary, it be granted leave nunc pro tunc pursuant to s 471B of the Corporations Act to continue the current proceeding against Maliver.
205 Section 471B of the Corporations Act relevantly provides that, while a provisional liquidator of a company is acting, a person cannot begin or proceed with a proceeding in a court against the company or in relation to property of the company except with the leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms (if any) that the Court imposes.
206 As set out at [5] above, the Provisional Liquidators were appointed to Maliver on 15 December 2020. Accordingly, ASIC requires leave to continue with this proceeding against Maliver and, as it did not seek that leave immediately following the appointment of the Provisional Liquidators, it requires that the order be made nunc pro tunc.
207 In DSG Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Helenic Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 293 at [55] Leeming JA (with whom Meagher JA agreed and with whom Bergin CJ in Eq substantially agreed) referred to the rationale behind the requirement for leave as follows:
As McPherson J explained in Ogilvie-Grant v East (1983) 7 ACLR 669 at 671–2, the requirement for leave was a consequence of the fact that winding up before judicature legislation was an administration conducted in chancery. The cases are largely directed to the choice between ordinary litigation and the more streamlined procedure of a proof of debt: see the review by Wilcox, Burchett and Beazley JJ in Vagrand Pty Ltd (in liq) v Fielding (1993) 41 FCR 550 at 553–7, which is not significant in the present case.
208 The principles applying to a grant of leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act were recently summarised by Derrington J in J&J Richards Super Pty Ltd ATF the J&J Richards Superannuation Fund v Linchpin Capital Group Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 1772 at [8]-[9] where his Honour relevantly said:
8 The principles on which a court will grant leave under s 471B are well established and are substantially the same as those which apply to an application under s 500(2) of the Corporations Act. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe the following matters:
(a) The broad purpose of s 471B is to prevent an insolvent company’s assets being dissipated by unnecessary litigation and it enables the Court to effectively supervise the claims brought against the company. The section prevents circumstances arising in which the company in liquidation is subject to a multiplicity of actions which would be expensive, time consuming and, most likely, unnecessary.
(b) An applicant for leave will be required to show why it should not be left to prove its debt in the winding up and, in the absence of establishing any such reason, it ought ordinarily be left to pursue that process.
(c) In seeking leave, an applicant must generally establish that it has a good claim with a solid foundation which gives rise to a serious question to be tried. It is perhaps not necessary to establish a prima facie case. Relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion are factors such as the amount and seriousness of the claim, the degree of complexity of legal and factual issues, the prospect that a proof of debt will be rejected and the stage at which the proceedings, if already commenced, have progressed.
(d) It must be recognised that the power to grant leave is discretionary and depends upon the particular circumstances of the case and there are many other factors which may be relevant to the power’s exercise.
(e) Special circumstances exist where a policy of insurance may exist for the purposes of indemnifying a claim made against the company.
9 It is widely accepted that the power under s 471B may be exercised by the Court by granting leave nunc pro tunc: Emanuele v Australian Securities Commission (1997) 188 CLR 114, 132 per Toohey J; Seeley International Pty Ltd v Millennium Electronics Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2020] SASC 211, [44]–[47] per Livesey J. …
209 I am satisfied that the leave sought by ASIC to proceed with this proceeding against Maliver should be granted for the following reasons:
(1) this proceeding does not result in a multiplicity of proceedings. That is, this is not a case where there is a choice between this litigation and the lodging of a proof of debt;
(2) the very nature of the proceeding lends itself to the Court making the order sought. In particular, the proceeding is brought by a regulator, ASIC, which seeks relief for the benefit of investors who were clients of Maliver, including an order that Maliver be wound-up on the just and equitable ground;
(3) relatedly, the proceeding will not result in any prejudice to creditors or any delay; and
(4) the Provisional Liquidators consent to the continuation of the proceeding against Maliver.
210 It is clear that leave can be granted nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, I will make an order pursuant to s 471B of the Corporations Act granting ASIC leave to proceed against Maliver nunc pro tunc.
4.2 A financial services business without an AFSL – s 911A of the Corporations Act
211 By para 1A of the third further amended originating process ASIC seeks declarations that Ms Caddick and Maliver each contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act because neither of them held an AFSL, nor were they an authorised representative of an AFSL holder, at the time they carried on a financial services business.
212 In the case of Ms Caddick, ASIC seeks a declaration that she contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act from about October 2012 and continuing until about November 2020 and, in the case of Maliver, ASIC seeks a declaration that it contravened s 911A from about June 2013 and continuing until about November 2020.
213 Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act concerns financial services and markets. Part 7.6 of Ch 7 concerns licensing of providers of financial services. It includes s 911A which requires that a person who carries on a financial services business in Australia must hold an AFSL covering the provision of the financial services. Section 911A also sets out the circumstances in which a person will be exempt from that requirement including where the person provides the service as a representative of a second person who carries on a financial services business and holds an AFSL that covers the provision of the service: see s 911A(2)(a)(i) of the Corporations Act.
214 The phrase “financial services business” is defined to mean “a business of providing financial services”: see s 761A of the Corporations Act.
215 Section 761C of the Corporations Act, which is titled “Meaning of carry on a financial services business”, provides that in working out whether someone carries on a financial services business, Div 3 of Pt 1.2 needs to be taken into account but that s 21(3)(c) of the Corporations Act does not apply for the purposes of Ch 7.
216 In turn, Div 3 of Pt 1.2 of the Corporations Act is titled “Carrying on business” and comprises ss 18 to 21. Section 20 provides:
A reference in this Act to a person carrying on a business, or a business of a particular kind, is a reference to the person carrying on a business, or a business of that kind, whether alone or together with any other person or persons.
217 Section 766A(1) sets out when a person provides a financials service for the purposes of Ch 7. Relevantly, a person provides a financial service if, among other things, he or she provides “financial product advice” or “deals in a financial product”.
218 Section 766B defines “financial product advice” as follows:
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, financial product advice means a recommendation or a statement of opinion, or a report of either of those things, that:
(a) is intended to influence a person or persons in making a decision in relation to a particular financial product or class of financial products, or an interest in a particular financial product or class of financial products; or
(b) could reasonably be regarded as being intended to have such an influence.
219 There are two types of financial product advice: personal advice; and general advice: see s 766B(2). They are respectively defined in subs 766B(3) and (4) as follows:
(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, personal advice is financial product advice that is given or directed to a person (including by electronic means) in circumstances where:
(a) the provider of the advice has considered one or more of the person’s objectives, financial situation and needs (otherwise than for the purposes of compliance with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 or with regulations, or AML/CTF Rules, under that Act); or
(b) a reasonable person might expect the provider to have considered one or more of those matters.
(4) For the purposes of this Chapter, general advice is financial product advice that is not personal advice.
220 Section 763A sets out the general definition of “financial product” and relevantly provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, a financial product is a facility through which, or through the acquisition of which, a person does one or more of the following:
(a) makes a financial investment (see section 763B);
(b) manages financial risk (see section 763C);
(c) makes non-cash payments (see section 763D).
This has effect subject to section 763E.
221 The term “facility” is defined in s 762C to include intangible property; or an arrangement or a term of an arrangement (including a term that is implied by law or that is required by law to be included); or a combination of intangible property and an arrangement or term of an arrangement.
222 Section 764A provides for specific things that are financial products for the purposes of Ch 7. They include “a security”: see s 764A(1)(a). In turn, the term “securities” is defined to mean relevantly “shares in, or a debentures of, a body”: see s 9 and s 92(1) of the Corporations Act.
223 The concept of “dealing” in a financial product under s 766A(1)(b) (see [217] above) is given its meaning by s 766C which, among other things, provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the following conduct (whether engaged in as principal or agent) constitutes dealing in a financial product:
(a) applying for or acquiring a financial product;
(b) issuing a financial product;
…
(2) Arranging for a person to engage in conduct referred to in subsection (1) is also dealing in a financial product, unless the actions concerned amount to providing financial product advice.
224 Section 9 of the Corporation Act defines “issue” to include:
(a) in relation to interests in a managed investment scheme — make available; and
(b) otherwise — circulate, distribute and disseminate
The note to the definition provides that when “issue” is used in Ch 7 in relation to a financial product it has a meaning affected by s 761E of the Corporations Act.
225 Section 761E(1) provides that if a financial product is issued to a person, the person acquires the product from the issuer and the issuer provides the product to the person. In addition s 761E(4) relevantly provides that the “issuer” in relation to a financial product to a person, the client, is the person responsible for the obligations owed under the terms of the facility that is the product to, or to a person nominated by, the client.
226 Section 763B of the Corporations Act sets out when a person makes a financial investment. It provides:
For the purposes of this Chapter, a person (the investor) makes a financial investment if:
(a) the investor gives money or money’s worth (the contribution) to another person and any of the following apply:
(i) the other person uses the contribution to generate a financial return, or other benefit, for the investor;
(ii) the investor intends that the other person will use the contribution to generate a financial return, or other benefit, for the investor (even if no return or benefit is in fact generated);
(iii) the other person intends that the contribution will be used to generate a financial return, or other benefit, for the investor (even if no return or benefit is in fact generated); and
(b) the investor has no day-to-day control over the use of the contribution to generate the return or benefit.
(Notes omitted. Emphasis in original.)
4.2.2 Have Ms Caddick or Maliver contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act?
227 In order to establish that Ms Caddick and/or Maliver contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act, ASIC must establish two things.
228 First, it must establish that they were each carrying on a financial services business in Australia. That, in turn, requires ASIC to establish that Ms Caddick and/or Maliver were, at the relevant times, each providing financial product advice or dealing in a financial product. For that purpose ASIC relied on a detailed but non-exhaustive list of particulars which it said evidenced conduct sufficient to establish the necessary elements and thus the breaches by Ms Caddick and Maliver of s 911A.
229 Secondly, it must establish that at the relevant times neither Ms Caddick nor Maliver held an AFSL or was an authorised representative of an AFSL holder. As to this question, the evidence establishes that neither Maliver nor Ms Caddick holds or held an AFSL at any time. Nor was Maliver or Ms Caddick a representative of another person carrying on a financial services business and who held a licence that covered the provision of the services. To that end, as set out at [43]-[45] above, in July 2013 [REDACTED] declined to permit Ms Caddick to provide advice under [REDACTED]’s AFSL. Notwithstanding that, each version of Maliver’s FSG, as well as other documents issued by Maliver, includes an AFSL which is in fact that of [REDACTED].
230 I turn to consider the first and more complex question. That is whether Maliver and/or Ms Caddick were carrying on a financial services business in Australia.
231 As set out at [217] above, a person carries on a financial services business if the person provides financial product advice or deals in a financial product.
232 By its detailed particulars ASIC alleges that Maliver and Ms Caddick breached s 911A (I infer by providing financial product advice or dealing in a financial product) in five different ways:
(1) by issuing a financial product, namely an arrangement through which money was given to Maliver;
(2) by providing financial product advice about the “facility”;
(3) by providing financial product advice about acquiring securities;
(4) by providing financial product advice about disposing of superannuation interests; and
(5) by providing financial product advice about establishing a self-managed superannuation fund.
233 It is only necessary for ASIC to establish one of these categories of conduct.
234 Before proceeding further I note that ASIC provided its detailed particulars on the day before commencement of the hearing, I infer, in response to the submissions filed by the Contradictor. In his written submissions the Contradictor summarised his response to ASIC’s case alleging contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act in the following way:
(1) he did not dispute that at all material times neither Ms Caddick nor Maliver held an AFSL or that the arrangements between Maliver and investors through which money was given to Maliver by investors was a financial product within the meaning of s 763A(1) of the Corporations Act;
(2) however, he said that there should be no finding that Ms Caddick or Maliver provided financial product advice unless and until ASIC established particularised recommendations or statements of opinion within the meaning of s 766B(1) of the Corporations Act that amount to financial product advice;
(3) he did not dispute that the entry into the arrangements referred to at (1) above amounted to the issuing of a financial product by Maliver with the result that it dealt in that financial product within the meaning of s 766C(1) of the Corporations Act. However, he said that Ms Caddick did not issue the financial product and therefore did not deal in it within the meaning of s 766C(1); and
(4) there should be no finding that either Ms Caddick or Maliver dealt in financial products by “arrang[ing] for investors to apply for financial products, namely, shares”.
235 At the commencement of the hearing the Contradictor informed the Court that, in light of the detailed particulars provided by ASIC, he would not contend that the alleged breaches are inadequately particularised (see [234(3)] above), leaving ASIC to satisfy the Court, by reference to the evidence, that it is entitled to the declarations of breach that it seeks.
236 The first way in which ASIC alleged that Maliver carried on a financial services business for the purposes of s 911A of the Corporations Act was by issuing a financial product, namely an arrangement through which money was given to Maliver. That is by dealing in a financial product.
237 The general definition of financial product is found in s 763A of the Corporations Act. Relevantly, a financial product is a facility through which, or through the acquisition of which, a person makes a financial investment: see s 763A(1)(a).
238 The question that thus arises is whether Maliver provided, and investors acquired, a facility of that kind (the facility for the purposes of s 763A of the Corporations Act). ASIC contended that was the case. I am satisfied, based on the evidence relied on by ASIC, that is so.
239 An example of the provision of such a facility is found in Ms Kraft-Reid’s evidence (see [90]-[124] above). That evidence establishes that on 22 March 2016 she and her wife attended the Five Dock branch of the CBA with Ms Caddick to establish the Kraft-Reid CDI Account, at Ms Caddick’s suggestion Maliver’s post office box was nominated as the mailing address for that account, redemptions from Ms Kraft-Reid’s and her wife’s existing superannuation funds were transferred into the Kraft-Reid CDI Account and funds were subsequently transferred out of the Kraft-Reid CDI Account to Maliver for investment purposes. As to the latter, emails from Ms Caddick reported on the progress with and status of investments and available cash.
240 The evidence summarised in the preceding paragraph establishes that the arrangement which was put in place was a facility for the purposes of s 763A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act and therefore a financial product, and that the facility was provided by Maliver and Ms Caddick given their advice in relation to its implementation and their role in its ongoing operation. The same pattern of conduct is established by the evidence of Mr Wilson in relation to the Wilson Super Fund (see [74]-[83] above) and Mrs Coetzee in relation to the TC Super Fund (see [130]-[158] above).
241 ASIC has therefore established that Maliver was carrying on a financial services business by issuing or dealing in a financial product, namely the facility.
242 The second way in which ASIC alleged that Maliver was carrying on a financial services business for the purposes of s 911A of the Corporations Act was by providing financial product advice about the “facility”, as defined above.
243 The term “financial product advice” is defined by s 766B(1) of the Corporations Act (see [218] above). ASIC contended that Maliver provided financial advice about the facility by making recommendations or statements of opinion intended to influence, or which could reasonably be regarded as intended to influence, persons to make a decision in relation to the facility.
244 Once again ASIC relied on Ms Kraft-Reid’s evidence to establish the breach. To that end, in summary, Ms Kraft-Reid gave the following evidence:
(1) at their initial meeting on 10 November 2015 Ms Caddick recommended that she would set up a CommSec account through which she would invest on behalf of a self-managed superannuation fund which she also recommended should be established by Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife;
(2) at a meeting in May 2016, Ms Caddick gave advice about Ms Kraft-Reid’s wife’s ability to draw from the Kraft-Reid Super Fund upon her retirement. Among other things, she advised Ms Kraft-Reid’s wife about the amount that she would be able to draw from the Kraft-Reid Super Fund as a monthly pension payment and recommended that she set up a direct debit of $200 per month from her company account to the Kraft-Reid CDIA as an ongoing contribution to her superannuation to enable her to draw the pension amount discussed;
(3) on 8 July 2017 Ms Caddick informed Ms Kraft-Reid’s wife that she had transferred “$15,000 from the CBA trading account to your working cash account” which was the pension payment for the year 2017-2018. I would infer from this email that Ms Caddick had provided an opinion to her about the annual pension amount that could be withdrawn; and
(4) on 24 August 2020 Ms Caddick, having spoken to AMP, made a recommendation to Ms Kraft-Reid about the amount that she should transfer from the funds she still held with AMP to the Kraft-Reid Super Fund and the balance to be left invested with AMP so as to retain her current insurances.
245 Each of these interactions evidences the provision by Ms Caddick on Maliver’s behalf of a recommendation or opinion which was intended to influence, or which could reasonably be regarded as influencing, Ms Kraft-Reid and/or her wife to make a decision in relation to the facility. They included the decision to set up the facility, the decision to add to the facility by making regular monthly payments to ensure that there were sufficient funds to meet future payments and the decision to transfer a further lump sum into the facility for the purpose of investment.
246 It follows that I am satisfied that ASIC has established that Maliver was carrying on a financial services business by providing financial product advice in relation to the facility.
247 The third way in which ASIC alleged that Maliver was carrying on a financial services business for the purposes of s 911A of the Corporations Act was by providing financial product advice in relation to the acquiring of securities. More particularly, ASIC contended that Maliver breached s 911A by making recommendations or statements of opinion intended to influence, or which could reasonably be regarded as intended to influence, persons to invest in a particular financial product or class of financial products, namely securities.
248 ASIC relied on the following evidence of Ms Kraft-Reid:
(1) on 10 November 2015 at the initial meeting between Ms Caddick, Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife, there was discussion about their current superannuation balances, the establishment of a CommSec account for the purposes of purchasing shares on their behalf and the shares which Ms Caddick followed or had an interest in at the time. During the meeting Ms Caddick provided Ms Kraft-Reid with the documents set out at [100] above, including the Maliver FSG;
(2) in April 2016, on Ms Caddick’s recommendation, Ms Kraft-Reid wrote a cheque for $300,000 in favour of Maliver. Ms Caddick informed Ms Kraft-Reid that they would be placing those funds “in the market”. Ms Kraft-Reid understood this to mean that Ms Caddick would use those funds to buy shares;
(3) between June 2016 and September 2020 Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife received regular Portfolio Valuations for the Kraft-Reid Super Fund;
(4) Ms Kraft-Reid received a document from Maliver for each of the years 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2018-2019 providing an economic review of the previous 12 months including an opinion in relation to interest rates, share market, commodity prices, the Australian dollar and investment returns, and the issues to watch for the coming year; and
(5) from time to time Ms Caddick provided advice to Ms Kraft-Reid and her wife about what to do with their funds or steps she had taken in relation to the sale of shares in their portfolio (see for example [121(9)] and [121((11))] above).
249 ASIC also relied on other evidence as particulars of conduct which it contended amounted to the giving of financial product advice by Maliver (and Ms Caddick). That evidence included but was not limited to:
(1) the conversations between Ms Horn and Ms Caddick in 2012, prior to Maliver’s incorporation, in which Ms Caddick inquired whether Ms Horn would be interested in investing via her new business and in which she represented that she would be investing Ms Horn’s superannuation in shares and that the process was low risk and simple (see [52]-[53] above);
(2) the discussion between Mr and Mrs Coetzee and Ms Caddick at their initial meeting on 23 October 2014 when Ms Caddick recommended investment in shares, rather than property, and advised on the allocation of assets in the TC Super Fund including the percentage she recommended be invested in shares and the advice subsequently given by Ms Caddick, on an intermittent basis, that more of the TC Super Fund’s assets should be invested in shares (see [131]-[132] and [146] above);
(3) the discussion between Mr Wilson and Ms Caddick on 6 May 2015 at their initial meeting in which Ms Caddick indicated that, in terms of investing Mr Wilson’s superannuation, she was only interested in about 10 Australian equities and her provision of a draft investment strategy, based on Mr Wilson’s financial circumstances, from which Mr Wilson understood that Ms Caddick would invest in 10 Australian equities on his behalf using a CommSec account and an associated CDI Account (see [75] above); and
(4) the recommendation made by Ms Caddick in August 2016 as to how Maliver would invest Mr Wilson’s personal funds. The accompanying “short form recommendation” provided on Maliver letterhead was a “proposed asset allocation” for Mr Wilson for an initial contribution of $200,000 which included four Australian listed securities and recommended ranges for allocation of funds to each (see [80] above).
250 I am satisfied that in each case the evidence relied on by ASIC establishes that Maliver, and Ms Caddick on its behalf, made recommendations or gave opinions intended to influence, or which might reasonably be regarded as being intended to influence, a person to make a decision in relation to securities.
251 For example, the documents provided to Ms Kraft-Reid at the initial meeting explained the nature of the relationship between Maliver and the investor and set out Ms Caddick’s credentials and her role as advisor. It, coupled with the other documents provided (see [100] above), was intended to influence Ms Kraft-Reid in her decision to invest in securities. The Portfolio Valuations were opinions as to the value of the investments in securities at different points in time which were intended to influence an investor such as Ms Kraft-Reid to make a decision about securities, most likely to continue with those investments.
252 The initial discussions between Ms Caddick and prospective clients, such as those with Ms Horn, Mr and Mrs Coetzee and Mr Wilson relied on by ASIC, were clearly recommendations or statements of opinion by Ms Caddick intended to influence those persons to invest their funds in securities. In addition the intermittent advice given to, for example, Ms Horn and Mrs Coetzee about the contributions to be made either to superannuation or for investment, and ultimately to enable further investment in shares, are also examples of recommendations or statements of opinion intended to influence those persons in relation to securities.
253 It follows that I am satisfied that ASIC has established that Maliver carried on a financial services business for the purposes of s 911A of the Corporations Act by providing financial product advice in relation to acquiring securities.
254 ASIC also relied on two additional categories of conduct which it contended evidence the carrying on of a financial services business by Maliver (and Ms Caddick) (see [232] above) although it did not elaborate on or provide any submissions in relation to that conduct. However, given my findings in relation to the first three categories of conduct and the nature of the relief it ultimately seeks it is not necessary for me to consider those additional categories.
255 The evidence establishes that Maliver carried on a financial services business by issuing a financial product, namely an arrangement through which money was given to Maliver, and by providing financial product advice in relation to both the facility (as defined above at [218]) and acquiring securities. It did so over a period when it did not hold an AFSL nor an exemption from the requirement to do so. Accordingly, I am satisfied that Maliver breached s 911A and that its contravening conduct extended over the period from about June 2013, when it was incorporated, to November 2020.
256 ASIC relied on the same categories of conduct the subject of its detailed particulars (see [232] above) to support its contention that Ms Caddick carried on a financial services business.
257 ASIC submitted that there were two broad reasons why it contended that Ms Caddick breached s 911A of the Corporations Act: firstly, because the authorities supported its contention that both the company and its sole director were liable for the same contravening conduct; and secondly, because given the nature of the conduct this is the type of case in which the Court would pierce the corporate veil.
258 As to the first reason ASIC relied on four authorities: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Marco (No 6) [2020] FCA 1781 (ASIC v Marco (No 6)), Re McDougall [2006] FCA 427; (2006) 57 ACSR 175, Re PFS Wholesale Mortgage Corporation Pty Ltd [2006] VSC 192; (2006) 57 ACSR 553 and Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Activesuper Pty Ltd (2015) 235 FCR 181. Not much was said about these authorities by ASIC in its submissions. In order to understand their relevance it is convenient to set out a summary of each focussed on those aspects relied on by ASIC.
259 In ASIC v Marco (No 6) ASIC alleged that each of the defendants operated a scheme by which investors executed a declaration of trust with the first defendant, Mr Marco, who guaranteed very attractive returns on maturity of their investment. ASIC alleged that Mr Marco represented that his ability to generate high returns was because of his access to, and participation in, “Private Placement Programmes”. The evidence revealed that investors’ funds were used by Mr Marco and the second and third defendants, AMS, to purchase real estate and vintage cars. Mr Marco and his son, Damon Marco, were the directors of AMS and Mr Marco was its sole shareholder. By trust deed executed in July 2013, AMS became the trustee of the AMS Holdings Trust and it was in that capacity that AMS was named as third defendant.
260 By the time of the proceeding, work undertaken by interim receivers, who had been earlier appointed on ASIC’s application, confirmed that there was a significant shortfall, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, owing to investors.
261 Among other things, ASIC sought a declaration that each of the defendants contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act by carrying on a financial services business without holding an AFSL. At [94] McKerracher J found that the evidence demonstrated that all relevant actions were conducted by Mr Marco but that “he was also the guiding mind and will of (and controlled) AMS in both its capacities”, that “[t]o the extent actions were performed using AMS, those actions were controlled by Mr Marco” and that “AMS only acted on direction from Mr Marco and at his instance”. At [95] his Honour continued:
The defence has called no evidence at all in this final hearing in which relief was sought against all defendants. No conclusion is sensibly open, other than that all actions performed by AMS in both capacities were performed at the relevant times at the instance of, and jointly with, Mr Marco. I consider that the position of the respective defendants cannot be relevantly distinguished. Liability is established against all of them. In light of the following matters and for the same reasons that the defendants all carried on a managed investment scheme, but also by reference to the definition of persons in s 2C of the Acts Interpretation Act, it has been established that the defendants all carried on a financial services business.
262 At [96]-[99] McKerracher J referred to the facts based upon which his Honour found that Mr Marco was dealing in financial products and thus carrying on a financial services business. At [100] his Honour said:
While it may have been the case that the positive acts of ‘dealing’ in the financial products (whether by issuing or varying them) were performed by Mr Marco in his personal capacity, and while Mr Marco represented to investors that their funds would be used in ‘private placement programmes’ in which he alone would partake, it is clear that AMS’ property holdings formed an essential element of the business as a whole. This is demonstrated by the evidence as to the transfer and application of investor funds, between and by both defendants, as addressed at [74]-[147] of the Gomm Affidavit and evidenced in the primary bank statements exhibited to the Lim Affidavit. While AMS’ role in the Scheme may have been completely internal and not ‘investor-facing’ its operation of the Scheme was central to Mr Marco’s ability to deal in the interests created by the Scheme such that it also carried on the financial services business: MyWealth (at [125]) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Arafure Equities Pty Ltd (2005) 56 ACSR 429; [2005] QSC 376 (at [30]).
263 In Re McDougall ASIC relevantly sought declarations of contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act in relation to an unregistered managed investment scheme and injunctions restraining the defendants, Mr McDougall and the company of which he was sole director, BTS Management Pty Ltd, from contravening that provision. The scheme was conducted by BTS under the business name “Chargeitcards”, the business name registration for which recorded that both BTS and Mr McDougall carried on business under that name. Mr McDougall and BTS did not oppose the making of the declarations and consented to the orders sought by ASIC.
264 At [39] Young J held that both Mr McDougall and BTS contravened s 911A and thereafter set out his reasons for reaching that conclusion. Relevantly, in relation to Mr McDougall’s conduct at [50]-[51] his Honour said:
[50] I consider that McDougall, as the sole director and controller of BTS and as one of the registered owners of the business name Chargeitcards, was also carrying on an unlicensed financial services business in contravention of s 911A(1). Further, and in any event, McDougall was acting as a representative of BTS in offering and promoting memberships in the scheme. As such, McDougall was only exempt from the requirement that he hold an Australian financial services licence if BTS itself held such a licence, and it did not.
[51] Numerous cases have held that s 911A of the Act extends to a company director who conducts or is involved in a company’s carrying on of a financial services business without an Australian financial services licence: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Giann & Giann Pty Ltd (2005) 141 FCR 278; 23 ACLC 45; [2005] FCA 81; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Manito Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 56; [2005] FCA 386; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Drury Management Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 068.
265 In PFS Wholesale ASIC sought declarations against that a number of the defendants had contravened several provisions of the Corporations Act, injunctions consequent upon such declarations as may be made and orders disqualifying the personal defendants from managing corporations. There were 14 defendants, 11 of whom were companies comprising the PFS group. The twelfth defendant, Mr White, was a director of each of those companies and the remaining two defendants, Mrs White and Mr Tolson, were each a director of one or more of the corporate defendants. The PFS group carried on three businesses: a business of establishing and managing self-managed superannuation funds on behalf of clients; a property development business; and a mortgage and finance broking business. There was substantial inter-relationship between the first two of those businesses as the trustees of self-managed superannuation funds were encouraged to invest superannuation moneys in developments undertaken by the property development business.
266 Commencing at [355] Hargrave J considered whether any of the defendants carried on a financial services business by recommending to potential clients that they establish self-managed superannuation funds or invest in PFS group property developments. His Honour concluded that certain of the defendants engaged in a financial services business in that way. His Honour then turned to consider which of the defendants contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act by carrying on a financial services business without an AFSL. In relation to the personal defendants, after finding that none of them held an AFSL in their own names, at [360] his Honour said:
In my view the evidence establishes that each of the personal defendants carried on a financial services business. Shaun White did so by his overall control of the PFS group. An example of particular recommendations made by him is to be found in the information pack which he prepared and which was distributed to persons interested in establishing SMSFs. In her administrative role, Nicole White was involved, at the very least, in the varying of the superannuation interests of PFS group clients. Tolson admits that he recommended to friends and family that they establish SMSFs. Further, there is no question that he recommended that persons, including Aaron Kendon through his SMSF, invest in redeemable preference shares in Nycam Werd.
267 In Activesuper, among other things, ASIC alleged that the defendants referred to as the “ActiveSuper” defendants, provided financial services when, at the relevant times, none of them held an AFSL covering the provision of those services and those defendants thereby contravened s 911A(1) of the Corporations Act. The “ActiveSuper” defendants were the first defendant, ActiveSuper, the second defendant, a company referred to as Royale, the third defendant, Mr Burrows, who controlled ActiveSuper and exercised considerable control over Royale, and the fourth defendant. Mr Gibson, who carried out many of the day to day activities of Royale: see Activesuper at [3]-[4].
268 In relation to that allegation at [310]-[311] White J said:
[310] ASIC alleges that the ActiveSuper defendants contravened s 911A(1) in the following ways by their conduct with respect to the establishment and variation of SMSFs:
(1) by making recommendations intended to influence persons in making decisions in relation to the acquisition of superannuation interests;
(2) by arranging for persons to acquire, vary and/or dispose of superannuation interests; and
(3) by arranging for persons to acquire, vary and/or dispose of interests in deposit and payment accounts.
[311] Conduct of the kind alleged by ASIC has been recognised as constituting the carrying on of a financial services business. In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v PFS Business Development Group Pty Ltd, Hargrave J held that the following conduct to constitute the carrying on of a financial services business: making recommendations to clients to vary existing superannuation arrangements or to establish SMSFs (at [357]); making recommendations to potential investors that they invest in identified property developments or other specific projects (at [358], [360]); preparing and distributing information packs which encourage potential investors to establish SMSFs (at [360]); and assisting in varying the superannuation arrangements of clients when employed in an administrative role (at [360]).
269 At [321]-[323] his Honour set out the reasons for his conclusion (at [324]) that the individual defendants, Mr Gibson and Mr Burrows, as well as the corporate defendants, ActiveSuper and Royale, had contravened s 911A(1) of the Corporations Act in relation to the self-managed superannuation funds:
321 It is plain that the conduct of Royale’s telemarketers, and of Mr Gibson himself, amounted to recommendations intended to influence the recipient of the cold calls in relation to the acquisition of an SMSF. Two SMSF witnesses, Singer and Mewis, were contacted by a Mr Bartlett, one of the telemarketers. Their evidence indicates that Mr Bartlett made recommendations or statements of opinions intended to influence Ms Singer and Mr Mewis to acquire an SMSF.
322 By their respective defences, each of ActiveSuper and Mr Burrows denied having made recommendations intended to influence persons in making a decision to acquire vary and/or dispose of an interest in a SMSF. In his s 19 examination on 23 April 2012, Mr Burrows did however admit:
[O]nce we get the application forms we’ll organise the trust deeds to be established and all the relevant minutes. We use a third party provider to provide those. Then once we receive those documents … [we send] a welcome pack out to the client and they need to execute those documents and get them back so that we can have that fund created. So we’ll do the registration of the fund and make sure it gets created.
He also referred to the assistance which he and ActiveSuper provided in the establishment of the Macquarie Accounts, in dealing with client enquiries about the “roll over” of funds into the new SMSF, and to the banking by ActiveSuper of the cheques into the Macquarie Accounts.
323 Quite apart from the activities of Mr Burrows himself, I am satisfied, for the reasons given earlier, that the conduct of Royale and Mr Gibson should be attributed to Mr Burrows and ActiveSuper.
270 Against that background, I turn to consider Ms Caddick’s conduct.
271 Having regard to the matters set out above, I am of the opinion that all of Maliver’s actions were undertaken or performed at the relevant times at the instigation of, and jointly with, Ms Caddick. Further ASIC has established that Ms Caddick (as well as Maliver) carried on a financial services business by providing financial product advice. My reasons for reaching that conclusion include:
(1) Ms Caddick was the sole director and guiding mind of Maliver. She was intimately involved in its day to day operations and, indeed, was the only person at whose instigation it operated and took steps;
(2) at all relevant times Ms Caddick was the person who made representations on behalf of Maliver to investors. To the extent that Ms Caddick relied on her employees, the evidence establishes that any tasks they undertook were administrative in nature and were undertaken on instruction from Ms Caddick. Ms Caddick attended all meetings with clients including initial meetings, annual review meetings and any other discussion that took place concerning investments;
(3) all key correspondence from or on behalf of Maliver was signed by Ms Caddick and, I would infer, prepared by her. In addition Ms Caddick provided the pre-investment documents, including the Maliver FSG which, in turn, nominated her as the “adviser”, and worked with prospective clients to understand their respective risk profiles and asset and liability positions. On a monthly basis Ms Caddick despatched, on behalf of Maliver, Portfolio Valuations to investors; and
(4) Ms Caddick advised on and assisted in the establishment of self-managed superannuation funds and their subsequent administration and assisted in the establishment of bank accounts with the CBA through which moneys would be transferred to Maliver. She often advised on and directed the quantum and timing of transfers of funds to Maliver.
272 These matters are borne out by the evidence of the Investor Witnesses which is set out in detail above. The evidence comfortably establishes that Ms Caddick dealt in a financial product by issuing the facility and that she gave financial product advice in relation to the facility and acquiring securities in the manner particularised by ASIC (see [232] above). My findings in relation to each of those breaches, set out at [227]-[271] above, apply equally to Ms Caddick. It is not necessary to repeat them.
273 As to the second reason, ASIC submitted that the Court could comfortably conclude that Maliver was Ms Caddick’s alter ego which she used to perpetrate an elaborate fraud. Specifically Maliver was formed by Ms Caddick to disguise a fraudulent Ponzi scheme which she masterminded. ASIC submitted that in those circumstances the corporate veil could not be maintained and the only sensible conclusion is that the positions of Maliver and Ms Caddick could not be relevantly distinguished. ASIC contended that both the creation and use of Maliver was integral to the perpetration of the fraud and the Court would have no hesitation in disregarding Maliver’s separate legal personality. ASIC submitted that while each of Maliver and Ms Caddick was carrying on a financial services business that business was in fact a sham and an elaborate façade for Ms Caddick’s fraudulent Ponzi scheme.
274 ASIC relied, in particular, on two decisions in support of that proposition. The first was Commissioner for Fair Trading v TLC Consulting Services Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 233. In that case the plaintiff, the Commissioner for Fair Trading, brought an application for an order that the third respondent, Ms Dimitrijevski, be punished for contempt for breach of an order made by the court in April 2003 (April Order) which restrained her from carrying on an “introduction services” business. The central question before the court on that application was whether, notwithstanding that the prohibition in the April Order was not worded to expressly prohibit Ms Dimitrijevski from engaging as a director or shareholder or an employee of a company in carrying on the business of introduction services, Ms Dimitrijevski (either by herself or by her servants or agents) had breached the April Order through the involvement of the company Love Network Qld Pty Ltd. The sole shareholder of Love Network was Southport Central Property Pty Ltd of which Ms Dimitrijevski was the sole shareholder, director and secretary.
275 The Commissioner’s primary submission was that the circumstances of the case were an example of where the corporate veil of Love Network could be pierced to show that its incorporation and the conduct of business by it were a sham or device used by Ms Dimitrijevski to avoid the obligations imposed on her by the April Order and to enable her to conduct the business proscribed by that order: TLC Consulting at [31]. Commencing at [34] Philippides J, by reference to the Commissioner’s submission, surveyed the authorities (at [34]-[35] and [37]-[40]) including as follows:
[34] The applicant relied on the following statement of principle in Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (at [4.250]), concerning the use of a company structure for the sole or dominant purpose of avoiding an existing legal obligation:
It is acceptable for someone embarking on an enterprise which may attract future obligations and liability to form a limited company to carry on the enterprise. However, the position is different where persons who are already under an existing obligation form or acquire a company to engage in conduct which, if engaged in by those obligors, would be breaches of their obligation, and the avoidance of that obligation is the sole or the dominant intention of the obligors in forming or acquiring the company. If the company engages in the conduct, the Court may ascribe the company’s conduct to the obligors.
[35] Reference was made to Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 and Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 as leading cases for lifting the corporate veil in circumstances where there is an attempt to avoid an existing transaction. The use of a sham or device was also considered in Artedomus v del Casale [2006] NSWSC 146, upon which reliance was placed. In that case, the defendant was alleged to have breached, inter alia, the express terms of a covenant and agreement associated both with the termination of his employment and with a sale of shares in a company in which he was interested and requiring him not to compete with the company for a period of three years. The court held that the restraint was not able to be circumvented by the defendant carrying on business through the vehicle of another company as it was found to be a sham. Burchett AJ stated:
[19] The first difficulty confronted by the plaintiff, in so far as it relies upon the agreement by Mr Del Casale “not to compete with the Company for a period of three years”, is that the clause does not contain the words usually inserted in such clauses “directly or indirectly”, and the importation and sale of stone, which plainly does compete with the plaintiff, has been carried out through the company Stone Arc, not in the name of Mr Del Casale personally. However, it was part of the plaintiff’s case that Mr Del Casale’s incorporation of Stone Arc was an act done for the very purpose of competing with the plaintiff and that his subsequent attempt to dissociate himself from it under the cloak of a transfer of his interest to Mr Savini, which was not shown, certainly in the period of the establishment of its business, to have been properly documented and formalised, was a mere veil, sham or device. In J.D. Heydon on The Restraint of Trade Doctrine, 2nd edition (1999) at 243–244 it is stated:
But the covenantor cannot evade the covenant by carrying on a business under a title, or by forming a limited company which is a mere veil for the convenantor’s own activities, or by using a nominee for this purpose.
[20] A number of authorities are cited in support of this proposition. In Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch 935, as is made clear in the judgment of Farwell J at 937, the case against the defendant company was “put on the ground that the defendant company [was] merely the creature of the first defendant [an individual who had been the managing director of the plaintiff and had entered into a covenant not to entice away customers], and the first defendant is committing breaches of the covenant by the agency of the defendant company”. Lord Hanworth MR made it clear (at 956) that he accepted this view of the case, and Romer LJ expressed the same conclusion in the following terms (at 969):
[T]his defendant company was formed and was carrying on business [emphasis added] merely as a cloak or sham for the purpose of enabling the defendant Horne to commit the breach of the covenant that he entered into deliberately with the plaintiffs on the occasion of and as consideration for his employment as managing director.
On that basis, an injunction was granted against both defendants. This view of the law was in accordance with a dictum of Lindley LJ in Smith v Hancock [1894] 2 Ch 377 at 385:
If the evidence admitted of the conclusion that what was being done was a mere cloak or sham, and that in truth the business was being carried on by the wife and Kerr for the Defendant, or by the Defendant through his wife for Kerr, I certainly should not hesitate to draw that conclusion, and to grant the Plaintiff relief accordingly.
… The dictum of Lindley LJ was applied by Beyers J in Scheckter v Kolbe where the respondent, who had given a covenant in restraint of trade upon the sale of his business, was afterwards involved as a manager of a competing company, shares in which were owned by his brother, the respondent having lent the brother money in order to enable him to acquire the shares and given a guarantee to the company’s bankers. Beyers J said (at 114), after citing the dictum of Lindly LJ:
I find it difficult to resist the conclusion that the respondent is carrying on the business, through the Company, for his brother. It is submitted on the respondent’s behalf that the fact of his being a creditor of the Company does not give him an “interest” in the business. That may be so; but the cumulative effect of the evidence is that the respondent has interested himself in the business to the extent that he may be described as the deus ex machina thereof.
…
[41] But something more needs to be said about the other provision of clause 6 by which Mr Del Casale agreed “not to compete with [Artedomus] for a period of three years”. As I have pointed out, this is not expressed to include competition by a company, even if owned or partly owned by Mr Del Casale. Yet, in the modern world, a company may be very much the alter ego of an individual. The principles of construction stated in J D Heydon, op cit, to which I have already referred, would suggest attention should be given to “the object” of the clause, being “protection … against rivalry in trade”, and the agreement should be understood as embracing competition by the use of a company. In any case, I have concluded that I should accept the submission of counsel for the plaintiff that the company was used as a mere cloak for Mr Del Casale’s activities in conjunction with Mr Savini, so as to attract the application of the dictum of Lindley LJ in Smith v Hancock to which reference has been made. Subsequent events strongly confirm this. There was much evidence that Mr Del Casale, while purporting to act as a contractor contracting independently with Stone Arc, has actually been treated by it as if he were, and has behaved himself as if he were indeed, an important member of its structure. I do not accept the evidence of Messrs Del Casale and Savini to the contrary.
…
[37] The applicant also relied on Kensington International Ltd v Congo [2005] EWHC 2684, where Cooke J in reviewing the authorities on piercing the corporate veil stated:
The Third Parties rightly state that the principles set out in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Limited [1987] AC 22 are fundamental, requiring the Court to recognise and respect the separate legal personality and a corporate entity. The authorities make it plain that the separate personality of the company cannot be ignored merely because a court considers that it might be just to do so. There are however a number of cases where the courts have thought it right to “pierce the corporate veil,” although the meaning of the expression and its out-working differs in the varying contexts of the authorities concerned.
The words or phrases which appear in the authorities where “piercing” has taken place and which are used in the context of justifying the court’s view, involve an element of impropriety and dishonesty. This is made plain by Hobhouse LJ in Ord v Bellhaven Pubs Ltd [1998] BCC 607 at p 615F. Transactions or business structures which are a “device” or “stratagem,” a “mask” a “cloak” or a “sham” can give way to the court’s examination and determination of what lies behind them and the real situation which obtains. The classic definition of a “sham” appears in Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 (CA). There Diplock LJ said that, if the word had any meaning in law, it meant “acts done or documents executed by the parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intended to create” …
The decision of the House of Lords in AG Securities Limited v Vaughan [1990] 1 AC 417 establishes that “sham” does have a meaning in law, namely an attempt to disguise the true character (of the agreement) which it was hoped would deceive the court …
In Re Polly Peck International Plc [1996] 2 AER 443 at page 444 Robert Walker J (as he then was) quoted Staughton LJ in an earlier decision, pointing out that it was better to speak of “substance”, “truth”, “reality” and that which was “genuine”, rather than use the words “disguise, cloak, mask, colourable device, label, form artificial, sham, stratagem and pretence” …
[38] The applicant also referred to the New Zealand decision of Official Assignee as Assignee of the Bankrupt Estate of Armitage v Sanctuary Propvest Ltd [2009] NZHC 1783 where the Official Assignee of a bankrupt estate sought to recover property held by the respondent company on the grounds the company was a sham and alter ego for the bankrupt and it was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil. The court considered evidence that showed the director of the company was the puppet of the bankrupt, doing as the bankrupt instructed, and the company structure was a façade to hide the involvement of the bankrupt, who was in fact controlling the company and carrying out all actions for the company in disregard for company structure. In determining whether the lifting of the corporate veil could be lifted with the result that the person who created the company was to be treated as the owner of the property, Asher J stated at [39]:
I am satisfied that if a company structure has been set up as a façade, lacking in reality a structure involving shareholders and directors, but rather involving control by a single person in order to avoid or disguise legal duties or obligation on that person, that the Court can look behind that structure. This was the sort of sham that was put to one side in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832.
[39] The applicant pointed to similar jurisprudence in the United States (see Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law at [4.255]) to the effect that the corporate veil may be lifted “when the notion of a legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime or where it is used to defeat an overriding public policy”.
[40] In Ace Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corp [2010] QCA 55 at [88], Keane JA, with whose reasons Douglas J agreed, expressed the approach of the court in respect of the principles concerning piercing the corporate veil in the following terms:
On occasion the courts have been willing to penetrate the corporate veil when the concept of separate corporate personality is sought to be used to defeat public convenience, or to justify wrong, or to protect fraud, or to defend crime.
276 At [56] Philippides J set out her conclusion. Her Honour observed that the April Order did not prohibit Ms Dimitrijevski from indirect involvement in the business of providing introduction services by being a shareholder in a company that provided such a service. However, her Honour continued as follows:
But it was an entirely different matter to circumvent the prohibition contained in the [April Order] by interposing a corporate structure to disguise and conceal the reality revealed by the affidavit material that the respondent was in fact directly engaged in the operation of the business and was its controlling mind. The respondent interposed a corporate structure, but then proceeded to bypass that structure in involving herself directly in the day to day running of the business. The corporate vehicle was merely a device adopted to conceal that reality. I am satisfied to the requisite standard on the material before the court that the sole purpose of the company [Love Network] was to conceal the respondent’s engagement in the conduct which was proscribed by the [April Order] and to evade the legal obligations stemming from the [April Order]. I conclude that the incorporation and the conduct of the business by the company [Love Network] was a sham or device used by the respondent to avoid the obligations of the [April Order].
277 The second authority relied on by ASIC was Trustor AB v Smallbone and Others (No 2) [2001] WLR 1177. In that case the plaintiff, Trustor, claimed as against the first defendant, Mr Smallbone, compensation and damages for breach of trust and/or his duties owed as a director to it and, as against the first to eleventh defendants, damages on the ground that they had knowingly received funds belonging to it which had been unlawfully obtained by Mr Smallbone. The proceeding had a somewhat complicated history. The background to the application that was then before the court was described at [1] as follows:
On 25 June 1999 Rimer J gave summary judgment under RSC Ord 14 for the claimant, Trustor AB, against the first defendant, Mr Smallbone, for £426,439 and interest. At the same time he discussed an appeal of the second defendant, Introcom (International) Ltd (“Introcom”), from the order of Master Bowman giving summary judgment under the same rule in favour of Trustor for Sw Kr 166.7m, £404,100 and Fin Mk 75.5m. On 9 May 2000, on appeal from the orders of Rimer J, the Court of Appeal indicated that, in their view, Mr Smallbone’s liability was not limited to the amount of the judgment against him but extended to a joint and several liability for the much larger amount for which Introcom had been found to be liable. They did not then extend the judgment against Mr Smallbone to the larger amount because counsel for Mr Smallbone had not had adequate opportunity to deal with some of the conclusions of the Court of Appeal. This application was made by Trustor on 12 September 2000 seeking judgment for the additional relief the Court of Appeal had suggested.
278 Trustor submitted that the circumstances were such as to warrant the court “piercing the corporate veil” and recognising the receipt of monies by the second defendant, Introcom, as receipt by Mr Smallbone, noting that the authorities justified that course in three, potentially overlapping, categories including, as the first category, where the company was shown to be a façade or sham with no unconnected third party involved. The issue identified by the court for resolution was whether it was entitled to regard receipt of funds by Introcom as receipt by Mr Smallbone. As to the first category at [20] Sir Andrew Morritt V-C said:
I should also refer to some of the cases relief on by counsel for Trustor. In Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1993] Ch 935 an individual bound by a non-solicitation covenant after the termination of his employment set up in business through a limited company. The individual was held to be in breach of covenant, notwithstanding the interposition of the company, because the company was formed as the device, stratagem or mask to “the effective carrying on of a business of” the individual: see pp 956, 965 and 969. In each of the passages to which I have referred it was made plain that the conclusion was one of fact. In Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 an individual had contracted to sell land. Wishing to avoid his liability he transferred the land to a company he had acquired for the purpose. A decree of specific performance was made against both the individual and the company on two grounds. The first was that the individual had sufficient control of the company to compel it to perform the contract. The second, following the principle applied in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne, was that the company was the creature of the first defendant, “a device and a sham, a mask which he holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition in the eye of equity”: see [1962] I WLR 832, 836. In Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1978 (HL) 90, 96 Lord Keith of Kinkel pointed out that it was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil “only where special circumstances exist indicating that [the company] is a mere façade concealing the true facts”. This principle was applied by the Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 542A-B. Adam’s case was follows by the Court of Appeal in In re H (Restraint Order: Realisable Property) [1996] 2 All ER 391, which was applied by Rimer J in Gencor ACP Ltd v Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 34. These authorities plainly establish the first proposition of counsel for Trustor 1 referred to in paragraph 14 above.
279 At [23] his Honour observed that, in his opinion, the court was entitled to “pierce the corporate veil” and to recognise the receipt of the company as that of the individual in control of it if the company was used as a device or façade to conceal the true facts and thereby avoid or conceal any liability of that individual.
280 The question that arises is whether Maliver was a sham used to disguise Ms Caddick’s fraudulent scheme.
281 Maliver was established shortly after Ms Caddick established her investment advice business and was controlled by Ms Caddick, its sole director and shareholder. The evidence reveals that the business carried on by Maliver was a scheme designed to entice investors to invest their funds with Maliver which, in turn, would invest in securities on their behalves as advised and effected by Ms Caddick acting for Maliver. The purpose of the investment was to generate returns.
282 With Ms Caddick’s assistance, structures and accounts were established by the investor for that purpose. Although she did not always have control, Ms Caddick usually had complete visibility of those structures and accounts and advised on the movement of funds from the accounts to Maliver purportedly for investment purposes. In fact, and despite representations made to the contrary, those moneys were never invested in shares. Ms Caddick, through Maliver, maintained the façade that they were so invested for many years by, among other things, issuing the Portfolio Valuations, which included purported CommSec accounts showing the current value of the portfolio and which inevitably showed growth, providing annual market updates and meeting regularly with investors to discuss their investments. The evidence establishes that the funds provided by investors were not applied to the purchase of share portfolios on their behalves but were transferred to accounts in the name of or associated with Ms Caddick and used to fund her lifestyle and/or, I infer, to repay those investors who redeemed their investments in part or in whole.
283 In my opinion the evidence establishes that Maliver was a vehicle through which Ms Caddick operated and was able to perpetrate a fraud on investors. That is, it was a sham or façade adopted to conceal the reality and was used by Ms Caddick for that purpose. The reality was that the actions of Maliver were carried out at the behest of Ms Caddick and it was Ms Caddick who took all necessary steps, provided the purported advice and ran the scheme described above. In those circumstances, to the extent that it has been established that Maliver was conducting a financial services business without holding an AFSL in contravention of s 911A, it is apparent that, in fact, Ms Caddick was also carrying on that business and doing so without holding an AFSL in contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act.
284 It follows from the matters set out above that ASIC has established that Ms Caddick contravened s 911A of the Corporations Act by carrying on a financial services business without holding an AFSL with the contravening conduct occurring both prior to, when she operated on her account, and after Maliver’s incorporation.
285 As set out at [211] above, by para 1A of its third further amended originating process ASIC seeks declaratory relief against Ms Caddick and Maliver in relation to their contraventions of s 911A of the Corporations Act.
286 The Court’s power to grant declaratory relief is found in s 21 of the FCA Act. In ASIC v Marco (No 6) at [120] McKerracher J said about that power:
As observed in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Sweeney [2001] NSWSC 114 (at [30]), it is beyond contest that a superior court of record has plenary jurisdiction to make a declaratory order concerning contravention of the Corporations Act (citing Australian Softwood per Gibbs CJ (at 125 and Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Transphere Pty Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 596 per Young J at 209). In circumstances where contraventions have been established and declarations would have utility, including by identifying contravening conduct and recording the Court’s disapproval of that contravening conduct, the Court ought to grant declaratory relief: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ostrava Equities Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1064 per Davies J (at [51]).
287 Both Ms Caddick’s and Maliver’s contravening conduct has been identified with sufficient particularity and established by ASIC. In the circumstances, there is utility in making the declarations sought by ASIC and they will be made.
4.3.2 Appointment of receivers pursuant to s 1101B of the Corporations Act
288 By para 9A of the third further amended originating process ASIC seeks an order pursuant to s 1101B(1) of the Corporations Act that the Interim Receivers be appointed as Receivers of the Receivership Property for the purpose of:
(1) identifying, collecting and securing the Receivership Property;
(2) taking possession of and realising the Receivership Property;
(3) if considered necessary, winding up the Caddick Services Trust;
(4) to the extent necessary, establishing an interest bearing trust account with an authorised deposit taking institution nominated by the Receivers for the purposes of holding any net proceeds of realisation of the Receivership Property referred to in paras 9A(b) and 9A(c) of the third further amended originating process (Receivers’ Trust Account);
(5) to the extent necessary, ascertaining the total quantum of Investor Funds and any funds advanced by an Interested Party to Ms Caddick or Maliver and the identity of all investors who in the Receivers’ view ought to be included as an Out of Pocket Investor as well as any Interested Party who may be a creditor of Ms Caddick;
(6) to the extent necessary, ascertaining the total quantum of “First Defendant Investor Funds” and the amount of money returned to each of those investors and the total quantum of funds received by Ms Caddick from any Interested Party;
(7) to the extent necessary, ascertaining the total quantum of the “Second Defendant Investor Funds” and the amount of money returned to each of those investors and the total quantum of funds received by Maliver from any Interested Party; and
(8) to the extent necessary, seeking directions in relation to the distribution of funds in the Receivers’ Trust Account.
289 The following definitions are included in the third further amended originating process:
(1) “First Defendant Investor Funds” means:
(a) Monies however received by [Ms Caddick] from Investors for investment in shares and other assets to be held in their names (or their nominees); or
(b) Second Defendant Investor Funds received by [Ms Caddick].
(2) “Second Defendant Investor Funds” means:
Monies received by [Maliver] from Investors for investment in shares or other assets to be held in their names (or the names of their nominees).
(3) “Investors” is defined to mean the parties set out in “Updated Annexure I”.
290 Paragraph 9B of the third further amended originating process sets out the proposed powers to be given to the Receivers as follows:
(a) the power to do all things reasonably necessary or convenient to be done, in Australia and elsewhere, for or in connection with, or as incidental to the attainment of the objectives for which the [Receivers] are appointed;
(b) the powers under section 1101B(8) of the Corporations Act;
(c) the powers set out in section 420 of the Corporations Act save for the powers set out in paragraphs 420(2) (d), (h), (j), (m), (n), (o), (s), (t) and (u) and provided that wherever in that section the word ‘corporation’ appears, it shall be taken to include reference to [Ms Caddick];
(d) the power to seek directions from the Court regarding any matter relating to the exercise of the [Receivers’] powers;
(e) the power to require, by request in writing, any employee, agent, banker, solicitor, stockbroker, accountant, consultant or other professionally qualified person who has provided services or advice to [Ms Caddick] or [Maliver], to provide such reasonable assistance (including access to any documents, books or records to which [Ms Caddick] has a right of access or control) to the [Receivers] as may be required from time to time.
291 ASIC also seeks an order in the terms of para 9C (see [11(3)] above) of its third further amended originating process in relation to the process which the Receivers must follow in the event that they intend to realise any property.
292 The Contradictor and Ms Caddick’s parents each made submissions in relation to ASIC’s application for the appointment of the Receivers. Before proceeding further and considering the parties’ submissions and whether the orders should be made, it is useful to understand why ASIC sought to file the third further amended originating process by which it amended the prayers for relief in relation to the appointment of the Receivers, and to highlight the differences between the orders it now seeks and those it sought in the second further amended originating process.
293 The key difference between para 9A appearing in the second further amended originating process and that appearing in the third further amended originating process concerns the definition of “Receivership Property” over which ASIC seeks the appointment of the Receivers.
294 In the second further amended originating process Receivership Property had an expansive definition which covered Ms Caddick’s property and Maliver’s property. In that way, ASIC sought to appoint the Receivers over the property of both Ms Caddick and Maliver, it seemed, as if the assets of the two entities had been pooled and was available for the benefit of all persons claiming on it, whether they be creditors or persons claiming to have an interest as a beneficiary or otherwise, of Ms Caddick or Maliver. ASIC submitted that this was not the intended effect of an order in terms of para 9A of the second further amended originating process. Rather, an order was sought in those terms in order to avoid litigation between the two estates, i.e. the estate of Ms Caddick and the estate of Maliver; because the Court would pierce the corporate veil, Maliver’s existence would become, in effect, irrelevant and ultimately only one available pool of assets would be available which would be impressed with an equitable charge in favour of all investors; and the proposed orders were predicated on the basis that before any distribution is made the Receivers and liquidators, if appointed, would seek directions from the Court.
295 Be that as it may, by reason of the amendments included in the third further amended originating process, Receivership Property is now confined to Ms Caddick’s property such that ASIC only seeks the appointment of the Receivers over that property. That approach overcomes the concerns about the potential to create a mixing of the assets of each of Ms Caddick and Maliver as a single fund at this early stage and without further consideration being given to the proper approach by any controllers appointed and affected beneficiaries and/or creditors. Accordingly, the need to address a number of the issues raised and submissions made by the parties falls away. However, a number of questions still arise for consideration in relation to this category of relief which I address below.
4.3.2.1 The Contradictor’s submissions
296 The Contradictor submitted that ASIC’s proposed orders amount, in substance, to the winding up of Ms Caddick’s insolvent estate, albeit without provision being made for any distribution to creditors. The Contradictor contended that the substance of the regime is that the Receivers will realise and distribute Ms Caddick’s assets subject to the Court’s directions. The Contradictor submitted that this goes beyond the purpose for which the legislator enacted s 1101B of the Corporations Act and is therefore beyond the power conferred by the provision. He submitted that the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) covers the field when it comes to the winding up of an estate of an insolvent individual and that, by comparison, s 1101B(1) is a remedial “gap-filling” provision that operates in a context that has nothing to do with insolvency, i.e. Ch 7 of the Corporations Act. The Contradictor submitted that the breadth of s 1101B does not mean that it can be used as a vehicle for rewriting Commonwealth legislation, in this case the Bankruptcy Act.
297 The Contradictor submitted that it cannot have been Parliament’s intention that s 1101B of the Corporations Act, being a remedial provision that applies following breach of the laws relating to the provision of financial services, conferred power on the Court to make orders that, in substance, amounted to the administration of a personal bankruptcy when the regulation of that area of law is entirely contained in the Bankruptcy Act. He submitted that it follows that s 1101B does not confer the power for which ASIC contends.
298 In the alternative, the Contradictor submitted that, if the Court is satisfied that s 1101B is capable of conferring power to make the orders ASIC seeks, that power would only arise if the Court is satisfied that the orders “would not unfairly prejudice any person”. The Contradictor submitted that the order sought in para 9A(h) (of the second further amended originating process) would, if made, unfairly prejudice creditors other than “Interested Parties” as defined, referring to the ATO, which has asserted a proof of debt against Ms Caddick, and the fact that she owes two small credit cards debts. He submitted that it is unclear what steps, if any, the Interim Receivers have taken to ascertain the existence of other creditors. The Contradictor said that, given what is sought to occur is a distribution of all of Ms Caddick’s insolvent estate and ASIC has not established that investors have a proprietary claim in relation to those assets that would take priority over unsecured creditors, the regime as formulated in the second further amended originating process would unfairly prejudice unsecured creditors other than investors. On that basis the Contradictor also submitted that the Court does not have the power to make the orders sought under s 1101B of the Corporations Act in its proposed form.
299 In the further alternative, the Contradictor submitted that if the Court is satisfied that it has power to make the orders sought by ASIC it would not exercise its discretion to do so for the reasons already given and the additional reason that, in this case, the connection between the alleged contravention of Ch 7 of the Corporations Act and relief claimed is, at best, indirect. The Contradictor said that the relief is predicated on the proposition that Ms Caddick’s assets should be distributed because of claims that might be made against her arising from causes of action that do not arise from a breach of s 911A(1) of the Corporations Act. He submitted that the relief is not directed towards remediating that breach but instead providing a regime through which third parties can assert different causes of action. The Contradictor submitted that this is a powerful discretionary factor tending against the grant of relief.
300 The Contradictor also made a number of submissions based on the uncertain status of Ms Caddick. While neither ASIC nor the Contradictor contended for a finding as to her status, which I observe is not a question that could, in any event, be resolved on the evidence before me, the Contradictor made submissions in relation to the different possible outcomes based on two scenarios: the first where Ms Caddick is deceased; and the second where Ms Caddick is alive. In the Contradictor’s submission, the potential consequences are important matters that inform both the consideration of the Court’s power to grant the relief sought and the exercise of discretion.
301 The Contradictor submitted that on the assumption that Ms Caddick is deceased it would follow that there would be no proceeding against her because she would have ceased to be a natural person, her property would vest in the NSW Trustee pursuant to s 61 of the Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) (Probate Act) pending a grant of probate and, upon a grant of probate of Ms Caddick’s will or administration of her estate, her property would vest in her executor or the administrator of her estate pursuant to s 44 of the Probate Act. In those circumstances the NSW Trustee could be substituted as the proper defendant pursuant to r 9.09 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) instead of Ms Caddick because the proceeding is taken against Ms Caddick’s property.
302 The Contradictor submitted that if Ms Caddick is deceased then, by the relief it seeks, ASIC is attempting to pre-empt the administration of her estate under the Probate Act by taking it out of the remit of that legislative scheme and bringing it within the remit of the Corporations Act. He contended that, at least implicitly, ASIC asserts that it would be an appropriate exercise of the Court’s discretion because it would take too long to await the Coroner’s report which would clarify whether there was any obstacle to the grant of probate and the administration of Ms Caddick’s estate under the Probate Act.
303 The competing scenario is that Ms Caddick is alive. The Contradictor submitted that, if that is so, she has been tried in her absence for a contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act, an offence provision, and for orders which will have the effect of winding up her entire estate. The Contradictor contended that, in the event that Ms Caddick is alive, ASIC has tendered no evidence to suggest that any notice has been given to her of the proceeding. He said that to the extent that, as ASIC contended, more conventional proceedings, such as a bankruptcy notice issued under the Bankruptcy Act, could not be served on Ms Caddick the same problem equally infects this proceeding. That is because the only form of originating process brought to Ms Caddick’s attention was that served on 11 November 2020, two days before she was reported missing, which did not seek declarations for a contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act or the consequential relief now pressed by ASIC. Those prayers for relief were introduced on 20 April 2021, some five months after Ms Caddick was reported missing, and there is no evidence to suggest that Ms Caddick has been notified of the amended form of originating process.
304 The Contradictor submitted that, in order to overcome these issues, one option available to the Court in the exercise of its discretion is to refrain from making orders amounting to the realisation of Ms Caddick’s estate until the issue of the Coroner’s report, which I understand to be a submission that the Court would refrain from making any of the orders sought by ASIC in para 9A of the third further amended originating process. The Contradictor said that if the Coroner concludes that Ms Caddick is deceased, then many of the problems that arise can be resolved in a more conventional way.
305 The Contradictor submitted that there is an alternative way to proceed. That is that, as a matter of principle, the liquidators, if appointed to Maliver, could investigate the claims available to it, including claims against Ms Caddick. He contended that, while a lot of time, effort and money had been spent on complicated tracing exercises, there is potentially a more efficient way of dealing with the issues. He said that it is likely that, to the extent that Ms Caddick withdrew money from Maliver’s bank account improperly, Maliver would have a claim against her for the amount so withdrawn and so too would investors to the extent they paid money directly to Ms Caddick after Maliver’s incorporation because Ms Caddick caused that money to be paid to her in breach of her duties owed to Maliver. The Contradictor submitted that there is a presently subsisting claim for the total amount paid by investors after Maliver’s incorporation that could be brought against Ms Caddick, without the need to get into any proprietary issue, and a corresponding claim that post Maliver incorporation investors have against Maliver.
306 The Contradictor submitted that, in other words, the post incorporation investors have a monetary claim against each of Ms Caddick and Maliver and that Maliver has a corresponding monetary claim against Ms Caddick. He said that therefore there is a relatively straightforward process by which investors could prove their claims against Maliver, Maliver could prove its claim against Ms Caddick, without going through the tracing exercise necessary to establish whether there should be a pooling order, and money could be distributed through that mechanism via the liquidation. The Contradictor submitted that pre-incorporation investors are in a slightly different category because they would only have a direct claim against Ms Caddick but, as a matter of principle, that should not matter because it means that they are her creditors in addition to Maliver being her creditor for money invested by post incorporation investors.
307 In short, the Contradictor submitted that the import of his submissions is that he proposes a way of advancing the matter without subverting the operation of the Coroner’s task and the Probate Act that could lead to an efficient way of returning money to investors.
308 Insofar as the third further amended originating process is concerned, the Contradictor submitted that ASIC has not clarified the basis upon which it contends that the Receivers are entitled to realise the Receivership Property for the purposes of para 9A(b). He contended that, if ASIC still asserts that Ms Caddick’s property should be sold in vindication of a proprietary right of the investors that is yet to be established and yet to be asserted by them, the proposed order does not solve any concern about pooling. The Contradictor submitted that the only basis upon which the Court would be satisfied now that investors could possibly hold a proprietary interest in Ms Caddick’s assets capable of being vindicated by an order of the nature contemplated would be if it held that the investors were entitled to trace into the assets based on the evidence before the Court. The Contradictor submitted that the Court would not be so satisfied on the basis of Mr Gleeson’s evidence. That is because it demonstrates that there was comingling of funds within each of the accounts such that the only way in which the investors would be able to trace into the ultimate assets would be if, at some point in the future, a pooling order is made. The Contradictor said that the difficulty with granting the Receivers the power to sell Ms Caddick’s assets in a proprietary claim is that, regardless of the strength of that claim, it completely ignores how the funds are to be traced into Ms Caddick’s assets, unless one assumes that at some point in the future a pooling order would be made in relation to the entire estate. For that reason the Contradictor submitted that even the third amended originating process did not address the Court’s concern about whether or not a proper basis for pooling had been established.
4.3.2.2 Ms Caddick’s parents’ submissions
309 Ms Caddick’s parents made no submissions on whether the Receivers ought to be appointed. Rather their position was that if the Court were to find that there is power and were persuaded to exercise its discretion to make the appointment, they wished to be heard on that process of reasoning. In particular, their position was that if the Court was minded to grant the relief sought by ASIC, no findings should be made concerning the interests of the investors or any of the “interested parties” in the Receivership Property. They submitted that the making of an order for the appointment of the Receivers and the granting of the relief sought by ASIC premised on any such findings would cause unfair prejudice to them. In that regard, Ms Caddick’s parents raised four issues in relation to the relief sought by ASIC.
310 First, they submitted that, on the basis of the evidence put forward by ASIC, the Court cannot be confident that Ms Caddick’s property is the subject of a Black v Freedman trust in favour of the investors or that only Investor Funds were used by Ms Caddick for her personal expenses. They raised two claims. Their first and primary claim is that they provided over $1.1 million to Ms Caddick for the purchase of the Edgecliff Property on the express understanding that such contribution would entitle them to at least a 37.37% interest in the Edgecliff Property and the right to live in it for the rest of their lives, such that it is held on constructive trust for them. Their secondary claim is that they provided approximately $260,000 to Ms Caddick for “safekeeping money” for her to hold on their behalf and to distribute to them in smaller payments for living expenses.
311 Ms Caddick’s parents contended that, despite Mr Gleeson’s conclusion that Investor Funds were used to pay both the deposit and the balance of the settlement moneys in relation to the Edgecliff Property, his evidence reveals that the extent to which funds other than Investor Funds were used by Ms Caddick might be a matter which has to be determined by the Court at a future point in time. They pointed in particular to Mr Gleeson’s evidence summarised at [195] above and to his acknowledgement, in his affidavit sworn on 25 June 2021, that it is unclear whether Ms Caddick paid her son’s school fees using funds provided to her by them or with Investor Funds. In light of those matters, Ms Caddick’s parents said that the evidence does not show that Ms Caddick’s property is the subject of a Black v Freedman trust in favour of the investors.
312 Secondly, and relatedly, Ms Caddick’s parents submitted that ASIC has not addressed the nature of their interests, or those of other persons, and how those interests intersect with the claims of investors, including the possibility that there may be subgroups of investors with different and potentially competing interests. They said that it is plainly obvious that a substantial number of investors contributed funds after the $1.1 million contribution towards the purchase of the Edgecliff Property in April 2017. They contended that there is therefore plainly a question of competing priorities insofar as the equitable interest in the Edgecliff Property is concerned which will need to be resolved by the Court at some point in the future. Ms Caddick’s parents submitted that, if the appointment of a receiver in this case requires the Court to determine that Ms Caddick’s property is the subject of a trust in favour of investors which ranks ahead of other equitable interests, the Court should not make such an order. To do so would directly affect their rights in circumstances where they are not parties to the proceeding, the issue has not been properly ventilated before the Court and the Court does not have evidence of the kind that would usually be adduced in these kinds of cases.
313 Thirdly, to the extent that any issue of pooling arises under the third further amended originating process, Ms Caddick’s parents submitted that they oppose any attempt to pool the assets of Ms Caddick and Maliver. They contended that the Receivership Property would include property that was not bought using Investor Funds, that the Court has not had the opportunity to hear from any interested persons who might be affected by a pooling order and that such an approach would be prejudicial to their interests in circumstances where their primary claim is to a particular piece of real property based on a substantial contribution. They said that, despite Mr Gleeson’s evidence in support of a pooling order, there remains a real question about proper parties and the Court is not in a position to determine whether the assets should be pooled.
314 Fourthly, Ms Caddick’s parents raised concerns in relation to para 9C of the third further amended originating process. They accepted that the proposed process under para 9C would provide them with an opportunity to be heard in relation to the sale of any of Ms Caddick’s property (as defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act). However, they submitted that ASIC has provided no evidence that this process is more cost effective or efficient than what might otherwise occur under the bankruptcy and probate regimes. They pointed to para 9C(c) of the third further amended originating process, which is identical to para 9C(c) of the second further amended originating process (as set out at [11(3)(c)] above), and submitted that ASIC’s proposal under that paragraph, in effect, pushes back debates that would occur under those regimes to a later point in time and sets up a substantial and potentially costly exercise in which the Receivers would have to come back before the Court. Those costs are said to arise from the need for the Receivers to commence proceedings for the purpose of seeking directions and the question of who the appropriate parties to those proceedings will be, given that some, or many, investors would wish to be heard on those matters.
315 Section 1101B(1) of the Corporations Act confers a discretion on the Court to make such order as it thinks fit if, on the application of ASIC, it appears to the Court that, among other things, a person has contravened a provision of Ch 7 or any other law relating to dealing in financial products or providing financial services. Section 1101B(1) also provides that the Court can only make such an order if it is satisfied that the order would not unfairly prejudice any person.
316 Section 1101B(4) sets out non-exhaustive examples of the orders that the Court can make under subs (1) including relevantly an order appointing a receiver of property of a financial services licensee: see s 1101B(4)(g). Insofar as the appointment of a receiver is concerned subss 1101B(8) and (12) provide:
(8) A person appointed by order of the Court under subsection (1) as a receiver of the property (see subsection (12)) of a financial services licensee:
(a) may require the financial services licensee to:
(i) deliver to the person any property of which the person has been appointed receiver; or
(ii) give to the person all information concerning that property that may reasonably be required; and
(b) may acquire and take possession of any property of which the person has been appointed receiver; and
(c) may deal with any property that the person has acquired, or of which the person has taken possession, in any way in which the financial services licensee might lawfully have dealt with the property; and
(d) has such other powers in respect of the property as the Court specifies in the order.
…
(12) In this section:
compensation rules has the same meaning as in Part 7.5.
property , in relation to a financial services licensee, includes:
(a) money; or
(b) financial products; or
(c) documents of title to financial products; or
(d) other property;
entrusted to, or received on behalf of, any other person by the financial services licensee or another person in the course of, or in connection with, a financial services business carried on by the financial services licensee.
317 The first question to resolve is whether the Court has the power to make the order sought by ASIC for the appointment of the Receivers in the context of this case.
318 The power vested in the Court by s 1101B of the Corporations Act is a statutory power. It may be exercised only for the purpose for which it was granted: see Correa v Whittingham (2013) 278 FLR 310 at [4] (per Barrett JA); R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170. The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all of the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole: Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
319 The appeal in Correa concerned, among other things, a challenge to the validity of the purported appointment of an administrator under s 436A of the Corporations Act including on the ground that there had been a contravention of s 41 of the Registered Clubs Act 1976 (NSW) and, by way of notice of contention, the Court’s power to make curative orders under s 447A of the Corporations Act in respect of invalidity of an administrator’s appointment arising under s 41 of the Registered Clubs Act, if the challenge to the appointment on this ground was upheld on appeal.
320 In the context of considering the operation of s 447A of the Corporations Act Barrett JA observed that “[t]he principal source of constraint and limitation upon the power [in s 447A] is therefore the statement of the object of Pt 5.3A in s 435A, coupled with the nature, incidents and aims of the particular form of external administration as gathered from the provisions of Pt 5.3A as a whole”. At [7]-[8] his Honour said:
[7] In the present case, it would be possible, as a matter of drafting, to fashion an order to the effect that Pt 5.3A is to operate in relation to the Club as if there were inserted into it a provision that a person deemed by s 41 of the Registered Clubs Act 1976 (NSW) to be incapable of being appointed as administrator of the Club and of acting as such administrator is, by force of the provision so inserted (and notwithstanding the contrary provision of State law), taken always to have been capable of being so appointed and of so acting.
[8] Such an order would, however, exceed the proper purpose limitation. It would do nothing to promote any object for which Pt 5.3A exists or to facilitate or assist the form of external administration for which it provides. The purpose of the order would be to seek to neutralise the State law provision. Nor, despite its form, would the postulated order be an order about how Pt 5.3A was to operate in relation to the Club. It would be an order about how the State law was to operate in relation to the Club. For those two reasons, the order would not be authorised by s 447A. In BE Australia WD Pty Ltd v Sutton (2011) 82 NSWLR 336 the New South Wales Court of Appeal again considered the operation of s 447A this time in the context of a challenge to an order made under s 447A that the respondent, Ms Sutton, be treated as a creditor on the basis that the order was beyond power. At [181] Campbell JA (with whom McColl JA agreed) accepted that s 447A confers a broad discretionary power on the Court but cautioned that “any statements that first instance judges have made about the breadth of the power should, like all judicial statements, be read subject to the context in which they are made”. At [186]-[188] his Honour said:
186 The importance of a court exercising a broad power that has been conferred on it to achieve the purposes for which it was conferred appears from the judgment of Wilson J in FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268, that their Honours cited in the footnote just mentioned. The power in question in FAI General Insurance was a court’s power to extend or abridge time for the delivery of particulars. After referring to the breadth of the discretionary power, Wilson J said (at 283–284):
“It is a remedial provision which confers on a court a broad power to relieve against injustice. The discretion so conferred is not readily to be limited by judicial fiat. The fact that it manifestly is a power to be exercised with caution and, in the case of conditional orders, with due regard to the public policy centred in the finality of litigation does not warrant an arbitrary limitation of the power itself, not expressed in the words of the rule, so as to deny its capacity to apply to circumstances such as those which are to be found in the present case. It would be wrong to so read the rule as to deny to a court power to prevent injustice in circumstances where the party subject to a conditional order ought to be excused from non-compliance.”
187 This principle also appears from the passage in PMT Partners Pty Ltd (In liq) v Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (1995) 184 CLR 301 that was cited in the footnote. Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said (at 313) that a particular power that had been conferred on a court to extend time concerning an arbitration:
“… is one that must be exercised judicially. That means, among other things, that it must not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or to frustrate the legislative intent. Rather, it must be exercised in the interests of justice and within the confines of ‘the purposes for which it was entrusted’.” (Footnote omitted)
188 However, the fact that a power is conferred on a court does not necessarily mean that its scope will be construed as broadly as its words will stand. In Australasian Memory itself (at [17]) the court recognised that “[c]ogent reasons” could result in the scope of a power given in general terms being read down. …
321 Section 1101B is in Div 2 of Pt 7.12 of Ch 7 of the Corporations Act headed “Other matters”. It is a broad power but is to be exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred. Chapter 7 sets out a scheme for the supervision and regulation of financial markets and providers of financial services to clients. The purpose of s 1101B is informed by those matters as well as the object of Ch 7 set out in s 760A which provides:
The main object of this Chapter is to promote:
(a) confident and informed decision making by consumers of financial products and services while facilitating efficiency, flexibility and innovation in the provision of those products and services; and
(aa) the provision of suitable financial products to consumers of financial products; and
(b) fairness, honesty and professionalism by those who provide financial services; and
(c) fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial products; and
(d) the reduction of systemic risk and the provision of fair and effective services by clearing and settlement facilities.
322 Section 1101B of the Corporations Act is a broad remedial power to be exercised by the Court in circumstances where it appears that there has been a breach of the requirements for the provision of financial services as required by Ch 7. Its purpose is to uphold public confidence in the public in the providers of financial services and the protection of consumers of financial services. That this is so is reinforced by the objects of Ch 7 set out in s 760A. In Re Idyllic Solutions Pty Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hobbs [2013] NSWSC 106; (2013) 93 ACSR 421 Ward J (as her Honour then was) reached the same conclusion. At [103], in considering the disqualification power in s 1101B of the Corporations Act, her Honour referred to the purpose of the section as “the protection of the public interest in the prevention of the conduct to which it relates and to the importance of upholding public confidence in the persons who might provide financial advice or financial services to consumers”.
323 The Contradictor contended that the effect of the orders sought by ASIC is to seek to subvert the operation of other more apt procedures and, in particular, the operation of the Bankruptcy Act and the Probate Act in relation to Ms Caddick and her assets. But, having regard to the purpose of s 1101B, the broad discretionary power it confers on the Court including as to the nature of the orders that can be made, the circumstances of this case and the orders sought, I do not think that is so.
324 Essentially ASIC seeks the appointment of the Receivers over the Receivership Property being all of Ms Caddick’s property as defined by s 9 of the Corporations Act. Section 9 of the Corporations Act gives an expansive definition of property which, relevantly, includes “any legal and equitable estate or interest (whether present or future and whether vested or contingent) in real or personal property of any description and includes a thing in action”. The effect is that the definition of “Receivership Property” for the purposes of the third further amended originating process goes beyond that in s 1101B(12). However, the latter is an inclusive definition and not confined to the matters set out.
325 The appointment of receivers pursuant to s 1101B of the Corporations Act in circumstances where the threshold for appointment has been met cannot be said to be beyond power. That is what occurred in ASIC v Marco (No 6), albeit in slightly different circumstances. There McKerracher J considered whether orders should be made to appoint scheme receivers on a final basis pursuant to s 1101B(1)(a)(i) and for the unregistered managed investment scheme and AMS (in both its capacities) to be wound up pursuant to s 601EE and s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act. His Honour was satisfied that both the scheme and AMS should be wound up and that a single insolvency practitioner should be appointed across all the potential assets forming part of the scheme. As to the relationship between the scheme receivers and the court-appointed liquidators his Honour observed that “the Scheme Receivers will deliver up that part of the property, that is the property of the Scheme to the liquidators and the asset preservation orders will lapse upon the later appointment of the Scheme Receivers and Court-Appointed Liquidators”.
326 At [132] McKerracher J addressed the appointment of the scheme receivers, which he observed Mr Marco opposed particularly in relation to his personal assets. His Honour said:
… it is entirely appropriate and conventional where there will be no asset preservation orders on an ongoing basis. … Here, the role of the Scheme Receivers is to secure, identify and deliver up all Scheme property to the Court-Appointed Liquidators While there is merit in Mr Marco’s contention that ASIC’s relief does not provide for a termination of the receivership and it is unclear what their ongoing role will be after delivery up of the Scheme property, the practical reality is that both appointments will be carried out by the same insolvency practitioners (the current Interim Receivers). It is not the case that the concurrent appointments will occasion unnecessary duplication or cost, rather it is a prudent approach to ensuring that the appointed insolvency practitioner is sufficiently empowered to do what is necessary to bring the Scheme to an end and return available funds to investors. …
327 In Hobbs Ward J considered the question of relief following a hearing on liability in which her Honour had found numerous contraventions of the Corporations Act on the part of the defendants including contravention of s 911A (no AFSL), and s 601ED(5) (operating an unregistered management investment scheme) and various breaches of directors’ duties. The defendants had been involved in investment schemes through which investors’ funds were pooled for the purpose of investment into the offshore wholesale market. The fourteen individual investment schemes the subject of the proceeding together constituted a single managed investment scheme that was required to be (but was not) registered under the Corporations Act (referred to as the Hobbs scheme). At [117] Ward J considered the appointment of a receiver to the assets of three individuals under s 1101B and s 1323(1) of the Corporations Act. Her Honour said:
I have already referred to the broad discretion under s 1101B of the Act on which reliance is placed by ASIC, together with s 1323(1)(h), for the appointment of a receiver to the assets of Ms Wu and to any assets in the jurisdiction of Mr and Mrs Hobbs. There is clearly power to make such orders on the application of ASIC. For the purposes of s 1323(1)(h), the relevant question in the present case is whether such an appointment is considered necessary or desirable to protect the interests of investors in the schemes (or creditors of the corporate administrators) with which those defendants were involved. ASIC submits that such an appointment is appropriate in order to ascertain whether those defendants have any assets that may be shown to have been derived from the relevant schemes. I agree.
Her Honour was satisfied that an order for the appointment of a receiver should be made: see Hobbs at [460].
328 The Contradictor submitted that the only reason for the appointment of the receivers in the cases referred to above was to identify and secure the assets of the scheme that were in the hands of the relevant individuals, which is different to the reason for the orders presently sought by ASIC. But, by analogy, the reason for appointment of the Receivers is to identify (to the extent that has not already occurred as a result of the work undertaken by the Interim Receivers) and secure the assets of Ms Caddick that may be impressed with a trust in favour of the Identified Investors (see [335]-[336] below).
329 The further issues that the Contradictor raises concerning the question of whether by its orders ASIC is attempting to subvert the regime that might otherwise apply under the Bankruptcy Act or Probate Act are, in my opinion, matters that go to the extent of the powers to be conferred on and the role of the Receivers, if appointed, as opposed to the power to appoint them. I address those issues below in the context of considering whether ASIC has satisfied me that the orders should be made.
4.3.2.5 Should an order be made under s 1101B(1) of the Corporations Act?
330 The first question to consider is whether it appears to the Court that a person has contravened a provision of Ch 7 of the Corporations Act or any other law relating to the provision of financial services. Given my findings above in relation to contravention of s 911A of the Corporations Act by Ms Caddick, the jurisdictional prerequisite has been met such as to enliven the discretion under s 1101B and to permit the Court to make an order.
331 I turn then to consider the nature of the order sought by ASIC.
332 Relevantly, s 1101B(4) provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of orders that can be made. It includes an order for the appointment of receiver. Where a receiver is appointed, he or she can exercise the powers set out in s 1101B(8)(a) to (c) and “such other powers in respect of the property as the Court specifies in the order”: see s 1101B(8)(d).
333 The next question that arises is, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, what order should be made, if any.
334 Before turning to the specific submissions made it is convenient to recall the Interim Receivers’ findings (see [173]-[200] above). In summary and on a preliminary basis, they concluded that Ms Caddick received the benefit, directly or indirectly, of Investor Funds and acquired property principally with the benefit of those funds, that she treated her affairs and those of Maliver as one and the same and that she transferred Investor Funds between Maliver’s and her bank accounts. Instead of investing the Investor Funds by the purchase of shares in the investors’ name as Maliver, through Ms Caddick, represented it would, those funds were comingled into accounts operated by Maliver or Ms Caddick and used to pay for Maliver’s and Ms Caddick’s expenses and to facilitate the acquisition of property in Ms Caddick’s name or trust structures that she controlled. Further investigations have been undertaken by the Interim Receivers since delivering their report which support these preliminary findings.
335 ASIC submitted that the Interim Receivers’ investigations suggest that the funds advanced by investors were impressed with a Black v Freedman trust and that the property acquired with those funds is subject to a trust on the same basis. The reference to a Black v Freedman trust is based on the principles in Black v Freedman (1910) 12 CLR 105. There (at 110) O’Connor J said “[w]here money has been stolen, it is trust money in the hands of the thief, and he cannot divest it of that character. If he pays it over to another person, then it may be followed into that other person’s hands”; see too Griffiths CJ at 108-109. To like effect, and relying on Black v Freedman, in Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2018] NSWSC 404; (2018) 125 ACSR 149 at [30] Brereton J said:
Where money has been stolen, or obtained by fraud, it is held on trust by the recipient. Here, contrary to what was represented to investors, funds were procured by the companies, not for the purpose of undertaking foreign exchange trading, but to return capital and return on investment to earlier investors, in the course of a Ponzi scheme. While the non-Brexit investors submitted that whether a trust arose must depend on the facts of each individual case, and that — as the Brexit Investors were all existing clients with an established relationship with the companies — there may well be more to the relationship, in my view it is inconceivable that any would have invested had they understood that their funds were to be used not for foreign exchange trading, but to pay out earlier investors, and that repayment to them would be dependent upon the survival of the scheme. Accordingly, this is a further alternative basis for concluding that the funds invested with Courtenay House were held on trust for the investors.
(Footnote omitted.)
336 While it is not necessary for me to make any finding, and to do so at this stage would, in my view, be premature, given the preliminary conclusions and other evidence of the Interim Receivers in relation to Ms Caddick’s conduct and my findings at [238]-[255], [271] and [280]-[284] above there is, in my opinion, a sufficiently arguable case that the Investor Funds which were paid to Maliver and ended up in Ms Caddick’s hands are held on trust by Ms Caddick. It would follow that to the extent those funds could be traced into assets, they too are impressed with the same trust: see, for example, Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296 at [562].
337 ASIC submitted that the appointment of the Receivers is the first step in the unravelling of the fraud which was perpetrated on the investors. In that context and having regard to the purpose of the appointment of the Receivers identified by ASIC I turn to consider the submissions made by the Contradictor and Ms Caddick’s parents.
338 The first question that arises on the Contradictor’s submissions is whether Ms Caddick’s uncertain status, a matter in relation to which I am not asked to make any finding, would lead the Court to decline to make the orders sought at this stage.
339 The evidence before me rises no higher than to indicate that there will be a coronial inquest into Ms Caddick without any indication as to its timing. I assume that the outcome of that inquest will determine her status. The question is whether any further dealings with Ms Caddick’s assets should await the outcome of that process.
340 If Ms Caddick is found to be deceased the scheme under the Probate Act will take effect and, as the Contradictor submitted, her assets will eventually vest in her executor or the administrator of her estate. In addition, a creditor who can meet the requirements of s 244 of the Bankruptcy Act may present a creditor’s petition seeking an order that Ms Caddick’s estate be administered under Pt XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 244 of the Bankruptcy Act relevantly provides:
(1) Subject to this section, where:
(a) a debt of not less than the statutory minimum was owing by a deceased person at the time of his or her death to a creditor, or debts amounting in the aggregate to not less than that amount were so owing to any 2 or more creditors; [or]
…
(c) a debt of not less than the statutory minimum, or debts amounting in the aggregate to not less than that amount, which a deceased person would have been liable to pay to a creditor or any 2 or more creditors if he or she had not died becomes or become owing after his or her death;
the creditor or creditors to whom the debt or debts is or are owing may present a petition to the Court for an order for the administration of the estate of the deceased person (in this section referred to as the deceased debtor) under this Part.
…
(5) A petition under this section shall be verified by the affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the facts.
(6) A petition under this section shall not be presented unless:
(a) the debt, or each of the debts, in respect of which it is presented:
(i) is a liquidated sum due at law or in equity or party at law and partly in equity; and
(ii) is payable immediately or at a certain future time; and
(b) at the time of his or her death, the decease debtor:
(i) was personally present or ordinarily resident in Australia;
(ii) had a dwelling-house or place of business in Australia;
(iii) was carrying on business in Australia, either personally or by means of an agent or manager; or
(iv) was a member of a firm or partnership carrying on business in Australia by means of a partner or partners, or of an agent or manager.
…
(9) Subject to subsection (10), a sealed copy of the petition shall be served upon the legal personal representative of the deceased debtor or, if there is no legal personal representative, upon such person as the Court directs.
(10) The Court may, if it is satisfied that there is no legal personal representative of the deceased debtor and that there are special circumstances that justify its so doing, by order dispense with service of the petition, either unconditionally or subject to conditions.
(11) At the hearing of the petition, the Court shall require proof of:
(a) the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);
(b) service of the petition, unless service of the petition has been dispensed with; and
(c) the fact that the debt or debts to which the petition relates is or are still owing;
and if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make an order that the estate be administered under this Part.
(12) If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters or is of the opinion that for other sufficient cause the order sought ought not be made, it may dismiss the petition.
(13) Where proceedings have been commenced in a court for the administration of a deceased person’s estate under a law of a State or Territory, a petition for an order under this section in relation to the estate shall not be presented by a creditor except by leave of the Court and on such terms and conditions (if any) as the Court thinks fit.
(Emphasis in original.)
341 To attempt to consider what might happen, both at the coronial inquest and beyond, would be mere speculation in which I do not intend to engage. That said, in my opinion, that there is to be a coronial inquest is not a reason why I would exercise my discretion to decline to make the orders sought by ASIC. In particular it is not a reason why I would decline to appoint the Receivers. It is apparent that there has been a breach of Ch 7 of the Corporations Act by Ms Caddick enlivening the power to make an order aimed at protecting the investors by, in this case, appointing the Receivers. They can secure and hold Ms Caddick’s assets. That process can occur notwithstanding that, in the meantime, a coronial inquest will proceed.
342 If Ms Caddick is found to be deceased, it seems to me that the procedures under the Probate Act, and, if they are pursued by a creditor, the Bankruptcy Act, can take their course notwithstanding the appointment of the Receivers. Their appointment and ongoing role can be considered in light of those processes. To that end, I note that s 1101B(11) of the Corporations Act empowers the Court to vary, rescind or suspend the operation of an order made under s 1101B.
343 A related issue is the impact on the relief sought if Ms Caddick is alive. The first iteration of the originating process which sought declarations of breaches of s 911A of the Corporations Act and related relief, the further amended originating process, was filed after her disappearance. However, it was filed with the consent of Mr Grimley who holds an enduring power of attorney dated 15 September 2016 in his favour in relation to Ms Caddick’s “financial and personal/health matters” and which has no limitations on the conditions of its exercise. On 21 December 2020 the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) made a finding confirming that the power of attorney was valid. In the period 17 November 2020 to 19 February 2021, Mr Grimley in his capacity as Ms Caddick’s attorney was represented by lawyers in the proceeding. The evidence before me confirmed that since that time, and at least until the date of the filing of the further amended originating process, ASIC has liaised with Mr Grimley in relation to the proceeding.
344 The Contradictor submitted that the exchange of correspondence leading up to, and the filing of, the further amended originating process with Mr Grimley’s consent would not satisfy me that it is an appropriate exercise of discretion to make orders including a declaration of an offence provision and for the winding up of an estate notwithstanding that there is no evidence that Ms Caddick personally has notice of the proceeding and may in fact be deceased, in which case the agency in favour of Mr Grimley would have terminated.
345 In the extraordinary circumstances of this case I am satisfied that ASIC has done all it can to give notice of the proceeding and nature of the relief it presently seeks to Ms Caddick. True it is that it has not served Ms Caddick personally but, given her disappearance, it is not possible to do so. In Ms Caddick’s absence ASIC brought the proposed amended originating process to the attention of Mr Grimley, her attorney, whose appointment was declared valid by QCAT as at 21 December 2020, a date after Ms Caddick was reported missing. Mr Grimley subsequently consented to its filing. As at the date of the hearing there was no evidence that Ms Caddick is deceased. In the absence of positive evidence that Ms Caddick is deceased there is no basis on which to conclude that the appointment of Mr Grimley as Ms Caddick’s attorney has come to an end.
346 The next question to address is whether, as the Contradictor submitted, there is an alternative way to proceed which would not require the appointment of the Receivers. That alternative is based on Maliver’s right to bring a proceeding against Ms Caddick for the moneys she misappropriated. That is, as I understand the submission, Identified Investors who invested their funds with Maliver after its incorporation would lodge proofs of debt in Maliver’s liquidation based on their claims against Maliver for the funds paid to it for investment (but which were not so invested) and Maliver, in turn, would make a claim against Ms Caddick.
347 ASIC submitted that the alternative method proposed by the Contradictor would not be without complexity for two reasons: first, because there could be no guarantee that the investors would act in concert and limit themselves to a claim against Maliver, particularly in circumstances where Ms Caddick holds substantial assets and Maliver holds relatively few; and secondly, in any claim by Maliver against Ms Caddick, Ms Caddick could plead an illegality defence, referring to Bilta v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23.
348 There can be no guarantee that investors will not take proceedings in some form whether ASIC is successful in its application or not. The issues that arise as a result of the combined conduct of Maliver and Ms Caddick and the movement of funds are of some complexity and will need to be unravelled and addressed in an orderly fashion. It is quite possible that, notwithstanding the best intentions to introduce a regime to do so, investors will bring proceedings or assert rights. In any event, while the approach proposed by the Contradictor may well be available, it too has its complexities, particularly given Ms Caddick’s uncertain status. There may well also be other ways of proceeding. But, while those complexities are being resolved, it is, in my opinion, of some importance that Ms Caddick’s assets are identified and secured and, if possible, the extent to which those assets represent or were acquired with funds provided by investors to Maliver or Ms Caddick is also identified. The latter task may necessarily require the consideration and resolution of claims of other parties.
349 The balance of the submissions made by the Contradictor and those made by Ms Caddick’s parents go to the extent of the Receivers’ powers, if appointed. The concerns centre around the proposal that the Receivers would have the power to sell the assets and create a pool of funds and the power to distribute those funds, albeit subject “to the extent necessary, seeking directions” from the Court as to the latter. I share those concerns.
350 As I have already observed the facts of this matter raise numerous complex issues. They include, but are by no means limited to the following: that Ms Caddick has been missing since mid-November 2020 and her status uncertain; the pending coronial inquiry; the identification of all claimants on Ms Caddick’s estate in the event that she is found to be deceased and/or she, or her estate, is declared bankrupt and thus the potential to prematurely administer her estate via the receivership process; the extent to which investor funds can be traced into assets held by Ms Caddick and, if so the nature of the investors’ claims to those assets and whether their claims to any of the assets should rank ahead of other claimants, for example Ms Caddick’s parents; the question of whether, because tracing the interests of individual investors is not reasonably or economically practical such that the funds are irreversibly deficient and mixed, a pooling order should be made (see for example Courtenay House at [33]); and the question of, if funds are distributed to investors, what method should be adopted for that purpose.
351 That being so, in my opinion, at this stage the Receivers, if appointed, must act with caution. Section 1101B(8) of the Corporations Act confers certain powers on a receiver appointed under the section which, when viewed in context, are limited to dealing with the property received by the financial services licensee in that capacity and in the manner in which the financial services licensee is entitled deal with it. However, s 1101B(8) also provides that the Court may specify other powers for a receiver appointed under the section in respect of the property of a financial services licensee. But, to the extent the Court does so, regard must be had to the purpose of s 1101B as a whole, the purpose of the appointment of receivers under the section and the particular facts of the case.
352 I have addressed the purpose of s 1101B above (see [321]-[322] above). Here, in contrast to the position in ASIC v Marco (No 6), there is no liquidator or other relevant controller to whom the Receivers can deliver up the property once identified and secured. That is one of the unique issues that arises in this case. Nor can the Receivers simply return the funds to the Identified Investors on some rateable basis because there are other issues that arise in relation to entitlement and other claimants on the fund. Finally Ms Caddick’s status, once known, may also affect the way in which the assets identified by the Receivers are to be administered.
353 ASIC understandably seeks to bring some finality to the process and certainty to the Identified Investors in order to enable them to make recovery at an early stage and in an efficient manner. But that objective needs to be balanced with a consideration of the complex issues that the specific facts of this case raise, the proper applicant for some of the relief sought by ASIC and the need to ensure an orderly administration of the assets and ultimately, if it arises, Ms Caddick’s estate.
354 Having regard to the matters set out above, I am satisfied that in the exercise of my discretion the Receivers should be appointed. The Court’s power to do so has been enlivened and it is in my opinion necessary to appoint the Receivers to identify the Receivership Property, to the extent that has not already occurred, and to secure it including, as they are empowered to do by s 1101(8) of the Corporations Act and, subject to my further comments, to take possession of it. There are however issues that arise in relation to some of the Receivership Property, most notably the Edgecliff Property given the claim by Ms Caddick’s parents in relation to it. Accordingly the power to take possession of any Receivership Property (and to realise it) will be subject to the Receivers first approaching the Court for directions. I would envisage that this would not occur until the issues that arise in relation to the property in question have been identified so that, at the appropriate time, the necessary application for directions could be made. It should also permit the orderly conduct of the receivership and give the Identified Investors some comfort that the Receivership Property, to which they may have an entitlement, is secure.
355 Given that approach I do not think that any person would be unfairly prejudiced by the orders appointing the Receivers. If any applications for directions are made, the parties affected by that application will be notified and will have an opportunity to be heard on the application.
356 I turn then to the specific orders sought by ASIC in the third further amended originating process. In light of the conclusion I have reached and putting to one side who should be appointed, a matter which I address below, I would make orders in accordance with paras 9A(a), (d), (e) (but excluding any reference to Maliver), and (f), 9B(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) (but excluding any reference to Maliver), 9D and 9DD. By para 9A(b) of the third further amended originating process, ASIC seeks that the Receivers be appointed for the purpose of taking possession of and realising the Receivership Property. While I will make an order to that effect, it will be subject to a requirement first, that they notify the affected parties of their intention to do so in order to identify whether any such party objects and, if so, the basis for the objection; and secondly, that they approach the Court for directions in relation to their intention to do so. I would not confine the possible affected parties to the “Interested Parties” as defined in the third further amended originating process as there may be other affected parties, depending on the nature of the Receivership Property. It will be a matter for the Receivers, based on their acquired knowledge, to identify any party who might be affected by a proposal to take possession of and/or realise any such property and to satisfy the Court on any application for directions that they have done so.
357 I will also make an order enabling the Receivers to seek directions for the distribution of funds in the Receivers’ Trust Account (as defined) as sought by ASIC in para 9A(h) of the third further amended originating process but subject to them again first, notifying any affected parties of their intention to do so to identify if any party objects and, if so, the basis for the objection; and secondly, approaching the Court for directions in relation to their intention to do so.
358 Although orders of this nature made add some additional cost to any realisation of Receivership Property and subsequent distribution of funds, in the unusual circumstances of this case and having regard to the matters outlined at [350], [352] and [353] above, including Ms Caddick’s unknown status, it is the most appropriate way to proceed.
359 I will also make orders in relation to the Receivers’ Remuneration in accordance with paras 9F, 9G and 9I of the third further amended originating process.
360 By para 19A of the third amended originating process, ASIC seeks orders that Maliver be wound up pursuant to s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act and that the Provisional Liquidators be appointed as the liquidators of Maliver.
361 Section 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act permits the Court to wind up a company where it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so. ASIC has standing to bring the application: see s 462(2)(e) of the Corporations Act.
362 In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Merlin Diamonds Limited [2019] FCA 1546 at [107]-[108] O’Bryan J relevantly said:
[107] … It has long been established that a company may be wound up on the just and equitable ground where there is “a justifiable lack of confidence in the conduct and management of the company’s affairs” and thus a risk to the public interest that warrants protection: Loch v John Blackwood Ltd [1924] AC 783 at 788 per Lord Shaw. More broadly, the Court may wind up a company under the just and equitable ground if there is mismanagement, misconduct or a lack of confidence in the conduct and management of the affairs of the company; if there have been breaches of the provisions of the Act including breaches of directors’ duties, inadequacy of accounts and record keeping; if there is a need to ensure investor protection; and if the company has not carried on its business candidly and in a straightforward manner with the public: Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited (1995) 62 FCR 504 (AS Nominees) at 532-533 per Finn J. Public interest considerations may be prominent when ASIC applies for a winding up order. In ASIC v Finchley Central Funds Management Ltd [2009] FCA 1110, Gilmour J observed (at [3]):
The plaintiff stands in a somewhat different position to a private applicant for winding up on this ground because the public interest considerations attaching to ASIC as the corporate regulator are relevant to the application. Where companies are engaged in fund management and where there is evidence of serious mismanagement or repeated breaches of the Act so that there is a risk to the public, and in circumstances where ASIC has lost confidence in the company to comply with the relevant law, the court may act to wind up that company on the just and equitable ground.
108 Similarly, in AS Nominees, Finn J said (at 531) that where a statutory body is authorised to apply for the winding up of companies:
…there seems to be no reason at all why a court entertaining such an application should not have regard to such actual public interest considerations as have … or may have induced the governmental body to seek a just and equitable winding up order.
363 For the following reasons I accept ASIC’s submissions that there are compelling reasons why an order winding up Maliver on the just and equitable ground should be made.
364 First, there is a “justifiable lack of confidence in the conduct of” Maliver’s affairs. That is borne out by the evidence which shows the way in which Maliver operated by obtaining funds form investors for the purpose of acquiring shares on their behalf; failing to act in accordance with investors’ wishes and instructions; and diverting those funds to meet expenses and to its director and shareholder, Ms Caddick.
365 Secondly, there have been breaches of s 911A of the Corporations Act in that Maliver was carrying on a financial services business without holding an AFSL.
366 Thirdly, as further evidence of the poor management of Maliver, the Provisional Liquidators have reported that the company is insolvent and likely has been since its incorporation and, based on the information available to them, that Maliver did not maintain proper books and records.
367 Fourthly, Ms Caddick, Maliver’s sole director, has been missing since 13 November 2020. There is no present director and there is no other person who is likely to be appointed as a director to run Maliver: see In the matter of Lilibuck Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1950 at [5].
368 Finally, there are public interest considerations given the evidence of Maliver’s mismanagement and its breaches of the Corporations Act. I would infer that ASIC, which has applied for the order as the relevant regulator, has lost confidence in Maliver’s ability to operate.
4.5 Who should be appointed as the Receivers?
369 ASIC sought that Messrs Gleeson and Soire be appointed as the Receivers as well as the liquidators of Maliver (as to which see below). An issue that arose was whether there was any conflict in their taking on the dual appointments.
370 The Contradictor submitted that if the same persons are appointed as Receivers and liquidators there were two potential areas where a conflict of duty might arise.
371 First, the Contradictor submitted that there is at least a strongly arguable case that the investor creditors of Maliver are a subset only of Ms Caddick’s creditors by reason of the fact that some investors deposited money prior to Maliver’s incorporation. He contended that this is commercially significant because the motor vehicles are in the name of Maliver and may not be available for distribution to pre-incorporation creditors and resolution of this question would necessarily involve a conflict. He observed that it is notable that it is not addressed by the Interim Receivers’ evidence who proceed in a manner favourable to the pre-incorporation creditors by assuming that Ms Caddick and Maliver are jointly liable to all of them.
372 Secondly, the Contradictor submitted that there are claims that may exist between Ms Caddick and Maliver: potentially a director’s loan owed by Ms Caddick to Maliver; and an obvious potential claim by Maliver against Ms Caddick to the extent she paid herself from Maliver’s bank account. The Contradictor submitted that these claims cannot be assessed without a clear obvious conflict if the same person is appointed to both roles.
373 While Messrs Gleeson and Soire take a neutral position on this application they made submissions in relation to the prospect of their dual appointment as Receivers and as liquidators of Maliver.
374 In In the matter of Bella Fountain Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 391 Gleeson J said the following at [36]-[37] in relation to the test for independence:
[36] It is well-established that the liquidator must, in the performance of his or her duties, not only be independent, but also be seen to be independent: Australian Property Holdings Custodian Ltd v Capital Finance Australia Ltd [2012] VSC 124 at [113] (Ferguson J) referring to Re National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian Division [1990] VR 29 at 34 (court appointed liquidator); Advance Housing Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newcastle Classic Developments Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 230 (voluntary liquidator).
[37] Black J stated the well-known test for independence in Re Anglican Development Fund Diocese of Bathurst Board (recs and mgrs apptd) [2015] NSWSC 6 at [47] as follows:
… the test for independence is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that receivers might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a relevant question and that test is concerned with the real possibility of a lack of independence: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Franklin [2014] FCAFC 85; (2014) 101 ACSR 87 at [59], [77].
375 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to appoint Messrs Gleeson and Soire as the Receivers and as liquidators of Maliver for the following reasons.
376 First, in light of the nature of the matter, there will likely be a significant degree of commonality of many issues. That has already proven to be the case as between the Interim Receivers and the Provisional Liquidators.
377 Secondly, Messrs Gleeson and Soire in their capacity as Interim Receivers and Provisional Liquidators have already invested significant time in understanding the nature of the issues that arise and identifying assets. It would not be in the interests of the efficient disposal of the further administration to be undertaken or of creditors or other stakeholders to introduce a new insolvency practitioner at this stage, particularly where the prospect of a conflict remains theoretical.
378 Further, in their capacity as Receivers, Messrs Gleeson and Soire will need to approach the Court for directions before they take any substantive steps in relation to possession, realisation or distribution of the Receivership Property which introduces a further check in relation to the identification of potential conflict.
379 Thirdly, as the Contradictor identifies, there is the prospect for there to be claims as between the Receivers and liquidators in relation to the property over which they respectively have control or claims they may have. However, both Messrs Gleeson and Soire will be acting as officers of the Court and, I would infer, are conscious of the need to remain alert to the possibility of conflict should it arise in the future.
380 Relatedly, in the submissions filed on their behalf it is noted that each of Messrs Gleeson and Soire proffers an undertaking to the Court that, should that occur, they will approach the Court and inform it of that circumstance. That being so the Court will retain the power to ensure that no real conflict operates to the prejudice of any third party without imposing, from the outset, the additional costs and complications that would arise from an immediate appointment of an additional set of practitioners as a guard against what is, at this stage, a theoretical possibility of a future conflict. That approach was adopted by Jagot J in Application by Solomons [2013] FCA 1273. In that case the evidence revealed a “considerable intermingling” between a bankrupt estate and an estate in liquidation. Her Honour accepted a submission that in the interests of efficiency and the effective conduct of the two administrations the joint role remained appropriate: see Solomons at [6]-[8]. The same approach should be adopted in this case on the basis of the undertaking proffered by Messrs Gleeson and Soire in the written submissions filed on their behalf.
5. Receivers’ Remuneration Application
381 In appointing the Interim Receivers, the December Orders relevantly included:
The Receivers’ remuneration, costs and expenses shall be capped at $70,000 or such other amount as the Court subsequently orders, and the Receivers shall make an application to the Court for approval of their reasonable remuneration, costs and expenses and their payment out of the Property of the first defendant, within 14 days following the provision of the report referred to in Order 7.
382 By interlocutory application filed on 2 March 2021 the Interim Receivers seek orders that:
(1) their remuneration, costs and expenses as Interim Receivers of the Property of Ms Caddick for the period from 15 December 2020 to 22 February 2021 be fixed in the sum of $189,148.09 inclusive of GST or such other amount as the Court deems fit and proper;
(2) the costs of the interlocutory application be paid out of Ms Caddick’s property on an indemnity basis; and
(3) the amount fixed in accordance with para 1, including the costs the subject of para 2, be paid out of Ms Caddick’s property and in priority.
383 Despite that, at the hearing the Interim Receivers only pressed para 1 of their interlocutory application and, in doing so, sought that their remuneration, costs and expenses be fixed in the sum of $188,017.84 incl of GST (rather that the amount in fact included in the interlocutory application) and that the balance of their interlocutory application be stood over.
384 In support of their application the Interim Receivers relied on the affidavits of Mr Gleeson sworn on 1 March 2021, 4 May 2021 and 25 June 2021, and affidavit sworn by their solicitors, Michael Kevin Hayter, formerly a partner of Gillis Delaney and now a partner of Swaab, sworn on 1 March 2021, affidavits of Martin Vu, an accountant and principal of Jones Partners, sworn on 23 June 2021 and 1 July 2021, an affidavit sworn by Daniel Robert Soire on 1 July 2021 and an affidavit sworn by Suzi Stojanovski sworn 16 June 2021.
385 Mr Gleeson provides an overview of the work carried out by the Interim Receivers and their employees. In summary, he gives the following evidence.
386 First, Mr Gleeson notes the purpose of the receivership was for the Interim Receivers to identify, collect and secure Ms Caddick’s property; approve or make payments from that property in accordance with the Orders made on 10 November 2020, as varied; ascertain the amount of money received by Ms Caddick from funds paid to Maliver by investors for investment (i.e. Investor Funds); identify any Investor Funds held by Ms Caddick, any property acquired by her with Investor Funds, any payments made by her to third parties with Investor Funds and any other dealings by Ms Caddick with Investor Funds; ascertain whether any money was paid directly to Ms Caddick by investors for investment; and investigate and report to the Court and ASIC.
387 Secondly, Mr Gleeson refers to the Interim Receivers’ Report filed on 24 February 2021. Among other things, their report provides a high level overview of the work carried out by the Interim Receivers since their appointment including:
(1) telephone attendances, conferences and correspondence with solicitors regarding court orders;
(2) attendance at and arranging access to Ms Caddick’s properties;
(3) conducting investigations and searches;
(4) reviewing affidavits filed in the proceeding;
(5) reviewing correspondence with ASIC;
(6) corresponding with financial institutions;
(7) obtaining and reviewing property, title searches and lodgement of caveats;
(8) property and site attendances;
(9) telephone attendances and conferences with relevant parties including family members, external advisors and Out-of-Pocket Investors;
(10) reviewing and analysing financial records and tracing results;
(11) investigations and searches of properties in the United States of America;
(12) liaising with financial institutions regarding tracing of Investor Funds and transactions;
(13) reviewing and analysing transactions, thousands of records and documents;
(14) conferring with staff regarding investigative work and analysis;
(15) reviewing insurance records, valuations, property searches, bank statements;
(16) correspondence with ASIC regarding assets;
(17) tracing of asset disposals;
(18) issuing notices to various parties to produce books and records;
(19) preparing and analysing bank accounts with credits to determine living expenses claim;
(20) attendances at ASIC for inspection of Ms Caddick’s property;
(21) conferring with senior counsel and solicitors regarding investigations and court reports;
(22) reviewing and analysing records to ascertain possible recoveries;
(23) reviewing and considering valuations;
(24) corresponding with media outlets and conducting interviews;
(25) preparing the Interim Receivers’ Report; and
(26) liaising with various parties regarding weekly payments claims.
388 Thirdly, Mr Gleeson provides an itemised costs analysis for the Interim Receivers and their employees who assisted on the matter for period from 15 December 2020 to 22 February 2021 inclusive, which he certifies to be true and correct, and which represents the time spent on the tasks identified in the preceding paragraph and the attendant charges based on the hourly rates provided to the Court prior to the Interim Receivers’ appointment.
389 Relevantly, during the period from 15 December 2020 to 22 February 2021 inclusive, the total remuneration of the Interim Receivers for undertaking the tasks referred to in [387] above was $109,918.60 inclusive of GST. This amount has been calculated based on the time spent by the Interim Receivers and their staff in undertaking those tasks and applying the applicable hourly rates, being those provided to the Court prior to their appointment. That amount is net of the time spent on attendances which, after review by the Interim Receivers of the time entries and purpose of the attendances, were written off.
390 Fourthly, Mr Gleeson believes that, having regard to the work conducted in the period the subject of their application, the Interim Receivers’ claim for remuneration is necessary, fair and reasonable and that the internal records of Jones Partners accurately reflect and describe the work carried out by the Receivers and their employees in the conduct of the receivership during the relevant period.
391 The Interim Receivers also seek their costs and expenses.
392 In terms of costs the Interim Receivers seek internal costs for search fees and photocopying expenses of approximately $434.
393 In terms of expenses, i.e. disbursements, Mr Gleeson has provided a summary and the relevant invoices were in evidence before me. They comprise insurance, storage, valuation and legal costs. The total amount claimed for disbursements in the period from 15 December 2020 to 25 February 2021 is $69,647.89.
394 A significant proportion of the disbursements sought by the Interim Receivers comprise their legal costs, in relation to which Mr Hayter gives evidence. He explains that upon being instructed to act on behalf of the Interim Receivers he opened three files: one in relation to the provisional liquidation of Maliver; a second in relation to the appointment of the Interim Receivers to Ms Caddick’s property; and a third was a combined file relating to the provisional liquidation and the receivership. Mr Hayter says that he recorded his time spent by allocating his time to the best of his ability among the three files. For the purpose of the Interim Receivers’ application for remuneration, costs and expenses he apportioned the time on the combined file relating to both the provisional liquidation and the receivership equally as to 50%, which he believes is indicative of the appropriate proportion to be allocated to those administrations. Mr Hayter has provided copies of the accounts rendered to the Interim Receivers and believes that they accurately reflect the time both he and his firm spent in acting for them over the relevant period.
395 Mr Gleeson also gives evidence as to why the Interim Receivers’ remuneration, costs and expenses have exceeded $70,000 as foreshadowed in the December Orders. Mr Gleeson explains that there are a number of factors which contributed to the Interim Receivers’ remuneration, costs and expenses exceeding the initial estimate they provided to ASIC and based upon which the Court made the Order set out at [381] above. In particular Mr Gleeson notes that:
(1) he provided the estimate of likely remuneration, costs and expenses to ASIC prior to the Interim Receivers’ appointment and that the estimate was based on the limited information provided by ASIC at the time. That is, Mr Gleeson provided the estimate on the basis that there would not likely be any substantial investigations or complexities beyond those typically encountered in a family business external administration and allowing for a certain number of creditors, investigation issues and the like;
(2) subsequent to the Interim Receivers’ appointment and upon commencing the tasks allocated to them by the Court, he discovered that the administration involved substantially more work than he had envisaged, including considering complex legal issues;
(3) when providing the initial estimate he was not provided with copies of the affidavits filed in the proceeding as at that date or any detailed information about the issues likely to arise. Had he been provided with the affidavits, his estimate of the remuneration, costs and expenses would have been substantially greater;
(4) there were a number of tasks, which he described in detail, which the Interim Receivers and their employees carried out which were not foreseen by him at the time of providing the initial estimate and which led to a higher level of costs than had been anticipated being incurred; and
(5) when he provided his initial estimate he was unable to properly consider the complex valuation and legal issues that arose in the administration and which would not typically present in a family business external administration. Those matters are addressed in the Interim Receivers’ Report. The need to consider those issues meant that the Interim Receivers incurred costs in retaining third parties to assist them in performing their duties, including legal fees, insurance premiums and valuation fees.
396 The approach to be taken on an application for remuneration of the nature brought by the Interim Receivers is well settled. Recently, Yates J in Hutchins, in the matter of Ardenberg Pty Ltd (in liq) (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2020] FCA 1424 set out a summary of the applicable principles. At [17]-[20] his Honour said:
17 A convenient summary of the principles to be applied is found in Re Say Enterprises Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 396 at [6], where Brereton J set out the following propositions (citations omitted):
(1) A receiver is entitled to the costs, charges and expenses properly incurred in the discharge of the receiver’s ordinary duties, or in the performance of extraordinary services that have been sanctioned by the Court.
(2) The ultimate question is what amount of remuneration is ‘reasonable’, and this involves considering whether the work in respect of which remuneration is claimed was reasonably undertaken in the due course of the receivership, and whether the amount claimed for it is a fair and reasonable reward for it. The objective is to award a sum or devise a formula which will reasonably and fairly compensate the receiver for the time and trouble expended in the execution of his or her duties and the responsibility he or she has assumed.
(3) The receiver bears the onus of justifying the reasonableness and prudence of the tasks undertaken for which remuneration is sought, and the reasonableness of the remuneration claimed for them.
(4) Remuneration may be allowed on the basis of a fixed salary, a commission on receipts, or a quantum meruit having regard to the time, trouble and responsibility involved. It is a matter for the Court to determine what basis is appropriate in the particular case, having regard to the principle that the remuneration must be reasonable.
(5) If a time-based approach is adopted, the Court is guided by professional scales of charges, with emphasis on the broad average or general rate charged by persons of the relevant status and qualifications who carry out the relevant type of work. The Court will usually act on time sheets created in the receiver’s office, provided that they do significantly more than merely detail the total number of hours spent by the receiver and officers of particular grades on his or her staff.
(6) By analogy, the task involves consideration of the matters referred to in Corporations Act, s 425(8), which applies to receivers appointed under an instrument, namely:
(a) the extent to which the work performed by the receiver was reasonably necessary;
(b) the extent to which the work likely to be performed by the receiver is likely to be reasonably necessary;
(c) the period during which the work was, or is likely to be, performed by the receiver;
(d) the quality of the work performed, or likely to be performed, by the receiver;
(e) the complexity (or otherwise) of the work performed, or likely to be performed, by the receiver;
(f) the extent (if any) to which the receiver was, or is likely to be, required to deal with extraordinary issues;
(g) the extent (if any) to which the receiver was, or is likely to be, required to accept a higher level of risk or responsibility than is usually the case;
(h) the value and nature of any property dealt with, or likely to be dealt with, by the receiver;
(i) whether the receiver was, or is likely to be, required to deal with:
(i) one or more other receivers; or
(ii) one or more receivers and managers; or
(iii) one or more liquidators; or
(iv) one or more administrators; or
(v) one or more administrators of deeds of company arrangement;
(j) the number, attributes and behaviour, or the likely number, attributes and behaviour, of the company’s creditors;
(k) if the remuneration is ascertained, in whole or in part, on a time basis:
(i) the time properly taken, or likely to be properly taken, by the receiver in performing the work; and
(ii) whether the total remuneration payable to the receiver is capped;
(l) any other relevant matters.
7 Many of those factors — in particular, pars (d)-(e) and (g)-(h) — have as their unifying theme the concept of proportionality (being the relationship of the work done and the remuneration claimed to the value of the estate), which is an important consideration in determining reasonableness.
8 It will rarely be appropriate for a Judge to review a decision of a Registrar on remuneration on an item-by-item basis.
9 In respect of disbursements, no Court approval or specific order is necessary in the absence of a challenge, although receivers should scrutinise them to ensure that they are reasonable and properly payable, and the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to review receivers’ disbursements as they are officers of the Court. However, a receiver may seek a direction that he would be justified in paying certain disbursements in order to obtain prior protection in respect of such a disbursement.
18 When considering the reasonableness of claimed remuneration, the question of proportionality is important. In Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137; 108 ACSR 545 (Templeton), the Full Court said:
[32] The question of proportionality in terms of the work done as compared with the size of the property or activity the subject of the insolvency administration or the benefit or gain to be obtained from the work is an important consideration in determining overall reasonableness: see Re AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 1004 at [18] and [19] per Brereton J, Re AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1270 at [35], [36], [43] and [45] per Brereton J, Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell [1998] 1 BCLC 638 at 645, 651 and 652 per Ferris J (also reported at [1998] BCC 324), Re On Q Group Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 1428 at [20] per Brereton J, Bank of Nova Scotia v Diemer [2014] ONCA 851 at [33], [45], [55] and [56] per Pepall JA, Re Roslea Path Ltd (in liq) [2013] 1 NZLR 207 at [108], [115] and [121] per Heath and Venning JJ, Brook v Reed [2012] 1 WLR 419 at [51], [86] and [87] per Richards J, referring to the relevant 2004 UK Practice Statement [2004] BCC 912, Re Korda; Re Stockford Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 424 at [47] per Finkelstein J, although we do not endorse his Honour’s obiter observations on the “lodestar” methodology as being the required approach as distinct from merely one practical way to proceed in a particular case.
[33] Generally, in looking at proportionality, the value of the services rendered must be considered. We would endorse the observations of McLure JA in Conlan as liquidator of Rowena Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Adams (2008) 65 ACSR 521 at [47] where her Honour observed:
As to the performance of a task reasonably embarked upon, the work done must be proportionate to the difficulty or importance of the task in the context in which it needs to be performed. This is what is encompassed in assessing the value of the services rendered. Using an example from the law, the time spent by an appropriately qualified and experienced practitioner in drafting a statement of claim should be proportionate to the amount in issue.
[34] Finally, even if one was not to address proportionality as an express factor, nevertheless its absence may have forensic significance in determining reasonableness. Another way to look at proportionality can be to conclude from a lack of proportionality between the cost of the work done relative to the value of the services provided that there has been overcharging or excessive remuneration claimed (see Thackray v Gunns Plantations Ltd (2011) 85 ACSR 144 at [64] per Davies J).
(Emphasis in original.)
19 At [52], the Full Court observed:
[52] More generally, in considering the question of proportionality one also has to bear in mind two other points that may be overlooked. First, in performing some work, it may not be entirely clear ex ante what the precise benefit might be. A situation where work was being performed to preserve property of known value is quite different to the situation where work was being performed to achieve a return to creditors that was unclear. In the latter case, it might be inappropriate to use a hindsight analysis of known returns after the event to assess whether the work performed was proportional to the task; in such a situation one would look at the expected realistic return at the time the work was performed rather than actual outcomes. Second, some work may be sufficiently complex and labour intensive such as to justify a cost/benefit ratio of 6/10. After all, if the duty of the Receivers is to maximise returns and it is necessary to spend $0.60 to achieve $1.00, then proportionality is satisfied even if the ratio might be high.
(Emphasis in original.)
20 Reference should also be made to the discussion of principles by Bathurst CJ in Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38; 93 NSWLR 459 at [48] – [60]. I note in particular Bathurst CJ’s observation at [57] that the mere fact that the work performed does not lead to an augmentation of the funds available for distribution does not mean that there is no entitlement to remuneration for the work performed.
397 In effect, the sole question to be addressed in such an application is the fixing of remuneration which, in all of the circumstances, is reasonable: see Paul’s Retail v Morgan [2009] NSWSC 1222; (2009) 76 ACSR 26 at [76]. That is a multifaceted enquiry which requires, at the end of the day, an evaluative judgment: see Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137; (2015) 108 ACSR 545 at [23].
398 It is apparent from the evidence that the Interim Receivers undertook their work in two separate but overlapping areas: the identification and securing of Ms Caddick’s property; and the preparation of a detailed report in relation to the affairs of Ms Caddick. An examination of the Interim Receivers’ Report reveals that the Interim Receivers and their employees were required to undertake a detailed investigation and analysis of the circumstances in which investor funds were obtained by Ms Caddick and how those funds were expended. In that regard, I accept Mr Gleeson’s evidence about the complexity and extent of the work required to be undertaken in order to complete his investigation and to prepare the Interim Receivers’ Report.
399 The work undertaken by the Interim Receivers and their employees is described in detail in the timesheets which were in evidence before me and is summarised in a document which sets out the names of each employee undertaking work on the matter, his or her applicable hourly rate, total hours spent by each fee earner, total remuneration (based on total hours and applicable hourly rate) for each fee earner and a breakdown of the amount of time spent by each fee earner on each category of work. I am satisfied that the evidence relied on by the Interim Receivers permits me to assess their claim for remuneration by providing a sufficiently detailed explanation of each particular attendance. When that information is coupled with other evidence relied on by the Interim Receivers and the work product, which includes the Interim Receivers’ Report, I am satisfied that the work for which the remuneration is sought was reasonably necessary for the purpose of carrying out the tasks assigned to the Interim Receivers by the December Orders and to enable them more generally to fulfil their duties.
400 I am also satisfied that the work was reasonably done by the Interim Receivers and their employees. I accept Mr Gleeson’s evidence that, by its nature, the assignment given to the Interim Receivers was one which required a greater than usual hands-on role by senior practitioners. Given the need to prepare a report, and the nature of the matters considered within that report, there were significant aspects of work which could not be delegated to more junior employees. That said, the summary of employees who worked on the matter showing their level of experience and the relative hours spent by them on the tasks satisfies me that the work was undertaken by fee earners at appropriate levels of seniority within the Interim Receivers’ office and delegated to appropriately qualified staff where appropriate.
401 As to quantum, the evidence before me establishes that the hourly rates which have been applied are below those normally charged by Jones Partners and below prevailing market rates for services of the type provided by firms operating in the Sydney market.
402 As referred to by Yates J in Hutchins at [17], by analogy, the task of considering the reasonableness of the remuneration sought involves consideration of matters referred to in s 425(8) of the Corporations Act, which applies to receivers appointed under an instrument. As submitted by the Interim Receivers, by reference to the factors included in that section, the following matters are relevant:
(1) the work required of the Interim Receivers was substantial and had to be completed within a tight timeframe given the December Orders: see s 425(8)(c);
(2) the factual complexity of the investigations which underpinned the preparation of the Interim Receivers’ Report and the volume of material which had to be obtained and analysed added to the complexity of the work: see s 425(8)(e) and (f);
(3) the quality of the Interim Receivers’ Report and their underlying work has provided both an explanation to investors and has been relied on as a factual base in this proceeding: see s 425(8)(d);
(4) the number of external enquiries which the Interim Receivers had to address whilst undertaking their tasks: see s 425(8)(j); and
(5) the level of scrutiny which the work of the Interim Receivers has attracted and may continue to attract given the level of public interest in this matter: see s 425(8)(l).
403 In addition to the above factors, it is evident that Mr Gleeson has carefully considered the time charged. He has quite properly removed any charge for time spent dealing with a large number of media enquiries which arose given the public interest in the administration and the time spent in attendances by his employees at internal meetings or participating in discussions with external lawyers, where multiple employees were present to remove double charging.
404 As is clear from Mr Gleeson’s evidence, the Interim Receivers seek approval for a level of remuneration which exceeds the amount included in the December Orders by approximately $40,000. Mr Gleeson has adequately explained the circumstances in which he provided his original estimate to ASIC, which formed the basis of that Order, and the reasons why the actual remuneration has exceeded the amount of that estimate. I accept that the extent of the work which was required to be undertaken could not have been reasonably anticipated, particularly given the limited information provided by ASIC to Mr Gleeson prior to his appointment, and that Mr Gleeson did not anticipate that he would need to review large volumes of documents and, in effect, reconstruct records in order to prepare the Interim Receivers’ Report.
405 Finally, as to proportionality, here the work has been undertaken to identify and preserve assets and to consider the nature of the assets. There has been no realisation of assets and may not be for some time such that a mathematical-style analysis cannot be undertaken. However it is clear given the complexity of the work, as described by Mr Gleeson, that the costs are proportionate to the task undertaken and its outcome and significance for the matter generally. In particular, the Interim Receivers were required to make sense of a large volume of documentation, large parts of which were unreliable, in order to determine what had happened to Investor Funds. As set out at [400] above, significant aspects of that task could not be delegated to more junior employees.
406 I turn then to the disbursements. Given the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that they are reasonable. They were clearly not anticipated at the time Mr Gleeson provided his estimate to ASIC and are not accommodated, at least at the level incurred, in the December Orders. However, I accept that it was necessary for the Interim Receivers to retain lawyers, whose fees make up a significant proportion of the total disbursements, at an early stage to assist in the performance of their duties. An examination of the tax invoices rendered by the lawyers so retained satisfies me that their fees are reasonable.
407 Finally, I note that the Interim Receivers served their interlocutory application on a number of parties including ASIC, Mr Grimley, Ms Caddick’s parents and some of the investors. No party objects to their application or has sought to make any submissions to the Court in relation to the remuneration which the Interim Receivers seek.
5.4 Conclusion on the Interim Receivers’ interlocutory application
408 For those reasons I will make an order in terms of para 1 of the Interim Receivers’ interlocutory application that their remuneration, costs and expenses incurred in the period from 15 December 2020 to 22 February 2021 be fixed in the sum of $188,017.84 and will stand over the balance of that interlocutory application.
409 ASIC requested that I reserve on the question of costs as contemplated in paras 9E, 9H, 19D and 26 of the third further amended originating process. Those prayers for relief concern the payment of any remuneration, costs and expenses of the Interim Receivers approved by the Court from funds held within the Receivers’ Trust Account, which is also the subject of the Interim Receivers’ interlocutory application which has been stood over; payment of the remuneration, costs, expenses and disbursements of the Receivers, Provisional Liquidators and liquidators from the funds in the Receivers’ Trust account; ASIC’s costs of and incidental to the winding up application; and the costs of the proceeding.
410 I will grant leave to any party who wishes to file submissions, not exceeding six pages in length, in relation to these matters or other aspects of costs of the proceeding within 21 days of publication of these reasons. Any party filing submissions should indicate whether an oral hearing is required or whether any outstanding questions of costs can be dealt with on the papers.
411 I will make declarations and orders giving effect to these reasons.
I certify that the preceding four hundred and eleven (411) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Markovic. |
Associate: